Datensatz: Replication Data for: How open lists undermine the electoral support of cohesive parties
Datum der Erstveröffentlichung
Autor:innen
Andere Beitragende
Repositorium der Erstveröffentlichung
Version des Datensatzes
DOI (Link zu den Daten)
Link zur Lizenz
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Bewerten Sie die FAIRness der Forschungsdaten
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Publikationsstatus
Zusammenfassung
How does ballot structure affect party choice? We argue that open lists undermine the electoral support of cohesive parties, to the benefit of internally divided parties. We conduct a survey-embedded experiment in the aftermath of the European migrant crisis, presenting German voters with real parties but fictitious politicians. A crossover design varies ballot type and exposure to candidate positions on immigration. We find that the internally divided CDU/CSU gains votes at the expense of the cohesive AfD when open lists are used and candidate positions are known. For individuals who are equally attracted to both parties, switching is most likely if their immigration preferences lie near the midpoint between the two parties. Overall, our analysis establishes conditions under which ballot structure can affect the electoral performance of parties in general, and that of the populist right in particular.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
Schlagwörter
Zitieren
ISO 690
BRÄUNINGER, Thomas, Thomas DÄUBLER, Robert HUBER, Lukas RUDOLPH, 2021. Replication Data for: How open lists undermine the electoral support of cohesive partiesBibTex
RDF
<rdf:RDF
xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" >
<rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/72292">
<dcterms:created rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2021-05-25T16:29:00.000Z</dcterms:created>
<dc:creator>Rudolph, Lukas</dc:creator>
<dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2025-02-12T13:50:09Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Däubler, Thomas</dc:creator>
<dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/71935"/>
<dcterms:issued>2021</dcterms:issued>
<void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
<bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/72292"/>
<dc:contributor>Bräuninger, Thomas</dc:contributor>
<dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/71935"/>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:creator>Bräuninger, Thomas</dc:creator>
<dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2025-02-12T13:50:09Z</dcterms:available>
<foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
<dcterms:title>Replication Data for: How open lists undermine the electoral support of cohesive parties</dcterms:title>
<dc:rights>Creative Commons Zero v1.0 Universal</dc:rights>
<dc:contributor>Rudolph, Lukas</dc:contributor>
<dc:creator>Huber, Robert</dc:creator>
<dc:contributor>Däubler, Thomas</dc:contributor>
<dc:contributor>Huber, Robert</dc:contributor>
<dcterms:abstract>How does ballot structure affect party choice? We argue that open lists undermine the electoral support of cohesive parties, to the benefit of internally divided parties. We conduct a survey-embedded experiment in the aftermath of the European migrant crisis, presenting German voters with real parties but fictitious politicians. A crossover design varies ballot type and exposure to candidate positions on immigration. We find that the internally divided CDU/CSU gains votes at the expense of the cohesive AfD when open lists are used and candidate positions are known. For individuals who are equally attracted to both parties, switching is most likely if their immigration preferences lie near the midpoint between the two parties. Overall, our analysis establishes conditions under which ballot structure can affect the electoral performance of parties in general, and that of the populist right in particular.</dcterms:abstract>
<dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/legalcode"/>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
