Erschienen in: KEUNE, Maarten, Hrsg.. The State of European Social Rights and European Social Citizenship. 2024, S. 109-143. EuSocialCit Flagship Report. 1
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10840424

7. How Individual- and National-level Power Resources Shape Social-rights Take-up, Spending and Outcomes

Brian Burgoon, Marius Busemeyer and Gianna Maria Eick

7.1 Introduction

This chapter explores empirically the claim at the heart of this volume's collective judgment that social-rights outcomes rest upon "power resources" available to citizens – not only normative resources that confer *de jure*, deontic social rights, but also instrumental and enforcement resources that capacitate a person's access to such rights. The chapter's study of this claim uses quantitative information at both the individual and national levels relevant to social-rights resources, outputs and outcomes, focusing on the social-rights realms of worker unemployment and employment. Using such information, the chapter therefore asks whether and how the volume's resource-based framework stands up to empirical scrutiny: Do various measures of power resources empirically spur, or at least positively correlate with, subsequent social-policy participation, with actual spending on employment-related social policies, and with favourable employment-related outcomes?

The chapter's answers to this question focus partly on well-known measures in the labor-market realm – such as output-related spending on unemployed insurance (UI), on early-childhood education and care (ECEC), and on maternal/paternal/parental leave, as well as measures of social-rights outcomes of poverty and employment rates. However, we also focus on less studied issues of benefit access, including measures of *social-benefit take-up* in these policy realms – that is, actual participation in or reliance on unemployment insurance, early-childhood education and care, and parental leave programmes. Most importantly, the chapter explores how such take-up and spending outputs, and employment and poverty outcomes, might be shaped by measures of normative, instrumental and enforcement power resources. Our measures of such resources include individual-level characteristics like a person's education, income, and union-affiliation that make it easier to navigate social benefit systems. But our resource measures also include national-level conditions that constitute power resources – such as social-benefit online portals, awareness campaigns, union density and coverage and legal transparency conferring instrumental resources, as well as judicial non-corruption and inspection capacities conferring enforcement resources.

Using such measures, the chapter presents explanatory evidence in two steps. First, it gives quantitative descriptive and inferential evidence to clarify how and whether the national-level measures of resources are associated with social-rights outputs with respect to social-benefit take-up and spending, as well as social-rights outcomes with respect to employment and poverty rates. Second, the chapter then digs deeper into how resources relate to take-up in social rights realization – with analysis of individual-level survey data that allows more controlled and extensive analysis of the conditions under which target groups of unemployment benefits get access to and make use of such benefits. Such survey data clarifies how normative, instrumental and enforcement resources, measured at both the micro-individual level and the macro-national level, moderate an individual-level measure of social policy take-up: the chances that an unemployed citizen gains access to unemployment insurance benefits.

These analyses unearth broad descriptive and inferential evidence that power resources facilitate social-rights realization, in line with our and the broader volume's expectations. The analysis of national macro-level patterns suggests that settings with more generous UI, ECEC, and parental leave benefits tend to have slightly higher estimated take-up rates than do settings with less generous benefits, and that national-level instrumental and enforcement resources also tend to spur such estimated national-level take-up rates. It also shows that the same national-level measures of normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources are associated with higher employment rates and lower poverty rates – primarily but not only via their implications for social benefit spending. More importantly, perhaps, the chapter's analysis of the individual survey data indicates that normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources tend to increase the likelihood that unemployed individuals actually rely upon unemployment insurance transfers. Such information and analyses, of course, capture only a slice of social rights realization and the roles that power resource play in such realization – most obviously because of the data limits on such national-level and individual-level resources. However, the patterns clarify the volume's collective claim that power resources are crucial to Europe's social rights realization that is central to the European Pillar of Social Rights.

The chapter proceeds in four steps. The next section 2 lays out our central expectations that flow from the volume's resource-based framework of social rights realization – where normative/deontic, instrumental, and enforcement resources can be expected to shape key social rights outputs like benefit take-up and actual spending, and thereby foster better social-rights outcomes. Section 3 summarizes the key measures used in our exploration of this broad set of claims – including both individual-level micro information about resources and take-up, as well as national-level macro information about normative, instrumental and enforcement resources, take-up, spending and outcomes. Section 4 then develops both the macro-level analysis of national-level patterns, as well as the micro-level analysis of survey data. A final Section 5 concludes.

7.2 Theorizing how power resources play out for social-rights outputs and outcomes

Understanding the state of social rights in Europe involves understanding a complex of political, legal, social, and economic facets of human experience. In our conception, social rights realization resides in the *power resources* that individuals in a society possess (knowingly or not). As discussed in the previous chapters of this volume (see also Vandenbroucke et al. 2021), we focus on three kinds of power resources: normative, instrumental and enforcement resources. *Normative or deontic resources* include the *de jure* legal regulations, broadly held ideational standards (shared judgments of deservingness and living standards), and policies that legitimate and mandate rights in principle. They can be more or less generous to target recipients and more or less complicated in their character and provision – with the most generous provisions sometimes entailing more conditionality, procedures, and complexity to access. *Instrumental resources* involve the individual, meso- and macro-level conditions (including national- and EU-level provisions) that facilitate the ability and willingness of individuals to actually claim or take-up those *de jure* rights. They can be individually inherited or learned capacities of people, and they can be provisions at any level of governance that, intended or not, facilitate making-use of normative resources. Finally, *enforcement resources* reside in conditions that foster or ensure oversight and enforcement of both *de jure*/deontic standards and their take-up. They can again be features providing monitoring/inspection and enforcement/policing of standards to be upheld and legal recourse to allow a citizen rights-holder to hold a system or other people to account to uphold rights provisions.

The broad conviction animating this chapter and the broader volume is that social rights reside importantly, perhaps fundamentally, on the quality of this complex of normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources. A person in a particular place of work and living can be said to be more or less adorned with social rights by understanding the extent, quality, and interconnection of that person's normative, instrumental and enforcement resources. However, the state of social rights depends – more obviously, perhaps – on the extent to which such *resources* actually foster and give rise to social-rights *outputs* and *outcomes* that capture the realization of social-rights.

Social rights realization is likely to involve normative, instrumental and enforcement resources leading to or being accompanied by policy use and practices that are social-rights outputs – such as patterns of participation in, or take-up of, social policies, as well as patterns of social policy spending as shares of GDP or per head of a policy's target group. And when all is said and done with such resources and outputs, however, the proof of the pudding of social rights realization is in the eating – in the actual outcomes of human flourishing or suffering that make social rights meaningful. Such social-rights outcomes are most obviously conceptualized and empirically explored with respect to material measures of such flourishing or suffering. Commentators, citizens, and politicians judge outcomes in terms of poverty rates or individual experience of poverty; in terms of employment, having meaningful and fairly paid work or

access to work; in terms of actual or possible movement up the class or income hierarchies, i.e. the professional ladders of the good life.

While our describing of social-rights outputs and outcomes is part of understanding the state-of-affairs of social-rights realization, our main interest is in clarifying whether and how social rights realization involves resources having causal implications for take-up, use or implementation of benefit provisions (social-rights outputs), in turn collectively leading to spending-effort outputs and thereby also social-rights outcomes. Figure 7.1 captures the line of relationships that we think is key to understanding social-rights realization. It graphically summarizes our simple and broadest expectation: that normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources should foster higher take-up rates, higher spending-effort outputs, and in turn be associated with, and maybe even cause, better social-rights outcomes.

Figure 7.1. Social-rights Resources, Outputs, and Outcomes



First and perhaps most fundamentally, we argue that normative, instrumental and enforcement resources are likely to matter in shaping how individuals behave in the presence of policies and socio-economic positions – including their decisions and abilities to participate in social benefits that might be available *de jure* (as a normative resource, that can be more or less generous as an element of social rights). The normative resources themselves can also be expected to positively shape social policy take up – as citizens should be more motivated to navigate and try to access social benefit systems when there is more to gain from doing so. Also, studies of universality in social benefit systems suggest that generosity goes hand-in-hand with easily navigated benefit access (Rothstein, 1998). However, this possible positive take-up effect of normative or deontic resources is far from automatic, since potentially benefiting from a generous programme is not the same as actually accessing it. Indeed, it may be that a more generous social-benefit programme (constituting a larger 'normative resource') might entail more layers of benefit options, bureaucratic complexity and conditionality.

Hence, we are particularly suspect that instrumental resources, though also perhaps enforcement resources, positively shape social-policy take-up. For instance, one can expect that individual-level instrumental resources involving educational experience or organizational assistance influence whether a person has the capacity to navigate the bureaucratic steps necessary to take advantage of a given social policy service or benefit. And one can expect that meso- or macro-level provisions or actions by actors, including governments, can confer enforcement or instrumental resources to make such navigation possible or worthwhile – as with more or less extensive outreach or awareness campaigns to ready a populace for existing social provisions or standards, or with systems of transparent reporting and policy evaluation.

Second, we argue that such take-up patterns – however much and in whatever ways they are rooted in power resources, are likely to give rise to more policy outputs manifested in spending on transfers and services, and interventions to promote social justice more generally. In the social policy realm, this link is almost automatic in nature, in that actual implementation of many policies and the spending effort accompanying them requires that citizens sign-up for and use these policies – whether we are talking about unemployment or pension benefits, parental leave rights, healthcare or disability subsidies, or childcare services. More take up should be a stepping-stone to more actual policy effort.

Third and finally, we argue that the actual spending and other macro-level outputs should shape measures of social-rights outcomes. Such spending measures in fact should reflect the accretion of normative resources and take-up, and thereby carry their potential causal impact – this in addition to the visibility of actual macro-level spending measures of welfare outputs. From the point of view of gauging the roots of social-rights outcomes, it is likely more appropriate to focus on spending per head of the targeted/eligible group rather than as a share of GDP – as the former is closer to the effects of policy interventions for particular societal groups.

Whatever the particular causal chain at work, our main expectation is that any of the micro- or macro-level measures of instrumental, normative or enforcement resources should be positively associated with better social-rights outputs and outcomes.[30] These are the direct-effect expectations informing our analysis below. We can also expect, however, that measures of resources can have indirect or complicated connections to one another than the linear and one-way pathway suggested by Figure 7.1. For instance, substantial normative resources in the form of easily qualified-for, no-waiting-time, long-lasting and generous unemployment insurance may induce an unemployed person to actually claim such benefits, shown in higher take up rates, to the extent that the unemployed people have instrumental resources to know about and go through the administrative steps to access a defined benefit. In this way, the relationships between resources and outputs are more complicated. Similarly, resources can also moderate how take-up or spending outputs affect actual outcomes, or have implications for social-rights

[30] The aim of our analysis is not to judge which particular resources are more important than others, But this may be an important question for future research.

outcomes that are direct – that is, do not have effects on outcomes via resources' effects for take-up and spending as the causal chain summarized in Figure 7.1 simplifies.

While our general expectations are quite straight-forward, it is important to know that existing research – including our own – has hitherto provided little traction to test them. The rest of this chapter reports on attempts to remedy that situation and provide such traction. Our focus is on finding sources of data to measure social-rights resources, outputs, and outcomes that can support inferences about the links heuristically summarized in Figure 7.1. This is akin to illustrating and testing the causal chain implied by our resource-based framework on social-rights outcomes in Europe.

Our analysis focuses on important slices of social rights resources, outputs and outcomes relevant to European social rights generally and the European Pillar of Social Rights particularly. We focus on the social-rights realms close to labour market experience – for employed and unemployed people – partly because these are realms for which we have quality data measures that allow for comparisons between individuals as well as across time and space. This focus means analyzing normative, instrumental and enforcement resources relevant to the terms of work and employment, and of benefits for those who find themselves unemployed – those who do not have, but want and are seeking, work. It also means analyzing labor-related social-rights outputs, like actual participation in or take-up of rights, as well as spending on various kinds of employment or unemployment benefits. And it means analyzing well-known measures of social-right outcomes like whether a person is employed (aggregated to employment rates in a country) and whether people (working or otherwise) are at-risk-of-poverty (aggregated to poverty rates in a country).

Our focus on all these matters concerns the position of any citizens facing employment and unemployment – not focusing, for instance, on the positions of particular groups and rights of equal access regardless of gender or ethnic background. And more biting, our focus is on resources, outputs and outcomes at the individual-level and *national* macro-level – the latter being national-level legal, policy and organizational measures of normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources; patterns of participation and spending that are national-level measures of take up; and employment and poverty rates that are national-level measures of outcomes.

To be sure, such a focus on general labor-market social-rights realization ignores large swaths of particular social rights and conditions – from workplace safety, to housing, to education. And focusing on national-level provisions also ignores the role of meso-level – say resources at the level of a province or community or economic sector – and at the supra-national European level, particularly the rapid and important developments in EU-level normative, instrumental and enforcement resources. What we get in return for such selective, partial analysis is more clarity about an important social rights realm where data availability allows us to trace the steps of how social rights resources play out in Figure 7.1's chain of social rights realization.

In particular, we can analyze existing aggregate national-level and individual-level data to empirically explore our resource-centered expectations: that measures of social-rights resources (normative, instrumental and enforcement) are meaningfully related to measures of social-benefit take-up and spending outputs, as well as measures of employment and poverty outcomes. Before turning to the analysis we need some clarity on how to measure the key, if selective, elements of social-rights realization.

7.3 Data on and measures of (selected) social-rights resources, outputs and outcomes

Our measures of employment-related social-rights outcomes, outputs and resources rely on a combination of aggregate national-level and individual-level data. The aggregate national-level data provides leverage to gauge measures of normative, instrumental and enforcement *resources*, measures of (aggregate take-up and spending) *outputs* and measures of *outcomes* that are comparable over time and space in and beyond Europe. The micro, individual-level data allow us to measure individual-level instrumental resources. But they also, mainly, provide leverage to measure individual-level estimates of social-benefit take-up (particularly of unemployment insurance benefits), and better assess how both national- and individual-level normative, instrumental and enforcement resources influence such estimated take up. These data come from a wide range of sources, but many of the macro-level measures are combined into Comparative Social Citizenship Database (CSCD) (Eick et al. 2021; original data sources itemized below).

7.3.1 Measuring Upstream from Outcomes, to Spending Outputs, to Take-up Outputs

Outcomes. Our snapshots of social-rights outcomes relevant to employment and unemployment are two widely-studied and measured aggregate measures of political economic flourishing versus suffering: first, the *employment rate*, which is defined as the percentage of the civilian active population in employment, available between 1993 and 2018 (Eurostat 2023a); and, second, the *at-risk-of-poverty rate*, i.e. the percentage of persons with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold (60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income) after social transfers – available from 2001 to 2019 (Eurostat 2023b). Appendix Table A7.1 summarizes these outcome measures and all other (output and resources) variables used in our national-level analysis.

Spending-effort Outputs. One step causally upstream from Figure 7.1's stream of social rights realization are spending output measures. We are interested in the consequences of social-benefit spending for outcomes, and of course in how such spending outcomes are shaped by more upstream dynamics (take-up and of course power resources) – ideally addressing particular target employed and unemployed target groups. We therefore focus on spending *effort,* where the spending is per head of the target group. The baseline measures of this sort are drawn from Ronchi (2020) (the SIWE dataset), spanning 1995 to 2018.

UI spending effort is the spending on unemployment insurance and redundancy programs, normalized by total unemployed persons. *ECEC spending effort* is spending on in-kind child benefits, mainly early childcare services and education, normalized by the number of children (0-5) (OECD 2022, own calculations). And *Mat./Pat. Leave effort* shown is based on maternal and paternal leave spending, normalized by birthrate (logged), spanning 1980 to 2019 (OECD 2022, own calculations). Finally, *Total social spending effort*, is a standardized scale of all the SIWE categories (child, old-age, work, and sickness/health effort).

To get a sense of the national variation of the outcome and spending output measures, Figure 7.2 shows the distribution of each theme-specific measure of spending effort on the horizontal axes, set against our two measures of employment-rate (left-hand panel a.) and poverty-rate outcomes (right-hand panel b.) on the vertical axes. We can observe the usual pattern of social spending effort, particularly for UI and ECEC, where the Southern European and CEEC countries manifest substantially less spending effort than their Northern European counterparts. And we can observe that there is a similar skew in the *employment-rate* and *at-risk-of-poverty-rate* on the vertical axes – with the better outcomes (high employment rates and low at-risk-of-poverty rates) clustered in the Northern European settings and the worse outcomes clustered in Southern European and CEEC settings. The actual relationships between spending effort and outcomes are the subjects of extensive study, obviating the need to explore them fully here. But we expect and see that, descriptively, more spending effort tends to correlate with higher employment rates and lower at-risk-of-poverty rates – the main exception being the non-significant negative association between parental leave spending effort and poverty.

Figure 7.2: Spending Outputs, and Employment-rate and At-risk-of-poverty-rate Outcomes

a. Employment Rate



b. At-risk-of-poverty Rate



Sources: Ronchi 2018; Eurostat 2023a, 2023b (see text).

Estimated Take-up Outputs. Causally upstream from spending outputs and outcomes are measures of the actual participation in social benefit programs – or what is often termed social-benefit take-up. Such take-up measures, of course, enter-into what gets measured downstream with respect to actual spending on

programs just discussed. But estimating take-up directly is crucial to understanding social-policy outputs – particularly so as to clarify social rights realization that we argue involves citizens that may or may not have the resources to take advantage of the normative resources captured by the *de jure* generosity measures. The problem is that measuring take-up in a way that fully distinguishes those fully eligible or not, and those actually using a benefit to which they are entitled turns out to be very hard in general, and particularly for comparing take-up rates across countries over time – as is important for the present analysis. Hence, we construct or rely on rough national-level estimates of programme participation, or "pseudo" take-up that do not fully distinguish the fully eligible from ineligible but *do* capture programme participation of target groups at the level of a country and year for our study of social-rights outcomes. In particular, we consider three direct, national-level macro measures of such social-benefit (pseudo) take-up for the policy realms, respectively, of unemployment insurance, parental leave, and ECEC. First, *estimated UI take-up (OECD)* is based on the "pseudo" coverage rates, focused on people receiving unemployment insurance and assistance benefits (mostly categorized as UI and a few as ALMP) as a share of "unemployed" (based on ILO definitions) (OECD 2021).[31] Second, *estimated Mother/Father/Parent leave take-up,* measures the standardized average number of parents making use of maternal or paternal leave benefits in a country, per 100 live births (OECD 2023b). Third, *estimated ECEC take-up* is based on the average of the standardized percentages of children enrolled in early childhood education and care services: the percentage for 0-2-year-olds (ISCED 0 and other registered ECEC services), and the percentage for 3-5-year-olds (ISCED 2011 level 0) or primary education (ISCED 2011 level 1) (OECD 2023c). *Estimated UI take-up* and *estimated ECEC take-up* correlate positively with one another, as do the do estimated ECEC- and leave take-up; but estimated UI- and leave take-up are negatively correlated.

To visualize the associated between take-up output measures, Figure 7.3 shows the distribution of each theme-specific measure of take-up (horizontal axis) set against its counterpart spending-output measure (vertical axis), which is causally downstream from take-up. We see a familiar pattern of social spending effort, particularly for UI (middle panel) and ECEC (center panel), that Southern European and CEEC countries manifest substantially less spending effort than their Northern European counterparts.

[31] As noted by Burgoon (2022), the 'pseudo' of *estimated UI take-up* lies in the participation patterns. Reported shares can exceed 100% because some measured recipients may not be registered as unemployed (and some "unemployed" may not be eligible for benefits). The EU LFS data discussion has reported that about 23% of UI recipients in 2012 were working, while 40% were jobless but not officially unemployed by ILO standards. Unemployment-benefit recipient counts, hence, include people not actively looking for work (OECD 2021).

Figure 7.3: Spending effort and Take-up/participation rates by social-benefit theme



Sources: Ronchi 2018; OECD 2021, 2023b, 2023c; own calculations (see text).

Precisely because measuring take-up at the national level is roughly estimated, our study's empirical measurement of social-benefit take-up also considers micro-level individual data, based on the probability that an unemployed individual actually depends on unemployment insurance as a significant source of his or her household income, and whether an older (60+) individual actually depends on pension benefits – after controlling for a range of other characteristics of an individual and his or her place of residence. The individual-level data on which we focus for such conceptualization and measurement of 'take up' are from the European Social Survey (ESS), providing multi-country, multi-year data with excellent sampling properties and well-framed questions on individual characteristics and attitudes related to the welfare state (ESS 2008; ESS 2016; ESS 2020).[32] These data are not so much useful to generate (alternative measures of) national-level averages of take up, but more because they allow much more valid judgment of how resources influence the probability of an unemployed person to actually rely upon, i.e. to take up,

[32] We focus particularly on ESS waves with questions on social rights attitudes – ESS round 4 (2008) and 8 (2016) – but also the most recent available round 10 (2020). The dataset combining 2008 and 2016 provides information from nearly 100,000 respondents in 32 European countries, including 26 EU member states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Croatia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, and Ukraine. Coverage is smaller for some aspects of our analysis; we report results for the fullest sample for which data is available for the respective story.

unemployment benefits (more on this below). Appendix Table A7.2, in any event, summarizes all the variables used in our individual-level analysis.

7.3.2 Selective Normative, Instrumental, and Enforcement Resources

Most important for this chapter's and volume's arguments about social rights realization are the *power resources* that we suspect foster the aforementioned social rights (take-up and spending) outputs and (poverty and employment) outcomes. The three broad conceptual categories of such resources on which we focus – normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources – have particular and complementary relevance to realization of social citizenship. However, such power resources have also been subject to much less empirical and conceptual development in the study of social policy and social rights across the legal, humanities and social science fields (Keune et al. 2023; Ferrera et al. 2023).

The selected measures on which we shall focus are national-level normative, instrumental and enforcement resources, plus some individual-level instrumental resource conditions, that allow comparison across countries and time. These should not only be seen – as noted above – as selective in their ambit (excluding for instance EU-level resources or sector-specific or region-specific resources). And they should also be seen as work-in-progress, in that the many conceptual aspects of such resources are hard to measure systematically – that is, validly and reliably capturing the many important and disparate conditions that constitute power resources in our conceptual framework. The measures we construct for this chapter are those for which existing empirical sources allow quantitative operationalization and comparison. A few are characteristics distinctly relevant to social-policy access, but most are conditions often studied in other contexts but that we judge as particularly relevant national-level or individual-level capacities conferring and constituting normative, instrumental or enforcement resources for social rights realization. Finally, the resources on which we focus are important to employment and unemployment social-rights realization, but also relevant to many other kinds of social rights outputs and outcomes beyond this chapter's employment and unemployment realm.

Normative resources. Our main measures of normative/deontic resources are metrics of social policy generosity in several social benefit realms relevant to the take-up and spending outputs discussed above: unemployment insurance; maternal-paternal or parental leave; and early childhood education and care (ECEC). The first, *UI generosity*, is based on the sub-metrics of benefit generosity (e.g. replacement rates, waiting periods, duration, coverage, etc.) developed as part of the Social Citizenship Indicators Project (SCIP) and the overarching Social Policy Indicators Project (SPIN), available for 30 OECD countries and 22 EU member states between 1970 and 2016 (Nelson et al. 2020; cf. Scruggs, 2022). We take simple standardized sums to scale the sub-measures (taking positive values that manifest more generosity and negative values for provisions manifesting less generosity). And we also consider a composite of UI-benefits, childcare, pension, and healthcare provisions when focused on general poverty-rate and employment-rate outcomes for which we deem the encompassing *Social benefit generosity scale* to be most relevant. The measure of *ECEC generosity* is based on OECD gauging "net childcare costs" that

measure the extent to which childcare benefits/rebates and tax deductions contributions offset childcare costs per country year (OECD 2022), available for 30 OECD countries and 26 EU member states between 1960 and 2019. And finally, the measure of *Mother/Father/Parental leave generosity* is based on OECD social indicators of weeks of public or mandatory paid leave (OECD 2020), with the same country coverage as UI generosity. Figure 7.4 summarizes the patterns averaged for the sample years focused on the available European Union sample. There are not clear patterns of countries tending to be consistently more generous in such distinct normative resources, and indeed *UI generosity* correlates only modestly positively with *ECEC generosity* but negatively with *parental leave generosity*.

Figure 7.4: Normative Resources in UI, ECEC and Parental Leave



Sources: Nelson et al. 2020; OECD 2020.

Instrumental resources. Instrumental resources can empower citizens to navigate and take-up such normative resources. Measuring instrumental resources can be difficult, particularly since we conceptualize these as attributes from the point of view of individual citizens while the most relevant are specific to social-benefit administration and program design in different countries. With our available data, however, we focus on a several individual features and three key macro-level features that can be seen as conferring instrumental resources relevant to social benefit take-up. The selected individual features are six generally-relevant individual demographic and socio-economic status conditions that not only capture socio-economic risk but can be also expected to affect the capacities of individuals to understand, look into and figure out how to access the social-benefit bureaucracy. *High educated,* having completed at least some tertiary education, is relevant to cognitive ability and familiarity with more complex educational systems. *Non-low income,* having a household income above the third decile, provides time and financial resources to investigate and pursue access to programme details. *Native-born,* being born in the reporting country, selects for familiarity with legal/bureaucratic and social

traditions/practices relevant to social-benefit navigation. *Union membership* has been shown relevant to providing members with informational and logistical social-benefit resources, not just in Ghent-system countries (Van Rie et al. 2011; Kim & Margalit 2017). Also at the individual level, the ESS data includes a couple of non-demographic measures that constitute instrumental resources: *Interested in politics,* the subjective degree of following and caring about public, and political issues, relevant to understanding social policy bureaucracy and rules; and *Daily internet use,* that captures familiarity with and exposure to internet-based material that can be essential to navigating social-benefit provisions.

As for the national-level macro measures of instrumental resources, we focus on three that we consider particularly relevant to take-up issues. The first is a macro-level national measure of instrumental resources, based on reporting by the European Social Policy Network (ESPN) on initiatives in European countries (including all EU member states) to improve social-benefit transparency and accessibility (Spasova et al. 2022). We focus on *Portals & Campaigns (ESPN),* the sum of the two standardized measures of two simple counts: Social-benefit campaigns counts of whether a country has existing social benefit awareness campaigns on general social benefits, unemployment provisions, ECEC provisions, pension provisions, and sickness/disability provisions; and Social-benefit portals counts programmes where a country has existing internet portals to help citizens navigate general social policy, or a given program of social policy. The measure is based on simple counts, of course, saying nothing about the (presumably-varying) quality of the campaigns and portals. And the measure is purely cross-sectional, and has unspecified specific dates since the reporting shows that they include programs created many years earlier than 2020. But the measure directly captures or proxies for the concept of instrumental resourcees relevant to our study. Figure 7.5 summarizes *Benefit Portals&Campaigns,* in the left-hand panel, suggesting that the usual distribution of social-benefit generosity and effort does not clearly apply – with some social-transfer stalwarts like Belgium and Germany being on the low end of such *Portals&Campaigns,* while Latvia, Poland and Slovenia are at the high end of such resources (see Appendix Figure A7.1 for detail of portals as opposed to social benefit campaigns).

Figure 7.5: Selected National-level Instrumental Resources



Sources: Spasova et al. 2022; Williams 2015; Visser 2019.

We also consider two other macro-level country conditions that can be expected to confer instrumental resources on citizens in particular national settings. One is *informational transparency,* the index on extent of free and independent media, budgetary transparency, and political constraints in governments (Williams 2015), available for 30 OECD countries and 26 EU member states from 1980 to 2015. We see this as relevant to citizens having access to accurate and fair information about their own government's policies and budgets, in principle encompassing provisions relevant to tracking and understanding the administration of social policy regulations and *de jure* benefits – and in any event a proxy for informational resources to navigate assistance systems. The other is a *labor-power index,* a composite of labor representation and centralized wage bargaining (based on Visser 2019), with the same country coverage but between 1960 and 2018. This is a classic and widely studied aspect of industrial relations and power resources in studies of political economic governance – including studies of social policy development. For us, it is relevant partly as a compositional effect of the informational and logistical assistance involved with union membership noted above (Kim and Margalit, 2017). At the national-level, labour power has often entailed traction and proxies for union representatives being able and actually helping union members and other workers to access benefits – particularly but not limited to unemployment benefits and in (former) Ghent-system countries in particular (Rainbird, 2000; Scruggs 2002). These two other macro level conditions (center-panel and right-hand panel) correlate positively with the *Portals & Campaigns* measure, and with each other. But they are weakly enough correlated as to suggest that the conditions capture very different aspects of national-level instrumental resources.

Enforcement resources. Finally, Figure 7.6 summarizes two country-year measures of enforcement resources. They capture different institutional realms of enforcement function. *Judicial non-corruption* is based on the expert-coding of non-corruption of decisions handed down in a country's judicial system (Coppedge et al. 2020), covering 30 OECD countries and 26 EU member states between 1960 and 2019; and *labor inspection capacity,* a composite of the number of labor inspections per 10,000 workers and inspections of workplaces per year (ILO 2020), covering 24 OECD countries and 20 EU member states between 2008 and 2018. These measures capture enforcement capacities for, respectively, the broad judicial system and labor standards – both relevant to employment-related social rights. The empirical patterns across countries (Figure 7.6's left-hand panel) suggest skews in *judicial non-corruption* and *labor-inspection capacity* that track broader and composite measures of state capacity. But the patterns show variation without any familiar regional skew (e.g. high for Germany, Spain and Romania, but modest for France and Sweden). The over-time trends (not shown) indicate increasing enforcement with respect to judicial non-corruption but modestly declining labor-inspection capacity. Once again, the two enforcement measure are positively but only weakly correlated, again suggesting that they capture quite distinct enforcement resources.

Figure 7.6: Judicial non-corruption and Labor inspection capacity as Enforcement Resources



Sources: Coppedge et al. 2020; ILO 2020.

7.4 Empirically Gauging How Resources Shape Social-rights Take-up, Spending and Outcomes

Using such measures, we can analyze how our resources measures play out for estimated take-up and spending outputs, and for employment-rate and poverty outcomes. We do so in two steps. The first step focuses purely on the national-level country-year information to assess such playing-out. It gives descriptive and aggregate quantitative evidence suggesting that national-level measures of resources are positively associated with social-rights outputs with respect to social-benefit take-up and spending, and also with social-rights outcomes with respect to employment and poverty rates. The second step is to use the micro-level survey data to dig deeper into how resources relate to take-up. This allows more controlled and extensive analysis of how normative, instrumental and enforcement resources, measured at both the micro-individual level and the macro-national level, affect the chances that an unemployed or pension-age citizen actually makes use of unemployment insurance and pension benefits. In all cases, we present and discuss in the main text graphical summaries of the results, relegating fuller presentation of the quantitative models to the Appendix.

7.4.1 Macro-level exploration: Country-level Resources and UI, ECEC, and Parental-leave Take-up

To explore how national-level measures of resources might be associated with, or even perhaps shape, social-rights outputs and outcomes, we consider descriptive patterns and the summary results of simple inferential regression models. Our analysis here is meant to be illustrative, foregoing a wide range of more extensive modeling design issues and opting instead for a simple and intuitive estimation approach. That approach involves regression models where we regress the outcome of interest (e.g. UI take-up rates) on a given normative, instrumental or enforcement measure – taking each resource measure separately given limits on degrees of freedom. The models are ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors, and we address endogeneity and omitted variable bias by lagging the explanatory factor of interest and including controls for economic growth, trade openness, left government, dependent population and EU membership.

Consider first how our aforementioned national-level measures of normative, instrumental and enforcement resources are associated with patterns of UI, ECEC, and Parental-leave take-up. Figure 7.7 provides a first snapshot, visually mapping the bivariate relationship between the three respective generosity measures of normative resources on the one hand, and its counterpart measure of take-up on the other. Consistent with expectations, these three measures of normative resources are modestly positively associated with their counterpart take-up measures. This makes sense in that, as noted in Section 2, more generous programmes offer more to gain through participation, even though participation can be complicated and costly – as participation in more generous social benefits may come with additional layers of benefits and bureaucratic administration to navigate.

Figure 7.7: Take-up/participation rates and generosity measures associated per social-benefit theme



Sources: Nelson et al. 2020; OECD 2020; OECD 2021, 2023b, 2023c.

Our fuller national-level analysis of how resources are associated with take-up patterns is summarized in Figure 7.8. The Figure provides a snapshot of the key results of regression models focused on our measures of UI take-up (left-hand panel), ECEC take-up (middle panel), and Parental-leave take-up (right-hand panel). For each panel we see the summary of the coefficient and 95%-confidence interval for each measure of normative, instrumental and enforcement resources – each estimated in separate models.33

The basic pattern modestly comports with our expectation that resources spur and hence positively correlate with social-policy take-up. With respect to the role of normative resources – the first row in each panel – we can see that the respective policy generosity measure are positively and significantly associated with higher estimated take-up rates for UI and for Parental leave, but there is no statistically significant association in the case of ECEC. In that case, the significantly positive relationship summarized in Figure 7.7's bivariate scatterplot is not corroborated by a regression setup with controls. As for instrumental resources, we see a broadly positive portrait, but not unanimously so. Informational transparency is significantly associated in all policy realms with higher take-up rates, and labor power is significantly associated with higher estimated UI take-up and estimated parental-leave take-up but not significantly so for the ECEC realm. And benefit Portals&Campaigns tend to be positively but insignificantly

[33] The full results are available in Appendix Table A7.3.

associated with estimated take-up rates. Finally, with respect to enforcement resources that we expect to foster confidence and hence participation in a given social benefit realm, we see that judicial non-corruption is significantly associated with more take-up in all three policy realms, while labor inspection capacity is so associated with estimated UI take-up and estimated ECEC take-up but not with estimated parental-leave take-up.

Figure 7.8: Take-up/participation rates and normative, instrumental and power resources



Note: See Appendix Table A7.3.
Sources: Nelson et al. 2020; OECD 2020; OECD 2021, 2023b, 2023c.

Figure 7.9 summarizes results from a similar analysis focused on measures of spending effort – a downstream output measure that takes into account take-up patterns.[34] The patterns here are again not unanimous in their verdicts, but they are in line with our expectation that normative, instrumental and enforcement resources ought to be associated with higher levels of UI, ECEC and Parental-leave policy spending effort. The UI and parental-leave generosity measures of normative resources are significantly positively associated with spending effort, though insignificantly positive for ECEC. Benefit Portals&Benefits are positively but insignificantly associated with spending-effort measures. Information

[34] Full results are not shown but follow set-up in Appendix A3 and are available upon request.

transparency is positively and significantly associated with parental-leave spending effort and ECEC spending effort but insignificantly so with UI spending effort. Labor power and Judicial non-corruption are both significantly positively associated with all three realms of spending effort. And labor inspection capacity is significantly positively associated with only ECEC spending effort.

Figure 7.9: Take-up/participation rates and normative, instrumental and power resources



Note: See Appendix Table A7.3.

Sources: Ronchi 2018; Spasova et al. 2022; Williams 2015; Visser 2019; Coppedge et al. 2020; ILO 2020.

Figure 7.10 summarizes our final macro-level results, of how resources are associated with country-level social-rights outcomes of employment rates and at-risk-of-poverty rates. For this analysis, we focus on how resources might be expected to influence general and very causally-downstream outcomes: employment and poverty rates. So our analysis considers not only how a given resource is associated with these outcomes, net of controls, but also whether their effect is due to affecting take-up and spending outputs. This can be roughly gauged by considering whether the associations between a given resource and a given outcome is dampened (as we would expect) once we include the spending measure of interest as a control variable. For each resource measure, hence, we show two results. The upper one is the coefficient estimate and confidence interval for a given resource without controlling for total spending effort (on UI, ECEC, Parental-leave, and other parts of the welfare state); and the lower one is for a given resource WITH the control for total spending effort. The resource measures are the same, except for

normative resources where we consider not just each of our UI, ECEC and Parental-leave realms (not shown) but also on a composite measure of generosity.35

The results broadly comport with our resource-based framework. With the exception of the enforcement-resource labour inspection capacity, we see that all our measures of normative, instrumental and enforcement resources are significantly associated with higher employment rates and lower at-risk-of-poverty rates. And also in line with our expectations, in all these cases we see that this positive effect is somewhat more modest once controls for total social spending effort are added – suggesting indeed that part of any causal implications that resources might have for employment and poverty outcomes likely travel through their spurring of take-up and spending effort. The results also suggest, however, that such mediation is not the full story for how resources can matter to outcomes. In a number of cases it is clear that resources still have significant positive associations with employment rate and negative ones with at-risk-of-poverty rate even after controlling for spending effort. This suggests that particularly Portals&Campaigns, informational transparency, and judicial non-corruption might influence employment and poverty rates via spending effort but also through possible direct effects.

Figure 7.10: Employment rates and at-risk-of-poverty rates as functions of normative, instrumental and power resources



Sources: Ronchi 2018; Spasova et al. 2022; Williams 2015; Visser 2019; Coppedge et al. 2020; ILO 2020.

35 Full results are not shown but follow set-up in Appendix A3 and are available upon request.

7.4.2 Micro-level Exploration of Estimated Take-up

Our analysis so far has explored how the aforementioned national-level macro-measures of normative and instrumental resources shape (estimated) take-up rates, spending outputs, and outcomes. We now explore our resource-based framework through another, more focused way, by exploring the ESS individual-level survey data (introduced above) that clarifies how power resources shape UI-related social-benefit reliance (or, if one prefers, participation or dependency) (see Burgoon et al. 2023). In all cases, such analysis can only reveal broad associations, but these support causal inferences about whether normative, instrumental and enforcement resources matter. Because most of our explanatory conditions of interest are at the country-year level while our outcomes are at the individual-country-year level, our baseline analyses are multi-level random intercept models (with country-waves as the level 2 variables). The estimators produce logistic regression coefficients depending on the benefit-reliance outcome on which we are focusing, and robust standard errors with unconstrained covariances. All our estimations include several controls that help isolate the effects of social-rights resources: Female; Age; Native-born; Unemployed; High-educated; High-income; Live-with-partner; Children-living-at-home; Union member; Left-Right scale (see Appendix Table A7.2 for details).

With this set up, we consider how normative, instrumental or enforcement resource measures moderate the influence of unemployment status on the likelihood of relying upon public unemployment benefits. Figure 7.11 summarizes the key UI-reliance results, clarifying how individual-level characteristics conferring instrumental resources affect likelihood that an unemployed respondent reports that "unemployment or redundancy benefits are the main source of household income" (the full results for UI are in Appendix Tables A7.4 and A7.5). Several micro-level instrumental resources spur the likelihood that being unemployed translates into UI reliance. In particular, the Figure shows (on the vertical axis) the chance that unemployment status translates into UI-benefit reliance. This chance is always high and statistically significant (see Appendix Table A7.4), but the Figure shows what this chance is when the individual-level indicator is low versus high, or non-existent versus present. We can see that the chance that unemployed status translates into social-benefit dependency is markedly higher when a respondent is a union member (yes) versus not a union member (no); when education is high rather than low; when income is not very low (rather than very low); when a respondent is native-born rather than foreign-born; and when a respondent is interested in politics rather than is disinterested in politics. The only micro-level instrumental resource measure that does not significantly increase the likelihood of take up is daily internet use (see last column of Appendix Table A7.4).

Figure 7.11: How micro-level instrumental resources affect UI-benefit take-up



Note: See Appendix Table A7.4.

Sources: Ronchi 2018; Spasova et al. 2022; Williams 2015; Visser 2019; Coppedge et al. 2020; ILO 2020.

Figure 7.12 summarizes how national-level normative, instrumental and enforcement resources affect an individual unemployed respondent's likelihood of relying upon unemployment or redundancy benefits. Once again this focuses on the role of a given resource in shaping UI take-up, based on the full models shown in the Appendix (see Appendix Table A7.5). The first, left-hand result focuses on UI generosity – a normative resource measure – followed by our three instrumental-resource measures and the two enforcement-resource measures. As can be easily glimpsed from the Figure, all our national-level measures of resources have positive coefficients, significantly so for Benefit Portals & Campaigns, Informational Transparency, and Labor inspection capacity. Such patterns suggest that two of our instrumental resources, including the one closest to claims of validity of resources relevant to social-benefit take up (Portals & Campaigns), as well as one of our enforcement-resource measures (Labor inspection capacity), tend to spur UI take up. These patterns provide modest evidence, hence, that individual-level and national-level measures of power resources foster social-rights take up with respect to unemployment insurance.

Figure 7.12: How national-level normative, instrumental and enforcement resources affect UI-benefit take-up



Note: See Appendix Table A7.5.

Sources: Ronchi 2018; Spasova et al. 2022; Williams 2015; Visser 2019; Coppedge et al. 2020; ILO 2020.

It is important that both all UI-reliance results summarized here are robust to a range of alternative specifications with respect to the controls, the embedding of the multi-level models, and estimator. The pattern of resources positively shaping programme participation also hold for the other policy realm that the ESS data measures, reliance on pensions.36 Looking jointly at the individual micro-analysis the macro-level analyses in Section 7.3, hence, we have some meaningful empirical support for this chapter's and volume's expectation that normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources can be important bases for social-rights take-up and spending, and thereby also poverty-rate and employment-rate outcomes.

7.5 Conclusion

[36] In particular, study of the ESS data reveals that the individual-level resource-conditions increase the likelihood that 60+ respondents rely on pension benefits, but we also that virtually all of the national-level conditions also increase the likelihood that older respondents rely on pensions (see Appendix Table A7.6 for the results).

This chapter has developed a core argument of this volume – that power resources are crucial to social-rights realization in Europe – and explored its traction in individual-level and national-level analysis of quantitative data. The principal expectations have been very broad with respect to which power resources might matter and how they might play into social-rights realization. We have worked within the view that the simple condition of holding substantial normative, instrumental and enforcement resources relevant to a range of social rights constitutes having meaningful social rights. But we have focused in this chapter on the proposition that 'the proof of the social-rights pudding' with respect to having normative, instrumental and enforcement resources 'is in the eating': that having normative, instrumental and enforcement resources can be expected to facilitate actual social-rights take-up when it is needed; and in turn be an important underpinning of social rights spending effort; and in turn an important spur to social-rights outomes relevant to human flourishing.

Our tests of this broad proposition focused on the social-rights realm of employment and unemployment, and on both national-level and individual-level quantitative exploration of the various steps of social-rights realization. The key focus has been on both individual-level data on instrumental resources and national-level data on instrumental, normative and enforcement resources. And we have presented two kinds of quantitative exploration into social-rights realization as functions of power resources. The national-level exploration suggests that measures of national-level normative, instrumental and enforcement resources tend to modestly promote social-rights realization in the realms of unemployment insurance, ECEC assistance, and parental leave assistance. The national-level measures of resources tend to spur social-benefit take-up (a social rights output), spending effort (another social rights output), and in turn better social-rights outcomes with respect to higher employment rates and lower at-risk-of-poverty rates. The individual-level exploration, meanwhile, has dug deeper into whether measures of individual-level instrumental resources and national-level normative, instrumental and enforcement resources spur take up of unemployment insurance benefits. We found that individual-level instrumental resources are important to take-up, while at the national level it is particularly the social-benefit portals and awareness campaigns, together with legal transparency and labor inspection capacity, that matter to UI take-up. In short, power resources increase or spur social-rights take-up or participation, the first test of social-rights realization; and by doing so, normative, instrumental and enforcement resources also spur spending-effort outputs and major aspects of social-rights outcomes.

We should conclude by reminding readers of the many limits of such a conceptual and empirical exploration. Conceptually we have focused on very broad and big picture measures of normative, instrumental and enforcement resources, and simple ways that such resources play out in social-rights realization. We did not include, for instance, the many more complex feedback loops and interactions between conditions that might affect how resources shape social rights outcomes. Empirically, our focus has been for practical reasons very limited in the realms of the social rights we have explored. Within these limits, however, the chapter provides substantial traction to further explore how power resources can be leveraged to promote social rights realization in Europe and the world.

References

Burgoon, B. (2022). Employment-related social Citizenship and its Resource-based Underpinnings: An Assessment of Country-year Data. EUSOCIALCIT Working Paper.

Burgoon, B., Busemeyer, M. R., & Eick, G. M. (2023). Listening to the Citizens on the State of Social Rights in Europe (1.0). Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8289176

Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Glynn, A., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Pemstein, D., ... & Tzelgov, E. (2020). *Varieties of democracy: Measuring two centuries of political change*. Cambridge University Press.

Eick, G. M., Burgoon, B., & Busemeyer, M. R. (2021). Measuring Social Citizenship in Social Policy Outputs, Resources and Outcomes across EU Member States from 1985 to the Present, *EuSocialCit working paper*.

Eick, G. M.,Busemeyer, M. R., & Burgoon, B. (2022). 35 Years of Public Opinion Surveys and European Social Citizenship: What Can We Conclude? *EuSocialCit working paper*.

ESS Round 4: European Social Survey Round 4 Data (2008). Data file edition 4.5. Sikt – Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.

ESS Round 8: European Social Survey Round 8 Data (2016). Data file edition 2.2. Sikt – Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.

ESS Round 10: European Social Survey Round 10 Data (2020). Data file edition 1.2. Sikt – Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.

Eurostat. (2023a). Database on Labour Market Statistics. Employment Rates Tables. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_labour_market_-_quarterly_statistics#:~:text=In%20the%20second%20quarter%20of%202023%2C%20195.2%20million%20persons%20in,as%20shown%20in%20Figure%201.

Eurostat. (2023b). Database on Population and Social Conditions. At-risk-of-poverty Tables https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/product?code=tps00184

Ferrera, M., Corti, F., & Keune, M. (2023). Social citizenship as a marble cake: the changing pattern of right production and the role of the EU. *Journal of European Social Policy*, *33*(5), 493-509.

International Labour Organization (ILO). (2020) Statistics on safety and health at work. https://ilostat.ilo.org/topics/safety-and-health-at-work/ (accessed in October 2022)

Keune, M., Ferrera, M., & Corti, F. (2023). Introduction: Marshall in Brussels? A new perspective on social citizenship and the European Union. *Journal of European Social Policy*, *33*(5), 487-492.

Kim, S. E., & Margalit, Y. (2017). Informed preferences? The impact of unions on workers' policy views. *American Journal of Political Science*, *61*(3), 728-743.

Nelson, K., Fredriksson, D., Korpi, T., Korpi, W., Palme, J. & Sjöberg, O. (2020). The Social Policy Indicators (SPIN) database. *International Journal of Social Welfare*. 29 (3). 285-289.

Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2022. SourceOECD social indicators database. (2020). https://www.oecd.org/gender/data/length-of-maternity-leave-parental-leave-and-paid-father-specific-leave.htm

OECD (2021). Social Benefit Recipients Database (SOCR). https://www.oecd.org/social/recipients.htm

OECD (2023a). Net childcare costs (indicator). Doi: 10.1787/e328a9ee-en. https://data.oecd.org/benwage/net-childcare-costs.htm (Accessed on 20 April 2023)

OECD (2023b). Use of Childbirth-related Leave Benefits (PF.2.2), in *Family database: Public policies for families and children (PF)*. https://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm

OECD. (2023c). Enrollment in Childcare and Pre-school (PF.3.2), in *Family database: Public policies for families and children (PF).* https://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm

Rainbird, H. (2000). Skilling the unskilled: access to work-based learning and the lifelong learning agenda. *Journal of education and work*, *13*(2), 183-197.

Ronchi, S. (2018). Which roads (if any) to social investment? The recalibration of EU welfare states at the crisis crossroads (2000–2014). *Journal of Social Policy*, *47*(3), 459-478.

Rothstein, B. (1998). *Just institutions matter: The moral and political logic of the universal welfare state*. Cambridge university press.

Scruggs, L. (2002). The Ghent system and union membership in Europe, 1970-1996. *Political Research Quarterly*, *55*(2), 275-297.

Spasova, S., Atanasova, A., Sabato, S., & Moja, F. (2022) Making access to social protection for workers and the self-employed more transparent through information and simplification: An analysis of policies in 35 countries. *European Social Policy Network Report to the European Commission.* Doi: 10.2767/017942.

Van Rie, T., Marx, I., & Horemans, J. (2011). Ghent revisited: Unemployment insurance and union membership in Belgium and the Nordic countries. *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, *17*(2), 125-139.

Vandenbroucke, F., Keune, M., Ferrera, M., & Corti, F. (2021). The nature and rationale for European social rights, *EuSocialCit Working Paper*.

Vandenbroucke, F., Burgoon, B., Kuhn, T., Nicoli, F., Sacchi, S., van der Duin, D., Hegewald, S. (2018). Risk Sharing When Unemployment Hits: How Policy Design Influences Citizen Support For European Unemployment Risk Sharing (EURS), *AISSR Policy Report 1.*

Visser, J. (2019). Trade unions in the balance. *ILO ACTRAV Working Paper, Geneva*.

Wendt, C., Mischke, M., & Pfeifer, M. (2011). *Welfare states and public opinion: perceptions of healthcare systems, family policy and benefits for the unemployed and poor in Europe*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Williams, A. (2015). A global index of information transparency and accountability. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, *43*(3), 804-824.

Appendix

Appendix Table A7.1:
Summary statistics national-level data (country-years), 1960-2017

Variable	*Obs*	*Mean*	*Std.Dev.*	*Min.*	*Max.*
Employment rate (working age)	662	70.965	6.642	49	89.3
At-risk-of-poverty rate	332	16.339	3.995	7.9	26.4
UI spending effort (SIWE)	500	28218.770	29617.9	1776	174530
Child spending effort (SIWE)	500	2600.099	2685.4	0	11384
Total spending effort (SIWE)	500	0.000	1.95	-2.901	6.145
P/M/Parent leave spending (OECD)	949	0.314	0.260	0	1.3055
Estimated UI take-up	377	0.603	0.448	0.012	2.173
Estimated ECEC take-up	436	53.326	24.304	8.4	97.65
Estimated Pat/Mat/Par. Leave take-up	188	95.896	73.064	21.2	360.69
UI generosity (SCIP)	937	0.641	0.138	0	1
ECEC generosity (OECD)	2,147	92.288	5.659	72	100
M/F/Parental leave generosity (OECD)	1,091	3.327	1.106	0	5.118
Total generosity (Scruggs)	721	33.832	5.716	20.810	46.84
UI generosity alternate (Scruggs)	743	10.097	3.001	2.032	15.05
Soc.ben. campaigns & portals scale (ESPN)	2,001	0.434	0.243	0	1
Informational transparency	1,079	66.476	11.143	32	85.83
Labor strength (union density/coverage)	1,343	0.417	0.192	0	1
Judicial non-corruption	1,970	3.115	0.602	0.865	3.824
Labor inspection capacity	258	0.224	0.196	0	1
Real GDP growth	1,245	2.815	3.417	-21.26	25.49
Left government	1,307	35.423	35.189	0	100
Dependent population	1,640	53.087	7.424	38.457	86.2
Trade openness	1,316	86.060	48.825	23.109	416.4
EU member	2,445	0.788	0.409	0	1

Appendix Table A7.2:
Summary statistics (European Social Survey, ESS), 2008, 2016, 2020
[to be expanded]

Variable	*Obs.*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min*	*Max*
UI reliance	99,325	0.018	0.133	0	1
Soc.benefit reliance	99,325	0.046	0.209	0	1
Unemployed	99,325	0.062	0.241	0	1
Female	99,289	0.535	0.499	0	1
Age	98,984	48.216	18.473	15	105
Native-born	99,198	0.905	0.294	0	1

High educated	99,041	0.181	0.385	0	1
Non-low income	94,237	0.739	0.439	0	1
Live with partner	99,325	0.631	0.483	0	1
Child at home	99,045	0.371	0.483	0	1
Union member	99,325	0.164	0.371	0	1
Left-Right scale	85,267	5.177	2.259	0	10
Government redistribution	99,325	3.883	1.009	1	5
Working parent	99,080	0.329	0.470	0	1
Old-age (60-plus)	99,325	0.306	0.461	0	1
Interested in politics	99,059	2.393	0.915	1	4
Daily internet use	99,325	0.445	0.497	0	1
Bad health	99,208	2.240	0.934	1	5
Support deeper EU integration	89,773	5.16	2.673	0	10
UI generosity (SCIP)	79,419	0.053	0.509	-0.878	1.438
Sickness/health generosity (SCIP)	79,419	0.024	0.540	-1.649	1.322
Pension generosity (SCIP)	79,419	-0.293	0.510	-1.316	1.072
M/F/Parental leave generosity (OECD)	77,383	3.754	0.833	1.720	5.118
ECEC generosity (OECD)	83,603	92.250	5.047	72	100
Social benefit generosity scale (SCIP)	79,419	-0.215	1.082	-2.673	2.697
Estimated take-up UI (OECD)	86,701	0.659	0.489	0.028	2.034
Estimated take-up ECEC (OECD)	86,084	56.067	26.613	10.850	96.767
Est. take-up M/F/Parental leave (OECD)	37,417	99.322	75.285	23.188	335.083
Estimated Take-up scale	30,268	0.805	1.658	-1.899	4.204
UI/Work spending effort (SIWE)	74,220	25753.63	21187.34	3790.901	100837.2
Social transfers effort (SIWE)	74,220	-0.066	0.617	-1.222	0.952
Old-age spending effort (SIWE)	74,220	13598.94	5348.022	3786.572	24437.73
Total social spending effort (SIWE)	74,220	0.009	1.937	-3.306	3.401
Soc.-benefit Campaigns (ESPN)	99,325	2.508	2.038	0	6
Soc.ben. Portals (ESPN)	99,325	1.744	0.804	1	3
Soc.ben. campaigns & portals scale (ESPN)	99,325	0.005	0.780	-1.074	1.644
Labor inspections	58,017	0.291	1.146	-0.774	3.677

Appendix Table A7.3:
National-level estimates of take-up as functions of resources(country-years)

a. Estimated UI take-up

	(1) Estimated UI take-up	(2) Estimated UI take-up	(3) Estimated UI take-up	(4) Estimated UI take-up	(5) Estimated UI take-up	(6) Estimated UI take-up
Generosity measure	.058***					
	(.011)					
Cmpgns.&portals (ESPN)		-.037				
		(.103)				
Information transparency			.056			
			(.05)			
Labour strength				.197***		
				(.024)		
Judicial non-corruption					.042***	
					(.005)	
Labour inspect.capac.						.181***
						(.037)
GDP growth	.003		-.005	-.006	-.003	-.011
	(.008)		(.007)	(.005)	(.005)	(.009)
Left government	0		0	.001	.001	.002
	(.001)		(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Dependent population	.009		.046***	.024***	.028***	.046***
	(.008)		(.006)	(.004)	(.005)	(.006)
Trade openness	.001		.001	0	0	.001
	(.001)		(0)	(0)	(0)	(.001)
EU membership	.721***		.132	.161*	.2	.297***
	(.078)		(.111)	(.063)	(.104)	(.057)
Constant	-1.015*	.598***	-4.198	-.67**	-2.323***	-2.164***
	(.438)	(.094)	(2.197)	(.236)	(.262)	(.33)
Observations	164	25	135	290	297	169
R-squared	.282	.012	.239	.345	.298	.367

DV= Estimated UI take-up.
All models are ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses).
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05*

b. Estimated Leave take-up

	(1) Estim. Leave take-up	(2) Estim. Leave take-up	(3) Estim. Leave take-up	(4) Estim. Leave take-up	(5) Estim. Leave take-up	(6) Estim. Leave take-up
Generosity measure	35.9***					
	(5.602)					
Cmpgns.&portals (ESPN)		21.121				

		(14.073)				
Inform. transparency			86***			
			(17.331)			
Labour strength				26.3***		
				(7.133)		
Judicial non-corruption					10.0***	
					(2.078)	
Labour inspect.capac.						-24.6***
						(6.072)
GDP growth	4.131		2.294	3.095	2.401	2.311
	(2.334)		(1.417)	(1.737)	(1.56)	(1.858)
Left government	.058		.424	.094	.101	-.348
	(.259)		(.279)	(.215)	(.216)	(.297)
Dependent population	1.452		1.572	-2.575	-2.559	2.97
	(1.763)		(2.393)	(1.519)	(1.835)	(2.417)
Trade openness	-.171***		-.064	-.253***	-.133*	-.173
	(.048)		(.067)	(.055)	(.056)	(.237)
EU membership	-1.088		-27.975	41.067*	50.46**	-6.548
	(10.644)		(17.438)	(16.614)	(15.517)	(15.145)
Constant	-111.725	84.3***	-370***	211.4*	-146.37	-3.31
	(103.53)	(18.483)	(848.96)	(83.243)	(137.7)	(127.1)
Observations	143	14	67	154	156	85
R-squared	.142	.165	.463	.163	.18	.187

DV= Estimated ECEC take-up.
All models are ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses).
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05*

c. Estimated ECEC take-up

	(1) Estim. ECEC take-up	(2) Estim. ECEC take-up	(3) Estim. ECEC take-up	(4) Estim. ECEC take-up	(5) Estim. ECEC take-up	(6) Estim. ECEC take-up
Generosity measure	.258					
	(.179)					
Cmpgns.&portals (ESPN)		.336				
		(3.239)				
Information transparency			12.75***			
			(2.323)			
Labour strength				.26		
				(1.191)		
Judicial non-corruption					3.166***	
					(.208)	
Labour inspect.capac.						2.803
						(1.568)
GDP growth	.121		.06	.286	-.025	.07
	(.303)		(.298)	(.321)	(.238)	(.407)
Left government	.046		.093*	.051	.039	.059
	(.036)		(.04)	(.033)	(.025)	(.049)
Dependent population	3.07***		2.701***	3.287***	2.297***	3.453***
	(.211)		(.295)	(.211)	(.191)	(.261)

Trade openness	.068***		.049**	.071***	.062***	.029
	(.018)		(.017)	(.017)	(.015)	(.041)
EU membership	-11.1***		-9.61***	-9.229**	7.86*	-9.051
	(3.012)		(2.731)	(3.15)	(3.392)	(5.085)
Constant	-124***	59.3***	-641***	-113***	-180***	-114***
	(15.802)	(4.683)	(102.976)	(11.34)	(10.338)	(15.277)
Observations	335	26	174	339	348	176
R-squared	.327	0	.405	.331	.573	.374

DV= Estimated ECEC take-up.

All models are ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses).

**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05*

Appendix Table A7.4:
Micro-level power resources and take-up of unemployment benefits

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Unemployed	3.686***	3.56***	3.187***	3.618***	3.493***	3.174***	3.723***
	(.129)	(.131)	(.198)	(.129)	(.126)	(.232)	(.172)
Unem.×Union memb.		.815***					
		(.251)					
Unem.×Native			.592***				
			(.151)				
Unem.×High Educ.				.664***			
				(.21)			
Unem.×Non-low inc.					.5***		
					(.144)		
Political interest						-.223***	
						(.068)	
Unem.×Polit.int.						.219***	
						(.083)	
Daily internet use							-.082
							(.145)
Unem.×Daily internet							-.084
							(.18)
Female	-.259***	-.268***	-.26***	-.265***	-.279***	-.273***	-.257***
	(.074)	(.074)	(.074)	(.073)	(.074)	(.074)	(.076)
Age	-.006***	-.007***	-.006***	-.007***	-.007***	-.006**	-.008***
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.003)
Native-born	-.223**	-.227**	-.589***	-.219**	-.218**	-.214**	-.227**
	(.09)	(.09)	(.133)	(.09)	(.088)	(.092)	(.089)
High educated	-.402***	-.398***	-.402***	-.814***	-.379***	-.358***	-.376***
	(.121)	(.12)	(.121)	(.163)	(.122)	(.123)	(.122)
Non-low-income	-1.595***	-1.592***	-1.594***	-1.588***	-1.903***	-1.574***	-1.583***
	(.088)	(.09)	(.088)	(.088)	(.121)	(.089)	(.086)
Live-with-partner	-.296***	-.3***	-.297***	-.291***	-.275***	-.291***	-.297***
	(.093)	(.093)	(.093)	(.093)	(.095)	(.093)	(.094)
Child at home	.352***	.362***	.354***	.355***	.362***	.342***	.346***
	(.086)	(.086)	(.086)	(.087)	(.084)	(.086)	(.088)
Union member	.194	-.232	.188	.197	.201	.211	.197
	(.138)	(.233)	(.139)	(.138)	(.137)	(.138)	(.137)
Left-Right scale	-.02	-.02	-.019	-.02	-.02	-.019	-.02
	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.016)	(.015)
Support govt. redist.	.094***	.093***	.091***	.094***	.09***	.093***	.092***
	(.032)	(.031)	(.031)	(.032)	(.031)	(.032)	(.031)
Const.	-4.19***	-4.082***	-3.888***	-4.147***	-4.043***	-3.714***	-4.092***
	(.3)	(.298)	(.314)	(.297)	(.287)	(.32)	(.33)
/var(_cons[cntryes~)	.839***	.818***	.848***	.833***	.83***	.84***	.858***
	(.259)	(.255)	(.263)	(.257)	(.255)	(.256)	(.268)
Observations	80468	80468	80468	80468	80468	80318	80468
Log likelihood	-4400.3	-4390.6	-4394.7	-4395.6	-4393.3	-4384.8	-4398.5

DV=Main source of household income is unemployment/redundancy benefit (0=other income source; 1=dependent on unemployment or redundancy benefits)
All models are multi-level random intercept models (with country-year as level 2 variable), with logistic regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses).
Standard errors are in parentheses: **** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

Appendix Table A7.5:
UI Take-up as a Function of Normative, Instrumental and Enforcement Resources

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Unemployed	3.418***	3.705***	-1.968	3.707***	2.77*	3.668***
	(.586)	(.073)	(2.539)	(.14)	(1.292)	(.169)
UI generosity	.002					
	(.078)					
UI generosity×Unemp.	.021					
	(.054)					
Portals&Campaigns		-.31**				
		(.099)				
Port.&Cmpgns×Unemp.		.126**				
		(.045)				
Informat. transparency			.023			
			(.032)			
Transparency×Unemp.			.072*			
			(.033)			
Labor strength				.143		
				(.174)		
Labor str.×Unemp.				.059		
				(.128)		
Judicial non-corruption					.459	
					(.405)	
Jud.non-corr.×Unemp.					.269	
					(.383)	
Labor inspection capac.						.144
						(.162)
Lab. insp.cap.×Unemp.						.167**
						(.06)
Female	-.291***	-.243***	-.264***	-.27***	-.267***	-.23**
	(.085)	(.066)	(.074)	(.079)	(.075)	(.089)
Age	-.006*	-.007***	-.006**	-.007**	-.006**	-.006*
	(.003)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.003)
Native	-.253*	-.276**	-.217*	-.254**	-.206*	-.193
	(.105)	(.096)	(.093)	(.095)	(.094)	(.13)
High education	-.5***	-.436***	-.404***	-.403**	-.41***	-.461**
	(.111)	(.111)	(.122)	(.126)	(.121)	(.146)
Non-low income	-1.675***	-1.629***	-1.623***	-1.631***	-1.625***	-1.521***
	(.099)	(.072)	(.089)	(.094)	(.089)	(.093)
Live with partner	-.262*	-.328***	-.286**	-.301**	-.283**	-.419***
	(.116)	(.075)	(.094)	(.099)	(.095)	(.121)
Child at home	.307**	.349***	.359***	.36***	.365***	.468***
	(.11)	(.075)	(.09)	(.093)	(.089)	(.092)
Union member	.199	.28**	.195	.22	.186	.043
	(.143)	(.102)	(.138)	(.143)	(.141)	(.212)
Left-right scale	-.036*	-.02	-.026	-.018	-.026	-.034
	(.016)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.02)
Constant	-3.208***	-3.534***	-5.438*	-3.585***	-5.185***	-3.786***
	(.812)	(.215)	(2.526)	(.29)	(1.354)	(.377)
RE variance compon.	.493***	.646***	.663**	.743**	.667***	.884*
	(.133)	(.167)	(.242)	(.267)	(.188)	(.366)
Observations	49987	65638	74953	70485	74953	49889
Log likelihood	4201	-4290	-4293.7	-4295.2	-4293.1	-4284.1

DV= Unemployment insurance is main source of household income (0=other source of income; 1=dependent on unemployment or redundancy benefits). All models are multi-level random intercept models (with country-year as level 2 variable), with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses). **** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05*

Appendix Table A7.6:
Pensions Take-up as a Function of Normative, Instrumental and Enforcement Resources

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age 60+	4.255***	3.948***	.194	4.022***	2.491***	3.873***
	(.042)	(.03)	(.416)	(.032)	(.139)	(.036)
Pension generosity	-.745***					
	(.131)					
Pens.gen. ×60+	.477***					
	(.068)					
Portals&Campaigns		-.047				
		(.051)				
Port.&Cmpgns×60+.		.041*				
		(.021)				
Informat. Transpar.			-.041**			
			(.013)			
Transperency×60+			.049***			
			(.005)			
Labor strength				-.128		
				(.072)		
Lab. Str.×60+				.174***		
				(.033)		
Judicial non-corrup.					-.552***	
					(.104)	
Jud.non-corr.×60+					.458***	
					(.044)	
Labor inspect. capac.						.079
						(.086)
Lab.insp.×60+						.068*
						(.029)
Female	.186***	.201***	.213***	.212***	.211***	.19***
	(.028)	(.028)	(.025)	(.026)	(.025)	(.031)
Native	.209***	.255***	.119**	.224***	.121**	.035
	(.054)	(.055)	(.046)	(.052)	(.046)	(.055)
High education	-.347***	-.377***	-.34***	-.361***	-.339***	-.378***
	(.038)	(.039)	(.035)	(.036)	(.035)	(.042)
Non-low income	-.945***	-.881***	-.899***	-.933***	-.899***	-.823***
	(.033)	(.032)	(.029)	(.03)	(.029)	(.035)
Live with partner	.032	.072*	.036	.04	.03	.013
	(.031)	(.03)	(.028)	(.029)	(.028)	(.034)
Child at home	-1.127***	-1.124***	-1.11***	-1.128***	-1.103***	-1.065***
	(.037)	(.035)	(.033)	(.034)	(.032)	(.04)
Union member	-.863***	-.91***	-.816***	-.878***	-.819***	-.702***
	(.044)	(.046)	(.04)	(.042)	(.04)	(.051)
Left-right scale	-.009	-.003	-.005	-.003	-.007	-.013
	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.007)
Constant	-2.515***	-2.211***	.992	-2.288***	-.427	-2.087***
	(.101)	(.097)	(1.028)	(.094)	(.342)	(.114)
RE variance comp.	.146***	.177***	.193***	.181***	.174***	.208***
	(.035)	(.042)	(.042)	(.041)	(.038)	(.057)
Observations	66858	65796	79387	73835	79387	50057
Pseudo R^2	.z	.z	.z	.z	.z	.z

DV= Pensions are main source of household income (0=depend on other income sources; 1=depend on pension benefits).
All models are multi-level random intercept models (with country-year as level 2 variable), with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses).
Standard errors are in parentheses: **** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05*

Figure A7.1: Social-benefit Awareness Campaigns and Digital Portals