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Settling Resistant Territorial Disputes: The Territorial Boundary Peace in Latin America

Luis L. Schenoni
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE)

Gary Goertz
University of Notre Dame

Andrew P. Owsiak
University of Georgia

AND

Paul F. Diehl
University of Texas at Dallas

Why do some territorial disputes defy settlement? Through what mechanism might these resistant territorial disputes be settled? We propose that the answer involves three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. First, the dispute must receive *attention*—i.e., be (re)placed and (re)prioritized on the dyad's agenda. Second, governments need *altered preferences* that expand the bargaining range so they can break deadlock and pursue settlement. Finally, disputing states need *third-party assistance* to facilitate, locate, incentivize, and support a settlement of their protracted dispute. We test this "AAA Model" in post–World War II Latin America. To do this, we first theorize the particular form of the general model; in post–1945 Latin America, attention, altered preferences, and third-party assistance operate through the mechanisms of militarization, democratization, and mediation respectively. We then identify resistant territorial disputes and advance a novel, multimethod research design to evaluate our hypotheses—one that relies more heavily on within-case counterfactual analysis. An extensive series of these counterfactual analyses, along with a statistical analysis, produce consistent, significant support for our model. When resistant territorial disputes in post–1945 Latin America have attention, altered preferences, and third-party assistance simultaneously, they always settle; when they lack any one factor, however, settlement never occurs.

Interstate relationships have become less violent and more peaceful over the past 40–50 years (Pinker 2011; Goertz, Diehl, and Balas 2016). One explanation for this trend derives, in part, from shifts in the issues over which states contend. Territorial issues constitute one of—perhaps *the*—most salient issue in interstate relations, producing a disproportionate share of international conflict over the past 400 years (Vasquez 2009). As more states remove territorial issues from their foreign policy agendas, peace therefore stands to spread significantly.

We refer to the full removal of territorial issues as "territorial boundary peace."[1] This concept is inherently dyadic, resulting from dyadic territorial claims that affect the involved states' dyadic relationship. Its achievement demands both the full delimitation (or settlement) of a dyad's mutual borders (Owsiak, Cuttner, and Buck 2018) and the removal of all territorial claims from that dyad (Frederick, Hensel, and Macaulay 2017). Territorial boundary peace is consequently a tall order, for a given dyad must settle *all* its outstanding territorial issues to achieve that status—even those issues we refer to as "resistant" cases (i.e., territorial issues that defy settlement for myriad reasons).

In this study, we not only conceptualize and measure resistant territorial disputes, but also develop a model that explains their successful settlement. Our model consists of three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. First, the resistant territorial dispute must appear and be prioritized on the dyad's agenda—that is, receive *attention*. Although seemingly trivial, data on territorial disputes reveal that long periods pass with no serious attention given to them. Settlement cannot proceed without such attention. Second, leaders of the disputing states need to *significantly alter their preferences* to permit settlement. Territorial disputes provoke hardline positions that eliminate the

Luis L. Schenoni is an Assistant Professor in the Division of International Studies, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), Mexico City.

Gary Goertz is professor of political science at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

Andrew P. Owsiak is an associate professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia. His research interests broadly include international conflict, conflict management, law, and crisis diplomacy. He most recently co-authored the book *International Conflict Management* (2019).

Paul F. Diehl is the Ashbel Smith professor of political science at the University of Texas-Dallas. He is the co-author most recently of *International Conflict Management* (2019) and *The Puzzle of Peace* (2016).

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[1] "Territorial boundary peace" describes a relationship in which neighboring states do not contest (land) territorial issues. It therefore does not include maritime boundaries, which states manage via a distinct logic anyway (Hensel et al. 2008). Moreover, because it does not invoke the causal relationship between the settlement of territorial disputes and the lack of interstate violence, it also differs markedly from Gibler's (2012) "territorial peace."

bargaining range—that is, the set of settlement terms that all disputants prefer to continued non-settlement. To break the bargaining impasse, at least one side must offer concessions, which demands a change in leaders' preferences. Finally, disputants require *third-party assistance* to facilitate negotiations, voice creative or unpopular settlement terms, or assist with the indispensable requirements for a final settlement (e.g., demarcation). Resistant territorial disputes, by definition, evade settlement and, in the process, sour the involved states' relationships (Rider and Owsiak 2015). Third parties facilitate settlement amid the disputants' heightened distrust and enmity. These three conditions—attention, altered preferences, and assistance—are individually necessary, in that resistant cases *never* settle if a dyad lacks any single one of them; they are jointly sufficient because settlement *always* occurs if all three conditions coexist simultaneously.

We explore the features of this general model in post–1945 Latin America. Such scope conditions are critical. On the one hand, the permissible avenues for resolving resistant territorial disputes change considerably after 1945 (Zacher 2001). A theoretical model that applies to the post-1945 period will therefore likely not generalize to the pre-1945 period. On the other hand, our causal inference strategy demands individual case counterfactuals for each of the three individual conditions—*and* their joint sufficiency—within each resistant case we analyze. This requires considerable knowledge and causal analysis of the included cases, making it necessary to restrict the spatial scope of the study for practical reasons.

Moreover, when examining the model in Latin America, the three general conditions adopt consistent, particular forms. Attention (i.e., agenda setting) emerges through militarization of the resistant dispute by one or both sides; preference change arises through democratization and the outright replacement of previous—usually military—regimes; and third-party assistance consists of mediation (e.g., good offices or fact-finding). These *expressions* of the general conditions are particular to Latin America and different from the general model itself, which we argue generalizes to other post–1945 resistant cases. As an illustration, militarization produces attention in Latin America, but in other regions, there may exist other, substitutable means for placing and prioritizing these issues on dyads' agendas (e.g., demonstrations). The model, in other words, consists of two levels: the general and the particular (Goertz 2020). Exploring how the model specifically works in other regions will require extensive counterfactual case study research similar to what we conduct in Latin America—an undertaking that lies beyond the scope of this work.

Our study offers four main contributions to existing research. First, the model explains resistant territorial dispute settlement and receives strong, consistent empirical support. It thereby contributes significantly to research on territorial disputes. Second, unlike most statistical models, we advance a *complete* explanation for how states successfully settle resistant territorial disputes. Third, we introduce the concept of "resistant territorial disputes." For dyads to experience greater levels of peace (e.g., positive peace), they must first achieve a territorial boundary peace (see Goertz, Diehl, and Balas 2016). Settling resistant territorial disputes proves critical to that endeavor. We not only identify the subset of resistant disputes, but also propose that it is qualitatively distinct—demanding that we treat it as a unique phenomenon. Finally, we introduce and adopt an innovative, multimethod approach. Multimethod research typically involves a statistical analysis, along with some accompanying case studies or vignettes. The statistical analyses provide the primary causal inference (Goertz 2017), while the case studies illustrate the mechanism's workings. Our approach, in contrast, places more weight on the counterfactual case studies, which form the core of our causal inference strategy. It then augments these "within-case" counterfactuals with statistical "cross-case" analyses. In so doing, it advances a new, multimethod approach, one whose key features include a more equal balance between the case studies and statistical analysis than usually appears, the explicit use of within-case counterfactuals for each component of the model, and, to underscore the generalizability of the model, a reliance on multiple cases for causal mechanism analysis. Future research may deploy this novel approach in myriad additional contexts.

Territorial Conflict and its Settlement

Extensive research exists about the role of territorial issues in interstate conflict (see Vasquez 2009), the origin of territorial claims (Huth 1996), the management and resolution of these claims (Wiegand 2011; Huth, Croco, and Appel 2013; Mattes 2018), and the effect that claim resolution exerts on both dyadic relationships (Gibler 2012) and systemic peace (Goertz, Diehl, and Balas 2016). This robust research agenda identifies numerous factors that make some territorial claims more difficult to resolve than others. Huth (1996), for example, shows that claims involving strategically advantageous territory or ethnic kin prove more difficult to resolve than those without such characteristics. Mattes (2018) finds that greater claim salience, a more asymmetric power distribution between disputants, and claims embedded within interstate rivalries are more difficult to resolve than their counterparts. Others conclude that territorial disputes are more likely to resolve peacefully when one disputant's legal claim to the disputed territory holds a significant advantage under international law (Huth, Croco, and Appel 2013).

The above findings illustrate three consistent points. First, they help locate resistant territorial disputes, indicating the characteristics that likely distinguish them from the "easy" cases. Second, they suggest that "easy" and "resistant" claims settle differently. There is therefore value in conceptualizing "resistant" cases as a distinct phenomenon. Finally, they indicate the need for our study. Existing research answers the question: Under what general conditions are claims more or less likely to settle? In response, they produce a list of characteristics that facilitate or hinder claim settlement. We, however, pursue a more focused question: Given a claim that is difficult to resolve (i.e., given the pool of cases that defy "easy" settlement), how does successful settlement occur?

The AAA Model of Resistant Territorial Dispute Settlement

Generally, for a policy problem—e.g., a resistant territorial dispute—to transition from simple existence to being productively addressed, three conditions must be individually and simultaneously present: (1) an awareness of and desire to devote *attention* to the problem; (2) *altered preferences*, which open space for mutually acceptable solutions, or a bargaining range, to emerge (i.e., break the deadlock to allow win-sets to overlap); and (3) *assistance* from key actors to help find the terms of such a solution. This tripartite framework, which we designate as the "AAA Model," aligns well with Kingdon (1984), who labels these the problem,

politics, and policy streams respectively. In this section, we explicate the causal mechanism logic underlying the model, how it specifically applies to post–1945 Latin American disputes, and how it generalizes to other disputes.

Scope Conditions

Any model must specify the scope or domain within which it operates (Goertz 2017). Our model functions under three scope conditions. First, it begins with an existing territorial dispute that resists settlement efforts—a "resistant" dispute (operationalized below). Second, it focuses entirely on the post–World War II era. Research demonstrates that the accepted methods for managing interstate territorial disputes changed markedly between the World Wars and consolidated by 1945 (Zacher 2001; Hathaway and Shapiro 2017). Settlement mechanisms that dominate pre-1945 (e.g., violence) therefore differ from those operating post-1945 (e.g., nonviolence), which means each period demands a distinct theoretical model. We select the post-1945 period to gain insight into contemporary disputes. Finally, although the general model applies widely (see below), the particular version of it that we develop and test in this study applies specifically to Latin America.

Our model, in other words, contains two levels (Goertz 2020, Chapter 10). The general model uses core, broad, easily remembered theoretical concepts (e.g., attention, altered preferences, and assistance), while the particular model contains the form through which the general concepts manifest in a given context (e.g., militarization as a particular, attention-generating pathway in Latin America). Scholars frequently use such models. "Democracy" causes peace generally, for example, but only via numerous, particular pathways that vary, such as elections, institutions, norms, or opposition parties. We explore our model's particular form in Latin America because the territorial integrity norm first developed there, disputes there have a longer decolonized history to analyze (Owsiak, Cuttner, and Buck 2018), it makes best use of our Latin American expertise, and it ensures a practical multimethod research design (i.e., it needs only a manageable number of individual counterfactuals for causal inference). We return to the generalizability of our general model later in this section.

The AAA Model

According to the general model, three factors are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for resistant territorial dispute settlement: attention, altered preferences, and assistance (see Figure 1). First, the dispute needs policymakers' *attention*. Although seemingly trivial, territorial disputes compete with other political issues for policymakers' consideration. Thus, rather than always remaining a top priority on the dyadic political agenda, leaders instead prioritize a resistant dispute's management when it requires immediate attention—e.g., periods of heightened hostility and tension with neighboring states—and focus on other, more pressing issues when it does not. For a resistant dispute's settlement to proceed, that dispute needs to be (re)placed, (re)activated, and (re)prioritized on the dyad's agenda amidst other issues. In short, leaders must give it attention.

Numerous factors might (re)place, (re)activate, and (re)prioritize a resistant claim on a dyad's mutual agenda. In post–1945 Latin America, *militarization* of the territorial dispute consistently serves that function. Militarization raises the territorial dispute to the status of a security threat and a challenge to national honor. Domestic audiences then



Figure 1. The AAA model of resistant territorial dispute settlement

demand that leaders give it attention, at the expense of other issues if necessary. Moreover, militarization frames the dispute as a challenge to the territorial integrity norm—a widely accepted, consolidated norm that asserts the inappropriateness of settling territorial disputes via violence (see also Rochefort and Cobb 1994). To avoid norm violation and escalation, disputants—and perhaps the international community—prioritize addressing the dispute, especially once militarized.

Importantly, it does not matter how or why militarization occurs. Leaders might expect and intend militarization—or other pathways in the general model—to generate (dyadic or international) attention for, or ultimately to settle, their dispute, but they might not. Attention can emerge unintentionally, and it often does through militarization in Latin America. In contrast, some leaders might seek attention for their dispute (e.g., through militarization or other pathways; see Mares 1996). The model operates identically under either scenario. What matters is that militarization sets and prioritizes the dispute on the dyadic and international political agenda, and it will do this regardless of why a leader militarizes.

Significantly *altered preferences*, which expand the bargaining range, is the second necessary condition. When states dispute territory, their leaders advance conflicting sovereign claims to it. Settling the dispute requires reconciling these claims. To do so, concessions must be made, but leaders have strong incentives not to offer them. On the one hand, the policy apparatus often works against concessions. Territorial disputes that evade settlement cause interstate relations to sour and increase in hostility (Rider and Owsiak 2015). Each disputant increasingly views the other as a threat, enemy, and competitor—for both the immediate and foreseeable future. Given such an outlook, each state orients its foreign policy around confronting the other and, relatedly, protecting itself from the other's aggression. Deviating from this institutionalized policy will be difficult, as it runs counter to the government's entrenched worldview, strategy, and policy planning. Concessions seem imprudent and illogical in such an environment, absent a structural break in the interstate relationship.

On the other hand, leaders spend a significant amount of time convincing one another that territorial concessions are impossible (i.e., misrepresent their position; Fearon 1995). This serves a strategic bargaining purpose. A negotiator who can only offer limited concessions forces potential settlement terms closer to her ideal, preferred position. Mindful of this, leaders often politicize territorial issues so that domestic audiences constrain the concessions they can make. In so doing, the leader promises to protect the territorial interests of the state. Any subsequent deviation from that hardline stance places the leader at risk. Domestic audiences will accuse such leaders of incompetence, brand them as traitors, deride them for threatening the state, or otherwise punish them for their behavior (Wiegand 2006, 2011).

The above constraints operate persistently, but not with the same intensity. All leaders are beholden to a domestic coalition that keeps them in power. Any leader's exact coalition, however, can change (Mattes, Leeds, and Matsumura 2016). When it does, the constraints under which the leader operates change as well (e.g., relaxing as a new leader takes office; Ghosn 2010). We consequently propose that coalition changes can offer an opportunity for expanding the bargaining range (i.e., the set of mutual settlement terms that all disputants prefer to continued non-settlement). By relaxing constraints, coalition changes alter preferences for the affected leader(s)—i.e., enlarge the win-set, or set of settlement terms that a leader prefers to continued non-settlement—in a way that then opens or expands the bargaining range. As the bargaining range grows, the probability of settlement increases.[2]

Not all coalition changes, however, produce similar effects. In Latin America, the majority of post–1945 territorial disputes occur within nondemocratic dyads that contain military regimes. For ideological and corporative reasons (e.g., the size of the defense budget), militaries take a particularly intransigent position on territorial issues. Coalition changes that weaken military regimes therefore might best increase a negotiating leader's win-set and, consequently, open a bargaining range for resistant dispute settlement. Nondemocratic states experience a coalition change when nondemocratic institutions shift—that is, when a state transforms from one type of nondemocratic regime to another or transitions to a more democratic regime (Mattes, Leeds, and Matsumura 2016). Either possibility can alter preferences, but the latter—*democratization*—offers the promise of more significant preference change. First and foremost, the size and social composition of coalitions shift more drastically, *ceteris paribus*, when moving from a nondemocratic to a democratic regime. This, in turn, creates a larger structural break with past policies and constraints, opening space for leaders to consider new policies. Second, to protect nascent democratic institutions, leaders bolster them. In Latin America, the military constitutes a threat to democracy, particularly because it is usually the former governing elite and can credibly use external security threats (e.g., territorial disputes) as an excuse to (re)intervene in democratic politics. To bolster democratic institutions in this environment, democratic leaders need to resolve resistant territorial disputes, thereby sidelining the military. We consequently focus on democratic regime change (or democratization) as the mechanism that alters preferences significantly in Latin America.[3]

The third necessary condition invokes third-party *assistance* to help disputants overcome bargaining obstacles (Palmer 1997; Simmons 1999; Herz and Nogueira 2002). A change in coalitions may expand the bargaining range, but challenges remain. Leaders need to rewrite and coordinate their policies; find and agree upon a specific solution within the bargaining range (i.e., settlement terms); and manage domestic audiences, who will still find territorial issues highly salient. To overcome such challenges—and to make (historically) unpopular concessions—leaders frequently need third-party assistance.

Third parties play three particular roles that encourage the settlement of territorial disputes. First, they introduce rewards and punishments that incentivize settlement, making it appear more palatable than it otherwise would. Second, they identify solutions that the disputants cannot themselves find or voice. The former might result from being persistently entrenched in a given position, at which point disputants cannot see beyond the options they have already considered. The latter, in contrast, might result when key domestic actors preclude the disputants from entertaining certain settlement terms. Lacking these constraints, the third party can introduce the "forbidden" settlement terms and, if necessary, accept responsibility for their adoption (i.e., provide domestic political cover). Finally, third parties underwrite agreements to ensure their durability when disputants might develop incentives to renege later. This not only increases the stability of settlements, but also reassures the disputants that they will not be renegotiating the agreement from a weaker position in the post-agreement, implementation phase (Walter 2002). In the Latin American context, third-party actors play these roles through *mediation*, which includes fact-finding, good offices, conciliation, and facilitation.[4] Nevertheless, the model remains agnostic about the mediator's exact identity or the precise role it plays, for the model functions regardless of this variation.

These three factors—attention, altered preferences, and third-party assistance—largely operate independently of one another. One can theorize specific instances in which two of the three causally connect (e.g., leaders attract third-party attention through their attention-generating mechanism), but even then, the factors depend on the interaction of many actors and respond to their own logic. In fact, when they appear together in post–1945 Latin America—through militarization, democratization, and mediation—the occurrence is highly contingent.

Figure 1 summarizes the AAA Model. At the general level (Level I) sit the broad concepts at the heart of our theory: attention, altered preferences, and (third-party) assistance. At the particular level (Level II) sit the various ways that the general model plays out in post–1945 Latin America: militarization, democratization, and mediation (respectively). Levels I and II therefore share intimate links. Level II describes the manifested pathway through which Level I occurs in the post–1945 Latin American context.

Figure 1 highlights four noteworthy features of our model. First, attention (militarization), altered preferences (democratization), and assistance (mediation) are individually necessary—but individually insufficient—for settlement. Settlement never follows if disputants lack one or

[2] Coalition change within a single state will affect the bargaining range.

[3] Some might question whether democratization contributes to territorial dispute settlement, since recent research shows that neighboring states almost always delimit their borders before both states become consolidated democracies (see Gibler and Owsiak 2018). This, however, confuses: (1) democratization with *consolidating* democracy; and (2) dyadic with monadic democratization. In our mechanism, democratization need not produce a consolidated democracy, and *only one* state must democratize—not both. Our model therefore coexists well with existing work.

[4] Mediation attempts require all disputants' consent. Unilateral third-party intervention is therefore excluded.

more of the three. Disputants need solutions (e.g., assistance), for example, but were these available, it would matter little if they could not be adopted (i.e., no altered preferences). Second, and relatedly, attention (militarization), altered preferences (democratization), and assistance (mediation) are jointly sufficient for settlement. Settlement always occurs when the three factors simultaneously coexist. Third, the temporal ordering of the three factors does not matter in the model; they can emerge in any order but must converge—or be present simultaneously—for resistant territorial disputes to settle. Finally, regardless of what level we consider (i.e., Level I or II), the model operates identically. These features lead to the following formal hypotheses:[5]

H1: *Attention (militarization) is individually necessary, but individually insufficient, for resistant territorial dispute settlement.*

H2: *Significantly altered preferences (democratization) are individually necessary, but individually insufficient, for resistant territorial dispute settlement.*

H3: *Third-party assistance (mediation) is individually necessary, but individually insufficient, for resistant territorial dispute settlement.*

H4: *Attention (militarization), significantly altered preferences (democratization), and third-party assistance (mediation) are jointly sufficient for resistant territorial dispute settlement.*

Generalization

The three scope conditions outlined earlier affect the model's generalizability. The first—a resistant dispute—indicates that the model does not apply to less resistant (or "easier") disputes. Negotiating positions harden less in easier cases, given the lower salience of the substantive matters involved. The need for altered preferences and third-party assistance therefore diminishes greatly, suggesting that a distinct theoretical model must be built for easier disputes. This admittedly means we cannot explain settlement in *all* territorial disputes. Nevertheless, our model captures the disputes that consume the most resources (e.g., in duration, salience, escalation risk, and conflict management).

The second scope condition—a post–1945 settlement environment—indicates that the model does not apply to pre-1945 settlements. Scholars generally agree that the world changed fundamentally after World War II, particularly with regard to the use of force and the management of territorial disputes (Zacher 2001; Fazal 2007; Goertz, Diehl, and Balas 2016). They therefore frequently restrict arguments or analyses to the post-1945 period. Moreover, the post-1945 period leaves ample room for our argument to operate—and within an environment characterized by notable spatial and temporal variation.

Finally, the particular, Level II model rests on a third scope condition: a Latin American dispute. This raises the question of the model's generalizability to other regions. As Figure 1 demonstrates, our model contains both a general (Level I) and a particular (Level II) level. The general model applies broadly across regions. All resistant disputes require attention, altered preferences, and assistance. These three factors, however, might manifest themselves or be present in different ways. For example, mediation pushes settlement forward in Latin America, but adjudication—a stronger form of third-party assistance—might prove more relevant in Africa. Similarly, democratization alters preferences in Latin America, but changes in nondemocratic, governing support coalitions might achieve a similar end in the Middle East.

Figure 1 reflects this diversity at Level II. It underscores that the general model might function via various pathways (i.e., our Latin American mechanisms at Level II are bolded, while substitutes appear in regular font). The general, Level I model applies widely, but the particular, Level II model we explore in this article may generalize partially or not at all beyond Latin America. Regional expertise in specific, other regions will be required to verify the generalizability of individual, Latin American, Level II mechanisms or to uncover their alternatives. We necessarily save this task for future research.

Research Design

Our study introduces a new multimethod approach. We outline that approach in detail in this section, explaining how it differs from more commonly used designs. We then conceptualize "resistant territorial disputes," with particular attention on Latin America, and explain how we measure the variables used in both our quantitative and case study counterfactual analyses.

Multimethod Research Designs and Causal Inference

Our model advances a *complete* explanation of resistant territorial dispute settlement[6]; settlement always occurs when our three conditions are present simultaneously and fails otherwise. Complete causal models are extremely rare. Scholars typically argue that an identified factor is *an* important cause of the outcome—one that increases the probability of the outcome by a certain margin—but almost never claim to provide a complete explanation of it. This divergence carries noteworthy research design implications.

Our study's central hypothesis concerns the effect of three individually necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient for an outcome—not merely the effect of a single independent variable on a dependent variable. Moreover, we have a small population of cases to examine (see below). This renders standard approaches inappropriate. Purely quantitative work, for example, often stresses a bivariate relationship. It therefore begins with a two-way table that presents this relationship, before moving to multivariate analysis (usually with complex statistical procedures) that introduces control variables to strengthen inferences about the initial, bivariate relationship. Similarly, in many multimethod designs, statistical analysis provides the primary causal inference strategy, while case studies (or vignettes) illustrate the proposed mechanism's operation. Both strategies work well when analyzing a large number of cases, especially when focused on a specific, bivariate relationship.

Lacking such characteristics, we devise a different, multimethod path forward—one that places more weight on the "within-case" counterfactuals, and less weight on the statistical analysis, than standard multimethod designs. In particular, we use statistical analysis to demonstrate some *prima facie* "cross-case" empirical support for the model. We then rely on an extensive set of "within-case," counterfactual

[5] Our model therefore contains a triple interaction term. The light turns on (i.e., settlement occurs) when all three switches are in the "on" position, but the light remains off under all other switch combinations. The comparison to a quantitative interaction term, however, should not be taken too far.

[6] This is akin to a directed acyclic graph (DAG; see Knight and Winship 2013). DAGs imply a complete—typically, general—explanatory model of a phenomenon.

analyses to supply the dominant causal inferences, before constructing crossword diagrams—another novelty—that offer still further evidence that the model operates as the counterfactual analyses claim. Space constraints preclude us from including all of our counterfactuals below ($n = 15$; five settlement cases, with three variables), so the text that follows offers brief sketches of four—one for each necessary condition ($n = 3$) and one for their joint sufficiency ($n = 1$)—with the remainder relegated to Appendix C (online).[7] Nevertheless, this balance between the statistical and within-case counterfactual analyses, as well as the heavy use of within-case counterfactuals for causal inference, separates our approach from other multimethod studies.

Unlike most studies, then, which are broad and shallow (i.e., look at one factor across a wide scope of cases; e.g., a standard quantitative study), our study is narrow and deep, meant to examine a small number of cases in greater depth (i.e., post–1945 Latin America). We do this purposively. First, a complete explanation must apply *to all included cases*. Statistical analyses that consider only probabilistic effects of an individual variable allow room for anomalies, but our study does not. We consequently must specify the particular (Level II) model carefully (see Figure 1). Moreover, because a complete explanation demands significant research on each included case, it must identify a manageable set of cases to analyze within a single study. Second, we suspect that a different causal model (e.g., pre-1945) or disaggregated mechanism (e.g., beyond Latin America) might apply outside our scope conditions. We propose that the general (Level I) model generalizes broadly, while the particular (Level II) model does not—either partially or completely; Level II simply expresses the form the general model takes in Latin America.

Given our complete model, its necessary and sufficient condition logic, and our multimethod design, one can contest our causal analysis in two ways. First, although the model asserts a factor as necessary for settlement, a critic could deny that necessity in a particular case. Second, although our model asserts the three factors are jointly sufficient for settlement, a critic might argue that an omitted variable accounts for resistant territorial dispute settlement instead (i.e., Figure 1 lacks a key variable).[8] Either challenge cannot be general; rather, it *must* be specific to our individual, included cases—and therefore requires examining the details of these cases to contest the case-counterfactual analysis we provide. Consider, for example, United States hegemony in Latin America. We cannot deny that the United States exerts major influence over what occurs in Latin America; yet we do contest—and find no evidence—that the United States played a significant role in the settlement of our resistant disputes (see Appendix D, online). More generally, although quantitative studies (or critics) may suggest variables that *possibly* matter for our cases' settlement, plausible assertions of omitted variable bias require reviewing our cases for evidence to that effect—particularly the cases that settle (i.e., with positive outcomes) and, ideally, identifying potential, omitted variables that do not operate through the conditions our model already captures.

The counterfactual sketches that follow constitute the most "difficult" tests available for each condition (i.e., hypothesis). Given three necessary conditions, the toughest test for each will be one in which two of the three conditions exist frequently (e.g., a and b), but the third appears rarely (e.g., c). If that third condition is necessary, then the outcome will not occur until that rare, third condition appears, even though the other two conditions regularly exist (e.g., in abundance). Such an approach strengthens our counterfactual claims that each independent variable proves individually necessary—and jointly sufficient—for the outcome (see Goertz 2017, Chapter 5). These counterfactuals, combined with those in Appendix C (online; $n = 12$ additional ones), essentially replace the multivariate analysis that appears in standard quantitative articles. Readers interested in the extended version of our included counterfactual analyses will find them in Appendix C (online).

Identifying Resistant Cases: An Application to Latin America

A "resistant territorial dispute" repeatedly defies settlement. Existing research hints at what characteristics these disputes might possess, but how might they be systematically conceptualized and identified? One potential answer concerns the salience (or value) of the territory under dispute (Frederick, Hensel, and Macaulay 2017). Although a useful starting point, it quickly proves insufficient; *a priori*, we find no theoretical argument that consistently links salience with settlement. Neighboring states might focus on more salient territorial issues first, setting aside less salient ones until they find a workable solution to the former. This could result, for example, if negotiators view settlement as a package deal in which nothing is settled until everything is settled. Alternatively, states may settle the less salient territorial disputes first, postponing the highly salient cases that elude quick agreement. From this perspective, states warm up to one another during the conflict management process; any settlement progress on less salient territorial issues builds momentum toward settling the more salient ones. Finally, there may be no relation between salience and settlement, with states merely seeking agreement on unrelated, nonterritorial issues to build a *modus vivendi*. Scholars advance arguments and provide evidence consistent with all three possibilities (Blum 2007; Hensel et al. 2008; Mattes 2018), making it unclear how salience alone would define resistant disputes.

Resistant disputes might, alternatively, arise when the involved states possess equally strong legal claims to the disputed territory (Abramson and Carter 2016), resulting in no legal advantage that favors a single contender (Huth, Croco, and Appel 2013). This, alone, also offers an insufficient description of resistant disputes, especially in the Americas. The two longest, unsettled contiguous borders on the continent, for example, remain so, even though one party holds a clear legal advantage (Venezuela-Guyana and Guatemala-Belize). Conversely, many situations of legal claim parity seem unproblematic; they often concern islands of questionable value or never produce the militarization associated with other resistant disputes (e.g., the San Andres and Providencia claim between Colombia and Nicaragua, or the El Chamizal dispute between the United States and Mexico). At least in the Americas, then, legal advantage and resistant disputes do not coincide well.

A third means to identify resistant disputes might look at the duration and management of territorial disputes. A dispute's persistence suggests it is resistant to settlement. Nevertheless, persistence alone fails to indicate how actively the involved states try to settle the matter—a key indicator of whether a dispute resists settlement efforts. Research

[7] Our study aligns with the common "potential outcomes approach," in which scholars often replace individual case counterfactuals with statistical estimates (e.g., the synthetic control method). We follow the same general approach but rely on a separate counterfactual for every variable within each resistant, settled case.

[8] Our counterfactuals address omitted variable bias by investigating exactly how and why resistant cases settle (Appendix C, online).

demonstrates that neighboring states often work repeatedly toward the settlement of their territorial disputes, including in Latin America (Ireland 1938). This suggests that resistant disputes will be those that not only persist, but also see repeated settlement attempts fail. As conflict management in territorial disputes consists largely of bilateral negotiations, resistant cases—compared with nonresistant ones—should experience significantly more negotiation rounds, as well as greater recourse to militarized force as those negotiations stall and fail (Hensel et al. 2008).

Given that no single characteristic captures resistant territorial disputes perfectly, we employ a multidimensional conceptualization and, therefore, operationalization. We begin with the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) territorial claims data ($n = 41$ after 1945; Frederick, Hensel, and Macaulay 2017; see Appendix B, online, for a full claims list). A territorial claim exists when two or more governments issue official statements that contest sovereignty over the same, specifically identified territory. Using such claims as a foundation, we next restrict our attention to the post-1945 period and examine five distinct criteria: claim salience, legal (position) strength, claim duration, negotiation attempts, and the use of violence (see Appendix B, online for pre-1945).[9] First, claims vary in salience because disputants value territory differently, depending on its characteristics. ICOW measures salience along a twelve-point index, deriving six points from each dyad member's valuation of the disputed territory's (economic, security, and cultural) features (Frederick, Hensel, and Macaulay 2017). We classify claims that score >7 on this index, or are valuable to both disputants along at least two distinct dimensions, as highly salient. Because states bargain harder over more valuable stakes, these are the more "resistant" disputes.

Second, legal strength evaluates whether each disputant possesses a strong, mixed, or weak legal position for a given claim (Huth, Croco, and Appel 2013). Disputes in which the involved states hold legal positions of similar strength prove more complicated to settle under international law—or "resistant." A legal advantage exists when one state holds a strong legal position on the territorial claim, while the other holds a weak legal position. All other situations produce relative legal strength parity.

Third, resistant territorial disputes persist for myriad reasons. The precise duration that separates resistant from nonresistant disputes is admittedly fluid, making any threshold appear arbitrary. We consequently adopt a standard procedure, which recommends establishing a threshold along the data distribution that divides it into two clusters of roughly equivalent size (Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser 2009). Through this process, seventy-five years becomes the threshold. Any dispute that lasts more than seventy-five years qualifies as "resistant."[10]

Fourth, negotiated settlement attempts capture the territorial disputes that states want, but fail, to resolve—another indicator of a dispute's resistance to settlement. Using ICOW claim settlement data, we consider a claim "resistant" if it experiences more than nine bilateral negotiation attempts over the claim's lifetime (Hensel et al. 2008). Finally, the introduction of violence should complicate the settlement process, making it more intractable than it otherwise might be (see Vasquez 2009). If a dyad threatens, displays, or uses violence to manage its claim at *any* point in the claim's lifetime, we consider the claim to be "resistant" (Palmer et al. 2016).

Twenty-eight post–1945 Latin American territorial disputes possess at least one of these five indicators (see Appendix B, online). Overlap across multiple indicators, however, identifies ten very highly (five indicators; $n = 1$), highly (four indicators; $n = 4$), and moderately (three indicators; $n = 5$) resistant disputes in Latin America after 1945. We list these disputes in Table 1. For each dispute, we include the challenger state (i.e., the state contesting, but not holding, the territory), the target state (i.e., the state holding the territory), and the specific territory being disputed. The columns numbered 1–5 display the specific criteria that each dispute satisfies. Finally, the remaining columns indicate each dispute's resistance level, duration dates, and settled status.

The ten disputes in Table 1—five that settle, five that do not—comprise the data for our analysis. We begin with a statistical analysis, which explores whether the model might plausibly operate empirically. To create the observations needed, we divide each settlement case ($n = 5$) into distinct five-year periods (e.g., 1945–1949, 1950–1954, and so on), based on the theoretical premise that settlement requires an "incubation period"—or more than a single dyad-year—to unfold (e.g., see Bara 2014). This process yields 111 observations, within which we then track the absence/presence of our three main variables (see below). After laying this foundation, we next conduct detailed, within-case counterfactual analyses for every variable ($n = 3$) in each case that settles ($n = 5$), yielding fifteen counterfactuals. Finally, we create crossword figures that merge the qualitative and quantitative analysis—with particular attention given to the joint sufficiency argument. Due to space constraints, a brief sketch of four case counterfactuals appears in the text below, while the remainder—and the complete version of the included counterfactuals—appear in Appendix C (online).

Key Variables

Evaluating our model requires four variables. The dependent variable is *territorial boundary peace*, which a dyad achieves when it both: (1) delimits the entirety of its mutual border (Owsiak, Cuttner, and Buck 2018); and (2) removes all territorial claims from contention (Frederick, Hensel, and Macaulay 2017). The remaining three variables are the independent variables in Level II of the model, as applied to Latin America. First, *militarization* exists empirically when one state threatens, displays, or uses force against the other (Palmer et al. 2016). The severity of this force does not matter for the model (e.g., casualties); so long as one state militarizes, it incentivizes the dyad to devote attention to the dispute—a position the case study research confirms. Second, *democratization* unfolds when a nondemocratic regime turns into a semi-democratic or democratic regime. We rely on data from Mainwarring and Pérez Liñán (2013) for this variable, and since they do not code Belize, Guyana, and Suriname, we follow their rules to do so. We also consider independence as the functional equivalent of democratic regime change—in that it potentially alters preferences significantly. Finally, *mediation* occurs when a third party facilitates a settlement between disputants, but ultimately allows them to accept or reject that settlement. In practice, mediation takes numerous forms, including fact-finding (i.e., the third party investigates the issues under dispute), good offices (i.e., the third party facilitates negotiations),

[9] We identify ten resistant territorial disputes in Latin American during 1816–1944. Each settles—either directly or indirectly (i.e., violence produced a new territorial status quo, which unlocked negotiations)—via violence/conquest, which supports our contention that different settlement mechanisms operate pre- and post-1945 (see scope conditions and Appendix B, online).

[10] Any duration threshold between fifty-two and ninety-two years produces the same case list.

Table 1. Resistant cases in Latin America, 1816–2001

Challenger	*Target*	*Disputed territory*	*Indicator*					*Resistance*	*Duration*	*Status*
			1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*			
Argentina	United Kingdom (UK)	Malvinas/Falklands	■	■	■	■	■	Very high	1841–	Ongoing
Bolivia	Chile	Antofagasta	■	■		■	■	High	1884–1904 1962–	Ongoing
Ecuador	Peru	Oriente-Mainas	■		■	■	■	High	1854–1945	Settled
Guatemala	UK/Belize	Belize*	■		■	■	■	High	1868–	Ongoing
Argentina	Chile	Beagle Channel		■	■	■	■	High	1904–1985	Settled
Argentina	Uruguay	Rio de la Plata			■	■	■	Moderate	1882–1973	Settled
Ecuador	Peru	Cordillera del Cóndor	■			■	■	Moderate	1947–1998	Settled
El Salvador	Honduras	Bolsones-Fonseca		■	■		■	Moderate	1899–1992	Settled
Suriname	UK/Guyana	Corentyn*		■			■	Moderate	1816–	Ongoing
Venezuela	UK/Guyana	Essequibo*	■			■	■	Moderate	1841–1899 1966–	Ongoing

Notes: (1) Indicators: 1 = salience, 2 = legal strength parity, 3 = longer duration, 4 = many negotiation attempts, 5 = militarization at any point during claim (see Appendix B, online, for coding details). (2) We combine ICOW's two claims over Antofagasta. The first never settles, both claims involve the same actors, and no interim without a claim exists between the two ICOW claims. (3) *Claims that involve a colonial power and are either transferred to a successor state or de-settled after independence are considered a single case.

traditional mediation (i.e., the third party enters the negotiations), and conciliation (i.e., the third party proposes nonbinding settlement options). In territorial disputes, third parties often use these tools through a commission—alongside representatives of the disputing states, usually to help demarcate the border in the field and resolve discrepancies between the border political leaders delimited on a map and how that border finds expression in the field. Because such commissions do not often appear in existing datasets, we review historical narratives to determine whether and when third-party mediation took place, using the definition provided here.

Results

Our multimethod approach yields two broad categories of evidence: cross-case (i.e., statistical) and within-case (i.e., counterfactuals). We consider each in turn before summarizing the evidence they cumulatively provide in support of our hypotheses.

Cross Case: prima facie Evidence of a Causal Mechanism

Cross-case (i.e., statistical) analysis offers an indication of—or *prima facie* evidence about—the plausibility of our argument. It tells us when our model's three conditions appear over time in each of the settled and non-settled cases. If we uncover no evidence that the factors generally align when settlement occurs—and relatedly, that they do *not* align when settlement does not occur—then the model cannot possibly explain settlement in the cases.

We first divide each resistant case ($n = 10$) into discrete observations that cover a five-year period between 1945 and 2015 (e.g., 1945–1949, 1950–1954, etc.). Then, because Hypotheses 1–4 can be expressed as distinct bivariate relationships—the presence or absence of the condition and settlement—we analyze the resulting 111 observations in a series of two-by-two tables, which appear as the various panels of Table 2.

If Hypotheses 1–3 are accurate, then settlement will not occur in the absence of any given factor (i.e., the factor is individually necessary for settlement)—but *may* occur if it is present (i.e., the factor is individually insufficient for settlement). The first three panels of Table 2 consider this possibility and show evidence that supports it. When there is no militarization, zero settlements occur (Panel A); when there is no democratization, zero settlements occur (Panel B); and when there is no mediation, zero settlements occur (Panel C). The presence of any single factor alone does not *guarantee* a settlement (see the second data column in each of Panels A–C). Many observations contain a given factor, even when settlement fails. Nonetheless, settlement never occurs in each factor's absence. This supports Hypotheses 1–3.

Table 2. Cross-case, statistical analysis of hypotheses about territorial settlement

Panel A. Attention-militarization and territorial settlement

	No militarization	Militarization
Settlement	0	5
No settlement	78	28

Fischer exact test (p value) = 0.002

Panel B. Altered preferences-democratization and territorial settlement

	No democratization	Democratization
Settlement	0	5
No settlement	67	39

Fischer exact test (p value) = 0.008

Panel C. Assistance-mediation and territorial settlement

	No mediation	Mediation
Settlement	0	5
No settlement	91	15

Fischer exact test (p value) = 0.000

Panel D. Joint effect of factors for territorial settlement

	No interaction	Interaction
Settlement	0	5
No settlement	106	0

Fischer exact test (p value) = 0.000

The model, however, offers one more prediction: that the three factors together are jointly sufficient for settlement (Hypothesis 4). Table 2 supports this prediction as well. When the interaction exists—that is, all three factors appear together in the same five-year observation—settlement always occurs (top row, Panel D). In contrast, when one or more of the factors is absent—that is, the

three factors do not appear together in the same five-year observation—settlement always fails (lower row, Panel D). This supports Hypothesis 4.

Cumulatively, such findings offer *prima facie* evidence in favor of our hypotheses (Braumoeller and Goertz 2000). Our model therefore seems plausible. To draw causal inferences about *why* these strong cross-case results exist, however, we must turn to the within-case counterfactuals.

Within Case: The Causal Mechanism at Work

Our model proposes three factors that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for resistant territorial dispute settlement. The first three, short counterfactuals presented below—selected according to the criteria discussed earlier—explore the individual, necessary conditions (Hypotheses 1–3), while the fourth considers their joint sufficiency (Hypothesis 4). The accumulation of these counterfactuals—including longer discussions of each one, additional counterfactuals, and the source material presented in Appendix C (online)—constitutes the strong empirical, causal evidence that supports our model.

Attention Through Militarization (Hypothesis 1): Río de la Plata

In all five resistant cases that settled after 1945, militarization proved critical to settlement—namely, by generating attention and encouraging settlement as a way to avoid further violence (see Appendix C, online, for all counterfactuals and source material). The Argentina-Uruguay boundary dispute over the Río de la Plata provides a noteworthy illustration. In this case, militarization disappeared from the dyad in 1907, and the two countries subsequently developed one of the most amicable and interdependent relationships in the Southern Cone. This might have increased the resistant dispute's odds of settlement; yet settlement did not proceed until a fairly minor episode of militarization (re)placed and (re)prioritized the dispute on the dyad's agenda. Militarization (i.e., attention) therefore was a necessary condition for settlement.

Argentina and Uruguay disputed the Río de la Plata boundary after Uruguayan independence in 1828. Argentina claimed the river's deepest channel as the boundary (i.e., thalweg), while Uruguay proposed a middle-line solution. In the *Ramirez-Saenz-Peña Protocol* of 1910, the two states established a *modus vivendi*, freezing the status quo in lieu of a permanent settlement. They reaffirmed this position as late as 1961 (in the *Joint Declaration on the Outer Limits of the Río de la Plata*; Castillo LaBorde 1996), and neither state challenged it. Bilateral cooperation over energy and telecommunications subsequently strengthened, particularly during democratic spans in Argentina. Nevertheless, the dispute persisted.

The main obstacle lay not with "the political will and the determination to come to an agreement," which prevailed throughout the 1960s (Castillo Laborde 2007, 50). Rather, progress moved "sporadically," with "long periods of stagnation" (Castillo Laborde 2007, 51). A series of incidents, including Uruguay reasserting its claim to the disputed territory during bilateral working group meetings, undermined negotiation progress in the late 1960s. The Uruguayan claim prompted Argentine forces to occupy Timoteo Domínguez on January 13, 1969—the first episode of dyadic militarization since 1907. Intense and frequent negotiations followed, ultimately producing the 1970 *River Uruguay Declaration*, as well as four declarations signed in July 1971—all dealing with sovereignty issues. After ignoring the issue for a century-and-a-half, sovereignty over Timoteo Domínguez/Punta Bauzá rose to the most important concern in every bilateral negotiation until Argentina and Uruguay signed the *Treaty Concerning the Río de la Plata and the Corresponding Maritime Boundary* in Montevideo on November 19, 1973.

As predicted, settlement of the resistant dispute also required democratization and mediation (see Appendix C, online). Yet even when these characteristics appeared and even within a dyad whose members had a relatively amicable, interdependent relationship, settlement did not proceed without *some* (minor) militarization. The dispute remained nonmilitarized throughout the 1800s and, therefore, not a priority. Militarization (1907) then facilitated a *modus vivendi* (1910), but when that militarization dissipated, so did settlement progress. The involved states subsequently engaged in informal, low-level negotiations, but settlement still eluded them. Only when militarization re-emerged (1969, 1973) did a flurry of diplomatic activity result. Given that settlement breakthroughs followed only in the immediate wake of militarization and that disputants were unable to secure settlement progress during two prolonged, nonmilitarized periods (i.e., 1829–1907, 1907–1969), it is highly unlikely that settlement would have occurred without militarization.

Altered Preferences Through Democratization (Hypothesis 2): Bolsones-Fonseca

Democratization played a crucial role in the settlement of resistant territorial disputes in Latin America too—namely, by altering the settlement terms that the government would accept (i.e., its preferences over outcomes; see Appendix C, online). Latin America experienced frequent episodes of democratization and backsliding, which often resulted from a tug-of-war between the military and democratic, civilian leaders. Military leaders generally adopted a hardline position on territorial disputes. When democratic leaders entered government, they then softened the state's position—not only because they were beholden to a larger support base, but also because doing so sidelined a viable challenge to their power: the military. The military often had previously governed—giving society a viable alternative to civilian government—but more importantly, it could use external threats (e.g., territorial disputes) to underscore the importance of its expertise in government (e.g., to best protect national security) and open opportunities for it to re-intervene in politics. By settling territorial disputes, civilian leaders removed these opportunities. As a result, democratization was a necessary condition in Latin America—altering preferences, breaking bargaining deadlock, and pushing settlement forward.

The El Salvador-Honduras dispute over Bolsones-Fonseca highlights the necessity of democratization well. After independence in 1838, both states advanced overlapping territorial claims (Day 1987). They tried to reconcile these claims repeatedly—and made progress at various times (e.g., an 1884 treaty that Honduras failed to ratify)—but ultimately failed. The 1969 Football War even supplied both militarization and mediation (Day 1987); yet settlement still failed.

In the 1980s, democratization and settlement began to progress gradually and concurrently (e.g., in 1980 and 1986; see Appendix C, online). Nevertheless, the situation changed radically in the 1990s. Honduras elected Rafael Callejas in 1989; he drastically reduced the military's influence in the policy process (e.g., creating a civilian

intelligence service), prosecuted the armed forces for their crimes (e.g., assigning a commissioner to investigate human rights abuses), and appointed civilians to carry out the negotiations (as opposed to military officials). These moves laid the foundation for a final settlement by sidelining the Honduran military; yet democratization in El Salvador proved far more critical. The *Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional* (FMLN) operated in the disputed *bolsones* (i.e., "pockets" of disputed territory). As a guerrilla movement, the FMLN took hold of the *bolsones* during the Salvadoran civil war and then blocked settlement progress, largely by preventing the disputing states from presenting territorial surveys to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and completing demarcation.

The FMLN had two conditions for demobilizing and allowing Salvadoran officials access to the *bolsones*: the creation of a civilian police force (at the expense of the military's power) and participation as a political party in free and fair elections. Thus, sidelining the Salvadoran military and securing (full) democratization became necessary for a peace accord, which would, in turn, dislodge the territorial dispute's stalled settlement progress. Both of the FMLN's conditions were met in the United Nations-mediated *Chapultepec Peace Accords* of 16 January 1992, which ended the civil war. The ICJ ruling followed thereafter (September 11, 1992), and the parties accepted it, despite the objections of the Salvadoran military and with the FMLN playing a major role in its implementation (Bleichert 1992, 836).

The El Salvador-Honduras case grants us much inferential leverage regarding the individual necessity of altered preferences, particularly given its rarity in this dyad. Honduras experienced only twelve years of democratic rule before the settlement, while El Salvador experienced none (Mainwarring and Pérez Liñán 2013). Nevertheless, settlement could not proceed without democratization, despite the regular presence of both militarization (i.e., attention) and mediation (i.e., third-party assistance). Under a military government, the FMLN would remain unsatisfied and block settlement progress, while the government adopted a hardline bargaining position. It is therefore highly unlikely that settlement would have occurred without democratization.

Assistance Through Mediation (Hypothesis 3): Oriente-Mainas and Cordillera del Cóndor

Resistant territorial dispute settlement in Latin America also depended on third-party mediators, who played three primary roles (see Appendix C, online). First, when a dispute escalated, mediators frequently checked the disputants and prevented further violence. Second, mediators often pressured the disputants to settle, providing logistical support or incentives that promoted settlement. Finally, mediators regularly recommended final settlement terms. This allowed disputants to entertain previously unacceptable solutions, for the mediator could voice creative or unpopular terms and, thus, shield leaders from domestic backlash. Although our model remains agnostic about the exact mediator or the precise role it played, third-party mediators—through the roles outlined above—became a necessary condition for settlement in every resistant, Latin American case.

The Ecuador-Peru dispute demonstrates the necessary role of third-party mediation through the settlement of two territorial claims: Oriente-Mainas and Cordillera del Cóndor. Ecuador and Peru inherited an unclear mutual border at independence, quickly advanced competing territorial claims, and failed to resolve the matter for over a century. Peru eventually invaded the Oriente-Mainas territories in 1941, causing numerous casualties on both sides. With World War II diverting the attention of the great powers (Wood 1978), the involved states accepted a mediation proposal from Brazilian Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha. His efforts produced the 1942 *Rio Protocol*, which prominently featured third parties—establishing both a Demarcation Commission led by the Brazilian boundary service and an agreement "guarantor" team comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States. After Ecuador and Peru signed the 1942 agreement, Aranha then continued to play a prominent role, acting as a de-facto arbiter over demarcation disagreements (Palmer 1997), while the US Army Air Force supplied maps and details about the topography and hydrography of the region to further support demarcation. Given the number of mediators involved, the various roles they played, and the technological limitations of Ecuador and Peru, these delimitation and demarcation efforts would have been impossible without external assistance.

By 1947, "the territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru appeared settled" (Mares 1996, 101). The discovery of the Cenepa River, however, fundamentally challenged the status quo, introducing new information about the region's watershed(s) and resources. Ecuador argued that the conditions under which it signed the Rio Protocol had fundamentally changed, ordered the demarcation commission to halt, and objected to 90 percent of the completed demarcation work. Moreover, because it now believed that treaty to be inapplicable, Ecuador also prevented the guarantors from intervening. In 1960, it declared the Rio Protocol "null and void" and refused to allow the guarantors to mediate the substantive territorial issues. During a subsequent military spat with Peru (1981), it even insisted that the Organization of American States (OAS) mediate—not the guarantors—and that mediation focus only on ceasing hostilities—not the disputed territorial issues (Palmer 1997).

Third-party mediators remained excluded—and the resistant dispute unresolved—until the Cenepa War started in 1995. This time, to avoid escalation, Ecuador "seemingly abandoned the nullification thesis and publicly asked for the guarantors' mediation" (Mares 1996, 103). The Brazilian Foreign Ministry began mediating within days, facilitating what eventually became the *Itamaraty Peace Declaration* (1995). Meanwhile, the guarantors and OAS collectively constrained both disputants' military activities, deployed the full contingent of soldiers under the United Nations' Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEP), and, at the behest of Ecuador and Peru, agreed to decide the settlement terms if the parties could not secure them bilaterally. As Palmer (1997, 128) argued, "without the involvement of the representatives of the United States, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina in all stages of the diplomatic process, and without the MOMEP on the military side, it is unlikely that a permanent solution to Latin America's longest-running, most intractable border problem will be found" (Palmer 1997, 128). Indeed, in 1998, the Ecuadorian and Peruvian Presidents asked the guarantors to propose a final solution to their dispute—the one reflected in the *Global and Definitive Peace Agreement* of October 26, 1998 (St John 1999).

Could Ecuador and Peru have settled their dispute without third-party mediators? It is highly unlikely. During 1942–1947 and 1995–1998, third parties stalled the dispute's escalation, facilitated bilateral agreements, enabled demarcation, reaffirmed the importance of signed agreements, constrained wartime hostilities, deployed a military observation mission, and proposed the settlement terms eventually adopted. Moreover, even though democratization and militarization frequently occurred in the 1970s

and 1980s, Ecuador and Peru failed to settle until mediators assisted (see Day 1987). We therefore conclude that mediators were a necessary condition of settlement (see also Simmons 1999, 19).

The Convergence of Factors (Hypothesis 4): The Beagle Channel

Militarization (i.e., attention), democratization (i.e., altered preferences), and mediation (i.e., third-party assistance) each prove essential to resistant dispute settlement; yet settlement itself only succeeds when all three factors converge (see Appendix C, online). The Beagle Channel dispute illustrates this well. Argentina and Chile began disputing the Channel at independence, but granted it little attention until militarization occurred. Repeated militarization in the 1870s, for example, prompted a US-mediated agreement in 1881, although the disputants subsequently disagreed on its interpretation (Ireland 1938; Day 1987). Further militarization between 1881 and 1910 led to additional agreements (e.g., *modus vivendi*), and the dispute then went dormant, receiving little attention until militarization brought it back to the forefront again (1950–1970).

After a period of prolonged militarization, Argentina and Chile signed an arbitration agreement (July 22, 1971). Per this accord, Queen Elizabeth II referred the dispute to an arbitration panel, which issued its award in 1977. Argentina declared the award null and void, though, and both sides immediately prepared for confrontation and placed their forces on alert. The Argentine junta even began executing Operation Sovereignty (December 20, 1978)—a military operation to retake the disputed islands by force—but halted the operation hours before its scheduled start time when Pope John Paul II signaled his intention to mediate (Lisińska 2019).

Over the next two years, the disputants—amidst militarized encounters—met repeatedly with the Pope and his representatives, who proposed the terms that would eventually comprise the final settlement. "The Vatican's patient and persistent mediation effort [therefore]…aid[ed] the conclusion of [the] conflict" (Lindsley 1987, 451). Nevertheless, it did not immediately settle the dispute. Chile accepted the papal proposal with minor reservations. Argentina, however, dismissed it after it was leaked to the press in 1981 and continued plans to settle the dispute via force (see Arquilla and Moyano 2001).

Two major impediments to settlement then remained: the Argentine military's nationalistic ideology (Lisińska 2019) and the institutional composition of both military governments, which allowed hardliners to block any rapprochement (Villar 2016). Only when the Argentine junta weakened considerably (as a consequence of defeat in the Malvinas/Falklands War) did democratizers in both countries issue a joint call for the territorial dispute's settlement, thank the Pope, and promise that "on regaining democracy, our peoples will be in a better condition to consolidate peace" (Day 1987, 383). That final necessary condition—altered preferences through democratization—occurred in late 1983, when Argentina elected Raúl Alfonsín. According to Vatican representatives, "Alfonsín's flexibility…laid the groundwork for resolution" (Garrett 1985, 81). He had campaigned on resolving the Beagle Channel dispute and made this a top priority once in power, not least to introduce cuts to the military budget (Day 1987). Moreover, he put diplomats—instead of military officials—in charge of the negotiations (a "crucial change"; Lindsley 1987, 447) and called for a referendum on whether Argentina should accept the papal settlement terms, which pressured the remaining hardliners to relent. The referendum results overwhelmingly endorsed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, thereby granting Alfonsín the leverage to overcome the opposition to ratification in Congress. In the end, "the appearance of a conciliatory figure in Argentina, Alfonsín, was crucial for the [dispute's] resolution" (Garrett 1985, 102). Scholars therefore unanimously agree that "regime change should be considered an explanatory factor" in the dispute's settlement (Villar 2016, 158).

In the Beagle Channel dispute, we see "a century-old conflict…resolved when domestic political changes, skillful mediation, and [the] willingness to compromise converge" (Lindsley 1987, 453). In our model's language, settlement required attention, assistance, and altered preferences *simultaneously*. Militarization regularly incentivized dyadic and international attention, but could not alone produce settlement. Mediation, in concert with militarization, moved the settlement process forward significantly; yet even then, settlement stalled because hardline bargaining positions remained intact (Day 1987). Only when democratization changed Argentine leaders' preferences over outcomes—while militarization promoted attention and third parties mediated—did bargaining space open and settlement proceed. In particular, as the democratic coalition voiced its support for settlement, Alfonsín became unconstrained by past policies and recognized that settling the dispute would reduce the military's influence; he preferred settlement to non-settlement, even on the same terms that the Argentine military previously rejected (repeatedly).[11] In short, attention, altered preferences, and assistance—three factors that contingently converged at a specific juncture—were individually necessary *and jointly sufficient* for the Beagle Channel settlement.[12]

Integrating the Findings: "Crossword Figures"

Figures 2 and 3 concisely integrate our main findings across all post-1945, Latin American, resistant territorial disputes. These "crossword figures" use the quantitative data introduced earlier to illustrate that militarization (i.e., attention), democratization (i.e., altered preferences), and mediation (i.e., third-party assistance) are individually necessary (Hypotheses 1–3) *and* jointly sufficient (Hypothesis 4) for settlement. For each dispute (row), we track militarization, democratization, and mediation across each five-year period from 1945 to 2015 (column). If our model's hypotheses are accurate, then: (1) settlement *always* occurs when a dispute's three variable rows "light up" at the same time; and (2) *never* occurs when they do not. This is exactly what we find.

Figure 2 contains the resistant disputes that do not settle. As the figure demonstrates, no five-year period contains all three necessary conditions simultaneously. Many periods contain none (e.g., Malvinas, 1985–2015), one (e.g., democratization in Antofagasta, 1955–1959) or two (e.g., militarization and mediation in Essequibo, 1970–1974,

[11] Alfonsín's haste to settle the dispute owed much to the uncertainties of Argentina's fragile transition, particularly the need to weaken the military to avoid a new coup (Garrett 1985, 103).

[12] Although we analyze only positive cases of settlement, our point is equally illustrated using "most likely" cases of settlement that failed to settle because they lacked at least one individually necessary condition. Bolivia and Chile, for instance, almost resolved their Antofagasta claim in 1974–1978. They resumed diplomatic relations in 1975 (severed since 1962) and agreed to a formula for resolution. Nevertheless, the dispute lacked militarization, excluded third parties, and experienced no democratization.



Figure 2. Configuration of conditions in unsettled, resistant cases
Note: The United Kingdom appears in thirty-seven of seventy-five non-settlement observations; it is, however, neither necessary nor sufficient for the non-settlement of resistant territorial disputes.



Figure 3. Configuration of conditions in settled, resistant cases

1980–1984, and 1995–1999)—but never all three—of the model's necessary conditions. As a result, settlement never occurs. This strongly supports Hypotheses 1–3. Militarization (Hypothesis 1), democratization (Hypothesis 2), and mediation (Hypothesis 3) are individually insufficient for settlement to occur. No single factor, or any combination of two, alone yields settlement.

Figure 3 provides similar information on the resistant disputes that settle, and its data lead to two main conclusions. First, as in Figure 2, when none, one, or two of the three necessary conditions present, settlement *never* occurs (e.g., Río de la Plata, 1945–1969). Second, when all three factors present simultaneously, the dispute *always* settles (e.g., Oriente-Mainas in 1945–1949 or Bolsones-Fonseca in 1990–1994). Such findings strongly support Hypotheses 1–4. Militarization (Hypothesis 1), democratization (Hypothesis 2), and mediation (Hypothesis 3) are each individually necessary, but individually insufficient, for settlement to occur. They must *each* be present for settlement, and no single factor (or combination of two) alone will yield settlement.

Moreover, militarization, democratization, and mediation—whenever together simultaneously—are jointly sufficient for settlement to occur (Hypothesis 4). Settlement always happens at these moments.

Conclusion

Territorial boundary peace drastically alters interstate relationships (see Goertz, Diehl, and Balas 2016). By taking the most contentious issue in world politics off dyadic agendas, it paves the way for positive peace, in which greater interstate cooperation and integration flourish. Evidence confirms that a territorial boundary peace has expanded globally over the past two centuries (Appendix A, online); yet it is not all encompassing. In Latin America, for example, roughly 8 percent of neighboring states have not delimited their (in)land borders in entirety (Owsiak, Cuttner, and Buck 2018). Of the 92 percent that have, 29 percent partly contest the legal settlements involved (Frederick, Hensel, and Macaulay 2017). This suggests that a number of disputes resist settlement, despite over a century of settlement attempts. Combined with six additional disputes between non-neighboring states—often an important legacy of colonialism—they also upset the regional prospects for a complete territorial boundary peace in Latin America.

How then do resistant territorial disputes settle, thereby expanding the territorial boundary peace? We propose that settlement occurs when three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions exist. First, the dispute must receive *attention*—i.e., be (re)placed and (re)prioritized on the dyadic (and perhaps, international) agenda. Militarization accomplishes this in post–1945 Latin America, largely because it threatens to violate the territorial integrity norm. Second, states must *alter their preferences* to break the bargaining deadlock and expand the bargaining range. A government's preferences most drastically change when the leader's support coalition changes. At that time, an opportunity arises for a significant shift in the settlement terms that the government prefers to continued non-settlement. In post–1945 Latin America, this occurs during democratic regime change—when civilian leaders need to end territorial disputes to prevent the military from (re)intervening in politics and, relatedly, to protect nascent, democratic institutions. Finally, disputants require third-party *assistance* to locate, voice, encourage, and underwrite a settlement to their protracted dispute. Mediation plays this role in post–1945 Latin America.

According to the model, settlement occurs when these three factors converge simultaneously—attention (i.e., militarization in Latin America), altered preferences (i.e., democratization in Latin America), and third-party assistance (i.e., mediation in Latin America). If one (or more) is lacking, however, settlement does not occur. Evidence from a wide array of within-case counterfactual analyses (see Appendix C, online) and a cross-case statistical analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions supply significant, multifaceted support for the model. Attention, altered preferences, and assistance are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for resistant territorial disputes to settle in the Americas after 1945. Resistant cases *never* settle when one or more of the conditions are absent and *always* settle when the three factors appear simultaneously. Whether this differs across time (i.e., pre-1945) and perhaps space (i.e., outside Latin America) remains an area of inquiry for future research. Any such research, however, will need to consider the specific causal mechanisms through which attention, altered preferences, and assistance operate in other regions (i.e., Level II; see Figure 1), much as we did for Latin America in this study.

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