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

Parties' (Non)Responses to Levels and Changes of Inequality: Reconciling Rival Views Using New Data on Equality Concepts

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

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Parties' (non)responses to levels and changes of inequality: Reconciling rival views using new data on equality concepts

Abstract

Do parties respond to inequality? Despite the growing relevance of economic disparities and their negative political and societal consequences, our understanding of party competition over redistribution remains limited. Thus far, research had to rely on broad salience scores of socio-economic positions from party manifestos rather than parties' distinct stances on (economic) inequality. To tackle this limitation, we introduce a novel (*Varieties of Egalitarianism*) dataset on party stances on economic inequality, equal chances, and equal rights for OECD countries over five decades (1970-2020). We demonstrate that responsiveness found in previous studies is driven by non-economic equality concepts. We then re-assess the impact of "inequality" on party responsiveness. Theoretically, we question (left) parties' responsiveness to levels of inequality. Low visibility of levels and system justification beliefs undermine the mobilization of those voters most in need of redistribution. As a result of the electoral disincentives, left parties do not emphasize economic equality. By contrast, rising inequality is visible and poses a real electoral threat that left parties should address via economic egalitarianism. In line with these rationales, we find that 1) (left) parties do not respond to inequality levels but 2) left parties do respond to increases in inequality when their below-median core groups fall behind. In the concluding discussion; we argue that our results suggest that a ratchet pattern could stabilize entrenched inequality.

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Programmatic reactions to inequality

Economic inequality is one of the greatest challenges for contemporary democracies with tremendous implications for people's living conditions, political representation and political fairness. Despite its relevance and ongoing debates over the inability or unwillingness of political actors to tackle ever-growing levels of economic disparities (e.g., Piketty 2014, 2020, Sandel 2020), we know surprisingly little about party reactions to it and the few existing studies (Pontusson and Rueda 2010, Tavits and Potter 2015) are more positive regarding responsiveness than inequality trends suggest (Atkinson 2015, Milanovic 2016, Piketty 2020).

Thus far, the two most influential studies (Pontusson and Rueda 2010, Tavits and Potter 2015) suggest that party responses point to the kind of left right gradient most partisan theories would predict (Korpi 1983, Esping Andersen 1985). Both studies expect and find left responsiveness as high (levels of) inequality translates to more demand for redistribution and thus a larger constituency for left parties. Conversely, center-right parties – in lieu of a viable economic response – put more emphasis on value issues (Tavits and Potter 2015). The *right avoidance* argument is in line with recent research on the strategies of center-right parties (Gidron and Ziblatt 2019, Ziblatt 2017, Hacker and Pierson 2020). Conversely, results for left parties are hard to align with current debates in and outside political science: If the Left was really responsive, why has inequality been on the rise since the 1980s (Atkinson 2015, Milanovic 2016, Piketty 2020)? How can the idea of left responsiveness be reconciled with the verve with which left parties are routinely scolded for being irresponsive and inactive vis-a-vis high and ever rising material inequalities – most recently and most prominently by Piketty (2020: 832-836) and Sandel (2020)?

This manuscript proposes empirical and theoretical remedies to resolve this puzzling incongruence: Empirically, we argue that previous research has over-estimated party responsiveness as lacking data on parties' egalitarian agenda was replaced with broad policy

measures, such as general right-left scores – a problem that has been acknowledged and whose implications are clear to scholars of the politics of inequality (Rueda 2008, Rueda and Pontusson 2010). To address this issue, we combine computational methods with large-scale online crowdcoding to distinguish economic from non-economic equality concepts in 850,000 party statements from 12 OECD countries, covering a time period from 1970 to 2021. Theoretically, we develop and test arguments that emphasize different rationales of party responsiveness to *levels* and *changes* of inequality, which help to reconcile optimistic and pessimistic views on party responsiveness.

The paper presents three rationales that lead to different expectations about party responsiveness to *levels* and *changes* of inequality: First, media attention is focused on changes and spikes rather than levels or long-time developments, which results in higher public *visibility* of rising inequality (McCall 2013, Mosley 1984, Vliegenthart & Boomgaarden 2007). Second, left *mobilization* among low-income voters is hard in very unequal contexts (Solt 2008, 2010; Gallego 2015), making it less attractive to politicize the issue at high levels of inequality (Mahler 2008, Barth et al. 2015, Avery 2015, Bechtel et al. 2016, Fenzl 2018). Third, system justification and meritocratic beliefs help to justify and stabilize high levels of inequality (e.g., Trump 2018, Mijs 2021), while people are sensitive to information about rising inequality (McCall et al. 2017) – resulting in larger *awareness* of changes in inequality. Accordingly, we expect that left responsiveness is limited to *rising* inequality, as attention to and awareness of the problem will be higher and voters can (still) be mobilized with redistributive issues.

Moreover, we expect that left parties' responsiveness is mostly driven by concerns over lower income groups. Hence, measures of inequality that directly capture the economic sort of below-median income groups should be most likely to reflect Left responsiveness.

In the conclusion, we summarize how these expectations yield a "ratchet" pattern that helps to understand three seemingly countervailing observations: inequality levels are entrenched, the left is not indifferent to rising inequality, but the rich get ever richer. While a real ratchet allows motion only in one direction, we use the metaphor as a heuristic to illustrate how a different susceptibility to react to inequality levels and changes explains how responsiveness and high inequality can coexist. Before we move to our theoretical argument and the respective tests, we introduce the original dataset we collected to overcome the limitations of previous research on parties' responses to economic inequality.

Varieties of Egalitarianism vs. previous measures of economic egalitarianism

One precondition for the assessment of the hypotheses and the overall question if parties respond to economic inequality is to use data that allow us to distinguish whether parties favor economic inequality and redistribution or in fact talk about other – equally important yet distinct – concepts of equality. The landmark studies by Pontusson and Rueda (2010) and Tavits and Potter (2015) exemplify the data constraints scholars have faced thus far. Although both articles are concerned with the changing redistributive profiles of parties in response to inequality, the lack of suitable data made it impossible to test if parties respond to inequality with increased emphasis on economic equality and redistribution. To test claims about party reactions to inequality, at the very least, we must try to decipher economic and non-economic equality concepts. We do this based on a reproducible and scalable data gathering process that combines automatic classifiers (to segment and preselect relevant text) with online crowdcoding of specific inequality concepts.

Analyzing ca. 850,000 programmatic statements from parties, we distinguish positive references to economic equality from other equality-related statements and thus speak directly to the question which parties respond to inequality by demanding material equality – as

opposed to parties that strengthen their focus on equal chances or equal rights/anti-discrimination. As Figure 1 suggests, this mix is what existing studies have (i.a.) captured. What is kept separate in our three equality concepts and most case sensitive research on the equality discourses of left and right parties (Hopkin and Shaw 2015, Blanc-Noel 2013, Lindvall and Rothstein 2006, Meagher and Szebehely 2019, Falcinella 2022, Hickson 2009, Dahlerup 2018, Weeks and Allen 2022) is conflated. "Redistributive appeals" are measured via "economic" responsiveness indices (Tavits and Potter 2015) including items such as "equality positive" (MARPOR item 503[1]) – which shows almost the same trajectory as Tavits and Potter's economic index.

Figure 1 Development of parties' focus on equality, 1970 – 2020. Colored lines represent five different concepts of equality. Grey area shows the development of the economic position index from Tavits and Potter (2015). All lines are smoothed by fitting a first-order local polynomial with a=0.7.



Figure 1 tracks the emphasis on various equality concepts (relative to the entire emphasis in texts measured at each election). Panel A shows the patterns for all parties, Panel B contrasts

[1] The MARPOR item equality positive, while the best proxy available, exemplifies the issues of MARPOR indices of which it is an item; multidimensionality. It was previously called "social justice" and then renamed, and is inherently a mix of first and second dimension statements of parties (and the MARPOR project and item 503 description is transparent about this). It is thus unsurprising that, in a previous paper, Tavits (2007) used the item as a second dimension item, whereas the 2015 paper uses the item for the "economic" responsiveness index.

left and right parties. A comparison with the salience of the economic index from Tavits and Potter (2015) illustrates the aforementioned multidimensionality issue: a general hike suggests that parties became more egalitarian over time and stability before 2000. Yet, looking at the specific concepts such as economic equality, this is not generally true. Instead, there are countervailing trends for different equality concepts. The index (based on categories from the Manifesto Project, e.g. 503) illustrates that the use of a multi-dimensional measure risks conflating concepts that should be separated for answering our research question.

The descriptive patterns also challenge the premises that left parties reduce attention to equal rights and anti-discrimination or increase it at the expense of outcome equality. Instead, we see an initial de-traditionalisation (less economic equality) followed by a re-traditionalisation of the Left, that is – importantly – accompanied by a sustained upward trend on anti-discrimination/equal rights. Party-level correlations between the concepts confirm that economic equality and antidiscrimination/equal rights are hardly related (cf. appendix, p. 44). This very weak association speaks against using measures such as "equality positive", economic indices and left-right measures (as used in Tavits and Potter 2015, Pontusson and Rueda 2010, Polacko 2020) as a proxy for redistributive or economic equality responses to inequality. The subsequent section describes the crowdcoding of the equality concepts in detail, before we outline the rationales for party responsiveness to economic inequality.

Crowdcoding of inequality concepts

Crowdsourced data collection refers to the online-collection or annotation of data using multiple judgments from lay coders. Crowdcoding applies this approach to text analysis. It has been presented as an approach to scale expert knowledge for tasks that are (still) too complex for fully automated approaches (Benoit et al. 2016) and has been applied to collect and annotate data on party positions, issue salience or sentiment (e.g., Benoit et al. 2016;

Haselmayer & Jenny 2017; Lehmann & Zobel 2018) and parties' inequality concepts (Horn 2019). This paper uses as similar approach to gather new data on parties' emphasis on five different concepts of inequality: economic inequality, equal chances, anti-discrimination, general mentions, and a residual category that mostly includes regional, generational, or healthcare-related aspects of inequality. In order to reduce the workload for and costs of human coders, we built a text analysis pipeline that fuses humans' ability of deep semantic understanding with computational efficiency gains.

The elicitation of equality conceptions relies on party manifestos that are regularly published in advance of national elections. In those documents, parties state their goals and vision for the years to come, which render them a suitable foundation to measure their focus on and understanding of equality. Across the 12 OECD-countries we study[2] (1970-2021), we collected 965 party manifestos. 544 of those were retrieved from the Manifesto Project (MARPOR) database via their API. The remaining documents were collected manually from different sources such as (online) archives and libraries.

Following MARPOR, we zoom in on quasi-sentences as the unit bearing semantic meaning. Thus, raw texts for all manifestos, published before 1998 had to be segmented using a binary classifier as they were not available in digitized form (cf. Appendix A1 for more information). This process essentially segmented all party manifestos into 850,000 quasi-sentences. The next step consists of identifying statements that concern equality. In order to lower the workload for and, hence, costs of human coders, we trained a logistic regression classifier on quasi-sentences that pertain to category 503 (labeled by the MARPOR as "Equality: Positive"). The classifier was fine-tuned to reliably identify the vast majority of relevant

[2] These countries are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Switzerland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States.

statements at the expense of more false positives (we set a minimum level of 0.8 for precision). The (potentially) relevant units were subsequently checked by trained research assistants. This process left us with about 55,451 quasi-sentences that speak to equality and social justice.

To classify these statements into different concepts of equality, we rely on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), a platform that has been successfully used for collecting data in previous research (e.g., Berinsky et al. 2012; Sumner et al. 2020; Skytte forthcoming) and consistently produced the best results in extensive pre-tests using different platforms. Coders were asked to read short instructions (see Appendix A) and judge whether a statement includes a positive reference to equality and equal treatment and if so, which of the specific categories applies. We also provide the previous statement as context to facilitate valid coding decisions (Benoit et al. 2016). The pre-selected units (quasi-sentences) were split into tasks of 500-1000 units and distributed on AMT from February to May 2022.

On AMT, we restrict access to contributors with IP-addresses from countries with similar geographical and/or cultural backgrounds and control coder accuracy against a benchmark of test statements that have been unanimously coded by three experts. We collect five coding decisions per unit and made sure our workers were able to attain local minimum wages.[3] In total, 293 workers contributed to the full task and the modal worker contributed 180 units. To assess their quality, we aggregate individual codings per unit based on majority vote (de Condorcet 1785). Doing so, we obtain a Krippendorff's alpha of 0.72 between the crowd's judgment and the experts based on 2,904 coded units, which exhibits very good agreement even by conventional standards of quantitative content analysis (the Appendix shows country-

[3] We calculated (average) hourly wages based on extensive pre-tests assessing the average coding duration per unit. The Appendix provides detailed information on the payment.

specific levels of validity with unit-level alpha values ranging between 0.6 and 0.85 - see Figure A1, Table A4). These results confirm that crowds are able to replicate expert judgments of complex tasks – even at the unit level. With this data at hand, we are able to test whether parties indeed push for economic redistribution in response to inequality. The next section outlines three theoretical rationales for party reactions.

Constraints and incentives for party responsiveness to inequality

Previous research argues that left parties should respond to high levels of economic inequality for strategic reasons. The baseline of such arguments resides on the seminal contribution of Meltzer and Richard (1981), which is based on a couple of strong assumptions. For once, such arguments suppose that (rational and informed) low-income voters are supportive of (more) redistribution promoted by leftist parties – which should receive their (full) electoral support. As higher levels of inequality are equated with a larger share of voters suffering economic hardship, a second assumption is that this increases electoral demand for redistribution –
– thereby creating strategic incentives for left parties to put economic debates evolving around redistribution on the top of their (electoral) agenda (Tavits and Potter 2015). The direct link of individual economic hardship and electoral demand for redistribution has been qualified as low-income voters are typically harder to mobilize (Pontusson and Rueda 2010). Yet, as we argue, mobilization is only one of the constraints to (left) party responsiveness to inequality.

Visibility

Previous research implicitly assumes that (levels) of inequality have imminent and direct effects on voters and party platforms. This requires at least one important precondition: that voters and parties actually take note. However, perceptions of inequality do not mirror the actual levels of inequality in a given context (e.g., Kennworthy and McCall 2008; McCall 2013). One important driver of general public perception is media attention. Media salience

influences audiences' perceived importance of (McCombs, 2005) and knowledge about the object of coverage (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000). Yet, the available body of research shows that media attention to economic inequality does not reflect actual levels of inequality (McCall 2013 for US election campaigns; Schröder and Vietze 2015 for German TV broadcasts and newspapers). Instead of levels, or decreases in inequality, media coverage focused – by and large – on rising disparities (McCall 2013) or emphasized dramatic increases (Schröder and Vietze 2015). These findings align with studies demonstrating that media coverage does not track real-world indicators, such as unemployment and inflation (Mosley 1984), or immigration rates (Vliegenthart& Boomgaarden 2007). In line with theories of newsworthiness and gatekeeping (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Shoemaker and Vos 2009), the media turns the spotlight on novel events or drastic changes and developments. These biases in coverage should result in lower public visibility and salience of inequality levels. By contrast, the public's attention should be more focused on changes in inequality.

Mobilization

A second hurdle to left parties' responsiveness to economic inequality is electoral mobilization. The general proposition based on conflict-theory would suggest that higher inequality should increase electoral mobilization as the share of those faced with the perils of economic hardship goes up and these voters will align their preferences in demand for more redistribution (Meltzer and Richard 1981). Yet, an influential set of theories postulates the opposite pattern, namely that higher levels of inequality reduce turnout of low-income voters as the wealthy can use their resources to dominate the political process, causing the demobilization of less-well-off citizens (Goodin and Dryzek 1980). The idea that high levels of inequality reflect unequal power balances that undermine rather than induce egalitarian responses is also reflected in classic power resources theory. Korpi (1983) posits a "democratic class struggle" in which the welfare state and high inequality are not just a result

of, but also a determinant of redistribution. These arguments fit best with very unequal contexts, where the poor dispose of few resources to pursue their political goals, and are dominated by top-income groups in (full) control of the political agenda (Schattschneider 1960, Gilens and Page 2014). Thus, where income inequality is high, low-income voters will "(…) conclude that hat there is little point to being engaged in politics" (Solt 2008: 49) and thus abstain. Empirical evidence shows that low-income voters indeed participate less at higher levels of income inequality (Mahler 2008, Solt 2008, Gallego 2015, Fenzl 2018).

The demobilization of low-income voters has varying implications for parties according to their political profile. Despite changes of party support over time, people in the lower half of the income distribution still constitute a core constituency of left parties (Pontusson and Rueda 2010). More recently, Abou-Chadi and Hix (2021) empirically re-confirm that the (mainstream) Left still mainly secures the electoral support of working-class voters. This suggests that (low-income) turnout will predominantly affect the electoral fortunes of the Left. Accordingly, Bechtel et al. (2016) present convincing causal and correlational evidence that left parties fared better when compulsory voting led to high turnout. This, suggests that redistributive platforms of the Left should be more efficient under low levels of inequality as poorer voters should be more likely to turn out. Conversely, at higher levels of inequality, an important fraction of the Left's core constituency may be hard to mobilize (Pontusson and Rueda 2010). Thus, faced with a shrinking electoral support base, left parties could be constrained to adapt their electoral platform to compensate such losses by appealing to moderate voters, a finding corroborated in research on parties' welfare positions (Barth et al. 2015). Hence, a negative effect of inequality on turnout could mute left party responsiveness at high levels of inequality.

Awareness

An abundant literature on individual perceptions of inequality argues and shows how various cognitive heuristics may reduce demand for redistribution and thereby stabilize high levels of inequality. Such processes can be motivated by system justification, which reflects the desire of individuals to think that their social systems are fair and just (Trump 2018; Jost et al. 2004). Or, the raise of meritocratic beliefs may promote the understanding that high levels of inequality result from a fair, meritocratic process where success reflects individual talent, ambition and hard work (Mijs 2021). Despite varying mechanisms, both accounts present convincing evidence that individuals indeed legitimate high *levels* of inequality (Trump 2018, Mijs 2021). However, despite broad evidence in favor of self-reinforcing inequality, experimental work suggests that individuals may adapt their preferences if they are made aware of *rising* inequality. Provided with factual information about rising inequality, individuals were slightly more supportive of redistributive policies in experimental setups (Kuziemko et al. 2015; McCall et al. 2017). This suggests that whereas high levels of inequality may be self-reinforcing, awareness of rising inequality is associated with increased support for redistribution.

These findings are also important for (left) mobilization over redistribution. For once, providing information to raise awareness of inequality will not suffice to alter preferences for redistribution as voters have accommodated high levels of income disparities (Trump 2018). Conversely, bolstering public awareness of growing inequality can raise awareness and alter preferences for redistribution (Kuziemko et al. 2015; McCall et al. 2017). From a strategic point of view, more egalitarian platforms only seem to pay off if inequality is on the rise.

To summarize, there is no reason to expect a uniform pattern of party response to economic inequality, because propagating redistributive policies promises no electoral rewards for right

parties, which should opt for deflecting public attention towards more favorable topics (Tavits and Potter 2015). Moreover, we found broad evidence suggesting a skeptical view towards left party responsiveness *at high levels* of inequality. In such contexts, public attention to the topic will be modest, the low-income voters that should be susceptible to redistributive policy platforms are harder to mobilize, and individuals may have accommodated the status quo. As consequence of shifted preferences towards redistribution (due to demobilized low-income voters), strategic left parties should turn their campaign focus towards more moderate voters. Such response could even result in de-emphasis of left egalitarian platforms. Conversely, rising inequality should inspire left party responsiveness. In such circumstances, public awareness should be greater, low-income voters should be easier to mobilize and individual-level heuristics legitimizing inequality should be less relevant.

While we do not test the direct effect of these rationales on party behavior, we argue that they have the potential to modify strategic incentives for party responsiveness to levels and changes of inequality. Accordingly, we derive two overarching expectations for party responses to inequality.

Expectation 1: Neither left nor right *parties are responsive to levels of inequality.*
Expectation 2: Left parties respond to rising inequality by emphasizing redistribution.

The theoretical arguments presented above accentuate the role of low-income groups. Yet, extent research on party responses to economic inequality has focused on overall inequality measured by the Gini (Tavits and Potter 2015) or top income shares (Pontusson and Rueda 2010). The former is a very broad indicator, which is particularly susceptible to changes in the middle of the income distribution (Atkinson 1970: 256-7) that often masks substantial variation in-between units of observation (Blesch et al. 2022). The latter – due to its explicit

focus on top income groups – does not capture whether low-income groups lose ground vis-à-vis the top rich. Thus, both indicators appear ill-suited to test the theoretical constraints for left party responsiveness outlined above. As most rationales center on the pivotal role of below-median income groups, we posit that left responsiveness should primarily reflect inequality as captured by low-income shares. In line with this qualification, we also examine how well changes and levels of different types of inequality align with party responsiveness.

Before we test these expectations, we describe our data and modelling strategy.

Data and methods

Our data include 12 OECD-countries representing important variation in the role of the state, institutional settings, and the type of market economy. Moreover, covering five decades (1970-2021) and varying trends in inequality, our results should provide a representative picture of party reactions to economic disparities in democratic market-economies.

Dependent variable

We obtain our dependent variable from the crowdcoding of equality concepts. As we focus on parties' economic response to inequality, the measure reflects the share of a party's positive references to economic inequality based on its total manifesto statements in an election. To provide an example, in its 2019 manifesto, the Danish Social Democrats (Socialdemokratiet) devoted 8.4% or 238 of their 2842 manifesto statements to economic equality. In the same election the Conservatives (Konservative Folkeparti) referred to economic equality in 2.5% of their manifesto (28/1131 statements), while the Socialist Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti) was most attentive to the topic (11.7% or 84/719 statements). On average, parties emphasized economic equality in 3.2% of their manifesto statements.

Independent variables

To examine party responsiveness to economic inequality, we collect and assemble data on all relevant indicators from various datasets for each country in a given year. The appendix provides detailed information on these indicators.

Gini

We draw on the most comprehensive data source for overall inequality measured with the Gini coefficient, the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID, Solt 2020)[4]. The database compiles and standardizes observations from various original data sources (e.g., OECD, World Bank, Eurostat, Luxemburg Income Study). In line with previous research on party responses to economic inequality (Tavits and Potter 2015; Pontusson and Rueda 2010), we use data on inequality before (market) taxes and transfers with values ranging from 0.38 to 0.56. Lower values indicate lower inequality, higher values represent more inequality.

Income shares and income ratios

For data on income groups, we utilize data from the World Income Database (WID).[5] The WID combines different data sources, such as national accounts, surveys and fiscal data to compile the most comprehensive data on income levels and distributions currently available (see e.g., Piketty et al. 2014). We use these data to compute the shares of top and bottom income groups (before taxes and transfers). We use the most common shares: Top 1% and Bottom 50% and present results for a broader range of income groups in the Appendix. Moreover, we rely on detailed information on specific income percentiles for calculating the ratios of various income groups (e.g., between the 90th percentile and the 50th percentile). Based on the extant literature on income inequality, we focus on two (percentile) ratios a) top

[4] Data are available at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/LM4OWF
[5] Data are available at: https://wid.world/data/

incomes relative to median income (90-50), b) top incomes relative to low incomes (90-10). In the appendix, we present results for median to low incomes (50-10) as well as differences between the low(er) and upper middle class (80-20).

In the analysis, we emphasize differences between levels and changes of inequality indicators. The former is measured as the level of inequality one year before an election, the latter refers to the annual changes in inequality (obtained by calculating first differences). Thereby, we focus on levels and changes of inequality that are available and prevalent at the time when parties publish their manifestos.

Partisanship (left-right)

The paper expects different patterns of responsiveness according to partisanship. We obtain this variable from the widely used coding of party families of the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2021). Left parties include Social Democratic parties, Green parties and Communist parties. Right parties include Liberals, Christian Democrats, Conservatives and Nationalist parties. Fringe parties (agrarian, ethnic/regional, special issue) are excluded. This standard coding yields an almost balanced share of left (43%, N=379) and right (57%, 496) parties.

Turnout

Higher inequality has frequently been linked with lower voter turnout of poorer voters (Beramendi and Anderson, 2008; Jensen and Jespersen, 2017; Solt, 2008, 2010; Polacko et al. 2021). This could have important implications for (left) party responsiveness, which could be less rewarding if low-income voters do not cast a ballot. As general turnout is largely driven by electoral participation of low-income voters (Mahler 2008), we follow the mainstream literature and operationalize low-income mobilization accordingly (Pontusson and Rueda

2010; Polacko 2020; Polacko et al. 2021). To do so, we use data from the Quality of Governance dataset (Teorell et al. 2022), with an average turnout of 75%.

Controls

A number of factors related to differences at the level of parties and countries could drive the extent to which parties make positive references to economic equality. Thus, we adjust our models for a number of potential confounding variables. First, at the level of parties, we account for party age (measured in years), party size (a party's vote share at the national-level), and whether a party is a niche party or not (i.e., ecologist, communist, nationalist party, agrarian, ethnic/regional, special issue parties). Thereby, we take into account that new, small and niche parties may be less responsive than established or mainstream parties. At the country level, we adjust our models for the effective number of parties in an election (ENP), and economic performance (% GDP growth). The Appendix contains more details on these variables (Appendix B).

Model specification

To analyze whether parties respond to economic inequality, we estimate linear, mixed-effects regression models following similar applications (Tavits and Potter 2015). Our baseline models of party responsiveness use an interaction term of inequality with left-right partisanship as independent variables. To account for variation between parties and countries, we include random effects at the level of parties and countries. The appendix includes various robustness checks that a) use different model specifications (fixed-effects models, fractional regression models and jackknifed estimates with clusters at the level of party families and countries), b) account for a more comprehensive set of control variables (electoral system, redistribution, decade dummies) and c) restrict observations (by excluding fringe parties with

less than 2% in national elections, by focusing on mainstream party families, or by excluding outliers). These additional tests corroborate the results presented below (see Appendix C).

To provide some context, the appendix presents descriptive information on trends in various inequality indicators and party emphasis of economic inequality (see Figures B1a and B1b). We further provide the usual summary statistics of all variables in Table B1 of the Appendix.

Results

In line with our theoretical expectations, there is no reason to expect a 'uniform pattern of responsiveness. Therefore, we focus on different patterns in responsiveness of left and right parties (additional analyses in the appendix confirm the absence of a 'general' response to inequality across the partisan spectrum – see Table C1). Table 1 shows results for key inequality indicators, Figure 2 plots the predicted shares to provide a more intuitive representation of the interaction effects (cf. Table C2 for regression results based on additional inequality indicators). In general, positive values of an inequality indicator are associated with higher inequality. Therefore, a negative interaction term indicates that left parties respond more to higher levels of economic inequality than right parties, while a positive coefficient indicates the opposite pattern. This applies to all inequality indicators but the bottom shares: here, a positive value indicates that persons at the lower end of the income distribution dispose of larger income shares, which means less/lower inequality. Thus, for bottom shares, a negative coefficient indicates *less* responsiveness from the Left.

We also examine whether inequality indicators pertaining to the sort of low-income voters are best suited to capture our theoretical arguments.

Table 1: Explaining party emphasis on economic equality: Type(s) of inequality and partisanship

	Gini		Income ratios				Income shares			
	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 3a	Model 3b	Model 4a	Model 4b	Model 5a	Model 5b
	Gini (L1)	Gini (D)	Ratio 90-10 (L1)	Ratio 90-10 (D)	Ratio 90-50 (L1)	Ratio 90-50 (D)	Bottom 50 (L1)	Bottom 50 (D)	Top 1 (L1)	Top 1 (D)
Inequality	1.68	-0.09	-0.14*	0.42**	-0.95^{+}	1.98^{+}	0.15^{+}	-0.63*	-0.12	-0.12
	(5.08)	(0.49)	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.52)	(1.13)	(0.08)	(0.27)	(0.09)	(0.21)
Inequality # Right parties	-1.02	-0.06	0.17*	-0.40^{+}	1.26*	-2.18	-0.21*	0.99**	0.20^{+}	0.02
	(5.92)	(0.66)	(0.08)	(0.22)	(0.61)	(1.54)	(0.09)	(0.34)	(0.11)	(0.28)
Right parties	-1.64	-2.10***	-4.09***	-2.13***	-5.01***	-2.12***	2.41	-2.06***	-4.33***	-2.20***
	(2.74)	(0.35)	(1.05)	(0.34)	(1.45)	(0.34)	(2.00)	(0.33)	(1.19)	(0.34)
Voter turnout	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
New party	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Niche party	0.19	0.21	0.04	0.10	0.03	0.10	0.03	0.12	0.27	0.23
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)
Party size	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP change	-2.95	-2.96	-0.95	-1.02	-1.29	-0.63	-1.24	-1.10	-5.32	-2.83
	(5.77)	(5.76)	(5.74)	(5.71)	(5.73)	(5.74)	(5.75)	(5.76)	(5.00)	(5.13)
ENEP	0.44*	0.44*	0.41*	0.46**	0.41*	0.45*	0.42*	0.43*	0.41*	0.51**
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Constant	2.31	3.12*	5.06**	3.30*	5.63**	3.26*	0.35	3.37*	4.68*	2.96^{+}
	(2.87)	(1.54)	(1.70)	(1.52)	(1.89)	(1.52)	(2.36)	(1.50)	(1.88)	(1.53)
Sigma (countries)	-0.00	0.01	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.07
	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Sigma (parties)	0.01	0.01	-0.05	0.01	-0.04	-0.00	-0.07	-0.02	-0.00	0.03
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Sigma (residual)	1.03***	1.03***	1.00***	0.99***	1.00***	0.99***	1.00***	0.99***	1.04***	1.03***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	756	756	724	724	724	724	724	724	820	812
AIC	3808.95	3808.91	3602.93	3601.06	3603.12	3604.61	3602.50	3599.20	4141.14	4098.54
BIC	3869.11	3869.07	3662.53	3660.66	3662.73	3664.21	3662.10	3658.80	4202.37	4159.63

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 2: Predicted share of economic inequality statements conditional on partisanship



Notes: Areas indicate 95%-confidence intervals. Bars show variable distribution

Party responsiveness to inequality levels

We start by inspecting patterns related to our first set of expectations by looking at reactions to levels of inequality. Here, we did not expect (left) party responsiveness.

A quick spot of the regression coefficients presented in Table 1 indicates that left parties de-emphasize egalitarianism at high levels of inequality (except for the Gini). The full pattern of association becomes evident, once we consider the predicted shares of left and right parties' emphasis of inequality as shown in Figure 2. The figure's left panels show party responses at various levels of inequality. The x-axis presents the empirical variation of inequality indicators, the y-axis returns the predicted share of statements for left and right parties at given values of inequality.

The first panel shows results for the most commonly used Gini indicator. Based on this indicator, previous research has shown that left parties were more responsive to higher levels of inequality than parties at the right of the political spectrum (Tavits and Potter 2015). By contrast, using data on parties' equality concepts, we observe no reaction from left parties to higher levels of the Gini: left and right parties show clear differences in promoting egalitarianism, yet these are not related to levels of the Gini. This non-finding mirrors our expectation that the Gini is rather ill-suited to capture party reactions to inequality as it mostly reflects changes in the midst of the income distribution. Turning to measures capturing income ratios (90-50 and 90-10), both of them exhibit the same pattern of responsiveness: at lower levels of inequality (e.g., when the 90th percentile earns 1.74 more than the 50th percentile), there is a strong partisan divide: left parties put much stronger emphasis on economic inequality (5% vs. 2% of statements), at high levels of inequality (e.g., when the 90th percentile makes 3.75 more than the 50th percentile), this difference vanishes (at roughly 2.5% of egalitarian statements). Importantly – this convergence stems from left parties' deemphasizing egalitarianism at high levels of income disparities. The pattern is mirrored if

we look at low- and top-income shares, both of which also show similar effect sizes with left parties cutting their egalitarian agenda by 40% under high inequality (5% to 3% for contexts where the share of below-median income earners is halved from 27% to 13%). It is noteworthy that the result for top-income shares contradicts earlier evidence on the subject matter (Pontusson and Rueda 2010). Yet, the original study argued that left responsiveness will depend on low-income turnout. To test this argument, we present additional analyses below, where we examine a possible interaction of turnout and responsiveness.

In sum, the results corroborate claims that left parties have 'abandoned' low-income groups. This is particularly true when/where low-income groups are already marginalized compared to the better-off. In such contexts, left and right responses are indistinguishable.

Party responsiveness to inequality changes

Our second expectation posits a different pattern of left responsiveness to rising inequality that threatens their core constituency of low-income voters. Evidence in Table 1 and Figure 2 aligns well with this expectation. The x-axis presents changes of the indicators, most of which mirror rising inequality. As above, we observe two flat lines of egalitarian emphasis for changes in the Gini, which reinforces our reservation about its suitability for gauging partisan response to inequality. The static behavior of the Gini indicator (typical annual changes are of about 0.1 units) makes it particularly challenging to expect that parties take note and react to these miniscule changes. We go on to inspect results for changes in income ratios. In line with our theoretical reasoning, left parties indeed respond with more egalitarianism when inequality goes up. Across the empirical range of changes in inequality [6], left parties more than double the share of statements on economic inequality in their manifestos. For example,

[6] As visible from Figure 2, a few outliers in data on changing income ratios skew the variable, which calls for some caution. Yet, in general, steep changes have good face validity as they reflect key events such as financial crisis or stock market crashes with stark implications for the income distribution. Moreover, robustness tests excluding outlier cases corroborate our results.

for the 90-50 ratio, left parties' emphasis of economic equality increases from 2% to 5% across the range of 90-50 ratios. Again, flat lines for right parties show the expected non-response of these parties. Turning to low-income groups (negative values indicate a decrease of bottom income shares), left parties put a much stronger emphasis on economic equality, when the Bottom 50% are losing ground (5.5% for a 1.23% decrease in their share compared to 2% when their share raises by 3.7%). In line with our theoretical framework, left parties respond with more emphasis when inequality of their core constituency is on the rise. At the same time, right parties show the opposite pattern: they devote more attention to economic equality when the share of the Bottom 50% goes up. Next, we inspect whether partisan patterns transfer to changes in the Top 1% of the income distribution. As obvious from Figure 2, there is no political reaction to changes in top-income inequality. Horizontal lines in the down-right panel of figure 2 show that changes in top-income shares do not inspire more economic egalitarianism in left nor right party manifestos. Previous research using top-income shares reports stark increases in inequality and assumes that (left) political parties are either not able or not willing to respond to trends at the top of the distribution (e.g. Piketty 2020). Our results align with such reasoning.

In sum, our findings show that party responsiveness to inequality is far from uniform. In contrast to previous research based on multidimensional dependent variables that mix economic and non-economic aspects of equality, we find that left parties do not adapt their manifestos in response to overall inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient (Tavits and Potter 2015). Examining the impact of various types of inequality, we – unsurprisingly – find that right parties hardly ever react to economic disparities. By contrast, left parties show a nuanced programmatic reaction: the Left devotes more space to economic equality when low-

income groups have more (according to ratios and bottom shares), which suggests that these parties have indeed abandoned the most marginalized groups in contexts of high inequality. Conversely, left parties are (still) reacting to changes in inequality: when inequality is on the rise, they make more positive references to economic equality. Finally, much recent research attention has focused on rising top-level inequality. Our results show that left parties put less emphasis on economic equality when the very well-off receive a very large share of incomes. Equally worrisome, they are not reactive to changes in inequality at the top of the distribution.

The role of turnout, electoral systems, redistribution and levels of inequality

In line with research finding a demobilizing effect of inequality for low-income voters (Beramendi and Anderson, 2008; Jensen and Jespersen, 2017; Solt, 2008, 2010; Polacko et al. 2021), our baseline models control for turnout. Yet, as argued elsewhere, the effect of turnout might as well *moderate* left responsiveness (Pontusson and Rueda 2010), which requires a three-way interaction of inequality, partisanship and turnout. Another prominent argument in the literature on parties and inequality emphasizes the importance of electoral institutions suggesting that proportional systems are more redistributive than majoritarian ones (Iversen and Soskice 2006). Finally, responsiveness could reflect earlier redistributive efforts in a country or reactions to rising inequality could differ according to existing levels of inequality.

To test these arguments, we estimate regressions that add a tree-way interaction with turnout, and present models controlling for the electoral system and redistribution at t-1 to the baseline regression models (see Tables C3-C5, Figure C2). We further present results where we add the level of inequality (t-1) to models estimating the effects of changes in inequality and interact changes and levels of inequality (Table C6, Figure C3). None of these additional tests affects our findings.

Conclusion

Our points of departure for this paper were countervailing perspectives on parties' programmatic responsiveness to economic inequality and the mismatch of empirical results (Tavits and Potter 2015; Pontusson and Rueda 2010), an influential literature that ritualistically blames "the Left" for its abandonment of those most in need (e.g., Piketty 2020, Sandel 2020), and actual trends in inequality (Atkinson 2015, Milanovic 2016, Piketty 2020).

To resolve this puzzling incongruence, we compiled new data on parties' inequality concepts enabling us to distinguish a focus on economic equality from other equality concepts in 12 OECD countries between 1970 and 2021. We further proposed three rationales with different implications for party responsiveness to *levels* and *changes* of inequality. Moreover, we argued that measures including the sort of low-income groups are best suited to capture theories about (left) responsiveness to inequality. Our conclusions are threefold:

First, there is no – or even a negative – programmatic response to high levels of inequality, which corroborates skeptical views stressing that the Left has abandoned its core constituency (e.g., Piketty 2020; Sandel 2020). This reflects self-reinforcing mechanisms of high (levels of) inequality as observed in studies of public visibility, voter demobilization or individual-level heuristics that help to justify inequality (McCall 2013; Solt 2008; Trump 2018). It is particularly noteworthy that the Left deemphasizes rather than emphasizes the topic when the lower-income groups are most in need of help. Overall, our findings support the notion that higher (levels of) inequality undermine left egalitarianism.

Second, there is a positive left response to changes in inequality: In line with an 'optimistic' perspective (Tavits and Potter 2015; Pontusson and Rueda 2010), we show that left parties respond to inequality. Yet, contrasting previous evidence, the Left only reacts with positive references to economic equality when income disparities are *rising.* This pattern reflects

expectations that rising inequality is more salient and creates stronger electoral incentives for the Left to push for more egalitarianism (McCombs 2013; Bechtel 2016; McCombs et al. 2017).

Third, as if these findings would not have enough problematic implications, we observe limits in party responsiveness to rising inequality. Thus, there is no reaction to growing top-level inequality. Rises in the share of the top income earners figure prominently in recent research (e.g., Piketty 2020, 2014), yet they are disregarded by parties from both sides of the political spectrum – helping us to understand why inequality at the top grows particularly fast. This suggests that left responsiveness to rising inequality and rising levels of top inequality are not a contradiction. Left responsiveness simply does not extend to growing top-level inequality. That this qualification vanishes when the well-off 90th percentile is pitched against the median or low incomes indicates that party reactions are "denominator-driven": as expected, left parties are more susceptible to react to the sort of (below) median incomes rather than insulated top shares.

Overall, our findings produce a "ratchet-effect" heuristic: left parties may push back against rising disparities, but have given up on lowering existing levels of inequality. To us, the findings imply lock-in effects that should also be reflected in policy patterns and (pre)distribution profiles. While we only focus on party manifestos here, a ratchet-effect pattern may also describe policy and inequality outcomes. Yet, while the ratchet-finding is robust to potential confounders, we find no responsiveness for top income inequality – leaving little hope for the kind of egalitarian responses Piketty, the Occupy movement, and others have advocated for.

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Appendix A: Crowdcoding of inequality concepts

Appendix A1: Pre-processing, segmentation and classification of manifesto statements

The raw text of parties' manifestos hardly lends itself to be analyzed for conceptions of equality without further pre-processing. Rather than the entire text – and much in the spirit of the MARPOR – our data elicitation instead zooms in on quasi-sentences as the unit bearing semantic meaning. Ideally, each of those quasi-sentences only contains one relevant statement regarding policy. Unfortunately, the data retrieved from MARPOR is only pre-segmented in quasi-sentences from 1998 onwards, which means the other manifestos must still be segmented. Ideally, this segmentation retains the underlying logic of quasi-sentences developed by the MARPOR. To this end, we developed an automated segmenter that was trained on two-thirds of the pre-segmented party manifestos available from the MARPOR. Essentially, the segmenter is a binary classifier (logistic regression) that was trained using the popular Python-library scikit-learn. It learns to predict whether a given word is the beginning of a new statement, based on the lemmatized surrounding words, punctuation, and the shape of the lemmatized focal word. Using this information, the segmenter[7] can splice a long raw string of text into quasi-sentences that adhere to the MARPOR logic of quasi-sentences. Subsequently, we used a regular expression to identify quasi-sentences, that might have been mis-segmented. These can either be statements that have been incorrectly split or statements that the classifier failed to split into separate statements. In a final step, those flagged quasi-sentences were forwarded to research assistants to check and, if necessary, revise the segmented quasi-sentences. This process essentially segmented all party manifestos into 850 000 quasi-sentences.

[7] For quality measures of the different segmenters, please refer to the appendix.

While those quasi-sentences could, in principle, be forwarded to the crowd, this would both unduly increase the workload on crowd-coders and raise the costs of content-coding parties' equality conceptions. Therefore, the next step consists of identifying statements that concern equality. The central idea of this step is to discard obviously irrelevant statements to lower the workload for and, hence, costs of human coders. For this task, we again capitalize on the fact that MARPOR supplies quasi-sentence level data that has already been content-coded. Using this information, for each country we trained a logistic regression classifier on quasi-sentences that pertain to category 503 (labeled by the MARPOR as "Equality: Positive"), which contains statements describing the "concept of social justice and the need for fair treatment of all people". Importantly, the hyper-parameters of the classifier were fine-tuned to reliably identify the vast majority of relevant statements at the expense of many false positives, i.e., we trade off precision for recall. Generally, our trained classifiers achieve a minimum recall of 0.80, meaning they successfully retain at least 80% of all potentially relevant statements about equality. Using these classifiers, we flagged each statement as either relevant or irrelevant with regard to equality. All statements flagged as relevant were subsequently forwarded to trained research assistants who checked the automated decision. This reduction process left us with about 55451 quasi-sentences that speak to equality and social justice.

Appendix A2: Additional information on crowdcoding inequality concepts

To control their accuracy, coders had to pass an entry test of ten units taken from a country's manifestos. All test units have been unanimously coded by three experts (post-doctoral researchers) to assure that they are neither too challenging to exclude 'sincere' coders, nor too obvious to enable spammers (workers seeking to maximize profits through random responses) or unqualified workers (that do not meet minimum quality criteria) to contribute data. As there are six answers to each coding unit (five inequality concepts and "NA" for units that do not deal with the topic), we settle on a minimum of 60% agreement thresholds according to

country-specific pre-tests (accordingly, the odds of passing by guessing are below 0.002% and thus negligible). Moreover, given smaller crowd sizes for the two languages Danish and Swedish, we relied on machine translation provided by GoogleTranslate to access the larger English-speaking crowd. The Appendix contains detailed information on country-specific settings (Table A3). As additional quality check, we add five percent of expert-coded units to all our tasks. This enables monitoring and validating coder performance during the task and assures that qualified coders maintain their accuracy.

Based on previous research (Horn 2019) and our own pre-tests, we collect five coding decisions per unit. This number guarantees that aggregated results can match expert ratings and at the same time, ensures fast data collection at reasonable costs. To warrant fair remuneration, we made sure our workers were able to attain local minimum wages.[8]

In total, 293 workers contributed to the full task and the modal worker contributed 180 units. To assess their quality, we compare their performance against the expert coding. We aggregate individual codings per unit based on majority vote. This approach reflects the general idea of the 'wisdom of the crowd' and is well anchored in social choice theory (de Condorcet 1785). Doing so, we obtain a Krippendorff's alpha of 0.72 between the crowd's judgment and the experts based on 2,904 coded units at the unit level, which exhibits very good agreement even by conventional standards of quantitative content analysis. The Appendix provides a graphical presentation of coder agreement and shows that we obtained high levels of validity across countries (unit-level alpha values between 0.6 and 0.85 see Figure A1, Table A4). These results confirm that crowds are able to replicate expert judgments of complex tasks – even at the unit level.

[8] We calculated (average) hourly wages based on extensive pre-tests assessing the average coding duration per unit. The Appendix provides detailed information on the payment.

Appendix A3: English version of coding instructions (Amazon Mechanical Turk)

Does the statement include a positive reference to equality, social justice, and/or equal treatment of all people?

- If YES, which of the following categories (1 to 5) applies?
- If NONE apply, select category 6.
- If more than one category applies, decide which ONE you think is most clearly emphasized.
- Please read the six categories carefully!

1) **Economic equality:** In favor of more financial and economic equality. Examples: we criticize that ordinary citizens are doing poorly; economic inequality is on the rise in our country; we must redistribute more from the top to the bottom; the rich should bear a larger burden; society is drifting apart; we have to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor; wealth tax now; we should share the (economic) benefits of globalization fairly; unevenly distributed wealth threatens social cohesion; mobility/energy/housing/health care must be affordable for all.

2) **Equal opportunities and social mobility**: equal education, economic, and social opportunities. Examples: good education for all, higher education should be (more) accessible for low- and middle-income students; a child's social background/economic status should not determine their future; everyone must be given a fair chance - regardless of their parents' income.

3) **Anti-discrimination:** Against discrimination based on disability, race, color, religion, sex, gender; LGBTQ friendly. Includes statements on equal pay for women (gender pay gap). Examples: we are the party of diversity and inclusion; we want a diverse society; we support a quota for women on supervisory boards.

4) **Non-specific mention** of equality, (social) justice, and solidarity: example: we are the party of equality (or equity); we stand for (more) solidarity; towards a more just society.

5) **Other**: A reference to equality, but the statement does not fit into any of the previous categories. Example: global justice now; more development aid/international aid; reduce regional inequality (e.g., in terms of mobility, internet, environment), no region(s) left behind, climate and environmental justice, intergenerational justice.

6) **NO - no positive reference**. (e.g.: equality before the law, fair application of the rule of law, physical integrity, immigration/asylum, noise mitigation, or crime).

Appendix Table A1: Local minimum wages and coder pay

Country	Wage (€)	Duration /unit (sec)	Estimate $	Payment $	Balance
Australia	13.86	20	0.08	0.08	0
Austria*	9.07	20	0.05	0.08	0.03
Canada**	11.01	20	0.07	0.08	0.01
Denmark*	15.83	20	0.09	0.09	0
France	10.57	20	0.06	0.08	0.02
Germany	9.82	20	0.06	0.08	0.02
Ireland	10.50	20	0.06	0.08	0.02
New Zealand	13.24	20	0.08	0.08	0
Sweden*	10.34	20	0	0.1	0.1
Switzerland**	19.59	20	0.11	0.11	0
United Kingdom	11.45	20	0.06	0.08	0.02
United States	7.25	20	0.04	0.08	0.04

Notes: * based on collective bargaining agreements for the service sector (countries without federal minimum wages); ** based on averaging local/regional minimum wages.

Table A3: mTurk task settings

Country	Entry test % threshold	Experience (N tasks submitted)	Accuracy (% tasks approved)	IP restriction
Australia	70	500	99	English-native speaking OECD countries
Austria	60	-	-	German-native speaking European countries
Canada	70	500	99	English-native speaking OECD countries; French-native speaking countries
Denmark	70	-	-	Western-European countries
France	70	-	-	French- native speaking countries (Europe, French overseas regions)
Germany	60	-	-	German-native speaking European countries
Ireland	70			English- native speaking countries (Europe)
New Zealand	70	500	99	English-native speaking OECD countries
Sweden	70	-	-	Western-European countries
Switzerland	60	-	-	German-native speaking European countries; French-native speaking countries
United Kingdom	70	-	-	English- native speaking countries (Europe)
United States	70/80*	100/500*	92/99*	English-language (US)

Notes: * Settings adapted based on quality monitoring.

Validation

Each test unit was unanimously coded by three expert coders (postdoctoral researchers). All agreement scores compare the aggregated crowd-coded majority decision against this gold standard at the unit-level (individual manifesto statements). These unit-level agreement scores exceed those from previous applications to comparable tasks (Horn 2019) and demonstrate that online crowds are able to match expert ratings – even at the statement-level.

Table A4: Unit-level agreement of expert coding and aggregated crowd (majority vote)

Country	N (gold)	Percentage agreement	Krippendorff's alpha	% without majority
Australia	171	75	0.66	7.60
Austria	447	76	0.69	7.16
Canada	144	79	0.69	11.81
Denmark	325	73	0.65	14.77
France	159	80	0.73	10.06
Germany	509	87	0.82	4.32
Ireland	271	74	0.66	12.18
New Zealand	195	71	0.60	10.26
Sweden	161	80	0.71	12.42
Switzerland	159	90	0.85	3.77
United Kingdom	203	79	0.71	9.36
United States	160	80	0.69	9.38
Overall	2904	79	0.72	8.99

Figure A1: Validation of crowd-scores (majority vote) against VoE gold standard



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Appendix B: Descriptive information

Table B1: Summary statistics of main variables

	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max	N
% of economic inequality statements	3.24	2.34	3.41	0.00	38.17	953
Market Gini (L1)	0.46	0.46	0.04	0.38	0.56	875
Market Gini (D)	0.10	0.07	0.33	-1.11	1.04	875
Ratio 90-10 (L1)	11.97	11.12	3.30	7.62	24.25	843
Ratio 90-10 (D)	-0.07	-0.05	0.94	-8.34	2.19	843
Ratio 90-50 (L1)	2.32	2.25	0.45	1.74	3.75	843
Ratio 90-50 (D)	-0.01	0.00	0.13	-1.28	0.21	843
Bottom 50% (L1)	21.13	21.71	2.98	12.89	26.86	843
Bottom 50% (D)	-0.02	-0.04	0.62	-1.23	3.73	843
Top 1% (L1)	10.32	10.29	2.11	5.50	18.88	953
Top 1% (D)	0.09	0.04	0.73	-2.02	2.28	942
Rightist parties	0.57	1.00	0.50	0.00	1.00	875
New party	54.81	57.00	37.53	0.00	188.00	958
Niche party	0.38	0.00	0.49	0.00	1.00	974
Party size	16.72	10.73	14.88	0.22	56.67	972
ENEP	3.63	3.38	1.26	1.68	6.82	974
GDP change	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.07	0.11	974
Voter Turnout	75.33	78.81	14.77	42.22	95.77	974
Electoral System	2.72	3.00	0.86	1.00	4.00	802
Year	1996	1997	14.62	1970	2019	974

Table B2: Overview of variables and data sources

Variable	Data source	Reference
Emphasis of economic inequality (%)	Crowd-coding of manifesto statements (Varieties of Egalitarianism project)	
Market Gini	SWIID	Solt (2020)
Disposable Gini	SWIID	Solt (2020)
Top 10%	WID	https://wid.world/data/
Top 1%	WID	https://wid.world/data/
Ratio 90-10	WID	https://wid.world/data/
Ratio 90-50	WID	https://wid.world/data/
Ratio 80-20	WID	https://wid.world/data/
Ratio 50-10	WID	https://wid.world/data/
Bottom 50%	WID	https://wid.world/data/
Bottom 40%	WID	https://wid.world/data/
Right party (0/1)	Manifesto Project	Volkens et al. (2021)
New party (party age)	PARLGOV and Wikipedia	Döring et al. (2022), Herrmann and Döring (2021)
Niche party (0/1)	Manifesto Project	Volkens et al. (2021)
Percent of vote	Manifesto Project	Volkens et al. (2021)
Effective number of parties	Own calculation	
Real GDP growth (% change from previous year)	Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS)	Armingeon et al. (2021)
Voter turnout	Quality of Governance (QoG)	Teorell et al. (2022)
Electoral System (proportional representation)	Quality of Governance (QoG)	Teorell et al. (2022)

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Figure B1a: Levels of inequality and party emphasis of economic inequality across countries over time (Gini



Note: Source for income inequality: SWIID.

Figure B1b: Levels of inequality and emphasis of economic inequality across countries over time (Income Ratios)



Note: Source for income inequality: WID.

Figure B1b: Levels of inequality and emphasis of economic inequality across countries over time (Income shares)



Note: Source for income inequality: WID.

Figure B2: Pearson correlations of equality concepts at the party level (all parties)



Figure B3: T-test on difference in means between party families across three different equality concepts



Notes: The diagonal denotes the mean salience of a given equality concept per party family (in p.p.). The off-diagonal squares show the difference in salience between different party families (Y – X). The grey shading denotes the level of significance.

Appendix C: Robustness tests

Table C1: Explaining party emphasis on economic equality: Type(s) of inequality (general effect)

	Gini (L1)	Gini (D)	90-10 (L1)	90-10 (D)	90-50 (L1)	90-50 (D)	Bottom 50 (L1)	Bottom 50 (D)	Top 1 (L1)	Top 1 (D)
Inequality	1.08	-0.13	-0.05	0.21^{+}	-0.26	0.83	0.03	-0.06	-0.00	-0.12
	(3.75)	(0.34)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.40)	(0.79)	(0.07)	(0.18)	(0.06)	(0.14)
Right parties	-2.11***	-2.11***	-2.08***	-2.10***	-2.08***	-2.09***	-2.08***	-2.08***	-2.18***	-2.20***
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Voter turnout	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
New party	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Niche party	0.19	0.21	0.13	0.11	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.28	0.23
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)
Party size	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP change	-3.00	-2.97	-0.80	-1.16	-0.90	-0.56	-0.85	-1.34	-5.02	-2.83
	(5.77)	(5.76)	(5.74)	(5.72)	(5.74)	(5.75)	(5.75)	(5.79)	(5.01)	(5.13)
ENEP	0.44*	0.44*	0.41*	0.45*	0.42*	0.44*	0.42*	0.43*	0.41*	0.51**
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Constant	2.59	3.13*	3.97*	3.28*	3.98*	3.23*	2.76	3.45*	3.39^{+}	2.96^{+}
	(2.41)	(1.53)	(1.61)	(1.52)	(1.72)	(1.52)	(2.13)	(1.51)	(1.76)	(1.53)
Sigma (countries)	-0.00	0.01	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.07
	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Sigma (parties)	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Sigma (residual)	1.03***	1.03***	0.99***	0.99***	0.99***	0.99***	0.99***	1.00***	1.04***	1.03***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	756	756	724	724	724	724	724	724	820	812
AIC	3806.98	3806.92	3604.89	3602.42	3605.31	3604.61	3605.49	3605.61	4142.68	4096.54
BIC	3862.51	3862.45	3659.91	3657.44	3660.33	3659.63	3660.51	3660.63	4199.19	4152.94

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Table C2: Explaining party emphasis on economic equality: Type(s) of inequality and partisanship (additional indicators)

	80-20 (L1)	80-20 (D)	60-40 (L1)	60-40 (D)	50-10 (L1)	50-10 (D)	Low 40 (L1)	Low 40 (D)	Top 10 (L1)	Top 10 (D)
Inequality	-0.53^{+}	1.58*	-1.46	7.33^{+}	-0.70	1.40*	0.21^{+}	-0.77*	-0.08	-0.01
	(0.28)	(0.66)	(1.75)	(3.84)	(0.46)	(0.66)	(0.12)	(0.34)	(0.06)	(0.18)
Inequality # Right parties	0.59^{+}	-1.62^{+}	3.32*	-14.94**	0.66	-1.25	-0.29*	1.18**	0.11	-0.07
	(0.31)	(0.89)	(1.66)	(4.83)	(0.51)	(0.84)	(0.13)	(0.42)	(0.07)	(0.23)
Right parties	-4.02***	-2.12***	-6.94**	-2.12***	-5.43*	-2.09***	1.80	-2.07***	-5.75*	-2.18***
	(1.08)	(0.34)	(2.44)	(0.33)	(2.62)	(0.34)	(1.81)	(0.33)	(2.28)	(0.34)
New party	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Niche party	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.15	0.10	0.13	0.04	0.13	0.27	0.28
	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.40)
Party size	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP change	-1.11	-1.53	-1.10	-0.29	-0.53	-2.13	-1.14	-1.16	-5.11	-4.78
	(5.73)	(5.72)	(5.73)	(5.71)	(5.75)	(5.76)	(5.75)	(5.79)	(5.04)	(5.05)
ENEP	0.40*	0.45*	0.42*	0.44*	0.41*	0.42*	0.42*	0.43*	0.41*	0.41*
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Voter turnout	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	5.02**	3.32*	5.57*	3.33*	7.01*	3.69*	0.68	3.39*	6.01*	3.35*
	(1.69)	(1.51)	(2.78)	(1.50)	(2.76)	(1.53)	(2.25)	(1.51)	(2.60)	(1.52)
Sigma (countries)	0.08	0.07	0.04	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.06
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Sigma (parties)	-0.04	-0.00	-0.05	-0.02	-0.03	0.02	-0.06	-0.02	-0.03	0.01
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Sigma (residual)	1.00***	0.99***	1.00***	0.99***	1.00***	0.99***	1.00***	0.99***	1.04***	1.04***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	724	724	724	724	724	724	724	724	820	820
AIC	3603.36	3601.99	3603.76	3597.67	3605.24	3603.24	3602.84	3599.95	4142.07	4144.46
BIC	3662.97	3661.59	3663.37	3657.27	3664.84	3662.85	3662.44	3659.55	4203.30	4205.68

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure C1: Predicted shares of inequality statements conditional on types of inequality and left partisanship (additional indicators)



Notes: Areas indicate 95%-confidence intervals. Bars show variable distribution

Table C3: Explaining party emphasis on economic equality: Type(s) of inequality and partisanship (proportional representation)

	Gini (L1)	Gini (D)	90-10 (L1)	90-10 (D)	90-50 (L1)	90-50 (D)	Bottom 50 (L1)	Bottom 50 (D)	Top 1 (L1)	Top 1 (D)
Inequality	1.52	-0.09	-0.17*	0.42**	-1.11^{+}	1.98^{+}	0.16^{+}	-0.63*	-0.12	-0.12
	(5.09)	(0.49)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.60)	(1.14)	(0.09)	(0.27)	(0.09)	(0.21)
Inequality # Right parties	-0.98	-0.06	0.17*	-0.40^{+}	1.26*	-2.18	-0.21*	0.99**	0.20^{+}	0.01
	(5.92)	(0.66)	(0.08)	(0.22)	(0.61)	(1.54)	(0.09)	(0.34)	(0.11)	(0.28)
Right parties	-1.66	-2.10***	-4.07***	-2.14***	-4.99***	-2.12***	2.42	-2.06***	-4.33***	-2.20***
	(2.73)	(0.35)	(1.04)	(0.34)	(1.45)	(0.34)	(2.00)	(0.33)	(1.19)	(0.34)
PR system	-0.23	-0.25	-0.48	0.11	-0.35	0.01	-0.22	-0.03	-0.02	-0.10
	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.68)	(0.55)	(0.68)	(0.54)	(0.64)	(0.54)	(0.55)	(0.55)
New party	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Niche party	0.19	0.22	0.06	0.09	0.05	0.10	0.04	0.12	0.27	0.23
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)
Party size	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP change	-2.82	-2.83	-0.59	-1.07	-1.03	-0.63	-1.05	-1.08	-5.31	-2.79
	(5.78)	(5.77)	(5.76)	(5.71)	(5.76)	(5.75)	(5.78)	(5.77)	(5.01)	(5.14)
ENEP	0.47*	0.47*	0.46*	0.44*	0.46*	0.45*	0.44*	0.44*	0.41*	0.52**
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Voter turnout	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	2.41	3.14*	5.43**	3.28*	5.99**	3.26*	0.08	3.38*	4.68*	2.97^{+}
	(2.87)	(1.54)	(1.77)	(1.52)	(2.01)	(1.52)	(2.50)	(1.51)	(1.89)	(1.53)
Sigma (countries)	0.00	0.01	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.06
	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Sigma (parties)	0.01	0.00	-0.05	0.01	-0.05	-0.00	-0.07	-0.02	-0.00	0.03
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Sigma (residual)	1.03***	1.03***	0.99***	0.99***	1.00***	0.99***	1.00***	0.99***	1.04***	1.03***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	756	756	724	724	724	724	724	724	820	812
AIC	3810.77	3810.71	3604.42	3603.02	3604.85	3606.60	3604.38	3601.20	4143.14	4100.51
BIC	3875.57	3875.50	3668.61	3667.21	3669.04	3670.79	3668.56	3665.38	4209.07	4166.30

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. All baseline control variables are included (see Table 1 and 2).

Table C4: Explaining party emphasis on economic equality: Type(s) of inequality and partisanship (interaction with voter turnout)

	Gini (L1)	Gini (D)	90-10 (L1)	90-10 (D)	90-50 (L1)	90-50 (D)	Bottom 50 (L1)	Bottom 50 (D)	Top 1 (L1)	Top 1 (D)
Inequality	26.83	-0.18	0.20	-0.01	1.36	-0.16	-0.22	0.14	-0.29	1.83^{+}
	(26.52)	(3.27)	(0.34)	(0.02)	(3.19)	(0.15)	(0.42)	(2.19)	(0.44)	(1.08)
Inequality # Right parties	26.83	-0.18	0.19	-0.66	1.30	-16.21	-0.20	0.13	-0.30	1.85^{+}
	(26.52)	(3.27)	(0.34)	(1.56)	(3.16)	(14.47)	(0.41)	(2.18)	(0.44)	(1.07)
Inequality # Voter turnout	5.43	1.66	-0.19	-0.60	0.20	4.62	0.12	0.79	0.28	-2.50^{+}
	(30.97)	(4.40)	(0.39)	(2.04)	(3.54)	(18.36)	(0.46)	(2.76)	(0.58)	(1.35)
Right parties # Turnout	-0.33	0.00	-0.00	0.01	-0.03	0.22	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.03^{+}
	(0.35)	(0.04)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.17)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Inequality # Right # Turnout	-0.09	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.08	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.03^{+}
	(0.42)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.22)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Right parties	-3.74	-1.49	0.78	-1.46	-2.01	-1.28	-4.15	-1.52	-4.56	-0.78
	(13.70)	(1.48)	(4.70)	(1.45)	(8.12)	(1.46)	(10.04)	(1.43)	(6.50)	(1.44)
Voter turnout	0.15	0.00	0.05	-0.00	0.07	0.00	-0.10	-0.00	-0.03	0.01
	(0.16)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.02)
Standard controls	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*
Constant	-10.05	2.81	0.74	2.95^{+}	-0.05	2.75	7.38	3.08^{+}	6.36	2.17
	(12.24)	(1.72)	(4.51)	(1.71)	(7.58)	(1.72)	(8.80)	(1.69)	(5.17)	(1.70)
Sigma (countries)	-0.12	0.02	0.06	0.10	0.03	0.09	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07
	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Sigma (parties)	0.00	0.01	-0.07	0.00	-0.05	-0.01	-0.08	-0.02	-0.01	0.00
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Sigma (residual)	1.03***	1.03***	1.00***	0.99***	1.00***	0.99***	1.00***	0.99***	1.04***	1.03***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	756	756	724	724	724	724	724	724	820	812
AIC	3812.96	3814.40	3607.53	3605.50	3608.40	3607.92	3607.55	3604.84	4146.72	4099.58
BIC	3887.01	3888.45	3680.89	3678.86	3681.75	3681.28	3680.91	3678.20	4222.07	4174.77

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. All baseline control variables are included (see Table 1).

Figure C2: Predicted shares of inequality statements conditional on types of inequality, left partisanship and turnout



Notes: Areas indicate 90%-confidence intervals. Bars show variable distribution

Table C5: Explaining party emphasis on economic equality: Type(s) of inequality and partisanship (redistribution at t-1)

	Gini (L1)	Gini (D)	90-10 (L1)	90-10 (D)	90-50 (L1)	90-50 (D)	Bottom 50 (L1)	Bottom 50 (D)	Top 1 (L1)	Top 1 (D)
Inequality	0.16	-0.11	-0.12	0.43*	-0.85	1.86	0.14	-0.61*	-0.13	-0.07
	(6.63)	(0.49)	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.56)	(1.16)	(0.09)	(0.27)	(0.09)	(0.22)
Inequality # Right parties	-1.05	-0.07	0.16+	-0.40+	1.22+	-2.14	-0.20*	0.97**	0.19+	-0.09
	(5.92)	(0.66)	(0.09)	(0.23)	(0.64)	(1.57)	(0.10)	(0.35)	(0.11)	(0.29)
Right parties	-1.63	-2.11***	-3.98***	-2.15***	-4.91**	-2.13***	2.17	-2.08***	-4.10***	-2.11***
	(2.73)	(0.35)	(1.08)	(0.34)	(1.51)	(0.34)	(2.04)	(0.34)	(1.21)	(0.35)
Voter turnout	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Redistribution (t-1)	2.63	2.50	6.84	6.49	7.05	6.43	7.01	6.79	3.32	3.62
	(7.31)	(4.81)	(5.32)	(5.32)	(5.32)	(5.31)	(5.36)	(5.30)	(5.17)	(4.99)
New party	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Niche party	0.17	0.19	0.03	0.07	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.10	0.18	0.18
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.41)
Party size	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP change	-2.52	-2.57	-1.19	-1.19	-1.48	-0.90	-1.44	-1.25	-3.15	-1.95
	(5.89)	(5.80)	(5.99)	(5.94)	(5.99)	(5.98)	(6.01)	(6.01)	(5.86)	(5.97)
ENEP	0.44*	0.42*	0.36+	0.39*	0.36+	0.39*	0.36+	0.38*	0.43*	0.43*
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Constant	2.67	2.71	3.82*	2.27	4.36*	2.33	-0.44	2.36	4.21*	2.67
	(3.04)	(1.69)	(1.89)	(1.72)	(2.07)	(1.71)	(2.60)	(1.70)	(1.98)	(1.70)
Sigma (countries)	-0.01	-0.02	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.01	-0.01
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Sigma (parties)	0.01	0.01	-0.08	-0.02	-0.07	-0.02	-0.09	-0.04	0.01	0.01
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Sigma (residual)	1.03***	1.03***	1.01***	1.01***	1.01***	1.01***	1.01***	1.01***	1.03***	1.03***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	756	756	699	699	699	699	699	699	750	750
AIC	3810.82	3810.65	3500.06	3497.25	3499.96	3501.01	3499.24	3495.97	3783.15	3785.42
BIC	3875.61	3875.44	3563.76	3560.94	3563.66	3564.71	3562.94	3559.66	3847.84	3850.11

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Redistribution is measures as the reduction of market income inequality (Gini).

Table C6: Explaining party emphasis on economic equality: Type(s) of inequality and inequality at t-1 (control and interaction)

	Gini (D)		90-10 (D)		90-50 (D)		Bottom 50 (D)		Top 1 (D)	
Inequality (D)	-0.10	4.37	0.41*	0.94	1.90	-3.38	-0.62*	-0.77	-0.13	-0.97
	(0.49)	(5.29)	(0.17)	(0.71)	(1.18)	(8.12)	(0.27)	(1.40)	(0.22)	(1.12)
Inequality (D) #	-0.07	-1.62	-0.40^{+}	-1.13	-2.19	0.73	0.98**	0.30	0.01	3.49*
Right parties	(0.66)	(7.08)	(0.22)	(0.91)	(1.54)	(10.57)	(0.34)	(1.85)	(0.28)	(1.47)
Inequality (t-1)	1.13	2.25	-0.02	-0.11	-0.11	-0.72	0.02	0.11	-0.02	-0.14
	(3.74)	(5.11)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.44)	(0.57)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Inequality (D) #		-9.51		-0.03		1.44		0.01		0.07
Inequality (t-1)		(11.25)		(0.04)		(2.43)		(0.07)		(0.10)
Inequality (t-1) #		-0.97		0.15^{+}		1.08^{+}		-0.17^{+}		0.21^{+}
Right parties		(5.98)		(0.09)		(0.65)		(0.09)		(0.11)
Inequality (D) #		3.21		0.05		-0.59		0.03		-0.31*
Right parties #		(15.17)		(0.05)		(3.18)		(0.09)		(0.13)
Inequality (t-1)										
Right parties	-2.10***	-1.64	-2.13***	-3.89***	-2.12***	-4.62**	-2.06***	1.64	-2.19***	-4.51***
	(0.35)	(2.77)	(0.34)	(1.08)	(0.34)	(1.53)	(0.33)	(2.03)	(0.34)	(1.21)
Standard controls	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*
Constant	2.54	1.87	3.55*	4.55**	3.51^{+}	4.98*	2.90	0.91	3.21^{+}	4.65*
	(2.41)	(2.89)	(1.63)	(1.74)	(1.80)	(1.99)	(2.12)	(2.36)	(1.79)	(1.92)
Sigma (countries)	-0.01	-0.01	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.11
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Sigma (parties)	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.04	-0.00	-0.04	-0.02	-0.07	0.03	0.03
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Sigma (residual)	1.03***	1.03***	0.99***	0.99***	0.99***	0.99***	0.99***	0.99***	1.03***	1.03***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	756	756	724	724	724	724	724	724	812	812
AIC	3810.82	3815.73	3602.89	3605.47	3606.54	3609.35	3601.10	3603.36	4100.47	4095.16
BIC	3875.61	3894.41	3667.08	3683.41	3670.73	3687.29	3665.28	3681.30	4166.26	4175.05

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. All baseline control variables are included (see Table 1).

Figure C3: Predicted shares of inequality statements conditional on types of inequality, partisanship and levels of inequality (t-1)



Notes: Areas indicate 90%-confidence intervals. Bars show variable distribution

Table C7: Explaining party emphasis on economic equality: Type(s) of inequality and partisanship (Country-fixed effects)

	Gini (L1)	Gini (D)	90-10 (L1)	90-10 (D)	90-50 (L1)	90-50 (D)	Bottom 50 (L1)	Bottom 50 (D)	Top 1 (L1)	Top 1 (D)
Inequality	-5.31	-0.13	-0.17**	0.41***	-1.04*	2.01***	0.19*	-0.65***	-0.12	-0.16
	(6.67)	(0.47)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.42)	(0.53)	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.12)	(0.21)
Inequality # Right parties	3.10	0.28	0.17**	-0.39***	1.30**	-2.39**	-0.23**	1.03***	0.20	0.07
	(6.13)	(0.64)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.49)	(0.87)	(0.08)	(0.28)	(0.14)	(0.27)
Right parties	-3.58	-2.20***	-4.25***	-2.18***	-5.17***	-2.18***	2.63	-2.11***	-4.44**	-2.33***
	(2.87)	(0.34)	(0.83)	(0.29)	(1.19)	(0.29)	(1.61)	(0.29)	(1.56)	(0.36)
Baseline controls	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*
Country fixed effects	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*	*Included*
Constant	8.15*	5.20**	7.23***	5.39**	7.89***	5.49**	1.66	5.73**	7.01**	4.97**
	(3.94)	(1.98)	(1.77)	(1.89)	(1.91)	(1.87)	(2.78)	(1.80)	(2.56)	(1.88)
Sigma (residual)	1.07***	1.07***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***	1.09***	1.09***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Observations	756	756	711	711	711	711	711	711	804	796
AIC	3807.99	3808.76	3542.51	3544.54	3543.27	3547.67	3540.65	3541.30	4077.68	4037.34
BIC	3909.81	3910.58	3642.98	3645.00	3643.73	3648.13	3641.12	3641.76	4180.85	4140.29

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the level of parties in parentheses; $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C8: Explaining party emphasis on economic equality: Type(s) of inequality and partisanship (excluding fringe parties*)

	Gini (L1)	Gini (D)	90-10 (L1)	90-10 (D)	90-50 (L1)	90-50 (D)	Bottom 50 (L1)	Bottom 50 (D)	Top 1 (L1)	Top 1 (D)
Inequality	-0.83	0.05	-0.17*	0.45**	-1.11*	2.03^{+}	0.20*	-0.69*	-0.17*	-0.14
	(5.37)	(0.51)	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.53)	(1.15)	(0.09)	(0.27)	(0.09)	(0.23)
Inequality # Right parties	1.36	-0.35	0.22**	-0.38^{+}	1.69**	-2.68^{+}	-0.29**	0.98**	0.26*	-0.02
	(6.30)	(0.69)	(0.08)	(0.22)	(0.60)	(1.57)	(0.09)	(0.36)	(0.11)	(0.29)
Right parties	-2.75	-2.08***	-4.76***	-2.15***	-6.03***	-2.14***	4.02*	-2.07***	-4.93***	-2.22***
	(2.91)	(0.36)	(1.02)	(0.33)	(1.42)	(0.33)	(1.96)	(0.33)	(1.21)	(0.35)
New party	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Niche party	0.53	0.54	0.31	0.39	0.30	0.40	0.29	0.40	0.54	0.49
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.43)	(0.43)
Party size	-0.00	-0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP change	-2.15	-2.07	-0.07	0.01	-0.44	0.26	-0.40	-0.85	-6.19	-2.63
	(6.05)	(6.04)	(6.02)	(6.00)	(6.02)	(6.04)	(6.03)	(6.05)	(5.21)	(5.39)
ENEP	0.39*	0.38*	0.34^{+}	0.39*	0.35^{+}	0.38*	0.34^{+}	0.37*	0.32^{+}	0.47**
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Voter turnout	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	2.99	2.57	4.87**	2.78^{+}	5.50**	2.79^{+}	-1.12	2.90^{+}	5.12**	2.52
	(3.02)	(1.60)	(1.77)	(1.57)	(1.96)	(1.58)	(2.38)	(1.57)	(1.97)	(1.60)
Sigma (countries)	0.02	0.01	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.09	0.07	0.09	0.08
	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.26)
Sigma (parties)	-0.07	-0.05	-0.23	-0.14	-0.23	-0.16	-0.27	-0.17	-0.01	0.02
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Sigma (residual)	1.04***	1.04***	1.01***	1.00***	1.01***	1.01***	1.01***	1.00***	1.03***	1.03***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	688	688	655	655	655	655	655	655	744	737
AIC	3477.90	3477.53	3266.45	3267.09	3266.34	3270.82	3264.40	3266.29	3751.89	3718.64
BIC	3536.84	3536.47	3324.75	3325.39	3324.64	3329.12	3322.70	3324.59	3811.85	3778.47

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Excluding parties with a vote share below 2%

Table C9: Explaining party emphasis on economic equality: Type(s) of inequality and partisanship (mainstream parties*)

	Gini (L1)	Gini (D)	90-10 (L1)	90-10 (D)	90-50 (L1)	90-50 (D)	Bottom 50 (L1)	Bottom 50 (D)	Top 1 (L1)	Top 1 (D)
Inequality	-9.88^{+}	-0.55	-0.15^{+}	0.39*	-0.94^{+}	1.60	0.19*	-0.62^{+}	-0.17^{+}	0.03
	(5.90)	(0.63)	(0.07)	(0.19)	(0.56)	(1.34)	(0.09)	(0.33)	(0.10)	(0.29)
Inequality # Right parties	8.26	0.29	0.14	-0.47^{+}	0.96	-2.08	-0.21*	1.08**	0.21^{+}	-0.21
	(6.77)	(0.77)	(0.09)	(0.25)	(0.65)	(1.77)	(0.10)	(0.40)	(0.12)	(0.34)
Right parties	-5.49^{+}	-1.74***	-3.55**	-1.80***	-4.07*	-1.79***	2.53	-1.74***	-3.89**	-1.71***
	(3.13)	(0.40)	(1.14)	(0.36)	(1.60)	(0.35)	(2.12)	(0.35)	(1.30)	(0.40)
New party	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Party size	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP change	4.40	4.68	7.37	7.49	7.22	7.34	7.16	8.47	1.75	4.88
	(6.49)	(6.48)	(6.50)	(6.48)	(6.50)	(6.51)	(6.50)	(6.56)	(5.63)	(5.81)
ENEP	0.37^{+}	0.35^{+}	0.25	0.35^{+}	0.27	0.33^{+}	0.26	0.35^{+}	0.32^{+}	0.46*
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Voter turnout	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	7.15*	2.39	4.60*	2.53^{+}	4.98*	2.54^{+}	-1.04	2.40^{+}	4.46*	2.01
	(3.19)	(1.47)	(1.79)	(1.47)	(2.03)	(1.47)	(2.37)	(1.46)	(1.96)	(1.49)
Sigma (countries)	-0.30	-0.42	-0.21	-0.29	-0.23	-0.29	-0.20	-0.30	-0.38	-0.38
	(0.34)	(0.36)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.37)	(0.36)
Sigma (parties)	-0.23	-0.19	-0.42	-0.35	-0.40	-0.38	-0.43	-0.40	-0.06	-0.08
	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Sigma (residual)	0.99***	0.99***	0.96***	0.96***	0.96***	0.96***	0.96***	0.96***	0.99***	0.99***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	526	526	498	498	498	498	498	498	565	561
AIC	2604.18	2605.86	2434.33	2433.65	2435.33	2436.65	2433.50	2430.65	2804.32	2783.72
BIC	2655.36	2657.04	2484.86	2484.18	2485.86	2487.18	2484.02	2481.18	2856.36	2835.68

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. *Includes parties from the following party families: Social Democrats, Liberals, Christian Democrats, Conservatives.

Table C10: Explaining party emphasis on economic equality: Type(s) of inequality and partisanship (Decade dummies)

	Gini (L1)	Gini (D)	90-10 (L1)	90-10 (D)	90-50 (L1)	90-50 (D)	Bottom 50 (L1)	Bottom 50 (D)	Top 1 (L1)	Top 1 (D)
Inequality	-3.99	-0.05	-0.14^{+}	0.40*	-1.00^{+}	1.86	0.18*	-0.60*	-0.17^{+}	-0.11
	(6.15)	(0.50)	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.53)	(1.13)	(0.09)	(0.27)	(0.09)	(0.22)
Inequality # Right parties	-1.13	-0.07	0.16*	-0.41^{+}	1.25*	-2.18	-0.20*	0.99**	0.21^{+}	0.01
	(5.89)	(0.66)	(0.08)	(0.22)	(0.61)	(1.53)	(0.09)	(0.34)	(0.11)	(0.28)
Right parties	-1.64	-2.14***	-4.09***	-2.19***	-5.03***	-2.17***	2.18	-2.11***	-4.38***	-2.23***
	(2.72)	(0.35)	(1.04)	(0.34)	(1.45)	(0.34)	(2.00)	(0.33)	(1.18)	(0.34)
New party	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Niche party	0.13	0.13	-0.05	0.00	-0.06	0.00	-0.06	0.03	0.20	0.16
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)
Party size	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP change	-1.12	-1.63	0.81	0.68	0.55	1.05	0.86	0.87	-3.88	-1.89
	(5.90)	(5.85)	(5.78)	(5.75)	(5.78)	(5.78)	(5.80)	(5.82)	(5.05)	(5.16)
ENEP	0.41*	0.39*	0.34^{+}	0.39*	0.34^{+}	0.38*	0.34^{+}	0.37*	0.35*	0.46**
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Voter turnout	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Decade dummies	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Constant	4.50	2.82^{+}	4.26*	2.45	4.95*	2.47	-1.22	2.55	4.88*	2.79^{+}
	(3.07)	(1.67)	(1.87)	(1.69)	(2.06)	(1.70)	(2.61)	(1.68)	(1.90)	(1.61)
Sigma (countries)	0.02	-0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.03
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Sigma (parties)	-0.02	-0.00	-0.05	0.00	-0.05	-0.00	-0.07	-0.02	-0.02	0.02
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Sigma (residual)	1.03***	1.03***	0.99***	0.99***	0.99***	0.99***	0.99***	0.99***	1.04***	1.03***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	756	756	724	724	724	724	724	724	820	812
BIC	3811.68	3812.39	3605.20	3603.88	3605.17	3607.03	3604.31	3601.32	4144.59	4103.13

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table C11: Explaining party emphasis on economic equality: Type(s) of inequality and partisanship (jackknifed estimates (party families))

	Gini (L1)	Gini (D)	90-10 (L1)	90-10 (D)	90-50 (L1)	90-50 (D)	Bottom 50 (L1)	Bottom 50 (D)	Top 1 (L1)	Top 1 (D)
Inequality	1.85	-0.10	-0.14**	0.42**	-0.97*	2.01*	0.15+	-0.63*	-0.11+	-0.12
	(16.11)	(0.53)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.28)	(0.76)	(0.07)	(0.19)	(0.05)	(0.25)
Inequality # Right parties	-1.01	-0.06	0.17*	-0.40*	1.26*	-2.18	-0.21*	0.99**	0.20**	0.02
	(15.32)	(0.55)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.46)	(1.21)	(0.07)	(0.23)	(0.05)	(0.30)
Right parties	-1.65	-2.09+	-4.09*	-2.13+	-5.01*	-2.11+	2.44	-2.05+	-4.32**	-2.19+
	(6.46)	(0.89)	(1.29)	(0.87)	(1.71)	(0.87)	(1.58)	(0.84)	(1.01)	(1.00)
New party	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Niche party	0.19	0.22	0.05	0.10	0.04	0.11	0.04	0.13	0.28	0.23
	(1.01)	(0.99)	(0.76)	(0.89)	(0.76)	(0.90)	(0.74)	(0.87)	(1.04)	(1.03)
Party size	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP change	-3.07	-3.09	-1.10	-1.20	-1.45	-0.77	-1.44	-1.31	-5.46	-2.93
	(5.90)	(6.39)	(6.60)	(6.55)	(6.71)	(6.39)	(6.74)	(6.69)	(5.80)	(5.67)
ENEP	0.44*	0.43*	0.41*	0.45*	0.41*	0.44*	0.41*	0.43*	0.41*	0.51*
	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Constant	1.99	2.84+	4.70**	2.86+	5.25*	2.87+	-0.11	2.86+	4.17**	2.60
	(6.23)	(1.31)	(1.16)	(1.26)	(1.56)	(1.25)	(2.39)	(1.18)	(1.01)	(1.43)
Sigma (countries)	-0.02	-0.01	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.05
	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Sigma (parties)	0.01	0.01	-0.05	0.01	-0.05	-0.00	-0.07	-0.02	-0.00	0.03
	(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.52)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.26)	(0.27)
Sigma (residual)	1.03***	1.03***	1.00***	0.99***	1.00***	0.99***	1.00***	0.99***	1.04***	1.03***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Observations	756	756	724	724	724	724	724	724	820	812
AIC	3794.98	3794.95	3589.01	3587.17	3589.22	3590.70	3588.63	3585.36	4127.26	4084.61
BIC	3822.75	3822.72	3616.52	3614.68	3616.73	3618.21	3616.14	3612.87	4155.51	4112.81

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Table C12:Explaining party emphasis on economic equality: Type(s) of inequality and partisanship (jackknifed estimates (countries))

	Gini (L1)	Gini (D)	90-10 (L1)	90-10 (D)	90-50 (L1)	90-50 (D)	Bottom 50 (L1)	Bottom 50 (D)	Top 1 (L1)	Top 1 (D)
Inequality	1.85	-0.10	-0.14*	0.42***	-0.97^{+}	2.01	0.15*	-0.63^{+}	-0.11	-0.12
	(7.59)	(0.41)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.49)	(1.19)	(0.06)	(0.29)	(0.08)	(0.35)
Inequality # Right parties	-1.01	-0.06	0.17*	-0.40^{+}	1.26**	-2.18	-0.21*	0.99**	0.20	0.02
	(8.51)	(0.50)	(0.06)	(0.19)	(0.40)	(4.01)	(0.08)	(0.28)	(0.19)	(0.44)
Right parties	-1.65	-2.09**	-4.09***	-2.13***	-5.01***	-2.11***	2.44	-2.05***	-4.32	-2.19**
	(4.05)	(0.51)	(0.81)	(0.45)	(1.07)	(0.45)	(1.54)	(0.43)	(2.52)	(0.66)
New party	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Niche party	0.19	0.22	0.05	0.10	0.04	0.11	0.04	0.13	0.28	0.23
	(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.30)
Party size	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP change	-3.07	-3.09	-1.10	-1.20	-1.45	-0.77	-1.44	-1.31	-5.46	-2.93
	(5.13)	(4.98)	(4.56)	(4.69)	(4.64)	(4.83)	(4.68)	(4.67)	(7.35)	(4.85)
ENEP	0.44	0.43	0.41	0.45	0.41	0.44	0.41	0.43	0.41^{+}	0.51
	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.20)	(0.30)
Constant	1.99	2.84**	4.70***	2.86**	5.25**	2.87**	-0.11	2.86**	4.17**	2.60**
	(2.94)	(0.84)	(0.94)	(0.81)	(1.29)	(0.83)	(1.55)	(0.81)	(1.13)	(0.71)
Sigma (countries)	-0.02	-0.01	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.05
	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.27)
Sigma (parties)	0.01	0.01	-0.05	0.01	-0.05	-0.00	-0.07	-0.02	-0.00	0.03
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.31)	(0.36)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.26)
Sigma (residual)	1.03**	1.03**	1.00**	0.99**	1.00**	0.99**	1.00**	0.99**	1.04*	1.03*
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.36)	(0.35)
Observations	756	756	724	724	724	724	724	724	820	812
AIC	3804.98	3804.95	3599.01	3597.17	3599.22	3600.70	3598.63	3595.36	4137.26	4094.61
BIC	3855.89	3855.86	3649.45	3647.61	3649.65	3651.13	3649.06	3645.80	4189.06	4146.31

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Table C13: Explaining party emphasis on economic equality: Type(s) of inequality and partisanship (w/o outliers – 98% of observations)*

	Gini (L1)	Gini (D)	90-10 (L1)	90-10 (D)	90-50 (L1)	90-50 (D)	Bottom 50 (L1)	Bottom 50 (D)	Top 1 (L1)	Top 1 (D)
Inequality	-1.21	-0.33	-0.16*	0.55^{+}	-0.82	1.68	0.17^{+}	-0.52^{+}	-0.13	-0.19
	(5.16)	(0.55)	(0.08)	(0.29)	(0.55)	(2.45)	(0.09)	(0.31)	(0.09)	(0.23)
Inequality # Right parties	2.48	0.32	0.19*	-0.65^{+}	1.18^{+}	-4.14	-0.25**	0.91*	0.23*	0.09
	(5.98)	(0.74)	(0.09)	(0.37)	(0.63)	(3.20)	(0.10)	(0.41)	(0.12)	(0.29)
Right parties	-3.22	-2.16***	-4.41***	-2.13***	-4.84**	-2.12***	3.24	-2.03***	-4.61***	-2.21***
	(2.76)	(0.35)	(1.09)	(0.34)	(1.50)	(0.34)	(2.06)	(0.33)	(1.28)	(0.34)
Voter turnout	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
New party	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Niche party	0.17	0.22	0.02	0.11	0.04	0.09	0.03	0.17	0.28	0.23
	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.41)
Party size	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP change	-2.50	-2.20	-1.39	-0.64	-2.02	-0.55	-1.63	-0.55	-5.43	-3.50
	(5.84)	(5.87)	(5.94)	(5.80)	(5.85)	(5.79)	(5.88)	(5.86)	(5.12)	(5.18)
ENEP	0.45*	0.41*	0.41*	0.45*	0.40*	0.42*	0.40*	0.38*	0.40*	0.51**
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Constant	3.44	3.18*	5.24**	3.21*	5.35**	3.39*	-0.19	3.60*	4.76*	2.89^{+}
	(2.88)	(1.54)	(1.72)	(1.53)	(1.93)	(1.54)	(2.42)	(1.52)	(1.94)	(1.54)
Sigma (countries)	-0.02	0.01	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.05	0.08	0.08
	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Sigma (parties)	-0.09	-0.01	-0.08	0.01	-0.04	-0.01	-0.09	-0.03	-0.00	0.04
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Sigma (residual)	1.02***	1.03***	1.00***	1.00***	1.00***	1.00***	1.00***	1.00***	1.04***	1.04***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	745	743	712	711	715	711	714	711	804	801
AIC	3737.15	3751.90	3551.73	3547.40	3566.44	3547.26	3559.11	3542.22	4070.91	4047.26
BIC	3797.13	3811.84	3611.12	3606.76	3625.88	3606.63	3618.53	3601.59	4131.87	4108.18

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. *Observations at the outer bounds of the inequality indicators (p1 and p99) are excluded.

Figure C4: Predicted shares of inequality statements conditional on types of inequality and partisanship (w/o outliers – 98% of observations)



Notes: Areas indicate 95%-confidence intervals. Bars show variable distribution

Table C14: Explaining party emphasis on economic equality: Type(s) of inequality and partisanship (w/o outliers – 90% of observations)*

	Gini (L1)	Gini (D)	90-10 (L1)	90-10 (D)	90-50 (L1)	90-50 (D)	Bottom 50 (L1)	Bottom 50 (D)	Top 1 (L1)	Top 1 (D)
Inequality	0.73	-0.23	-0.18^{+}	0.84^{+}	-1.19^{+}	-0.95	0.16	-0.38	-0.11	-0.31
	(5.93)	(0.73)	(0.10)	(0.46)	(0.71)	(3.92)	(0.11)	(0.51)	(0.11)	(0.31)
Inequality # Right parties	4.29	0.14	0.24*	-0.89	1.81*	-4.15	-0.27*	1.20^{+}	0.21	0.27
	(6.90)	(0.97)	(0.11)	(0.61)	(0.78)	(5.19)	(0.11)	(0.67)	(0.14)	(0.40)
Right parties	-4.08	-2.19***	-4.92***	-2.20***	-6.22***	-2.20***	3.62	-2.01***	-4.46**	-2.22***
	(3.17)	(0.36)	(1.36)	(0.35)	(1.82)	(0.34)	(2.46)	(0.35)	(1.52)	(0.36)
Voter turnout	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
New party	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Niche party	0.09	0.17	0.08	0.12	0.10	0.16	0.06	0.16	0.31	0.26
	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.42)
Party size	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP change	-0.17	-1.50	-2.88	-2.33	-1.68	-0.01	-3.20	-0.19	-6.14	-4.83
	(6.13)	(6.25)	(6.40)	(6.24)	(6.41)	(6.12)	(6.37)	(6.25)	(5.33)	(5.71)
ENEP	0.38*	0.40*	0.34^{+}	0.42*	0.32^{+}	0.33^{+}	0.35^{+}	0.32^{+}	0.41*	0.53**
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Constant	2.51	3.17*	5.92**	3.20*	6.43**	3.32*	0.39	3.70*	5.00*	2.57
	(3.15)	(1.57)	(2.01)	(1.60)	(2.32)	(1.59)	(2.72)	(1.58)	(2.09)	(1.63)
Sigma (countries)	-0.07	-0.03	0.09	0.09	0.03	0.04	0.08	0.09	0.15	0.15
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Sigma (parties)	-0.17	-0.07	-0.11	0.02	-0.04	-0.05	-0.11	-0.05	-0.04	0.03
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Sigma (residual)	1.05***	1.06***	1.03***	1.02***	1.01***	1.00***	1.03***	1.02***	1.05***	1.06***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	689	689	654	652	655	658	659	660	748	732
AIC	3485.36	3513.36	3300.42	3284.08	3283.19	3289.66	3320.33	3315.27	3798.99	3736.17
BIC	3544.32	3572.32	3358.70	3342.32	3341.49	3348.02	3378.71	3373.66	3859.02	3795.92

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. *Observations at the outer bounds of the inequality indicators (p1-p2 and p98-p99) are excluded.

Figure C5: Predicted shares of inequality statements conditional on types of inequality and partisanship (w/o outliers – 90% of observations)



Notes: Areas indicate 95%-confidence intervals. Bars show variable distribution

Table C15: Explaining party emphasis on economic equality: Type(s) of inequality and partisanship (fractional logit regression)

	Gini (L1)	Gini (D)	90-10 (L1)	90-10 (D)	90-50 (L1)	90-50 (D)	Bottom 50 (L1)	Bottom 50 (D)	Top 1 (L1)	Top 1 (D)
Inequality	-0.64	0.03	-0.05**	0.14***	-0.28**	0.61**	0.05*	-0.17**	-0.01	-0.02
	(1.73)	(0.12)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.20)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Inequality # Right parties	0.71	-0.07	0.04^{+}	-0.13**	0.28*	-0.72*	-0.05*	0.32***	0.04	-0.04
	(1.79)	(0.24)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.33)	(0.02)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Right parties	-1.00	-0.67***	-1.17***	-0.70***	-1.32***	-0.69***	0.48	-0.68***	-1.10**	-0.73***
	(0.84)	(0.09)	(0.26)	(0.09)	(0.32)	(0.09)	(0.53)	(0.09)	(0.42)	(0.10)
New party	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Niche party	0.08	0.08	-0.00	0.03	-0.00	0.03	-0.00	0.03	0.05	0.05
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Party size	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
GDP change	-1.36	-1.33	-0.41	-0.71	-0.56	-0.39	-0.49	-0.55	-2.03	-0.80
	(1.72)	(1.70)	(1.74)	(1.75)	(1.76)	(1.77)	(1.77)	(1.73)	(1.57)	(1.55)
ENEP	0.16**	0.15**	0.15**	0.15**	0.15**	0.15**	0.15**	0.14**	0.13**	0.18***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	-3.78***	-4.06***	-3.56***	-4.03***	-3.43***	-4.02***	-5.22***	-4.02***	-3.76***	-4.17***
	(0.71)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.29)	(0.73)	(0.28)	(0.37)	(0.28)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	756	756	724	724	724	724	724	724	820	812
AIC	253.39	253.39	241.59	241.58	241.63	241.67	241.57	241.51	271.28	268.15
BIC	345.95	345.95	333.29	333.27	333.32	333.36	333.27	333.21	365.47	362.14

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the level of parties in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.