

The Policy Consequences of the European Project:
From Politics to Policies in the
EU and the Member States

**Doctoral thesis for obtaining the
academic degree Doctor of Social Sciences
(Dr. rer. soc.)**

submitted by

Daniela Beyer

at the Universität Konstanz

Sektion Politik – Recht – Wirtschaft

Fachbereich Politik und Verwaltungswissenschaft

Konstanz, 2017

Date of the oral examination: July 20, 2017

1. Reviewer: Professor Dr. Christian Breunig

2. Reviewer: Professor Dr. Dirk Leuffen

3. Reviewer: Professor Dr. Matthew Gabel

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Any kind of research aims at understanding another little puzzle piece of the big picture. It tries to move beyond what we know and present new knowledge that only combined serves its purpose. As such, also this dissertation would not have been possible without guidance, advice, collaboration, friendship, and hugs.

I am extremely grateful to my supervisor at the University of Konstanz, Christian Breunig, for, first of all, encouraging me to write this dissertation, but also for his advice, knowledge, projects, and ideas. This dissertation and my work in general has benefitted tremendously from all interactions with Christian. Our working group at the University of Konstanz has always been small but allowed strong bonds. Tinette Schnatterer and Miriam Hänni have been great companions on this journey. Talking and sharing with them, brainstorming together, experiencing fun adventures, and countless lunches have made those past years so much nicer.

I also wish to express my sincere gratitude to Dirk Leuffen and Matthew Gabel who are also part of my thesis committee but much more than that have really been important advisors and great people to work with. Their kind way of giving very constructive and thoughtful feedback facilitated the process and improved the results to an indescribable extent. Dirk's presence at the University of Konstanz and his willingness to read my work and come to my presentations and support me with his knowledgeable and well thought out comments was extremely valuable. A visit to Washington University in St. Louis in December of 2015 and a meeting at the MPSA conference in 2017 allowed me to gain insight into Matt's incredible knowledge and offered food for thought that greatly benefitted the project as a whole.

In general, it really is about the people you meet along the way, who share your path, or who make you the person you are, that make a project like this possible. I want to wholeheartedly thank my high school teacher who introduced me to political science and encouraged me in a way that still carries me today – Barbara Reske. During my undergraduate studies at the University of Mannheim it was Marc Debus, Thomas Meyer, Jochen Müller, Ullrich Sieberer, and Berthold Rittberger who always encouraged me to take the next step on this path. Being a graduate student at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Affairs in Bologna, Italy, made a difference for me in so many ways. It gave me confidence to interact as well as present and defend my work in English, gave me uncountable new perspectives with its interdiscipli-

nary, international, and multicultural environment, and presented me with the most supportive master thesis (and beyond) advisor – Erik Jones. To him, Mark Gilbert and Vincent Della Salla, I am also deeply indebted. Also the other great teachers at SAIS Europe who broadened my horizon beyond political science and integrated international economics, history and language studies must be mentioned.

Christian Preiser was my first supervisor while interning and later becoming a working student at a strategy and communications consultancy and has remained an important mentor for me. I am very lucky to call another person my advisor, who, formally, does not play a role in my thesis committee and yet supported me to an extent that is invaluable – Georg Vanberg. In addition to inviting me to spend a memorable semester as a visiting scholar at Duke, he went well beyond anything I could have asked for in giving me advice on my work. He certainly played an important role in helping me to get my first paper published. In the publication process, I got the chance to collaborate with two great journal editors and four very constructive anonymous reviewers at the Journal of European Public Policy.

Without the friendship of colleagues and others alike no one can succeed. I am particularly grateful for my three Bologna girls, Ashley, Liz, and Melanie, who became more family than friends while in Bologna and beyond. Countless cards and shared adventures let me forget (or be brave enough to cross) the ocean and are an invaluable source of encouragement. My colleagues and office-mates Verena, Niklas, Dominik, Hendrik, Arpita, Konstantin, Julia, Michelle, and Julian made life at the University worthwhile. I will never forget the lunches, canoe tour, SOLA races, and hours of sharing insights, doubts, and happiness. Thank you also to Francesca for the friendship we build while living and working at Duke. I am particularly grateful for my roommate Feli and the whole Hermann-von-Vicari-Straße crew for sharing life with me. Alessa, Verena, Luise, and Miriam always helped me to regain my balance when running together along the lake and beyond. Another group to be thankful for are my little horseback acrobats and their four-legged companions.

Finally but most importantly, there are no words expressing enough gratitude and love to all of my family(-friends) and especially my mom and dad, Ute and Harald Beyer. Without them, I wouldn't be who I am, I would not have taken this route, and would definitely never have succeeded. They are everything for me. If near or far, they carry me. I dedicate this book to them.

SUMMARY

Uniting at first six, now 28 sovereign nation states within a new political entity that adds another level of political competence and, with deepening integration, asks its members to increasingly surrender sovereignty sounds like a sheer impossible endeavor. Yet, political elites in Europe have pushed this process leading to what we now know to be the European Union. Since its very start, the Union has attracted researchers' attention. Almost every puzzle of the Union's institutional development, increasing membership and competencies, decision-making, and acceptance both from the elites and the public's viewpoint has been uncovered. Surprisingly little is known, however, about the consequences of European integration from a domestic, comparative politics perspective.

This cumulative dissertation tackles the consequences of multilevel governance in three ways: The first paper-chapter analyzes the neglected effects of Europeanization in the member states, thereby emphasizing the full extent of deepening European integration's consequences for member states' policy-making. Building on this new insight into the strong European influences on domestic policy-making, the question who actually cares for citizens' concerns, who represents Europe's citizens, becomes crucial for the second chapter. Finally, the focus on national influences on the European level and their feedback effects on members' acceptance of a common European path helps to understand the complex interaction of multilevel governance and its consequences.

In fact, the influences of the European level and their domestic consequences turn out stronger than expected:

- shifting competencies to the European level allow domestic policymakers to re-allocate their policy attention;
 - multilevel policy-making provides citizens with an additional level of representation; and
 - EU-level agenda-setting and decision-making is both nationally determined and has distinct consequences for national outputs and the convergence of EU member states' policy agendas
-

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die Vereinigung von zuerst sechs und nun 28 Nationalstaaten in einem neuen politischen Organ, das eine weitere Ebene politischer Kompetenz etabliert und mit fortschreitender Integration mehr und mehr Souveränität von seinen Mitgliedern fordert, scheint ein nahezu unmögliches Unterfangen. Dennoch haben mutige politische Eliten in Europa diesen Prozess vorangetrieben und zu dem geführt, was wir heute als Europäische Union kennen. Seit ihrem Beginn war die EU im Fokus der Wissenschaft. Beinahe jedem Puzzleteil, von der institutionellen Entwicklung der Union, steigenden Mitgliedszahlen und Kompetenzen, Entscheidungsfindungsprozessen und bis hin zur Akzeptanz sowohl auf Eliten- als auch auf Bürgerebene, wurde Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Überraschend wenig ist jedoch über die tatsächlichen Konsequenzen der europäischen Integration für die nationale, innenpolitische Ebene bekannt.

Die vorliegende kumulative Dissertation nimmt sich daher der Auswirkungen dieser neuen Form der mehrstufigen Politikgestaltung in drei Schritten an. Das erste Kapitel analysiert die vernachlässigten Effekte der Europäisierung in den Mitgliedsstaaten und zeigt dabei das gesamte Ausmaß der Konsequenzen europäischer Integration für die politische Entscheidungsfindung der Nationalstaaten auf. Darauf aufbauend stellt sich für das zweite Kapitel aufgrund der festgestellten starken Beeinflussung die Frage, wer sich im Multi-Ebenen Modell um die Belange der Bürger kümmert, wer Europas Bürger repräsentiert. Zuletzt ermöglicht es der Fokus auf nationale Einflüsse auf europäischer Ebene und deren Rückspiegelung auf die Akzeptanz eines gemeinsamen europäischen Wegs, die komplexe Interaktion von mehrstufiger Politikgestaltung und deren Konsequenzen zu verstehen.

Tatsächlich sind die Einflüsse der europäischen Ebene und deren innenpolitische Konsequenzen stärker als erwartet:

- auf die europäische Ebene übertragene Kompetenzen erlauben es nationalen Entscheidungsträgern, ihre Themen-Aufmerksamkeit neu zu verteilen;
 - mehrstufige Politikgestaltung ermöglicht Europas Bürgern eine weitere Repräsentationsebene; und
 - EU Agenda Setzung und Entscheidungsfindung ist stark national beeinflusst und hat ausgeprägte Konsequenzen für nationale Outputs und die Konvergenz der Politikgestaltung in den Mitgliedsstaaten.
-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction: The Consequences of European Integration for the Member States	1
i. Puzzle and Research Question	2
ii. State of the Art	4
iii. Three Papers and Their Connection	9
iv. Empirical Database	15
v. Contribution	17
<u>II. The Neglected Effects of European Integration: Policymaking in Europeanized and Sovereign Domains</u>	20
i. A Theoretical Framework for the Consequences of Europeanization	22
ii. Research Design and Methods.....	30
iii. Depicting Directly EU-influenced and Sovereign Policy Processes in Germany	34
iv. Empirical Analysis: Applying Probability Distributions to the Study of Europeanization ..	39
v. Conclusion: How Influential is Europeanization in Member States' Legislation?.....	48
Appendix II.....	50
<u>III. Democratic Surplus?: Representation in the European Multilevel System of Governance</u>	57
i. Congruence on EU- and National-Level Agendas with Citizens' Concerns	59
ii. Research Design and Methods.....	69
iii. Descriptives: Has the EU a Chance to Be Congruent?.....	75
iv. Empirical Analysis: Comparative & EU-level Congruence	79
v. Conclusion: Does a Democratic Surplus Exist?.....	88
Appendix III	91
<u>IV. Dynamics of Agenda Assimilation in Europe</u>	97
i. Role Choice and its Consequences	99
ii. Research Design and Methods.....	114
iii. Descriptives: The Effect of the Council Presidency.....	119
iv. Empirical Analysis: A Two Step Process	123
v. Conclusion: Do the Members Choose A Common Path?	129
Appendix IV.....	131
V. Conclusion: An Outlook on (Consequences of) the European Project	138
i. Consequences of the Three Paper's Connection and Their Role for the "Big Picture" ...	139
ii. Consequences for Future Research	143
iii. Consequences for the European Project.....	146
VI. Bibliography	150
VII. Data	164
VIII. Additional Appendices	167
Chapter II: Neglected Effects of European Integration	167
Chapter III: Democratic Surplus?	175
Chapter IV: Dynamics of Agenda Assimilation	177

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER II: THE NEGLECTED EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

FIGURE 1: A FIRST OVERVIEW OVER THE EUROPEANIZATION OF GERMAN LEGISLATION.....	35
FIGURE 2: SHARE OF DIRECTLY EU-INFLUENCED AND SOVEREIGN LEGISLATION IN MAJOR POLICY AREAS PRE- AND POST-MAASTRICHT	36
FIGURE 3: DEVELOPMENTS OF DIRECTLY EU-INFLUENCED AND SOVEREIGN POLICY-MAKING IN THREE MACRO POLICY AREAS OVER TIME.....	38
FIGURE 4: YEARLY DEVELOPMENT OF ENTROPY SCORES.....	40
FIGURE 5: HISTOGRAMS FOR PERCENTAGE-COUNT VALUES FOR ALL 18 CATEGORIES.....	43
FIGURE 6: THE DEVELOPMENT OF L-KURTOSIS SCORES (PERCENTAGE-COUNT) IN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT PHASES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION	44
FIGURE 7: DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEANIZED AND SOVEREIGN LAWMAKING OVER TIME AND ACROSS MAJOR POLICY AREAS	51
FIGURE 6B: SMOOTHED DEVELOPMENT OF L-KURTOSIS SCORES IN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT PHASES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION	55

CHAPTER III: DEMOCRATIC SURPLUS?

FIGURE 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS OVER TIME AND ACROSS COUNTRIES.....	77
FIGURE 4: MOST OFTEN QUOTED MIP OVERLAP ACROSS ALL EU COUNTRIES	78
FIGURE 5: RESPONSIVENESS TO MIP TOPICS IN THE EXAMINED EU MEMBER STATES LEGISLATION AND THE ECCS.....	80
FIGURE 6: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL INTERACTION MODELS ON THE ECCSHARE.....	87
FIGURE 1: MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS ACROSS ALL COUNTRIES OVER TIME.....	92
FIGURE 3: MIP ISSUE IMPORTANCE ACROSS COUNTRIES AND OVER TIME.....	93

CHAPTER IV: DYNAMICS OF AGENDA ASSIMILATION IN EUROPE

FIGURE 1: ASSIMILATION TENDENCIES DURING THE COUNCIL PRESIDENCY	119
FIGURE 2: AVERAGE ATTENTION FOR MACROECONOMIC ISSUES AND THE PRESIDENCY EFFECT.....	121
FIGURE 3: AVERAGE EFFECTS OF MAIN EXPLANATORY VARIABLES	126
FIGURE 4: EXPLAINING AGENDA CONVERGENCE WITH ROLE CHOICE	127
FIGURE 1B: ASSIMILATION TENDENCIES DURING THE COUNCIL PRESIDENCY FOR DIFFERENT POLICY AREAS .	131
FIGURE 5: POLICY AGENDA CHANGE THROUGH THE PRESIDENCY	131
FIGURE 6: HISTOGRAM OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE FOR PART II: CHANGE IN EMD ($T-(T+1)$).....	132
FIGURE 4B: EXPLAINING AGENDA CONVERGENCE WITH ROLE CHOICE (ROLE DUMMIES)	132
FIGURE 7: POLICY ATTENTION ACROSS POLICY AREAS AND OVER TIME.....	133

LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER II: THE NEGLECTED EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

TABLE 1: KURTOSIS & L-KURTOSIS SCORES OF DIFFERENT AGENDA SHARES IN GERMAN LEGISLATION.....	42
TABLE 2: AGGREGATION OF THE CAP CODES INTO MACRO TOPICS FOR ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND FOR USE IN FIGURE 3	50
TABLE 1B: KURTOSIS & L-KURTOSIS SCORES OF DIFFERENT AGENDA SHARES IN GERMAN LEGISLATION – WITH ROBUSTNESS CHECKS	50

CHAPTER III: DEMOCRATIC SURPLUS?

TABLE 2: ERROR CORRECTION MODEL FOR THE RATIO OF ECC/MEMBER STATE LEGISLATION SHARES	82
TABLE 3: GENERALIZED LINEAR MODEL (QUASI-BINOMIAL LOGIT) ON CONDITIONS FOR ECC CONGRUENCY ..	85
TABLE 1: CROSS-OVER CODING TABLE FOR THE DIFFERENT DATASETS USED (EUROBAROMETER MIP, CAP COUNTRY AND EU PROJECTS)	91
TABLE 4: ADL MODEL FOR CONFIRMATION OF ECM REQUIREMENTS	94
TABLE 5: HIERARCHICAL GENERALIZED LINEAR MODELS (QUASI-BINOMIAL LOGIT) ON CONDITIONS FOR ECC CONGRUENCY	95

CHAPTER IV: DYNAMICS OF AGENDA ASSIMILATION IN EUROPE

TABLE 1: PART I – EXPLAINING ROLE CHOICE	123
TABLE 2: PART II – EXPLAINING AGENDA CONVERGENCE WITH ROLE CHOICE	128
TABLE 1B: PART I WITH FIXED EFFECTS MODELS	134
TABLE 3: ROBUSTNESS CHECK – ERROR CORRECTION MODEL	136

ADDITIONAL APPENDICES

FIGURE 1: MEDIAN TIME REQUIREMENTS FROM INTRODUCTION TO ADOPTION OF A LAW IN THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG.....	169
FIGURE 2: TIME REQUIREMENTS FROM INTRODUCTION TO ADOPTION OF INDIVIDUAL LAWS IN THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG.....	170
FIGURE 3: HISTOGRAMS FOR THE MEDIAN TIME REQUIREMENTS OF THE SOVEREIGN AND EUROPEANIZED AGENDA SHARES.....	171
FIGURE 4: NUMBER OF LOBBY GROUPS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION.....	172
FIGURE 1A: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT	175
FIGURE 1B: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT WITH REPRESENTATIONAL TIES ..	175
FIGURE 2: MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM CONGRUENCE ACROSS TOPICS AND COUNTRIES	176
FIGURE 1: MEDIAN ATTENTION FOR MACROECONOMIC ISSUES AND THE PRESIDENCY EFFECT	177
FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTIONS OF LAWS ON POLICY ISSUES	178

CHAPTER I:

Introduction:

The Consequences of European Integration for the Member States

I. Introduction: The Consequences of European Integration for the Member States

60 years ago a courageous group of political elites from a variety of countries across Europe decided to join forces with their neighbors to form a European common market, a European Economic Community. The signature of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 laid the foundation for the European project we know today. From the idea of free movement of people, goods, and services across national borders to today's European Union a lot has changed. Twenty-two additional sovereign nation states have since joined the six founding members in multiple enlargement waves. Not only economic but increasingly sensitive policy issues, which affect the domestic context and member states' sovereignty, are now jointly decided and later transposed into national legislation. Institutional change and increasing numbers of competencies went hand in hand. By now, the European Union's institutional structure is a combination of supranational and intergovernmental bodies with varying jurisdictions. European citizens elect members of the European Parliament, countries send commissioners, and domestically elected elites meet their European counterparts on a regular basis to make landmark decisions for Europe. Researchers have analyzed this quasi experimental development of a new, "sui generis" international organization from manifold perspectives. Their findings have provided us with crucial insights into this new form of multilevel governance that is taking place in Europe. Most recent developments, however, like the economic and migration crises, the Brexit vote, and the threat of any domestic election turning more countries against the common European way, require yet another perspective.

i. **Puzzle and Research Question**

While competencies have shifted and the EU has grown stronger, a combination of supranational and intergovernmental decision-making at the European level and continuously strong nation states' domestic activity still defines the European project. 28 countries are now affected by the decisions made by a previously unheard of form of multilevel governance. By the same token, 28 countries' domestic political contexts also define what happens at the European level. The interplay between the European and domestic levels and the consequences of their interaction for the nation states of Europe and their citizens alike require our attention given the European project's particular set-up. Understanding the complex interactions, domestic and personal consequences and in particular the neglected, indirect, and unobserved effects helps us to see the whole picture of changes Europeanization entails. The European project is more than the EU and even more than a multilevel system of governance with European and domestic actors in the sense of a regional state as Schmidt (2006) proposes in her book on "Democracy in Europe". We can only understand what happens in Europe today, if we take the project for what it is – a club of strong, sovereign nation states that also make decisions on the European level. These decisions are a result of what happens at home and what the EU as a whole with its multiple channels and institutions delivers. The national and EU context together and their interaction define the politics and policies in Europe today.

Most of the existing research neglects this interaction and either focuses on the EU-level and its policies alone, or on domestic politics in the member states and how Europeanization affects the national context. Yet it requires the acceptance of the levels' connection and their actors' interrelation to understand the consequences of the European project, as I define it here: What has developed on the European continent is more than a new political entity. It is a form of multilevel governance with national influences on the European level, domestic consequences of the combination of all 28 national influences, and continuously strong, sovereign nation

states. In a nutshell, a European project combining national, intergovernmental, and supranational policy-making has developed.

National legislation is the final result of this interrelation, entailing both inputs to and outputs of the European level. It is therefore a crucial unit of analysis. In the particular multilevel setup with strong sub-level actors – nation states who voluntarily surrender sovereignty to European level institutions but preserve their say in the Council system – national policy agendas remain important. By the same token, national legislation mirrors what happens on the European level due to the need to transpose all European decisions into national law. Also indirect effects of adapting policy-making processes and policy convergence emerging through the institutionalized exchange between the “European club” become observable in the agendas of the member states. In the end, domestic policy consequences allow the clearest measurement of the effects of European integration and severely impact the European project’s perceived relevance. Member states define how they let the EU define them and define the European level in turn. If we only examine the European Union, we cannot assess how much change the member states transpose and thus realize. By narrowly focusing on the member states, however, the interrelation influencing the polities, politics, and policies in Europe’s nation states today can get lost.

This cumulative dissertation contributes to this gap in the literature by branching out in three areas of European integration’s consequences for the member states and their citizens. The papers aim to sow the seeds for a “third generation” of studies on Europeanized comparative politics, asking: How does deepening European integration affect policy-making? And who, as a consequence, represents the citizens of Europe? Finally, how can nationally influenced EU-level agenda-setting influence domestic agenda convergence across Europe?

The overarching question of interest thus is: What are the domestic policy consequences of the European project? – for the individual member state, its citizens, and the group of member states as a whole. I apply a comparative politics perspective and provide insight on the consequences which concern those actors that are the most decisive for the European project’s survival: the individual member states and their citizens.

ii. State of the Art

The reason I locate this cumulative dissertation in the “third generation”-literature on Europeanization stems from three observations in the bulk of literature on the topic: (1) different development phases of Europeanization resulted in different foci in the literature, (2) the multitude of different actors involved in the European process rarely allows a focus on all and misses a crucial one, (3) the newly emerged European studies subfield of political science lacks some analytical aspects of comparative politics.

(1) The Literature’s Development Phases – or: a Shifting Focus on European Integration

Schmidt and Radaelli (2004, 183) subsume the general trends observable in the literature dealing with the European Union since its very start in their terminology of first and second generation studies. Scholars have moved from an “almost exclusive focus on European integration, that is, on the process of building a European space in terms of EU-level policies, practices and politics” to an added concern with the “impact of European integration on member state policies, practices and politics.” (Schmidt & Radaelli 2004, 183). While first generation studies track and analyze the “formation of a European sphere”, second generation studies focus on the “process of national adjustment to the EU” (Schmidt & Radaelli 2004, 183).

This development is not surprising given the history of today’s European Union and its perception across the different phases. At the start, the European Economic Community seemed to

be just another international organization, with very limited, not necessarily domestic politics interfering competencies. It thus made sense to mostly examine institution-building, policy integration, and the new level's outputs (Hix & Goetz 2000, 1). Domestic politics acted as the explanatory, independent variable. With the "growing development of the 'multilevel' European polity", European integration became an explanatory factor to describe "continuity and change in domestic political systems" (Hix & Goetz 2000, 2).

The three papers presented in the subsequent chapters, initiate a third generation of studies. They shift the perspective towards the role of and consequences for the member states thereby taking into account the interaction between the levels. Given the further development of the European project and recent events, a new generation of studies that define the different levels' interplay and its consequences become necessary. New research must combine insights from the manifold European studies literature with the approaches the comparative politics discipline offers. Although today's European project has gained increasing influence on the nation states of Europe, the nation states themselves (and ultimately their citizens) still have the biggest say. As a result, it requires a perspective that takes into account both the national influences on the European level and the domestic consequences at home. The existing studies on Europeanization, the concept that aims to define the domestic effects of European integration, miss this interaction of the different levels and focus mostly on the direct EU influences:

(2) European Actors' Interaction – or: How the Perspective Matters

"The classic problem of comparative politics is the explanation of stable democratic political equilibrium in terms of the relations between elites, political parties, and public opinion. From this perspective, Europeanization raises the important question of how political equilibrium is altered by the mechanisms triggered by EU integration."
(Featherstone & Radaelli 2003, 338-9).

The question Featherstone and Radaelli (2003) raise is a first step in the direction of a third generation. Yet it contains only one of the two defining characteristics of the European project and aspects of comparative politics. The here implied top-down perspective – how Europeanization affects the political equilibrium, meaning the domestic context – portrays only part of the picture. By claiming that the focus on EU decisions' effects would "lead the researcher to adopt a top-down logic in which the only aim is to find out the domestic effects of independent variables defined at the EU level", Radaelli (2003) has already argued for an 'inside-out' or 'bottom-up' perspective. Recent literature has dealt with both individual directions, a combination of both, however, remains rare. However, even the literature starting at the "domestic 'hub'" "is still somewhat tainted by the top-down perspective, since it takes the EU decision as the point of departure of the study (to avoid saying 'independent variable'), and what happens at the domestic level as following from that decision" (Schmidt & Radaelli 2004, 190).

"European policy is not a mysterious deus ex machina situated 'up there'. Instead, it originates from processes of conflict, bargaining, imitation, diffusion, and interaction between national (and often subnational) and EU level actors." (Radaelli 2003, 34)

The main issue is that in the complex multilevel governance game, not only all these processes are intertwined and difficult to be entangled, but above all national level actors are also actors on the European level. National actors can be actual domestic actors, influencing the process bottom-up, or national delegates at the European level – national EU level actors –, interacting with their European colleagues on the European decision-making level. As a consequence, "the European Union is best understood as an arena rather than an actor" (Goetz 2002, 4). The strong intergovernmental decision-making aspect influences European level policies (Schmidt & Radaelli 2004, 191). The discussion should thus not just be about top-down versus bottom-up, but should include a combination of both. In particular, we need a perspective that accepts

the member states' influence on EU level decision-making and subsequent consequences for the member states at home. The particularities of the European project with its reversed quasi-federal nature with a stronger "sub-Union" (member state) level, as I argue, requires the combination and adaptation of perspectives.

(3) The Structure of the Literature – or: European Studies versus Comparative Politics

A third aspect that connects the existing literature on the domestic consequences of Europeanization is their contextual and analytical focus, easily observable in the structures of the seminal edited book editions and special journal issues. Cowles et al. (2001), Featherstone and Radaelli (2003), Brouard et al. (2012), Schmidt and Radaelli (2004, as an example for a journal special issue), Kohler Koch (2003 – with focus on governance), Schmidt (2006 – with focus on democracy) offer the most comprehensive picture of Europeanization's domestic effects in their volumes. However, they all concentrate on a specific aspect (share of Europeanized domestic legislation) in individual country chapters (Brouard et al. 2012), a common theme (Kohler-Koch 2003; Schmidt 2006), or, preponderantly, individual policy areas and institutions (Cowles et al. 2001; Featherstone & Radaelli 2003; Schmidt & Radaelli 2004). Two research gaps therefore become evident, both conceptual and empirical, with regard to the explanatory power of their findings. As a result of being part of European Union studies instead of comparative politics more broadly, most accounts lack a dimension of comparison. All edited books and special journal issues on Europeanization share the same structure: They start with an introduction on the domestic consequences before elaborating on (a.) institutional and (b.) policy area specific changes – or vice versa (Cowles et al. 2001; Featherstone & Radaelli 2003; Kohler-Koch 2003; Dyson & Goetz 2003 (with focus on Germany)).

Besides the fact that this structure again falls into the categories of bottom-up and top-down as illustrated before, there is a strong focus on individual institutions and policy specific arguments. When trying to explain how the EU influences domestic policy change content-wise, the issue specificity is necessary to deal with all particularities both at the domestic and European level. Yet, given that the EU started with very little policy competency in few areas and still remains limited in its scope with varying extent, we cannot understand the complex consequences of European integration for the nation states by focusing on individual issues only. Given that policy areas are differently affected by the European level and there is no clear divide between European and national level but instead often shared competencies, individual policy case studies are less expressive than they are in the standard national context. This situation has never occurred in a similar way before. Neither can we judge the EU's policy coverage by the standards of a nation state nor can we expect the seemingly independent national policy-making on sovereign issues to remain unchanged when many other issues are greatly affected by the EU. What we need is a comparative endeavor across different dimension.

A suitable, long-term and content-wise coded database on multiple countries' policy outputs has been missing so far. Lynggaard (2011, 25) criticizes the same point: "most of the otherwise limited empirical investigations of the implications of European integration, globalization and domestic sources of domestic change have been conducted with a focus on one particular policy sector, for example social policy, agricultural policy, telecommunication or economic policy". In his article on "Domestic Change in the Face of European Integration and Globalization: Methodological Pitfalls and Pathways" he also claims that we need a "cross-country comparative research design allowing for a multiple theoretical analysis" (Lynggaard 2011, 34). Until now, "our knowledge of the respective implications of European integration and globalization on policy sectors is, at best, uncertain and essentially an open empirical question" (Lynggaard


2011, 34). Focusing on policy contents is a limiting factor not only because it impedes generalizability but it also stands in the way of cross-national comparison and long time series. Too much (qualitative) knowledge is required for a carefully conducted study. As a result, the literature on domestic consequences so far lacks the three major analytical aspects of comparative politics: a comparison across issues, time, and countries.

New research that aims to add new knowledge to the already insightful literature on the European Union and its domestic consequences thus needs to take on new perspectives, accepting the European Union's development, the multilevel governance framework, and the characteristics of the European project as a whole. Since the member states remain continuously strong actors despite all influences the EU may have, a more comparative perspective becomes necessary. Instead of the usually applied 'goodness of fit' argument between the "proposed EU policy and long-standing national policy legacies" (Cowles et al. 2001; Windhoff-Héritier 2001; Börzel and Risse 2003, Schmidt & Radaelli 2004, 187) for successful EU influences, new data allows to examine decision- and policy-making processes more broadly.

iii. Three Papers and Their Connection

The below figure gives an overview of the multilevel European project I am interested in and the individual papers' location and connection in this framework. The arrangement of the three main actors of the European project – the EU, the member states, and the citizens – in descending order illustrates the multilevel framework of quasi-federal nature, yet emphasizes the particular role of the strong, sovereign member state(s) in the middle.

Graphical Overview



The first paper chapter focuses on the consequences for policy-making in the individual member state as a result of deepening European integration. It compares over time and between directly EU-influenced and sovereign policy-making. By applying this comparative, domestic focus, the paper adds another layer and solution to the puzzle of the domestic consequences of Europeanization that has received a lot of scholarly and societal attention but has not been answered conclusively. As Anderson (2002, 794) argues, “scholars have disagreed, at times vigorously, about the location, scope, and implications of integration-induced changes, but few question the reality of change (Sandholtz, 1996; Pollack, 2000).”

It is generally acknowledged, examined in various strands of research, and backed up with empirical evidence, that European integration increasingly influences the domestic arena and the “systemic functioning of democracy” (Anderson 2002, 815). The Europeanization literature clearly shows that an increasing number of policy areas is “affected by policy-making in Brussels” (Börzel & Risse 2000, 3). Whether or not Delors’ Myth of 80% EU-influenced legislation has come true, however, remains controversial (Brouard et al. 2012). Issues of measurement and scope definition give reason for debate (see for example Töller 2010). Independent of the actual strength of the findings, the research in the field confirms the significant European influence on the member states and asks for further thought on the domestic consequences, especially for policy-making processes.

Paper I thus examines the policy-making processes of both the directly EU-influenced and sovereign proportion of German laws¹ throughout the course of deepening European integration. The main underlying argument is that when policy competencies shift from the member state

¹ Germany presents itself as a good case study not only but mostly because it is the only member state where parliamentary services officially and reliably code EU influences on legislation. Another aspect of the choice is that we can expect the results to be at least as strong for the other members given Germany’s particular role in the EU.

to the European level, policy-makers gain capacities and can reallocate their attention within and between policy areas. Extended agenda-setting theories (March & Olsen 1984; Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner & Jones 1991, 1993(2009)) raise expectations for significant consequences for policy-making processes and the findings confirm the strong impact: With the strongly increasing share of directly-EU influenced laws through treaty change, directly EU-influenced and sovereign policy-making processes experience change in opposite directions. Their policy-making patterns converge. These findings add a solution to the debate around the Europeanization of domestic policy-making and uncover the neglected effects of European integration on the member states with profound consequences for the evaluation of their independence.

If policy-making is as deeply permeated by what happens on the European playing field, questions of representation gain momentum. Who deals with the issues of citizens' concern in a multilevel framework? This question is at the heart of Paper II with profound implications for policy responsiveness and therefore addresses the democratic deficit debates on both the European and national level. Its democratic performance has always been an issue for the European Union. In the public discourse, the EU is often perceived as an additional level of governance that deals with increasingly sensitive, national sovereignty curtailing, issues but remains removed from its citizens. Democratic weaknesses also become a concern for the national level given that the elected representatives seem to be "overruled" by the EU.

Paper II's analysis of the EU's relative congruence with citizens' concerns compared to the member states' can offer insights into the largely uncovered results the European Union provides, the threat of decreasing representation through the national level, and the conditions that allow issue responsiveness on the European level. The close-up presentation of the policy responsiveness channels the European project as a whole provides through the interplay of the different levels builds the foundation for the theoretical framework.

In the European project, citizens are represented by the directly elected European Parliament, the 28 nationally elected member states' representatives coming together in the Council, and in the member states themselves. As a result, the multilevel democracy can even offer a democratic surplus. Examining the comparative congruence to citizen's concerns, the paper takes all levels into account and also includes the necessary conditions for the EU to be responsive. Further circumstances to allow successful EU responsiveness are developed and analyzed in a second step. The findings indicate that the EU is just as congruent to citizens' concern as the median member state, especially when there are shared concerns throughout Europe. If member states' agree on a topic's salience, when there is a potential for cross-national coalitions or an individual member state is in an institutionally defined stronger position to promote their citizens' most important concerns as Council president, the chances for European responsiveness increase.

The Council Presidency and the multilevel particularities this institution provides for the European project are at the core of Paper III. If, as Börzel and Risse (2007, 2009) contend, policy diffusion in the EU develops through compliance and transposition of European legislation in the member states, we would expect the political agendas of the member states to become more similar. Also the institutionalized meeting structure of the "European club" in intergovernmental decision-making contexts can lead to the spreading of ideas. The overall dissertation project's general goal of examining the domestic consequences of European integration thus translates into the puzzle whether European Union membership leads to a convergence of member states' policy agendas. This question gives reason for vivid debate. On the one hand, an increasing number of EU competencies and national laws with EU influence should lead to more similar domestic policy-making processes and agendas. On the other hand, communal decision-making and domestic compliance have been characterized as limited.

I move beyond the static picture and instead ask when countries assimilate their national policy agendas. This is where the Council Presidency comes into play. It defines the case when an individual country has the highest potential of nationally influencing the “European agenda” with consequences for other members’ domestic agendas. The presidency requires the country in charge to take a stance at the European level. Any individual country can either try to push through its own priorities or act as a neutral, European integration promoting leader, which is what the presidency was originally designed for. The role the presiding country chooses to play depends on the salience attached to any given policy issue and the expected agreement of the other members in the Council, besides domestic context variables. National inputs thus define the presidency and the presidency in turn defines national outputs. Whether the individual countries’ domestic agendas converge depends on the role played, since not all countries follow a strong lead by also timely transposing the European decisions.

This perspective offers a step forward in understanding how the European project influences policy agendas in the member states. In this particular case of focusing on the consequences of presiding the European Council, it also allows a novel perspective on the Council presidency as a potential “power platform” (Tallberg 2008, 187). The empirical analysis thus again requires a two-step process. I examine first which role the presiding country chooses and what influences their role choice before moving into the analysis of other members’ convergence.

The three papers therefore have many commonalities. To enable analysis of their joint focus on the domestic consequences of the European project, they apply a comparative, member state focused perspective. Going into detail on different aspects and steps of the multilevel governance framework and its consequences for representation, they all use a time-series-cross-sectional data structure. This project is the first to make use of all analytical aspects of comparative politics in the context of examining the EU’s domestic consequences – it compares

over time, countries (in Paper II and III) and versus the European level (Paper I and II), and policy issues. While not moving into actual policy contents in any of the papers, which is not possible without a content-wise focus area, it can make a strong statement about the policy-making processes.

Just like the multilevel system of governance that is at the heart of the three papers, the papers themselves consider the different levels: the first paper focuses on the direct and indirect effects of European decisions on national legislation; the second examines both levels' combined outputs for the citizens; and the third extracts the national in- and outputs to the Council presidency and defines cases when the member states together take a common European path. All three papers uncover how European integration defines politics through policies and which role the member states play in the multilevel game. In the end, the combination of the papers thus also draws a more detailed picture of the European polities.

iv. Empirical Database

Detailed national and EU-level policy data allows this first comparative assessment of the European project's domestic consequences. The Comparative Agendas Project is an invaluable foundation for such an endeavor. It supplies data collected by country expert teams who own the relevant knowledge about countries' specific contexts and languages to code policy outputs with a shared, mutually exclusive, and backwards compatible codebook of 22 major and over 200 minor topic areas. I agree with and extend Gilardi's (2012, 29) claim that "the increasing quality and availability of data on policy agendas could also be used to investigate diffusion patterns" to the study of European integration's domestic consequences.

Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner originally initiated the agendas project in 1993 with data on legislative procedures and outcomes, executive speeches, budgets, media coverage, and

public opinion for the American case. Soon after, the idea began to spread to Europe and countries all over the world as well as to the European Union's institutions, resulting in more than thirty different data series. The aim of such an intricate data collection was to enable scholars to study public policy, and first and foremost attention to policy issues, by means of systematic indicators over a broad range of countries and long periods of time, ranging from the most current to varying years in the mid last century.

With additional data efforts combining individual countries' legislative datasets and merging them with variables measuring EU influence, public opinion data, and domestic context variables, the now presented database allows to gain an insight into the actual consequences of European integration. Eight examined countries with an average of 135 adopted laws per year and going back to the 1970s provide a large number of observations throughout the process of deepening European integration that started with the Single European Act in the 1980s and reached a turning point with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom allow to present a picture of both founding and early accession members, EU supportive and less supportive countries and citizenries, smaller and bigger states, and countries that were differently affected by the recent crises. Due to their accession in the 20th century and the resulting short duration of their membership, the data does not entail the relatively recent Eastern European member states.

The resulting database is a complex time-series-cross-sectional format with the unit of analysis comprising an individual country's policy attention on any given policy issue and year. As such it is possible to calculate comparative policy-making activity across topics in individual countries and years or across countries in topics and years. With the different possibilities of specifying the unit of analysis, the data allows further research on either in depth policy, country, or time specific questions or broad comparative policy-making processes.

v. Contribution

The EU alone cannot explain the European project – only the combination and interrelation of EU and member state level contexts and politics allow to examine the multilevel system of governance that defines Europe today. Recent crises have shown how important the member states are, both as sovereign nation states and as actors on the EU-level. The national systems provide inputs to and incorporate outputs of what happens in the EU and the European club of nation states.

The following three paper-chapters present a comparative politics approach to the study of European integration's consequences for the member states, their citizens and the project as a whole. As I define it, the European project entails all major actors involved in the multilevel framework of governance. Going the extra mile by incorporating their interrelation leads to the contribution the three paper chapters jointly offer: there are stronger than expected consequences of the European project. The nation states experience direct and indirect European influences and also collaboratively influence the European path ahead.

As a result, the examined domestic policies are much more than individual short-term decisions but help to define the project as a whole. While Paper I shows the neglected influences of the European project on domestic policy-making, Paper II examines when national representatives decide to act through the EU to deal with their citizens' concerns, and Paper III displays the nation states' role choice on the European level and its domestic feedback effects. The political dimension of the European project characterizes its policy consequences – the ultimate outputs that define the member states' role and their experienced changes.

By focusing less on specific policy contents and instead on policy-making and legislative output changes more broadly, the chapters illustrate the bigger picture: Paper I starts from the highly

debated myth of an 80% European influence on national legislation by portraying the development over time but then continues to analyze how, as a result of the increasing influence, policy-making processes change. Instead of lamenting the potential democratic issues European integration induces by shifting powers away from the directly legitimized national context to a seemingly removed new institution, Paper II shows how the combination of both levels can even add representational ties. Finally, Paper III combines the national inputs to and outputs of the European level, portraying the importance of and for the domestic context.

I argue that rather than the ‘goodness of fit’ of particular policies, which is “all about putting into practice—or ‘absorbing’—EU policy” (Radaelli 2003, 51), the profound changes to policy-making processes, agenda-setting, and the general agreement on a common European path is relevant. These processes entail the more complex and far reaching consequences for the member states and are a closer approximation of what the European Union is capable of doing and what the European project as a combination of EU level institutions and member states embodies. While the overarching independent variable for the whole project is European integration, the dependent variable are domestic policy consequences in the form of legislative outputs. The combination of institutional and policy development over the course of deepening European integration that finds its expression in policy-making processes cannot be understood without the actors’ involvement on both levels.

This dissertation project’s major underlying argument that it later proves empirically is that deepening European integration has an increasing effect on the European project as a whole. The empirical analyses apply both specific and recent approaches to the study of the highly complex data structures that the datasets compiled for this project entail. The comprehensiveness of the data on legislative outputs presented here is unique and opens up many possibilities to understand what is going on in Europe today.

CHAPTER II:

The Neglected Effects of European Integration: **Policymaking in Europeanized and Sovereign Domains**

This article finds that the transformative power of deepening European integration on member states' domestic policy-making processes is stronger than previously assumed. Moving beyond analysis of directly European Union-influenced domestic legislation, the article instead focuses on the indirect consequences that emerge from shifting policy competencies between levels of the European project. The main argument contends that as policy competencies move from the national to the European level, domestic policy-makers gain capacity to reallocate attention. The theoretical framework for this claim combines literature on Europeanization and agenda-setting theories to an argument of European integration's influence on domestic policy-making processes. Empirical findings, examining 35 years of deepening European integration, suggest that patterns of policy-making for the sovereign and directly European Union-influenced domestic agenda shares assimilate as European integration progresses.

Published in the Journal of European Public Policy

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1310275>

Beyer, D. (2017). "The Neglected Effects of Europeanization in the Member States – Policy-Making in Directly EU-Influenced and Sovereign Domains." *Journal of European Public Policy* (Advance Online Publication): 1–23. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2017.1310275.

II. The Neglected Effects of European Integration: Policymaking in Europeanized and Sovereign Domains

What happens when policy competencies transition from the national to the supranational level? Domestic policy processes change in a way that goes well beyond the immediate and obvious effects of an increasing amount of EU legislation incorporated into national law. Also sovereign, not directly EU-influenced policy-making processes transform.

One of the few commonly accepted facts in political science is that “the organizing principle of a political system is the allocation of scarce resources in the face of conflict of interest” (March & Olsen 1984, 741). Attention is particularly scarce, which requires policy-makers to select the most immediately relevant policy issues from a seemingly unlimited number for their legislative attention. This has severe consequences for policy-making processes. The Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), as one of the major theories of agenda-setting, expects long periods of status quo and incrementalism in policy-making to be interrupted by an overreaction in the form of major policy change once a topic reaches a certain attentional threshold. I argue that the shifting of competencies to the European level moderates the strength of the punctuation effect by reducing the potential number of issues on the sovereign agenda. When an increasing number of policy issues moves to the European level agenda, it frees up capacities and resources of national policy-making systems. Attention can be reallocated and sovereign policy-making becomes more efficient, after the EU’s member states adjust to the new dynamics. The directly EU-influenced proportion evolves contrarily as its agenda space starts to grow. As a result, patterns of policy-making converge given that EU policy-making and national transposition is now encountering more of the distributional issues previously dominant in sovereign nation states.

If European integration not only affects some policy areas directly but also domestic policy-making processes more broadly, it changes the politics of Europe even further. How much influence the EU actually has on its member states is crucial to understanding the consequences of this new and unprecedented multilevel framework of governance. By most existing accounts, the EU's penetration of member states' policies is not as far advanced as Delors expected in his 80 percent myth. I contend that an analysis of the EU's influence needs to consider more than just the direct influences to make a convincing statement: On the basis of Radaelli's definition, Europeanization not only consists of processes of construction, diffusion, and institutionalization on the European level, but also their incorporation in the domestic level's logic (2003, 30). To confront Delors' myth, we thus need to consider European influences that go beyond directly applied European decisions or mentioning the EU in domestic legislation. As such, this paper's research question takes the conceptualization of Europeanization an unprecedented step further and is therefore able to evaluate the actual consequences of the European project for the member states: how does deepening European integration affect policy-making in the member states?

I build my theoretical framework on literature that examines the scope and extent of Europeanization on the one hand and public policy-making and agenda-setting on the other. To test the theoretically derived expectations, I present a novel dataset on German legislation as an example for an EU member state. My analysis covers both directly EU-influenced and sovereign agenda shares' policy processes through a time period of major deepening European integration between 1977 and 2013.

i. **A Theoretical Framework for the Consequences of Europeanization**

This paper starts from the basic theoretical premise that the European project is a multilevel framework of governance that affects its sovereign member states in various ways. Empirical evidence supports the premise that European integration increasingly influences the domestic arena and the “systemic functioning of democracy” (Anderson 2002, 815). Cowles, Caporaso and Risse’s “Transforming Europe” (2001) or Featherstone and Radaelli’s “The Politics of Europeanization” (2003), for example, provide an informative overview of Europeanization’s domestic consequences. Both look at issues of convergence and harmonization, influence on domestic institutions and administrative reform, or consequences for interest group politics.

The existing literature with a focus on legislation is quite constrained. Radaelli’s (2003, 41) differentiation of vertical and horizontal ways of Europeanization distinguishes between cases with obvious pressure to conform or voluntary adjustments following market pressures or common developments. Most other accounts examining legislative activity focus on direct effects, most prominently on the proportion of Europeanized lawmaking in the member states. Brouard, Costa and König’s book on the “Europeanization of Domestic Legislatures” (2012) stands out as the only comparative study to measure this influence empirically. Despite concluding that the EU’s influence on its member states has grown continuously and that the share of Europeanized domestic legislation is increasing, they find only limited support for Delors’ myth of 80% Europeanized legislation in nine European Union member states. According to this paper’s broader definition of Europeanization, the book highlights part of the actual influence with its focus on directly EU-influenced legislation and cannot respond to the shortcomings Töller (2010) discloses concerning issues of measuring and differentiating scope and extent of Europeanization.

Both direct and indirect effects on domestic policy-making define the consequences of the European project for the member states. In the process of deepening European integration, the shifting of policy responsibilities between the national and supranational levels changes the conditions for policy-making. Most existing literature treats this process and its result as a dependent variable, examining implementation, adoption and enforcement (e.g. Breeman & Zwaan 2009) or compliance (e.g. Falkner 2005). Since the “focus on Europeanization can produce serious fallacies” when adopting a top-down logic only (Radaelli 2003, 51), I seek to explain Europeanization’s domestic effects conditioned by direct consequences of deepening European integration. This understanding of European influences as an independent variable is novel.

The transposition of European legislation on an increasing variety of issues into national law – the direct consequence – shifts competencies for certain policy areas from the sovereign to the European level. I argue that, as a result of this process, national policy-makers contend with fewer potential issues while, at the same time, European policy-makers contend with more. This frees up national policy-making capacity and consequently enables reallocating attention nationally. Attention scarcity and policy-makers’ inundation with potential policy topics, further complicated by interest group demands, have long been in the focus of political science scholars. Theories of organization, agenda-setting, party group pressures, and lobbying (famously March & Olsen 1984; Kingdon 1984) all offer expectations as to how the amount of policy fields requiring attention affects policy-making processes. This literature complies with the primary line of thought that an overflow of information with severe consequences for policy-making exists.

I use the theoretically defined and empirically tested assumptions of the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) as a baseline for the policy process that, as I argue, changes in the context of deepening European integration. The starting assumption is that due to cognitive limitations, policy-makers cannot respond to all policy issues. Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones (1991; 1993(2009); 2005) tailored Eldredge and Gould's evolutionary biology principle to a theory of policy dynamics, information processing and attention allocation. Their "microfoundational" model of decision-making expects policymakers' bounded rationality and institutional friction to be the cause for long periods of status quo in policy-making, only interrupted by significant policy change. Given the wide array of potential topics on a given policy agenda, strong focusing events or the reaching of a certain threshold are necessary for a new topic to gain policy-makers' attention and induce change. Overreaction often characterizes the resulting policy change. I apply these expected policy-making patterns as the baseline for EU member states and argue that following the same logic, this pattern adapts when deepening European integration changes the number of issues on the domestic agenda. Scarcity will always remain and strong focusing events lead to policy punctuations. Yet with fewer potential topics calling for attention, the threshold for a topic to make it on the agenda lowers. Even when competencies remain shared and the member states have a significant say, the array of work required at a given point in time is reduced. Freer agenda space allows policy-makers to shift time productively and debate other issues. While certainly not the only applicable theory for this baseline argument, PET has been established as one of the leading theories of the policy process (Princen 2013, 854) and has been tested empirically for many relevant country cases (for a comparative overview see: Green-Pedersen & Walgrave 2014; Baumgartner et al. 2009) and features of EU policy-making (Alexandrova et al. 2012; Princen 2013). As such, the application of PET to the levels' interplay in the European project is original but can be expected to be fruitful.

Deviations from PET's overall expected pattern occur in two stages. At first, European integration is a textbook example of major policy change following prolonged periods of stability. Deepening European integration results in a large array of topics shifting partially from member states' agendas to the European level. In the PET framework, the resulting change in "policy images" and "-venues", at times consciously induced through "venue shopping", enables change that interrupts periods of stasis (Baumgartner & Jones 2009). Thus, this first stage experiences major punctuations adapting to the new situation. In the second stage, national policy-making becomes more manageable. Two major theoretical expectations explain why this should be the case: deepening European integration (1) frees up national policy-making capacity and (2) changes the role of the national parliament:

(1) Domestic Policy-Making Capacity

If policy-making is punctuated because attention is scarce, but the EU takes over an increasing amount of issues, member states' policy-making patterns can be expected to change in the process. Reduced attention scarcity in the less crowded sovereign agenda space can be used productively to debate other issues. In the usual PET scenario policy-makers must prioritize issues they want to address because of an information overflow. The processing of information becomes disproportionate (Jones & Baumgartner 2005, 8). However, profound structural change affects this pattern. European integration impacts the nature, variety and number of topics on the sovereign agenda with three consequences: first, fewer exclusive responsibilities on the sovereign agenda and especially varying penetration of policy areas allow domestic policy-makers to focus on previously neglected topics. Outside influences now affect their original prioritization. Second, while member states still retain the responsibility to transpose European outputs into national law, European decisions are usually presented as "take-it-or-leave-it" packages" rarely amendable by domestic parliaments (Brouard et al. 2012, 2). Therefore the passage of laws becomes easier. Third, national parliaments' "loss of legislative sovereignty"

(Auel & Benz 2005, 372) also in increasingly sensitive and time-consuming areas alters the demands on national policy-makers. Despite the European nation states' reticence to handing over topics of great national importance to the EU, over time the EU has taken over topics requiring comparatively more information and attention.

As a result, member states can reorganize and reallocate their (human and structural) resources. The previous trade-offs that policy-makers faced to pick issues offering the highest pay-off – be it for constituency reasons, personal preferences, party pressures, or interest group demands – alters. When the EU claims one policy issue, it has consequences for the decision-making process of all remaining policies. While we cannot theoretically predict which policy fields benefit, or by how much this lowers the threshold for a policy to make it to the agenda, we can expect policy-making changes in the aggregate. This is not to say that attention scarcity and punctuated patterns of change have been fully eliminated. Most policy areas are shared competencies and together with the generally increasing demand there will always be factors complicating decision-making in national political systems². Nevertheless, even if the EU legislated only issues of minor importance, sovereign attention space would increase, allowing reallocation. A reduction in policy issues requiring attention, as seen in the context of deepening European integration, is unprecedented within PET's prior focus on national political systems.

My resulting argument is simple: If more attention capacity is created because fewer topics need to be potentially considered or because decision-making requires less time (attention) when voting on legislation prepared at the European level, smoother policy change will be possible on the proportion of the policy agenda that is not directly EU-influenced.

² See the Appendix for further discussion of the assumption of decreasing workloads.

(2) Institutional Adaptions

Deepening European integration also influenced institutional roles: national parliaments “earned the label of ‘losers’” (Ladrech 2010, 27). With no formal role in the EU’s lawmaking process (Norton 1996, 2) besides the transposition of European legislation into national law, parliaments have especially lost parts of their supremacy vis-à-vis the executive: “systemic features of the decisional process seem to favor the executive branch and insulate the representative institutions” (Raunio & Hix 2000, 146).

The adoption of EU legislation requires different approaches to policy-making, mostly outsourced to special committees dealing with the “‘flood of papers’ from Brussels” (Saalfeld 1996, 32). In response to changing amounts of information and tasks being altered, expanded or curtailed member states’ parliaments go through a development process. They revise “working methods” and/or create “new agencies managing the increase or change” (Cowles et al. 2001, 2). The most obvious step was the establishment of special “European Affairs Committees” (EACs) in nearly all member states. Their main task is to “coordinate parliamentary scrutiny of European matters and to monitor the government representatives in the Council” (Raunio & Hix 2000, 155). Thus, the assumed role is still quite limited but is able to counteract the otherwise increasing workload.

Germany as the examined empirical case has established strong committees in both chambers. The “Ausschuss für die Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union” (Bundestag EU committee) was founded in 1994 around the time of Maastricht and the EU’s strengthening role, the Bundesrat’s equivalent “Ausschuss für Fragen der Europäischen Union” dates back to 1957 as a special committee, which became a standing committee in the early stages of integration in 1965. According to the founding documents, both committees’ main task is to deal with bigger questions of European integration and control the executive whereas the transposition of EU

law does not play a role. The additional workload for the respective policy committees is assessed as small and doable in accordance with the official documents since it is usually not required to actively shape contents but to “execute” European guidelines³.

The general story of parliaments’ weakening role and the committees’ example conveys that there is an institutional response to deepening European integration with consequences for policy-making patterns. Parliaments are not suffering from additional workload due to their changing role. To the contrary, institutional reforms improved parliamentary infrastructure to deal with the new situation of European influences (Auel & Benz 2005, 385). Institutional friction, the second reason for expecting punctuated patterns of policy-making, does not seem to increase on the national level as a result of European integration.

On the basis of this theoretical framework, I develop two hypotheses:

First, I argue that European integration induced changes in policy issue attention suggest that the Europeanization of national policy-making does not only affect the increasing proportion of laws directly influenced by the EU, but the sovereign share as well. As a result of lessened workloads and institutional adaptations on the domestic level, national legislators have increased attention to devote to and (re-)distribute more efficiently across those policy issues that remain sovereign.

Hypothesis_{1a}: With the EU taking over topics of previous national competence, national policy-makers can distribute their attention more efficiently between the remaining topics on the sovereign agenda.

³ ‘Der Ausschuss für die Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union des deutschen Bundestages’ (1998).

On the basis of the reasoning leading to Hypothesis 1, attention scarcity only decreases but is never fully eliminated as long as the EU and member states share competencies and the nation states still need to transpose European legislation into national law. The process of shifting policy responsibilities expectably leads to more fluctuation in policy-making first, because processes need to adapt to the new circumstances. Significant changes in attention allocation occur when treaty change reallocates competencies. This requires a lengthy three step process: (1) countries need to agree on the contents for treaty change on the European level, (2) the EU needs to find compromise on actual policy outputs within the new areas of competence, and (3) member states need to transpose European outputs into national law. All three steps are known to take time and do not offer reason to expect sudden change in attention allocation immediately after treaty change.

Hypothesis_{1b}: Policy-making processes become smoother only after an adjustment period.

Second, applying the same logic, I expect the European integration process to contrarily influence the European level, which mirrors in the share of directly EU-influenced laws. As the sovereign agenda share becomes less crowded when the EU takes over issues, the Europeanized share deals with more policies. When the EU's policy agenda becomes more crowded, EU policy-making should more closely resemble patterns previously observed in national contexts. With initially few topics on the European agenda, little attention scarcity and resulting distributional issues were to be expected. This changes as European integration progresses. Furthermore, the agenda for transposing European legislation into national laws becomes more diverse. We can expect a zero-sum game. The sovereign and directly EU-influenced portions of the agenda experience developments in opposite directions. The twofold (as a mirror of the EU agenda and a national transposition agenda) affected directly EU-influenced share of policy-making will display more punctuated patterns, assimilating to the sovereign share's patterns.

Hypothesis₂: With increasing EU policy competencies, the directly EU-influenced agenda share becomes more crowded and policy-making therefore more punctuated. The policy-making patterns of directly EU-influenced and sovereign agenda shares assimilate.

ii. Research Design and Methods

By definition, hypotheses₁ and ₂ are closely linked, in that the development of one portion of the policy-making agenda mirrors the development of the other. To test these hypotheses requires a combined empirical analysis with high quality data that clearly differentiates between sovereign and directly EU-influenced national legislation. The number of laws adopted in different policy areas and especially their change over time defines the two agenda shares and indicates attention allocation. By taking the number of laws in one year and subtracting the number of laws in the previous year, then dividing by the earlier number of laws in the respective policy area, I calculate a change score of attention for every policy field. Over time and across policy areas, the distribution of these values enables us to draw conclusions about the policy-making processes by depicting the probability of major change vs. maintaining the status quo.

Case Selection

Germany serves as example for the following analysis for two reasons. First, because it is the only country that officially labels the “European influence” in its database of federal legislation (GESTA) thereby generating a reliable measure⁴. The database includes all federal legislation between 1975 and today. Brouard and co-authors (2012), explicitly state that every nation would ideally indicate in each national law if it originates from Brussels. Secondly, Germany is

⁴ See the Appendix for further information on the measurement.

also an interesting case because it speaks to the counterargument of generally increasing workloads when member states' are co-legislating on the European level. Especially in media perceptions, it seems as though Germany has a comparatively bigger influence than other member states in EU matters. As such, Germany would be the most likely case for workloads not to decrease, and not change policy processes in the sovereign share of its policy-making agenda. If we find the expected development for Germany it is very likely that other countries are at least as responsive to the change.

The Database of German Legislation

With raw data from the GESTA database coded into exclusive policy areas, I present a novel dataset of all German legislation for the upcoming analysis. The endeavor is part of the Comparative Agendas Project, where country experts developed a shared codebook of 22 major and 204 minor topics to comparatively examine public policy-making and agenda-setting over time. The German Agendas Project's data comes from Breunig (2014). Simone Burkhart (2008) compiled the raw dataset used for content coding for the years 1977-2005. It includes all relevant GESTA information and the dummy variable indicating direct EU influence. For more recent years, I coded the EU variable manually⁵ on the basis of the same information in the DIP (Documentation- and Information-Center of the German Bundestag). The dummy is coded 1 for all cases of domestic adoption of EU legislation and 0 otherwise. In the time span between 1977 and 2013, the German parliament adopted an overall number of 4,242 laws: 1,262 laws with direct European influence, and 2,980 laws of domestic origin. I deal with sovereign and directly EU-influenced agenda shares individually to measure the allocation of attention to a

⁵ In accordance with advice of representatives of the parliamentary documentation research service the data has been selected for "Gesetzgebung" (adopted laws) and "Innerstaatliche Umsetzung von EU-Recht" (domestic implementation of EU law) from this database: <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21.web/searchProcedures.do> (2015/01/22).

given policy area over time. The practical implementation of the approach for this paper, the so called percentage-count method (following PET approaches; Jones & Baumgartner 2005), uses the amounts of adopted laws in different policy areas and examines their change over time while not assuming the total number of laws to remain fixed⁶. This way, I control for growth of government and account for the fact that the agenda share of directly EU-influenced laws increases in the given time period. The percentage-count method subtracts the number of laws in policy area_i in year_t from the number of laws in policy area_i in year_{t-1} divided by the number in policy area_i in year_t. The resulting values' development is what then constitutes the basis for the distributional analysis.

Agenda Composition and Probability Distributions: Measuring Change in Policy Processes

First, I use the information about the amount of legislation on different policy issues in a given year to define the “general composition of the political agenda” (John & Jennings 2010, 579) with entropy scores. Entropy measures the spread of attention across issues and thus how evenly attention is distributed. Zero and low values of the Normalized Shannon’s H measure (most sensitive entropy measure, see Boydston et al. 2014) indicate that all attention is on one or a few topics. High values suggest that policy-makers distribute their attention evenly across all topics. Given that I use 22 major (204 minor) policy areas, the maximum possible entropy score and consequently the case of “equidistribution of attention across policy sectors” would be equal to the natural logarithm of 22 (204), thus 3.09 (5.3) (Alexandrova et al. 2012, 80). The normalized version of Shannon’s H ranges between zero and one in order to allow for comparison across the different coding levels. The results of this attention diversity measurement substantively examine whether the composition of the agenda shares changes as a result of the

⁶ The alternative percentage-percentage method treats agenda space constant through time (only included as robustness check).

shifting policy competencies: Does attention become more evenly distributed in the sovereign realm and more widely spread attention in the European share?

To understand the implications of policy-making changes over time, an appropriate empirical method should also compare the actual distribution of the data to the standard assumption of a normal distribution. Stochastic process models take on this task. As expressed in the well-known statistical concept of the Central Limit Theorem, they expect an additive and linear process to lead to a Gaussian (normal) distribution. Since rational updating is not possible in policy-making processes because of all previously described reasons, the theoretical expectations for decision-making assume serial and multiplicative processes that are not normally distributed. Instead, they yield a Paretian (Power) distribution (Jones & Baumgartner 2005).

According to PET and empirical findings from various countries⁷, decision-making follows a leptokurtic distribution. Kurtosis values, the distribution's commonly used numerical indicator, describe the ratio of the fourth moment of a distribution divided by its squared variance. L-kurtosis values are a more stable, scale-free measurement of the same concept (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 612). Compared to Gaussian distributions, a value of 0.123 is the equivalent to a normal distribution; values exceeding this number characterize a leptokurtic distribution. High values show that the variance results from infrequent extreme deviations rather than modest change. Histograms illustrate numerical (L-)kurtosis values' substantive content: A higher than normal peak exemplifies the high probability for continuance of the status quo, weak shoulders portray the basically non-existent modest change, and heavy tails demonstrate the high number of extreme outliers. These large number of cases far from the mean depict major policy change – the expected policy punctuations in Jones and Baumgartner's sense.

⁷ For example Comparative Political Studies 44(8).

Kurtosis values usually describe a policy agenda over a long time period. In addition to an overall distributional analysis to understand policy-making patterns, the particular case of this paper requires an analysis of kurtosis values' development throughout the deepening integration process. Since only treaty change can reallocate competencies, I expect the coming into force of a treaty to differentiate time periods that diverge with respect to policy-making patterns. So far, every treaty change has added competencies to the European level, therefore expectably smoothing the distribution of the sovereign share's policy-making patterns to what is considered more "normal" after some adjustment (H_1). At the same time this development supposedly leaves the directly EU-influenced share more punctuated (H_2). Since the most significant shift of responsibilities happened with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992/1993, I especially expect the pre- and post-Maastricht time periods to be turning points for policy-making processes.

iii. Depicting Directly EU-influenced and Sovereign Policy Processes in Germany

To validate the assumptions for the theoretically expected changing patterns, proportions of EU-influenced and sovereign legislation need to change over time and across topics, as the introductory descriptive data analysis below convincingly illustrates.

Figure 1, depicting the percentage of explicitly Europeanized laws over time, confirms the first condition: the share of directly EU-influenced German legislation is constantly increasing. Responsibilities shift from the national to the European level, allowing the assumption of attention re-allocation. Starting with values of mostly below 20% European influence in the early stages of Europeanization in the 1970s, this share increased to over 50% in 2013. An increase of that size reinforces the expectation of policy-making changes in both the sovereign share, which lost up to 50% of its competencies since the beginning of European integration, and of the Europeanized share, which gained significantly more responsibilities.




Figure 1: A First Overview over the Europeanization of German Legislation

An analysis of the EU’s policy-field specific influence (Figure 2) reveals the expected differences with respect to the degree of European influence. This meets the second condition for expecting changing patterns as a consequence of attention re-allocation between topics that are Europeanized to varying extents. Splitting the two periods before and after Maastricht offers an insight into the consequences of further integration. The areas of energy, external, justice, labor, rights, transport, and macroeconomic affairs experienced an increase of Europeanized legislation of over 20%. The policy areas of environmental affairs and finances, in addition to agriculture, have become preponderantly influenced by EU legislation, graphically illustrated by the now blue top of the share. This is an indication for the hypothesized increased capacity on the non-directly influenced, sovereign agenda share: If the EU legislates an average of 56% of all German laws on environmental issues, for example, it has consequences for all other issues. It allows German decision-makers not only to shift their attention to other aspects within the

environmental sector and adapt them with laws introducing more moderate changes, but also to potentially shift some attention to other policy areas.

Figure 2 also illustrates the increased overall amount of legislation, which raises the expectation of increasingly punctuated patterns of policy-making following classic PET approaches. If this is not the case for the sovereign realm, it is a further indication of the influence of shifting policy responsibilities.




Figure 2: Share of Directly EU-Influenced and Sovereign Legislation in Major Policy Areas Pre- and Post-Maastricht

A final descriptive perspective on three exemplary policy areas provides first insights into changing policy-making patterns for both agenda shares over the course of European integration before entering into the empirical analysis. Essentially, it shows that for both macro categories (a pooling of major categories, explained in Table 2 of the Appendix) of comparatively strong (and increasing) EU influence – the economy and the environment – the volatility of the number of adopted laws and thus of selective attention allocation decreases for the sovereign but increases for the Europeanized share. That this is not just a general trend is evident from

the comparison with the foreign affairs category, which experiences very little EU influence throughout the whole time period. In this policy area, the number of laws in the sovereign share remains more volatile while the low numbers of directly EU-influenced laws remain stable. Consequently, Figure 3 shows that European integration has in fact had two distinct impacts: (1.) in line with existing literature, the process has taken sovereignty away from the member states. It (2.) gives first evidence that the fact that the EU provides more economic and environmental policies, for example, has left the sovereign policy-making agenda space less crowded. Starting in the 2000s, with one exception in the economic field as a result of the economic crisis, the red line picturing the number of laws adopted without direct EU influence remains comparatively smoother with fewer peaks and low points. This development indicates that attention is distributed more evenly and efficiently with fewer extreme shifts to a topic when attention has long been overdue.




Figure 3: Developments of Directly EU-Influenced and Sovereign Policy-Making in Three Macro Policy Areas over Time

iv. **Empirical Analysis:**

Applying Probability Distributions to the Study of Europeanization

On the basis of these descriptive results, which confirm theoretical assumptions but cannot show the whole picture, it is now possible to conduct the empirical analysis. The distribution of attention to different policy fields and their change over time is indicative of policy processes. How likely significant outliers are when compared to the status quo with minor adjustments defines policy-making under conditions of cognitive limitations and institutional friction. Trying to conquer a large number of potential policy issues, moderate alterations are rare. A reduction of this pile of tasks alongside institutional improvements, I argue, leaves us with a distribution more similar to what rational incremental updating promises but remains punctuated to a smaller extent. The theoretical framework raises the expectation of leptokurtic policy-making for the overall German agenda, meaning that the status quo is only interrupted by significant policy change. In contrast, the sovereign share is expected to deviate from this pattern over the course of deepening European integration, becoming less leptokurtic after initial adjustments, while the directly EU-influenced share moves into a direction that is closer to nation states' (previous) levels of punctuation.

The stated hypotheses can now be reformulated into explicitly empirically testable expectations: First, sovereign decision-making suffers from less attention scarcity and policy-making becomes less punctuated as a result (**Hypothesis_{1a}**). This becomes possible only after treaties have shifted competencies and decision-makers have initiated responses on the European and national level (**Hypothesis_{1b}**). On the other hand, as the "recipient" of policy responsibilities, the directly EU-influenced portion of the policy-making agenda experiences an increased likelihood for punctuated legislative activity. The directly EU-influenced and sovereign agenda shares' level of (L-)kurtosis converge (**Hypothesis₂**).

The expected effect of shifting competencies to the European level – the possibility to re-distribute attention more efficiently on the sovereign agenda share and the increased attention scarcity on the directly EU-influenced share – become evident in two ways: in (1) entropy scores and (2) kurtosis developments.

(1) Entropy Analysis

The entropy scores explaining agenda composition in Figure 4 examine the degree to which shifting responsibilities have led to a more balanced distribution of policy attention. Since competencies remain shared and entropy scores define how evenly attention is spread between issues, we would not expect massive change in the sovereign agenda share, but an adjustment of the two agenda shares' composition:




Figure 4: Yearly Development of Entropy Scores

The rising entropy scores of the directly EU-influenced share clearly illustrate the rising issue diversity on the European agenda. While there has been an upward tendency since the 1980s, the real shift to a higher level of entropy scores happened with the Treaty of Maastricht. This goes in line with Alexandrova and co-authors' (2012, 81) findings about European Council policy-making. The directly EU-influenced share of national legislation mirrors what happens on the EU level.

For the sovereign share, the portrayed entropy scores are less expressive. Since competencies for policy areas remain shared, the sovereign agenda's issue diversity is not reduced to an immediately observable extent. Only in the 2000s is a slightly smoother downward trend visible, except for the crisis years of 2008 and 2012. A second influential factor for why we see little change in the early years of integration is that policy-making adapts slowly. This is what hypothesis_{1b} expects. As soon as a topic is considered, entropy scores portray that attention is spread more widely. This makes changes to the directly EU-influenced share more easily observable than reduced sovereign legislative activity within given policy areas.

(2) Kurtosis Analysis

While entropy scores define whether attention is spread more evenly between topics, kurtosis measures consider the distribution's efficiency. Comparing the actual policy processes to what would be defined as rational and thus normal, allows to make a statement about the actual change introduced by deepening European integration.

Observing policy-making processes across the whole time period in Table 1 and the accompanying Figure 5, the approach's idea and the difference between sovereign and directly-EU influenced proportions becomes evident. Both, as well as the overall German agenda, show the expected pattern of punctuated policy-making. We find high peaks marking the persistence of the status quo, weak shoulders indicating the difficulty of implementing medium change, and

high the likelihood of outliers once a topic has reached a certain attention threshold. What differs is that the Europeanized proportion is much closer to a normal distribution, less leptokurtic, when considering the entire time period. This confirms the expectation that with fewer issues on the agenda, policy-making can be smoother with more incremental shifts instead of punctuated changes.


Table 1 portrays all kurtosis and L-kurtosis scores of the percentage-count method. The overall agenda is clearly leptokurtic with a kurtosis value of 14.82 [compared to the normalized reference point of 0 for a normal distribution] and L-kurtosis value of 0.181 [compared to 0.123]. While the sovereign share alone is similarly leptokurtic, the directly EU-influenced proportion is closer to normal with an L-kurtosis value of 0.133. That traditional kurtosis values suffer from issues of sensitivity to outliers caused by their quadratic formula becomes obvious through the still relatively high kurtosis score not matching the L-kurtosis value in this instance. The additional Kolmogorov-Smirnoff Test values provide additional evidence that the overall German agenda's distribution deviates from the normal distribution and that the sovereign and directly EU-influenced shares differ significantly. All robustness checks with different categorizations and methods confirmed stable results (Table 1b in the Appendix).

Table 1: Kurtosis & L-Kurtosis Scores of Different Agenda Shares in German Legislation


	All Laws	N	KS	Sovereign	N	Europeanized	N	KS - Sov & EU
Kurtosis	14.82	603	0.16***	14.40	576	12.55	380	0.17***
L-Kurtosis	0.181	(63)		0.184	(90)	0.133	(286)	

*** *p*-value < 0.05; (NAs)

Yearly Percentage Change in the German Legislative Agenda



Yearly Percentage Change in Sovereign Laws



Yearly Percentage Change in Europeanized Laws




Figure 5: Histograms for Percentage-Count Values for all 18 Categories

Compared to the prototypical pattern of a high likelihood for the persistence of the status quo with only little modest change and major outliers in the tale, the sovereign share’s histograms demonstrates the first hints of change introduced by European integration: stronger negative changes indicate that some topics have received less attention over time. That the Europeanized share portrays a major likelihood for 100% negative change results from the challenge of dealing with low numbers of laws per year and topic. Especially for the EU, which does not own the competencies to deal with all topics, shifts from very low numbers of legislation on a topic in a year to no legislative attention in the subsequent year are exaggerated here.

This overall perspective on the agenda shares does not allow to draw conclusions about the actual change induced by deepening European integration and the shifting competencies. An

analysis of major steps of European integration and the consequent policy-processes – portrayed in Figure 6 – is required. The EU’s main treaties theoretically and empirically define these time spans⁸: the years prior to the Single European Act (1977-1987), the development up to the Treaty of Maastricht (1988-1992), the time span between Maastricht and Amsterdam during which many of the big changes introduced by Maastricht were implemented (1993-1998), the post-Amsterdam and pre-Nice years (1999-2002), the developments leading up to the Treaty of Lisbon (2003-2009), and the post-Lisbon years. Time periods defined by competencies-shifting treaty change are the only non-arbitrary way of distinguishing different phases of European integration and their effect on national policy-making. Figure 6 depicts empirical evidence for hypothesis_{1a} and ₂: more efficient attention distribution occurs in the sovereign arena with decreasing levels of punctuations. Patterns of sovereign and directly EU-influenced policy-making processes adjust.




Figure 6: The Development of L-Kurtosis Scores (Percentage-Count) in Important Development Phases of European Integration

⁸ See the Appendix for more information on time periods.

Figure 6 clearly demonstrates each treaty's effect in terms of shifting competencies and resulting policy-making patterns. Before introducing the Single European Act commencing deepening European integration, the sovereign agenda share follows the theoretically expected and empirically established pattern of punctuated policy-making in nation states. The directly EU-influenced proportion, on the other hand, does not reach a leptokurtic level. Given the European Union's low influence in this period, demonstrated by less than twenty Europeanized laws per year, information overflow and resulting attention allocation difficulties are not to be expected. This remains true for the pre-Maastricht period, which leaves the EU with only a few additional competencies. The extreme peak of leptokurtic values for the sovereign share in the late 1980s and early 1990s is most likely a result of the German reunification process and a particularity of the chosen case. Domestically changing policy images and venues, unpredictable events calling for attention, and altering conditions for institutional friction within the member state are major reasons for punctuated patterns of policy change in the Punctuated Equilibrium framework.

What then followed on the European level with the Treaty of Maastricht was arguably the strongest individual impetus for shifting policy competencies to the European level. The introduction of the pillar structure and the EMU's foundational blocks changed the European Community to a political and economic Union. Consequently, the post-Maastricht period saw the first major adaptations to Europe on the national level, adding empirical findings to the otherwise mostly qualitative accounts of the treaty's importance. It was a crucial time for transposing European legislation into national laws as depicted in the culminating punctuated patterns of policy-making for the directly EU-influenced proportion of the domestic agenda. These influences were strong enough to alter sovereign policy-making patterns, resulting in reduced kurtosis values.

Besides a short upward tendency during the post-Amsterdam years, the sovereign share subsequently becomes decreasingly leptokurtic. That the overall level remains higher compared to the initial value of the pre-SEA years is not surprising given the overarching political developments of the 20th century. As the descriptive statistics show, the number of topics calling for attention in the nation states increased over the years, more laws were passed, and attention allocation should have become more difficult as a result. Various theories, from the growth of government to PET itself, expect increasingly difficult and thus punctuated patterns of policy-making. The empirically deviating pattern of punctuations with decreasing tendencies since the 1990s can be explained by the shifting of policy competencies and the increasingly large share of laws with a direct EU impetus requiring different policy-making patterns. In reading kurtosis scores, one needs to remember that major changes like the ones introduced by the treaties become instantly evident in exceptional peak values, but new equilibria can be found. Despite further increasing responsibilities, patterns of policy-making do not need to become even more leptokurtic as a result.

In substantive terms, this means that despite remaining scarcity, domestic attention is distributed more smoothly with fewer major changes in attention to individual policy areas and instead more incremental and smaller adjustments. The directly EU-influenced agenda, by the same token, reaches a constant leptokurtic level after Maastricht. With more responsibilities shifted to the European level, this demonstrates evidence that patterns of policy-making assimilate to theoretical expectations and empirical findings for nation states.

The post-Lisbon years cannot be meaningfully interpreted at this stage. The remaining 23 months after the treaty entered into force in December 2009 do not offer enough information for expressive percentage-count change and kurtosis scores. At this point, the portrayed values for both proportions principally show the relatively small amount of passed legislation, which

per definition predicts low kurtosis scores. It remains to be seen, how policy-making alters in subsequent years and in which direction the next treaty change pushes the EU.

Summarizing Figure 6's results, the agenda shares' developments with deepening European integration offers important insights: EU treaties clearly shifted policy competencies in a way that enabled less punctuated patterns of policy-making for sovereign legislation after Maastricht (Hypotheses₁). Changing workloads and institutional adaptations, as proposed in the theoretical framework, explain the more efficient attention distribution. Policy-making for the Europeanized agenda-share, on the other hand, became increasingly difficult with more topics on the agenda, approaching nation states' levels of punctuations (Hypothesis₂). Assimilation of policy-making processes is visible in both the entropy and kurtosis-based analyses. While a direct comparison of entropy and kurtosis findings is problematic, both send the same main message with their different approaches to examining policy processes, different levels of detail, and temporal units of analysis⁹.

⁹ See the Appendix for an analysis without problematic cases of little legislative activity, confirming the results.

v. **Conclusion: How Influential is Europeanization in Member States' Legislation?**

What happens domestically in the process of deepening European integration goes far beyond an increasing amount of national legislation with direct EU influence. Domestic policy-making changes significantly. Shifting policy responsibilities affect and alter both sovereign and directly EU-influenced legislative processes. This previously neglected distinction helps determine how far-reaching the influence of European integration actually is on member states' policy-making processes with all its consequences.

Arguing that Europeanization alters the playing field, I developed two hypothesis. First, I contended that shifting policy competencies to the European level increases policy-making capacity on the sovereign agenda. This facilitates attention re-allocation and reduces issues of cognitive limitations that otherwise lead to strongly punctuated patterns of policy-making (*Hypothesis₁*). As a result, volatility in law-making decreases and we observe more modest, continuous adjustments instead of overreaction when a topic reaches an attentional threshold. Given that policy competencies shift towards the European level, I expected the directly EU-influenced proportion to develop contrarily. Policy-making processes in the two agenda-shares assimilate over the course of deepening European integration (*Hypothesis₂*).

High quality data on Germany allows us to precisely define the European influence on national legislation with a significant coding endeavor to differentiate detailed policy areas. This enables a unique approach to studying the European project's influence on its member states. By contrasting the policy-making processes of the sovereign and directly EU-influenced shares of the domestic agenda, I show that deepening European integration has an influence on member states' domestic agenda composition and thus on changing patterns for both their sovereign and directly EU-influenced policy-making. The consequences of European integration are more profound than previously assumed. Not only does the EU prepare an increasing amount and

variety of legislation that the member states transpose into national law, but the indirect consequences thereof also shape sovereign policy-making. This changes the opportunity structures of the multitude of potential policy issues on a given domestic agenda, and therefore affects questions of representation. The European project, entailing the EU institutions and the member states, increasingly becomes more of a multilevel polity.

Looking to the future, it will be interesting to see whether the Treaty of Lisbon, as a consequence of which national parliaments (re-)gained powers and support, and the further progression of European integration changes the dynamics of this situation in the long-run. More research on the unobserved, indirect impacts of Europeanization on member states' political processes is necessary not only to get the complete picture of the EU's influence, but also to better understand the European project in its entirety.

Appendix II

Aggregated CAP Codes	Table 2: Aggregation of the CAP Codes into Macro Topics for Robustness Checks and for Use in Figure 3			
Economy	Macro-economics (1) (short: Macro)	Labor, Employment & Immigration (5) (short: Labor)	Banking, Finance & Domestic Commerce (15) (short: Finances)	
Welfare	Healthcare (3)	Education (6)	Social Welfare (13) (short: Social)	Community Development & Housing Issues (14) (short: Housing)
Environment	Agriculture (4)	Environment (7)	Energy (8)	Transportation (10)
Law & Order	Civil Rights, Minority Issues & Civil Liberties (2) (short: Rights)	Law, Crime & Family Issues (12) (short: Justice)		
Foreign	Defense (16)	Foreign Trade (18)	International Affairs & Foreign Aid (19) (short: External)	
Government	Space, Science, Technology & Communications (17)	Government Operations (20)	Public Lands & Water Management (21)	State & Local Government Administration (99)
Reunification	Reunification (25)			
<p>The category "Other, Miscellaneous & Human Interest" (99) has not been included here "Other", "Public Lands & Water Management", "Administration", and "Reunification" are not depicted in the descriptive statistics due to very constrained occurrences and Germany-specificity.</p>				

Table 1b: Kurtosis & L-Kurtosis Scores of Different Agenda Shares in German Legislation – with Robustness Checks									
	All Laws	N	KS	Sovereign	N	Europeanized	N	KS - Sov & EU	
Across 18 Policy Categories									
Percentage-Count	14.82 0.181	603 (63)	0.16***	14.40 0.184	576 (90)	12.55 0.133	380 (286)	0.16***	Kurtosis L-Kurtosis
Percentage-Percentage	24.48 0.170		0.16***	33.43 0.188		15.60 0.122		0.18***	Kurtosis L-Kurtosis
Across 7 Policy Categories									
Percentage-Count	51.294 0.126	231 (28)	0.19***	40.399 0.138	231 (28)	3.845 0.116	192 (67)	0.11	Kurtosis L-Kurtosis
Percentage-Percentage	75.175 0.090		0.26***	55.099 0.101		2.424 0.076		0.19***	Kurtosis L-Kurtosis

the first value in each box represents the kurtosis value, the second the L-kurtosis equivalent; (NAs); * p-value < 0.05*




Figure 7: Development of Europeanized and Sovereign Lawmaking over Time and across Major Policy Areas

The following text components respond to footnote comments referring to this Appendix

1 – Discussion: The Assumption of Decreasing Workloads on the National Level:

There are counterarguments to this perspective of decreasing workloads on the national level. The three most important are growth of government, the differing importance and profoundness of legislation, and the co-development on and proposing of European legislation prepared at the national level. Yet, I contend and show empirically, that those factors do not contradict the argument. First of all, sufficient institutional capacity to deal with policy change induced by European integration seems to exist (Radaelli 2003, 46). A general development of bureaucratization goes hand-in-hand with a massive increase in staff members and institutional structures dealing with policy-making in the member states. The fear of EU laws complicating national legislation has also been examined and refuted. Knill and co-authors (2009) find cases of both expansion and dismantling when examining the influence of European laws on the direction of domestic policy changes. Lastly, the actual interference of national-level policy-making in European legislation is hard to measure and generalize across member states. There are various accounts looking at uploading patterns, institutional limitations and beneficial timing for potential influencing (e.g. Börzel 2002). This precision cannot be maintained here examining the process after European decisions have been implemented nationally. Yet, countries have increased their staff size and created special institutions to precisely deal with those matters of protecting national interest on the European level, as also the institutional focus shows.

3 – Measuring Europeanization: What Counts as a Direct European Impulse?

Naturally, any definition of the European influence on national legislation has certain drawbacks. However, for the purpose of this study, the measurement issues and controversies do not weigh equally problematic as they do in many other cases. As the most critical piece on the validity of the “European impulse” measurement by Hölscheidt and Hoppe (2010, 547) claims, the statistic does not comprehensively cover all laws with European influence but mostly those in which the initiators want to implement European legal guidelines explicitly. We can thus only be sure to have laws with an “explicit and obvious EU reference” included in the measurement. Yet, for this paper’s analysis laws with explicit EU references are the most important to distinguish from other legislation with expected indirect influences. The most explicit EU impulses to be transposed in national legislation require and allow the smallest domestic influence. As Höllscheidt and Hoppe but also Göller (2009) contend, it is barely possible to detect all European influences in laws. I purposely selected the German case, because German legislative procedures are in fact quite comprehensive with respect to flagging EU origin: §43 Paragraph 1/8 of the Common Ministerial Rules of Procedure (GGO) asks the legislators to label and identify “references to European law” (<https://www.jurion.de/Gesetze/GGO-4/43>), which is precisely what the GESTA database codes as a European impulse. Worst case, the results underestimate the proportion of directly influenced legislation and also include laws with subtle European influence in the sovereign share. This undercount would not distort the findings in a problematic way, but lead to an underestimation of the theoretically expected effect. What is common to the critical voices of this measurement approach is their claim that Delors’ Myth cannot be accounted for by measuring the sheer proportion of those most direct influences. This article is a response to this critique by analyzing and comparing all changing processes, thereby reducing the danger of losing information through categorization.

7 – Time Periods: How to Account for the Deepening of European Integration?

An analysis of shorter or different time periods is not practicable for theoretical and empirical reasons. Theoretical, since only treaties can shift competencies which is the process that introduces the expected change. Empirical, because the concept of measuring (L-)kurtosis requires high case numbers and comparatively long time spans. Reaching a sufficient number of cases is difficult since not all policy areas require attention in any given year in general and the EU only slowly increased its legislation across policy areas. Furthermore, time spans cannot be chosen too limitedly since (L-)kurtosis measurements rely on the idea of capturing change over time. Case requirements are also the reason for not taking advantage of the more detailed minor topic level codes. Their application would induce too much volatility, lead to high numbers of zero occurrences for small policy areas not legislated annually, and be particularly problematic for the Europeanized agenda share in its early years but still today.

8 – Extracting Outliers: Overestimating Change in Areas of Little Legislative Activity

One of the main issues when calculating percentage-count change scores and subsequently kurtosis values is how to deal with cases of little legislative activity. When certain policy areas do not ask for legislative activity in a given year, change scores for the policy area in question tell us a strong value of minus 100% or NA if legislation is passed after a year with zero occurrences. The European case is especially prone to overestimating negative change. Changing and varying policy competencies and thus policy area involvement characterize European influences. However, these cases of major change do not depict what we usually define as punctuated policy change. They overestimate small change in areas that require less legislative action. Figure 6b thus portrays the developments of L-Kurtosis scores over time and with respect to treaty change without all cases that change from very low numbers of laws to zero and back in both the sovereign and directly EU influenced agenda share. These outliers' exclusion as a robustness check for policy-making developments offers a similar overall picture to the original Figure 6. The line with the directly EU influenced proportions' scores is only slightly parallel upward shifted. This way, the additional test confirms the finding that the Europeanized national agenda starts to follow the general patterns of decision-making known from traditional nation states more closely while independent policy-making is also affected and becomes less punctuated.




Figure 6b: Smoothed Development of L-Kurtosis Scores in Important Development Phases of European Integration

CHAPTER III:

Democratic Surplus?:

Representation in the European Multilevel System of Governance

Citizens, political elites and scholars alike criticize the EU for being distant from Europe's citizens while claiming sovereignty and therefore representational rights from the member states. I contend that policy representation in Europe can only be understood in the multilevel framework of shared responsibilities with the same political elites. This paper therefore examines both levels' relative congruence to citizens' major concerns and derived conditions for national representatives' EU-level responsiveness. In a first step, it finds that today's EU can be more congruent relative to the member states whenever it has the competency in the relevant policy field and an issue is of cross-national importance. Secondly, the following conditions increase the likelihood of policies in areas of citizens' concerns to appear on the European agenda: (a) the existence of a shared saliency perception, (b) the formation of coalitions over topics, or (c) the institutionally advantaged country playing a stronger role. I present empirical evidence using Eurobarometer data on citizens' "Most Important Problem"-survey responses, individual member states' legislation, and European Council Conclusions.

III. Democratic Surplus?: Representation in the European Multilevel System of Governance

Europeans are represented at two levels: the same nationally elected representatives represent their constituencies directly at the nation state level and indirectly through the Council structure at the European level. Decision-making and thus policy representation in the Council system happens via the 28 member states' heads of state or governments. Commission delegates and directly elected members of the European Parliament complete the representational picture. The European project as a multilevel governance framework established the collaboration of sovereign nation states in policy areas that are better tackled collectively than individually. Since this allows to represent citizens at two levels, should we not speak of the potential for a democratic surplus instead of fearing an EU-induced democratic deficit?

The fear of a democratic deficit has generated passionate societal and scholarly debate. It is rarely taken into consideration, however, that the multilevel structure offers a double-layer of representation. Both an individual's nation state and the EU can deal with topics that are of major concern to the citizen and thus provide democratically legitimate actions simultaneously at two levels. While different representational frameworks define conditions for responsiveness in the member states, policy representation's underlying idea is simple: decision-makers offer policy solutions to citizens' concerns. The strict representational linkage that institutionally exists in Europe's nation states cannot be found on the European level judging from the traditional criteria of evaluating representative democracies. Yet, since it is the same representative acting on two levels, the European project opens up new possibilities. The EU can be even more congruent to citizens' concerns whenever it is the better venue for addressing common concerns.

This paper's main argument is that an issue needs to meet certain conditionality for allowing EU congruency: If the national and European level at least share competencies and an agreement among countries on an issue's saliency exists, it can be beneficial to (also) deal with a major topic collectively. For a topic to make it on the EU's agenda in this framework, there need to be shared perceptions of saliency and urgency among the directly elected national representatives collectively acting at the European level. Also emerging cross national coalitions on an issue can get their way. An individual country has the biggest chances to set the agenda in response to its citizens' concerns when it holds the Council presidency and is therefore in an institutionally privileged position.

Both national and European level congruence with topics of citizens' concern need to be considered to evaluate policy representation as one major element of democratic legitimacy in the European project. Only the relative congruence of both levels offers an understanding of how representation works in the multilevel framework. The analysis of the national and European representational linkage is important from both the member states' and the EU's perspective to account for claims of democratic and representative deficits at both levels: "Any political system purporting to be democratic can be assessed in terms of supply and demand" (Dehousse & Monceau 2009, 29). By adding another layer of governance to long-established, strong sovereign nation states, the European Union is particularly dependent on positive results to justify its continued existence. Political scientists like Scharpf (1999) have always emphasized the importance of "output legitimacy" in the EU context and Commission President José Manuel Barroso even coined the term "the Europe of results". This particularity allows policy representation to succeed on the European level despite the absence of other factors that usually define successful representation, such as direct representational linkages or low levels of decentralization.

Policy representation in the multilevel framework thus has potential for a democratic surplus when an analysis jointly deals with both European and national-level congruence to topics of citizens' concern. In posing the question "who represents Europe's citizens in today's European multilevel game?", this paper speaks to the literature on the democratic deficit, agenda responsiveness, European studies and comparative politics

i. **Congruence on EU- and National-Level Agendas with Citizens' Concerns**

When, how, and why should policy makers take citizens' concerns into account when setting the agenda? Issues of representation and responsiveness are amongst the most controversial in political science. Even when focusing on established, traditional democracies, several layers complicate the process. The interests of individual citizens are not necessarily the same as are the aggregated concerns of the citizenry. Political decision-makers, despite their democratic accountability, bring their own interests to the table and are influenced by organized interest, and limited by institutional, time and material constraints.

Existing literature on responsiveness in the nation state context, majorly influenced by Wlezien (2004/2005) with Soroka (2012), Hobolt & Klemmensen (2005/2008), Stimson (2004) with Mackuen & Erikson (1995), and Page & Shapiro (1983), examines representatives' dynamic reaction to public opinion. Responsiveness is thus understood as "congruence of collective public attitudes towards political issues with the political preferences and actions of elected representatives" (Hobolt & Klemmensen 2005, 380). Responsiveness is shared salience. The underlying reasoning for the assumption of responsiveness in this literature is that incumbents need to follow their electorates' demands to minimize the risk of being replaced in the next election (Ferejohn 1986; Hobolt & Klemmensen 2008, 312). In fact, studies on the relationship between expressed citizens' concerns and the congressional agenda have shown that "the issues that policymakers in the United States address are closely matched to the priorities of the public"

(Jones & Baumgartner 2004; Jones et al. 2009). If citizens perceive the economic situation as critical and express the economy as their most important concern, for example, this is more influential for reaching politicians' attention than the objective state of the economy at the time (Jones & Baumgartner 2012, 9). Wlezien and Soroka's famous "Thermostatic Model" describing a reciprocal relationship between citizens' demand for a policy and policy-makers' supply seems to work in the nation state context: "opinion and policy move together in salient policy domains" (Wlezien & Soroka 2012, 1408). This relationship works best in election seasons and when the degree of decentralization is low (Bonafont & Palau 2011, Bevan & Jennings 2014).

In the highly decentralized European context, direct electoral linkages are rare, representational issues are aggravated. Not only do the individual member states bring their national constraints to the bargaining table, but the complex, layered institutions at the European level further complicate decision-making. Competencies must be formally assigned to the EU while often still being shared with the member states. Intergovernmental and supranational institutions interact vertically on the EU institutions level and then again horizontally with the member states and their citizens (Moravcsik 2002, 610). Decentralization is high and the chain of democratic accountability, if existing at all, is long. Beyond all, the transposition of European decisions always occurs through the member states who often shift the blame and take the glory.

Given this (standard) gloomy outlook, why should the EU address issues of citizens' concern at all? The answer is simple: to survive. The nation states of Europe have voluntarily surrendered sovereignty to deal with topics no individual country is able to deal with alone, to benefit from the economic advantages of the collaboration, and to ensure peace. The EU must deliver positive results to confirm to its *raison d'être*. The more it requires from the Europe's citizens, the

more it must cater to their needs. This is most striking in areas of continental concern and in major, thorny issues. Consequently, this paper considers policy solutions as a form of responsiveness and thus narrows the definition of responsiveness to congruence. The share of legislation and European Council Conclusions, respectively, on topics of importance to citizens define which level can offer solutions in the responding policy areas. With the same representatives acting at both levels, the sharing of competencies also enables the sharing of responsibilities of citizens' concern.

It is the idea of representative democracies that elected representatives act responsively: "a key characteristic of democracy is the continued responsiveness of the government to the preferences of the people" (Dahl 1971, 1). Political institutions establish the representational link that allows this idea to succeed but even at the national level this functions imperfectly. On the European level, direct causal responsiveness is generally not to be expected. When applying national findings to the European Union, we must question even the basic premise of responsiveness – which electorate should the EU be responsive to? The missing European public sphere and "European-wide policy discourse" (Scharpf 1999) complicate representational success. A national perspective often also prevails on the European level. For institutional reasons, the EU is not comparable to other known forms of representative democracies. Citizens and scholars criticize the European Parliament for being weak. Likewise, a common complaint is that the Commission is too technocratic. The Council, according to Gabel and Anderson (2002, 894) the most important legislative body in the EU, "consists of representatives of national governments elected in national, not EU, elections". Furthermore, the strong form of party government that prevails in the member states is much less accentuated on the European level, and decentralization is inevitably higher (Hix 2008).

Accepting that national interest do play a role at the European level, the level-focused criticism is less worrisome. If member states collaborate out of self-interest on the European level when certain conditions are met, the EU can still offer policy solutions to the citizens of Europe that could otherwise not have been reached. To achieve those solutions on the European level not only one country's citizens' concerns and decision-makers' motives must align but also those of 27 others. It is this paper's major argument and contribution to define the conditions under which national decision-makers decide to deal with a topic on the European level and therefore reach EU-level congruence. This perspective allows more optimistic conclusions for policy representation in the European project:

In the multilevel politics approach, European and national institutions provide threefold representational linkages for the citizens of Europe: the European Parliament represents the joint European constituency and the Council system offers indirect representation through governments and heads of state or government which are held accountable in domestic elections (Bellamy & Castiglione 2013, 206). These same elected representatives govern the individual nation states. As a result, we can speak of a double-layer of representation: the directly elected members of the European Parliament, domestically elected governments that together represent Europe's citizens in the Councils, and the member states' representatives themselves deal with topics of citizens' concern. The public as well as the scholarly community (see for example Follesdal & Hix 2006; Majone 2000) claim these various and indirect forms of representation on the EU-level to be intransparent, giving rise to democratic concerns. Yet, the diversity of these channels can also be viewed positively. Different types of representation as prevailing in the EU multilevel system can be "productive". Bicameral systems often use a similar approach aiming at balancing "short- and long-term, national and regional, majority and minority interests" (Bellamy & Castiglione 2013, 207). If countries agree to collaborate on the European level,

the multilevel EU framework including EU-level institutions and member states can act as a new “multi-cameral system”.

The usually critically assessed domestic focus of all European debates and elections is not necessarily a representational issue. Quite to the contrary, it only tells us, that national governments also represent their citizens on the European level. This, on the one hand, allows to make the assumption of a double-layer, without having to assume that citizens address one or the other level depending on the critical issue. On the other hand, it emphasizes the importance of the individual member states’ role and thus mitigates the fear of an overall loss of democratic responsiveness. The continuing shift of responsibilities from the national to the European level in the process of deepening European integration without a noticeable establishment of equivalent representational ties on the EU level had aggravated this perception.

Under the assumption of double-layered representation of the same national representatives acting on both levels, it becomes crucial to define when nationally elected elites would choose to deal with topics in the European instead of the domestic arena. This requires a two-step process: (1) First, two conditions are necessary for the potential of EU-level congruence to citizens’ concerns. In addition to that, (2) further conditions must make it beneficial for the national representative to deal with a topic supranationally. After all, electoral benefits seem to stem mostly from the domestic arena. “Blame-shifting” on unpopular policy issues, arguing that ‘the EU made me do it’ (Schmidt 2006, 37–43), seems to be national representatives main use of the European setting. Yet, if there is a shared saliency and urgency perception, cross national coalitions over topics form (maybe but not necessarily more favorable than agreements at home), or the respective country is in an institutionally advantaged role to push through its citizens’ concerns on the European level, there may also be benefits of shifting a topic to the European level.

Before the potential utilitarian decision of dealing with a topic supranationally, stands the necessary condition of formal competence. The idea of a European level of policy-making in addition to the continuous existence of the strong sovereign nation states has particularities for the variety of topics on the EU agenda: the treaties strictly define the EU's competencies. Exclusive EU competencies remain rare, most of the time responsibilities are shared between the European and the national level. Through deepening European integration and continuous treaty change, however, an ever increasing amount of policy areas can also be tackled at the European level. Yet, we cannot assume that the EU ventures out into all possible policy fields as previous research had assumed and then criticized the EU for to not dealing with salient issues (Moravcsik 2002).

(a) To potentially include topics of citizens' concern on its agenda, the EU needs to have the competencies in the respective field.

While competence is a necessary condition for EU-level involvement, it is not a sufficient condition looking back at the representational issues. Yet, times are changing as a result of shared problems, like the financial crisis or the refugee tragedies in the Mediterranean. With globalization tendencies and increasingly big, not nationally constrained issues, or issues that are better approached as a Union of States, I argue that the EU can take its part of the share in addressing issues of citizens' concern within the multilevel framework. Collaboration among states has become more important and the EU has become a stronger player. At the same time, European citizens' issue perceptions expectably converge. This is the second defining condition for relative EU congruence: common concerns.

European decision-making is generally dependent on member state input, decided in meetings of rather intergovernmental than supranational character. The here emphasized European Council is often characterized as the long-term agenda-setter of the Union. This confirms the

assumption that there is no need for citizens to approach one or the other level for solutions. No direct dynamic representational linkage in Soroka and Wlezien's sense has to exist. While Hobolt and Tilley (2014) are the first to find that citizens are capable of distinguishing between the levels and requesting respective response, there is no necessity for this assumption when looking at the multilevel framework and in particular the Council system. Nationally elected representatives only jointly decide to tackle issues at the European instead of the national level for reasons of practicality or blame-shifting when an issue of cross-national importance is concerned. When they share a common issue perception. National decision-makers' agreement to implement a policy-solution on the European instead of the national level means that the European level has important problem-solving capacities.

The two most recent crises are important examples in this respect. While the Eurozone crisis concerned the whole Euro-Group and was thus tackled communally from the start, the consequences of the crisis in the Mediterranean used to be regionally restricted at first view. It concerned the bordering countries most in the beginning while others seemed to avoid becoming involved. Since no country was able to deal with the consequences alone, however, attempts were made to find solutions for both issues on the European level. It is thus a question of surrendering responsibilities to the EU-level and the willingness to move beyond immediate national interest that decides on the success or failure of these negotiations. This, in turn, depends on shared problem awareness and compromise on potential solutions¹⁰.

¹⁰ Position-matching plays less of a role for this paper since whenever countries agree on the necessity for European intervention and a topic makes it on the agenda there will be some kind of compromise. Whether or not this matches the expectation of the citizenry is equally arguable as it is for national level compromise.

As the major agenda-setter and given the dominance of intragovernmental decision-making on the European level, especially the Council system offers the double-layer of representation: nationally elected politicians represent their own citizens and in agreement and coordination with others they attempt to cater to the whole European citizenry. It is not only one's own elected representative but those of 28 sovereign countries trying to find solutions. By definition, issues thus need to be shared and touch more than just individual member states' interests¹¹:

(b) Issues that span the European continent are more likely to be tackled at the European level, especially if they are touching more than just individual member states' national interests

Those two conditions – competence and shared issue perception – influence the likelihood for the EU-level to be more congruent to immediate citizens' concerns than the national level. Moving forward, it becomes possible to define the circumstances that influence the likelihood of a topic to be included on the European agenda.

¹¹ If a topic makes it on the European agenda, it has often been questioned whether those policies truly originate at the European level or were simply "uploaded". For this paper, this is of less concern since also an uploaded policy would fulfill the same requirements and equally emphasize the problem solving capacity of the EU. An important literature also exists in the context of spatial analysis for the EU context. This entails considerations on party, citizens' and issue positioning on the left-right axis (see for an overview Van der Eijk & Franklin 1996). But again, the focus on policy representation does not require to go into detail here.

Conditions for a Topic's Likelihood to Succeed on the EU-Level

Despite the optimistic perspective on the European project's institutional framework and its increasing issue responsibilities, the previous section also reemphasized that both institutionally and in terms of the citizens' and elites' mindset, the EU remains more of an intergovernmental than a federal system. As a consequence, I contend that an issue is most likely to make it to the European-level agenda when at least one of the following three conditions is met and examine their marginal importance. If for reasons of blame shifting or expected benefits, it requires agreement among the member states or an institutional advantage to deal with a topic in the intergovernmental realm:

Representation on the EU sphere of influence in the multilevel context succeeds if -

(c.1) a shared saliency perception exists

(c.2) cross-national coalitions form on a topic

(c.3) an individual country can play a major role as institutionally defined in the Council presidency

First (c.1), it remains a fact that EU-level decision-making requires a high degree of consensus, higher than in any national system (Bellamy & Castiglione 2013, 216; Moravcsik 2002). Due to the high threshold requirements defined by the EU's institutional setting, "overwhelming consensus is required for any policies to be agreed" (Follesdal & Hix 2006, 540/544). Most important for this story is that the reason for the high institutional thresholds, the safeguarding of national interests, usually is the toughest hurdle for EU-wide decision-making to succeed: "Basically, because the governments run the EU and there is 'hard bargaining' in the adoption of all EU policies, the EU is unlikely to adopt anything which negatively effects an important national interest or social group" (Follesdal & Hix 2006, 541). The EU is strongly constrained by

its own “plural structure of checks and balances” and by its need to “co-exist within a multi-level system of governance with fiscally, administratively and legally more powerful nation-states” (Moravcsik 2002, 611). It thus requires a common problem perception and urgency to include an item on the European agenda. Whether this shared problem perception exists is an empirical question and will be examined in the following.

Second (*c.2*), in case an issue perception is not commonly shared, it requires at least a coalition of like-minded countries for an issue to make it on the EU-level. While it is conceivable that logrolling and bargaining arrangements allow for outcomes in which not all member states’ national interests are satisfied, a sufficient majority must exist. The bigger the overlap in perceived issues across member states is, the higher the likelihood for successful supranational decision-making. In this case European action is possible with a very domestic focus in the Council. Bellamy and Castiglione (2013, 217) claim that the more the EU moves into policy areas not as clearly cut and Pareto optimal if approached supranationally, “the more contentious action by the EU will be”. While this is certainly the case, it also opens up new possibilities for coalitions of member states on the European stage. Topics that have once made it to the European agenda, are likely to remain at that level, given the general theories on agenda-setting and venue shopping (see for an overview Jones & Baumgartner 2012). Domestic policy-makers have to adapt to this new situation with new strategies of reaching consensus. This is unlikely to happen in cases with too high costs for individual member states. For cases without strong disagreement, collaborating countries can succeed in bringing a topic to the agenda when the coalition is sufficiently large.

Third (*c.3*), an individual country can only play a strong role if it has the institutional means to influence the EU agenda. While some member states are stronger (or stronger-willed) than others, it is unlikely that an individual country gains as big of a bargaining role that it manages

to reach its individually preferred option. Institutionally, an individual country is the most likely to have a comparatively bigger bargaining and, more importantly, agenda-setting power when holding the Council presidency. This country's citizens' concerns might therefore be more influential for the overall agenda than those of other member states, especially if there are no strong objections to the path taken (for more information on the capacity of the presidency see for example Tallberg 2003).

ii. Research Design and Methods

Case Selection: How to measure congruence in Europe

Theoretical considerations guide my focus on member states' legislation and European Council Conclusions' congruence with citizens' perceived "Most Important Problems":

To measure EU-level congruence with citizens' concerns, decision-makers' need something to respond to. Yet, it is one of the EU's major critiques that a common European public policy agenda (as opposed to a political agenda) is questionable from the start with public involvement being very limited (Princen & Rhinard 2006, 1121). My approach differs twofold: without assuming a European policy space (as opposed and additional to the domestic one) to be necessary for the EU to be congruent with citizens' concerns in the multilevel framework, I use topics of broad citizens' concern and compare their share on both the European and member states' agendas. Since the same representatives act on both levels, I neither distinguish between the national and European levels as addressee for concerns nor between most important problems perceived in respondent's own country of the EU as a whole. Bevan et al. (2016) show that expressed concerns differ between the personal and EU level and to a smaller extent also the national level. While this distinction tells us something about the difference in respondents' focus when asked about their concerns in different arenas, it is less important for

the study at hand. On the national level representatives also have to deal with concerns for citizens' private lives and the country as a whole. By the same token, the same representatives acting on the European level will deal with concerns on all three accounts if given the chance. First and foremost, however, they will stand up for their nation state and thus equally for the country-level concerns.

Consequently, comparing European Council Conclusions (ECC) and member states' legislation congruence with "Most Important Problem" responses examines whether in fact a double-layer of representation exists. It also defines under which conditions the political elites, that are the same in the European Council as in the member states, shift a topic to the European level.

While national legislation and European Council Conclusions are not documents of the equivalent stage in the legislative process, their comparison allows to study the role played by national representatives on both levels. Besides the above outlined argument of the intergovernmental channel's importance, the European Council is steering the EU and playing a crucial role in setting pace and direction of integration (Bulmer 1996; Bocquillon & Dobbels 2014). The European Council's Conclusions not only set "political guidelines" but often request reports and proposals, give clear instructions for their drafting, and set deadlines for the other institutions. As such, ECCs can be expected to entail highly aggregated policy issues of interest, defining the "issues of concern and actions to take"¹².

¹² <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/>

Databases

The Most Important Problem data for the following analysis is extracted from Eurobarometer survey questions from 2002 until 2014. The Eurobarometer survey is a public opinion analysis conducted on behalf of the European Commission since 1973 with the goal of monitoring the evolution of public opinion in the member states. Since 2002, the official wording of the question relevant for this paper has remained the same and been included in all waves (two to three per year): “What do you think are the most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) in the moment?”, allowing a maximum of two answers. The answers are predefined to the following: crime, public transport, economic situation, rising prices/inflation, taxation, unemployment, terrorism, defense/foreign affairs, housing, immigration, health care system, educational system, pensions, environment, energy, government debt, others, none, and don’t know. With between 16,000 and 33,000 respondents per wave distributed across the individual member states, the survey’s individual-level data sums up to a total of 775,713 observations for 12 years.

The agenda data, on the other hand, stems from the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP)¹³, originally initiated by Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner. The EU Policy Agendas Project developed in more recent years as part of the overall project and gives valuable insights into EU institutions’ agenda-setting (Alexandrova et al. 2014). Within the comparative framework, country expert teams apply a shared codebook of 21 major and more than 200 minor topics to the coding of official documents and laws in particular. The European Council Conclusions are coded accordingly. As outlined in Table 1 in the appendix, I harmonized CAP’s major and minor policy codes with the Eurobarometer MIP categories.

¹³ <http://www.comparativeagendas.net/>

Country projects exist for a wide variety of member states and European institutions. For reasons of geographical spread and diversity in political systems and economic situations, this paper focuses on Germany, Italy, Denmark, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK for the empirical analysis. While it would be interesting to also include the political agendas of the more recent Eastern European member states, they are not yet fully comparable in the given time span due to their later accession and sometimes lack the relevant data (quality). By including all countries in the MIP analysis and a range of countries for the responsiveness part and given that the European Council agenda is the same influence to all member states the results of the analysis are nevertheless generalizable.

Operationalization and Methods

Any research design aiming to analyze congruence of the European multilevel framework's outputs and citizens' concerns needs to follow the three-step process outlined in the theoretical discussion:

(1) First, the general conditions for the potential of EU congruence need to be examined. If perceived MIPs diverged strongly between countries, congruence would be hardly establishable. In this case the sovereign members' representatives would not reach an agreement and rather deal with a topic domestically. I will approach the question of whether the EU has a chance to be congruent with a descriptive analysis of Most Important Problem data, this paper's main independent variable. MIP topics' development over time and across countries can give a first insight on whether topics under EU competence show some overlap across countries. Furthermore, the conditional variable "overlap" (c.2), defined as the number of countries agreeing on the most important MIP introduces those topics with highest likelihood for European action given theoretical considerations.

(2) The second step examines the influence of expressed MIPs on both levels' relative share of congruence with those topics of citizens' concern. The dependent variable for these models is the share of ECCs on the relevant policy field divided by individual member state legislation shares on the same:

$$Y = \frac{\% \text{ share of MIP topics on ECC agenda}}{\text{individual \% share of MIP topics on MSs' legislative agendas}}$$

Underlying is a time-series cross-sectional dataset on a year-topic-country level. Substantively, this ratio expresses how much more or less agenda space the ECCs devotes to topics of significant short-term concern to the citizens compared to each individual MS. 1 signifies that ECCs and member states' legislation are equally congruent, values above 1 indicate the EU to be more congruent, values between 0 and 1 the MS.

For a first overview, I plot the average congruence share across all topics for each included country and the ECC as well as the dependent variable ratio. An Autoregressive Distributive Lag Model (ADL) in the form of a one-step Error Correction Model (ECM) (De Boef 2001, 84ff; De Boef & Keele 2008) acts as first empirical test. It estimates the effects of one time series on another, relating how change in the independent variable of expressed MIPs (X) affects the equilibrium of the congruency ratio dependent variable (Y). I use the following model specification:

$$\Delta \text{Ratio} \frac{\text{ECC}}{\text{Laws}_t} = \alpha_0 + \gamma \text{Ratio} \frac{\text{ECC}}{\text{Laws}_{t-1}} + \eta_{1a} \Delta \text{MIP}_{ms} + \eta_{1b} \Delta \text{MIP}_{eu} + \eta_{2a} \text{MIP}_{ms_{t-1}} + \eta_{2b} \text{MIP}_{eu_{t-1}} + \text{conditions} + \varepsilon_t$$

The main independent variables here are the aggregated percentages of individual survey respondent answers claiming the respective topic to be their most important concern. This is included both for the member state level (*MIP_{ms}*) and an EU average (*MIP_{eu}*). To account for

time series characteristics and the specific research design, lagged variables for both MIP independent variables and the dependent variable are also in the model. By definition, the dependent ratio variable already includes the condition of competence, assuming that the ECC congruent share only exists in policy areas of EU competence. The independent MIPeu variables can be seen as a proxy for overlapping problem perception. In addition to that, I include the manually coded dummy for competence¹⁴ and the plotted overlap (most important MIP match across countries) for the claimed conditions.

(3) The third step then goes into more detail on the conditions (c.1 - c.3) for a topic to be included on the European agenda. Consequently, the dependent variable is defined as the share of MIP related topics in the ECCs. This data is measured on quasi-sentence level and has not been aggregated, thus enabling a very detailed perspective. Because of the dependent variable's proportional nature, I apply a generalized linear model of quasi-binomial logit type. Besides the main independent variable of an average EU-wide MIP perception, the three conditions defining issue perceptions' influence on EU agenda-setting are important: For (c.1) of easy agreement, I add a measurement of similarity in MIP perceptions (interquartile range of member states' MIP shares on individual topics) and a dummy of critical urgency (1 for all cases of extraordinary or Heads of States Council Meetings). While urgency can also indicate an increased level of controversy, I nevertheless claim that holding special meetings is a sign of agreement that an unforeseen issue needs to be tackled communally. Yet, any measure of controversy is certainly only an intermediary step since no aggregated control can account for individually difficult topics. This would require further qualitative assessments and an insight into the "politics behind closed doors" that cannot be provided here. The cross-national coalitions condition (c.2) can be proxied with the overlap control used before. Assuming that countries'

¹⁴ legal-formalistic definition on the basis of the treaties

citizens agree on a topic to be of most important concern, also cross-national coalitions can be expected to form more easily. Lastly, I only expect an individual country to be able to play an outstanding role (c.3) if it has the institutional means to do so. I thus examine whether the MIP shares of the country holding the presidency at the time play a role for ECC responsive shares. All variables are then interacted with the MIP independent variable to test whether they are necessary conditions for expressed MIPs to have an effect on ECCs on the topic.

iii. **Descriptives: Has the EU a Chance to Be Congruent?**

EU-level congruency requires, as has been elaborated before, competence and agreement among countries. A first look at the aggregated MIP responses over time and across topics reveals (see Figure 1 in the Appendix) that unemployment, only rarely contested by the economy as a whole, is the citizens' biggest concern across Europe. These findings are in line with national findings and with the traditional models on public opinion, political economy, rational choice, and the voting literature: Individual level characteristics are often reason for most important problem perceptions (Druckman & Lupia 2000). The identification of problems are often derivable from a person's own material well-being.

That the two most important problems are within the EU's scope of action is a first indication that the EU can actually play a role in finding solutions in areas of citizens' concern. More important, however, is to take a look at individual countries' perception of topics over time, since only a relatively parallel assessment enables the EU to be congruent to a majority of European citizens and makes national representatives' agreement on the EU level likely. Figure 2 gives an overview of all topics and shows that different patterns exist for different issue categories. It is important to note that the economy-related issues in the first column follow a similar or at least parallel development across all countries over time. Other issues, most obviously health, crime, and taxation, show a lot more variation across different countries coining the issue as

most important at different points in time. Considering the EU's potential to be responsive to citizens' concerns this gives reason for optimism. Issues that are within the realm of EU competencies seem to experience a more similar importance perception across countries. Especially economic concerns are a founding reason for European collaboration and policy competencies in this realm have been growing strongest throughout treaty revisions. It is a justified question whether this development occurred because different countries seem to be able to agree on those issues the easiest, as success factor (c.1) claimed, or because those are issues spanning the European continent, tackling all member states' interests evenly – necessary condition for EU responsiveness (b). Either way, these initial findings confirm the applicability of the theoretically developed hypotheses to the following empirical analysis.




Figure 2: The Development of Most Important Problems Over Time and Across Countries

Figures 3¹⁵ and 4 portray the overlap on individual issues in more detail which, from a traditional view on representation, seems to be a necessary condition for responsiveness to succeed. If countries' citizens disagree profoundly with respect to their concerns, intergovernmental agreement does not seem likely. The number of countries whose citizens share the same most important MIP topic, portrayed in Figure 4 below, confirms the assumption of an EU responsiveness potential on issues that are among its main competencies. Economic issues are the most decisive across countries. Their temporal variation is merely caused by shifts between unemployment, inflation, and economic concerns as the most important MIP.




Figure 4: Most Often Quoted MIP Overlap across all EU Countries

¹⁵ In the Appendix - on the median probability of an issue to be defined as most important and its variation across time and countries

iv. Empirical Analysis: Comparative & EU-level Congruence

The following empirical analysis proceeds in two analytical steps: It first examines the relative share of congruence between the national and European level starting from the assumption of the multilevel framework and consequent multilevel representation in accordance with the shared competencies. The second step then focuses on the conditions for successful EU-level congruence.

What influences the relative share of congruence with topics of citizens' concern?

With the descriptive section confirming the assumption of overlapping concerns in areas of competence, we can now move on to the question how much agenda space topics of immediate concern to the citizens occupy on the European and national agenda.

Figure 5 shows the percentage of laws in the examined member states that deal with topics of citizens' concern. Because it measures the proportion of new laws in a given policy area and year, this percentage is comparable and not biased by cross-country differences¹⁶ in law-making procedures. Nonetheless, I find variation between the member states in a range of 35%. The Dutch data, closely followed by the Italian and French which increase over time, shows lows of around 30% MIP relevant laws. The United Kingdom on the other hand, with the Belgian, Danish, and German laws coming only somewhat close, reaches highs of 65% of MIP topic related laws. The dark orange line that includes the European Council Conclusions as another case into the first part of Figure 5 marks high values of 45% to 55% between 2002 and 2009 and a rise to about 60% in 2010 and 2011. Just like any other country's agenda, the ECCs deal with a significant number of topics of citizens' concern and are close to the Median member

¹⁶ This includes differences such as country preferences for multiple shorter laws instead of one comprehensive reform, for example.

state (light violet line). Given recent developments in EU politics with the British referendum on EU membership, the importance of issue congruence is further emphasized.

The second part of Figure 5 introduces the ratio dependent variable, measuring how much bigger or smaller the share of MIP relevant topics is on the European Council agenda compared to the median member state's. The first impression goes contrary to the multitude of voices claiming that the EU is too distant from the citizens of Europe for congruence to succeed. That the line is very close to one in most years confirms that ECCs and median MS's legislation are similarly congruent most of the time. In 2005 and again in 2010 and 2011, the European Council Conclusions even entail a higher share of MIP relevant topics. Thus, national decision-makers use both venues to address issues of concern to their citizens.




Figure 5: Responsiveness to MIP Topics in the Examined EU Member States Legislation and the ECCs

Yet again, the particularities of the European framework play a role and require caution, this time favoring the national level: The member states still have significantly more tasks to fulfill of which not all can be of direct, and therefore in many cases short-term, importance for the citizens. If the share of all ECCs on economic issues was higher, for example, it would not necessarily mean that the EC tackles more issues but only that economic issues occupy a greater agenda share. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the EU which is often accused of dealing with very abstract issues has a high share of MIP relevant topics on its agenda. It allows us to move forward to the empirical analysis of what influences change in this ratio: when do ECCs become more or less congruent than member states' legislation.

Table 2 below depicts an Error Correction Model (ECM) that aims at explaining the relative share of both levels' congruence to MIP topics. The variables I expect to influence this ratio are changing MIP perceptions in the member states (Eurobarometer individual level data aggregated to the member state level), or on the European level (Model₁: mean of the 7 examined member states; Model₂: mean of all 27 member states; robustness checks for medians with same results) as well as the one year lagged dependent ratio and MIP variables. The model furthermore includes the two conditions on competence and overlap.

The results are consistent in showing the importance of the effect of MIP perceptions aggregated to the EU level (and even more so including all 27 instead of the examined 7 countries in the MIP term). A shared MIP perception across Europe clearly influences how relatively more congruent the ECCs compared to member states' legislation are: national decision makers are more likely to deal with MIP topics on the European level when the member states' citizens MIPs align.

Table 2: Error Correction Model for the Ratio of ECC/Member State Legislation Shares

	Dependent Variable: ΔRatio ECCshare/individual MSshare			
	(1) (examined MS)	(2) (all MS)	(3) (only MS MIPs)	(4) (only EU MIPs)
Ratio ECC/MSshare lagged (1yr)	-0.25***	-0.25***	-0.25***	-0.25***
α_1	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
ΔChange in MIPms	-7.5	-7.19	0.93	
η_{1a}	(4.75)	(4.49)	(3.35)	
MIPms lagged (1yr)	-3.34	-3.34	0.22	
η_{2a}	(3.14)	(3.03)	(2.34)	
ΔChange in MIPeu	17.47***	20.38***		10.29**
η_{1b}	(6.58)	(7.22)		(4.67)
MIPeu lagged (1yr)	9.68**	8.84*		6.30*
η_{2b}	(4.66)	(4.72)		(3.51)
Competence Condition Dummy	1.56***	1.58***	1.12**	1.55***
	(0.50)	(0.53)	(0.46)	(0.50)
Overlap Condition	-0.18	-0.1	0.38	-0.18
	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.31)	(0.37)
Constant	-0.68	-0.57	0.03	-0.65
	(0.49)	(0.5)	(0.37)	(0.49)
Observations	521	521	521	521
R ²	0.109	0.110	0.095	0.104
Adjusted R ²	0.096	0.098	0.086	0.095
Residual Std. Error	4.160 (df = 513)	4.156 (df = 513)	4.183 (df = 515)	4.163 (df = 515)
F Statistic	8.921*** (df = 7; 513)	9.055*** (df = 7; 513)	10.789*** (df = 5; 515)	11.912*** (df = 5; 515)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

First of all, the highly significant error correction coefficient (the lagged version of the dependent ratio variable), indicates that an error-correcting long-term behavior occurs. It thereby justifies the selection of the chosen approach. A previously conducted ADL model (results in the appendix) showed a p-value of 0.752 which clearly fulfills the requirement of a stationary model. Of the main independent variables, both change in MIP and lagged MIP variables are only significant for the European, not the member state level, and show the expected effect: With an increasing perception of a certain topic as most important (in the mean of the EU

member states), the change in the congruent ratio of ECC to MS legislation on the topic is positive. The positive value expresses comparatively bigger EU- than member state level congruency. The MIP perceptions for the individual MS, while not significant, show the opposite direction with a negative sign in both cases (change and lagged variable).

An equilibrium thus exists between EU-wide aggregated MIP responses and the congruence ratio. Content-wise, the coefficients express that a one point increase in EU-wide MIP perceptions of the respective topic moves the ratio of ECC to member state congruence up by 17.5 in the short-term (7.8 in the second short-run effect ($\eta_2 - \eta_1$)) and 9.7 over future time periods. The total effect consequently is 27.1 in the short- and longterm. In Keele and De Boef's ECM the long-run multiplier k_1 is easily computable by $k_1 = \frac{\eta_2}{\gamma}$ replacing $k_1 = \frac{(\beta_1 + \beta_0)}{(\alpha_1 - 1)}$ in the ADL approach. This way, k_1 amounts to 25.2 for the MIPeu (and 0.9 for the MIPms, remaining insignificant).

Of the competence and overlap variables, attempting to operationalize the conditions for EU congruency, only the competence dummy is significantly showing the expected effect. If the EU has the respective competencies for a topic we can expect more EU involvement in the topic. However, as presented in the operationalization, the de-facto conditions of competence and overlap are already included in the numerator of the dependent variable (for competence) and in the MIPeu variables (for overlap).

The ECM consequently contends that positive change in the share of ECCs compared to MS legislation does in fact go hand in hand with an EU-wide citizen perception of an issue as important. The significance of the lagged variable indicates that ECCs actually respond to the expressed MIPs. Yet, Table 2 merely confirms that there is a relationship between MIPs and policy-makers attention to the topic in question but does not claim a direct causal reaction.

Which conditions play a role for a topic to be included on the European agenda?

Beyond this empirical confirmation of the theoretically claimed congruence of not only the member states' legislation but also ECCs to citizens' most important concerns, it is crucial to empirically determine the effects of the conditions for EU-level congruence: easy agreement, cross national coalitions, and a strong role of an individual country. While certainly only applying a first broad attempt at measuring the conditions' concepts, the findings in Table 3 confirm their justification and necessity for further research in this realm.

Both models in Table 3 use a generalized linear, quasi-binomial logit approach. The conceptual difference between the models is that Model(1) does not assume the conditions to be necessary for EU-wide MIPs to influence the ECC's congruent share while Model(2) expects a conditional effect. If the conditions were necessary, the main MIP_{Eu} (MIP perceptions aggregated to the European level) independent variable would not be surpassing zero due to the nature of the included interaction effects: Models with interactions capture the effect of the independent on the dependent variable given that the conditioning effect is zero and thus not present in the main coefficient.

Table 3: Generalized Linear Model (quasi-binomial logit) on Conditions for ECC Congruency

	Dependent variable: ECC share on MIP-relevant topics	
	(1) Without Necessary Condition Assumption	(2) with
MIPeu (main independent variable)	0.56*** (0.15)	-2.63*** (0.17)
c.1a Similarity (interquartile range)	-4.77*** (0.22)	-21.40*** (0.46)
c.1b Urgency	0.33*** (0.05)	0.002 (0.04)
Interaction c.1a (MIP EU * c.1a)		70.12*** (1.59)
Interaction c.1b (MIP EU * c.1b)		0.79 (0.56)
c.2 Overlap	0.08*** (0.01)	0.004 (0.02)
Interaction c.2 (MIP EU * c.2)		-0.45*** (0.05)
c.3 Presidency	1.28*** (0.05)	0.68*** (0.09)
Interaction c.3 (MIP EU * c.3)		3.06*** (0.47)
Constant	-2.06*** (0.01)	-1.42*** (0.01)
Observations	7,490	7,490
Dispersion Parameter	0.03675054	0.02025457
Null Deviance	415.51 on 7489 df	415.51 on 7489 df
Residual Deviance	322.69 on 7484 df	172.84 on 7480 df
Number of Fisher Scoring Iterations	5	6

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Starting with Model(1), both measurements of c.1 – easy agreement – show significant effects in the expected direction. More similar MIP concerns between the individual member states (lower interquartile ranges) and the summoning of special meetings, indicating the respective issue(s)' importance and decision-makers' readiness to tackling it supranationally, go hand in hand with higher shares of MIP relevant topics on the ECC agenda. C.2 – cross national coalitions – portray small but significantly positive effects. Overlap between countries' majority's MIP concern define the likelihood for the establishment of cross-national coalitions. Lastly, c.3 – presidency – the problem perceptions of the country currently holding the presidency plays a stronger role for the share of congruent ECCs¹⁷.

Model(2), models the interaction terms and achieves a significantly higher improvement for the residual deviance measure. The estimates in this model confirm the effect of similarity in MIP perceptions (c.1), presidency holding countries' citizens' problem perceptions and thus the presidency's agenda-setting power (c.3), and the overlap condition (although only in the interaction term). That the individual value of the MIPeu independent variable is negative is not troubling. While we would have expected a zero value for the necessary condition argument, the negative value even shows that increasing concerns without agreement, overlap, or a strong presidency role have a negative effect on the congruent ECCshare.

Yet, this primary results table and interpretation is insufficient for a profound understanding of the actual effects. The coefficients do not indicate an average but instead a conditional effect of the variables on the ECCshare for the condition that the other variables are 0 (Brambor et

¹⁷ The overall low values in this model are a function of, first, the applied dataset with a quasi-sentence level of analysis, and, second, the measurement of the variables in percentages expressed between 0 and 1 but with a small actual data range close to zero. The goodness-of-fit statistics and in particular the difference between the null and residual deviance shows that the introduction of the variables improve the prediction of the congruent ECCshare compared to the model including the intercept only.

al. 2006). Thus, to actually grasp the effect of the theoretically derived conditions, it is necessary to calculate the three continuous condition variables' (c.1a, c.2, c.3) conditional effects on the effect of MIPeu concerns on the ECCshare. In Figure 6 below I graph the slope of the MIPeu and interaction term coefficients times simulated values of the conditions in the observed range. The graphs confirm the increasing marginal effect of MIPeu concerns on congruency to differing degrees in all three cases (hierarchical combination of individual interaction terms in the Appendix).




Figure 6: Marginal Effects of the Individual Interaction Models on the ECCshare

Summarizing the whole empirical section, the most important lesson learned is that both the member state- and EU-level bears their share of topics of immediate citizens' concern. Given it shares the relevant competencies, the EU is just as congruent as the median member state. The probability for national decision-makers decision to deal with a topic in the European instead of the domestic arena increases when certain conditions are met. If there is no shared saliency perception, potential for cross-national coalitions or a stronger presidency influence, however, increasing citizens' concerns even have a negative effect on the likelihood for responsive ECC shares. In this case, agreement between the nationally elected decision-makers in intergovernmental debates on the supranational level is unlikely and domestic solution-search more efficient. Different scenarios influence representatives' response allocation on one or the

other level, yet also intergovernmental decisions on the European level cater to the citizens' needs.

These results add to findings of a recently published article on European Council responsiveness by Alexandrova, Rasmussen, and Toshkov (2016). With a sole focus on the European level, the authors find increasing, but in some fields still limited congruency with citizens' concerns by measuring correlations, contemporaneous associations, and fractional logit regressions of European Council attention to individual policy areas. Their claim of the importance of "considering the complex multi-level nature of the data in studies of the relationship between opinion and attention" (Alexandrova et al. 2016, 607) is approached here for the first time. The above presented findings take these complexities into account by, on the one hand, accepting the member states' and EU-level's shared responsibility for dealing with topics of citizens concern. On the other, the here applied approach defines and tests the conditionality that is required for the EU to be congruent as an additional level of governance.

v. Conclusion: Does a Democratic Surplus Exist?

"Constitutional checks and balances, indirect democratic control via national governments, and the increasing powers of the European Parliament are sufficient to ensure that EU policy-making is, in nearly all cases, clean, transparent, effective and politically responsive to demand of European citizens." (Moravcsik 2002, 605)

Andrew Moravcsik has long claimed that no alarming and objectionable democratic deficit exists in the European Union. Yet, while his argumentation attracted scholarly debate but barely influenced many elites and publics' pessimistic views on the matter, no comprehensive empirical evidence had yet been presented. Around the same time, EU treaty change responded to the concern of a democratic deficit in a Union that seems to increasingly take over sovereignty

from its member states. The EU thereby reemphasized representation: Article 10 of the EU Treaties as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon¹⁸ states that “the functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy” and defines that citizens shall be “directly represented at the Union level in the European Parliament” and “Member States are represented in the European Council (...)”. These recent treaty revisions slowly start to put the multilevel format of representation and responsiveness into writing that differentiates the European project from what we already know about representative democracies on the nation state level.

But do we actually need a European public sphere and direct forms of representation to improve the EU’s democratic accountability? I argue that with the developments of the 20th century this remains a concept of traditional, nation state-focused representation that might not even be necessary in an unprecedented project of multilevel governance. Familiar types of representation remain on the national level. A congruency type of policy representation nonetheless emerges on the European playing field through intergovernmental decision-making of nationally legitimized representatives. Unfortunately, this uncovered congruence remains largely unnoticed by the public.

With a focus on congruence on both levels, my findings suggest that European Council Conclusions are in fact not more distant from citizens’ concerns than member states’ legislation given the required competencies. EU-wide aggregated, instead of individual nation states’, citizens’ concerns explain increasing shares of congruent ECCs compared to member states’ legislation. Under three scenarios, congruence on the European level for topics of citizens’ concern becomes possible: (1) in cases in which member states’ representatives agree on a topic’s salience, (2) when there is potential for cross-national coalitions, or (3) if individual member states

¹⁸ From: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228848/7310.pdf

are in an institutionally stronger role to promote their citizens' most important concerns. This conditionality is important in order to take the particularities of the double-layer of representation into account.

In closing, it has to be reemphasized that this paper is by no means exhaustive for the question of policy representation in the European project. Further research is necessary to learn more about the timing and direction of MIP concerns and legislative decisions. Also the channels for EU congruency – are decisions made on the national level and only performed at the European level or do we also see true European responses? – would be an interesting field for further research. Lastly, the measurement of congruence and conditions for success is certainly only a first, but up to date unique, approach to the topic. More qualitative assessments could get closer to an understanding of content-wise proximity. All this paper claims and offers empirical evidence for is that in the unprecedented multilevel project of governance in Europe decision-makers are not as distant from citizens' concerns as we might have believed. If the conditions support it national decision-makers approach issues of citizens' concern jointly on the European playing field.

Appendix III

Table 1: Cross-Over Coding Table for the Different Datasets Used (Eurobarometer MIP, CAP Country and EU Projects)

Eurobarometer Category	CAP Codes	Competence Dummy ¹⁹
Crime	12 (without: 1208, 1223, 1227)	0
Transport	10	0
Economy	100 / 108 / 1521	1
Inflation	110 / 101	1
Taxation	107	0
Unemployment	103	0
Terror	1227/1927	1
Foreign Affairs & Defense	16/19	1
Housing	14	0
Immigration	230	0
Health	3	0
Education	6	0
Pensions	1303	0
Environment	7	1
Energy	8	1
Government Debt	105	1
Others		
None		
Don't know		

¹⁹ For an overview of competence definitions used for coding see: <http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/competences/faq#q1>




Figure 1: Most Important Problems Across All Countries Over Time




Figure 3: MIP Issue Importance Across Countries and Over Time

Table 4: ADL Model for Confirmation of ECM Requirements

Dependent Variable:	
<u>Ratio ECCshare/individual MSshare</u>	
ADL Model	
Ratio ECC/MSshare lagged (1yr)	0.75***
α_1	(0.03)
MIPms	-7.5
β_{0a}	(4.75)
MIPms lagged (1yr)	4.16
β_{1a}	(4.7)
MIPeu	17.47***
β_{0b}	(6.58)
MIPeu lagged (1yr)	-7.79
β_{1b}	(5.97)
Competence Condition Dummy	1.56***
	(0.50)
Overlap Condition	-0.18
	(0.38)
Constant	-0.68
	(0.49)
Observations	521
R ²	0.525
Adjusted R ²	0.518
Residual Std. Error	4.160 (df = 513)
F Statistic	80.844*** (df = 7; 513)

*Note:**p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

Table 5: Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (quasi-binomial logit) on Conditions for ECC Congruency

Dependent variable: ECCshare on MIP relevant topics										
<i>Hierarchical Models</i>										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	c.1a	c.1b	c.2	c.3	c.1a&b	c.1&c.2	c.1&c.3	c.2&c.3	c.1&c.2&c.3	all
MIPeu	-3.11*** (0.13)	1.70*** (0.05)	1.34*** (0.12)	-4.07*** (0.11)	-3.11*** (0.13)	-1.6*** (0.15)	-4.29*** (0.13)	-3.49*** (0.16)	-2.63*** (0.17)	-2.63*** (0.17)
c.1a Similarity	-17.76*** (0.27)				-17.75*** (0.27)	-23.46*** (0.37)	-15.27*** (0.39)		-21.41*** (0.46)	-21.4*** (0.46)
Interaction c.1a	61.52*** (0.80)				61.47*** (0.8)	81.59*** (1.14)	49.72*** (1.31)		70.16*** (1.59)	70.12*** (1.59)
c.1b Urgency		0.51*** (0.06)			0.005 (0.05)					0.002 (0.04)
Interaction c.1b		-0.64 (0.89)			1.22** (0.61)					0.79 (0.56)
c.2 Overlap			-0.50*** (0.02)			-0.03 (0.02)		-0.019 (0.026)	0.004 (0.02)	0.004 (0.02)
Interaction c.2			1.29*** (0.04)			-0.36*** (0.05)		-0.157*** (0.058)	-0.45*** (0.05)	-0.45*** (0.05)
c.3 Presidency				-0.99*** (0.07)			0.61*** (0.08)	-1.301*** (0.086)	0.68*** (0.09)	0.68*** (0.09)
Interaction c.3				13.05*** (0.25)			3.08*** (0.38)	15.306*** (0.383)	3.06*** (0.47)	3.06*** (0.47)
Constant	-1.46*** (0.01)	-2.3*** (0.01)	-2.21*** (0.01)	-2.01*** (0.01)	-1.46*** (0.01)	-1.38*** (0.01)	-1.51*** (0.01)	-2.022*** (0.010)	-1.42*** (0.01)	-1.42*** (0.01)
Observations	7,490	8,281	8,281	8,281	7,490	7,490	7,490	8,281	7,490	7,490

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

CHAPTER IV:

Dynamics of Agenda Assimilation in Europe

This paper examines under which circumstances the European Council presidency influences the convergence of member states' domestic policy agendas. I argue that the presiding member state makes a conscious decision on whether to rather push its own agenda or give up a deviant position in favor of a common European way. This decision depends on domestic conditions, the comparative salience attached to an issue, and the expectation about other members' acceptance, which is not only important to reach compromise in the Council but also crucial for long run considerations. Only the actual implementation in a majority of the other member states will lead to the expected benefits of harmonization and convergence effects. The second analytical step therefore considers the convergence of member states' policy agendas dependent on the role the president decided to play.

I apply a strong focus on national legislation due to the domestically influenced role choice and success evaluation based on reaching nationally implemented agreement. Eight European Union member states' legislation from 1988 to 2008 build the basis for the empirical analysis.

IV. Dynamics of Agenda Assimilation in Europe

National influences to European Union decision-making give reason for scholarly, political, and societal debate. Small versus big, rich versus poor, old versus new member states are only some of the conflictual dimensions. Given that countries voluntarily surrender sovereignty to the European Union as an additional level of governance, the influence and equality of all members has always been safeguarded institutionally. In most cases, strong majority requirements were implemented for this reason. The Presidency to the European Council System takes a different approach. While the six-month rotation principle is yet again a measure to ensure equality, the fact that one country presides the important intergovernmental arena of EU decision-making enables and requires each and every country to take a stance on the European level for its presidency turn.

Whoever holds the presidency is recognized as the “first among equals” (Tallberg 2006, 85). Books have been written about how countries carry out the presidency and the role they decide to play from different angles and theoretical as well as empirical backgrounds (for an overview see Naurin & Wallace 2008 or Elgström 2003). Yet, questions remain open due to the difficulty of measuring what happens in the black box of closed door negotiations. While the presiding country does have stronger agenda-setting power due to its procedural and informational advantages that it might use to its own benefit, its formal task is also to act as the broker for compromise that all can accept given the consensual nature of negotiations.

Accepting the intergovernmental nature of decision-making in the Council and national legislation as the ultimate output of transposed European decisions, this paper proposes a new way

of opening the black box with a focus on national in- and outputs. In accordance with the rational choice institutionalism and general bargaining theory framework that Tallberg (2006) and others initiated, I also argue for the opportunity of European agenda-setting influence the presidency offers the member state in charge. Instead of measuring policy preferences and bargaining outcomes, I focus on policy attention for the understanding of the president's agenda-setting decision. Whether the president decides to emphasize issues that are of national importance or assimilate its policy attention to shared issues can act as a proxy for the role it plays when leading the Council.

I apply and extent Braun and Gilardi's (2006) policy change model to the president's role choice. The conscious choice the presiding country makes depends on domestic conditions that would facilitate or impede strong position taking, the comparative salience it assigns to the issue in question, and its expectation about other members' acceptance. The latter, facilitated by the proclaimed informational advantage of the president, defines the actual utility the president can draw from setting the agenda. Only if the other members put the negotiation outcomes into practice through national adaptations and assimilate their agenda in the president's favor will the president benefit from influencing negotiations in the Council. Given that it can act in favorable domestic conditions, the president's calculus is therefore a trade-off between the assigned salience and the proximity to other member's position and therefore their expected agreement. The second analytical step I add to examine this assumption and the consequences of role choice for other members' willingness to follow an individual member state's lead on the European level confirms that the implementation of a common path, and therefore agenda convergence in the future, is in fact more likely if the president acted as a broker. With data on national legislation in eight member states over a period of 20 years, I examine two to three presidencies of each country and their respective role choice with all consequences.

While this approach does have its drawbacks with respect to missing knowledge about policy content- and negotiation outcomes, it has the major advantage of quantifying the first stage inputs and final stage outputs. Besides adding to the prevailing presidency case study research, the focus on national policy attention examines the most crucial actors and shows the most far-reaching effect the Council presidency and European integration can achieve: the convergence of member states policy agendas.

i. **Role Choice and its Consequences**

“Considerable debate remains however on key issues of how power transacts in the Council” (Lewis 2012, 322)

Despite the significant amount of attention the scholarly community in the field of European studies has devoted to the Council system and its presidency in particular, the role the president plays still remains controversial and partly hidden in the black box of behind closed doors negotiations. I identify two reasons and potential solutions to gain further insights into the presidency game: (missing) national focus and comparative politics approaches.

At the end of the day, the ultimate in- and outputs of Council negotiations are national. The Council system is the major intergovernmental institution in the European Union’s institutional framework. Accepting that the sovereign member states (almost) always have the last say in European decisions and the multilevel system of governance, we need a stronger focus on the national dimension. Not only is decision-making at the European level strongly consensual and the Council system the ultimate decision-maker when it comes to politically divisive issues but the presidency itself with its powerful agenda influencing position is ultimately nationally defined. Equipped with strong informational and procedural power resources, the Council president’s privileged position in the process helps to find compromise but is also used for the presiding country’s private gains, promoting “agreements whose distributional implications they

privately favor” (Tallberg 2006, 5). The presiding member state’s representatives therefore need to walk a fine line between catering to the expectations and “delivering at home” and finding solutions everyone in the EU can live with (Lewis 2012, 321). This means that the identified solutions not only lead to compromise and successful negotiation outcomes in the Council but are later also transposed into national legislation. The gains of being a member of a Union of states and influencing the Union in one’s favor ultimately arise through harmonization and convergence effects.

Since policy convergence means dealing with the same problems, incorporating positive harmonization effects, the recognition of interdependence leads to EU-wide responses to relevant policy issues even if the exact domestic processes may differ (Bennett 1991, 218-24). This recognition of interdependence in Europe implies a “reliance on others for the performance of specific tasks to ensure complete and successful implementation or to avoid troubling inconsistencies” (Bennett 1991, 225) for the success of the common market and shared policy issues: *“Convergence in this sense results from the existence of shared ideas amongst a relatively coherent and enduring network of elites engaging in regular interaction at the transnational level. Convergence is not the result of constraints imposed by the problem, or of collective insecurity, but of an identifiable elite bound by knowledge and expertise of a common policy problem and a shared concern for its resolution.”* (Bennett 1991, 224). Convergence, however, is not a “condition of 'being' more alike” but a process of “becoming” more alike. For the transnational problems all member states face, this is one of the major reasons for European integration. The EU council system establishes an even stronger ‘club’ of the European member states. Given the institutionalized interaction of member states’ governing elites, their regular exchange can enhance convergence effects in any area, if Europeanized or not. Supporting a common European way on shared policy issues and moving European integration forward, in turn, is one of the official goals of the presidency.

With this realization of the Council's decision-making process' ultimate in- and outputs' national origin it becomes evident that a comparative politics approach is needed for the study of the presidency. For its role choice, the respective presiding member state deals with domestic context variables influencing its negotiation power, with the comparative salience it attaches to one issue over another, and with the combination of domestic contextual factors and issue salience in the other members that leads to their acceptance of the presidency's proposed path. While, in line with Tallberg (2006, 11), countries may choose to accept compromise knowing that the rotation principle will give them their chance to influence the agenda to their own benefit at a later point in time, the actual domestic implementation and convergence of policy agendas requires an even further step.

I understand the president's agenda setting role in Kingdon's sense. Kingdon's (1984) conception of agenda setting focuses on changing salience instead of outcomes. The possibility to introduce or emphasize issues of importance and exclude those with expected disagreement or lower national importance is what the research on the Council presidency assigns to the president's role. Shaping the political agenda means shaping political priorities for European decision-making. I do not account for the actual policy preferences and complex compromise finding procedures that define the details of the outcomes. Particularly since the negotiation outcomes expectably vary between the presiding nation's inputs, the written outputs, and national implementations, this degree of detail speaks to different research questions. Current research argues for the clear advantage in procedural controls the presidency owns, but the restricted formal powers. The president therefore needs to focus on procedural controls when trying to influence outcomes (Warntjen 2008, 216). When we find assimilating agenda focus in the member states following the presidency, it is also an indication for a shared policy direction.

In the following theoretical framework, I first lay out the power of the Council Presidency and the president's domestic background for defining a "European agenda" and apply a rational choice bargaining framework to the president's role choice. These theoretical considerations guide the adaption and presentation of a model for policy change, which takes into account the reasoning for presidential role choice.

The Power of the Council Presidency. Together with the European Council, where the heads of state or government meet, the Council of the European Union, often referred to as the Council of Ministers or simply the Council, is part of the EU's council system, its main intergovernmental body. In the EU's still predominantly intergovernmental rather than supranational decision-making structure, the Council Presidency grants individual member states significant influence on setting a European level agenda. Until the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 2009, the presiding country chaired both the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Since then the European Council has a full-time, longer-term President (so far in the person of Herman van Rompuy and Donald Tusk) and the between member states rotating EU presidency remains in charge for the Council of Ministers (Council from here on).

After introducing regular meetings of the highest national decision-makers on the European level in 1975, Council meetings became "the president's show" (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace 2006, 178). The presidency itself was first established in 1957 in the Treaty of Rome, which stipulates that the "office of President shall be held for a term of six months by each member of the Council in turn". Since then, Council meetings have become more frequent and the Council's position in the EU's institutional framework has solidified. The Council system has emerged as the "new center of political gravity in European Union (EU) policy-making" throughout that process (Puetter 2014, 68). Particularly when guided by a strong president, the Council acts as the pace-maker in EU policy-making (Puetter 2014, 69-70).

Given this extraordinary role for an individual country in the EU's institutional framework, the evaluation of the rotating presidency's actual power has given reason for scholarly debate. On the one hand, it is the presiding country's specific task to manage the agenda which does offer quite a bit of leverage: The presidency can propose initiatives, define the inclusion of issues, structure the agenda, moderate discussions and allocate time, and organize informal and special meetings besides other administrative tasks (Alexandrova & Timmermans 2013, 320; Thomson 2008, 594). This "procedural control" (Tallberg 2003) allows structuring the agenda in a favorable way, including preferred issues but also excluding issues that might turn out more contested or against which the presidency is opposed. On the other hand, the Council secretariat handbook strictly states that "the presidency must, by definition, be neutral and impartial". Norms, domestic and institutional factors limit the presidency's leeway: The presiding country always has to trade-off agenda-setting potential with the norm of being neutral and impartial and the aim of reaching outcomes the other member states are willing to accept and to converge to. Limited agenda-setting power can also depend on broader consensus building or effectiveness considerations (Niemann & Mak 2010), domestic political conditions (Kirchner 1992; Bunse 2009) or constraints imposed by previous meetings (path dependency), focusing events, and the brevity of the term (Bunse 2009; Thomson 2008).

While Jean-Louis Dewost, most famously, describes the office as "responsabilité sans pouvoir" (1984, 31 in Tallberg 2003, 19), more recent accounts paint a more diverse picture: Thomson (2008) and Alexandrova and Timmermans' (2013) results suggest that while limitations exist the institutional advantages of the presidency prevail. The presidency allows member states to influence the Council agenda (Alexandrova & Timmermans 2013, 330). Also the long-standing debates around the reform of the presidency (Warntjen 2007, 1135) confirm the strong role it had previously offered to the presiding country. Small and medium sized states strongly objected losing part of the influence the presidency promises as the established most egalitarian

institutional arrangement in the EU (Bunse 2009) when the “trio presidency” in 2007 and the permanent presidency in 2009” (Carammia et al. 2016, 811) were introduced.

The National Aspect of the Council Presidency. The Council presidency gives the presiding member state the unique opportunity to influence the agenda for the 28 member states of the European Union in its favor. With deepening European integration and the resulting increase of issues on the agenda, setting political priorities has grown in importance. The sheer number of potential topics on the agenda makes “tough priorities necessary” (Elgström 2003, 6), which makes the role of the president increasingly important and influential. The Council presidency became more and more of a “power platform” (Tallberg 2008): *“The rotating presidency has evolved to meet growing functional demands for agenda management, brokering compromise efficiently, and representing the Union to the outside world. Even more, by rotating equally, the presidency diffuses power and provides each country ‘a privileged opportunity to influence the outcomes’”* (Lewis 2012, 328; Tallberg 2006, 222).

In setting the agenda, the presidency is supposed to come up with proposals that are “yesable” to all member states, while at the same time, the presidency is seen as the chance to promote national interests by many actors of the domestic arena (Elgström 2003, 1): “this is the time, they hope, when due attention will be given to the specific national needs and concerns of the country at the helm”. Also in interinstitutional relations for EU level agenda-setting and decision-making, the presidency can play a “first among equals” role. In cases where the commission has the “monopoly on policy initiation” (Tallberg 2006, 85), the presiding country can benefit from its closer cooperation with the Commission. According to an interviewed Commission official, all member states can lobby the Commission but “there is a special relation to the presidency”, since the presidency’s support is important for the Commission’s achievement of their own goals (Tallberg 2006, 85).

As a result, national preparations for the presidency play an important role. Concluding case studies of individual Council presidencies, Elgström and Tallberg (2003, 192) argue: *“all country chapters testify that Presidency priorities are the product of a long and careful process of interest aggregation at the national level. Whereas interest aggregation is an everyday element of the national political process in the member states, involving competing domestic interest coalitions, the prospect of the Presidency presents governments with an additional incentive and opportunity to canvass domestic interests”*. To prepare for their political program while holding the presidency and during the presidency itself, the presiding country must rally domestic support. The priorities the presiding member state sets at home can act as a proxy for what it aims to push through also at the European level. A “long preparatory process at the national level, where government ministries and agencies canvass domestic interests, identify ongoing European policy processes, develop action plans, and issue priority papers”(Tallberg 2006, 84) define the president’s role in Council negotiations. For this process it not only requires domestic majorities for given policy issues but also the respective administrative capacities. Without the respective capacities or will to push through a nationally defined agenda in an attempt to find compromise for a common European path, there is no need to try to influence the European agenda. Societal demands and administrative capacity also influence the salience attached to any issue (Leuffen et al. 2014, 629) and the resulting decision on how to stand in for the issue on the European level.

All policy-making processes in the Council depend heavily on nation states preferences and domestic contexts. According to Lewis (2012, 321) the Council is a “mixed-motive setting” since it allows to “safeguard national interests (however narrow or rooted in ‘special circumstances’)” and provides a “collective legitimation process” for EU outputs.

Besides the strong national influences on the presidency, also the outputs of the presidency are national. Since the Council plays a major role in EU level decision-making, coordinating member states policies and negotiating and adopting EU laws in 'codecision' procedure, Council outputs have a direct effect on the Europeanization of member states agendas. Moreover, the Council meetings institutionalized regular meetings of the 'club' of the 28 sovereign member states, therefore potentially not only influencing European legislation that is later transposed into national law but also member states policy agendas more broadly. The question whether the country chairing the process can therefore influence a common European agenda given it plays its role "right" is the next analytical step.

As the EU's "political executive" (Carammia et al. 2016, 809), the Council Presidency offers the presiding country the task and potential to take a stance on the European level. Yet, the national context and intergovernmental decision-making between sovereign states defines the president's role that in turn influences the national feedback to the decisions made. This bargaining process requires further analysis.

Bargaining in the Council Presidency. Decision-making in the EU and particularly in the Council is characterized by "intensive negotiations and compromises" (Schalk et al. 2007, 230). Since "holding the Presidency automatically places a country at the center of EU negotiation processes" (Elgström 2003, 2) and "the EU's Council system is designed to represent national interests and make joint decisions." (Lewis 2012, 321), I evaluate the president's role choice along the lines of rational choice-based bargaining theory.

Tallberg (2003; 2004; 2006) is the strongest advocate of a rational choice institutionalism approach, having provided a theory of leadership in international organizations with application to the Council presidency. His basic underlying assumption is that formal leaders are "opportunistic actors who will seek to take advantage of the chairmanship in order to favor their own

interests in the bargaining process” (Tallberg 2006, 31). The anticipated agenda management, brokerage and representation role becomes possible because the presiding country holds procedural control mechanisms and informational advantages: the presidency receives support through the Council secretariat but most importantly it owns knowledge about the other member states’ preferences and acceptable solutions (the so called confessionals) (Thomson 2008, 597). The additional information available to the presidency about preferences, proposals, and procedures is “political hard currency, as is the power to control the process and format of the negotiations” (Tallberg 2006, 32). Using the presidency’s resources consciously, the president can “steer negotiations away from their worst alternative and towards their preferred outcome” (Tallberg 2004, 1019; see also Schalk et al. 2007, 233).

Tallberg’s theory conceives of the formal institutional environment as an intervening factor that conditions “when, where, and how negotiation chairs exert influences over outcomes” (Tallberg 2006, 5). With the focus on national in- and outputs, I add extra-institutional conditions to the story of the Council presidency, taking Tallberg’s argument about intergovernmental decision-making a step further and anchoring it in the realm of multilevel governance that characterizes decision-making in Europe.

The presiding country would only put more weight on an issue in its presidency half year if (1) a topic has high salience for a country and/or (2) the presiding country’s national representatives expect agreement with the other members to be possible. For reasons of the above presented connection between the national context and the intergovernmental negotiations in the Council as well as the informational advantage, the shifting of national agenda shares can act as a proxy for the outcome of these considerations. The national decision-makers in the president’s role would not put strongly deviating topics on the agenda in the presidency year unless it is of absolute crucial importance to them.

Countries that alter their agenda for their presidency term in a way that increases the differences between their own and other members' agenda further act as a pioneer. They push their own agenda, trying to move the Union into a new direction that their country favors. The extremity of the president's policy position compared to those of the other members affects the likelihood of adopting a proposal given the brevity of term (Thomson 2008, 598). As rational actors, the national representatives in the president's role take into account which outcome would be desirable and how likely or easily they can sell the proposed outcomes to the other members in the intergovernmental negotiations.

Here a particularity of the Council presidency comes into play: The original intention behind the establishment of the presidency was to enable compromise on a common European path between the sovereign members in an intergovernmental negotiation environment that moves European integration forward. Additionally, it was established in line with the principle of the members' equal say and therefore defined by strong norms of impartiality for the acting president. The acting president must therefore take other members' expectations, preferences and domestic contexts into account. As an agenda-setter in an increasingly multi-issue environment, the presiding country might also have to trade off issues for concessions in other fields. Furthermore, the "Europeanization" of an issue can be costly and require sufficient national capacity that not all members are capable or willing to put up. If a topic therefore does not have overarching importance for the presiding country the other factors may move its position closer to the European status quo on the issue. In this case, I expect the president to adjust its policy agenda towards the other members and act more like a mediator in the respective policy area. The choice for either of these roles depends on the presiding country's expected utility calculations of setting a topic on the agenda and entails assumptions about other members' willingness to follow their lead both in the negotiations and later at home.

Role Choice and the Potential of Assimilation. To better understand the different presidential role choices and their consequences for the potential of agenda convergence in Europe, I adapt Braun and Gilardi's (2006) expected utility model for policy change for its application on role choice in the Council Presidency. I define the utility the presiding country assigns to a policy agenda change based on the policy's importance and the expected likelihood of agreement in the Council.

National decision-makers responsible for carrying out the Council Presidency attribute a certain utility U_i to setting a topic on the European Agenda. This utility of having a policy option $_i$ on the agenda is a function of the expected acceptance A_i and assigned policy importance P_i . A_i is crucial for surmounting majority requirements and facilitated by the presidency's informational advantage about other members' preferences. Both factors are weighted by the relative importance the presidency assigns to their own ideal point $(1-w)$ vis-à-vis other members' acceptance (w) . Given what we know about the Council presidency, the weight depends on the importance the presidency attributes to the norm of impartiality and the common European path ahead. U_i then defines the payoffs associated with having a topic on the European agenda.

In Braun and Gillardi's framework, the expected utility EU is a function of the above defined payoffs and the effectiveness of a policy. This effectiveness m is the likelihood that agenda convergence takes place in the European context, that decisions made on the European level are transposed at the national level. Only in this case, the presiding country can expect actual advantages of setting a topic on the European agenda, as theoretically outlined above. Besides the idea of creating lasting peace in Europe, the common market originated in the idea of creating mutual advantages of the collaboration of sovereign nation states. Only when the convergence of policy (agendas) across EU member states leads to shared benefits, will sovereign nation states surrender some of their sovereignty in policy-making and agenda-setting.

The presiding member state thus compares the expected utility of the status quo (SQ) with the re-allocation of policy attention on the agenda. A country's representatives decide to pioneer in a given policy field when the expected utility of change (j) is greater than that of the SQ (i) (Braun & Gilardi 2006, 302).

The alternative policy is j with n being the measure of convergence probability.

$$U_i = wA_i + (1 - w)P_i; \quad EU(i) = EU(SQ) = mU_i; \quad EU(j) = EU(change) = nU_j$$

The expected utility of change is furthermore influenced by transaction costs C , which are defined by domestic and European context variables, and the "uncertainty of the process" – in Braun and Gilardi's terms (2006, 302): "*ceteris paribus*, the more the reform process is likely to fail (...), the lower the expected utility of change". Expressed in probabilities, the topic is thus set on the agenda with probability p while the SQ remains with probability $(1-p)$. The domestic context variables and controls for external events, both limiting the president's ability to negotiate only according to the "external" bargaining considerations defined above, are introduced with their hypothesized effects in more detail below.

Subsuming all introduced factors, the expected utility of change is given by:

$$EU(change) = pnU_j + (1 - p)mU_i - C$$

The presidency thus brings a topic on the agenda when $EU(change) > EU(SQ)$:

$$pnU_j + (1 - p)mU_i - C > mU_i$$

$$U_i \frac{nU_j}{U_i - m} > \frac{C}{p}$$

In the end, the relative expected utility needs to surmount the cost divided by the probability that the topic successfully makes it on the agenda. The presidency decides to force a topic on

the agenda when the effectiveness – the likelihood for convergence of policy agendas across Europe – of the SQ drops, the effectiveness of change increases, and $U_j > U_i$. If this is the case, the presidency might even decide to put a topic on the agenda if costs are high and the likelihood of change is low. Another constellation in which change is possible is when the effectiveness of both the old and new agenda constellations are high and $U_j > U_i$. Change is also possible yet more unlikely if the effectiveness of the new agenda constellation is small. In this case, U_j needs to be much bigger than U_i or the old effectiveness m needs to be particularly low to compensate for the small n . All options that make change possible are thus somehow influenced by the perceived potential for the convergence of policy agendas

What this model tells us is that the salience attached to a given policy issue and the expectation about other members agreement go hand in hand with the expected effectiveness of setting a topic on the European agenda in the sense of convergence. I thus hypothesize that the *more comparative salience the presiding country assigns to a topic, the more likely will it act as a pioneer, which reduces subsequent chances of agenda convergence across Europe*. On the other hand, I claim that *the stronger the prevailing differences between the presiding and the other member's agendas are, the more likely will it act as mediator, which makes agenda convergence across Europe more likely*.

Deriving Country-Specific Expectations. The above defined expected utility calculations can only work successfully if domestic conditions allow the national representatives in the presidency to choose their role dependent on the “external” bargaining considerations of salience and expected acceptance. National context variables strongly influence bargaining considerations and role choice since they define not only the capacities but also the unity of the country in charge at the European level. They either have an amplifying or counteracting effect to the

other bargaining considerations and are included in the utility calculations as additional transaction costs. This particularly concerns a country's size, economic strength and trade dependence, as well as political unity.

First, it is generally accepted that small and large states play different roles at the European level and have different resources to draw from. As Bunse (2009, 19) argues, the rotating presidency used to be "the most far-reaching mechanism in guarding equality between the EU's 'big and small'". The 6 months rotation system had offered any state the same potential to influence the agenda. Smaller states might thus take the most advantage from their strong role and take the chance more likely than bigger states even with the same "external" bargaining considerations. They can gain a disproportionately bigger increase in influence through their exposed position in the presidency and achieve goals which would otherwise be impossible to administer. Bigger states who can also influence the agenda at other times would instead be more likely to make concessions when holding the chair (Elgström 2003, 49-50). Yet, two factors also present the smaller states with more difficulty in playing a strong role: administrative capacities and different preference- and power-distributions. As Leuffen, Malang and Wörle (2014) find, administrative capacity even influences salience. Given that the presidency's fundamental idea is defined by providing equal say to the Union's members and small states fought for its institutional survival (Warntjen 2007, 1135; Bunse 2009), I expect smaller states to be more likely to use the presidency to push their own agenda in choosing a pioneering role than bigger states.

Secondly, the economic strength or weakness of the respective presiding country is relevant for their role choice. Economic strength facilitates playing a strong role when owning potential agenda-setting power. Pushing forward a provocative hypothesis, economically stronger countries also generally seem to have a bigger say in EU politics. Less economically advantaged

states sometimes lack the resources to push their personal agenda (see for example Bunse 2009) while an economic heavyweight often also becomes a political heavyweight. However, this can also work in the opposite direction: just like big states, economic heavyweights might not require the tools of the presidency to push their own agenda. For the decision which role to play in the presidency, a country's dependence on trade can also play a relevant role. Considering the importance assigned to the norm of impartiality and to finding compromise and concessions when holding the presidency, countries that are heavily dependent on trade will be more reluctant to act as a pioneer. I thus hypothesize that economically stronger countries are more likely to act as pioneer. Dependence on trade, on the other hand, increases the likelihood for choosing a mediating role.

Lastly, and this considers politics on the member state level, member states with more or less clear majorities and strong governments may choose different roles when presiding the Council. For a strong Council Presidency, the presiding country needs to act as a unitary actor when trying to push for significant change. This is more likely in cases of clear majorities and more difficult for coalition governments. Furthermore, the proximity to an election can give different incentives for representation on the European level. I claim that the stronger the domestic political agreement, the more likely will a country play a leadership role.

The above introduced political and economic circumstances should greatly affect member states' potential to enact the president's role. In addition to country-specific characteristics, existing research emphasizes that particular European circumstances and strong focusing events on either level influence presidencies and limit or magnify countries' leverage (Alexandrova & Timmermans 2013, 322). As a result, we have to take factors that unexpectedly (or at least previously underestimated) influence Europe as a whole or the domestic context and therefore the president's leverage for nationally-influenced agenda-setting into account.

Summarizing the existing literature and derivable expectations for a country's role choice when presiding the Council, I claim that dependent on effectiveness considerations, context and country characteristics and their combination, the two different role choices have distinct future consequences for the convergence of policy agendas across Europe. Per definition, the pioneer tries to move Europe's agenda into a direction that is closer to its own. Convergence is harder to achieve in those cases. When deciding to act as a mediator, on the other hand, the presiding country moves the agenda into a direction that is acceptable to many and convergence is more easily achievable.

ii. Research Design and Methods

To evaluate my claim about the national inputs to and outputs of the presidency's role choice, I combine data from the Comparative Agendas Data project for a comparative study of agenda-setting and -convergence in Europe. Aiming to provide a better understanding of public policy-making over time, Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner originally established the data collection project for the American context in the 1990s. Today, the Comparative Agendas Project offers comparable, longitudinal data on legislation for a multitude of countries. Using a shared, backwards compatible codebook of 19 major and more than 200 minor topics codes, country experts code individual laws into policy areas. Their combined endeavor offers a unique insight into the development of policy agendas. For reasons of data availability and geographical spread I run the following analysis on legislative data from Germany, Italy, Denmark, France, Belgium, Spain, as well as the Netherlands and the UK. I use the time span of 1988-2008 to cover a sufficiently long time period influenced by the major steps of deepening European integration however not yet influenced by the Treaty of Lisbon reforming the Council Presidency. For this time frame, the eight selected countries provide the most consistent information. They include both founding and early accession members, driving forces for integration as well as

countries that negotiated differentiated integration, and more and less EU supportive countries.

The resulting dataset for analysis is on a country-year-topic level for 8 countries, 20 years, and 19 policy areas. This results in a sample size of 3,184 observations. All countries held the presidency at least twice if not three times in the given time period. For the analysis of role choice and the resulting focus on the presidency cases, the sample size is 392. Using the relative share of one to all other topics in a given year and country has the advantage of including national differences in policy-making such as the adoption of many small instead of one large reform.

In accordance with the theoretical framework, the empirical analysis proceeds in two steps: First, it examines how expected utility considerations and domestic conditions as controls influence role choice. The second analytical step moves the analysis to a different time period, shifting from the examined change to the presidency year to the time after the presidency. The goal here is to examine whether country's role choice in fact leads to convergence of policy agendas across Europe in the aftermath of the presidency. While convergence considerations are implicitly part of the presidency's role choice through the expected agreement measurement of previous levels of deviation, the actual occurrence of the same in the future is an interesting further analytical step.

For the first analysis, I consider the temporal change from $t-1$ to t to define the president's role choice. The dependent variable role choice is operationalized as the absolute difference of the presiding country's percentage of laws on a topic in a given year compared to the mean across all other countries but the presidency. In subtracting the same value of the previous year, I receive values above 0 for all cases of further deviation from the mean and values below 0 for

assimilation to the mean. This value is then coded as a dummy variable for mediator and pioneer role choice. Although results are similar if using the variable as a continuum, the actual decision to move in one or the other direction is the focus here.

The main independent variable is the Earth Mover's Distance (EMD) from one country to all others. Lupu, Selios, and Warner in a recent *Political Analysis* article introduce the EMD as a new measurement for distance. In their case of analyzing representational ties by examining mass-elite congruence, they find that the EMD measure borrowed from the computer sciences provides better estimates for all replications of existing accounts (Lupu et al. 2017). I apply the measurement to the definition of distance between policy-area specific attention shifts in the presiding country compared to all others. Previously, two measures of distances had dominated in political science: (1) the difference between means (see for example Budge & McDonald 2007, Powell 2000), and (2) the overlap between cumulative distribution functions (Golder & Stramski 2010). The EMD measure's major advantages are the possibility of calculating pairwise distances between all data points retaining relevant information, and the avoidance of ignoring local maxima and information from the distribution's tails (Lupu et al. 2017, 103). It also facilitates multidimensional approaches. Measuring Euclidean distances, larger EMD values indicate "greater distance, less similarity, and less congruence" (Lupu et al. 2017, 101). In the case of comparing the president to the other member states, congruence corresponds to agenda similarity and higher EMD values therefore imply bigger differences between the president's attention to a policy issue and the others'. I include the EMD measure both for the current year t and the preceding year $t-1$ to examine the comparative salience assigned to each policy area in the presidency year and the previously prevailing agenda differences from other members.

I then combine the legislative data on the share of attention on different issues in a given year and country with data from the OECD, the Penn World Tables (Feenstra et al. 2013), ParlGov database (Döring & Manow 2016), and the European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook (Armingeon et al. 2016, Comparative Political Data Set) to include the above outlined domestic conditions. The main variables are size measured in population numbers, economic strength defined by real GDP and openness to trade, and participation in the Economic and Monetary Union. The political variables include different types of coalition governments versus single party governments, ideological constitutions of the acting governments (left-wing – balanced – right-wing), percentage seat support for the government, and an election year dummy to express domestic majorities and unity. Additional control variables for external events include time and country (presidency-) fixed effects.

Since I am interested in the effect of agenda differences and domestic variables on the dummy dependent variable role choice, I apply a generalized linear logit model from the binomial family in the first analysis. I expect the comparative salience attached to a topic to positively and the prevailing agenda differences as a proxy for expected (dis-)agreement to negatively influence the presiding country's decision to act as a pioneer. A country will be more likely to push its own agenda on the European level if it is small in size, economically strong but less dependent on trade, and domestically unified.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{logit}(\pi) = \log\left(\frac{\pi}{1-\pi}\right) = & \beta_0 + \beta_{\text{salience}[EMDt]} + \beta_{\text{agendadifference}[EMDt-1]} \\ & + \beta_{\text{size}} + \beta_{\text{emu}} + \beta_{\text{gdp}} + \beta_{\text{trade}} + \beta_{\text{coalition}} + \beta_{\text{support}} + \beta_{\text{party}} + \beta_{\text{election}} \end{aligned}$$

The second stage analyzes the influence of role choice on changing distances between domestic agendas following the presidency. Here, the dependent variable is the Earth Mover's Distance from one country to all others per topic and year, but calculated as the change in agenda distance from year t to the subsequent year $t+1$. As a result, I measure each country's level of

convergence to all others in the sample. With this unit of analysis, the presiding country's assumption about the other country's agreement and potential convergence to its proposed position can be examined on a country basis.

Two main independent factor variables for role choice are used: First, the mediator and pioneer category are compared to cases where the country does not hold the presidency, leading to higher numbers of observations. Second, role choice is defined more strictly since a 2% change in the presidency year needs to be evaluated differently than a 20% change, for example. According to the distribution of the data (find the histogram in Figure 6 of the Appendix), the cut-off for change is at 5% in both directions to account for the majority of countries remaining close to the status quo. Below $\pm 5\%$ defines the mediator and pioneer roles respectively. I thus measure the influence of different role choice on converging national agendas compared to, first, non-presidency and, second, years when the president only marginally changed its position in one or the other direction. Small changes do not exemplify role choice and its consequences in the same way bigger changes do. Not only does the additional specification take into account that more extreme pioneering compared to other policy areas and presidencies might play a role for the likelihood of convergence in the subsequent year but it also extracts instances of changing national policy-making that might not be profound enough to play a role at the European level.

Overall, it is important to remember that both analysis rest on the assumption of comparative change to the presidency year between the presiding and all other countries for role choice and from each country to every other for convergence in response to the presidency. I therefore additionally include bilateral agenda distances fixed effects (interacted with the presidency dummy) to control for the influence bilateral relations might have for the convergence analysis.

An ordinary least square linear regression model matches the data best. Due to the three-dimensional time-series-cross sectional nature of the dataset, any particular standard errors require caution. For robustness checks, I calculate the main model with two-way clustered standard errors: I first collapse year and topic variables in order to allow for common attentional shifts and secondly topic and country variables to recognize particularities in issue attention. Both specifications do not alter the main model's results.

$$Y_{EMDchange} = \beta_{rolechoicefactor} + [\beta_{FE}] + \epsilon$$

iii. Descriptives: The Effect of the Council Presidency

The descriptive portrayal of Part I's dependent variable before its dummy-coding gives an interesting perspective on the difference between presidency and non-presidency years and shows the empirical puzzle for this paper. Although highly aggregated across all policy issues and time periods, Figure 1 shows that all examined countries re-allocate their policy attention for their presidency:




Figure 1: Assimilation Tendencies during the Council Presidency

Holding the presidency influences the deviation of the presiding country's policy attention to the member states' mean. While with this perspective Belgium and Germany seem to move their agenda focus closer to the mean during their presidencies, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the UK seem to diverge more and to a much greater extent. The last three countries deviate the strongest during their presidency²⁰. Interestingly, both Denmark and the UK often stand out in the EU context due to their attainment of differentiated integration in some policy areas. Observing the pattern across topics (see Figure 1b in the Appendix) indicates that major "European topics" show the effect of the presidency best. The attention shifts to macroeconomic issues indicate the strongest divergence, followed by law, international affairs, government and finance- and commerce policies.

Further reducing the level of aggregation and looking at the attention shifts on individual topics during the presidencies, it becomes obvious that macroeconomic issues are the most affected (Figure 5 in the Appendix). As a result of this observation, the following Figure 2 focuses on the changing policy attention on macroeconomic issues to illustrate the empirical puzzle in more detail. The average attention on macroeconomic issues of all countries but the presiding member state mostly moves between 8% and 16%. The red dots are the individual data points for the sample's eight countries. The blue dots for the presiding country stand out at first view. In many cases, they are the most extreme data points. The connecting line illustrates their development:

²⁰ Denmark and the UK are the only countries that reach a significance level of $p < 0.005$ due to the extreme difference between presidency and non-presidency years even across topics and time. This level of aggregation needs to be reduced for the empirical analysis due to the otherwise low number of cases (2-3 presidency values per country if aggregated across all dimensions) and theoretically expected different behavior across policy issues and time.




Figure 2: Average Attention for Macroeconomic Issues and the Presidency Effect

When portraying the presiding countries' change in attention on macroeconomic policy issues from the previous to the presidency year relative to the red mean line in the second part of Figure 2, a different aspect of this development comes to light. The blue triangles represent the president's attention on macroeconomic issues in year $t-1$ and the blue dots for year t . Additionally, the country marked black dots illustrate the dependent variable of the presidency's deviation from the mean in year $t-1$ to year t . Here we observe that most presidents deviate

stronger from the mean in their presidency year than before but to differing extents. It becomes clear for all, however, that macroeconomic issues play a comparatively bigger role during presidency years. This finding is in line with the general importance economic issues have for the European Union. A couple of examples illustrate the picture further: the biggest change – contrary to the general development in the other member states – occurred during the UK’s presidency in 2005, when macroeconomic policy attention increased from about 14%, which was already well above the mean in the respective year, to 29%. Remaining with the UK’s example we find another comparative increase in attention in its presidency in 1992 and an economically more neutral role in 1998. For many of the other cases, such as Germany, we find a more balanced picture. While Germany deviated from the mean in its presidency in 1999, it assimilated for its 1988 and 2007 presidencies. For the three years, for which both presidencies are included, we always find one presidency to take a more extreme stance. This observation indicates that not particularities of any given year lead to the more extreme results but that the presidency’s agenda-setting plays a role.

We can draw three major lessons from this first descriptive view on the empirical puzzle: First of all, countries change their policy agenda for their presidency. Secondly, policy attention is distributed differently across topics and time which re-emphasizes the need to examine relative shares of attention on different policy issues without aggregation. This approach has the additional advantage that it automatically controls for legislative particularities in the individual countries: whether countries prefer to adopt multiple small laws or one major reform does not distort findings in this set-up. Finally, third, countries differ with respect to the role they choose for their presidency: some countries play a more pioneering or mediating role overall, others play different roles in different topics depending on the topics’ relevance in the given time frame. To be able to incorporate all policy-area specific comparative changes across all countries into one model, we now move into the empirical analysis:

iv. **Empirical Analysis: A Two Step Process**

Empirical Analysis Part I: Explaining Role Choice

In the first part of the empirical analysis I examine the presiding country's role choice. I ask: what makes a country more likely to act as a pioneer? The logit binomial model provides explanations for the president's choice, strongly emphasizing the agenda differences between the presiding and the other members in the respective policy area and given year.

Table 1: Part I – Explaining Role Choice

GLM – Logit Binomial Model	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Pioneer – Mediator Dummy		
	(1) Saliency	(2) Expected Agreement	(3) Combined
Saliency [EMD(t)]	42.63*** (6.53)		132.27*** (14.77)
Agenda Difference [EMD(t-1)]		-15.87*** (4.31)	-114.06*** (13.98)
Population(log)	-0.74** (0.29)	-0.80*** (0.27)	-1.07*** (0.38)
EMU	0.44 (0.39)	0.46 (0.37)	0.81 (0.50)
Trade	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)
Real GDP	0.02 (0.11)	-0.002 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.15)
Coalition(minimal)	0.45 (0.32)	0.33 (0.30)	0.01 (0.40)
Coalition(surplus)	0.21 (0.43)	0.20 (0.41)	-0.26 (0.55)
Government Support	0.03* (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)
Party(balanced)	-0.33 (0.32)	-0.40 (0.30)	-0.56 (0.39)
Party(leftwing)	0.05 (0.34)	0.16 (0.32)	0.45 (0.44)
Election Year(dummy)	0.13 (0.40)	0.28 (0.37)	0.13 (0.52)
Constant	5.43* (2.91)	8.17*** (2.79)	10.15*** (3.76)

Observations	392	392	392
Log Likelihood	-229.63	-255.79	-155.79
Akaike Inf. Crit.	483.26	535.59	337.57
<i>Note:</i>			*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

The positive EMD value at time t , signifying less congruence – growing deviation – between the presiding and other countries’ agenda shares with increasing values, indicates that strong differences in policy attention on a given issue increase the likelihood for choosing the pioneer role. The comparative salience assigned to a topic in the presidency year is important: when the presiding country puts comparatively high attentional focus on an issue in the presidency year domestically, it is more likely to act as a pioneer. As portrayed in the average effects plots in Figure 3, an agenda difference above 0.1 makes a pioneering role choice extremely likely, if surpassing 0.2 the likelihood is approximating 100%.

By the same token, the EMD distance in the preceding year $t-1$ has a negative significant effect. Stronger agenda deviation in the previous year makes a pioneering role choice less likely. While also low EMD values already show decreasing likelihood for pioneer role choice, a value of above 0.15 moves the likelihood to act as pioneer towards zero. This development indicates that presiding countries that are aware of prevailing large differences in policy agendas are more reluctant to choose a strong pioneering role and are instead more likely to act as a mediator. The theoretically outlined willingness to compromise to find agreement in the Council and the assigned value to the norm of impartiality comes into play here. With both utility considerations included in one model (3), the individually observed effects of assigned salience in the presidency year and expected disagreement because of previously existing large differences grow stronger in the expected direction.

Of the control variables, the country's size measured by its population figures has a significant effect. Bigger countries are less likely to choose a pioneering role. When reliant on trade, countries also choose a pioneering role less often. Lastly, the data confirms the expected requirement of domestic political unity for change in the Council when measured as the percentage of seats supporting the government. This is the most "numerical" measure for a government's decision-making ability. All other variables such as coalition compared to single party governments, the ideological composition of the government or an upcoming election do not play a significant role. Real GDP also remains insignificant when entered individually. Pure economic strength is thus not as decisive for role choice but rather economic ties through trade. The agenda differences in fact turned out to be the most significant, strongest predictor for role choice. Controlling for external focusing events and their limiting power to the president's leeway to set the agenda with year, country, and presidency fixed effects (see Table 1b in the Appendix) confirms the importance of agenda differences and domestic unity for role choice. All other variables remain insignificant.




Figure 3: Average Effects of Main Explanatory Variables

Empirical Analysis Part II: Explaining Agenda Convergence through Role Choice

The consequential second part of the analysis, examining how the chosen role affects the likelihood of domestic agenda convergence, offers a clear picture. Measured in the Earth Mover’s Distance change from the presidency year t to the following year t+1 between all individual countries, the deviation of countries’ policy attention on the different issues is significantly influenced by the president’s role choice. When the president chooses a mediating role, the other members’ agendas converge. On the other hand, the deviation between the individual agenda shares will increase across countries when the president acts as a pioneer.

Compared to a presidency that remains close to the status quo within a 5% bound, a strongly pioneering president increases agenda distances by 0.04 while a mediating president decreases distances by 0.02. The underlying EMD change dependent variable ranges on an effective scale from a minimum of -0.2 (assimilation) to a maximum of 0.19 (deviation) with a mean of 0.




Figure 4: Explaining Agenda Convergence with Role Choice

Both the coding of the main independent variable role choice as 0 for no presidency years in Models 1 and 2 and the stricter definition of roles that defines cases in which countries change their policy attention within a 5% bound for their presidency as 0 yield the same results in Models 3 and 4. The first two models use the full sample of 3184 observations and thus show smaller but still highly significant patterns of the same effect: a mediating role decreases while

a pioneering role increases the domestic agenda distances between the examined member states following the respective presidency. Clustered standard errors do not affect the results. When additionally including the individual country differences for cases of holding the presidency, the explanatory power increases and the role choice variable's patterns remain stable. Bilateral agreement particularly plays a role in cases that include Germany, Denmark, or the Netherlands.

Table 2: Part II – Explaining Agenda Convergence with Role Choice

OLS Models	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	EMD Change (t- (t+1))			
	0 – No Presidency		0 – Status Quo in Presidency	
Mediator	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.022*** (0.006)	-0.024*** (0.006)
Pioneer	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.0001 (0.004)	0.041*** (0.005)	0.033*** (0.006)
presidency		0.008* (0.004)		
		Bilateral Distance*Presi- dency		Bilateral Distance FE
Constant	0.0001 (0.001)	-0.014*** (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.010*** (0.003)
Observations	3,184	3,184	391	391
R ²	0.012	0.133	0.155	0.310
Adjusted R ²	0.012	0.117	0.150	0.252
Residual Std. Er- ror	0.027 (df = 3181)	0.025 (df = 3124)	0.027 (df = 388)	0.025 (df = 360)
F Statistic	19.719***(df = 2; 3181)	8.121***(df = 59; 3124)	35.528***(df = 2; 388)	5.389***(df = 30; 360)

Note:

*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

Testing these results with several robustness checks produces the same results. An additional error correction model (Table 3 in the Appendix) also confirms the mediator's higher and the pioneer's lower potential to achieve more agenda convergence for Part II. For Part I, the ECM reinforces that the value of the previous year has a significant effect on the change value and thus role choice.

v. **Conclusion: Do the Members Choose A Common Path?**

This paper offers two main lessons: First of all, it confirms the importance of the Council Presidency and defines the domestically-rooted reasons for and national consequences of role choice. If a country is not strongly dependent on trade, domestically unified, and views the presidency as its chance to take a stance at the European level, it chooses to act as a pioneer when an issue entails sufficient comparative salience. If it became clear previously that reaching an agreement in the Council would be difficult due to large existing agenda differences between the national agendas, the presiding country is less likely to choose a pioneering role.

The second analytical step, testing the assumption that role choice would affect the likelihood for domestic agenda convergence, shows that after a mediating presidency the agenda differences between the different members' agenda shares on the respective issue decrease. Acting as a mediator makes the subsequent convergence of the individual domestic agendas more likely. After a pioneering presidency, instead, the agenda differences between the member states increase in any given policy area. One explanation for the increasing agenda differences between all countries after a pioneering presidency is that some member states follow the president's lead at home, while others do not. This can concern both the timely transposition of achieved agreement in the Council or simply the effect of being part of the club of nation states in the Council where policies diffuse through the institutionalized meeting structure and the president's lead in agenda-setting.

What these findings teach us for nationally-influenced, intergovernmental agenda-setting and decision-making on the European level and its domestic consequences is that countries considerately choose how to act dependent on the (nationally-defined) expected consequences. While having to cater to their home countries' need they also want to achieve agreement in the Council and later agenda convergence to benefit from the harmonization effects within a

Union of States. The subsequent time period shows whether the other member states follow the president's lead nationally.

The Council presidency thus not only influences agenda-setting on the European level and EU intergovernmental decision-making processes between the member states but also domestic policy agenda convergence. Given that particularly smaller countries took the chance of the strong role choice, the 2009 reform might have reduced the effect and the likelihood of pioneering agenda-setting. If smaller countries however only used this opportunity because the bigger countries would do so without the help of the presidency, the Union became less equal.

This paper is certainly only a first step in finding answers to the overarching question of domestic policy agendas' convergence across the European Union's member states. Further analysis is important for understanding members' roles and willingness to join in a common path. This, in turn, will define the European project's survival.

Appendix IV




Figure 1b: Assimilation Tendencies during the Council Presidency for Different Policy Areas





Figure 5: Policy Agenda Change through the Presidency



**Figure 6: Histogram of the Dependent Variable for Part II:
Change in EMD (t –(t+1))**




Figure 4b: Explaining Agenda Convergence with Role Choice (Role Dummies)




Figure 7: Policy Attention across Policy Areas and Over Time

Table 1b: Part I with Fixed Effects Models

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Pioneer – Mediator Dummy		
	(Time FE)	(Country FE)	(Presidency FE)
Saliency [EMD(t)]	140.64*** (15.71)	135.20*** (15.09)	135.20*** (15.09)
Agenda Difference [EMD(t-1)]	-119.70*** (14.78)	-114.83*** (14.16)	-114.83*** (14.16)
Population(log)	-3.56 (5.51)	0.30 (4.21)	0.30 (4.21)
EMU	-0.16 (7.00)	0.09 (0.77)	0.09 (0.77)
Trade	-0.01 (0.20)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Real GDP	1.61 (9.13)	-0.32 (0.29)	-0.32 (0.29)
Coalition(minimal)	-1.10 (8.26)	-1.03 (0.80)	-1.03 (0.80)
Coalition(surplus)	4.47 (26.34)	-0.36 (0.72)	-0.36 (0.72)
Government Support	0.14 (0.20)	0.07** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)
Party(balanced)	-1.03 (2.78)	-0.79 (0.51)	-0.79 (0.51)
Party(leftwing)	1.22 (2.97)	1.31* (0.72)	1.31* (0.72)
Election Year(dummy)	-0.93 (5.88)	0.10 (0.66)	0.10 (0.66)
as.factor(year)1989	-3.04 (14.31)		
as.factor(year)1990	-1.96 (18.43)		
as.factor(year)1991	-3.45 (11.29)		
as.factor(year)1992	5.24 (24.28)		
as.factor(year)1993	0.33 (18.12)		
as.factor(year)1994	3.12 (14.76)		
as.factor(year)1995	0.19 (7.60)		
as.factor(year)1996	6.99 (27.23)		

as.factor(year)1997	-6.45		
	(30.59)		
as.factor(year)1998	-3.03		
	(10.06)		
as.factor(year)1999	5.50		
	(22.78)		
as.factor(year)2000	-6.68		
	(32.42)		
as.factor(year)2001	-6.85		
	(32.94)		
as.factor(year)2002-2008			
as.factor(country)Denmark	2.61		
	(2.48)		
as.factor(country)France	-1.13		
	(9.04)		
as.factor(country)Germany	-0.12		
	(10.09)		
as.factor(country)Italy	-0.33		
	(8.96)		
as.factor(country)Netherlands	1.38		
	(2.88)		
as.factor(country)Spain	-0.03		
	(7.68)		
as.factor(country)United Kingdom	-1.84		
	(8.64)		
presBE			1.84
			(8.64)
presDE			1.72
			(1.90)
presDK			4.46
			(10.18)
presES			1.81
			(1.56)
presFR			0.72
			(0.95)
presIT			1.52
			(1.17)
presNL			3.22
			(6.10)
Constant	26.29	-5.69	-7.53
	(19.76)	(36.71)	(44.88)
Observations	392	392	392
Log Likelihood	-147.84	-152.48	-152.48
Akaike Inf. Crit.	347.69	344.96	344.96
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3: Robustness Check – Error Correction Model

OLS Error Correction Model	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	EMD Change (t – (t-1)) (Part I)	EMD Change (t – (t+1)) (Part II)
Earth Mover’s Distance (t-1)	-0.471*** (0.015)	
Earth Mover’s Distance (t)		0.368*** (0.057)
Mediator		-0.023*** (0.006)
Pioneer		0.011* (0.007)
Constant	0.018*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.002)
Observations	3,184	391
R ²	0.235	0.237
Adjusted R ²	0.235	0.231
Residual Std. Error	0.023 (df = 3182)	0.026 (df = 387)
F Statistic	979.895*** (df = 1; 3182)	40.000*** (df = 3; 387)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

CHAPTER V:

Conclusion:

An Outlook on (Consequences of) the European Project

V. Conclusion: An Outlook on (Consequences of) the European Project

Three paper chapters have dealt with one overarching question of interest: What are the domestic policy consequences of the European project? – for the individual member state, its citizens, and the group of member states as a whole. The domestic policy consequences have gained increasing importance in the context of the “Europe of Results” debate. The actual change the multilevel framework induces only becomes obvious when applying a broad perspective to the change in outputs of the continuously strong, sovereign nation states.

I therefore extend Hix and Hoyland’s key assumption that the “EU is a political system” to the European project as a whole: “because of this, political science has a lot to teach us” about the multilevel system of actors and processes interacting on the different levels (Hix & Hoyland 2011, 331). By the same token, studying the European project “helps us to re-evaluate some of our general theories of how politics works” (Hix & Hoyland 2011, 331). The larger goal of this project is thus to define what happens in the new multilevel system of governance via its ultimate national results. This approach requires the acceptance of the division of tasks between the levels and a spotlight on the main actors making decisions: national representatives. “As in all systems, policy outcomes in the EU are the result of strategic interaction between actors.” (Hix & Hoyland 2011, 337)

Micro level theories about policy makers’ attention scarcity and agenda-setting, expected utility theory, general bargaining theory and other standard comparative politics approaches thus serve us well. Since equilibria are also “structure-induced” (Hix & Hoyland 2011, 337), however, the particular context needs to be taken into consideration. What has happened in the context of deepening European integration has never happened to sovereign national systems before.

Neither has a nation state lost competencies, nor has it been able to influence a supranational “project” with feedback effects to how it is domestically influenced in turn. The consequences of this understanding for the broader framework, for further research, and for the European project as a whole are at the core of this final, concluding chapter. The following links the research presented in this cumulative dissertation, elaborates on further research questions, and gives a more normative outlook for the European project and the citizens, member states, and EU level institutions as its main actors.

i. **Consequences of the Three Paper’s Connection and Their Role for the “Big Picture”**

As the introductory chapter claimed, this project provides seeds for the study of the European project: On the theoretical end, it allows further understanding of the multilevel governance framework and the required perspective: The project looks into those outputs that are the most prone to change but have never been affected as profoundly from the outside before – national legislation. In its entirety, national legislation defines a country’s agenda and therefore its political preferences, issues, and all outputs a political system can offer to its citizens, the ultimate principals. Since the way the European project is structured requires European outputs to be transposed into national law, we can analyze the direct and indirect effects of Europeanization through the domestic policy consequences. Both the adaption to the new circumstances as part of a multilevel framework of governance and the actual changes the EU induces mirror in national laws. These actual changes are unique in the history of the nation state because it is the first time that countries surrender parts of their sovereignty and competencies are shifted away from the main political entity.

Due to all given particularities, Zahariadis queries whether the frameworks aimed at explaining national policy-making processes are “sufficiently robust to explain the EU pro-

cess as well”, whether “they need to be significantly altered to serve as adequate explanations”, or even must be discarded altogether and replaced by “EU-specific frameworks” (Zahariadis 2013, 813). I instead propose to use those lenses we already know for analyzing national political systems and their outputs to examine the complexity of the European inputs and outputs through national legislation. In the end, it is the domestic level that really counts. From simple policy decisions to the survival of the European project, which also strongly depends on citizens’ benevolence and resulting voting behavior, the member states have the last word. Their policy outputs thus mirror the European project. The comparative politics approach that all papers share is a strong contribution of this project.

On the empirical side, the project’s use of complex data structures allows to take further particularities of multilevel governance and the shared competencies into account. Focusing on individual policy areas might be beneficial when trying to understand policy contents and their change. When the analytical goal is to understand the effect of the multilevel system of governance and the consequences for the member states and their citizens, however, it requires a more comprehensive perspective. The conditions for European and member state roles and the resulting consequences have already and continue to change— with differences over time, countries, and issues. As such, the complexity of data structures and analytical steps is necessary for the comprehension of the whole project. By linking the nation state and EU level both in terms of data and theory, I contribute to a deeper understanding of the European project’s characteristics and consequences.

With that approach and the acceptance of the multilevel structure and member states’ interaction at the European level, the paper chapters present insights into the neglected effects of Europeanization, the functioning of the European project’s congruence with citizens’ concerns,

and the member states' policy agendas mutual convergence. Empirically examining policy outputs, all three papers indicate that the European influence – even if decided through intergovernmental channels and yet enabled and executed by the Union – on the domestic context and for Europe's citizens is stronger and more diverse than expected:

The first paper chapter finds that European integration, by shifting policy competencies and therefore freeing attentional capacity on the domestic level, affects sovereign policy-making processes. Instead of the usually expected patterns of punctuated policy-making, more rational updating becomes possible for sovereign share of national legislation over time. The treaties that enable the shifting of policy competencies to the European level have the opposite effect on the directly EU-influenced proportion of national legislation. With an increasing number of policy areas on the European agenda, EU policy-making, mirrored in the transposed decisions in national laws, becomes increasingly punctuated. As a result, policy-making processes of both agenda shares converge. The chapter on the "Neglected Effects of Europeanization" shows that whatever happens on the European level has significant domestic consequences, directly with increasing proportions of Europeanized legislation and indirectly through the changes' effects on domestic policy-making patterns.

The chapters on a "Democratic Surplus?" and "Dynamics of Agenda Assimilation across Europe", display the strong role of national actors' interaction on the European level for the results the EU can provide for the citizens and for nation states' willingness to join in a common path: The second paper chapter finds that despite the whole democratic deficit debate concerning the European Union, the acceptance of the multilevel framework uncovers additional representational ties. National representatives, together with their colleagues from the 28 other member states, decide on which level – national or European – to deal with topics of major concern. Elaborating on the conditions that define comparative congruence with such

concerns on both levels and successful congruence of the European level, the paper's findings show that the European level can be just as congruent to citizens' concerns as the median member state given that the EU owns sufficient competencies. When the member states share common concerns, cross-national coalitions form, or an individual member state plays an institutionally defined stronger role through the Council presidency, EU-level congruency increases.

The final third paper chapter on the dynamics of agenda assimilation takes on the particular role the Council presidency offers to an individual country and examines how the role the country chooses while acting as president affects the likelihood of other countries to follow a European lead. The findings show that the president's role choice depends on the attached salience to a given policy issue and on the expectation of others' acceptance. Assuming that the presiding country only benefits from setting the agenda when the other members' domestic outputs align in its favor as policy convergence theory would tell us, the second analytical step confirms the importance of including considerations of the others' acceptance. Domestic convergence across Europe is less likely to occur if a country pushes its own agenda too much.

We thus learn that (policy-making) processes change in Europe and that both levels together represent Europe's citizens and decide which way to take ahead. The three paper chapters teach an important lesson about the nature and characteristics of the European multilevel project: the member states are crucially influenced but remain strong, sovereign actors. Their citizens maintain their representational ties to their nationally elected representatives and gain ties to the European level through the same. The European level, nevertheless, has more influences than we would have thought.

ii. Consequences for Future Research

The three preceding paper chapters prelude the third generation of studies on European integration's consequences. After the focus changed from the European level to the national level from the first to the second generation studies, the third generation I propose emphasizes the interplay of the two levels. Accepting the multilevel framework and their actors' interaction on both levels will allow to better understand the European project in its entirety, the results it provides, and the members' roles and willingness to join in a common path. All three factors, in the long run, define the European project's survival. Only by incorporating both the domestic and European level as well as the influences both exert on the respective other the full consequences of Europeanization become visible.

The presented paper chapters introduce new findings on the most important consequences of European integration in the member states – the neglected influence on policy-making, policy responsiveness, and policy agenda convergence. Yet, this research can only be the start for further investigation in the topic: finding that direct effects of Europeanization have indirect consequences on sovereign policy-making, more research on the change in member states' political processes becomes necessary. Questions about how the sovereign focus shifts as a result of the re-arranged competencies and which topics benefit are the logical next step. Realizing that, when taking on multilevel representation for what it is, the European level might not be more distant from "its" citizens than the member states are, we need further research on the timing and direction of MIP concerns and legislative decisions in general and on the channels for EU congruency in particular. Another important research question in this respect would be the following: Which issues do national representatives shift to the European level for joint solution finding and how does that differ from the issues the directly elected but often as too removed criticized European Parliament takes on? Lastly, given that the results indicate that domestic policy agendas converge given certain conditions, the overarching question of

assimilating domestic policy agendas in Europe and thus the convergence of Europe's member states requires more attention.

While it is one of these paper projects' contribution to present the results across all policy areas, multiple countries and years, more qualitative or case study accounts could now add further knowledge in subsequent steps. Particularly for the approach to understanding responsiveness, they can add more content-wise information, when starting from the lessons learned here. The same is true for convergence. Policy process analysis shows the big picture and overarching effects, policy content analysis could examine the extent of agenda convergence or the proximity to citizens' concerns.

Despite the significant amount of attention the research on Europeanization has already received, "Europeanization is unlikely to be a passing fad as it relates to major developments affecting states, societies, and the European Union institutions." (Featherstone & Radaelli 2003, 331). Any related research has a broad, general relevance as a result. However, all research that contains the effects of European integration is immediately labeled as European studies, gains little attention from outside the subfield, and often also does not venture out in related subfields when looking for explanatory approaches, theories or empirics. The main risk for the research agenda is "academic isolation", as Featherstone and Radaelli argue:

"One of the main problems encountered by European integration theory has been the evolution of concepts and frameworks cut off from mainstream international relations, international political economy, and comparative politics. (...). The last thing we want to do is to recreate the preconditions for intellectual isolation by segregating Europeanization into an ad hoc vocabulary and models that do not travel outside the territory of a small community." (Featherstone & Radaelli 2003, 332)

This kind of delimitation is not only dangerous for reasons of academic isolation in both directions, but also for the narrowing of the perspective to an extent that does not reflect the political reality any more. In particular for the multilevel European project where international, supranational, intergovernmental, intragovernmental, and domestic contexts and characteristics clash, we need the comparative politics, international relations, political economy, and highly specialized European studies lenses and perspectives to explain the inputs, outputs, and indirect consequences of and on the different levels.

Featherstone and Radaelli (2003, 332) claim that Europeanization research should draw on these other disciplines and provide theoretical feedback: “This can be done, at a minimum, by refining models, by showing how conventional political science explanations do not work well (and therefore need adaptation in the light of findings produced by research on Europeanization), and by integrating theoretical frameworks.” Instead, I argue that established approaches from comparative politics may inform our understanding of the domestic consequences of European integration. I present an extension of the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (Baumgartner & Jones 1991; 1993(2009); 2005), representing a broader agenda-setting and policy-making idea, and an adjustment of Braun and Gilardi’s (2006) policy change model adapted from their diffusion approach. For both, I find that Europeanization has created a new situation which might not have occurred to the theory before but that the theories’ underlying expectations still hold. All existing research on the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, for example, examines the continuous increase of policy issues on political agendas and resulting increasing attention scarcity while I find reducing scarcity as an indirect effect of European integration. While not in line with the existing scholarship’s findings due to the different context, all results confirm the foundation of the theory.

Further research should thus not define and focus on the European Union as too much of a “sui generis” political entity but instead on the European project as a multilevel framework of governance that requires the combined use of the different theoretical lenses we already know. While, “in the last 20 years or so, analysts have developed increasingly sophisticated simplifications (frameworks or lenses) of the European Union (EU) policy process, seeking explanatory insight and predictive capability” (Zahariadis 2013, 807), little is still known about the Europeanized domestic processes and the domestically influenced European procedures. A start has been made here with the three paper chapters branching out in different areas – policy-making, responsiveness, and convergence – but European integration’s consequences deserve and require more attention.

iii. Consequences for the European Project

The European project as pictured here may never become a United States of Europe. It is more likely to establish a “reversed” federally structured political entity with strong nation states. Yet, it is not a dispensable additional level. The origins and ultimate goals and gains may be economic, but without Europe’s nations’ collaboration in the framework that has developed until this point neither the economic prosperity nor the countries’ problem-solving capacities in other policy areas or their shared role in the world can be maintained.

The increasing Euroscepticism pictured in the change from a permissive consensus to a constraining dissensus by Hooghe and Marks (2009) is dangerous for the European Union. In situations where neither its input (participation and representation) nor its output legitimacy (performance criterion) (Scharpf 1999) seems to be given, the EU gets close to failing. Commission President José Manuel Barroso coined the term “the Europe of results”. Only by providing results, the EU can convince citizens’ and political elites alike of the necessity of its continued existence as an additional level of government. The three paper chapters’ findings, highlighting

different aspects of the European project's consequences, show that the European level has an influence and provides results. Even though there might be strong domestically influenced conditions for EU congruence and the convergence of domestic policy agendas, the member states' EU-level collaboration induces change. Looking at the European project from a broader perspective, my findings have opened up the view on a broader influence. Also that policy-making in the member states changes as a result of European integration is per se a good thing. The more rational and less punctuated updating of attention, that the shifting of competencies allows, enables better policy decisions instead of overreaction when reaching attentional thresholds. With the premises accepted here and the multilevel perspective taken, there might be a way of stopping to tilt at windmills:

“The European Union (EU) and its member states have become a multilevel polity whose characteristics are poorly understood in political discourses as well as in academic controversies that are shaped by our conventional understanding of national politics and international relations. In public debates, we typically find unrealistic expectations—fears or hopes—of what European policy might achieve, combined with ignorance of what is in fact achieved, and polemics against the ‘democratic deficit’ of the institutions and processes through which European policy outcomes are being achieved. There is, in other words, no realistic understanding of the extent and the limitations of either the institutional capacity or the institutional legitimacy of the European polity.” (Scharpf 2001, 1)

There is not only a “vertical relationship between European and national levels of government” (Scharpf 2001, 4) but also a horizontal relationship between national actors on the European level, between the 28 member states' intergovernmental club, and the more supranational institutions.

As Zahariadis (2013, 810) contends: *“EU policy-making is very messy because it is characterized by heavy doses of complexity. This is not to say that national policy-making is not messy, but rather the complexity of the EU renders policy-making difficult to understand.”*

With all complexities adding up when the “messy” European level outputs influence the national systems it gets to a point where few people approach the topic at all. Complexities must be reduced and the basic knowledge political science research provides about decision-making must be applied to understand and make more sense of what happens in the European project. While the changes European integration induces for domestic policy-making might be unique and we do not know a comparable case where sovereign nations are influenced to a similar extent or have to adjust their policy-making accordingly, the basic premises still hold.

Since it is the domestic level that really counts when we accept the quest for a “Europe of results”, the EU does not need to please anybody but those judging whether their European interactions are worth their while. With the citizens ultimately influencing the domestic political elites, the outputs that reach them through the adoption of European decisions into national law or simply the adjustment of policy processes become crucially important. In the end, we do not only need to understand what happens on the European level but what happens nationally as a result. The EU faces electoral, national threats much more than discords at the level of the EU institutions. It thus requires a comparative, multilevel interaction- and consequence-focused perspective for the study of the European project. We need to understand not only the “sui-generis”, new political level, but also the resulting multilevel framework of governance that is composed of actors we know and we can assess. “European issues are penetrating domestic political debates across the continent like never before” (Featherstone & Radaelli 2003, 331) and we need the European project to solve those issues.

VI. Bibliography

Alexandrova, P., Carammia, M. and Timmermans, A. (2012). 'Policy Punctuations and Issue Diversity on the European Council Agenda', *Policy Studies Journal* 40(1): 69–88.

Alexandrova, P., and Timmermans, A. (2013). 'National Interest versus the Common Good: The Presidency in European Council Agenda Setting', *European Journal of Political Research* 52(3): 316–38.

Alexandrova, P., Carammia, M., Princen, S., and Timmermans, A. (2014). 'Measuring the European Council agenda: Introducing a new approach and dataset', *European Union Politics* 15(1): 152–67.

Alexandrova, P., Rasmussen, A., and Toshkov, D. (2016). 'Agenda responsiveness in the European Council: public priorities, policy problems and political attention', *West European Politics* 39(4): 605–27.

Anderson, J. (2002). 'Europeanization and the transformation of the democratic polity, 1945–2000', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(5): 793–822.

Armingeon, K., Isler, C., Knöpfel, L., Weisstanner, D., and Engler, S. (2016). *Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2014*. Bern: Institute of Political Science, University of Berne.

Auel, K., and Benz, A. (2005). 'The politics of adaptation: The Europeanisation of national parliamentary systems', *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 11(3-4): 372–93.

Baumgartner, F., and Jones, B. (1993/2009). *Agendas and instability in American politics*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Baumgartner, F., Breunig, C., Green-Pedersen, C., Jones, B., Mortensen, P., Neytemans, M., and Walgrave, S. (2009). 'Punctuated Equilibrium in Comparative Perspective', *American Journal of Political Science* 53(3): 602-19.

Bellamy, R., and Castiglione, D. (2013). 'Three models of democracy, political community and representation in the EU', *Journal of European Public Policy* 20(2): 206-23.

Bennett, C. (1991). 'What Is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?', *British Journal of Political Science* 21(2): 215-33.

Bevan, S., and Jennings, W. (2014). 'Representation, agendas and institutions', *European Journal of Political Research* 53(1): 37-56.

Bevan, S., Jennings, W., and Wlezien, C. (2016). 'An Analysis of the Public's Personal, National and EU Issue Priorities', *Journal of European Public Policy* 23(6): 871-87.

Bocquillon, P., and Dobbels, M. (2014). 'An elephant on the 13th floor of the Berlaymont? European Council and Commission relations in legislative agenda setting', *Journal of European Public Policy* 21(1): 20-38.

Bonafont, L., and Palau, A. (2011). 'Assessing the Responsiveness of Spanish Policymakers to the Priorities of their Citizens', *West European Politics* 34(4): 706-30.

Börzel, T. (2002) 'Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanization', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(2): 193-214.

Börzel, T., and Risse, T. (2000). *When Europe hits home: Europeanization and domestic change*. Badia Fiesolana, San Domenico (FI): European University Institute.

Börzel, T., and Risse, T. (2003). 'Conceptualising the Domestic Impact of Europe', in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds.), *The Politics of Europeanisation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 57–80.

Börzel, T., and Risse, T. (2007). 'Europeanization: The Domestic Impact of European Union Politics', in K. Jørgensen, M. Pollack, and B. Rosamond (eds.), *Handbook of European Union Politics*, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 483-506.

Börzel, T., and Risse, T. (2009). 'The Transformative Power of Europe: The European Union and the Diffusion of Ideas', KFG Working Paper Nr.1.

Boydston, A., Bevan, S., and Thomas, H. (2014). 'The Importance of Attention Diversity and How to Measure It', *Policy Studies Journal* 42(2): 173–96.

Brambor, T., Clark, W., and Golder, M. (2006). 'Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses', *Political Analysis* 14(1): 63–82.

Braun, D., and Gilardi, F. (2006). 'Taking Galton's Problem' Seriously – Towards a Theory of Policy Diffusion', *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 18(3): 298-322.

Breeman, G. and Zwaan, P. (2009). 'Domestic change and EU compliance in the Netherlands: policy feedback during enforcement', *Journal of European Integration* 31(3): 349–67.

Breunig, C. (2014). 'Content and Dynamics of Legislative Agendas in Germany', in C. Green-Pedersen and S. Walgrave (eds.), *Agenda Setting, Policies, and Political Systems: A Comparative Approach*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 125-44.

Breunig, C., Koski, C., and Mortensen, P. (2010) 'Stability and Punctuations in Public Spending: A Comparative Study of Budget Functions', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 20(3): 703–22.

- Brouard, S., Costa, O., and König, T. (eds.) (2012). *The Europeanization of Domestic Legislatures: The Empirical Implications of the Delors' Myth in Nine Countries*, New York, NY: Springer.
- Budge, I., and McDonald, M. (2007). 'Election and Party System Effects on Policy Representation: Bringing Time into a Comparative Perspective', *Electoral Studies* 26(1): 168-79.
- Bulmer, S. (1996). 'The European Council and the Council of the European Union: Shapers of a European Confederation', *Publius* 26(4): 17-42.
- Bunse, S. (2009). *Small states and EU governance: Leadership through the Council Presidency*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Burkhart, S. (2008). *Deutsche Bundesgesetzgebung 1972 – 2005*. GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA4569 Datenfile Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.4569.
- Carammia, M., Princen, S. & Timmermans, A. (2016). 'From Summitry to EU Government: An Agenda Formation Perspective on the European Council', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 54(4): 809-17.
- Cowles, M., Caporaso, J., and Risse, T. (eds.) (2001). *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press.
- Dahl, R. (1971). *Polyarchy; Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- De Boef, S. (2001). 'Modeling Equilibrium Relationships: Error Correction Models with Strongly Autoregressive Data', *Political Analysis* 9(1): 78-94.
- De Boef, S., and Keele, L. (2008). 'Taking Time Seriously', *American Journal of Political Science* 52(1): 184-200.

Dehousse, R., and Monceau, N. (2009). 'Are EU policies meeting Europeans' expectations?', in R. Dehousse, F. Deloche-Gaudez, and S. Jacquot (eds.), *What is Europe up to?*, Presses de Science Po: 29-42.

Döring, H., and Manow, P. (2016). Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies. Development version.

Druckman, J., and Lupia, A. (2000). 'Preference Formation', *Annual Review of Political Science* 3(1): 1-24.

Dyson, K., and Goetz, K. (eds.) (2003). *Germany, Europe, and the Politics of Constraint*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Elgström, O. (2003). 'Introduction', in O. Elgström (ed.), *European Union Council Presidencies: A comparative perspective*, London: Routledge, 1-17.

Elgström, O., and Tallberg, J. (2003). 'Conclusion: Rationalist and sociological perspectives on the Council Presidency', in O. Elgström (ed.), *European Union Council Presidencies: A comparative perspective*, London: Routledge, 191-205.

European Commission (2002-2014). Eurobarometer 57.2, 59.1, 60.1, 61, 62.0, 63.4, 64.2, 65.3, 66.1, 67.2, 68.1, 69.2, 70.1, 71.1, 71.3, 72.4, 73.4, 74.2, 75.3, 76.3, 77.3, 78.1, 79.3, 80.1, 81.2, 81.4, 82.3. TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]; GESIS Data Archive: <http://zacat.gesis.org/> [accessed 06/26/2015].

Falkner, G. (2005). *Complying with Europe: EU harmonisation and soft law in the member states*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Falkner, G., Hartlapp, M., Leiber, S., and Treib, O. (2004). 'Non-Compliance with EU Directives in the Member States: Opposition through the Backdoor?', *West European Politics* 27(3): 452–73.

Featherstone, K., and Radaelli, C. (eds.) (2003). *The Politics of Europeanization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Featherstone, K., and Radaelli, C. (2003). 'A Conversant Research Agenda', in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds.), *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 331-41.

Feenstra, R., Inklaar, R., and Timmer, M. (2013). 'The Next Generation of the Penn World Table', NBER Working Paper no. 19255.

Ferejohn, J. (1986). 'Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control', *Public Choice* 50(1/3): 5-25.

Fiorina, M., and Shepsle, K. (1989). 'Formal theories of leadership: agents, agenda setters, and entrepreneurs', in B. Jones (ed.), *Leadership in Politics: New Perspectives in Political Science*, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas: 17-41.

Follesdal, A., and Hix, S. (2006). 'Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 44(3): 533–62.

Gabel, M., and Anderson, C. (2002). 'The Structure of Citizen Attitudes and the European Political Space', *Comparative Political Studies* 35(8): 893–913.

Gilardi, F. (2012). 'Transnational diffusion: Norms, ideas, policies', in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B. Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 453-77.

Goetz, K. (2002). 'Four worlds of Europeanisation', *Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops*. Turin, Italy, 22–7 March 2002.

Göller, D. (2009) 'Europäisierung hat viele Gesichter. Anmerkung zur Widerlegung des Mythos einer 80-Prozent-Europäisierung', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 50: 75-9.

Golder, M., and Stramski, J. (2010). 'Ideological Congruence and Electoral Institutions: Conceptualization and Measurement', *American Journal of Political Science* 54(1): 90-106.

Green-Pedersen, C., and Walgrave, S. (2014). *Agenda Setting, Policies, and Political Systems: A Comparative Approach*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Hayes-Renshaw, F., and Wallace, H. (2006). *The Council of Ministers*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hix, S. (2008). *What's wrong with the European Union and how to fix it*. Cambridge ; Malden, MA: Polity.

Hix, S., and Goetz, K. (2000). 'Introduction: European Integration and National Political Systems', *West European Politics* 23(4): 1–26.

Hix, Simon, and Høyland, K. (2011). *The Political System of the European Union*. The European Union Series. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hobolt, S., and Klemmensen, R. (2005). 'Responsive Government? Public Opinion and Government Policy Preferences in Britain and Denmark', *Political Studies* 53(2): 379–402.

Hobolt, S., and Klemmensen, R. (2008). 'Government Responsiveness and Political Competition in Comparative Perspective', *Comparative Political Studies* 41(3): 309–37.

Hobolt, S., and Tilley, J. (2014). 'Who's in Charge? How Voters Attribute Responsibility in the European Union', *Comparative Political Studies* 47(6): 795–819.

Hölscheidt, S., and Hoppe T. (2010). 'Der Mythos vom „europäischen Impuls“ in der deutschen Gesetzgebungsstatistik', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 41(3): 543-51.

Hooghe, L., and Marks, G. (2001). *Multi-Level Governance and European Integration*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Hooghe, L., and Marks, G. (2009). 'A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus', *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (1): 1–23.

John, P., and Jennings, W. (2010). 'Punctuations and Turning Points on British Politics: The Policy Agenda of the Queen's Speech, 1940-2005', *British Journal of Political Science* 40(3): 561-86.

Jones, B., and Baumgartner, F. (1991). 'Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems', *Journal of Politics* 53(4): 1044-74.

Jones, B., and Baumgartner, F. (2004). 'Representation and Agenda Setting', *The Policy Studies Journal* 32(1): 1–24.

Jones, B., and Baumgartner F. (2005). *The Politics of Attention: How government prioritizes problems*, Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press.

Jones, B., Larsen-Price, H., and Wilkerson, J. (2009). 'Representation and American Governing Institutions', *The Journal of Politics* 71(1): 277–90.

Jones, B., and Baumgartner, F. (2012). 'From There to Here: Punctuated Equilibrium to the General Punctuation Thesis to a Theory of Government Information Processing', *Policy Studies Journal* 40(1): 1–20.

Keele, L., and De Boef, S. (2004). Not Just for Cointegration: Error Correction Models with Stationary Data. *Nuffield College Working Papers in Politics 2005-W7*.

Kingdon, J. (1984). *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Kirchner, E. (1992). *Decision making in the European Union: The Council Presidency and European integration*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Knill, C., Tosun, J., and Bauer, M. (2009). 'Neglected Faces of Europeanization: The Differential Impact of the EU on the Dismantling and Expansion of Domestic Policies', *Public Administration* 87(3): 519–37.

Kohler-Koch, B. (ed.) (2003). *Linking EU and National Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kröger, S., and Friedrich, D. (2013). 'Democratic representation in the EU: two kinds of subjectivity', *Journal of European Public Policy* 20(2): 171–89.

Ladrech, R. (2010). *Europeanization and national politics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Leuffen, D., Malang, T., and Wörle, S. (2014). 'Structure, Capacity or Power? Explaining Saliency in EU Decision-Making: Explaining Saliency in EU Decision-Making', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 52(3): 616–31.

Lewis, J. (2012). 'Council of Ministers and European Council', in E. Jones, A. Menon, and S. Weatherill (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 321-31.

Lupu, N., Selios, L., and Warner, Z. (2017). 'A New Measure of Congruence: The Earth Mover's Distance.' *Political Analysis* 25(1): 95–113.

Lynggaard, K. (2011). 'Domestic Change in the Face of European Integration and Globalization: Methodological Pitfalls and Pathways', *Comparative European Politics* 9(1): 18–37.

Majone, G. (2000). 'The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 38(2): 273–302.

March, J., and Olsen, J. (1984). 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', *American Political Science Review* 78(3): 734–49.

Mazey, S., and Richardson, J. (2001). 'Interest groups and EU policy-making: organizational logic and venue shopping', in J. Richardson (ed.), *European Union: Power and Policy-Making*, London & New York: Routledge, 217-38.

Moravcsik, A. (2002). 'In defense of the democratic deficit: reassessing legitimacy in the EU', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(4): 603–24.

Naurin, D., and Wallace, H. (2008). *Unveiling the Council of the European Union: Games Governments Play in Brussels*. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Niemann, A., and Mak, J. (2010). '(How) Do Norms Guide Presidency Behaviour in EU Negotiations?', *Journal of European Public Policy* 17(5): 727–42.

Norton, P. (1996). *National parliaments and the European Union*, London: Routledge.

Page, B., and Shapiro, R. (1983). 'Effects of Public Opinion on Policy', *American Political Science Review* 77(1): 175–90.

Pollack, M. (2000). 'The End of Creeping Competence: EU Policy-making since Maastricht', *JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies* 38(3): 519–38.

Powell, G. (2000). *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Versions*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Princen, S. (2013). 'Punctuated equilibrium theory and the European Union', *Journal of European Public Policy* 20(6): 854–70.

Princen, S., and Rhinard, M. (2006). 'Crashing and creeping: agenda-setting dynamics in the European Union', *Journal of European Public Policy* 13(7): 1119–32.

Puetter, U. (2014). *The European Council and the Council. New Intergovernmentalism and Institutional Change*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Radaelli, C. (2003). 'The Europeanization of Public Policy', in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli, *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 27-56.

Raunio, T. and Hix, S. (2000). 'Backbenchers learn to fight back: European integration and parliamentary government', *West European Politics* 23(4): 142–68.

Robinson, S., Caver, F., Meier, K. and O'Toole, L. (2007) 'Explaining Policy Punctuations: Bureaucratization and Budget Change', *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 140–50.

Saalfeld, T. (1996). 'The German Houses of Parliament and European Legislation', in P. Norton (ed.), *National parliaments and the European Union*, London: Routledge, 12-34.

Sandholtz, W. (1996). 'Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional Approach to European Institutions', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 34(3): 403–30.

Schalk, J., Torenvlied, R., Weesie J. and Stokman, F. (2007). 'The Power of the Presidency in EU Council Decision-Making', *European Union Politics* 8(2): 229–50.

Scharpf, F. (1999). *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Scharpf, F. (2001). 'Notes Toward a Theory of Multilevel Governing in Europe', *Scandinavian Political Studies* 24(1): 1–26.

Schmidt, V. (2006). *Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schmidt, V., and Radaelli, C. (2004). 'Policy Change and Discourse in Europe: Conceptual and Methodological Issues', *West European Politics* 27(2): 183–210.

Stimson, J. (2004). *Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stimson, J., Mackuen, M., and Erikson, R. (1995). 'Dynamic Representation', *American Political Science Review* 89(3): 543–65.

Tallberg, J. (2003). 'The agenda-shaping powers of the EU Council Presidency', *Journal of European Public Policy* 10(1): 1–19.

Tallberg, J. (2004). 'The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency and Distribution in EU Negotiations', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 42(5): 999–1022.

Tallberg, J. (2006). *Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union*. Themes in European Governance. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tallberg, J. (2008). 'The Power of the Chair: Formal Leadership by the Council Presidency', in D. Naurin and H. Wallace (eds.), *Unveiling the Council of the European Union. Games Governments Play in Bruxelles*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 187-202.

Thomson, R. (2008). 'The Council Presidency in the European Union: Responsibility with Power', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 46(3): 593–617.

Töller, A. (2010). 'Measuring and Comparing the Europeanization of National Legislation: A Research Note', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 48(2): 417–44.

Van der Eijk, C., and Franklin, M. (1996). *Choosing Europe?: The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Warntjen, A. (2007). 'Steering the Union: The impact of the EU Presidency on legislative activity in the Council', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 45(5): 1135–57.

Warntjen, A. (2008). 'Steering, but not Dominating: the Impact of the Council Presidency on EU legislation', in D. Naurin and H. Wallace (eds.), *Unveiling the Council of the European Union. Games Governments Play in Bruxelles*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 203-19.

Wessels, W. (2008). 'The European Council: A Bigger Club, a Similar Role', in E. Best, T. Christiansen, and P. Settembri (eds.), *The Institutions of the European Union: Continuity and Change*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 16-33.

Windhoff-Héritier, A., Kerver, D., Knill, C., Lehmkuhl, D.; Teutsch, M., and Douillet, A. (eds.) (2001). *Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on National Policymaking*. Governance in Europe. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.

Wlezien, C. (2004). 'Patterns of Representation: Dynamics of Public Preferences and Policy', *The Journal of Politics* 66(1): 1–24.

Wlezien, C. (2005). 'On the salience of political issues: The problem with "most important problem"', *Electoral Studies* 24(4): 555–79.

Wlezien, C., and Soroka, S. (2012). 'Political Institutions and the Opinion–Policy Link', *West European Politics* 35(6): 1407–32.

Zahariadis, N. (2013). 'Building Better Theoretical Frameworks of the European Union's Policy Process', *Journal of European Public Policy* 20(6): 807–16.

Comparative Agendas Project Data²¹

The raw data used to prepare the comparative datasets on national legislation all stem from the individual country projects within the Comparative Agendas Project framework. While some datasets are publicly available online, others have been shared with me by the original authors. Current developments in the project, including the endeavor to make all data available to the public with online analysis tools, contacts, and the master codebook can be found on the new shared webpage: <http://www.comparativeagendas.net/>.

Belgium:

“The Belgian data were originally collected by Stefaan Walgrave and his collaborators (Jeroen Joly, Anne Hardy, Brandon Zicha, Julie Sevenans, and Tobias Van Assche). Funding came from the European Science Foundation (grant number: 07-ECRP-008), from the Flemish National Science Foundation (grant number: G.0117.11N) and from the Belgian Federal Science Policy (grant number: IUAP P7/46). The original collectors of the data do not bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here.”

Denmark:

“The data in the Danish Policy Agenda Project have been collected by Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Peter B. Mortensen with support from the Danish Social Science Research Council and the Research Foundation at Aarhus University.”

²¹ Citations and reference styles differ in accordance with the requested formats: <http://www.comparativeagendas.net/pages/How-to-cite>. All other datasets but the here cited CAP raw data can be found in the bibliography.

European Union:

Alexandrova, P., Carammia, M., Princen, S., and Timmermans, A. (2014). 'Measuring the European Council Agenda: Introducing a New Approach and Dataset,' *European Union Politics* 15 (1): 152-167.

France:

Baumgartner, F., Brouard, S., and Grossman, E. (2010). 'Agenda-setting dynamics in France: revisiting the 'partisan hypothesis',' *French Politics* 7(2): 75-95.

Germany:

Breunig, C. (2014). 'Content and Dynamics of Legislative Agendas in Germany', in C. Green-Pedersen and S. Walgrave (eds.), *Agenda Setting, Policies, and Political Systems: A Comparative Approach*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 125-44.

Extended with Burkhart (2008) and manual coding for Paper I:

Burkhart, S. (2008). *Deutsche Bundesgesetzgebung 1972 – 2005*. GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA4569 Datafile Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.4569.

Italy:

Borghetto E., Carammia M., and Zucchini F. (2014). 'The Impact of Party Policy Priorities on Italian Law-Making from the First to the Second Republic (1983-2006),' in C. Green-Pedersen and S. Walgrave (eds.), *Agenda Setting, Policies, and Political Systems: A Comparative Approach*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 164–182.

Netherlands:

Timmermans, A., and Breeman, G. (2014). 'The policy agenda in multiparty government: Coalition agreements and legislative activity in the Netherlands,' in C. Green-Pedersen and S. Walgrave (eds.), *Agenda Setting, Policies, and Political Systems: A Comparative Approach*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 87–104.

Spain:

"The data was originally collected by Laura Chaqués-Bonafont, Anna M. Palau and Luz M. Muñoz, with the collaboration of graduate students and the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Innovation and Science and the Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca (AGAUR). Neither these public institutions nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here."

United Kingdom:

John, P., Bertelli, A., Jennings, W., and Bevan, S. (2013). *Policy Agendas in British Politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian.

VIII. Additional Appendices

The following chapter contains further robustness checks and information on Paper I, II, and III, that has not been (would not be) included for publication. For Paper I, the additional information revealed during the 'Revise and Resubmit' process is documented here.

Chapter II: Neglected Effects of European Integration

Decreasing Sovereign Policy Workloads

Another empirical implication of the theoretical expectation of less crowded agenda space in the sovereign share is that topics taken over by the EU and subsequently transposed into national legislation in the directly EU-influenced share actually require less attention from national policy-makers. Marshalling empirical evidence for this idea is challenging. The obvious approach would be to measure the time of debate for both agenda shares, expecting less debate in the directly influenced proportion. Yet, the only measurable time period is from a law's introduction to its adoption. This has three drawbacks:

(1.) Process-oriented, the time frame from introduction to adoption should be similar for most laws independent of their origin, since all need to pass through the same formal requirements, committee meetings, parliamentary debates etc. that for scheduling reasons alone induce a lengthy process. Thus, I would not expect too much difference on average, independent of the amount of actual debate on the issue taking place in the committee and parliamentary meetings. To circumvent this problem, we would need to be able to differentiate the time spent on a particular law in the actual meetings which happens behind closed doors.

Moreover, (2.) a comparison of time requirements is also complicated by the fact that adoption times differ between policy areas. First, because some areas are more salient than others, and second, because meeting schedules differ. Since we cannot expect the distribution of laws over policy areas to be similar comparing the directly influenced and sovereign agenda shares or rather have to expect the exact opposite, a comparison across the two agendas is problematic. These issues are aggravated when also comparing over time. Sovereign legislation comprises all kinds of laws, from easy to highly controversial, from tiny changes in existing laws to full grown reforms. All EU influences, on the other hand, used to be unprecedented and drew parliamentarians' attention to them in the early years of European integration. With integration moving forward, more topics, in number and diversity, made it into the EU-influenced proportion, leading to an expected assimilation (see a policy area specific portrayal of the developments in the Appendix). The expectation would therefore be an adjustment over time.

(3.) From what we know from transposition literature in the European studies context (for an overview Falkner et al. 2004), most legislation introduced by the European Union is consciously delayed in transposition in the member states. Topics are put aside until transposition cannot be avoided. In addition, even if transposition is not attempted to be delayed, the priority of pushing through national laws can be expected to be generally higher. While this tells us nothing about the amount of time spent on the discussion leading to transposition in the end, the general expectation would be to find longer implementation times for EU-influenced legislation.

Concluding the three measurement related issues, we should thus find strongly negative results if we just look at the median time difference between sovereign and EU-influenced legislative activity ($\text{time}_{\text{sovereign}} - \text{time}_{\text{eu}}$). First, delaying strategies expectably lead to negative values of the

median time differences. With shifting competencies that free up agenda space on the sovereign agenda, an adjustment takes place in a second step. The graph on median time difference confirms those considerations and yet shows a clear upward trend resulting in balanced time spans in the last few years. The differentiation of required adoption times for EU-influenced and sovereign laws in the graph's second part shows that this development is indeed a function of the directly EU-influenced laws requiring less time for adoption over time and adjusting to the sovereign level:




Figure 1: Median Time Requirements from Introduction to Adoption of a Law in the German Bundestag

A major reduction from a median of about 300 days per law to nearly half with 170 days per law portrays a clear development. Although to a smaller extent compared to the Europeanized agenda share, also the sovereign laws experience a reduction in time requirements in the median from about 220 to 160 days. On average, this means time savings of 60 days or over 25%. We observe a stronger normalization for the directly EU-influenced blue proportion after the

initial years of major change and competence shifting leading to generally similar time requirements for adoption. By the 2000s, both shares' law-making processes have adjusted.

A case-by-case distinction over time additionally indicates that the more extreme outliers in terms of lengthy processes for individual laws are to be found in the sovereign share. Histograms on time requirements in both agenda shares show that while the EU-influenced laws overall take a little longer to get adopted, they are adopted in a smaller date range with fewer extreme outliers. This speaks in favor of the delaying theory and confirms the theoretical expectations and kurtosis findings of easier transposition of EU legislation. While I thus cannot proof lower workloads in directly EU-influenced legislation with the data available, the most applicable measurement behaves as expected and indicates adjusting adoption times that can be evaluated in combination with the findings on punctuatedness.

More detailed empirical evidence on time requirements:




Figure 2: Time Requirements from Introduction to Adoption of Individual Laws in the German Bundestag




Figure 3: Histograms for the Median Time Requirements of the Sovereign and Europeanized Agenda Shares

Interest Group Involvement as a Measure of National Parliamentarians’ Involvement

Given the difficulty of measuring involvement and debate time – national parliamentarians’ workload – for EU influenced legislation, I attempted to find alternative approaches and looked into interest group involvement. The underlying idea here is that if a topic becomes less important on the national level because the EU is the more important player in the field, there is less interest group involvement on the sovereign but instead on the European level and therefore lower workload and time and attention scarcity for national parliamentarians. Again, I am aware of the drawbacks of such an approach with measurement difficulties (voluntary registration with changing requirements and only recent documentation) and the non-tangible actual influence of the individual group in the respective policy field, but hope to provide at least additional evidence for the consequences of shifting competencies. The below graph shows the number of newly registered interest groups per year in the European Unions’ Transparency Register since its start in 2008. In early 2016, these numbers have added up to 9205 interest groups lobbying the European level (status 23rd February 2016) [<http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do?locale=en#en>]. The graph additionally portrays the share of

interest groups with headquarters in Germany rising parallel to the overall numbers and making up a non-negligible share. What this tells us is that interest groups have clearly started to act at the European level. Following Mazey and Richardson (2001) they would then rationally distribute their resources to where they believe they are of best use. They focus on influencing the European rather than the domestic level wherever they believe that more gain is to be reached. With shifting competencies, interest groups were bound to “allocate increasing amounts of lobbying resources to that [the European] level.” (Mazey, & Richardson 2001, 221). In fact, the EU in many cases turned out to be the easier “target”. The “permeability of the Commission, and other EU venues (...) to interest groups weakens the ability of states to control and steer national interest groups” (Mazey & Richardson 2001, 221). As a consequence of interest groups increasingly influencing policies also at the European level the “maturing system of interest group intermediation at the European level” has “transformed national policy-making systems”(Mazey & Richardson 2001, 220). The number of annually additionally registered interest groups portrayed by the below graph confirms these expectations. Topics that are decided on the European level are likely to be influenced by interest groups on the European level which leads to the expected time savings for policy-making on the sovereign agenda share.




Figure 4: Number of Lobby Groups in the European Union

The Particularities of Sharing Competencies

In the European multilevel system of governance competencies often times remain shared. The EU consists of strong, sovereign nation states which will always deal with a significant amount of topics, making punctuated policy-making likely. It is not my intention to claim that punctuatedness vanishes. I only argue that it happens less often and more incremental changes become possible. As a result, (L-)kurtosis values decrease but remain leptokurtic to some extent, which is also what the data shows. While there can be competition over an issue, some policies end up on the sovereign and some on the European agenda. Certain conditions apply which go beyond the scope of this paper but which I am working on in Paper II. The main argument in this paper is not that some policy areas shift completely or sovereign states lose all of their say on a certain issue but rather that with more policies legislated on the European level the overall sovereign workload decreases. Even if only small issues, the ones nation states do not hesitate to hand over to the European level, were taken over by the EU, decision-makers would be able to re-distribute their attention on the sovereign agenda share. My argument is not about contestation but contends that as soon as the EU claims an issue, it has consequences for all remaining issues. With the increasing number of laws with direct EU inputs, the relevant number of sovereign laws decreases. Thus, attention is re-distributed as the descriptive section and particularly Figure 2 shows.

Having said that, the labelling of the not directly EU-influenced share as sovereign is strong. I initially used directly and non-directly influenced agenda shares instead. Changing this wording was not only an issue of improving readability, I also believe the term sovereign expresses the concept I illustrate above: The sovereign agenda share, as I define it in the paper, is the share of national legislation that is, as opposed to the directly EU-influenced share, not marked with a direct EU impulse in the German database of legislation. It thus applies to all laws that are not official transpositions of EU legislation into national laws. While it is a valid point to state

that they might include indirect EU influences too those are the laws which could, theoretically, be defined completely sovereign.

Figure 6 and its Punctuations

Focusing on only the important punctuations of figure 6 has been an additionally considered option but has not been executed for multiple reasons, most importantly threshold considerations. Finding the relevant threshold is an ongoing debate in the literature on punctuations, as is the issue of different dynamics of positive and negative changes (Robinson et al. 2007, 147). It has been found before that for different research subjects (media and budgets for example) and across different policy areas (Breunig et al. 2010) the interesting change values differ. Thus, given the comparatively low number of cases, I believe that finding optimal thresholds for punctuations in lawmaking would be much more difficult than for budgets for which this approach has been applied before. Secondly, I would be hesitant to judge the different thresholds across policy areas for legislation. In addition, due to the change of individual policy issues' importance over time thresholds for individual policy areas would also need to change.

Chapter III: Democratic Surplus?




Figure 1a: The Institutional Framework of the European Project

The argument of the potential for democratic surplus rests on the institutional design of the European project, taking into account the multilevel system of governance. Not only do the directly elected national and European parliament represent the citizens directly, but national representatives also represent their citizens in the EU’s Council system – together with the representatives of the 28 other member states.




Figure 1b: The Institutional Framework of the European Project with Representational Ties




Figure 2: Most Important Problem Congruence across Topics and Countries

Chapter IV: Dynamics of Agenda Assimilation




Figure 1: Median Attention for Macroeconomic Issues and the Presidency Effect




Figure 2: Distributions of Laws on Policy Issues