“Public Administration meets Peacebuilding”
Peace Operations as Political and Managerial Challenges

An International Conference
University of Konstanz, Germany
June 15–17, 2007

Conference Report[1]

Konstanzer Online-Publikations-System (KOPS)
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-106869
URL: http://kops.ub.uni-konstanz.de/volltexte/2010/10686/

[1]Principal drafters: Till Blume and Julian Junk, under the lead of Wolfgang Seibel – who is also heading the overall project – and with the assistance of Florian Roth and Johannes Cherbuliez. We are grateful to Susanna Pfohl Campbell, who provided her notes of the conference. David Antal proved invaluable for the finalization of this report.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The international dialogue organized at the University of Konstanz, June 15–17, 2007, explored two largely neglected aspects of United Nations (UN) peace operations: the administrative side of peacebuilding and the political side of international administration. Key topics were coordination, leadership, and learning as managerial and political challenges. Each of these three factors was addressed by panels composed of scholars and practitioners.

Papers and discussions on coordination confirmed and supplemented mainstream interpretations of managerial challenges posed by complex peace operations. Although nonhierarchical modes of coordination are crucial in the interorganizational networks that characterize peace operations, hierarchy and classic bureaucracy remain important, if not dominant, components. Rather than dwell on informal coordination in the form of networking, students of peace operations should acknowledge the role of tightly coupled chains of command and hierarchical accountability.

The question of whether leadership as individual agency is a distinct component of management or rather an all-encompassing activity including effective coordination and successful learning remained unresolved during the conference. However, a widely shared view was that a mixture of social and political entrepreneurship, personal charisma, and political guidance constitutes the main ingredient of effective leadership in the framework of UN peace operations. The credibility of mandate enforcement, for instance, depends not only on determined and consistent action by leading field-level officials but also on continuous and unambiguous support from the UN Secretariat and the sponsoring nations.

Learning is a pivotal notion shaping both the work of related departments of the UN Secretariat (e.g., the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO; and the Department of Political Affairs, DPA) and the perceptual patterns in the relevant literature. Triggered by the traumatic disasters of the 1990s (in Somalia, Rwanda, and Srebrenica, for instance), substantial progress has been made on the UN's strategic commitment to peacebuilding and its conceptualization. The relevant hallmarks of that advance are the Brahimi report (2000) and the final report of the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004). However, power asymmetries, organizational compartmentalization, and national or professional identities restrict learning in matters of field tactics and performance. Acceptance of second-best options may be the best that managers of complex peace operations are able to achieve.

These observations lead to a general caveat: Many of the weaknesses and flaws of UN peace operations are part and parcel of the weaknesses and flaws of the entire UN system. They can be mitigated but will not be eliminated by intensified managerial efforts alone. UN peace operations, however benevolent in nature, remain a form of foreign intervention. Their state-building capacity is thus fundamentally limited not only by continuing hostility among conflicting parties but also by a widespread perception in both the target regions and the sponsoring nations that UN engagement is integral to western interventionism.

Merely normative statements intended to improve coordination, leadership, and learning may therefore turn out to be illusory or misleading. Poor coordination may actually be due to problems stemming from cooperation that requires the consent of veto players or spoilers at all levels, including that of the central budgeting process. Poor leadership may just be the flip side of senior staff being confronted with unsolvable problems. Poor efforts to learn and a consequent dearth of learning effects may owe to what Karl W. Deutsch termed the "ability to afford not to learn"—an insignia of real power.

The pervasive politicization of UN peace operations thus requires scholars and practitioners to refrain from applying textbook solutions to problems of coordination, leadership, and learning. What is required is pragmatism, the readiness to accept second-best solutions,

and the ability to learn creative coping in an attempt to do justice to commonly accepted standards of morality and good governance as effectively as possible under existing circumstances. Knowledge and experience about the nature of coordination and learning in complex organizations is essential for successful management of peace operations. Ultimately, however, the quality of leadership is what determines the ability to cope with complex situations in peace operations.

INTRODUCTION: PEACE OPERATIONS, STATE-BUILDING, AND ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE

The introductory statements by Winrich Kühne and Wolfgang Seibel traced the origins of this conference. The linkages between public administration and peace operations had been discussed at length by scholars and practitioners in June 2004 at an international workshop on a future MA program, "Public Administration and Conflict Management," in the Department of Politics and Management of the University of Konstanz. The program, which was launched in the fall of 2005, is linked to that university's newly created Center of Excellence, "The Cultural Foundations of Integration."

One achievement of the 2004 conference was the acknowledgement of the organizational and administrative complexity entailed by a new way of internationally administrating UN peace operations and regional organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are important players in peace operations and compound the complexity of coordination, leadership, and learning in the resulting organizational conglomerate.

As Seibel commented, mainstream literature on public administration and organization theory provides valuable knowledge about basic forms and mechanisms of coordination, leadership, and learning that occur in any organization. Moreover, those basic forms and mechanisms have certain identifiable affinities with ideal-typical kinds of organizations—hierarchical, single-unit structures (type I) and fragmented, decentralized, multi-unit, network-like structures (type II).

Coordination may imply coping with a multitude of tasks or dealing with rivals, regardless of the organizational form in which those activities take place. A type II structure is likely to be based on interpersonal and interorganizational reciprocity and trust-building rather than on hierarchy, as in type I structures. Leadership can be based on personal traits of leaders, on acquired personal attributes, on networking skills, or on personal charisma—all of which may figure in any structural setting. Leadership in type II structures, though, may be based much more on networking skills, trust-building, and proven problem-solving ability than is the case with leadership in type I structures. Lastly, learning may mean adapting organizational structures or changing mindsets, or both, again regardless of the circumstances. Learning in type II structures, however, is likely to result from errors and legitimation pressure rather than from the systematic evaluation of information or the controlled change of mindsets that is common in type I structures.

Despite a broad variety of theoretical approaches, the literature on coordination, leadership, and learning does not truly reflect the organizational reality of complex peace operations. Kühne and Seibel's initial theoretical guess was that the reality of the multidimensional peace operation can be characterized by the type II organization, for both are complex and contradictory endeavors. It became clear at the conference that the proposed standard concepts—type I and type II structures—delineate ideal-types more than they do analytical frameworks that are designed to correspond exactly to any single empirical observation.

Kühne described the dialogue between academics and practitioners on the present and future challenges of peace operations and peacebuilding as a demanding, but indispensable, process. Additional scholarly field research is needed on the most pressing issues of peace operations, including security, the rule of law, security-sector reform, and institution-building.

PEACEBUILDING AND THE UNITED NATIONS—TAKING STOCK

Volker Rittberger gave an overview of the development of peacekeeping and peacebuilding within the UN. He pointed out that "peacekeeping," though a global phenomenon today, did not exist as a term when the UN was founded in 1945 and did not appear in the UN Charter. The first peace operation (UN Truce Supervision Organization) was established in 1948. The most recent one dates from 2007, with more of them to follow (e.g., in Sudan). Whereas traditional peacekeeping has become multidimensional, most operations today apply a "complex peacekeeping" approach designed to deal with a wide range of issues, including reform of the security sector, rebuilding of government services, and reinvention of the educational system. The aim is to secure lasting peace by developing a comprehensive political framework that builds incentives for former conflict parties to refrain from violence.

Peacekeeping and peacebuilding have become central features of international politics. They have also developed into highly specialized and diverse fields of research. Nevertheless, important questions remain unanswered. For example, how can individual lessons that have been learned be transformed into guidelines? How can cooperation between governmental and nongovernmental actors be fostered and designed? And how can the rapidly changing dynamics of postwar reconstruction be dealt with? Rittberger highlighted the cooperation between the research projects on peace operations and peacebuilding at the University of Konstanz, the Global Public Policy Institute (Berlin), and the Center for International Peace Operations (Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze, Berlin).

SESSION 1: COORDINATION

Keith Provan, in his presentation on network governance, argued that networks are trust-based rather than hierarchical, though contracts or formal agreements may be involved. Networks are important organizational forms when one organization lacks sufficient resources to deal with complex and seemingly intractable problems or seeks to gain legitimacy. In these cases, a network may be the superior alternative. Network governance can be characterized by three trade-offs: efficiency vs. inclusiveness or involvement; internal vs. external network legitimacy; and flexibility vs. sustainability. This interplay between several organizations may counter a network's effectiveness. Nevertheless, organizations that are part of relatively large networks are sometimes able to innovate, learn, and access knowledge better and more quickly than other organizations. Further research on network organization would be relevant, for example, to the various networks within peace operations. The UN should tackle the following questions: How do networks behave and act? How are they sustained? What is network effectiveness? What skills and roles do network administrators and leaders need to have? Future research in this area should concentrate on the influence that different institutional structures have on network organization.

Michael Lipson presented the outlines of a research project on complex peacebuilding and coordination. The project deals with both formal and informal processes for coordinating peace operations at two levels (headquarters and the field) and with applicable theories (transaction costs, network theories, coordination theories, and resource dependence theory). Lipson formulated several hypotheses connecting actor and environment characteristics to certain network forms that will be analyzed in the project. (One hypothesis, for example, is that multilateral environments lead to rather formal coordination; bilateral environments, to rather informal coordination.) Coordination in this research is seen as the dependent variable: the extent to which organizations attempt to take account of and adjust to other ones. This preliminary research framework was confronted with evidence from Bosnia and will be applied to developments in Afghanistan and Kosovo as analysis proceeds.

Jörg Raab and Joseph Soeters presented their work on peacekeeping missions as network forms of temporary organizations. They show that networks can be distinguished according to their goal orientation, structure, tasks, and management control. In the military reality of peace operations, different types of networks exist (there is no ideal-type I or II): politico-military networks, military-civilian networks, and military-military networks. The propositions about network governance were developed from empirical material collected on the UN missions in Lebanon (UNIFIL II) and Liberia (UNMIL). The authors demonstrated that coordination between different military parts of peace operations and between civilian and military parts remains a challenge despite hierarchical integration, for information asymmetries and differences will persist. Performance measures and coercive and noncoercive sanctions can contribute to improvement. There is a need to create cross-organizational, network-wide, and inter-mission learning processes. The major challenge is to strengthen network identities and think in terms of entire peace operations, for up to now they often represent "fragmented, decentralized, multiunit conglomerates consisting of people who are used to working in closed communities and strong hierarchies."

Given the proliferation of peacekeeping functions and increasingly complex organizational arrangements, Peter Schumann noted that coordination would become not only more complex but even more necessary than it already is. In addition to still unresolved UN intra-organizational policy matters related to coordination, the capacity to coordinate and the impact of coordination at the field level need to be addressed in greater detail than has been the case thus far, both from a policy and an operational point of view. In view of existing and anticipated challenges, there is a sense of urgency to improve PKO coordination. He pointed out that 60,000 to 70,000 peacekeepers and 10,000 to 15,000 civilian personnel may soon be deployed in the Horn of Africa apart from Sudan, Chad, and Central Africa. The affected communities and even potential beneficiaries are reacting with increasing hostility to "foreign interventions."

As a general observation based on a recently published DPKO assessment, Schumann noted that a large number of current missions are operating with a 35 percent vacancy rate, yet seem to be functioning. One conjecture is that peace operations may simply be overbudgeted and could in fact operate with fewer staff members than initially planned. Staffing and capacity problems are aggravated by quick rotation of staff, with some of the personnel being replaced after six months, others after twelve months. Another problem is the question of how multidimensional—and even more striking—hybrid peace operations (as in Darfur) will be organized, managed, and financed.

Schumann was skeptical of the type I–type II scheme. The extent to which sustainable learning processes are actually taking place remains very uncertain, he argued, although many peacekeeping staff are moving from one operation to another. To understand peace operations, different functions or sectors must be taken into account and analyzed separately. Each of them is very different in scope and operational requirements (e.g., humanitarian affairs, political affairs, security-sector reform, and cease-fire monitoring). Different activities may require different organizational forms corresponding to the PKO mandate and operational requirements. The dissimilar nature of funding for peacekeeping (assessed contributions) and funding for reconstruction and development (voluntary contributions) makes matters such as cross-sectorial activities (disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, rule of law, and human rights) difficult to sustain.

Souren Seraydarian commented that the central dilemma of coordination was that everybody wanted coordination but that nobody wanted to be coordinated. He complemented the organization-centric view with one that takes the people of the country into account. Local populations do not necessarily understand the difference between different UN organizations, for they all use the initials "UN" on their vehicles yet provide different messages and have different nuances. The resulting encounters sometimes lead to the perception that the UN does not know what it is doing. This situation is reinforced by contradictory messages from the peace operation. Seraydarian argued for a problem-solving approach to organiza-

tional design: The question is not whether one should have integration; it is “how to make it work.” He argued that real-life peace operations represent a combination of type I and type II organizations. The weaknesses that must be overcome for problem-solving peace operations include the lack of information-sharing and strategic leadership among the actors involved.

Dominik Bartsch outlined the main characteristics of an integrated mission by referring to the 2005 note of guidance on integrated missions, an approach initiated by the Secretary General of the UN to strengthen the coordination and collaboration between the peacekeepers and the UN Country Team (UNCT), including humanitarian UN agencies. The difficulty, however, lies in setting up a clear chain of command without disrespecting the various distinct operational mandates within the broader UN peacebuilding effort. He sees peace operations as temporary networks that nevertheless have a strong mandate and may encompass multiple tasks. However, UN agencies are structured differently from a peacekeeping mission, and the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) cannot directly control their activities. The fact that large peacekeeping budgets attract secure funding through assessed contributions discourages thrift, especially in the eyes of UN agencies that rely on voluntary funding and are continuously challenged to “do more with less.” These differences in resource allocation hinder effective coordination. All these structural and process-related obstacles to coordination exacerbate the need for the UN to articulate a unity of purpose in a given operation and to develop a common vision through a peacebuilding strategy. The Peacebuilding Commission could play a crucial role in this area.

Cedric de Coning drew attention to the large gap between the intent and reality of coordination. In many instances coordination takes place more within different sectors than between the organizations. The programmatic activities need to be coordinated. There is also a need for overall strategic frameworks within which the different actors can plan and implement their operations. Coordinators should therefore facilitate the development of a coherent, general approach that helps achieve common objectives. A further question directly related to outcomes of coordination is that of how peace operations can ensure local ownership. UN peace operations carried out in cooperation with development agencies need phased approaches and distinct critical components in each phase of coordination.

Discussion

Jan Pronk started the discussion by referring to the politics of peace operations, which should be included in the analysis of organizational structures. Danilo Türk cited the example of Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) at the headquarters level. The experience there was rather unreassuring. Even the Afghanistan mission was designed without an IMTF. The main problem is that both the coordination of administrative structures and the space for political judgment and decision-making are needed. A further difficulty is the coordination of headquarters and the field when it comes to decision-making processes. (The timing of elections can be extremely controversial, for example.)

Türk argued that the main judgment should be left to the field staff and the SRSG. On the ground, the balance between the political tasks of the mission and the activities of the UNCT are a function of the leadership exerted by the SRSG. A consensus on goals is extremely important. If they cannot be defined, a network model may not work. But once organizations have common goals and joint outcomes, they can have different ideologies and approaches, maintaining the self-interest of each participating organization. Keith Provan agreed that goal consensus plays a major role in the functioning of networks. Jörg Raab added that the management of entire networks is different from the management of organizations in networks. The fundamental mode of coordination in networks is negotiation, which requires different management skills.

Effective decision-making, according to Souren Seraydarian, is hampered by firewalls between the various organizations. For instance, despite the transfer of the Resident Coordinator’s competencies to one Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General

(DSRSG), there is still a Country Director of the UN Development Programme. Hence, the DSRSG has to assume potentially competing tasks. De Coning added that the problem of leadership is apparent in each UN Country Team as well.

Michael Barzelay concluded this first discussion by stating that the analytical categories drawn up in the paper by Seibel et al. might be difficult to work with in further research, for they might "in reality" often appear jointly. He argued that research could be both more feasible and policy-oriented if the different phases of peace operations were used as primary vocabulary for analytical delineations. There seems to be strong need to define analytical categories for research.

SESSION 2: LEADERSHIP

Silke A. Eisenbeiss, in her paper with Steffen Giessner, gave an overview of the history of leadership research, particularly focusing on leadership in multicultural organizations. Leadership can be defined as intentional influence exerted by one person over other persons in order to structure and facilitate activities and relationships within organizations. Traditional leadership theories encompass trait approaches (which focus on the relationship between the personal characteristics and the leadership success of promising leaders) and behavioral approaches (which deal with the relationship between the enacted behavior and the leadership success of leaders). Contingency approaches take the situational context into account. They, too, counted among traditional leadership theories. By contrast, the "New Leadership Approach" no longer posits the leader–follower relationship as a purely rational transaction process but rather emphasizes transformational, charismatic, and visionary aspects of leadership. Research on leadership in multicultural organizations shows that charisma, team orientation, and participation are cross-culturally accepted and efficient forms of leadership. Charismatic and transformational leadership engender organizational performance particularly in situations of high environmental uncertainty. Empirical results suggest that diversity can be managed best if a leader pursues the dual strategy of boosting the social identity of the group and maximally exploring the different perspectives of its members (e.g., by stimulating task-related conflict).

Nancy Roberts focused her contribution on social entrepreneurship, adapting the organization-centric world view to a relation-centric one. The normative implication of her presentation was that social business entrepreneurship affects the quality and sustainability of social change and reforms. She contended that it not only yields grass-roots economic activity but also trains entrepreneurial leaders in developing and postconflict countries. As shown by her example of Kiva (a U.S.-based NGO that coordinates donations to grass-roots organizations), self-organization and community-based learning can improve stability and economic growth in crisis states. If used as an incentive to think about other ways to lead and learn, social entrepreneurship stands for an alternative intervention strategy in peace operations.

Manuel Fröhlich shed light on the role of SRSGs in peace operations. Because their role and functions are not regulated in the UN Charter, SRSGs can be entrusted with a multitude of different tasks and mandates by the Secretary General and the Security Council. Over the last 63 years, the number of SRSGs has increased considerably. SRSGs are now a standard tool of conflict resolution and are employed around the world. Their number in 2006 was highest for African conflicts and second highest for crosscutting issues. Approximately 50 percent of them had worked as an SRSG before their current assignment. With the emergence of multidimensional and robust peacekeeping, their role has changed from that of political observers to that of dynamic actors in the transformation of conflict situations. As Kofi Annan said in a 2001 meeting of SRSGs, they are simultaneously the personification of the UN; the leaders of a peace process; the head of peacekeeping, political, and peacebuilding tasks of UN organizations; and a unifying force for all UN activities in the field. The

different roles, personalities, cognitive maps, and operational codes of the SRSGs all have direct bearing on whether they can attain their goals. Their leadership is crucial to success in peace operations because of their central responsibilities, which range from peacemaking activities to the coordination of various actors and the mobilization of necessary resources. Lacking the traditional insignia of economic or military power, SRSGs can be conceived of as "norm entrepreneurs" working to fulfill the principles of the UN Charter.

Jacques Paul Klein stated that there was no single formula on the ground to fulfill the mandate of peace operations. On the ground, the main virtue is flexibility, but no progress is possible without political backing and financial means. The prerequisites for success are (a) a good mandate, (b) a clear organizational structure, (c) strategic planning and prioritization through leadership, (d) political and personnel support, and (e) an exit strategy. It is crucial for success to see the mandate as the floor and not as the ceiling. The extent to which it authorizes the use of force largely determines whether a peace operation is able to reach its goals. A clear organizational structure coordinating civilian and military components is essential to achieving stability and delegating tasks to them (e.g., assigning operational control to the force commander). Prioritization is central to success, and it depends largely on leadership and strategic planning. (Dayton was a negative example in this respect.) SRSGs need to know where they are going. Furthermore, the right personnel is needed. The people selected must be able to help SRSGs implement the mandate and fulfill the Mission Implementation Plans. Klein also stated that staff rotation and the lack of perspective that many staff members exhibit as the mission draws down are major obstacles to producing sustainable results. The exit strategy should be clear about what has to be accomplished and left behind before the exit point.

According to Jan Pronk, all attempts at coordination within the UN since 1972 have failed, as nobody wants to be coordinated or integrated. This impasse is an old problem for development cooperation, and it seems to be a new one for peacekeeping. First, unity of command is essential in peace operations and should be the objective of any SRSG, who should simultaneously aim for consensus and encourage decentralization. Second, coordination with UN member states is difficult when it comes to negotiating peace agreements, which often undermine implementation of UN mandates Third, peace operations today, like humanitarian assistance in the early 1990s, are seen as a panacea for resolving violent conflicts. Major issues such as reconstruction, rehabilitation of infrastructure, mine removal, and development are on the agenda, but other issues are neglected in terms of budget, staff, and mandate. Fourth, peace operations are often pursued in regions where no peace exists (such as in Darfur), casting the UN increasingly as a Western invader. In such situations the main issue should be to forge peace with the many different social and economic stakeholders in the field, especially because peace processes are difficult long-term endeavors. Fifth, Pronk pointed out the special case of Sudan, where war has lasted 50 years, with the government in Khartoum always pursuing the same strategy of divide and rule, both internally and with the international community. The UN decided to have two missions (in Southern Sudan and Darfur), although the various conflicts in Sudan require a joint solution. The unity of the country is an attractive option, but the deployment of two missions will allow the Sudanese government to play one off against the other. Sixth, the UN has hit its own financial, physical, and coordinational limits on its capacity to carry out peace operations. If counterproductive decisions are to be avoided during planning and at headquarters, this stalemate needs to be countered by a high-profile political department able to provide the DPKO with political information and to collect and analyze information on the areas of deployment. Furthermore, the Security Council, which is no longer seen as an impartial and independent body, should be reformed in a way that enables the UN to conduct effective peace operations.

Klaus Reinhardt, drawing an analogy to the lack of leadership in the British invasion of Afghanistan in 1842, commented that all the missions he had been deployed in (Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo) were no real successes. Mandates were unclear, and the participating

organizations were fighting each other rather than trying to find joint solutions. Leadership in this context is crucial to peacekeeping. Decisions by the leaders are needed in order to provide political guidance and strategy. It all starts with the mandate. Its clarity has a major influence on how successful a mission can be, and the backing of capitals has a large impact on how influential leadership can be. The key thing, according to Clausewitz, is for the participating military and civilians to have trust in the political leadership. Lack of such trust will have major implications for performance. Reinhardt added that the rule of law is fundamental when it comes to rebuilding countries.

Discussion

Souren Seraydarian started off the discussion by stating that the main reason for mission failure is often not the lack of political leadership on the ground but the lack of political will and consensus in the Security Council. Similarly, Danilo Türk stated that norm entrepreneurship, through which ideas are transformed into norms, is a very important international part of leadership. The light-footprint approach in Afghanistan, which has fostered local ownership of the peace process and the ability to react to political dynamics, illustrate the importance of such advances. Nevertheless, norms survive only for a limited time, and the opportunities they present must be seized while they are still open. Jan Pronk agreed that political backing is central to success but also declared the political decision-makers in the Security Council to be politically naïve, attributing the lack of leadership partly to the lack of learning in that body. Its decisions would eliminate the political room for maneuver in the implementation phase.

Referring to another problem of leadership, Peter Schumann noted that the split in the DPKO is likely to complicate the department's efforts to give political guidance. The Field Support Unit as an operational department will take away competencies, making coordination and leadership from headquarters more difficult than they already are. Wolfgang Seibel added that political leadership in the UN is undermined by the institutional weakness of the Secretariat vis-à-vis the Security Council. Strategic and vested interests of the Permanent Five members weaken the implementation of peace operations on the ground (as in Sudan).

Thomas Rid suggested that the problem could also be viewed differently, saying that there is too much "leadership"—in the sense of analysis, attention, and debate—on the economic and reconstruction side of peace operations. He believed that much more concern should be felt about those who have a vested interest in violence. Francesco Mancini mentioned that the Secretary General and the SRSGs have to take on at least two roles, that of political leaders and that of managerial leaders. Sometimes it might be difficult for one person to perform both. Dominik Bartsch added that the criteria for good leadership, according to the presentations, entail an element of emotional intelligence and that it would be interesting to determine how these attributes could be applied to the selection process for SRSGs.

Cedric de Coning recommended that leaders of peace operations be given increased training and that people remain realistic about the goals defined by and attributed to SRSGs. Jan Pronk disagreed with him, urging formulation of political objectives that go beyond immediately obtainable results. He held that political goals and ideals are necessary for complex processes of achieving peace and reducing poverty. Jacques Paul Klein commented that it is a structural problem that the DPA and the DPKO in New York are not able to control the political process in New York. A problem of leaders is that they are ultimately isolated actors and face multiple demands (from the Secretary General, the Security Council, ambassadors, NGOs, and parties in conflict). Dirk Salomons argued that idealism is necessary to foster hope. Manuel Fröhlich accentuated that the very work of the UN is a permanent challenge to combine idealism with realism. It may be that the experience with successful peace operations indicates a new understanding of power. It is one in which power's classical ingredients—economic and military resources—are complemented by a crucial, if

less tangible, asset: the UN's ability to convince a peace process's stakeholders to comply with a set of norms and values.

SESSION 3: LEARNING

Ariane Berthoin Antal showed that, contrary to traditional organization theory, many organizations today exhibit only rudimentary structural continuity. Their attributes are rather temporary and in flux. Rapidly changing economic, sociopolitical, and technological environments force organizations to adapt quickly to new ways of operation and production in order to survive, compete, and fulfill their mandates. Focusing on organizational learning, she illustrated that peacebuilding operations face three interrelated main challenges: (a) the learning of each participating organization, (b) interorganizational learning between international organizations and between international organizations and local actors, and (c) support of organizational learning by local actors. She then linked these layers of learning to different types of learning by introducing the distinction between optimizing procedures (single-loop learning) and broader change of procedures (double-loop learning).

Berthoin Antal emphasized the importance of understanding these distinctions and of identifying routines that have to be unlearned before learning can take place in peacebuilding. One should clarify when to apply which mode of learning. Depending on the challenges facing the organization, one department may have to engage in a mode of learning different from that taking place in other departments (thus requiring ambidexterity in learning). There are very different types of knowledge that can be used for and produced by learning or unlearning, such as factual, procedural, and conditional knowledge. Knowledge can be explicit or tacit. Because these different types of knowledge are all shared and learned in different ways within and between peacebuilding missions, it seems necessary to reflect on how to increase and share different kinds of knowledge.

As Berthoin Antal pointed out, this issue is linked to the question of how knowledge is processed (multistage or cyclical) and to the question of who learns in peacebuilding. She recommended that organizations engaged in peacebuilding apply the concepts and models from organizational learning theory to diagnose where they have strengths and weaknesses in learning. By looking at the stage model of organizational learning, for example, they can specify whether their organizations are skimping on certain stages of learning in peacebuilding. The cyclical model of knowledge creation permits the diagnosis of processes that may be underused, such as socialization. She suggested that international organizations consider how best to support local organizations through the stages of learning and cycles of knowledge. Lastly, Berthoin Antal stressed the need to recognize the barriers to organizational learning so that they can be overcome, and she identified supportive learning conditions that organizations can capitalize on.

Melanie Schreiner and Rüdiger Klimecki, whose presentation was entitled "Managing the Tension between Strong Identity Requests and Restricted Learning Capabilities," focused on their research project on learning processes and identity. Klimecki explained that recent scientific approaches to governance highlight the importance of organizational identities, especially if different actors within the organizational framework need to cooperate or coordinate. Because UN peace operations today require integrated governance responses as well as adaptive capacities, Klimecki and Schreiner assumed that strong common identities are central in these processes. Common identities can be defined by both the organization (organizational attributes are shared by all members) and social attributes (members feel part of a particular group). Developing a shared identity is a learning process based on discourse, communication, and behavioral observation. It draws on the input of participating actors as well. Organizational learning provides the background for problem-centered learning and the development of adaptive capacities.

Melanie Schreiner then showed that the fault lines influencing the development of a common identity might exist between world views (e.g., military vs. civil), between cultures (e.g., UN vs. NGOs), or between different logics of action. In this respect, UN peace operations are fragile because they need to cope with many different identities and a high level of organizational heterogeneity. This fragility limits the learning capabilities for identity-related and problem-centered learning.

Michael Bauer (University of Konstanz) explained how the ability of organizations to reform heavily depends on their organizational environment. If the organization's domain is rather homogenous, learning processes are expected to be more efficient than in heterogeneous environments. The size and purpose of an organization are also factors that influence how it learns. Small organizations appear to be more reactive to their environments than do large organizations, and single-purpose organizations seem to be easier to reform than multipurpose ones. Other important determinants of the ability to change and the speed of change are leadership skill and concerns about previous performance. Most reforms in international organizations do not take place in a revolutionary manner. They are rather incremental and tend to result more from internal developments than from external pressure.

In the final presentation of the third session, Thorsten Benner and Thomas Rid drew attention to the role of learning in the wider context of peace operations: learning in military organizations and learning in the bureaucracy of the UN Secretariat. Thorsten Benner presented preliminary results of a two-year research project on organizational learning in the UN peacebuilding apparatus, a study funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research. He concentrated on the change in the DPKO's self-perception from a "logistics and support command" for the blue-helmet troops to a knowledge-based organization engaged in multidimensional peace operations. Since the 1990s, the UN has slowly acquired a capacity for knowledge creation and management. It has only recently solidified through Guéhenno's Peacekeeping 2010 reform initiative.

Benner illustrated how the bureaucratic nature of large organizations such as the DPKO inevitably leads to a generalization that may eventually cause people to lose sight of each mission's particular context. One danger is the tendency simply to draw lessons from current headline missions and apply them directly to the next mission that needs to be planned quickly with few resources. Another danger is that of neglecting the political questions of peacekeeping that overarch the small day-to-day lessons. Benner proposed two conclusions: (a) the need to recognize that drawing and applying lessons is not a technocratic business but rather a craft, and (b) the importance of providing space for adversarial contestation of knowledge within both the bureaucracy (in relation to political principals) and the wider public.

Commenting on the learning panel, Karen Smith presented the results of a survey done by the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section in 2004. They showed that field staff perceives the information flow within and between the missions to be largely unsatisfactory. Although the UN has developed some "lessons learned," they often remain "lessons identified" because policies change rather slowly, if at all, stopping the learning process before its lessons are implemented. In order to effect policy changes, the Best Practices Section developed the best practices toolbox, which consists of three parts. The first consists of mission staff handover notes, which are now mandatory but which need improvement to minimize information gaps after staff rotation. In the second part, end-of-assignment reports filed by senior staff are brought together with surveys of practice. This combination yields useful insights, especially into the relationship between the mandate and the mission. The third step encompasses after-action reports to facilitate transparent evaluation of the missions. Lastly, recommendations need to be formulated so that future missions can act upon them. Smith identified the development of an open dialogue between different actors as one of the most crucial challenges. The point is not to start a "blame game" but rather to parallel the possibility of and trust in admitting one's own deficiencies. Peer-to-peer learning seems to be a very promising tool for direct knowledge exchange. In order to establish trust in the best practices

system, it is essential to demonstrate what happens with information and how this information has an impact on their work.

Asith Bhattacharjee pointed out that learning in the UN system is fundamentally different from learning in private-sector organizations. The UN is a highly complex organization consisting not only of member states with their own political dynamics but also of bodies and agencies with their own governance systems. Additionally, the UN encompasses many time-bound projects that have other learning conditions. Moreover, the decision-making processes differ strongly between the different charter bodies in the UN. They all need to be both inclusive and coherent, and all need to be included. Ambitious mission-to-mission and headquarters-to-mission learning processes take place as "best practices" that inform policies, as was the case during the initial stages of the mission in Côte d'Ivoire, which tried to avoid repeating the early mistakes of UNMIL. Except in isolated instances, however, the charter bodies composed of member states do not appear to benefit from the lessons learned by the practitioners on the ground. The Security Council in particular tends to ignore field reports because member states continue to follow only their particular national interests. At the operational (field) level, the learning process is continuous in peacekeeping and occurs under stress in fragile and highly diverse environments. These factors, too, are what makes learning so challenging in the UN system.

Discussion

In the debate that followed, Nancy Roberts suggested distinguishing between real learning and symbolic learning. Real learning leads to changes of procedures and structures, whereas the only goal of symbolic learning is to give legitimacy to an organizational entity by pretending to learn without touching the organization's core. Ariane Berthoin Antal responded that doctrinal learning poses the danger that staff may feel called upon to produce doctrines without really incorporating learning effects. Yet people need to be encouraged to learn. Doctrinal development might therefore kick-start reflection and learning. However, small packages of doctrines may be more conducive to the development of learning across organizational types than big doctrinal accumulations are. Thomas Rid pointed out that the division of labor between civilians and the military as well as within the military is one of the major obstacles to cross-fertilization in peacekeeping because diverging experiences, in particular traumatic ones, lead to dysfunctional learning processes. The ability of UN missions to learn depends largely on the ability to create a common culture of learning that builds upon, rather than replaces, the existing cultures of the actors.

Jan Pronk remarked that in peacekeeping, one-size-fits-all solutions are more prevalent than situation- and context-tailored ones. He suggested that one learn more from past experiences with how to handle the complex processes when reforming and interacting with other societies. As in the case of France and Algeria, learning from a nation's worst experience is very difficult because it touches the very identity of the nation. As for UN peace operations, Pronk proposed the construction of a UN-wide career system covering all different organizations and peace operations. He also argued that the tension between the resources given to peace operations and the implementation ability of those missions could be partly resolved if more authority were given to the field offices of peace operations.

Dominik Bartsch noted that the challenge is not to encourage learning—a large amount of learning is taking place in the UN system and occurs continuously in the field—but rather to systematize this learning and channel it back into the institutions. Cedric de Coning referred also to the large amount of informal knowledge and self-learning processes already taking place. Dirk Salomons mentioned the example of the UN's mine-action service as an initially informal and then institutionalized focal point for a broad epistemic community. The service has led to a coordinated normative program that joins UN agencies, governments, NGOs, and commercial firms in a network of common standards and common practice.

Winrich Kühne called attention to the importance of the priority of political over military action and to lessons learned from past peace operations. He quoted the Rumsfeld war doctrine as applied recently in Iraq as a typical case in which ideological political thinking led to disastrous failure to heed past lessons. Responding to Asith Bhattacharjee, Rüdiger Klimecki supposed that the Charter bodies could also learn but that they might not listen to certain audiences and might find other ways of learning. Hence, the development of doctrine hinders learning by narrowing the ways to learn but may also open possibilities for integrating new paradigms and perspectives into existing doctrines. Danilo Türk highlighted the importance of the relationship between the UN and regional organizations for learning. Several regional organizations (e.g., the African Union) are becoming more assertive, a change that will challenge the UN approaches.

Peter Schumann stated that most learning takes place in the deployment period of UN peace operations. He also mentioned the important role SRSGs can have in encouraging learning and maintained that the SRSGs from outside the UN system were more innovative and curious than those within it. Furthermore, lessons already learned have gone untapped in the history of peacekeeping (as in Somalia), even though the resemblance between present and past conditions and experiences makes those lessons relevant. Michael Barzelay subsequently argued that lessons learned would have an impact only if leaders make the knowledge available. Susanna Campbell argued that the context for learning might be very important to knowing when learning will be successful. Till Blume asked both practitioners and scholars what relation day-to-day adaptation processes in peace operations have to learning and whether there are different mechanisms for intra- and inter-mission learning.

SESSION 4: ROUNDTABLE: "WHAT'S NEXT—STEPS FOR THE UN TO TAKE"

Winrich Kühne opened the roundtable by addressing the problem of the ever-increasing complexity and number of peace operations and the proliferation of actors and organizations in the field. This complexity is far beyond the absorptive capacity of the UN's decision-making process and bureaucracy. He also warned that the diversity of peace operations makes it difficult to generalize about them. Academic research also tends to neglect the highly political dimension of peace operations and peacebuilding. Future research should address three fundamental communication gaps in particular: (a) between the field and headquarters, (b) between international conflict-management practitioners and analysts on the one hand and between political decision-makers and parliamentarians on the other, and (c) between "us" (e.g., researchers and practitioners) and the broader public.

Kühne also argued that the diversity of actors involved in peacebuilding in the field, each having their own bureaucracy and self-interest, pose profound structural obstacles to coordination. Strong, transformational charismatic leaders of peace operations seem to be more successful in coping with this reality than do leaders with a bureaucratic-technocratic mentality.

Regarding the value of lessons learned, he noted that most lessons disappear in the "Bermuda triangle" of the Security Council, although much has happened in this vein in the DPKO and other UN department and actors. In the Council two often diametrically opposed processes clash, one coming from the field into the UN Secretariat and the other coming from the capitals of the member states and from their constituencies. Kühne concluded by emphasizing the need for a fundamental debate on the kind of missions that should be envisaged. In the missions there is a growing feeling that the present design is less than satisfactory. A new, fourth generation of missions may be needed.

William J. Durch spoke on the development of peace operations with special emphasis on police. He pointed out that the UN is not very adept at managing initial military interventions and suppression of violence and that other institutions (regional organizations or coali-

tions of states) would be better alternatives for such missions. A great many new UN operations do involve Chapter VII mandates, recognizing that force may be necessary to carry out the mandate. UN operations can resort to force up to a certain threshold, one that operations in Haiti and Congo may have reached already.

Concerning the doctrinal evolution of UN peace operations, he stated that member states had previously rejected the creation of any UN peacekeeping doctrine but that the current complex and dangerous operations demand a tough doctrine. Member states have finally recognized that the adoption of a tough peacekeeping doctrine would have three implications: (a) improved coordination and cohesion of forces on the ground, for the UN's expectations of the states would be clearer than they presently are; (b) a risk that the Security Council will craft mandates that exceed even expanded UN personnel and logistical capacities; and (c) continuing lack of precommitments of forces from member states that are "ready to fight" to fulfill such mandates.

Durch commented that a strategic information-management capacity and a rapid deployment of police and rule-of-law personnel are critical pieces missing in the current restructuring process of the DPKO. Subsequently, he proposed three measures to remedy the shortcomings in the UN public security presence: a standing Rule of Law Capacity of 400 staff, a UN police reserve to replace the current system of UN Police, and a UN senior reserve service of retired personnel.

Durch also emphasized an important lesson learned—the fact that operations still need the consent of the local parties involved, either their buy-in to the peace process or their eventual acquiescence to forceful intervention designed to create peace or save lives. He concluded with three observations. First, the real costs of non-UN peace operations are much higher than those of the UN, largely because of the lower personnel costs of current UN troop contributors. Second, democracy's evolutionary timeline is much longer than the political attention spans of current democracies. And third, protecting foreign civilians is clearly at odds with protecting the UN's own forces, justifying troop losses to domestic audiences, and defending consequent preferences for low-risk operations.

Dirk Salomons raised the question of the extent to which the UN system still has both the credibility and the capacity for nation-building, peacekeeping, and particularly peacebuilding. Thus far, the UN has responded to the challenges of the 21st century by relying on the organizational framework designed in the 1940s. Moreover, there is a clear lack of leadership in the Security Council. This situation leaves a huge black hole in international law. It diminishes the legitimacy of international interventions and often causes the UN to be perceived as an extension of Western civilization, even of imperialism. Salomons emphasized the increasing importance of regional organizations as partners in peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Concerning the UN's capacity to link peacekeeping and peacebuilding, he argued that the Peacebuilding Commission falls short on most accounts because of its intergovernmental dispositions and consensual provisions, its difficulties with bringing all development actors together, and its lack of additional funding. As he saw it, the technical and operational capacity to contribute to postconflict recovery existed, but the political and moral foundation of nation-building and peacebuilding was still missing.

Danilo Türk noted that the UN has transformed from a largely diplomatic organization into a much more operational one. But because operational changes are always a possibility, they are not necessarily accompanied by changes in mechanisms of governance. He argued that the idea of a permanent UN military capacity should not be discarded, and he emphasized the need for the UN to create cooperative frameworks with regional organizations, especially the African Union. Türk criticized the abiding weakness of the UN Secretariat's political capacity to cope the tasks ahead and made several recommendations to fortify it. First, he saw it necessary to give the Secretariat a stronger Department of Political Affairs. Second, he advised strengthening the policy group of the Secretary General so that stronger proposals can be brought before the Security Council. Third, he proposed that the structure of the executive committees be preserved and strengthened. Lastly, he

argued for improvement of the Secretariat's information-management systems. As for the field level, Türk pointed to the need for a more coherent vision of local ownership in the political sphere and to the critical importance of the rule of law in postconflict peacebuilding, especially with respect to organized crime.

Discussion

Dominik Bartsch pointed out that it is too early to declare that the Peacebuilding Commission has failed. The Peacebuilding Commission is a brand-new body that clearly needs more time to prove itself. Initial indications are that the Commission has made a positive contribution to sustaining the peace process in the first two countries it has dealt with: Burundi and Sierra Leone. Souren Seraydarian saw a major role for the Peacebuilding Commission and noted that the credibility of the whole UN system was at stake after the invasion of Iraq. The Peacebuilding Commission could be one remedy.

Jan Pronk argued that the credibility of peacekeeping is linked to the credibility of the system as a whole. In his opinion the UN should decide to focus on major threats and leave traditional development activities to others. In other words, the whole system needs to be reformed. He saw the UN losing credibility, especially if it foregoes reform of its major governing bodies. He proposed that the Security Council be reformed, with Europe and other regions receiving only one seat, and that the influence of civil society be increased in the UN system. With respect to agenda-setting, Pronk found the role of the European Commission and the European Council within the EU's political system much stronger than that of the Secretariat and the Security Council within the UN system, for the European Commission has the sole right to initiate legislation. He suggested that the comparison might but useful for reform of the UN system.

Jacques Paul Klein agreed there was a need to train police and military to improve the quality of current capacities. Volker Rittberger expressed reservations about the recurrent emphasis on charismatic leadership. He, too, proposed that the UN's governance mechanisms be moved toward certain aspects of the EU. Manuel Fröhlich expressed his discontent about the terminology. In his opinion the constant focus on "reform" implies a continuous state of malfunction, whereas reform is actually the permanent modus operandi of the UN. From that perspective, it would be more appropriate to speak of strengthening the UN rather than reforming it. The Peacebuilding Commission, therefore, should try to assume responsibility gradually. There will be no better legitimacy for the Commission than the reference to established successes. They, in turn, will give it even more political prominence and leeway over time.

Cedric de Coning called to mind the proliferation of predominantly enforcement-type operations and wondered how this kind of mission creep developed in the Security Council. In terms of challenges relating to the responsibility to protect, he stressed that simple technical military solutions can escalate conflicts. The undesirability of such outcomes underlines the importance of charismatic leadership, persuasion, and diplomacy. Danilo Türk acknowledged that the talk about reform takes away the responsibility to tackle problems and look for solutions. He was not convinced that a change in the constitutional structure of the UN will necessarily yield better results. Moreover, he argued that the cooperative dynamics between the UN and regional organizations are likely to gain momentum and importance. Referring to the Peacebuilding Commission, Türk said that the multi-stakeholder structure should be retained, although some of the original ideas had been watered down even as it was created.

Dirk Salomons agreed that one should not despair before the Peacebuilding Commission has been given a chance. With regard to troop structure, he voiced his concern that developing countries are providing most of the peacekeeping troops, whereas the industrialized nations shun such commitment. Some pay in blood; others, in cash. This pattern sends the wrong message to the international community. Salomons hoped that the Peacebuilding Commission would eventually become the single voice for postconflict recovery and poverty

alleviation as a key strategy for avoiding recurrence of violence. Lastly, Salomons claimed that the whole concept of integrated mission is flawed, that the constraints of assessed contributions limit its outreach. Much of the implementation of peace operations depends on voluntary contributions, which are volatile and unreliable for programming.

Responding to Jacques Paul Klein's question about troops, William Durch pointed out major achievements of the current system. For example, it was now a requirement that troop contingents be properly equipped, preinstructed, and trained according to UN standards and that they abide by UN rules of conduct. With respect to Cedric de Coning's question, he answered that mission creep ensued from a do-something attitude of the Security Council in a situation where the Council and major military powers had not been willing to take the political and military action themselves.

Winrich Kühne concluded the panel discussion by noting that there is considerable controversy about the current state of the UN and what would be necessary for substantial reform. There is therefore definitely the need for further research. He also came back to Wolfgang Seibel and Volker Rittberger's introductory statements about peace operations, noting that the statistics, as bad as they may be, show that the number of fatalities has dramatically fallen. As for the question of alternatives, Kühne's advice was to be critical when looking to the EU. For example, the operational relationship between the European Commission and the European Council is miserable. He emphasized that the international community is facing a crisis of the impact of multilateralism, a situation that is reducing its credibility and legitimacy.

WRAP-UP AND FINAL DISCUSSION

Wolfgang Seibel reemphasized the experimental character of the conference and referred to several central issues that, in his perception, explicitly or implicitly had shaped the discussions of the event. In general, the challenging task for students of peace operations, according to Seibel, is to combine two divergent research perspectives. On the one hand, research on UN peace operations should be guided by theoretically grounded hypotheses and by a more realistic notion of world politics. It should include the geopolitical shifts of the post-Cold War era and the way in which the UN and important regional organizations, especially the EU and NATO, have reacted to them. On the other hand, empirical research on the reality of peace operations needs to adopt a down-to-earth, more ethnographic approach. That is, reliance on participant observation by "embedded researchers" should be vastly increased at the field level.

Seibel drew four specific conclusions from the conference proceedings. First, the initial analytical categories, such as the distinction between type I and type II organizations, need to be applied with great caution. Despite sometimes having a network-like and fuzzy character, peace operations are relatively solid organizations and bureaucratic mechanisms. By the same token, coordination, leadership, and learning need to be conceived of as mutually connected components whose dissection for analytical purposes remains ambiguous.

Second, researchers should resist the attempt to develop a kind of recipe book promising miraculous improvement in peace operations. They should rather try to make sense of the world by identifying appropriate units of analysis for theory-guided testing of hypotheses. These units could include (a) cases of learning and organizational behavior, (b) segments of peace operations that are crucial to success and failure, (c) the role of spoilers, (d) the role of leaders, or (e) cross-dimensional issues such as coordination, leadership, and learning.

> (a) Looking deeper into learning processes, one finds basic mechanisms that not only relate to learning but improve understanding of how learning and unlearning may actually function. It seems that the main impediments to learning are power fragmentation and cognitive dissonances. The latter can be helpful for analyzing why certain things are not learned or not unlearned by individuals. One corresponding unit of

analysis could thus be the field staff of peace operations. The same holds true for the fragmentation of power. Seibel recalled the famous phrase by Karl W. Deutsch, to whom power is the "ability to afford not to learn."

(b) Units of analysis can also be identified through study of policy components that are crucial to the success or failure of peace operations. The components could be analyzed in the form of exemplary case studies. The establishment of rule-of-law institutions would be a suitable focus of interest, for instance.

(c) Similarly, the role of spoilers can be considered more systematically than it has been thus far and can be analyzed through comparative case studies.

(d) The role of leaders and leadership is under-researched. For instance, study of SRSG performance is highly desirable. Quantitative surveys such as the ones presented by Manuel Fröhlich should be complemented by comparative case studies in an attempt to reveal why some SRSGs have been more successful than others.

(e) Cross-dimensional issues, such as coordination, leadership, and learning, remain highly relevant for further research. However, it should cover several dimensions (vertical, horizontal, and cross-institutional) rather than only isolated segments of peace operations (such as the field level). Coordination, for example, is also a pressing issue in the relationship between UN headquarters and member states. And learning is a multilayered process involving the Security Council, member states, UN headquarters, and field-level officials. Moreover, public opinion—in the international realm, in the domestic arenas of pivotal states, and in conflict areas—is a worthwhile unit of analysis for framing patterns and normative justifications for peace operations. Another topic calling for additional research is the ways in which public opinion has an impact on the ability of member states to draw lessons from peace operations. Lastly, the role of political entrepreneurs using the media and investing their personal social capital for agenda-setting purposes has been largely neglected in the mainstream literature on peace operations.

Third, Seibel addressed some pragmatic implications of the conference. The "human factor" apparently has a huge impact on whether peace operations are able to cope successfully with the virtually insolvable problems confronting them. If it really does, then academic training, among other things, has to focus on coping techniques. Accordingly, Seibel urged practitioners to participate in academic teaching.

Fourth, the complementary nature of ideals and compromises should be acknowledged. Certain flaws and weaknesses of peace operations are intrinsic to the structural flaws and weaknesses of the UN itself. Again, it is crucial not just to foster ideals but to help create coping and problem-solving mechanisms that make second-best, but realistic, solutions both feasible and acceptable. However, training needs to be based on standards of morality and good governance in order to avoid educating peacebuilding technocrats.

Discussion

Jacques Paul Klein pressed for discussion of peace operations that also considers the increase of private security companies (PSCs). He argued that PSCs could be a valuable tool for humanitarian purposes as well. Thomas Rid, Jan Pronk, and Winrich Kühne were rather critical of privatizing security. Rid argued that the political planning horizon would be shortened even more than it already is because PSCs have more interest in profit than outcome. Pronk made a strong point for public and democratic supervision of security and peacekeeping functions. Kühne argued that an increase in well-trained governmental staff is needed rather than re-recruitment of former police staff for private companies.

Pronk continued by arguing that the discourse on peacekeeping should also address the fundamental types of peacekeeping that are required and the kind of soldiers that are needed for each type. A classic example is the discussion about the role of police and that of military units in providing security in postconflict settings. For example, there is a need for additional study of police functions in peace operations. Jan Pronk encouraged continuation of research on peacekeeping because there is a strong need for it, especially when looking beyond the intra-mission dimension to the environment in which peace operations are taking place (why, when, what kind of, and how peacekeeping is done). Research activities should increase, especially in Europe and Germany.

Kühne argued that future research should take stock and advantage of past research and policy work in order to avoid redundancy. Furthermore, the ability of academics to speak to practitioners and politicians has to be improved. Kühne also argued for improvement of the relationship between the public on the one hand and politicians and experts on the other in matters of peace operations. As currently seen in Germany, debates will persist, and there is a growing misunderstanding of and cleavage between public arguments, normative foundations of foreign policy, and the need for continued involvement abroad.

Souren Seraydarian recommended intensified discussion of the role played by regional organizations such as the EU. However, he was wary of the question about whether the EU should be seen as an example for the UN, for coordination between the European Council and the European Commission is very difficult. The role of the EU will increase once it agrees on a common foreign policy and on technical bodies. Philipp Rotmann underscored the need for additional field-level research that takes account of both the wider picture of peace operations and local knowledge.

Peter Schumann, commenting on future research strategies, noted the need for further analysis but also for a broadened scope of analysis that encompasses the output and macro-effects of peace operations and peacebuilding (such as the eradication of poverty). Furthermore, cooperation between and inclusion of beneficiaries and researchers from the countries hosting peace operations should be increased in research programs through scholarships and research grants. Schumann also argued that research on peace operations should be separated from the very complex and intricate reform discussions in the UN Secretariat because field operations have their own dynamics. With regard to the role of the public in Germany, Schumann had the impression that few journalists do extensive field research. Universities could also be more proactive in disseminating information about conflicts and peacebuilding strategies. As a recommendation to the Security Council and the Secretariat, the number of military troops in peace operations should be decreased.

Jacques Paul Klein mentioned the need for training and well-trained staff for peace operations, especially where police are concerned. A closer look should be taken at where staff comes from: government service or private companies. Dominik Bartsch stressed the need to increase the relevance of policy research from German academic institutions by basing it on direct contacts with the UN in New York. Nancy Roberts argued that research should intensify its focus on the difficulties that change agents face in organizational reforms.

Wolfgang Seibel concluded by proposing that both research and practice could benefit from “embedded researchers” directly involved in participant observation of how peace operations work and function. In terms of public debates on peace operations, journalists also play a crucial role in conveying the right message—that the translation of research results into everyday language needs to be improved and that research must move closer to real-world perceptual patterns than it currently is.

SPEAKERS AND PARTICIPANTS

Altenberg, Jöran	Student, Department of Political Science, University of Freiburg
Antal, David	Editor and translator, Berlin
Balint, Tim	Research Associate, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz
Bartsch, Dominik	Senior Strategic Planning Officer, Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), Executive Office of the Secretary General of the United Nations, New York
Barzelay, Michael	Professor of Public Management in the Department of Management, London School of Economics and Political Science
Bauer, Michael W.	Assistant Professor, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz
Beckmann, Ute	Lawyer, Rödl&Partner, Nuremberg
Benner, Thorsten	Associate Director, Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin
Berthoin Antal, Ariane	Acting Director, Research Unit on “Innovation and Organization,” Social Science Research Center (WZB), Berlin
Bhattacharjee, Asith	Senior Political Adviser, Office of D/SRSG (Operations and Rule of Law), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Monrovia
Blatter, Joachim	Professor, Department of Public Administration, Erasmus University, Rotterdam
Blume, Till	Research Associate, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz
Campbell, Susanna	Ph.D. Candidate, Fletcher School, Tufts University, Boston
Cherbuliez, Johannes	Student Assistant, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz
De Coning, Cedric	Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, and African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), Durban
Denskus, Tobias	Institute of Development Studies (IDS), Sussex, UK
Doering, Sebastian	Student, Department of Politics and Management University of Konstanz
Durch, William J.	Senior Associate and Codirector, Future of Peace Operations Program, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C.
Eisenbeiss, Silke	Research Associate, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz
Fröhlich, Manuel	Junior Professor, Institute of Political Science, University of Jena
Giessner, Steffen	Postdoctoral Fellow, Erasmus University, Rotterdam
Gräber, Stefanie	Student Assistant, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz
Hainzinger, Johannes	Student Assistant, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz

Hansen, Wibke	Head of Analysis Unit, Center for International Peace Operations [Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze, ZIF], Berlin
Hübner, Isabela	Formerly OCHA/OHCHR Angola
Junk, Julian	Research Associate, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz
Kaspersen, Anja Therese	Director, Project on Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Klein, Jacques P.	Former Special Representative of the Secretary General for Liberia, United Nations Mission in Liberia, Monrovia
Klimecki, Rüdiger G.	Professor, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz
Knill, Christoph	Professor, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz
Kühne, Winrich	Director, Center for International Peace Operations [Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze, ZIF], Berlin
Lipson, Michael	Associate Professor, Department of Political Science Concordia University, Montreal
Mancini, Francesco	Associate, International Peace Academy, New York
Mergenthaler, Stephan	Research Associate, Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin
Moje, Carolin	Student, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin
Nold, Verena	Student Assistant, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz
Park, Sabine	Lawyer, Amnesty International, Amsterdam
Pietz, Tobias	Project Coordinator, Center for International Peace Operations [Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze, ZIF], Berlin
Pronk, Jan	Professor, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague
Provan, Keith G.	Professor, Eller College of Management, University of Arizona, Tucson
Raab, Jörg	Assistant Professor, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Tilburg University
Reinhardt, Klaus	Former NATO Commander of Allied Land Forces Central Europe, German Armed Forces
Rentl, Michaela	Student Assistant, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz
Rid, Thomas	Research Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), John Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.
Rieck, Christian	Student, Humboldt University, Berlin
Rittberger, Volker	Professor and Director of the Center for International Relations and Peace Studies, University of Tübingen
Roberts, Nancy	Professor, Department of Defense Analysis, Naval University, Monterey

Roth, Florian	Student Assistant, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz
Rotmann, Philipp	Research Associate, Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin
Salomons, Dirk	Director of the Humanitarian Affairs Program, Columbia University, New York
Sappelt, Sven	Coordinator MA Programmes, Center of Excellence, University of Konstanz
Schöndorf, Elisabeth	Research Associate, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz
Schreiner, Melanie	Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz
Schumann, Peter	Regional Representative, United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), Juba
Seibel, Wolfgang	Professor, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz
Seraydarian, Souren G.	Former Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, United Nations Mission in Liberia, Monrovia
Smith, Karen	Best Practice Officer, Best Practices Section, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, New York
Soeters, Joseph	Professor, Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda
Trettin, Frederik	Student Assistant, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz
Türk, Danilo	Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ljubljana
Weinlich, Silke	Research Associate, Institute for Intercultural and International Studies, University of Bremen
Zapf, Martina	Student Assistant, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz
Zech, Martin Johannes	Junior Professional Officer, UNHCR