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Kees van Kersbergen
The Disenchantment of Politics

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Preface: Politics and Integration

This paper, which is very much work in progress, tries to give an impression of a project that I am working on during my stay at the “kulturwissenschaftliches Kolleg”. The goal of the venture is to understand better the current malaise in and of democratic politics. Before I present it, I would like to expound briefly how one could see, from a political science point of view, the link between (democratic) politics and the social and cultural constitution, that is to say, how this particular project might be thought to be connected with the general theme of the cultural dimension of social and political integration.

There is a long tradition of comparative research – starting with De Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* (2000 [originally 1835–1849]) via Almond and Verba’s (1963) *The Civic Culture* to Putnam’s *Making Democracy Work* and further – that connects the fate of democracy to the vitality of civil society. In recent decades, we have learned much about how social capital, that is to say, people’s extended bonds within and between social networks, and trust function as the societal glue, which holds a society together. This adhesive also secures, to cross-nationally variable degrees of course, an orderly, stable, vital and well-performing democratic system and a healthy political life. Although recently receiving somewhat less attention, we also know quite a bit about the reverse causal arrow, namely how democratic politics can help to pacify and resolve deep social, economic and cultural conflicts and how politics contributes to societal and cultural integration (particularly, but not exclusively, through consociational devices, see Steiner and Ertman 2002).

Indeed, politics is decisive for the fate of society (which can be anything between the extremes of thriving existence and total breakdown) and concerns all social activities of (groups of) individuals to handle their collective problems and resolve their conflicts of interests. Ultimately, it is the threat of violence, also in democracies, which is the most important source of power in the struggle over who decides which collective solutions will prevail. Constitutional democracies, however, are polities that have institutionalized the conditions under which public power, which is ultimately derived from the sovereign demos, is to be accumulated, distributed, constrained and exercised legitimately and without the use of brute force or naked violence. Democratic politics is therefore the legitimate way of competing for and acquiring the constrained public power to make decisions for a society as a whole – and of enforcing those decisions. Such collective choice usually takes the form of public laws, policies and regulations and is the authoritative means by which society is ordered, disciplined, coordinated, organized, controlled, monitored, punished, directed, corrected or – in a word – ruled.

Echoing Bernard Crick’s (1962) renowned defense of politics, Stoker (2006: 7) has recently given a passionate justification of the importance of (democratic) politics: “politics can provide a means of getting on with your fellow human beings that aims to find a way forward through reconciliation and compromise without recourse to straightforward coercion or outright violence. It provides a way to live in an ordered manner with your neighbours, but one that unavoidably often calls on you to sign up to deals and compromises that might not be your first or even tenth choice, but which nevertheless have

something in them that enables you to put up with them. It might not be very inspiring, but when it works politics delivers one great benefit: it enables you to choose, within constraints, the life you want without fear of physical coercion and violence being used against you. Politics creates space for human choice and diverse lifestyles. Politics, if done well, creates the positive context and stable environment for you to live your life. That's why politics matters."

(Democratic) politics, then, is critical for the integration of modern societies, each and every one of which is after all, to varying degrees, characterized by large differences between citizens in sources of power, identities, interests, and opinions. Politics in general is the way in which the social and cultural conflicts, which emanate from these differences, are dealt with in an imposing yet non-violent way. Democratic politics goes one step further, for the reason that it aims to solve potentially disruptive conflicts by institutionalizing both the conflict lines themselves (as with the translation of social and cultural cleavages into parties and political institutions) and the solutions to deal with such conflicts (as in public laws, policies and regulations). When democratic politics fails to live up to the promise of peaceful reconciliation, the constitution of society is at risk.

The distressing observation, which motivates this project, is that – in spite of growing popularity of democracy as a political regime around the globe – all well established (and new) democracies are confronted with increasing public dissatisfaction and disillusionment with politics. Ultimately, this is not only jeopardizing democracy as a system of governance, but is also endangering the brittle fabric of a well integrated society. No political regime is eternal, I assume, but we might want to try to prolong democracy's life somewhat more.

1. Introduction: The Paradox of Democracy and Universal Disaffection

It is difficult not to notice the great paradox of democratic politics of our time. On the one hand, if anything, in the past three decades, we have witnessed the increasing esteem, legitimacy and triumph of democracy as a regime throughout the world, while, on the other hand, we have been observing an increasing dissatisfaction with politics and the loss of confidence in the performance of government in new and well established democracies. Democracy is at once becoming more and less well-liked, or so it seems.

If we look at the bright side we see that – in spite of a recent setback – there has been a remarkable increase in the number of countries with a free and democratic political system in the past thirty years or so, from 42 (24 per cent) in 1974 to 90 (47 per cent) in 2007, and a decline in the number of not free countries, from 64 (41 per cent) to 43 (22 per cent) over the same period). In 2007, about 46 per cent (3,004,990,000 people) of the world's population lived in a free country (www.freedomhouse.org; access date 20 March 2008; Puddington 2007). Moreover, support for democracy as the best possible form of government is remarkably high in all regions of the world. The World Values Survey, for instance, includes the thesis "Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government". In all nations except one (Nigeria) an overwhelming majority (ranging from 62 per cent in Russia to 99 per cent in Denmark) of respondents agrees with this statement (data reported in Inglehart 2007).

At the same time, however, there is a dark side, since all well established democracies are confronted with increasing dissatisfaction and disillusionment with politics. This is evidenced by such indicators as the decline in electoral turnout and party membership,

increasing voter volatility (= decreasing partisan commitment), dwindling levels of trust in political institutions and actors, and growing political cynicism. Such developments are accompanied by “a clear tendency for political elites to match citizen disengagement with a withdrawal of their own. Just as voters retreat to their own particularized spheres of interest, so too have political and party leaders withdrawn into the closed world of the governing institutions. Both sides are cutting loose” (Mair 2006: 45).

Particularly intriguing is the observation (on the basis of data from the World Values Survey; Hay 2007) that although democracy is considered to be the best form of government, there is declining support for democracy as inherently a good form of government. As Hay (2007: 33) explains this discrepancy, there is evidence for “a rising tide of cynicism and fatalism about the capacity of even the best – democratic – system of government to provide good outcomes”. If democracy is considered to be the best form of government, but not essentially a good form, and if at the same time satisfaction with this least bad alternative is declining, then its future as a, in all senses, popular form of governance is perhaps more gloomy than some may believe.

One might add, somewhat speculative perhaps, but no less worrisome, that decreasing expectations in the established and advanced democratic world of what this system of governance is capable of delivering, may reinforce what Freedom House recently has identified as “freedom stagnation”, namely that “the percentage of countries designated as Free has failed to increase for nearly a decade” (Puddington 2007: n.p.). Increasing levels of political disaffection in advanced democracies may not only dampen popular expectations in countries that are currently not free (after all, why put your hopes on a system that apparently generates estrangement among the public in free countries?), but may also negatively affect the autocratic elites’ appraisal of “the people” as a possible source of legitimate political power and, accordingly, lessen their willingness even to engage in (small-scale) democratic experiments.

The explanations for the disquieting reality in advanced democracies are manifold, ranging from those who emphasize bad performance of economic and political institutions, to those who highlight lack of social capital and civic engagement as causes of the public’s distrust of politics and declining democratic proclivities. A survey of the literature (see section 2) shows that actually only a small number of accounts stress as the source of political disengagement the questionable role of a worn-out, unimaginative and deficient political elite and ill-adapted political institutions more generally. Most (academic and journalistic) accounts are, certainly, very critical of what political parties and politicians do, but remain generally supportive of politics as a process and of democracy as a regime. However, in one way or another, directly or indirectly, they tend to blame the citizen for a lack of commitment to and responsibility for the public domain.

The political elites in established democracies certainly blame the citizens. They have since long discovered, even before dissatisfaction was expressed in popular and electoral political apathy or protest (for instance very low turnout, populist revolts, inexplicable electoral swings), that their position is threatened by declining popular support, not haphazardly for the political party upon which their own power depends, but systematically for the very political order of which their parties are an intrinsic constituent. Everywhere they have started to experiment with political-institutional innovations to remedy the dissatisfaction and disillusionment with politics among citizens and cope with the ensuing problems of legitimacy and effectiveness of the system. Interestingly enough, contradictory

solutions – depending on the specific historical, institutional and political context of a country – are contemplated, including increasing and decreasing electoral proportionality, strengthening and weakening parliamentary power, centralizing and decentralizing public administration, expanding and contracting the authority of the executive, outsourcing and reclaiming public power, broadening and narrowing the opportunities for political participation and contestation, et cetera.

The most conspicuous fact of all this is perhaps not the contradictory nature of the various experiments in democratic engineering we observe, but rather that evidently in all established democracies, no matter what system prevails, elites consider reforms of the system of governance necessary as they are faced with citizens who do not seem prepared or are ill equipped to fulfil their political duties. We are facing the puzzling and disquieting truth that political disaffection is a universal attribute of established democracies and that citizens are to be blamed for this unhappy condition.

It seems to me, however, that too many enquiries into this sorry condition suffer from a biased and therefore incomplete understanding of the democratic predicament as exclusively or ultimately caused by citizens. I claim that in order to be able to capture better the current democratic predicament, explain it, and reflect on its possible consequences, we need to rethink the very issue, conceptualizing the problem, not so much in terms of the disaffection and disengagement of the public or the malfunctioning of the political elite, but above all in terms of the relationship between the political elite (the rulers) and the public (the ruled), a relationship that is deteriorating. This relationship is fundamentally one of exchange and power and I conceptualize it in terms of political allegiance.

My central question, then, is the following: why is it that – despite widely varying institutional arrangements, political histories, cleavage structures, cultural traditions, socioeconomic conditions, et cetera, and despite the world-wide popularity of democracy as a political regime – all well established democracies are confronted with the decline of political allegiance, that is to say, a deteriorating relationship of exchange and power between the rulers (political elite, government) and the ruled (people, citizens, voters)? My thesis is that the decline of political allegiance results from the disenchantment of politics. With the notion of the disenchantment of politics, I try to capture what I see as the deep sources of the large variety of phenomena that are usually interpreted as the disillusionment and disengagement with politics and the decline of public confidence in the institutions of politics and government, that is, what I have just proposed to reconceptualize as political allegiance. The concept of disenchantment refers to the gradual elimination of politics as an instrument of this-worldly salvation. To anticipate my line of reasoning below, it is the loss of the transformative vista of politics itself (enchanted political projects, missions), which lies at the heart of waning political allegiance.

2. The Current Predicament of Political Disengagement and Disillusionment

The current democratic predicament of political disengagement and disillusionment is not a problem that recently occurred or that has just been discovered by social and political scientists. Thirty years ago, the political discontent was already interpreted as a result of demand overload that produced the ungovernability of advanced democratic society. This added up to nothing less than the crisis of democracy as a system of governance (Crozier et al. 1975). And almost 15 years ago, Eckstein (1992: 259) observed a malaise about authority which “seems to exist concurrently with the progressive growth of what people

supposedly (and no doubt actually) want authority to be: decent, down to earth, participant, lenient, concordant, open to achievement”.

Some recent comprehensive and empirically informed studies (Stoker 2006; Hay 2007; Hay and Stoker 2007) reject most (speculative) explanations of political dissatisfaction, because careful scrutiny of the available evidence shows that these are hardly supported by the facts. Until recently, most explanations of political disaffection and disengagement have been citizen or demand-side oriented, with a tendency “to see its origins as resting not with changes in the supply of political goods so much as with changes in the responsiveness to, and desire for, such goods by their political consumers” (Hay 2007: 39). The dominant conviction seems to be that, when all is said and done, there is something wrong with “the people”, the public, or the citizen: (s)he lacks social capital and trust, is deprived socioeconomically and culturally, lacks information about good governance or is simply better informed by the media about bad than about good performance, has no interest in politics, does not participate, is too individualized and calculating, is indifferent to what politicians do, simply lacks the intellectual capacity to understand politics, or has rising expectations that can never be met (for excellent overviews see Stoker 2006; Hay 2007). The modern disengaged citizen is eager to claim rights (for instance freedom of expression), but fails to appreciate that these rights come with (participatory) obligations to the very system that guarantees them. The citizenry is criticized for ignoring that voting, for instance, is both a political right and a moral obligation or civic duty.

Increased dissatisfaction stems from citizens’ wrong comprehension of how democratic politics essentially and necessarily works (Stoker 2006). Citizens do not appreciate that democratic politics is meant to effect collective decisions that ultimately (may) involve the violation of their individual interests, rights and freedom. Citizens who are allowed to participate in decision making, then, in the end fail to appreciate that decisions with which they disagree are, even so, rightfully imposed upon them. In short, citizens seem to forget that the democratic system of governance may be receptive to popular demands, but ultimately is still a way of organizing the exercise of political power. It is about making collective decisions binding upon the political community as a whole. Democratic politics is still politics, as in David Easton’s (1953) sense: the authoritative allocation of values for the whole society. Citizens, who experience this, are disappointed, and, when it happens to them more often or regularly – as it is bound to, because of the system’s working – get disillusioned.

Many citizens, to the extent that they participate in the political system (for instance as voters), are, or course, quite capable of voicing their grievances. And this is precisely what democratic politics is designed for, as it precludes exit. But when citizens fail to appreciate that democratic politics also puts a heavy demand on their capacity to listen, the democratic engine stalls (Stoker 2006). The problem is reinforced, when citizens fail to appreciate that the outcome of the political process is typically not a clean solution to a well defined problem, but rather a complicated and blurry compromise, whose construction and composition are inexplicable, untraceable and very often unappealing, if not outright ugly. Democratic politics is, therefore, almost by design, destined to disappoint. The remedy that follows from this analysis is that citizens should be taught a more realistic understanding of politics so that they appreciate the positive side of democratic politics as peaceful conflict management.

Hay (2007: 55) criticizes the demand-side explanations and focuses exclusively on supply-side factors: “changes in the contents of the appeals that the parties make to potential voters, changes in electoral competition, changes in the substantive content of the “goods” that politics offers to political “consumers”, and changes in the capacity of national-level governments to deliver genuine political choices to voters”. The nature of these changes is such that they lead to depoliticization, that is the displacement of political responsibility 1) from the formal governmental sphere to the non-governmental public sphere (for instance quasi-public authorities, privatization), 2) from the public realm to the private realm (for instance rephrasing collective choice as consumers’ choice), and 3) from the so-called domain of deliberation (the political) to the domain of necessity and fate (the non-political) (for instance the appeal to processes that constrain the possibility of deliberation, choice and action, notably globalization).

Hay’s argument is that assuming the worst of political actors (in itself to some extent a sensible thing to do in a democratic polity where popular power is delegated to representatives) has become more prevalent since the 1980s, and is increasingly shared by politicians themselves, journalists and leading political science theories in the Rational Choice tradition (especially Public Choice). The political elite has fostered, among itself and the public, an overly cynical view of itself and, with the help of Public Choice theory (based on those very same contemptuous assumptions), in its natural affinity with neo-liberalism, has translated this into a political project that displaces political responsibility and degrades electoral politics. On top of this, politicians have embraced the idea that globalization emasculates them, with the result that “if policy-makers believe that their autonomy is greatly diminished and that, in an era of globalization, their policy choices must be driven by the perceived imperatives of competitiveness, they will deny themselves the political autonomy they might otherwise enjoy” (Hay 2007: 151). In sum, politicians are assumed to be “self-serving and self-interested rational utility-maximizers” and “increasingly seen to be powerless and ineffective in the face of processes beyond their control” (Hay 2007: 155). No wonder that the public turns its back on politics and distrusts those who, in election times, make promises that they know they cannot keep. This is the cause of declining political engagement. In other words, political democracies get the levels of participation they deserve.

Prima facie, then, Hay seems to offer an important correction of the pervasiveness of blame-the-citizen, demand-side explanations. However, his argument is that ultimately a focus on the demand side is inevitable. “For supply-side factors are only important in so far as they come to influence voters’ disposition to participate or not. In other words, they are only important in so far as they influence demand. And in order to influence demand, they must be perceived by potential participants as salient. Moreover, it is the perception rather than the reality of the supply-side factors that is important here” (Hay 2007: 60; see also pp. 158-60).

With this, we are back at Stoker’s argument that the cause of political disaffection is to be found in how citizens comprehend the functioning of democratic politics. What is more, this re-introduction of the demand-side as what ultimately matters for the democratic condition appears to make futile the whole exercise of debunking demand-side explanations and advancing a supply-side approach. For apparently it is the perception, and not the reality, of what politics has to offer that determines the condition. On balance, then, this implies that we cannot explain the disillusionment with politics with any reference to what

politics or the political has to offer. The reason is that we cannot discriminate between two situations, namely one in which citizens are disengaged because politics has nothing to offer, and one in which citizens are disillusioned because they do not recognize what politics has to offer. Effectively, it also renders impossible the evaluation of the accuracy and efficacy of any proposed remedy.

Stoker's book is about convincing people that they have unrealistic expectations about politics and that they should have a more positive understanding of politics, since they currently misinterpret it. As a result, he does not even raise the question whether and to what extent there may be something happening to the attractiveness of politics itself that explains, or at least contributes to, the deteriorating character of the exchange and power relationship between the political elite and the citizenry. Still, Stoker (2006: 202) clearly senses where at least part of the problem might also be located, but he does not translate it into an analysis that includes the role of the political elite and their projects (that is, the supply side): "This understanding that there is something substantially wrong with the way we do politics is joined by a deeper sense that somehow or other we have forgotten what politics is capable of doing – and, perhaps more importantly, we are unclear about what it can't do". That we are unclear about what politics is incapable of doing is certainly part of the story, but the fact that we fail to remember what politics can do, or has in fact done in the past, strikes me as an indispensable part of the explanation of the current predicament. In my view, the observation that "the malaise afflicting democratic governance today is that many citizens rather wish they could do without politics" (Stoker 2006: 203) is a crucial insight to the extent that it points to the accomplishments of politics in and of democracy that are now taken for granted.

Many citizens are convinced that they can do without politics, and, to some extent, they can indeed. However, neither the political elite nor the public seems to realize enough, or is ready to admit, that their joint political projects, such as the project of democracy or the welfare state, have empowered citizens to become more independent individuals (instead of, for instance, dependent members of a class, gender or other social group), by granting individual political and social rights that are collectively guaranteed. Such successful political projects are neither recalled nor appreciated for their provision of well-being and physical, social and economic security. At the same time, there are no new political projects that are deemed necessary for the provision of these important political goods and that could fill the void. Successful political projects, in other words, have been losing their capacity to arouse enthusiasm and passion for politics as a collective undertaking, yet no new political enterprises have come up as a replacement.

It is true that if "there is no collective capacity, there is no point to politics. Politics is about collective decisions, balancing conflict and cooperation, in order to promote human purposes" (Stoker 2006: 203–4). However, it seems that it is exactly this sense of purpose that has been lost. What is the point of citizens participating massively and enthusiastically if one cannot identify any worthy purpose other than solving petty daily problems of party power and personal position? Similarly, Hay makes an excellent critique of the thesis that declining social capital causes disillusionment with politics. Such an analysis "fails to consider the possibility that it is not the receptiveness and responsiveness of citizens that have changed so much as the character of the appeals and invitations to participate that they receive. To extend the economic analogy, it may well be that consumers' preferences have changed rather less than the quality of the goods on offer" (Hay 2007: 45). Hay is correct,

but this argument needs to be elaborated further than an allusion to political actors sending public choice inspired neo-liberal messages that feed scepticism, suspicion and anti-politics, while meanwhile globalization is reinforcing the idea of the powerlessness of politics.

If politics is a struggle between different views of the good life or good society, with underlying value conflicts between equality and liberty, as Stoker suggest, and if this is what once incited people to engage, then one must conclude that the sources of disengagement and dissatisfaction concern the evaporation of precisely this kind of struggles. At a deeper level, then, I would suggest, we are concerned with the loss of appeal of politics as comprising projects that were worth believing and even participating in, that is to say, projects that once promised to help bring about a better world, perhaps not here and now, but at least in the foreseeable future, and that because of this quality were enchanting. It is this property that seems to have been exhausted and it is this process that is described by the disenchantment of politics. Therefore, in order to understand better the current condition of dissatisfaction and disaffection, it seems crucial to appreciate what, to begin with, were the sources of satisfaction and affection. If one wishes to grasp how we lose our political aspirations and get disappointed, one would need to appreciate what it was that once made politics attractive, appealing, captivating, yes even mesmerizing in terms of ambition, animation and engagement.

In sum, although we have some very good and inspiring analyses and explanations of political disengagement and disaffection, a fully convincing answer, which takes into account both what citizens expect from politics and what politics has to offer, is still lacking. Assuming that citizens are politically dysfunctional inspires political reforms by the political elite that focus on re-educating and, literally, civilizing the populace. Unremarkably, the many remedies and political experiments are to stimulate people to participate. Behind this is the unshakable belief that participation can be increased and this conviction, in turn, is based on the well-known and undisputed normative notion that “every individual potentially affected by a decision should have an equal opportunity to affect that decision” (Mark Warren 2002: 678, quoted in Stoker 2006: 149).

There is something deeply disturbing about the citizen-oriented explanations of universal political disaffection and therefore about the remedies proposed. Since it is the political elite itself that identifies the political tragedy in terms of civic misbehaviour and builds its contradictory remedies on this, this very definition of the democratic predicament as caused by the public tends to aggravate the problem rather than contribute to its solution. Moreover, the blame-the-citizen explanations are “dangerously circular (or tautological)”, as they do not offer more than a re-description of the explanandum, for instance, “accounting for voter turnout by appeal to voter apathy – where apathy is understood as little more than the propensity of potential voters not to vote” (Hay 2007: 40). This seems to indicate that, in addition to the focus on the citizen, at least part of the democratic predicament needs to be explained by referring also to the actions of the political elite and/or the quality of their political programs and projects.

It seems to me that the answer needs to be sought by imagining how demand- and supply-side factors interact to cause the current condition of disaffection and disengagement. Of course, ultimately it matters how citizens perceive political actors, the political processes in which they are engaged, and the outcomes these produce, but I am convinced that the perception that induces scepticism actually has a firm foundation in the reality of politics itself. And this reality is epitomized by disenchantment. The problem, as I

understand it, is situated in the relationship between the democratic public (the demand-side) and the political elite (what it has to offer, that is to say, the supply-side). This is a relationship of exchange and power (allegiance) between – what also in a democracy still are – the rulers (the political elite) and the ruled (the public, voters, citizens).

This approach assumes that rulers and ruled have, next to individual or particular interests, fundamentally also common or shared interests that pertain to their relationship and the type of society in which they (wish or hope to) live. This – admittedly – functional assumption is the foundation of the notion of politics as a collective endeavour to shape the fate of the political community in the long run, affecting the lives of both the rulers and the ruled and their descendants. We therefore need to study the sources of the phenomenon of declining political allegiance in terms of a changing exchange and power relationship in order to come to terms with the democratic predicament. Therefore, in the next section, I offer a reconceptualization of what is actually to be explained (the dependent variable, so to speak).

3. Political Allegiance and Enchantment

One of Alan Milward's (1992: 3) key theoretical ideas in his masterful *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* is that "(...) without the process of integration the West European nation-state might not have retained the allegiance and support of its citizens in the way that it has. The European Community has been its buttress, an indispensable part of the nation-state's post-war construction. Without it, the nation-state could not have offered to its citizens the same measure of security and prosperity which it has provided and which has justified its survival".

Milward sees the modern nation-state as a complex political organization of mutual political obligations of rulers and ruled. The extension of public functions could only be achieved by the extension of obligations of the rulers to the ruled so as to effect the political allegiance of the public. But the scope of the necessary extension of functions went far beyond the capacities of nation-states. The rescue of the nation-state in the context of increased interdependence required in the post-Second World War period the delegation of competencies. This explains the construction of the European Community.

The nation-states followed a strategy of integration because this was "(...) one way of formalizing, regulating and perhaps limiting the consequences of interdependence, without forfeiting the national allegiance on which its continued existence depends" (Milward 1992: 19). National allegiance was secured and a secondary allegiance developed among national citizenries, because the national publics understood that integration was necessary and in their own interest. The phenomenon of "double allegiance" was born. Secondary allegiance did not significantly weaken primary allegiance, but the former depended on the latter (Van Kersbergen 1997, 2000).

Milward (1997: 11) defines allegiance as "the range of all those elements which induce citizens to give their loyalty to institutions of governance, whether national, international or supranational". Building on this, I see political allegiance as a relationship of exchange and power between the rulers and the ruled. It refers to the willingness of the ruled to approve of and to support the decisions, made and imposed on the public by a government, that affect their material and nonmaterial interests, in return for a more or less immediate and straightforward reward or benefit to which the public feels entitled on the basis of it having rendered approval and support (see Van Kersbergen 2000, 2003). I stress the returns to both

the rulers and the ruled. Political allegiance structures the relationship of power and exchange between the rulers and the ruled, where security and prosperity are theorized as the major benefits for a public offered by a government or the state, in return for the reward of diffuse support and obedience.

A relation properly described by allegiance is therefore not simply characterized by the diffuse loyalty, trust and obedience of the ruled, but most critically by an exchange between a ruler and the ruled, consisting of a trade-off between security (safety) and prosperity (well-being) on the one hand, and support on the other. Citizens have a basic set of preferences and this holds for all regimes (Alexander 2002: 33). First, citizens as political subjects care about their well-being, wanting to protect and advance their material and non-material interests, including obviously their social–psychological equanimity. Second, they want to be reassured about their security, ranging from a preference for the lowest possible risk of experiencing violence to a desire for the most solid possible shelter against social and economic misfortune. The notion of allegiance enables one to grasp better the historical and contemporary role of publics in relation to their rulers and introduces a relational view on the problems of political order, political integration and the legitimacy of a regime.

The general issue is: under what conditions and to what extent do publics (the ruled) accept and support decisions and actions of their governments (the rulers) that seem to affect their well-being and security beyond their direct control? The general answer is that they do so on the condition that this guarantees or reinforces (territorial, physical, psychological, social and economic) security and well-being. This induces allegiance. Both security and well-being are the major benefits for national publics offered by a government. Citizens, in return, offer their support to the elites who lead the social and political institutions. In other words, political allegiance, understood in terms of an exchange of well-being/security and diffuse support, is the mechanism that connects the rulers with the ruled.

The “goods” of security and well-being are varied and manifold. Security and well-being offered by a government can be territorial, physical, psychological, economic and social. It must in principle be understood in the broadest possible sense and ranges from issues of war and peace to economic (for instance employment and price stability), social (for instance income maintenance) and psychological (for instance peace of mind and sense of belonging) security and well-being. Diffuse support and obedience can be political, economic, social and civil and include all forms of social and political participation, ranging from the willingness to pay taxes and general law-abidingness to voting and standing for office.

I propose three large scale political projects (Nation-State Building, Democratization, Welfare State) and one primarily elite mission (European Integration) as having been crucial in structuring the long-term relationship between the ruler and the ruled. These projects and mission have provided the key mechanisms of exchange and investments in power. The exchanges and investments have produced benefits for both the ruler (power) and the ruled (security and well-being), establishing political allegiance.

I here shortly indicate how the three political projects and the elite mission enter the equation of allegiance. They all have been grand political undertakings. The rise and success of the modern Nation-State Building project is related to its capacity to provide (physical) safety and (existential) security, both externally vis-à-vis aggressive other states and internally concerning civic violence. Democratization as a project concerns the complex interplay between, on the one hand, state elites, who try to protect themselves from (violent)

upheaval, wish to continue to rule and seek to confer legitimacy upon their reign, and, on the other hand, excluded groups who wish to increase their influence and shape the conditions of security and well-being under which they live and are ruled. The Welfare State project has had two pivotal social and political security effects: social integration, where social policies and welfare arrangements mediate, regulate and reconcile social conflicts; and national or territorial integration, where the welfare state constructs and reinforces a national and political community by redistributing means from richer to poorer people and regions. European Integration, finally, as a political mission helped institutionalize the most basic precondition for security, peace, and assisted the European nation-states to re-establish the policy capacity that they needed to provide internally security and prosperity to their citizens. These are the sources of political allegiance.

What were the components of the political projects and mission that were capable of enchanting the ruled and the rulers, generating a beneficial relationship of allegiance between them? This, at a minimum, one would need to know, so as to be able to explain in some detail what disenchantment is and what the key mechanisms are that link it to declining political allegiance. The answer, I think, has to do with the fact that the projects and the mission were characterized by a form of political quasi-messianism, which concerns the visionary anticipation of a better world that is attainable, here and in the distant, yet foreseeable future. This better world is within reach through human collective intervention that aims to implement improvements in the human condition, which, because of their promise, have an enchanting quality. In this quasi-messianism political callings assume a role that is similar to the saviour in messianism, offering relief and hope for this-worldly redemption. In this quality, political projects, laden with an inspired and imaginative sense of purpose, direction and meaning, but also with this-worldly catalysts, which are operational and practical, have the capacity to enchant the political elite and public alike.

I introduce the concept of quasi-messianism here, so as to bring to light some affinity with Talmon's (1960) notion of political messianism as a mind-set, a faith, a belief in the possibility of salvation here and now, through the establishment of a just social order. Political messianism, as Talmon saw it, is inherently totalitarian as it places the collective realization of political ideals above individual freedom. To highlight the contrast with particularly this aspect, I use the term quasi to indicate that the quality of messianism I refer to has only some resemblance, particularly by virtue of the attribute of the belief in the possibility of salvation here and now, but is evidently not quite like Talmon's notion of messianism as necessarily totalitarian.

Political quasi-messianism, then, once was an important feature of politics as a vocation and a quality of political projects and missions that aimed to reform the social order through political exchange and the exercise of power. Political projects promised to liberate people from existential insecurity and material want. For some, such projects almost represented a messiah in whom they could vest their hope for security and well-being. For others, the projects were so abhorrent, that they were eager to contest them, perhaps because they stood to lose much or conceivably for the reason that they happened to believe in another one. The political causes and the movements they inspired contained for some the promise of triumph and the salvation of the world and for others perhaps no less than perdition. But be that as it may, the political quasi-messianism in these projects aroused political enthusiasm and passion; it led to zealous devotion to leadership (not necessarily a leader), the cause, and the movement, but therefore also gave rise to ardent conflicts that mobilized large numbers

of people, transferring them as active participants from the private or depoliticized public domain into the realm of politics.

Now, let me at this stage try to specify more directly what in the projects were the quasi-religious, enchanting mechanisms of politics and how the relationship between ruler and ruled in them was structured in such a way that it produced political allegiance. The starting point is the “religions proper” (the world religions of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism) (Smith 1993). There is a general structure that all religions proper have in common as they deal with the same basic problem. They share the diagnosis of the human predicament: “based on the nature of the religious ultimate aimed at locating what is wrong with our natural existence and what separates us from an ideal fulfilment in God, or Nirvana or the One”; this, in turn, leads to a quest “for that reality which has the power to overcome the flaw in our being disclosed in the diagnosis”; the quest, finally, is for a deliverer “which overcomes the flaw and restores the wholeness of our being” (Smith 1994: 3). Characteristic for the religions proper is that the ultimate goal is not any finite reality. And this is precisely the difference with quasi-religions (Humanism, Marxism and Nationalism in Smith’s case) that also have a structure of diagnosis, quest and deliverer, but define their ultimate as finite and of this world, and consider the transformation of man and the solution to the human predicament a distinct possibility within historical reach.

My treatment of Nation-State Building, Democratization and the Welfare State as enchanting projects and European Integration as a political mission, can now be further justified and explained. It is founded on the idea that as projects and a mission they perhaps lacked the strong religious connotations, which are so characteristic of the quasi-religions and the political religions more generally, but they still embodied somewhat of a visionary anticipation of a better world through human intervention. The analysis of the quasi-religions offers the conceptual tools to map the fundamental characteristics of the enchanting projects and mission (see Table: The Fundamental Characteristics of Enchanting Projects, next page).

Nation-State Building is a reaction to the problems of internal disorder and the risk of conquest by other states and the violence this entails. The state project is about achieving territorial order and stability that provides physical security and protection against violence. In addition, when order is guaranteed, well-being can become an option. The nation project concerns the creation of a sense of belonging and the construction of a collective identity of the population tied to the state and its territory. Among the various means that promised to achieve all this were the establishment of the state monopoly of the use of coercion and violence, the granting of civil and nationality rights to define the populace and its character, and the creation and reinforcement of a national bureaucracy (army, tax collector) so as to multiply the resources (soldiers, money, personnel) and, with that, the power of the state.

Similarly, Democracy was about achieving liberty, political equality, just exchanges in social and economic life, political and legal reliability and protection against the arbitrary power of the state. With the means of the Rechtsstaat, various liberties, the extension of the possibilities of active and passive political participation, and equal political rights (for instance one person, one vote), democratization established fundamental and inalienable basic rights, included the whole population in the political system, increased the predictability of state and government behaviour, greatly advanced the opportunities of self-determination, all of which instituted a crucial sense of political security.

The Welfare State project was about fighting inequality, poverty, and the social insecurity that resulted from industrial society and the market economy. It organized for the population compelling ways to deal with social risks and implemented public policies to stimulate economic growth and to combat the societal disruption that emanates from poverty and mass unemployment. The welfare state did this by making compulsory social insurance and enforcing solidarity on society, granting and guaranteeing social rights, and by experimenting with various ways of managing economic demand. The welfare state aspired to provide protection against, and freedom from, want, and full employment. It therefore offered, literally, social security.

The mission of European Integration was inspired by the spectres of anarchy in inter-state relations, the large destruction from two World Wars, the fear of a possible third World War, the costs of competition with totalitarian systems, and the economic underperformance of national yet interdependent nation-states, which aggravated the other risks. By institutionalizing ever closer forms of (supranational) cooperation between sovereign states and developing common policies, European Integration's aim was to prevent a new war, help re-establish the nation-states of Western Europe, provide a sense of collective security among the European populations and stimulate economic and social prosperity.

4. Disenchantment and the Waning of Allegiance

Now that the fundamental characteristics of the enchanting projects and mission have been determined, I can discuss the notion of disenchantment. This concept is of course taken from Max Weber's "Entzauberung der Welt". Disenchantment of the world, according to Weber (1905: 114; Weber 2005: 71) is "die Ausschaltung der Magie als Heilmittel" (the elimination of magic as an instrument of salvation). This "great historic process in the development of religions (...) had repudiated all magical means to salvation as superstition and sin" (Weber 2005: 61). Paraphrasing this, the disenchantment of politics, then, is defined as the gradual elimination of politics as an instrument of this-worldly salvation.

The enchanting projects established national political allegiance and the European mission introduced a form of double allegiance. They were enchanting projects and missions because they promised to deliver salvation and release in this world. Disenchantment, defined as the gradual elimination of politics as an instrument of this-worldly salvation, can now be specified more precisely. It is the gradual disappearance of the enthusiastic belief in the Quest to What Promises to Overcome the Flaws and the fading of the conviction that the Deliverer of Salvation and Release is known and immanent, which are delineated by disenchantment. The notion of the disenchantment of politics concerns the progressive abolition of quasi-messianism in politics and attempts to depict the demise of the transformative vista in these political projects as redemption and revelation, and, with it, the loss of the fervent commitment of both the rulers and the ruled in (the case of the projects), and of the rulers (in the case of the mission).

A corollary is that the disenchantment of politics must be assumed to lie at the heart of the contemporary decline of political allegiance. An important feature of politics gone astray concerns this idea of an almost religious collective human experience of captivating projects and leaders and faithful and devoted followers – and ever so many ardent opponents with challenging visions of the redemptive projects. Such political projects obtained their enchanting disposition to the extent that they were capable of offering hope of

redemption and an end to human suffering in this world, not by posing grand utopias that assumed a complete makeover of imperfect human nature, or by relapsing into the genuine religious guarantee of a better life after the present, but by presenting far-reaching yet level-headed reforms that took into account the human condition without relinquishing every bit of utopian zest.

Disenchantment describes the loss of utopia in the “utopian realism” that characterized the enchanting political projects. The oxymoron now has vanished, leaving only pragmatic realism to be the most significant feature of politics. Politics now seems to have deteriorated into an entirely secularized pragmatic and disengaged practice of professional politicians, administrators and civil servants who are submerged in the routine exercise of power over a populace, which is – at best – increasingly indifferent to any collective project, or – worse – more and more engaged in voicing futile protests against a by now autistic leadership, or – worst – entirely disengaging from democracy and cynically protecting purely private interests.

The political projects of Nation-State Building, Democracy, Welfare State, and the mission of European Integration, once promised to liberate people from existential insecurity and material want. They were all thoroughly connected via the notion of political allegiance. All dealt, in one way or other, with how best to guaranty security (safety) and prosperity (well-being). The promise of salvation and release of these projects and mission fostered the relationship of allegiance between rulers and ruled. The loss of this promise (or, ironically, its fulfilment) is what is summarized in the disenchantment of politics.

Recall that I explicated the relationship between the ruler and the ruled as characterized by an exchange between security/well-being and support/obedience. The projects of the Nation-State, Democratization, Welfare State and the mission of European Integration structured the relationship between the ruler and the ruled and provided the crucial mechanisms of this exchange. The exchange produced benefits for both the ruler (power) and the ruled (security and well-being), which made political allegiance a relation of exchange and power. This whole complex of power and exchange triggered off the positive outcome of political allegiance.

However, once political allegiance was the outcome, it had an unintended negative effect on the enchanting aspects of the three projects and the mission. Put differently, political allegiance had an unintended positive effect on the disenchantment of politics. When disenchantment occurs, it leads to a decline of political allegiance. Whether the negative impact of the disenchantment of politics overrides the positive effect of the mutually advantageous exchange relationship between rulers and ruled depends on the extent to which the projects continue to contribute to the beneficial exchange. But this continuation has become arduous and problematic.

There are several ways of specifying this. Most obviously, one could conceive of disenchantment in terms of the failure of the projects, for instance the Nation-State and Democracy because of internationalization (most notably migration), the relocation of power and the emergence of new forms of governance, or the Welfare State because of various endogenous (ageing) and exogenous (economic interdependence) pressures. Allegiance is the victim when the projects fail, because in this case the projects are losing what made them enchanting in the first place: their promise of salvation. This directly disrupts the relationship between the ruler and the ruled and leads to the decline of political allegiance. In the absence of new enchanting projects, this causes disillusionment with the

projects, and adds to the disenchantment of politics, reinforcing the decline of political allegiance.

One could also imagine that the political projects of the Nation-State, the Welfare State and Democracy and the mission of Europe Integration have reached a point where they have grown beyond their limits. For instance, the further enlargement of the European Union eastwards (Turkey) might seriously put at risk what is left of the permissive consensus. The fiscal deficits of the state and increasing tax demands might dangerously strain the moral willingness of state subjects to behave as good and law-abiding citizens. Further democratization might again overload the democratic system of governance with demands that cannot be met. A vicious causal sequence of project disillusionment, further disenchantment and reinforced decline of political allegiance would be the result.

Ironically, the disenchantment of politics is also most likely having detrimental effects on political allegiance, because of the immense success of the projects, as a result of which they are largely, but erroneously, taken for granted and lose their enchanting disposition. There is, however, yet another, and in my understanding most important way, in which the projects are connected to the decline of political allegiance, namely through the mechanism of unintended effects of interaction. This is, for instance, most clearly the case, where the mission of European Integration meets the other projects. In many people's view, European integration formally puts into question the sovereignty of the participating member states. The mission of European Integration does not seem to enhance, but rather shrink the policy making efficacy of the nation-state and is threatening its very survival as a sovereign institution. This causes great anxiety among both the elite and the public, because it damages the nation's sense of belonging and its constructed collective identity, and erodes the political elite's position of power. If the physical and psychological security offered by the nation-state ceases to be the benefit for the ruled, support for the rulers comes to an end. This anxiety is intensified by the fear that European Union is assaulting democracy and rapidly turning into a superstate. Finally, the weakening and even vanishing of national borders as a result of European integration is threatening national integration and social solidarity. There are serious risks that the territorially based solidarity, which was elaborated in the welfare state in the post-war era, is undermined (Ferrera 2005) as European integration continues to de-structure the nation-state and the social spaces contained within it, while not restructuring at the supranational level the kind of solidarity that is still currently expressed in the national welfare state.

5. Conclusion

The disenchantment of politics, that is to say, the gradual elimination of politics as an instrument of this-worldly salvation (once embodied in the enchanting political projects of Nation-State Building, Democracy and the Welfare State, and the elite mission of European Integration), is causing the decline of political allegiance, that is to say, a deteriorating relationship of exchange and power between the rulers (political elite, government) and the ruled (people, citizens, voters). Disenchantment occurs, because of the failure, the growth beyond limits, the success, and the unintended effects of interaction of the projects.

Pondering over the possible consequences of waning political allegiance, one might hypothesize that the disenchantment of politics causes a political void in contemporary democratic societies, an emptiness of collective power, which exerts a pull on various political experiments and escapades, some of which – to a lesser or greater extent – could

imperil the very existence of democracy. One could think of the decomposition of the political centre and the increasing importance of fringe (flank) politics that many advanced democracies are currently experiencing. As a result of this, coalition building and effective government on the basis of beneficial exchanges are becoming increasingly difficult. Ungovernability not only contributes directly to the further disenchantment of politics, but also reinforces the image of a, by and large, impotent elite that seems to have only one rationale left to govern: the protection of its own petty profitable position.

Here, both the toothless elite and the frustrated public become an easy victim for populist entrepreneurs. Populists effectively turn around the blame-the-citizen explanations of political disaffection and when these political adventurers manage to link the existing general frustration about politics with concrete problems of social and cultural integration, an explosive mix occurs that seriously stirs up normal democratic politics as we know it. Most European democracies seem to be captured by the populist “Zeitgeist” (Mudde 2004), especially, but not exclusively, articulated and pronounced on the right side of the political spectrum. One can observe a sharper and vaster political mobilization of latent xenophobia that is essentially directed against migration and the multicultural society. There is an increasingly expressive discontent with political culture that is being translated into a critique of political correctness and of prevailing public morality. Latent xenophobia in society surfaces in the form of a frontal assault on the moral pressure exerted on citizens not to speak negatively about any aspect related to migration. In addition, the articulation and politicization of popular dissatisfaction with the performance of government, and the political cynicism with respect to political elites that comes with it, is being converted into a revolt that attacks elitism, the closed nature of political recruitment, and the lack of representativeness of politicians more generally.

In a broader perspective, however, one should perhaps also recognize that even the most vehement populist revolts – so far and to some extent – have been channelled via democratic outlets and managed surprisingly well (e.g. the Fortuyn insurrection in the Netherlands). However, it is not excluded that much less innocuous political enterprises are also seeking to fill the void. The success of contemporary Western populism insinuates that popular sentiments predominantly hover around the edges of the radical right. In the context of the imperfect integration of religious and ethnic minorities and continuing migration, there is no guarantee that political firebrands will not find ways to tap into xenophobic undercurrents too.

John Gray (2007) suggests that American foreign policy, in the last decades or so, has lost its realism and increasingly has been permeated by an apocalyptic, millennialist belief in the immanent coming of democracy. The democratic void has allowed utopianism to enter the mainstream and 9/11 has led to the Americanization of the apocalypse, exemplified by US neo-conservatism. It has turned Americans into armed missionaries for democracy and led to a war that had no achievable goals. Democracy cannot be established in most of the Middle East countries, nor can terrorism be exterminated. Hence, as Gray stresses, Iraq is a twenty-first century utopian experiment, with the same disastrous results as the utopian experiments of the twentieth century: “the picture of post-war Iraq that neo-conservatives disseminated was a tissue of disinformation and wishful thinking, while the willingness to use intolerable means to achieve the impossible end showed the utopian mind at its most deluded” (Gray 2007: 160).

In other words, perhaps less easily recognizable, but equally if not more inauspicious political ventures may already have been filling the democratic void. Some sinister political enterprises, such as American missionary democracy, have not been launched from the outside, but from within, that is to say, they have been operating as “normal” democratic politics, but are dangerously utopian in their dogma. At the same time, from the outside, we see various fundamentalisms, including Christian, Islamic, Hebrew, and Eco-, organizing, penetrating the system, and influencing the conditions and possibility of democratic politics and debate. Fundamentalism is, of course, deeply at odds with democracy, because it denies every single principle on which democracy thrives (see Taverne 2005).

Reluctantly, but forced to do so, I end with a most pessimistic note. Currently, I see no project or mission on the horizon, which could be interpreted as comparably enchanting, sagacious, yet still cautious, as the projects of the Nation-State, Democracy, the Welfare State and European Integration. On the contrary, the political enterprises that are filling the void seem to be endangering democracy and are, ultimately and in their effects, endangering the integration of society.

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EXZELLENZCLUSTER

Kulturelle Grundlagen von Integration

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