Resistance is Not Futile - Factors predicting Nonviolent Activism in the Nepalese Civil War

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1 Dedication

I want to thank my supervisor Johannes Vüllers for his support and advice while working in his DFG project and developing the idea for the thesis and my three research contributions. I thank my supervisor Karsten Donnay, especially for his advice in the selection of quantitative methods to test my research questions and for being helpful in answering my questions about the applications of packages in 'R'. I particular want to thank my girlfriend Laura for her continued motivational and moral support during my work on this thesis.
2 Zusammenfassung


Events leisten einen geringeren, aber ebenfalls signifikanten Beitrag zur Vorhersage einer gewaltsamen Reaktion des Staates. Die Anwesenheit von Journalist*innen hingegen spielt keine Rolle dafür, ob staatliche Gewalt gegen die Aktivist*innen eingesetzt wird. Dieser Beitrag erweitert nicht nur unser theoretisches Verständnis, wann gewaltsame Repression gegen Aktivist*innen im Bürgerkrieg eingesetzt wird, er stellt für Aktivist*innen ebenfalls eine Anleitung dar, wie eine staatliche Gewaltreaktion möglicherweise in Zukunft vermieden werden kann.

3 Abstract

This PhD thesis investigates patterns of nonviolent activism in civil war contexts with the example of the Nepalese Civil War. The thesis is divided into three major parts. The first part offers a broad theoretical classification of nonviolent action research, while introducing the motivation and research contribution of the thesis. In the second part the three different contributions (papers) of this thesis are presented. In the third part, a summary and discussion of the findings concludes the thesis. The thesis contributes to civil war research by focusing on civilian actors and investigates how they can resist their civil war environment, being more than refugees or recruitment pools for armed factions.

The thesis advances the study of nonviolent resistance in civil wars by introducing a novel dataset of nonviolent activism. The thesis further presents results of an empirical field research project which deals with questions regarding organization of nonviolent activism and third-party support of activists also prior to their nonviolent action events. In doing so the thesis combines different state of the art quantitative and qualitative methods and statistical tools to investigate novel research questions.

For the first and second project of the thesis a new and unique disaggregated dataset on nonviolent activism on the event level was constructed to investigate patterns of nonviolent activism during the Nepalese Civil War in unprecedented detail. Utilizing this dataset, the first paper investigates a link between direct civil war violence as grievances and nonviolent activism in a spatial panel regression analysis. In the second quantitative contribution, a multilevel model tests different forms and kinds of nonviolent activism and activist group patterns during the civil war to predict a violent state reaction during the nonviolent event. An additional geographically weighted regression outlines spatial variation of the tested variables throughout the country and substantiates the results from the multilevel model.

The third contribution uses qualitative expert interviews to investigate the involvement of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to support and train activist groups during the Nepalese Civil War. This contribution utilizes data from an own field research study conducted in Nepal in 2018.

The first paper presents a robust, significant relationship between civil war violence and nonviolent action across the Nepalese districts in the spatial panel regression on a yearly as well as monthly basis during the civil war. The paper therefore strongly argues for a linkage between direct civil war violence as grievances with subsequent nonviolent action by civilians. This relationship was already found for battle related violence between conflict factions, but according to this paper now also seems to true for direct violence against civilians. It might explain why we regularly find nonviolent action also far away from the current battlefields in civil wars. The findings of the second contribution show that a high likelihood of disturbance of the public order by nonviolent action events predicts a violent
state reaction. Political orientation of activists or number of activist groups during an event also significantly predicted the likelihood of a violent state reaction, but to a lesser extent. The presence of journalists for example to document violence was not related to the likelihood of a violent state reaction. Results of the expert interviews in the third contribution showed in seven examples how nongovernmental organizations supported activist groups, which received counseling in goal formation and selection, and illuminate how conflict-affected parts of the population were supported to become activists step by step, using nonviolent tactics to receive compensation for war crimes and/or demand an end of the war. The findings of this thesis contribute fundamentally to theoretical motivations for nonviolent action during civil wars (direct civil war violence as grievances), and subsequent possible violent state reaction towards nonviolent action events. It extends our understanding of how the decision towards nonviolence and nonviolent action is made, what obstacles are to overcome, but it also outlines in examples how activist groups can receive a helping hand from third parties. In doing so the thesis greatly enhances our understanding of how nonviolent action is facilitated during civil wars, what motivates civilians to do it, what state reaction is to be expected, and what kind of support channels may exist.
4 General Introduction

Not only citizens of democracies are aware of demonstrations and various other kinds of public nonviolent forms of street actions as methods for civilians to take part in the political process. Some call it civil nonviolent resistance or nonviolent action. Today, most people are familiar with some form of nonviolent action as the recent years brought a new spike in the usage of nonviolent tactics. One of the most recent examples are the ‘Black Lives Matter’ mass protests in the United States which became famous in 2020 (e.g. Towler, Crawford, and Bennett 2020). The movement founded in 2013 was reignited in 2020 by the killing of George Floyd in police custody. The following ‘Black Lives Matter’ protests brought a new wave of attention to the issue of inequality within the criminal justice system of the U.S. (Dave et al. 2020). The subsequent protest campaigns served as an example of people successfully raising their voices against repression using nonviolent means. Meanwhile, not only people in Western democracies successfully use nonviolent tactics. In 2019, Algeria’s president Bouteflika, who was seeking a non-constitutional fifth term in office, was toppled by a popular uprising known as the ‘Smile Revolution’ (Nte 2021). In the same year, the governor of Puerto Rico was forced to resign after hundreds of thousands of citizens facilitated mass demonstrations and carried out strikes, mocking his statements regarding victims of hurricane Maria. Moreover, since October 2019 governments have fallen to popular protest movements in locations as diverse as Iraq, Bolivia, or Lebanon (Chenoweth 2020). These nonviolent protests all occurred only a few years after the famous Color Revolutions or the Arab Spring, which have reignited scholarly interest in the phenomenon of nonviolent resistance after several authoritarian regimes, for example in Tunisia and Egypt, got toppled with the help of nonviolent resistance (e.g. Hussain and Howard 2013; Nepstad 2013; Pearlman 2013; Weyland 2012).

However, while investigations regarding nonviolent activism have increased in recent decades, systematic research concerning nonviolent activism in civil wars is still surprisingly scarce. It is clear that the phenomenon exists not only in recent internal conflicts (e.g. Hallward, Masullo, and Mouly 2017). Nonviolent action is applied by citizens as a form of resistance and protection against civil war factions or violence, and can also influence the conflict itself. Recent case studies have shown that even under the harsh conditions of civil war, communities can use nonviolent action to successfully protect themselves from conflict factions and lessen their plight during a civil war (Kaplan 2017). There exist examples of nonviolent events in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and recently in Syria (e.g. Kahf 2020; Kaplan 2017). However, numerous questions concerning the onset, mobilization, and other general patterns of nonviolent action in civil wars are still unanswered. For example, why do certain villages in civil wars spawn nonviolent groups and actions while others fail to do so (Kaplan 2017; Masullo 2015)? Do grievances like civil war violence play a role? If yes, how are the violent incidents citizens have to endure related to nonviolent activism?
And what about the interactions between activists and the state or conflict factions? If repression by the conflict factions or the state plays a role in motivating or preventing people to use nonviolent tactics, what patterns of nonviolent action encourage a certain state reaction? Do regimes react violently to nonviolent activism under certain conditions? What is the role of third non-governmental actors supporting nonviolent action, for example like the Church offering a helping hand to certain villages in the Colombian Civil War (Masullo 2015)?

One reason why these questions to date remain largely unanswered is the lack of disaggregated data to draw conclusions outside detailed single nonviolent group or campaign analyses. The term nonviolent campaigns in this regard describes a series of nonviolent actions organized by a group of people sharing common goals (e.g. Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). This thesis aims to contribute to and extend the evolving field of research on nonviolent action in civil wars by utilizing a new and unique quantitative dataset to investigate questions regarding patterns of nonviolent actions during the Nepalese Civil War in combination with qualitative data from expert interviews. The three research questions of this thesis deal with patterns of nonviolent action origin in relation to civil war violence, subsequent possible violent reactions of the state towards nonviolent action, as well as involvement of third actors (NGOs) in the formation and support of nonviolent action groups.

The case investigated in the three papers is a good case to study nonviolent activism as it provides the required length, features as well as accessibility of data to provide large numbers of activism on the event level. At the same time, being a revolutionary, grievance based civil war with economic, developmental, and inequality-related factors, it is relatively easily comparable to similar conflicts for example in the Philippines, India, Yemen, Colombia, as well as many African countries (Joshi and Quinn 2017). Instead of focusing on civil war onset or termination, rebel groups or post-conflict effects, this thesis contributes to the relatively young and growing literature dealing with questions regarding civilian behavior during the civil war. With the perception of civilians as being more than mere recruitment pools for fighting armed factions or recipients of violence and hardships, this thesis enhances the understanding of how ordinary civilians behave and resist in a civil war environment with its limits and constraints regarding grievances like civil war violence or repression, scarcity of resources, but also in interaction with other civilian resistance groups and third actors like nongovernmental organizations.

Within the first project of this thesis, questions regarding triggers and motivations for nonviolent actions in relation to civil war violence are investigated while accounting for the spatial variation and temporal dimensions of the conflict. The second project investigates how the state reacted to different forms of nonviolent action events and the groups who conducted them. It investigates to which nonviolent events or groups the state reacted
with repressive measures, outlining the different group particularities or behaviors which increase the likelihood of a violent regime reaction.

Thus, the first and the second contribution of this thesis deal with nonviolent action events during the civil war, their triggers (direct civil war violence as grievance) and their consequences (violent state reaction). The third contribution, however, takes one step back and deals with the question of how nonviolent action groups were able to organize and conduct nonviolent action in the first place. It shows in examples from narrative interviews how nongovernmental organizations helped civilians to overcome civil war hardships, to organize themselves and form activist groups able to conduct nonviolent action themselves.

Methodologically, the quantitative analyses of the first two papers are combined with a qualitative approach to overcome some of the gaps existing in contemporary nonviolent action datasets that rely on newspaper articles, for example a lack of detailed information on nonviolent action groups’ formation, goal-setting, or an answer to the question of how they decided to choose nonviolent tactics in the first place, accumulate resources, or make personal decisions. Consequently, a field research project with expert interviews was conducted to complement the quantitative analyses of the first two projects. In narrative interviews, the third project outlined how nonviolent action groups received help and support by nongovernmental organizations. Thus, it sheds light on the involvement of third parties like non-governmental organizations as supporting actors in the process of nonviolent action.

Together, the different contributions in this thesis concerning the Nepalese Civil War show not only why, how, and where nonviolent action events happened in relation to civil war violence, but also which nonviolent tactics and behaviors more likely induced a violent regime reaction. Further, the contributions show how activist groups received support during the war in their strife for resistance. The findings of the thesis are generalizable to similar grievance-motivated or revolutionary-based civil wars and the constructed dataset can serve future scholars who aim at investigating the phenomenon of nonviolent action during such conflicts.

4.1 Theoretical Background and Research Overview

4.1.1 On the Concept of Nonviolent Action

Nonviolent action in general is not a new phenomenon. Authors have started to coin theories about nonviolent action since the 1920s and there is a broad academic literature available since the 1960s. Until today there is no unified, delineated scientific discipline of the subject. We therefore lack a common unified definition using the various terms involving nonviolent action. Comparable to other fields of research in political science,
many definitions, perceptions, and concepts exist. Therefore, as for example Vinthagen (2015) argues, we must remain open to various descriptions in order to discover interesting studies and aspects of the various branches of the research on nonviolence (Vinthagen 2015).

A first good description and entry into the topic of nonviolent action is offered by Schock (2003) in dealing with common misconceptions of the phenomenon. He describes the tactic as active, public, nonviolent, and not restricted to certain normative, moral, ideological, or spiritual beliefs (Schock 2003). Nonviolent action as a political form of expression appears outside regular institutionalized forms of political participation like for example voting or lobbying. The public and non-restricted aspects of nonviolence are additional important themes in Kurt Schock’s description of nonviolent action. Furthermore, Nepstad (2011) illustrates nonviolent action as a civilian-based form of struggle that employs social, economic, and political forms of power without resorting to violence or the threat of violence (Nepstad 2011b). Although the use of weapons is not included, civil resistance without violence can nonetheless be equally disruptive, as it generally occurs outside the parameters of institutional methods of political change like for example lobbying or legislating (ibid.). Chenoweth (2020) speaks of a ‘[…] method of struggle in which unarmed people confront an adversary by using collective action (including protests, demonstrations, strikes, and non-cooperation) to build power and achieve political goals. […] Sometimes called civil resistance, people power, unarmed struggle, or nonviolent action, nonviolent resistance has become a mainstay of political action across the globe’ (Chenoweth 2020, 70). In this definition of nonviolent action, some famous tactics like demonstrations and non-cooperation are already mentioned, while stressing the unarmed aspect of the various options. She also talks about the various terms used throughout research, like civil resistance, nonviolent action, and nonviolent resistance, which all basically describe the same phenomenon, that is citizens voicing their opinions in a public, unarmed collective effort.

In an early attempt to describe nonviolent action, Sharp and Finkelstein in the 1970s already defined over 198 tactics of nonviolent action (Sharp and Finkelstein 1973). Their list ranges from non-cooperation or pamphlets, over picketing and mock elections, to marches, (hunger-) strikes and boycotts, sit-ins, as well as various forms of demonstrations and blockades (ibid.). Although this compendium appears rather encompassing, it is only a small list of actions that are theoretically possible. Without doubt, a large number of further methods have already been used, but have not been classified, or are culturally exclusive and therefore less known (e.g. De and Srivastava 1967). Certainly, a multitude of additional nonviolent methods will be invented in the future. Such a listing and categorization of nonviolent tactics can be very helpful, but will likely never be exhaustive.

In some definitions of nonviolent action, for example by Schock and Nepstad, acting outside
conventional political channels or spheres is mentioned when defining the concept. Thus, the next chapter will focus on this aspect of nonviolent action and also outline how the phenomenon works within a political system.

4.1.2 Nonviolent Action as a Form of Political Contention

Nonviolent action can be understood as a technique to issue the political voice of individuals to a broader audience of people. Whether the goals are to make political claims, defend standpoints, or raise citizens’ voices against repression, nonviolent action can be conceptualized as another form of taking part in the contentious political struggle. McAdam and Tarrow (2000) describe such contentious politics as a form of episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their political abilities (McAdam and Tarrow 2000). Although nonviolent action can indeed be successfully performed by single persons (e.g. during a hunger strike), on most occasions nonviolent tactics are facilitated by a collective effort. The number of participants can range from a couple of activists to a massive crowd of hundreds of thousands of people. Peaceful movements using nonviolent action as tactics, as well as violent armed revolutions, first emerge as the products of dynamic interactions among various parties of a political struggle, whose orientation to each other defines a socially constructed field of contention (McAdam and Tarrow 2000). This field of contention is a set of relationships that is embedded in a legal, institutional, or normative system which constrains the strategic options available to all political contenders (Tarrow, Tilly, and McAdam 2001). Classical examples of actors who can take part and define such a field of contention are the government of a state, including its various officials, challenging groups like political parties, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil-rights or religious groups, the public, or the media. It is a struggle for political power in which various groups strive to issue their standpoints. Of course the different actors, whether state or non-state actors, have different political norms, physical or moral controls, and possibilities to define what is allowed and considered normal in such a given democratic or non-democratic system to contest for political power (McAdam and Tarrow 2000).

Challengers of such a constrained system have to decide which tactics to use to issue their position and to pursue their goals. Subsequently, if changes are to be made to the own status quo inside the system or even to the system itself, challengers have to choose tactics that restrict the social control resources of opponents which can be legitimately used against them, while increasing the overall costs of their opponents’ remaining options (McAdam and Tarrow 2000). This exactly describes one major benefit of nonviolent tactics. McAdam and Tarrow (2000) illustrated this mechanic with the U.S. Civil Rights Movement, which used particular areas and tactics of nonviolent action in their struggle to gain support for their movement from bystanders and third parties, while at the same time
limiting reactions of opponents and policy makers within the government. The U.S. civil rights activists in this example particularly chose Birmingham, Alabama for their protest, where an anticipated violent backlash ordered by particularly conservative government officials produced some of the most memorable images of the Civil Rights Movement. The following images of state forces violently repressing unarmed activist transmitted globally and set off tremendous worldwide criticism of the prevailing U.S. racial policies. Among a rising domestic sympathy for the movements, this forced the Kennedy administration to defend the Civil Rights Movement and ultimately contributed to a civil rights bill (McAdam and Tarrow 2000). After the incident in Alabama, theoretically a continuous violent response by the state towards the activists would have been possible, but this would have arguably cost the government further supporters as well as more public sympathy. This example illustrates how activists can utilize a following violent backlash to their advantage, limiting the subsequent reaction of the opponent, here the government, in their favor while raising overall sympathy for the activists.

Basically, nonviolent as well as violent resistance like armed insurgencies can both be understood as alternative strategies to a conventional political fight for power. In general, actors have to decide between alternatives considering institutionalized, conventional political action or non-institutionalized action. They have to choose between legal vs. non-legal ways to pursue their goals, and make the decision regarding a violent or nonviolent way (e.g. Tarrow, Tilly, and McAdam 2001). While making those decisions, actors are strongly affected by their own capabilities, the opponents in the system as well as the political system itself. In a democratic system, different norms and regulations might apply to the political struggle compared to in an autocratic system or during a war (Tarrow 2011).

During a violent conflict, rules defining the political struggle might be changing due to a transformation or shutdown of the political process. The norms of the political system itself might be under threat, for example due to authoritarian ideologies trying to take over a moderate, democratic system, or secession attempts trying to separate parts of the country from the previous political field of contention. Security concerns might make using regular political channels more difficult in conflict situations. In addition, many contenders in the political system might be influenced by diminishing personal and material resources due to the war and a violent insurgency influencing the political landscape. In an environment of civil war conflict, nonviolent action as a form of action outside the mainstream political channels could be additionally constrained by the emerging conflict parties, the changing state, possible war effects, and turmoil in the legislative systems leading to emergency legislation or limitations of previously natural civil rights. While the normal political process could be limited due to a varying level of civil war intensity, nonviolent action could remain and become a valuable option, considering the ability to
possibly restrict a violent backlash or turn it into an advantage for the activists.

4.1.3 The Spiritual, Normative Origin of Nonviolent Action

Over time, many different approaches to studying nonviolent action have been proposed. Modern studies of nonviolence began when the famous Indian lawyer and pacifist Mohandas Gandhi successfully led an independence movement, freeing India from the British occupation. Surprisingly, he was able to contest the British Empire, which was far superior in terms of military power as well as economic resources than Gandhi’s movement. His famous campaign between 1919 and 1948 captured international attention, as Gandhi was one of the first activists to use techniques of civil resistance during a large-scale movement for independence. This sparked interest by scholars studying Gandhi’s nonviolent campaigns and ‘Satyagraha’ principles (Case 1923; Gregg 1935). In this regard, Gregg used the term ‘moral jiu-jitsu’ to refer to the effect of how collective, communal suffering within Gandhi’s movement transformed it (Gregg 1935). The term describes the principle of a Japanese martial art, where enemies are defeated by redirecting the energy of their attack back towards the opponent. In this example, Gandhi’s movement was able to redirect the force of the opponent’s attack against him, unbalancing him in a moral perspective. Instead of using hatred and violent, armed retaliation when violence against activists occurs, voluntary commitment to suffering induces shame in an attacker and as a result may cease further repressive attacks (Gregg 1935). Emphasizing this, Gandhi himself defined his campaign’s principles of ‘swaraj’ in his writings as a nonviolent movement for self-purification with almost religious connotation (Dalton 1993). Gandhi, as well as many of the initial scholars studying him, relied strongly on the moral, normative dimension and effects of nonviolent action including terms like seeking truth or transforming the heart and mindset of the opponent (e.g. Brown 1974). Unfortunately, since much of the initial nonviolence research focused almost exclusively on Gandhi’s moral and religious beliefs, it was overlooked that Gandhi was also a great organizer and strategist. In addition, and in contrast to Gandhi, many of his various followers were not motivated solely by moral or religious beliefs. For example, Nakhre (1976) argues that already during Gandhi’s campaigns, a large part of his supporters viewed nonviolence as a tactic rather than as a religious commitment. He found that many people within Gandhi’s protests followed him mainly because of his speeches in which religious beliefs and commitment played a much lesser role than for example in his writings (Nakhre 1976). What the normative approach to nonviolent action therefore fails to explain is how and why for example certain groups prefer nonviolent action and others do not, apart from spiritual commitment.
4.1.4 The Tactical Perspective on Nonviolent Action

The mainly normative approach to investigate nonviolent action changed during the 1970’s and 1980’s, the time when collective action research became popular, when resource mobilization and political process theories emerged, emphasizing rational action and planning over emotional or normative factors for nonviolent action (e.g. Sharp and Finkelstein 1973). In rejecting models emphasizing the beliefs of movement participants, the tactical perspective underlined structural factors, availability of personnel resources, or organizational capacity of movements to explain the occurrence of nonviolent campaigns (e.g. McAllister 1982; McManus 1991; Michalowski and Cooney 1987; Sharp and Finkelstein 1973). A central scholar of this time was Gene Sharp, who presented a more direct, functional understanding of nonviolent action (Sharp and Finkelstein 1973). Sharp and Finkelstein were aware that the moral and spiritual requirements of Gandhi’s teachings were obstacles for many, who nonetheless could utilize nonviolent resistance as a rather pragmatic instead of a spiritual tool to reach common goals, while not necessarily sharing beliefs or convictions (Weber 2003). Sharp therefore introduced his utilitarian model, arguing in principle for the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance in relation to other available options (Sharp and Finkelstein 1973). According to this model, violent resistance is simply not necessary if citizens become aware of the various forms of power which they naturally possess over the state, such as the capacity to withhold their cooperation, skills and labor, as well as material resources (ibid.). To promote this approach, they collected and presented a compendium of over 200 nonviolent tactics from non-cooperation or strikes to different kinds of sit-ins or civil disobedience protests (Sharp and Finkelstein 1973). In doing so, Sharp showed that nonviolent resistance can be used broadly, under various different circumstances, and by literally anyone. After 1973, Sharp’s analyses became almost as self-evident in the discourse of nonviolence among nonviolence scholars as the ideas of Gandhi himself. With his paradigmatic influence, Gene Sharp has taken the decisive step towards a science of nonviolence (Vinthagen 2015).

Other scholars soon followed this more strategic perspective on nonviolent action, presenting examples of nonviolent tactics and showing their successful application in various descriptive examples of nonviolent resistance campaigns (Ackerman and DuVall 2001; Cunningham 2013; Soule 1995). Many scholars sharing the nowadays more common strategic perspective of nonviolence consider nonviolent action as more cost-effective compared to violent action. Weighing different options against each other, the nonviolent path seems to have benefits over violent alternatives. Respectively, violent action and reciprocal violent reaction of an opponent puts a higher risk on one’s life on a daily basis than nonviolent action does (Schock 2005). But although it is less likely in the case of nonviolent action, violent retaliation by opponents is still possible. Nevertheless, the costs of such retaliation are perceived as much lower compared to the violent repression for example states regularly
apply against armed insurgencies (Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017). The lower costs of nonviolent action are consequently perceived more strongly than the cost of mobilization of enough supporters and participants for the nonviolent actions to become noticed (Cunningham 2013).

4.1.5 Empirical Testing of Nonviolent Action and Findings on Success

A next development in nonviolent action research after the emergence of the tactical perspective was to direct the focus away from the documentation and analysis of 'successful' examples of applied nonviolence action campaigns, towards the empirical evaluation and testing of nonviolence theories. Nonviolent campaigns in this regard are consecutive nonviolent events like for example demonstrations, sit-ins or strikes which share a common goal, for example, the removal of the incumbent government or in the previously mentioned example of the famous American Civil Rights movement, the end of racial segregation and discrimination of Black Americans. Scholars began to compare successful and unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns, trying to understand the reasons leading to victory, meaning the achievement of their goals, while other campaigns failed to do so (e.g. Huff and Kruszewska 2016; Lehoucq 2016). For this reason, Chenoweth and Stephan (2008) constructed a database of nonviolent as well as violent movements with political goals such as overthrowing a regime in an independence movement or seceding from a nation (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). They found that overall, 52 percent of nonviolent movements obtained their goals, compared to only 26 percent of movements including violent insurgencies, strongly arguing for the effectiveness of nonviolence (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). They further discovered that regime change orchestrated with the help of nonviolent movements in the long run more often resulted in relatively stable democratic systems, instead of ending in turmoil and repetitive conflict (ibid.). Following Chenoweth’s and Stephan’s work and spurred by successful nonviolent campaigns utilized in the ‘Color Revolutions’ and the ‘Arab Spring’, the topic of nonviolent action received a new wave of attention among scholars (e.g. Celestino and Gleditsch 2013; Dudouet 2013; Nepstad 2011b; Pearlman 2013; Schock et al. 2015; Wang and Soule 2012, 2016).

Several factors were identified influencing whether or not a nonviolent campaign is able to reach its goals. A first factor is size, the number of people which are mobilized for the cause. Chenoweth and Stephan argue that size plays a role for whether goals of a campaign are reached. When more and more people become involved in the campaign against a state, they have a bigger leverage to disturb and challenge the state effectively, for example with a general strike (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). In addition, with a broader part of the population fighting for the same cause, mixing ethnicities, demographic identities, or political groups, it is more difficult for the state to quell the nonviolent campaign for example by means of violent repression.
The kind of goals also seems to play a role for the success of nonviolent campaigns. According to Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), nonviolent campaigns which had the goal to remove an authoritarian regime were more likely to be successful than nonviolent secessionist movements (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Moreover, Cunningham (2013) showed that large groups fighting for self-determination might rather also include violent methods into their tactical portfolio than their counterparts striving just for a regime change (Cunningham 2013).

Indeed, many scholars of nonviolent civil resistance in the past often defined ‘success’ of nonviolent campaigns as the overthrow of a government or the achievement of territorial independence due to a campaign within a year of its peak (Chenoweth 2020). This definition of success is contested, although for practical purposes it is often used when comparing cases of large-scale nonviolent action campaigns (e.g. Hussain and Howard 2013). Some studies also focus on rather long-term successes of nonviolent campaigns, such as the expansion of democracy, rights, and stability (ibid.).

Another factor influencing nonviolent campaign outcomes against a state is how the state reacts towards the nonviolent activists. Nepstad for example argues that it is important if defections occur within the military and state security forces (e.g. Nepstad 2011a, 2013). In this regard, according to a famous paper from Chenoweth and Stephan, large nonviolent campaigns were 46 times more likely to reach their goals if regime defections within the army and the security forces (e.g. the police) occurred (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Nepstad (2015) explains that when the police or army refuses to attack nonviolent activists and defects, an authoritarian regime loses its ability to sanction and repress, which often is a fundamental basis of its power (Nepstad 2015). This effect seems only to be true for nonviolent movements. Armed movements do not seem to have a significantly higher possibility to defeat a regime when security force defections occurred (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

The setting of the nonviolent campaign might also contribute to its success. White and colleagues (2015) point to effectiveness of nonviolent movements in urban settings (White et al. 2015). According to them, in urban areas, nonviolent campaigns are more effective as the state is heavily reliant upon citizens’ cooperation. The activists are more likely able to hinder major crucial businesses as well as transportation and communication systems (ibid.).

Another important factor affecting campaign outcomes seems to be if activist groups responsible for the campaigns are internally united. If there is an internal divide, when the campaign for example has a radical flank which uses violent tactics to issue discontent, this gives an opponent the justification and possible leverage to react violently not only against the radical flank but against the entire campaign (Pearlman 2012). Consequently, possible
future supporters of a nonviolent campaign are more sympathetic and more likely to join the campaign if the movement is acting nonviolently. Thus, a lack of internal discipline and cohesion resulting in violent behavior will also have consequences for future perception among and mobilization of the broader population (Hess and Martin 2006).

It is important to note that many of these findings on 'success' presented in this chapter relate to the campaign level of nonviolent resistance. In contrast, for a single small nonviolent event, like a demonstration or strike, the definition of success for the group organizing the event might differ and could for example just be the achievement of better working conditions or the perception of being heard by a larger audience, attracting additional supporters for their cause. Another form of success could be being able to issue own political statements without getting violently repressed by an opponent or receive compensation for losses or other small-scale political demands. Regime change or even a change of the political system is of course not desired in such a case.

Overall, many of the findings on success of nonviolent campaigns on a basic level seem to be transferable to the civil war context, although to date they are much less comprehensively investigated in conflict settings. Nevertheless, as already mentioned, success very much depends on stated goals, which might also change dynamically during an activist group's lifetime. For a group working towards an end of a civil war, success could mean reaching a ceasefire or negotiations between conflict factions. Instead, as outlined for example by Masullo (2015), the protection of certain isolated communities from civil war violence by conflict parties could be equally regarded as a example of success of nonviolent resistance during a civil war (e.g. Masullo 2015).

In sum, many of the factors defining success in this chapter deal with mostly large nonviolent campaigns. Besides these overarching factors like size or movement cohesion these campaigns benefit from, there is also the question what drives the individual activist to join nonviolent campaigns, or what drives citizens to form activist groups and choose nonviolent tactics in the first place, long before they turn into large-scale nonviolent campaigns. The next section therefore outlines findings concerning motivations for nonviolent action from an activist perspective.

4.1.6 Motivating Factors for Nonviolent Action

From the beginning a central part of nonviolent action research tended towards factors which were mentioned as triggers and motivations for nonviolent action among populations.

In many of the previous contributions on factors predicting nonviolent action, grievances and repression play a key role. Nonviolent action can be used as an alternative to conventional politics for example by oppressed social identity groups (McAdam and Tarrow 2000; Tarrow 2011). It can serve as an alternative tactic to be heard and to achieve goals
by groups for which regular political power situations make a change of their status quo rather unlikely. Some case studies examining the origin of nonviolent action groups point to initial grievances or exclusion from the political process as driving factors to form protest groups (e.g. Gurr 2000; Nepstad 2011b). In addition, quantitative studies by Chenoweth and Stephan point to state repression as a central factor spurring nonviolent civil resistance (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Stephan 2009). But this does not mean that nonviolent action exclusively spawns by groups which were continuously repressed and marginalized over a long time. Butcher and Svensson (2014) for example found that long-time state repression is not a necessary precondition for nonviolent campaigns to emerge (Butcher and Svensson 2014). Instead, for example according to Nepstad (2011), triggers or shocks might be sufficient, morally enraging parts of the population to start nonviolent action (Nepstad 2011b). Pearlman (2013) outlines this mechanism at the examples of some of the Arab Spring uprisings (Pearlman 2013). Anger due to such shocks can promote optimistic assessments, risk acceptance, and feelings of personal efficacy. Such emotions increase own willingness to engage in nonviolent resistance, even when it jeopardizes own security (ibid.).

Besides grievances there exist other contributing factors encouraging nonviolent action. Resource mobilization theory is mentioned for example by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) and an overall decreasing cost of nonviolent action. Basically, activists have to overcome costs for activating followers in addition to existing grievances. Following this line of argumentation, financial, human, and informational resources are influential in mobilizing people for collective action (e.g. Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). People need to believe that the potential cost of participation is lower than the potential benefits. The potential cost of participation for individuals, such as arrest or violent repression by the police, decreases as more and more people participate in nonviolent action (ibid.). In recent decades, there seems to be a development towards nonviolent rather than violent resistance, since the cost of violent rebellion increases with technological and globalizing developments (Karakaya 2018). In this regard, and alongside technological innovations, it seems to become increasingly easier to mobilize supporters for a nonviolent cause than for a violent insurgency. Technological innovations certainly play a role here, but not only for the activists, as for example governments can also use improved monitoring and counterinsurgency tactics against violent insurgencies as well as nonviolent activist groups (e.g. Hussain and Howard 2013). Also arguing for the importance of resource mobilization, Butcher and Svensson (2014) point out that manufacturing dissent brings people from diverse backgrounds together, which makes mass mobilization and nonviolent resistance more feasible (Butcher and Svensson 2014). Some scholars even argue for a general modernization approach to explain the rise in nonviolent resistance. Here besides technological advantages, increased communication and education are mentioned as contributing factors as well as urbanization.
and the spread of liberal norms and values (e.g. Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). While these factors might explain the current overall rise of nonviolent action across the globe, they fail to do so for the impressive examples of nonviolent resistance in the past, as well as for the well-documented examples existing in less technologically developed or urbanized parts of the world.

Another theory explaining nonviolent action is the opportunity structures approach (e.g. McAdam 2010). In this approach, the previously mentioned resource mobilization explanation is enriched with further external restrictions and opportunities. The decision to use violence or nonviolence here is influenced by the broader political context. While this is similar to the already depicted description of nonviolence as a form of political contention, opportunity structures include structural factors such as regime type, elections, post-Cold War period, human rights organizations, and international support as some influential factors in promoting nonviolent resistance (Karakaya 2018). Concerning the external factor of the state, according to Tarrow (2011), democratic systems could favor nonviolent action due to constitutional rights which by nature allow its citizens to conduct nonviolent action like public demonstrations, which might be more difficult to conduct in authoritarian regimes (Tarrow 2011). However, Cunningham (2013) finds that groups which for example struggle for self-determination rely more often on nonviolent tactics in authoritarian regimes than to choose the way of a regular opposition. Others point in the same direction, arguing for the regular occurrence of nonviolent campaigns in authoritarian systems despite missing constitutional rights which favour nonviolent action (e.g. Celestino and Gleditsch 2013; Gleditsch and Rivera 2017). A paper by Karakaya (2018) utilizing the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset argues that increasing levels of globalization lead to a preference for nonviolent campaigns over violent ones in contentious politics (Karakaya 2018). She combines existing grievances theories with resource mobilization theory and opportunity structures of activists. Overall, it should be noted that the resource and opportunity structure approaches towards nonviolent action are highly case-sensitive. While grievances, like repression, might often be underlying factors, many of the constraints described for example by resource mobilization theory stem from mass mobilization research on large nonviolent campaigns (e.g. Chenoweth and Schock 2015). These campaigns often have maximalist goals like secession or the overthrow of an regime or political system. It should be noted that considerably more resources are necessary to reach the goals in those campaigns than for small nonviolent campaigns and events which might only aim to improve the status quo of certain groups and minorities without changing the political system itself.
4.1.7 Additional Findings of Nonviolent Action Research

Besides the aforementioned motivations and underlying structural factors for nonviolent action, there are further exciting developments and findings concerning nonviolent action research which developed in the last decade and should not be left out. Noticeable for example are technological developments which some argue encouraged or simplified mobilization for nonviolent action (e.g. Martin 2005). As mentioned, new communication technologies and social media for example played a role in many recent examples and subsequent investigations of nonviolent activism for example during the Arab Spring or the Color Revolutions (e.g. Hussain and Howard 2013; Lawson 2015; McKone, Stephan, and Dickover 2015). Of course the debate regarding the effects which these technologies might have on mobilization of collective action, documentation of state repression during a nonviolent event, or even as a new tool for censorship and state repression itself is still ongoing. Another topic that should not be forgotten are the international aspects of nonviolent action. Gleditsch (2015) labeled the spread of nonviolence campaigns from one country to a neighboring country, like for example during the Arab Spring, nonviolent diffusion (e.g. Braithwaite, Braithwaite, and Kucik 2015; Gleditsch and Rivera 2017). In these cases, activism campaigns can inspire and encourage similar attempts in neighboring countries. Linked to this aspect is the ability and possibility to attract international mediators and assistance to nonviolent struggles which can influence the situation in favor of the activists (e.g. Dudouet 2015; Svensson and Lundgren 2018). And finally, there is the democratic effect as a long-term benefit of nonviolent resistance. Bayer et al. (2015) find that democratic regimes which experienced nonviolent resistance during their transition phase survived substantially longer than regimes which did not have nonviolent resistance in their transition period (Bayer, Bethke, and Lambach 2015). Many of the findings mentioned here are not exclusive to the state of peace, although they were predominantly investigated with examples and case studies not from conflict examples. But of course they might be relevant to the civil war context as well. The democratic stability aspect mentioned as the last point for example could be applied to the civil war context, arguing that peace which was accompanied by or even resulted from massive civil nonviolent action might be more stable and long-lasting than a victory which was violently achieved by a conflict faction. And of course also the populations of civil war countries benefit from technological advantages like cell phones or social media, which might have eased mobilization during the last decades. However, in research on nonviolent action in conflict settings, many unsolved puzzles remain.

4.1.8 New Quantitative Datasets

A recent development in nonviolent resistance research is to increasingly rely not only on rich case studies to investigate features of nonviolent resistance, but also on quantitative
datasets. The dataset by Stephan and Chenoweth can be considered a milestone in nonviolent campaign research. Their Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) data project was the first of its kind to codify the characteristics of resistance campaigns between 1900 and 2006 (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). Similarly, the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) provides additional disaggregated data for example on demonstrations, riots, strikes, repression, and violence in Africa (e.g. Hendrix and Salehyan 2017). It includes data on 47 African countries between 1990 to 2015 (ibid.). Although these datasets have limitations (e.g. Lehoucq 2016), they recently allowed researchers to test theories about nonviolent campaigns, their onset success, and long-term effects (Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017; Vüllers and Krtsch 2020). A recent addition to NAVCO is also the Nonviolent Action in Violent Contexts (NVAVC) dataset which includes major nonviolent campaigns for some of the African conflicts (Chenoweth, Hendrix, and Hunter 2019a). Apart from these contributions, the civil war context is still lacking quantitative datasets containing information on nonviolent activism, especially if one wants to get information on nonviolent actions outside large campaigns.

4.2 Nonviolent Action in Civil Wars

This chapter introduces three central aspects of civil war and outlines how they are connected to nonviolent action and how they further relate to the research questions investigated in this thesis. It also shows how this thesis contributes to and is situated in the recent dominant civil war literature.

4.2.1 The Civil War Context in Relation to Nonviolent Action

Since World War II, civil war quickly overtook the previously dominant interstate wars (Cederman and Vogt 2017). As a response, today the field of civil war studies has evolved into one of the most vibrant literatures in political science and corresponding fields of social sciences (ibid). In numbers, since World War II, civil wars have produced over 25 million casualties, as well as the forced displacement of millions more, along with economic collapse (Kalyvas and Kenny 2010). There are central factors defining the state of civil war in contrast to the state of peace, which are important pillars on which the research questions of this thesis rely on.

The first factor which differentiates civil wars in general from other forms of conflict or political unrest is a disproportionate amount of violence which also often affects civilians. Of course civilian victimization is a factor in any military conflict and is relevant both for inter-state and intra-state wars. Nevertheless, as research has shown, there seems to be a higher percentage of civilian casualties in civil wars than in previous inter-state conflicts. This phenomenon is accompanied by a vast amount of ‘violence in civil war’ literature which still continues to grow (e.g. Balcells 2010; Bencherif, Campana, and Stockemer
Within this civil war violence literature, Kalyvas (2006) laid a groundwork for a micro-theoretical approach in arguing that civil war research had too long focused on identifying the structural causes of civil war initiation at the expense of local war-time dynamics (Kalyvas 2006). He differentiates between discriminate (direct) and indiscriminate (indirect) forms of violence which civilians become victims of (Kalyvas 2006). In discriminate forms of violence civilians are purposely targeted by conflict factions for example to eliminate alleged spies or parts of civilian populations that are perceived as hostile by a conflict faction. The indiscriminate form of violence instead occurs for example as a byproduct of conflict factions engaging each other on the battlefields or targeting each other in closely populated areas like urban centers. As shown in previous studies concerning the onset of nonviolent action in times of peace, grievances or state repression often played a role as motivation for nonviolent action (Gurr 2000; Nepstad 2011b; Opp 1988). Being a major grievance in civil war, the factor violence could be a motivational trigger connected to civilian decision to act and engage in nonviolent events and campaigns during the conflict (e.g. Nepstad 2011b; Pearlman 2013). In addition, the importance of civil war violence in the decision to use nonviolent action was already mentioned and proven relevant in some studies dealing with nonviolent events and campaigns during conflicts (e.g. Masullo 2015; Vüllers and Krtsc 2020).

The second factor which differentiates civil wars from the time of peace is that the state is contested by armed factions within its territory. For example Cederman and Vogt (2017) define a civil war ‘..as armed combat within a sovereign state between an incumbent government and a non-state challenger that claims full or partial sovereignty over the territory of the state’ (Cederman and Vogt 2017, 1993). Here, a contested state tries to keep its sovereignty and political control over the country’s territory while fighting against armed competition from within. This is in contrast to an inter-state war, where the state is challenged by an outside opponent. This internal contention might become important considering a state’s reaction towards nonviolent actions of its citizens, when an armed challenger tries to contest its credibility within a state’s territory at the same time. Ordinary citizens engaging in nonviolent action disturb the public life or contest the state, thus they could have to fear becoming targeted by the state for being ’close’ to the armed rebel insurgency in terms of demands as well as goals.

This internal challenge of the state might not be limited to a military dimension, but might also include credibility and capability to be the sole provider of services, judiciary, and rules within a country. Arjona et al. (2015) outlines that a surprisingly large amount of rebel groups in civil wars try to establish some form of alternative governance structures. These structures can range from minimal regulations and taxation, to schools, courts, and even full bureaucracies (Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015). In doing so, a state’s
credibility is challenged for example as rebels try to substitute the services, security, and rules offered by a state providing their own alternatives (e.g. A. Adhikari 2014; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer 2021). As Cunningham, Huang and Sawyer (2021) put it, ‘Rebels don’t need to control territory as such in order to pursue some kinds of governance activities, such as organizing food distribution, establishing neighborhood councils, disseminating information on approaching enemy forces, or dispatching night watchmen in areas where state authorities are weak or absent’ (Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer 2021, 85).

This competition with an armed insurgency might influence a state’s reaction towards nonviolent action by its citizens who are not necessarily part of that armed insurgency. A state under such internal pressure might on the one hand try to project itself to still be able to uphold power towards the broader population, showing a picture of credibility, stability, and strength towards its supporters within the country, but also towards the international community and possible external supporters. One the other hand, a strong defiance by civil nonviolent action groups might in such a constellation be perceived as ‘close to the insurgents’ if they for example share certain demands and goals, perhaps even if their actions on the streets were carried out nonviolently. In this regard, a nonviolent action group which for example tries to cripple major national industries by strikes might pose a similar threat to the state as the armed insurgency which pursues the same goals with armed violent attacks in the rural parts of the country. Under such pressure, it might be difficult for a state to distinguish between demands of the civil society in the streets and the armed insurgency, which of course might simultaneously try to compete for the support of the general civil society. This relationship under challenge by an insurgency might determine how a state reacts towards nonviolent action by activists and this might be different to the time of peace or when a state faces external enemies.

The third factor differentiating civil wars from the time of peace is the instability and limitations of the political system. During a civil war and similar to other forms of military conflict, states suffer from an instability of the political system and political process (e.g. Hendrix 2010; Höglund, Jarstad, and Kovacs 2009; Thies 2010). Parts of the country if not even the whole territory of the state are contested by the insurgency, limiting the capacity of the state. Services as well as participation the state provides towards its citizens during peace time become more difficult to provide in their current form. When the civil war commences, this also often limits the institutionalized forms of political contention (e.g. Tarrow, Tilly, and McAdam 2001). Institutionalized forms of political participation like elections, political lobbying, or complaints become more difficult for citizens to take part in during civil wars. This has several reasons. First, personal financial assets get limited as the civil war destroys property and the economy. Citizens are expected to have less influence due to fewer chances to express opinions via elections and other
institutionalized forms of participation like political lobbying or complaints for example to local administrations. This is both due to a diminishing influence of the state and its political and social rules in the areas of the country where the insurgency commences, but also due to a state’s own emergency legislation or security concerns to allow participation, even in the areas which are still controlled by the state (Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer 2021). In practice, for example even if elections are held amidst an ongoing civil war, there is no reason to assume that violence and the war would end afterwards, if citizens try to end the conflict by voting for a different ruler. Indeed there exist examples where the conduction and outcome of elections during civil wars even had a negative impact on conflict dynamics and generated further violence and insecurity (Höglund, Jarstad, and Kovacs 2009).

Of course elections are not the only way to participate or to issue discontent and raise awareness for personal issues. Linked to this instability is the destruction by the war, limiting a state’s administrative and judicial capabilities. Not only infrastructure like roads and communication gets negatively affected by fighting conflict factions, but also the administrative and judicial capabilities (e.g. Thies 2010). As a result, regular political or legal complaints towards courts or political and administrative personnel become more difficult to issue, as the state looses influence in regions and districts due to competing influence of conflict factions in combination with diminishing resources (e.g. Kalyvas 2006). The processing of legal complaints, for example due to war atrocities, could be difficult in areas where the state lacks these capabilities due to security problems. Many rebel insurgencies often deliberately target state officials to cripple state administration and thereby the provision of such services (De la Calle 2017).

Overall, citizens who have to endure a civil war might have less opportunities to take part in and get heard via regular political channels, maybe also as a result of conflict factions establishing their own system of political rules (e.g. Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015). These limited or more-difficult-to-pursue regular institutionalized forms of political contention during civil wars might become important when citizens have to weigh their options to issue a plight via traditional political or judicial channels, or rather via alternative routes like protests, noncooperation, or other forms of nonviolent action (e.g. Masullo 2020). Of course these choices might similarly be made during times of peace, but it should be noted that under civil war conditions they could have different chances in terms of duration and fruitfulness.

These factors described in this chapter serve as a framework to understand how the condition of a civil war might be different to that of the state of peace. The factors might affect civilian choices within civil war to conduct nonviolent action. Violence as a central grievance might serve as a trigger and motivation, while political instability might limit other available options or makes nonviolent action more cost-effective to pursue in contrast
to other options. Besides civilians, the factors might also affect other actors within the civil war dimension. For the state the reaction towards nonviolent action on the streets might be shaped by the groups who facilitate them, but maybe also under the threat of an armed insurgency within the country. Third actors like nongovernmental organizations might be motivated to help civilians who get affected by civil war violence or are unable to relieve their situation with conventional legal or political means.

4.2.2 Bringing Together Research Traditions on Nonviolent Action and Civil War - The Contribution of this Thesis

As outlined in the theoretical background on nonviolent action, many studies of nonviolence and nonviolent mobilization stem from normative peace studies and research on social movements, which have primarily investigated social dynamics or protest movements during peace rather than violent conflict (Hallward, Masullo, and Mouly 2017). A basic divide in the scientific community regarding the investigation of social movements and nonviolent resistance can be observed. A broad scientific attention until today for example is centered on social movements, the groups behind the mostly nonviolent action. Historically, studies in this field of research for example dealt with questions regarding what kind of citizens were involved, patterns of group cohesion, attraction of followers and supporters, leadership particularities and effects, within-group decision making, and goal setting (e.g. Davenport 2014b; Maney 2012; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oliver and Myers 2003; Wang and Soule 2016). Unfortunately, scholars focusing on social movements and scholars focusing on patterns of conflict largely work in isolation from each other, although they share an emphasis on the study of escalating violence and social mobilization (E. J. Wood 2015). In particular, while social movement studies and the civil war context have empirical overlap, these fields are distinct and rarely consider each other (Della Porta et al. 2017). As armed conflict indeed has been studied intensively by political scientists, this line of research tends to focus on the dyadic competition between state and non-state armed actors, still often overlooking the civil actors (ibid).

Moreover, there has been a trend in studies of conflict to equate the word ‘nonviolent’ with ‘passive’, ‘weak’, or ‘pacifist’ (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013; Kurtz and Smithey 2018; Schock 2003). However, a first round of illustrative case studies has proven in recent years that nonviolent action, respectively nonviolent resistance, is used effectively in the civil war context. Gray (2012) or Masullo (2015) have illustrated how communities affected by civil war violence defended themselves with the help of nonviolent tactics against conflict factions during the Colombian Civil War, achieving safe spaces for their villages (e.g., Gray 2012; Masullo 2015). Kaplan (2017) or Schubinger (2021) extended this with examples from conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Peru, and recently Syria, where ordinary civilians took the risk of standing up to protect themselves and their communities against heavily
armed opponents (Kaplan 2017; Schubiger 2021).

These examples largely contradict the perception that civilians are mostly passive, powerless, or weak. Instead, they are able to respond to the dangers of conflict for example by social cooperation (ibid.). Such in-depth case examinations have shown that nonviolence concepts and tactics already described by Sharp and Finkelstein (1973), like deception, protest, non-cooperation, and many more, not only helped civilians to avoid getting targeted by conflict factions but also established safe spaces and achieved compensations for losses when violence and repression occurred (e.g. Sharp and Finkelstein 1973).

Overall, nonviolent action research in the civil war context is still a young field of research. As a consequence, numerous questions regarding nonviolent action in civil wars are far from sufficiently answered. Kaplan (2017) in his investigation raises the question why under similar pressure by conflict factions, certain villages in civil wars spawn nonviolent groups and actions and others fail to do so (Kaplan 2017). Abbs (2020) points in the same direction and a remaining puzzle concerning the early emergence of nonviolent action campaigns (Abbs 2020). Masullo (2015) illustrates how third parties like religious organizations could have played a strong role for groups’ or communities’ decision to use nonviolent tactics and follow them in certain conflict situations (Masullo 2015).

Beside these case studies, quantitative studies aiming to explain nonviolent action in the civil war context are especially sparse. However, some recent contributions find support for the grievance hypothesis playing a role for nonviolent action in civil wars as well. For example, Vüllers and Krtsch (2020) find support for their hypothesis that civil war battles and collateral damage among civilians trigger nonviolent protests in some of the African civil wars (Vüllers and Krtsch 2020). Concerning how nonviolent campaigns spawn in civil war countries, Gleditsch and Riviera (2017) find evidence for nonviolent diffusion, meaning the spreading of nonviolent campaigns from one civil war country to another if they are neighbors (Gleditsch and Rivera 2017). Regarding the question who is more prone to use nonviolent actions, Thurber (2018) argues that ethnic and social structures could impact when and where nonviolent campaigns might occur. She finds that nonviolent campaigns are less likely than violent ones to include participants from politically disadvantaged ethnic groups featuring also less political claims. She concludes that political exclusion and a small group size reduce the likelihood that members of an ethnic group will initiate a campaign of civil resistance (Thurber 2018).

In general, a big question mark still surrounds the basic ‘why’ and ‘how’, referring here to origins of nonviolent action and the reasons why they emerge in one location but not in another. The same seems true concerning motivations of citizens to choose nonviolent action during civil wars. As outlined, grievances certainly play a major role in case studies and the existing quantitative efforts concerning nonviolent action motivation. However,
in a civil war these grievances are often not restricted to single communities and areas in a civil war country. Although we see people become affected in masses by grievances, oppression, and violence, only some areas show signs of nonviolent action mobilization while other areas do not. This implies that there is a demand for further investigation of when and how nonviolent action emerges in civil wars.

This thesis aims at combining the research tradition of nonviolent action and civil war research by systematically relating the three factors that characterize civil war in contrast to the state of peace to the investigation of nonviolent action in civil wars. To do so, it follows the perspective to regard civilians as influential actors in civil wars beyond their role as victims or recruitment pools for armed factions. Indeed, despite a predominant focus on opportunities and constraints in the civil war literature, some recent studies started to emphasize the importance of individuals’ grievances and ideological motivations and how they can influence civil war dynamics (Cederman and Vogt 2017). In fact, directing the focus to ordinary actors within the civil war context, seeing them not merely as victims of violence, refugees, or recruitment pools for armed factions, is a relatively new development in civil war research (S. Barter 2016; Masullo 2015; Schubiger 2021). Some recent scientific contributions have increasingly taken civilians and their particularities into account and investigated their impact on civil war occurrence or termination. Nonviolent action here is only one aspect. ‘Gender and civil war’ can serve as an example of such a new research objective trying to estimate the effect for example of the status of women on the causes of civil war onset but also on the effects gender can have on war termination (e.g. Melander 2016). Nonviolent action can serve as another aspect for ordinary citizens to take influence within the war and continue to take part in the political process even if regular channels to do so collapse (Gustafson 2020; Masullo 2020).

A focus on civilians as influential actors in civil war does not only encompass the civilians themselves, but also their connection to other central actors in the civil war context. Indeed, nonviolent action in civil war can have an impact on the attitudes, strategies, and behavior of the conflict’s fighting factions. It can affect their strategies, attitudes, and behavior not only towards the acting civilians (Subedi and Bhattarai 2017). In some instances ordinary citizens serve as a catalyst to transform or even help end the conflict (ibid.). There exist examples like the ‘Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace’, whose nonviolent actions forced conflict parties to the negotiation table (Chenoweth 2020). Other examples show possibilities to initiate mediation efforts for example by international third actors to cease fighting or lessen war effects (e.g. Svensson and Lundgren 2018).

Following this overall line of thought, to give civilians agency within the civil war realm to conduct nonviolent action as a way of resistance, a first crucial step is to gain further knowledge about what motivates and triggers them to act. The first empirical contribution of this thesis therefore deals with civilian motivation to conduct nonviolent action during
a civil war in relation to civil war violence. In a subsequent step, it is equally important to understand how the surrounding environment reacts towards this nonviolent approach of resistance, and how civilians are able to facilitate their nonviolent approach under the often harsh conditions of a civil war.

To answer these following questions about surrounding reactions towards nonviolent action, this thesis investigates two further central actors in civil wars that are affected by civilians’ nonviolent action: The state and nongovernmental organizations. The state is one central figure that is contested during the civil war and is also during times of peace a major recipient of the nonviolent action in a country (e.g. Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017; Pierskalla 2010). Thus, in its second empirical contribution this thesis investigates under which conditions the state reacts violently to civilians’ nonviolent action. Shedding light on this behavior is crucial for example for activists to perhaps avoid such violence or for example to assure proper preparation and documentation. Besides the reaction of the state, there is the question of how activists overcome the civil war conditions and become successful activist groups able to pursue the nonviolent way instead of violent options. Of course there are incentives like for example a break-down of traditional channels of contention, but many practical and perhaps organizational hurdles are also to be overcome. In the already mentioned case study from Masullo (2015), it was in one example to a certain extent the Church which provided guidance, help, and persuasion towards citizens to follow a nonviolent path of resistance (Masullo 2015). Here could exist a supporting or moderating influence of third parties who could help activists in their efforts. In many countries plagued by civil war, there might exist organizations dealing with general development, building up organizational capacity, monitoring of civil rights, or civil rights promotion. In addition, many nongovernmental organizations are now busy with the active promotion of nonviolent tactics throughout the globe, of some of them we learned for example during the Color Revolutions. The 'Albert Einstein Institution' or the 'Center For Applied Nonviolent Actions and Strategies' are examples of such organizations which search for oppressed civil society groups and train them in nonviolent tactics to resist repression. Between 1953 and 2003 the number of organizations actively promoting nonviolent activism increased from about 100 to over 1000 (Schock et al. 2015). There is the chance that such organization become involved also during civil wars, where the suffering of populations could be similarly strong than within authoritarian regimes. To investigate if this factor played a role, the third empirical contribution of this thesis investigates the role of nongovernmental organizations in supporting civilians in conducting nonviolent action during a civil war. Overall, answering these questions may not only help scholars in understanding these processes, but might ultimately actively help to ease the way for further nonviolent action during such conflict, which could promote a peaceful way out for citizens to overcome grievances during these conflicts.
4.3 Three Research Questions for Nonviolent Action in Civil Wars

As outlined, this thesis presents three empirical contributions that investigate innovative research questions about nonviolent action in civil war. Each empirical contribution takes the perspective of one central actor in civil wars. The first paper focuses on civilians as actors, the second paper on violent state reactions towards civilian nonviolent action, and the third paper on the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in supporting civilian nonviolent action. Below the research questions investigated in the empirical contributions will be systematically deducted from the interplay of civil war factors and central actors in civil war.

4.3.1 Civilians’ Motivations for Nonviolent Action in Civil War: Direct Violence as a Trigger?

What exactly makes citizens in civil war environments choose nonviolent action? To investigate this motivation, the first and third factor of civil wars mentioned above are particularly relevant. The motivations to use nonviolent action during a civil war might be a combination of desperation due to grievances and an increasing difficulty to use conventional, traditional political means (e.g. Gustafson 2020). Concerning violence as grievance during a civil war, there is a vast literature available concerning the different devastating effects violence in civil war can have on the spreading, duration, or development of the war and how it affects different actors within, particularly civilians (e.g. Azam and Hoeffler 2002; Condra and Shapiro 2012; Keen 1998; Schutte and Weidmann 2011). This naturally includes various psychological, political, or social effects civil war can have on civilians. Investigating the role of grievances in civil war, Abbs (2020) argues that during conflicts nonviolent mobilization is made possible in ethnically polarized contexts when broader cross-cutting grievances enable local activists to widen their appeal across social lines (Abbs 2020). He focused on civil war grievances like food price spikes and unemployment as an example of cross-cutting civil war factors that are likely to affect consumers from different ethnic groups fueling ethnic tensions and also leading to nonviolent unrest (ibid). Nevertheless, as violence is very prevalent in civil wars, this thesis argues that violence as a kind of grievance plays a similar role in triggering nonviolent action (e.g. Pearlman 2013; Schock et al. 2015). Gustafson (2020) points in the same direction and attributes grievances like hunger due to rising food prices and unemployment as factors leading to nonviolent action escalation (Gustafson 2020).

Concerning instability and limitations of the political system during civil war, nonviolent action as described above as a tool outside conventional, institutionalized political norms might be a way to overcome the problem of missing elections or serve as compensation for other lacking possibilities to take part in the political process. They could serve as a tool for groups too weak for conventional political lobbying to influence relations with
conflict factions (Gustafson 2020). In addition, many civil war countries have authoritarian political systems and civil wars often occur in politically underdeveloped regions (Tarrow 2011). This implies that there is usually little space for traditional political opposition, thus groups might additionally be encouraged to act extra-institutionally (Gustafson 2020). This situation might be aggravated during a civil war where political contention could become further restricted. Civil rights limitations like state of emergency declarations might restrict or completely shut down the political process rendering conventional political representation difficult (e.g. Routledge 2010). Local administration and legislation might be malfunctioning due to security risks amidst civil war violence, closing down traditional channels for civilian complaints. Nonviolent tactics might be a viable and cost-efficient option to be heard in such a situation. As described, nonviolent action might be used as a tool to reestablish personal security in an area plagued by civil war violence (e.g. Hallward, Masullo, and Mouly 2017; Masullo 2015). It could further serve as a measure to seek protection by local or international third actors like religious or other non-governmental organizations offering possible support and protection (e.g. Masullo 2015). Nonviolent action could serve as a tool to direct international attention to the war and successive international pressure affecting conflict parties to refrain from using violence against civilians (e.g. Svensson and Lundgren 2018). Mediation effects to achieve ceasefires, peace talks and even an end of the war might also be possible.

Previous research on the conditions that foster nonviolent action in civil wars has mainly if not always included grievances as an explanatory factor (e.g. Abbs 2020; Masullo 2015; Vüllers and Krtsch 2020). As presented, grievances and repression play a major role as motivating factors for nonviolent action during the state of peace as well (e.g. McAdam and Tarrow 2000; Nepstad 2015; Opp 1988; Tarrow 2011). Further, a vast amount of research is related to civil war violence as a sad but common feature of modern day civil wars (Downes 2008; Kalyvas 2006). In addition, a large portion of the violence is not administered exclusively between civil war factions but is directed at civilians both unintentionally and intentionally (Balcells 2010; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Raleigh 2012). Although a major factor in the civil war context, violence has not yet been intensively investigated as a predictor of nonviolent action in civil wars. To date, there exist only a few quantitative studies that comparatively analyze violent and nonviolent resistance on the nonviolent campaign level (Butcher and Svensson 2014; Chenoweth and Lewis 2013, Karakaya 2018). Concerning indirect forms of violence civilians get affected by during civil wars, recently a study by Vuellers and Krtsch (2020) connected battle-related deaths to nonviolent action for some of the African civil wars (Vüllers and Krtsch 2020). They found a positive relationship, but did not include all the additional direct forms of violence in their analysis. This direct, one-sided violence can be a significant part of the overall civil war violence, which civilians have to endure also outside active combat (e.g. Eck and
Hultman 2007; Schneider and Bussmann 2013). This direct civil war violence might be a central trigger factor which could push civilians to act (Nepstad 2015). Political and economic discrimination might remain an issue, but during the war could be overshadowed by a larger amount of war-related grievances which act as a trigger (Kalyvas 2006; Nepstad 2015). The daily life of the citizens will be affected by these, influencing their assessment of whether steps outside the conventional form might be helpful to improve their situation. This might be the case when the civil war negatively affects state capacity and limits institutionalized forms of contention and political participation (Sobek 2010). A violent reaction such as joining a conflict faction is certainly an option, but so could be nonviolent action, especially if the costs of repression by the conflict factions are lower in comparison to joining an armed insurgency. The first empirical contribution of this thesis will investigate whether direct civil war violence serves as a systematic predictor of nonviolent action in civil war.

Research Question 1: Does the extent of direct civil war violence predict nonviolent action in civil war?

4.3.2 Violent State Reactions to Nonviolent Action in Civil Wars: Under which Particularities and Activist Behaviors does it Occur?

A logical step after the occurrence of nonviolent action in civil war is to investigate how the environment reacts towards them. Here, the state as a major recipient of nonviolent action comes to mind. A next promising research agenda concerning nonviolent action in civil wars is to investigate under which conditions the state reacts violently to civilians’ nonviolent action. For this investigation, the second factor of civil wars mentioned above is particularly relevant.

During civil war, the state is contested by competitors within, first and foremost by conflict factions. However, if civilians are not only seen as passive, but as pivotal actors in civil wars, nonviolent action conducted by civilians can put further pressure on the state and contest its legitimacy. To uphold its sovereignty and political control, the contested state might thus react violently to civilian actors, even if the civilians’ actions conduct nonviolent dissent. Consequently, if civilians become activists, there is the risk that they could become targets of violent retaliation by state security forces. In line with this, some recent contributions aimed at explaining how nonviolent resistance against repression can escalate into civil wars (e.g. Della Porta et al. 2017; Ryckman 2020; Svensson and Lundgren 2018). Della Porta et al. (2017) show under which circumstances nonviolent struggles and campaigns for democratization can turn into full-fledged violent conflicts (Della Porta et al. 2017). In this regard, Svensson and Lundgren (2018) find that protest movements with a higher risk of violent escalation, marked by radicalism or state repression, are more likely to be mediated, and that mediation of nonviolent disputes has shifted from domestic
to international mediators (Svensson and Lundgren 2018).

Thus, the fear that the state will retaliate violently if people try to raise their voices with nonviolent tactics is an important factor for the decision of civilians to use nonviolent action during a civil war. Even during the state of peace violent clashes between activist and police or security forces are a common phenomenon. They can massively influence a nonviolent campaign in either spurring mobilization for the movement or crushing the campaign altogether. This happened for example in Turkey 2013, where the nonviolent campaign in Gezi Park was successfully repressed by the regime (e.g. Demirel-Pegg and Rasler 2020). During a civil war, where the state is contested from within by an armed actor, inhibitions of state forces as well as armed factions to use violence could be lower than during a state of peace. Previous research has shown in examples that the reaction of a state to nonviolent action can play a pivotal role, crucially determining the success and future development of a nonviolent protest group (Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017; Demirel-Pegg and Rasler 2020; Hess and Martin 2006). But systematic, large-scale quantitative investigations on the nonviolent event level, regarding which nonviolent tactic or group a state reacts violent against, are still lacking in the civil war context. From an activist perspective, such information might nevertheless be crucial to anticipate and prepare for a violent backlash for example with proper documentation or protection of activists in case of injuries or damages. Consequently, the second research question this thesis investigates is under which tactical or activist group particularities a state reacts violently to nonviolent action during a civil war. Factors regarding group membership, political standpoints, disturbance of the public order, or visibility are tested as predictors of a violent state response.

Research Question 2: Under which tactical or activist group particularities does a state react violently to nonviolent action during a civil war?

4.3.3 Support of Nonviolent Action in Civil Wars by Nongovernmental Organizations: How does it Occur?

Focusing again on the first and third factor differentiating civil wars from peace times and NGOs as central actors in civil war, the third avenue for research on nonviolent action in civil wars is to investigate how third actors like NGOs support civilians in organizing and conducting nonviolent action during civil war. Civil war violence in combination with a breakdown of the services a state usually provides for its citizens were mentioned above as factors which differentiate the state of peace from the state of civil war.

Actors like nongovernmental organization who become aware of citizens suffering because of those war effects could try to offer help, cooperation, or other ways of support (Boothe and Smithey 2007). Public nonviolent action here could be a valuable tactic for citizens to
become heard, which could be promoted by these third-party organizations who might have superior knowledge about effectiveness and application of nonviolence than some of the war-torn populations of civil war countries. Having received proper training and skills to conduct nonviolent tactics can be very important for the success of activist groups (e.g., Martin and Coy 2017). The citizens suffering from these effects could in turn accept such support if provided or even actively pursue it as a way out of their situation. The third research question thus also deals with the origin of the idea of nonviolent action in the minds of citizens afflicted by civil war violence.

It tries to solve the puzzle of how citizens were able to form functional activist groups, despite a possible lack of knowledge about nonviolent action, proper tactics of mobilization as well as organizational capacity and scarce resources in the midst of a civil war. Concerning for example the first factor, civil war violence is of course not only perceived first hand as grievance by the war-affected civilians, but can also be observed by NGOs among the international community, or locally if they are already present within a civil war country. Some of the NGOs for example could already have agendas that are liked to development, governance, or the monitoring and promotion of civil- or human rights and could even have an agenda to help the population. Nonviolent action could be promoted by such organizations as a way to uphold those rights during a civil war, where existing methods to protect civilians collapse. NGOs could step-by-step engage or increase their activities during a civil war due to the escalating violence. They could support civilians in voicing their grievances by encouraging them to use nonviolent means instead of violence.

Concerning the third factor, the instability and destruction during civil war limits civilians’ opportunities to use conventional and institutional means of political contention to issue their plight (e.g., Tarrow, Tilly, and McAdam 2001). During this time of instability, the state is perhaps no longer able to provide regular structures for citizens to take part in the political process like during times of peace (e.g., Hendrix 2010; Thies 2010). NGOs could help citizens to spread their voices faster towards a larger, even international audience, help to raise awareness for suffering populations or provide guidance and material support. Consequently, the third paper aims to contribute to solving the puzzle of how conflict-affected citizens are able to organize themselves during a progressing civil war and how exactly the decision for nonviolent tactics is made instead of for example fleeing or taking up arms. This contribution broadens the debate in incorporating third actors into the decision, which for example remain unobserved in newspaper articles related to nonviolent action in civil wars, which serve as the data source for event-based datasets on nonviolent action. To investigate if nongovernmental organizations played a role in supporting nonviolent action, the paper adopted a qualitative approach, analyzing expert interviews with decision makers of nongovernmental organizations which were involved in
supporting activists during a civil war.

Research Question 3: Does third-party/NGO support affect the development and organization of nonviolent events and campaigns during a civil war? And if yes, how does it work?

4.4 Case Selection - The Nepalese Civil War

The following section first describes factors distinguishing different kinds of civil wars and afterwards presents criteria according to which the Nepalese Civil War was selected as a case for this thesis.

According to Kalyvas and Kenny (2010), civil wars since the end of World War II have lasted for over four years on average, which was a considerable increase from the one-and-a-half-year average duration of the 1900 – 1944 period (Kalyvas and Kenny 2010). Thus, it seems that this form of conflict is on the rise, not only in terms of numbers, but also in terms of duration. Existing research on civil wars is vibrant, diverse and manifold, which is no surprise as civil war quickly took over interstate war as the most important type of armed conflict after World War II (Cederman and Vogt 2017).

Previous academic investigations of civil war can be very loosely categorized according to the following dimensions: civil war outbreak or onset, wartime dynamics, conflict termination, and postwar recovery (Cederman and Vogt 2017). No two civil wars are exactly alike, but there certainly exist similarities according to which one can distinguish between these types of conflicts. Concerning the occurrence and onset of civil war, Gurr (1970) early on introduced a class of explanations corresponding to the grievance logic. According to Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation, the failure to achieve aspired goals triggers frustration which makes violence more likely (Gurr 1970). Tilly (1978) later criticized Gurr’s mostly individualist perspective and argued for structural and political factors affecting rebel factions’ opportunities as well as their resources and organization (Tilly 1978). Subsequently, Collier and Hoeflller (2004) introduced a new class of explanations based on greed, which was explicitly weighed against grievances. Their pivotal article coined a distinction of civil wars and their origins according to the dimensions greed and grievances, which influenced the academic discussion about civil war onset and motivation of actors for the following years (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). ‘Greed-based’ explanations focus on individuals’ desire to maximize their profits, while grievance-based explanations center on conflict as a response to socioeconomic or political injustice (ibid). Another concept, opportunity-based explanations, emphasizes factors which make it easier to engage in armed violent mobilization (Kalyvas and Kenny 2010). Focusing on ethnic internal conflict in the 1990s, Fearon and Laitin (2003) for example showed that after the end of the Cold War, protracted ethnic tensions and factors like poverty, political instability, rough terrain, and large populations favoured an armed insurgency (Fearon and Laitin...
2003). They emphasized an opportunity logic, showing how insurgent violence is more likely to erupt in weak states than in stable and resourceful governments. As another example of the most cited research articles on civil war, it turned the attention away from sole rebel motivations and included institutional and political dimensions.

However, how a civil war starts is only one factor to distinguish these conflicts. In general, civil wars can be further differentiated according to various other criteria, for example according to actual goals of the insurgents and the population base that drives them. Regarding the goals, civil wars can be for example differentiated according to secessionist goals versus revolutionary goals. This distinction is related to the Upsala Conflict Database Project (UCDP) and describes the incompatibility over which a state and the insurgents are fighting (Mason and Mitchell 2016). In a 'revolutionary civil war', the contestants fight over control of the government. The goal here is to overthrow the regime and to establish a rebel-controlled government within the same state territory. In a secessionist conflict the dispute is over territory. The goal for the insurgents here is independence and an own territory to govern, respectively to build a second nation independent from the previous nation state. In line with this, Cederman and Vogt (2017) speak of governmental civil wars if the main objective of the challenger is full governmental control of the state. When the goal is secession, the conflict can be classified as a territorial civil war (Cederman and Vogt 2017). Besides goals, we can also distinguish between reasons for the rebels to fight, what motivates them including their strategy to mobilize supporters. This line of thought distinguishes conflicts for example alongside ethnic divisions. In ethnic or identity civil wars, rebels use ethnic discrimination as a means to gain support from an ethnic group or identity (e.g. Bormann, Cederman, and Vogt 2017). Within such a conflict the rebels might try to gain the support of a particular class or ethnicity of citizens, for example peasants, by highlighting issues of poverty, inequality, or exploitation. Furthermore, it is possible to distinguish alongside civil war processes, for example concerning how the civil war proceeds within the county, how intense the fighting was between the conflict factions, how many casualties were produced, how the conflict factions behaved, how many attempts to reach a ceasefire were made, and how long they lasted. All these factors could in theory influence the occurrence of nonviolent action. In addition, numerous 'non-civil' war characteristics can be in theory considered for case selection, which also potentially influence the occurrence of possible nonviolent action. For example what kind of political system a country has, including patterns of wealth, urbanization, or demography.

In light of all these different characteristics of civil wars listed above, it is necessary to choose a suitable case for this thesis according to some of the civil war criteria mentioned. A initial goal of this thesis is to enrich nonviolent action research by a new dataset which is able to make statements about all nonviolent events during a civil war, driving the research in this field further, by introducing spatial variation and especially small nonviolent events.
into the equation. For this desired dataset of all nonviolent events during a civil war, it is necessary that nonviolent action occurs in large numbers, without limitation to certain time-points, single campaigns or locations during the war, which might be obstacles to data collection but also to a later generalization of the findings. To date unfortunately there exists no global database which includes all nonviolent action events for the entire population of civil wars, so we cannot be certain which particular civil war most likely spawns the most nonviolent action events. Nevertheless, it is possible to try to find examples of civil wars where the phenomenon of nonviolent action is likely to happen in large numbers and across the country. Certain factors of the civil war characteristics discussed in this chapter seem to contribute towards this goal. First, for this thesis it makes sense to look for revolutionary or governmental civil wars, where the insurgency aims to conquer the entire country and to overthrow the incumbent government instead of a secessionist conflict. This does not mean that there could not be nonviolent actions within the latter kind of war, but by nature a secessionist civil war would be centered in a certain part of the country which the insurgency wants to conquer to form their own secessionist nation. Choosing such a civil war would perhaps limit the number of discovered nonviolent events which can be connected to the civil war context, but also the intensity of the war would probably be much higher in this often small part of a country. The spatial variation of multiple possible independent variables, for example to explain nonviolent action onset or subsequent reaction towards it, could vary to a large extent in the secessionist region and the rest of the country.

Second, many revolutionary civil wars start in remote areas where state capacity is weak and the insurgency spreads step by step throughout the country. This in turn allows for great variation in external factors which might influence nonviolent action. In doing so, for example occurrence and other aspects of nonviolent action can be at the same time observed in areas where the state is strong and the insurgency is weak and vice versa. The same is true for the mentioned distinction between greed and grievances. Some of the most famous ’greed-based’ civil wars in Africa for example were centered around resource-rich areas of the respective countries, where resource extraction takes place from which the rebels want to profit (e.g. Thies 2010). Similar to a secessionist conflict, in a greed-based conflict rebel efforts could be limited to conquer only such resource-rich territories, perhaps affecting nonviolent action in this territory but not in the rest of the country.

Third, it also makes sense to search for civil wars where at least previous case studies hint towards the phenomenon of nonviolent action during the war. As the goal is to capture a high number of nonviolent events to assure the robustness of statistical analyses, several thousands of nonviolent events are needed. Fourth, another factor and maybe the biggest obstacle is data availability. As mentioned, difficulties to acquire data is probably one of the major reasons why the academic interest in nonviolent action in civil wars is relatively
Another demand this thesis wants to address is to rely on local newspapers instead of international news agencies because of their shortcomings in missing to capture small-scale nonviolent events not relevant enough for an international audience. A selected civil war needs to provide such data, being able to cover the war period and provide newspapers which reported from every part of the country throughout the conflict.

4.5 Reasons to Investigate the Nepalese Civil War

For investigations regarding patterns of nonviolent resistance, and according to the above-mentioned requirements for such a study, the Nepalese Civil War is an excellent case for a number of reasons. First, compared to other civil wars with shorter duration, the ten-year duration created opportunities for development of nonviolent events and campaigns which would be more difficult to discover in shorter civil wars. Forming nonviolent resistance groups, attracting people and resources, developing structures and goals, attracting supporters among the population and finally carrying out nonviolent events takes a certain time.

Second, although many civil wars have a similar duration, often insurgent activities are limited to a certain area of the state, like for example the resource-rich areas in ‘greed’-based civil wars. Only at a final stage or perhaps never, do the insurgent activities reach the entire country. Although in Nepal the insurgency also started in a remote area, after 2001 the entire country was affected by the conflict. This implies nonviolent resistance during civil war can be investigated not only for some remote or urban centers but instead for the complete country over several years. This is an important precondition for the investigations made in the first two (quantitative) papers of this dissertation as conclusions for the entire country can be drawn instead of just for some remote regions.

A third necessary factor is data availability. Collecting data from a country during a civil war is always a complicated task. Administrative statistical structures collapse and security concerns prevent data collection within a country during and often also shortly after a civil war. An aim of this dissertation is to draw conclusions about nonviolent activities on the event level. This implies that highly disaggregated information is necessary regarding the nonviolent event and its participants and location. A central benefit of this dissertation is that it aims to include all political nonviolent events during the Nepalese Civil War. This was achieved by relying on national newspapers instead of international news agencies (like most previous datasets did) concerning for example nonviolent campaigns. These international news agencies like for example AFP (Agence France-Presse) or Reuters mostly do not cover small nonviolent incidents as they are of less relevance to their international audience. Nevertheless, as even most large nonviolent campaigns started small, the inclusion of small cases into the analyses might be crucial for questions regarding the onset or motivations behind nonviolent actions. It allows to draw lines between similar
nonviolent events with same patterns in certain areas, to show how different groups use
 certain tactics, and to look closer at the state-activist interaction. This goal to cover also
 small nonviolent actions requires that national newspapers report over the course of the
 entire conflict in detail about these nonviolent events. Fortunately, this is the case for
 the Nepalese Civil War, as the two English-language newspapers of the Kathmandu Post
 and the Nepali Times covered the entire conflict and had correspondents in all Nepalese
 districts during the civil war years.

Fourth, being an identity-driven civil war underlined with economic, developmental, and
 inequality-related factors, the Nepalese Civil War is not too exotic for generalizations to
 similar conflict settings. In fact, as a grievance-based civil war it can be compared to
 similar conflicts for example in the Philippines, India, Yemen, Colombia, as well as many
 African countries (Joshi and Quinn 2017).

Fifth, concerning observations of nonviolent activities during the civil war on an event level,
 there has to be an existing population of cases to work with, if the goal is to construct a large
 dataset needed for robust statistical analyses. Nepal witnessed a significant development
 of contentious political activities both violent as well as nonviolent after the end of the
 Panchyat system and the establishment of the constitutional monarchy (Lawoti 2007). The
 following nonviolent activities during the early 1990s ranged from numerous identity, caste,
 and gender movements including various politically motivated strikes but also finally the
 violent Maoist rebellion leading to the civil war (ibid.). The democratization the country
 experienced during that time was accompanied by diverse and creative forms of nonviolent
 actions. As many people in Nepal were at least familiar with the concept of nonviolent
 activities as a tactic of political contention, the likelihood that nonviolent tactics were used
 during the civil war was relatively high. Indeed, nonviolent action became surprisingly
 influential during the conflict. During the final stage of the civil war in April 2006, the
 nonviolent collective action which flooded the streets was driven by united interests from
 civil society groups, political parties as well as the Maoist conflict faction united in their
 struggle to remove the King and restore democracy (Subedi and Bhattarai 2017).

4.5.1 Some Brief Facts about the Nepalese Civil War

The Nepalese Civil War started in 1996 and ended with the singing of a peace accord in
 November 2006. At first glance it was a grievance-based, identity civil war between Maoists
 and the country’s Monarchy. It took place between the Maoist Communist Party of Nepal
 (CPN-Maoist) and the country’s Monarchy. It is a ‘revolutionary civil war’ in terms of the
 UCDP database, meaning the Maoists had the goal to replace the government.

The Maoists launched their insurgency with the overall goal of overthrowing the country’s
 constitutional monarchy in favor of a proclaimed ‘people’s republic’. With several failed
attempts to reach peace by negotiations between the conflict parties, the ten-year conflict has lead to the death of more than 13,000 people in addition to a vast destruction of property, displacement of citizens, and gross human rights abuses (Lawoti 2010; Pettigrew 2013).

4.5.2 On the Causes of the Nepalese Civil War

Like many conflicts, the Nepalese Civil War had deeper underlying social conditions as well as economic and political factors which increased in the country’s instability and encouraged the conflict. In fact, economic, social, and political aspects were identified by scholars, making the conflict more likely or fueling it during its process.

First, prior to the civil war Nepal experienced pronounced regional economic disparities and poverty. At the beginning of the civil war, the Maoist insurgency respectively started in some of the poorest areas of the country (De Juan and Pierskalla 2016). According to for example Sherma (2006), development efforts in Nepal in the years preceding the war had failed to reach the poor and had contributed to grievances like a rise in unemployment, poverty, and rural–urban inequality, which significantly increased frustration and resentment among disadvantaged youth in the rural and remote areas, creating a supporting environment to the eruption of the war (Sharma 2006). Graham (2007) pointed in the same direction, stressing that the Rolpa and Rukum districts, the remote areas where the insurgency first emerged, have never seen any major development activity (Graham 2007). In sum, it was relatively easy for the Maoists to recruit among the poor and disappointed in these neglected and underdeveloped regions. Moreover, they benefited from a lack of stable state structures to successfully counter the insurgency.

Second, Mushed and Gates (2005) identified the concept of horizontal or inter-group inequality, with both an ethnic as well as a caste dimension, as a relevant factor underlying the Nepalese Civil War (Murshed and Gates 2005). Caste differences and clashes were a prolonging problem in Nepal. For example according to Graham (2007), the people of lower casts, often living in peripheral areas, have tended to suffer limited access to formal justice and a corrupt and rent-seeking polity dominated by a small number of privileged and predominantly Kathmandu Valley-based castes (Graham 2007). In contrast, the Maoist propaganda was promising to fight inequalities and to abandon caste and ethnic separation and segregation in their proclaimed ‘people’s republic’. Respectively, during the civil war people from minorities who had been discriminated against and had remained underrepresented across all spheres in Nepal like Dalits, Janajatis, or Madhesis were successfully encouraged by the Maoists to support and join their insurgency (Routledge 2010).

A third contributing factor were political dynamics. Massive protests during early 1990s
had achieved the construction of a constitutional monarchy in Nepal (Routledge 1997). However, what the protests had failed to achieve was substantial political change. The young Nepalese parliament was plagued by a highly fragmented party spectrum with difficulties to reach consensus. The elections in 1991 did not fulfill expectations for a redistribution of power. Moreover, according to De Juan and Pierskalla (2016), the newly established political system had proven incapable of balancing interests and demands by peaceful means (De Juan and Pierskalla 2016). Political activities of the left party spectrum were suppressed, fuelling a further radicalization until another party split lead to the new Communist Party of Nepal- Maoist (CPN-Maoist) party going underground and starting the civil war (Kumar 2005). As with most other conflicts it was most likely a complex combination of these and other factors which lead to and prolonged the Nepalese Civil War.

4.5.3 On the Processes during the Nepalese Civil War

The civil war broke out first in the rural North-Western part of the country, respectively in the districts of Rukum and Rolpa where the Maoists first started to attack police posts in 1996 (Gersony 2003). From there the insurgency spread throughout the country, until in 2001, the Maoist rebels had installed themselves in most parts of Nepal (De Juan and Pierskalla 2016). Initially, the Nepalese government mobilized the police to fight the Maoists and contain the insurgency as it was underestimated as a rather regional problem of the remote districts which were previously mostly ignored by development efforts. This containment of the insurgency was rather unsuccessful and by 2001, the Maoists had various degrees of presence in most of the Nepalese districts (Hutt 2004). Shortly after the ‘Royal Massacre’ in June 2001, in which crown prince Dipendra allegedly killed the Nepalese King Birendra and his family, the government and the Maoists declared a ceasefire and started the first peace talks. After these peace talks failed in November of the same year, following a wave of new attacks by the insurgents, the Nepalese army was unleashed against the insurgents. This was accompanied by a proclaimed state of emergency, raising the level of conflict intensity including a steep rise of casualties between the conflict parties as well as among civilians. Unfortunately, the Nepalese national army, although commonly being a well-respected institution in Nepal, was rather ill-equipped and not well-trained. It was also responsible for a large number of human rights abuses during the conflict (Joshi and Pyakurel 2015). Numerous incidents of extra-judicial detention and killings have been reported and a large part of the deaths during the conflict were a result of government counter-insurgency activities (De Juan and Pierskalla 2016).

At that time, Maoist influence and presence in the Nepalese districts was too strong and the engagement of the army was not rewarded by a fast military victory. Instead by 2002, the conflict had reached a new peak and the aggravating situation regarding casualties
was taking its toll on political stability. In 2002 the parliament was dissolved by the leading Nepali Congress Party (NC). New elections were boycotted by the Maoists, which facilitated a national strike on election day. Due to the failure to hold elections peacefully and a general inability to vote in many war-torn Nepalese regions, in October 2002 the Nepalese King took executive as well as legislative rights for himself, declaring a ten-month state of emergency (Gersony 2003).

Fighting and violence between the conflict parties followed until the government and rebels declared another ceasefire in January 2003. However, despite several rounds of talks, the two conflict parties could not agree on the future role of the monarchy. The Maoists demanded an election to form a constituent assembly offering the option of abolishing the monarchy. The government instead insisted that the Maoists either surrender their weapons or tone down their demands to fit existing laws. The Maoists left the peace talks again in August 2003 (Pradhan 2009).

In a desperate attempt to regain control over the further escalating war, Nepalese King Gyanendra took over state power in February 2005, declaring a state of emergency under which many fundamental civil rights were restricted. He continued to strengthen his absolute powers and targeted leaders of the political parties. This move by the King pushed the by then seven major parliamentary parties to form an alliance against the monarchy (Pradhan 2009). A massive countrywide popular uprising against the King followed, which left more than 20 dead and many more wounded. The uprising forced the King to give up any legislative or executive power and to return to a ceremonial role in April 2006 (Routledge 2010). The reinstated interim government signed a peace accord with the Maoists in November 2006, officially ending the civil war.

4.6 Methods and Data used in this Thesis

4.6.1 Limitations of Previous Datasets and a Demand for Disaggregation

The lack of high-quality and encompassing data is one of the major limitations to be overcome in civil war research. Local statistical bureaus often show white pages regarding civil war years or violence-affected regions of a country. A civil war in general might hamper data collection due to various security risks, a crumbling infrastructure, or diminishing general state capacity to collect data. Nevertheless, data collection efforts like for example the Correlates of War (COW) dataset have provided a wealth of information about civil war resources and institutions, but not so much information about non-state actors and nonviolent action (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013). Further, over the years, disaggregation of data has proven to be fruitful in the investigation of civil war patterns, as some studies have found substantial geographical variation for example concerning the level of civil war induced violence (e.g. Raleigh 2012; Schutte and Weidmann 2011). The same
might be true for nonviolent action which possibly occurs in large spatial variation during a civil war. Following some recent quantitative contributions on civil war nonviolent action, the further development of disaggregated quantitative datasets seems a fruitful research agenda. For example, Abbs (2020) in this regard successfully used spatially disaggregated data on government-targeted nonviolent action, analyzing grid-cell years across 41 African countries (Abbs 2020). Furthermore, Gustafson (2020) used Bayesian multilevel modeling to investigate the likelihood of violent escalation of nonviolent action in 2,405 nonviolent demonstrations from 1991 to 2017 in Africa and Latin America (Gustafson 2020).

One of the most frequently utilized quantitative datasets of nonviolent action is the NAVCO dataset (Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis 2018). In the most recent version 3.0 released in 2018, the dataset was enriched with hand-coded news reports instead of previously used search strings, but still only large campaigns are included in the dataset. The NAVCO versions 1.0 and 2.0 were limited to campaigns with maximalist goals of regime change, anti-occupation, or secession (Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis 2018). For cross-country investigations of nonviolent action campaigns during times of peace, this seems to be one of the most frequently used datasets. Concerning data on nonviolent action in civil war, NVAVC is a recent extension of the NAVCO dataset. The NVAVC also relies on international news agencies like AFP or BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) including search strings to find nonviolent activities in currently 17 countries and for the first time also in 20 civil wars (Chenoweth, Hendrix, and Hunter 2019a). Overall, it includes about 3,660 incidents of nonviolent action campaigns for those 20 civil wars (ibid.). Another dataset is the Social Conflict in Africa Dataset (SCAD; Hendrix and Salehyan 2017). It includes events, geolocations, and a broad range of claims in Africa and Latin America from 1990 to 2013. Overall, nonviolent action may be still viewed as difficult to measure empirically within a conflict setting, a fact that has undoubtedly deterred interest and complicated efforts to collect data, although the measurement of nonviolent action could shed light on some of the questions of what determines nonviolent action during a conflict setting. This might be the reason why for example the NVAVC dataset only recently started to incorporate first conflict-related nonviolent action campaigns into the NAVCO dataset (Chenoweth, Hendrix, and Hunter 2019b).

As valuable as the previous quantitative datasets are regarding the study of nonviolent action, they also have important limitations (McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996). First, they mainly rely on international news agencies as sources to capture nonviolent action. NAVCO, in its version 3.0 for example uses AFP and BBC (Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis 2018). Media reports of such news agencies might include an urban bias as well as a violence bias, that is over-reporting of events in urban centers where agencies have news correspondents, as well as on disrupting, sometimes violent incidents which might be more suitable for a broader international audience. These international news agencies provide
easy access and comparable, global news coverage, but at the same time the may fail to report detailed information on local small-scale nonviolent tactics like street dramas, sit-ins and fledgling demonstrations which could develop into massive nonviolent campaigns in the future (e.g. Pearlman 2013; Schock et al. 2015). In doing so they perhaps fail to observe nonviolent action in their early stages, or fail to disentangle and identify the events they report on in terms of participants. They also might over-report on certain nonviolent campaigns because of their disruptive capabilities, or overall repressive state reaction which might be attractive for an international audience. The focus on the large events only could result in an selection bias concerning nonviolent civil resistance (e.g. Oliver and Myers 2003). Addressing this in reference to the NAVCO dataset, Chenoweth et al. (2018) note that ideally a dataset like this would feature local and native source materials, but resource constraints prevented them from adopting this approach (Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis 2018).

This is a first major benefit of the dataset used for this thesis, which is the Political Activism in the Nepalese Civil War (PANC) dataset. In utilizing local newspapers as sources for nonviolent actions, it identified approximately twice as many nonviolent events for a single civil war, compared to for example the NVAVC-NAVCO extension which includes 3,660 nonviolent campaigns for 20 civil wars. This large number of nonviolent actions allows for robust statistical analyses of nonviolent action emergence and patterns.

Further, the NVAVC civil war addition of NAVCO is still limited to the campaign level, the large-scale form of nonviolent action (Chenoweth, Hendrix, and Hunter 2019a). As outlined, this excludes small events which might later turn into a massive nonviolent campaign. The inclusion of small nonviolent tactics thus might be crucial to discover which groups begin to use nonviolent action or in which geographical areas of a country they originate before they turn into massive nonviolent campaigns. Maybe nonviolent action group patterns change during the growth of the activities or campaigns. In addition, interaction between the state and nonviolent actors might be more fruitful to observe in a disaggregated form where one might distinguish between different nonviolent tactics and actors instead of large campaigns. A harsh state reaction to small nonviolent action events might be able to crush them before they become massive. Including those cases into the analysis might reveal crucial patterns concerning state repression of nonviolent action. If they are not crushed by opponents, even small nonviolent action efforts like the communities investigated by Masullo (2015) or Hallward et al (2017) could be influential and beneficial for civilians (e.g. Hallward, Masullo, and Mouly 2017; Masullo 2015). In sum, these factors call for the construction of a disaggregated dataset focusing on details of a single civil war, thereby circumventing resource constrains which would make this detailed investigation currently hardly feasible with a massive global dataset involving numerous countries and civil wars.
4.6.2 Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Methods

As outlined, there still exist numerous unanswered questions regarding nonviolent action during civil wars and the research questions investigated in this thesis are diverse and require different methods to be investigated. The first two papers will use state-of-the-art quantitative methods to deal with questions regarding nonviolent activism onset in relation to civil war violence in the first research paper, and subsequent reactions of the state towards those nonviolent action events in the second research paper. Civil war violence as well as state repression towards nonviolent action are not expected to be limited to a certain location or time-frame during the conflict. In contrast, as the war progresses and the insurgency gains ground it is expected to differ greatly across the country (e.g. Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Schutte 2017). Although for example case studies would theoretically have been possible to investigate these questions in a small-scale but detailed manner, the long time since the civil war ended and greatly varying independent variables during the civil war years would have probably limited the ability to generalize the results of such case studies. In addition, there already exist examples of detailed single-case studies about nonviolent action in civil wars and how grievances or relations to conflict factions influenced activist groups who stated them (e.g. Hallward, Masullo, and Mouly 2017; Masullo 2015). However, a comprehensive investigation is often missing with varying independent variables not on the group or campaign, but on the event level of nonviolent action. With a focus on the event level, it is possible to root out activist group particularities, special geographical factors, or time considerations of the war, which might have interfered with the relation between the dependent and independent variables. Such factors pertain to questions like: Does the postulated relationship hold with less or more grievances and repression in different geographical areas of the country, in areas where the insurgency was stronger during a certain time-frame, or in areas where there are less nonviolent events? There certainly exist many more of such spatial factors which might have limited the ability to generalize findings of studies which try to make statements about certain isolated cases of nonviolent action during a civil war. Instead, a central objective of the first two papers in this thesis was to make comprehensive statements about all nonviolent action events during a civil war, as long as there is the data and funding available to do so. This is in line with the current popular and necessary attempt in civil war research to obtain more detailed, disaggregated information, while at the same time taking into account the great variance in variables which might exist during these conflicts (e.g. Cederman and Vogt 2017; Raleigh 2012). In pursuit of this objective, following a quantitative approach with a large number of observations of nonviolent action during civil war, the first two papers therefore utilize a new dataset on the nonviolent event level which will be presented in detail in the next subsection. With this dataset, it is not only possible to investigate the postulated first two research questions of this thesis while accounting for detailed spatial
variation, but the dataset will also serve as a valuable resource for future efforts by other scholars interested in the investigation of nonviolent activism during the Nepalese Civil War.

However, the dataset used in the first and second paper is also not without limitations and is not suitable for all investigations related to civil-war-based nonviolent action. Based on newspaper reports of nonviolent action events, for example it lacks detailed information on factors preceding nonviolent action events. How was the decision made to follow the path of nonviolence within an activist group during the war? How were group members attracted and persuaded to do so? How were nonviolent action groups formed in the beginning? How did they fund themselves during the war? Did they receive help or inspiration in doing so? Newspaper reports, on which major datasets on nonviolent action usually are based, regularly lack the information to answer these kinds of questions. The initial steps leading to nonviolent action usually remain hidden, from activist group formation towards decision-making in various fields like member and follower mobilization, tactical decisions as well as financial aspects. Nevertheless, these seem to be important factors to fully understand the phenomenon of nonviolent action, especially alongside often harsh civil war conditions where personal and financial resource scarcity present major obstacles for activists. Consequently, quantitative event-based datasets are possibly not ideal to investigate such factors.

As outlined, the third paper investigates topics like goal-setting of activists, including external and mutual support as well as interaction between activist groups and third parties (NGOs). These topics are difficult to investigate with quantitative datasets relying solely on journalists’ reports about the final events these groups organized. Third-party support of activist groups by NGOs could of course happen during a demonstration or other nonviolent events, where for example a newspaper might even report the presence of such an NGO. But beside the NGO’s presence, the newspaper article would likely lack detailed information about what kind of support was provided. During the nonviolent event, it would be unclear whether an NGO supports an activist group or only independently takes part in the nonviolent event because they share the same goals as the activists. Moreover, in newspaper articles the relationships between different activist groups remain hidden. In a report about a multi-group event, it would often not be clear which group organized the event and which group only participated. More importantly, if NGOs support activist groups, this support also could take place specifically beforehand, during activist group formation and over a long time. However, this is not reported in newspaper articles. As a result, all this relevant information is missing in quantitative datasets based on nonviolent events coded from newspaper articles. To overcome these shortcomings, and to investigate the third research question adequately, a more direct approach where NGOs and their supported activists groups are directly consulted is more fruitful. As detailed information
on planning and decision-making within the NGOs over a long time-frame is required, this calls for an approach of interviewing expert leaders of the NGOs instead of surveying lower-level members of NGOs.

Thus, this thesis combines quantitative and qualitative methods to investigate the three research questions. To date, mixed methods of combining multiple quantitative as well as qualitative methods is considered a strength for the investigation of complex research questions (e.g. Brannen 2017; Ghiara 2020). As for example Chenoweth (2017) framed it, "...scholars might consider combining quantitative and qualitative approaches to improve the rigor and applicability of their findings to the real world. Research at different levels of analysis may also provide useful tests of a theory’s observable implications, providing a more compelling analysis than tests at a single level of analysis. For instance, testing theories of mobilization at the group and individual levels can help triangulate the mechanisms leading from nonviolent action to greater participation. Similarly, latent variable analysis and instrumental variable approaches might prove useful, though so far, they have been largely underutilized in estimating both repression and nonviolent resistance" (Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017, p.1957). Thus, the use of a broad methodological portfolio is strongly encouraged to take advantage of each method and to overcome limitations of the available data.

Following this call for mixed-methods research, this thesis uses state-of-the-art quantitative methods (spatial panel analysis, multi-level modelling and geographically weighted regression) fueled by a new disaggregated dataset to investigate the first two research questions. Additionally it uses qualitative methods (expert interviews) to investigate the third research question. With the qualitative expert interviews of the third paper it was possible to reveal further aspects of nonviolent action during the civil war, which would not have been possible with the quantitative dataset used in the first and second paper. The interviewed experts for example provided information which was not written down and thus not to be found in newspapers or other reports about activist groups which were active during the war (e.g. Rubin and Rubin 2011). For instance, the experts outlined the processes and obstacles to be overcome in facilitating nonviolent action during the war, they outlined how cooperation took place between activist organizations, or how and why the concept of nonviolence was chosen as a tactic.

The following sections describe the quantitative dataset generated for this thesis and the methods that were applied to investigate the research questions in detail.

4.6.3 The PANC Dataset

The first two papers of this dissertation adopt a quantitative approach and use a dataset which was newly created from newspaper articles. It is a disaggregated, country-specific
dataset containing detailed information about political nonviolent action events throughout the Nepalese Civil War. It provides detailed information on actors, tactics, day and location of nonviolent activities, and whether violence was used by activists or as a form of repression by the regime. It contains information on the Nepalese administrative divisions the respective event was situated in, as well as whether it was directed against or in favor of one of the conflict factions. It contains not only events directed against the state but also against other conflict factions or events of nonviolent action which were not at all conflict-related. If available in the newspaper articles, the dataset also contains information regarding the number of participants, although this information must be treated with caution as such reports differ massively, depending on whether the reports were issued by the police, participants, or media sources. Overall, from the single-person hunger strike to the mass street protest with hundreds or thousands of people, every reported incident is included. By relying on local newspapers for coding, even small nonviolent actions could be successfully included into this dataset. As outlined, this is a major advantage compared to relying on international news agencies which might over-report on large or disruptive events while at the same time fail to report events which are either too small or too remote and therefore may be unimportant for an international audience (Earl et al. 2004).

The dataset is based on articles published in English-speaking Nepalese newspapers, respectively the Kathmandu Post and the Rising Nepal. It was hand-coded mainly by myself out of thousands of pages of newspaper articles, resulting in a dataset containing over 5,000 cases of nonviolent action. To test if the newspaper reports from the two sources were unbiased compared to each other and report basically the same events, a mark- and recapture analysis was conducted for the first coded year of the civil war (Hendrix and Salehyan 2015). The results showed that event-detection capabilities of the two newspapers were equal. Therefore, and due to time constraints, only one newspaper (Rising Nepal) was used for coding the remaining years of the civil war.

For an event to be included in the dataset it had to meet certain criteria. First, there had to be an actual, observable use of nonviolent or violent tactics. This public criterion for example excludes prison riots. Second, mobilization had to be of political nature in a very broad sense, for example an expressed political motive had to be identified. The event had to issue a political demand or statement. By political, we refer to matters of, or relating to, the state or rebel government or the general public affairs of a country. These criteria exclude cases of non-political activism, religious events, and street brawls, for example following sports events. If an event is mentioned for consecutive days at a certain location, it is included in the dataset for this amount of time. A protest at a certain location which lasted for three days would be included three times in the dataset as long as the newspaper reports about it every day. As nonviolent events can evolve over time, this procedure allows for precise statements of protest structure, activist behavior, and particularities. For
example it might be possible that during the last days more groups joined the mentioned nonviolent event which resulted in different tactics and also a possible changing reaction of the state. All this would be observable within the dataset.

The next section outlines the data and methods used in more detail and also presents additional data used to investigate the research questions.

4.6.4 Addressing Research Question 1: A Spatial Panel Analysis to Account for Spatial and Temporal Patterns of Variation

The first paper of this dissertation investigates Research Question 1, namely if there is a relationship between civil war violence and nonviolent action. To do so, fine-grained data on civil war violence and nonviolent action is needed. In Paper 1, the PANC dataset containing all reported incidences of nonviolent action is combined with an equally fine-grained dataset containing all incidences of violence during the Nepalese Civil War. For this effort I relied on a dataset of individual civil war victims data by the Nepalese nongovernmental human rights organization Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC; Joshi and Pyakurel 2015). This organization’s civil war violence dataset has also been used in previous research (e.g. Joshi and Pyakurel 2015; Nepal, Bohara, and Gawande 2011).

INSEC was able to create a complete survey of the known population of victims for which information could be collected during the conflict. They relied on a network of district-level offices throughout the country. They had close relationships with grassroots and community organizations, civil and police administrations as well as political parties (Joshi and Pyakurel 2015). When information on violence incidents was received, INSEC personally visited the site and verified the information about each victim individually. In doing so, violence events were reported and various demographic, sociopolitical, and economic information on victims was collected. The NGO achieved this by interviewing family and friends of victims as well as members of the political and community organizations, if the victim was involved in such. In doing so they were able to create a database which contains very detailed data on violence available on the individual level, for each incident, victim, time, and location. At the same time, this approach addresses the problem of biased information, which might be the result of counting casualties during a civil war. It is a complicated task which has the potential for politically motivated leaders to promote false narratives or report inaccurate numbers for example in the media (Seybolt and Aronson 2013). Additionally, there is the possibility that media reports do not report about small events with only a low number of casualties or reject detailed reports in incidents where media workers could not reach the site because of the risk to become victims themselves. The NGO was able to overcome these considerations to a certain degree and for their commitment to unbiased reporting about civil victims, INSEC was respected by the rank-and-file members of the Maoist insurgency as well as by Nepalese
Both datasets, PANC as well as the violence dataset from INSEC, contain data points for all Nepalese districts and months of the civil war. This unique combination of two disaggregated datasets makes it possible to investigate the relationship of civil war violence and nonviolent action in detail while controlling for background variables and further sources of variation.

Civil war violence and nonviolent action vary both between districts and time over the course of the civil war, creating a spatial panel data structure, meaning time-series observations of data in a number of geographical units (e.g. Elhorst 2014). This speaks strongly for a spatial panel regression to test the relationship between violence and nonviolent action. Spatial panel regression has two central advantages. First, it can account for possible unobserved background variables which differ between spatial units. This is the case because spatial units like districts or regions within a country differ according to many third, unobserved variables which might affect the dependent variable. In Nepal, as in any other country, the regions and districts differ significantly with respect to background variables like population, infrastructure, media access, or ethnic cleavages, which might affect the occurrence of nonviolent events. We used two approaches to control for the influence of these background variables in the analyses. On the one hand, we included time-invariant control variables in initial pooling and random effects models. Nevertheless, there might still be additional unobserved factors varying between districts and months of the civil war, for which no dynamic data over the course of the civil war were available. Therefore, on the other hand, we computed regression models including time and spatial fixed effects. In doing so, we showed that the relationship of civil war violence and nonviolent action was significant even when unobserved variation between districts and months of the civil war was accounted for. The second advantage of spatial panel regression is that it is able to account for spatial lag, that is spillover of civil war violence or nonviolent action from one district to its neighboring districts. The Nepalese districts are no closed units, civilians and information can pass the border from one district to another. Civil war violence or nonviolent action in one district is theoretically able to influence for example nonviolent action in neighboring districts. Thus, we also computed a spatial panel regression model including these spatial lag effects. In sum, spatial panel regression analysis is well-suited to use the information available in the fine-grained datasets in order to draw robust conclusions about the relationship of civil war violence and nonviolent action in the Nepalese Civil War.
4.6.5 Addressing Research Question 2: A Generalized Mixed Model to Investigate Factors Predicting the Likelihood of Violent Regime Reactions to Nonviolent Action

The second paper in this dissertation investigates Research Question 2, namely the conditions under which violent regime reaction to nonviolent action is likely in the civil war context. Violent regime reaction towards unarmed activists can crush early protest groups or in the contrary mobilize even more people for their cause. Research is needed to investigate what kind of action, issue, or activist behavior results in violent regime reaction. Research Question 2 was again investigated with the PANC dataset. For Research Question 1, nonviolent events were aggregated to each district and month of the civil war in order to be matched with the INSEC violence data. In contrast, Research Question 2 used data on the event level, analyzing in detail for each single event whether the regime reacted violently depending on the organizational and tactical factors of the event.

Data were analyzed with a generalized linear mixed model, taking into account that nonviolent events were clustered in Nepalese districts and including district-level control variables. The likelihood of violent regime reaction (e.g., beating, arresting, or killing of activists) was predicted by the following factors: did the event pose a political threat to the regime, did it disturb the public order, was it organized by multiple groups, was it visible in the media, and did the activists themselves use violence. On the second analytical level, the level of Nepalese districts, we used data from a census in Nepal from 2001, a middle year of the civil war, to control for different socio-economic factors like ethnic cleavages among the population, wealth, or population density, which might have had a general, district-level effect on the likelihood of violent regime reactions to nonviolent action events. To bolster the results of generalized linear mixed model, an additional geographically weighted regression accounts for possible spatial variation of a violent state reaction within the districts and throughout the country.

In sum, by analyzing the PANC data on the level of each and every single nonviolent event, Paper 2 was able to use the detailed information about the specifics of the event to its fullest extent. Thus, it provides valuable knowledge about which kinds of events are more or less likely to elicit violent reactions by the regime. This knowledge is of high relevance to activist groups, as it contains information about which tactics they might better refrain from using to avoid violent reactions by the regime during a civil war.

4.6.6 Addressing Research Question 3: Qualitative Expert Interviews to Discover Patterns of Third Party (NGO) Support of Nonviolent Action

Regarding the idea and capabilities to use nonviolent action, an ongoing puzzle is the question about external help and support. If fledgling activists groups were supported by
third parties like NGOs, which offered a helping hand, this could be a crucial explanation why some groups survive while others vanish or do not follow the path of nonviolent action at all. In addition, resource mobilizations in a civil war might be more difficult in comparison to a state of peace and uncovering the role of thirds parties could shed more light on these processes.

A central problem regarding the role of such third actors is that such information cannot be found within news reports about nonviolent action which is the basis of the PANC dataset used for the first two papers. Indeed, newspapers report mainly about actors, their methods, and possible regime reactions or violent clashes. But they do not report about the previous planning process of the nonviolent action, the founding of the activists group, goal setting, and decision-making or material or ideological support a group received. Nevertheless, these processes might still offer important conclusions about where the decision to use nonviolent action stems from in a civil war setting and if third actors like NGOs played a role. Direct interviews of supporting third actors within the Nepalese Civil War provided answers to these questions. A field study in Nepal was conducted in 2018 in which interviews with leading members of NGOs and activist groups were conducted which were active during the Nepalese Civil War.

The goal of the interviews was to collect information on training regarding nonviolent tactics and support between NGOs and civil society groups (e.g. distribution of information, training, guidance, workshops, or other support from 'donor' organizations to 'receiver' organizations). Organizations may be both donors and receivers, for example when NGOs received support by international cooperation and distributed their knowledge and funds to regional groups.

The next three sections present the three research papers this thesis is comprised of. These three sections are followed by a Discussion and Conclusion of the different findings, also addressing topics like limitations, generalizability of results, policy implications, and future research perspectives.
5 Countering Guns Unarmed. The Effect of Civil War Violence on Nonviolent Activism in the Nepalese Civil War - A Spatial Panel Data Analysis

Status: Manuscript in preparation. Author: Kai Merkel

5.1 Abstract

Previous research has demonstrated that nonviolent activities can have positive effects within civil wars, both for the citizens who perform them, and in some cases also on a larger scale affecting the entire civil war dynamic. Previous case studies identified grievances and repression as theoretical motivators for citizens to use nonviolent tactics to get heard. In the civil war dimension, civil war violence has played a role in recent case studies as well as first quantitative contributions dealing with battle-related deaths, a factor connected not only to refugee numbers, but also a possible motivator and trigger for civilians to resist the war by nonviolent activities. What we still miss is an in-depth analysis accounting for direct, discriminate one-sided violence incidents against civilians in this regard, which can pose a major part of the violence incidents during a civil war. Such violence could be a trigger factor for subsequent nonviolent action by civilians to find a way out of their plight outside conventional institutionalized forms of political contention. I argue that incidents of direct violence against civilians positively correlate with nonviolent action activity. The present study tests the relation between direct, one-sided civil war violence against civilians and nonviolent activities with a fine-grained new dataset on political nonviolent activities (PANC) within the case of the Nepalese Civil War. Spatial panel regression analysis showed significant and robust positive effects of one-sided civil war violence on nonviolent activities for the 75 Nepalese districts across the civil war. This finding highlights the role of civilian actors within civil wars and the spatial relationship between violence and nonviolent action.
5.2 Introduction

Civilians in civil wars increasingly become affected by conflict violence, both due to armed struggles between conflict factions resulting in ‘collateral damage’ but also as deliberate, direct targets of violence and atrocities against the population (e.g. Azam and Hoeffler 2002; Condra and Shapiro 2012; Raleigh 2012; R. M. Wood 2010). While a vast and ongoing research effort brought an encompassing knowledge about how civilians get targeted and become victims by civil war factions (e.g. Hirose, Imai, and Lyall 2017; Kalyvas 2006; Schutte 2017), civilians are still often perceived as mere recruitment pools or passive recipients of violence with few options to resist except to flee, bear the violence, or join a conflict faction for violent retaliation (Hallward, Masullo, and Mouly 2017). As a novel development, some studies have started to explore the role of unarmed civilians seeking to bring about change through nonviolent activities in times of civil war (Hallward, Masullo, and Mouly 2017). These findings show evidence of civilians reacting with forms of nonviolent tactics to resist armed opponents in their conflict environment. Evidence from the Colombian Civil War, Afghanistan, or recently Syria show examples of civilians and communities who deliberately use nonviolent tactics as a way out of their plight (e.g. Hallward, Masullo, and Mouly 2017; Masullo 2015; Stanley 2017). While a larger research focus in relation to civil nonviolent resistance still focuses on large nonviolent campaigns in times of peace, in the contexts of armed conflict, civil resistance is often enacted for example as subtle acts of nonviolent noncooperation at the micro-level (Hallward, Masullo, and Mouly 2017). With a major focus on these large nonviolent campaigns, we unfortunately lack a basic understanding of how and why nonviolent action in civil war occurs on the micro level. From the case studies, we still do not understand the driving factors why for example in one village nonviolent tactics are applied but not in others. What we do know is that whether it is women and children marching to press Daesh to restore access to water pumps in the Syrian conflict (Stanley 2017), or communities resisting the ‘Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia’ (FARC) in Colombia with nonviolent noncooperation (Masullo 2015), civil war violence is often named as an initial grievance linked to subsequent nonviolent actions. From many studies dealing with motivations for nonviolent action during times of peace, we already know that grievances can be driving motivations behind nonviolent action (e.g. Gurr 2000; Pearlman 2013; Schock et al. 2015; Tarrow 2011). In being a sad but central major grievance in civil wars, there is strong reason to believe that civil war violence could be a driving factor behind nonviolent action in times of such conflicts. Beyond single case studies, this relation was recently tested by Vüllers and Krtsch (2020) for some of the African Civil wars (Vüllers and Krtsch 2020). They found a positive relationship, however, their analysis was focused on battles between conflict factions and collateral damage. This kind of violence represents only a small part of the violence incidents civilians have to endure. Indeed, in the Nepalese Civil
War which the current paper investigates, more than two-thirds of those killed died in a noncombat setting (Joshi and Pyakurel 2015). This kind of violence against civilians is also called one-sided violence (e.g. Eck and Hultman 2007; Fisk 2018; Schneider and Bussmann 2013). Moreover, the current paper will not only include fatality numbers or lethal direct violence into the investigation but especially also small-scale atrocities like beatings, violent extortion, abductions, or rape, which happen regularly in civil wars for example at the hand of rebel factions as well as the state. Moreover and importantly, this kind of violence does not necessarily happen close to military clashes between the conflict parties but throughout the country and not exclusively in areas which are currently highly contested by the conflict factions. Such direct violence incidents could be the moral triggers for the civilians to find a way out of their plight when the institutionalized paths of political contention get more and more difficult to pursue (Schock et al. 2015). If a civil war limits the regular, institutional channels to issue dissent or raise awareness for these grievances, nonviolent action could be a valuable option for the civilians.

In utilizing a new, fine-grained dataset on nonviolent action events during the Nepalese Civil War, combined with fine-grained data on violence used against civilians during the conflict from the Nepalese NGO Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC), this paper contributes to solving the puzzle of whether civil war violence is related to nonviolent action. To test the relation between direct violence and nonviolent action, a spatial panel analysis was conducted. Knowledge about what triggers nonviolent action during civil wars helps policy makers and civil society alike, on the one hand to encourage and support a nonviolent way out of the status quo instead of raising arms and perhaps prolonging the conflict. On the other hand this knowledge is important due to the possible positive effects nonviolent action can have on conflict processes and outcomes.

Indeed, the policy relevance of investigating the onset of nonviolent activities in civil wars stems from the effect these tactics can have, not only for the civilians who use them, but also for the dynamics, duration, or outcome of the conflict. Looking for small-scale effects, the example from the Colombian Civil War (in 1997) by Masullo shows how rural communities in conflict-ridden areas used nonviolent forms of noncooperation to defy armed state and non-state factions alike, successfully establishing safe grounds for them to survive (Masullo 2015). On a larger scope, like Chenoweth et al. (2019) outlined, movements like 'The Women in Peacebuilding Network' (WIPNET) conducted mass street protests and successfully lobbied Liberia’s President Charles Taylor to join peace talks during the Liberian Civil War (1999 - 2003), for which its founders later received the Nobel Peace Price in 2011 (Chenoweth, Hendrix, and Hunter 2019a). In addition, violent retaliation against nonviolent activities during a civil war can influence national and international support of conflict factions (e.g. Dudouet 2015; Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson 2014). This support might pave the way for negotiations by third actors or like in the WIPNET
example, might help to bring conflict parties to the negotiation table.

5.3 Theory

5.3.1 Civilians and Violence in Civil War

A central and well-studied aspect of civil wars is the extensive amount of civil war violence (e.g. Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Kalyvas 2006; R. M. Wood 2010). In relation, violence in civil wars is more often directed against civilians than in inter-state conflicts (e.g. Balcells 2010; Raleigh 2012; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004). Why civilians become victims of violence in civil war is broadly discussed and certainly varies with every conflict. The most straightforward cause might be that conflict factions engage each other on battlefields (e.g. Condra and Shapiro 2012; Kalyvas 2006). As a consequence, civilian victims might not necessarily be desired but could be a form of collateral damage. For example, Condra and Shapiro (2012) outlined that armed groups attack each other in urban, densely populated areas where the deliberate use of civilians as a protective shield against competing armed forces is a common practice (Condra and Shapiro 2012). But this might only be a small part of the violence civilians have to endure. As Raleigh (2012) has shown, retribution or collateral damage alone are probably not the only explanations for attacks on unarmed civilians, as violence against civilians is often a deliberate military objective in civil wars (Raleigh 2012). The reasons for this direct, one-sided violence are diverse. There might be political, ethical, religious, or cultural cleavages leading to armed groups repeatedly and deliberately engaging in direct forms of violence against civilians (e.g. Balcells 2010). Further reasons for such behaviour according to Wood (2010) or Subedi (2013) could be a collective action problem of armed factions and a lack of benefits to entice loyalty within their lower ranks (e.g. Subedi 2013; R. M. Wood 2010). Kalyvas (2006) explains that civilians become victims because of a lack of information of armed forces, hurting civilians in an attempt to attack deserters and spies (Kalyvas 2006).

5.3.2 Violence as a Trigger for Nonviolent Action in Civil Wars

Various examples from the Arab Spring showed that it was often the violent repression applied to a relatively small group of civilians which later sparked first local protests and subsequently in some countries nationwide rallies toppling their governments (e.g. Pearlman 2013). In addition, from within the civil war context, interviews by Masullo (2015) with nonviolent activist communities during the Colombian Civil War found that ‘it was the violence that took place at that time which made people resist’ (Masullo 2015, 8). In addition, a recent quantitative investigation by Vüllers and Krtsch (2020) found a relation between combat-related fighting, opportunity structures, and subsequent nonviolent action in some of the African civil wars (Vüllers and Krtsch 2020). Further, a
comparative case study of different nonviolent protest movements in Iraq after 2010 points to cyclical and unevenly distributed levels of violence which influenced protest groups in their activity (Costantini 2020). All these examples argue for civil war violence as an underlying cause which plays a strong role for civilians to start nonviolent activities as a possible way out of their plight.

From various theoretical contributions of nonviolent action in times of peace, we know that grievances or repression played a major motivating factor in citizens’ decisions to become activists. Gurr (2000) and Nepstad (2011) in this regard point to initial grievances or exclusion from political power as driving factors in the formation of protest groups (Gurr 2000; Nepstad 2011a). Nepstad (2011) further specifically emphasizes the occurrence of triggers and shocks morally enraging citizens to start nonviolent actions (Nepstad 2011b). During a civil war, incidents of direct violence against the population could very well be such a moral trigger. Direct civil war violence here seems well-suitable in contrast to mere collateral damage as a result of conflict related battles. This because it happens also in areas which are not, not yet, or no longer contested by the conflict factions. This might explain why we are able to find examples of nonviolent action also far away from the active battlefields between conflict factions. Direct civil war violence against civilians happens by state actors and rebel actors alike. Overall, on the one hand it happens more frequently by rebel factions but on the other hand it is often more lethal by state actors (Eck and Hultman 2007). But how does this direct civil war violence affect civilians to conduct nonviolent action? In a civil war environment, if the basic security needs of citizens are tangled by civil war violence, citizens might carefully choose between different options to respond. They might choose to endure the violence while hoping to not become the next victim, to flee the area, to try to work for a change within institutionalized political and legal paths, such as elections, lobbying and jurisdictional complains, to fight back violently (i.e., forming or joining a conflict party), or to react with nonviolent activities in order to resist their oppressors. A combination of these choices is of course also possible. First, violence-affected people could decide to issue their complaints during elections or via basic political lobbying. If more of less democratic elections occur during civil wars, these would be a regular channel of opportunity to address atrocities and grievances also via nonviolent action (e.g. McAdam 2010; Tarrow, Tilly, and McAdam 2001). Unfortunately, organizing and holding elections in civil wars is often not feasible. As a result of civil-war induced political instability, it is expected that peace-time opportunity structures like elections play a lesser role in civil war as a fast route to overcome civil war effects for citizens. In general, holding elections during a civil war is challenging, especially if the state has security concerns in parts of the country and his legitimacy is challenged by rebels (e.g. Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer 2021). Citizens would have to fear violent pressure of conflict factions to vote in their favor or not at all (Hutt 2004). If elections are
held, they can be easily contested and labeled invalid afterwards by conflict factions not satisfied with the outcome and therefore even result in more violence (Höglund, Jarstad, and Kovacs 2009). Waiting for the next elections, if they ever occur during a civil war, to issue atrocities seems not very promising. Another option to prevent further direct violent atrocities is political lobbying. Unfortunately, effective political lobbying relies on networks, material resources and influence, it is relatively costly and many citizens affected by direct civil war violence might not or no longer have the necessary resources available to change their status quo by political lobbying.

During a civil war, state capacity is often negatively affected, as a result legal complaints by citizens due to violence or atrocities become harder to issue, as the state for example looses jurisdictional or administrative capacity in parts of the country (e.g. Hendrix 2010; Höglund, Jarstad, and Kovacs 2009; Thies 2010). In such a situation, collecting evidence and a subsequent legal persecution of perpetrators of war atrocities leading to justice and compensation for affected civilians would be difficult and perhaps even unlikely to achieve amidst fighting conflict factions. Further, if the state itself acts as a conflict party, perhaps being responsible for war crimes against the population, achieving change via its own judicial channels seems difficult and unlikely to bear fast or reliable results.

Further to consider is a loosing trust in the overall incumbent political system. If citizens become exposed to direct civil war violence, a basic civil assumption might be the perception that the state is no longer capable of being the provider of security. Even if violence is not inflicted directly by state forces, research has shown that exposure to violence severely reduces trust in the national government and its protection (De Juan and Pierskalla 2016). Consequently, if citizens distrust the state because of the violence, they will be less inclined to comply with state rules and regulations and be open for challengers of authority (ibid.). This mechanism was recently found also by Sika (2020), linking sudden low political trust levels in institutions, courts and police, to a higher likelihood of activists to contest their regimes in some Middle-Eastern and North African countries (Sika 2020). This loss of trust might increase the likelihood that citizens could choose possible alternative paths including nonviolent action as a response. In such a situation, nonviolent activities might become more likely an option to raise awareness for the incidents in an attempt to regain the security which was lost. But how is this connected exactly to nonviolent action? If individuals in a community become direct targets of violence, these victims might be unable to serve this community in its current form, limiting the community’s overall capability to provide its services to its citizens. This in turn might trigger members of this community to start nonviolent activities, although they were neither the original recipients of direct violence nor necessarily close relatives of victims. During the Nepalese Civil War for example, school and university teachers were regular targets of violence by the Maoist insurgents (van Wessel and van Hirtum 2013). As victims of one-sided violence, they were
threatened, beaten, and even abducted and killed for teaching the ‘wrong’ ideology to the youth (ibid.). As a result, not only did sympathetic teachers and education workers start education strikes and other nonviolent activities, but countless other education workers feared going to work and schools remained closed. Subsequently, students, parents, and other members of the communities went to the streets to protest against closed schools and for the resignation of principals and ministers as schooling could no longer be provided in many parts of the country (e.g. Merkel 2022b; van Wessel and van Hirtum 2013). This example illustrates how nonviolent activities can be related to civil war violence, although their headline demands in the media might be in this example the resignation of the education minister or local school principal not being able to provide security for teachers and children. A similar mechanism might possibly be at work for local administration officials and politicians who became regular targets of violence by conflict factions. The overall capability of communities to provide basic services might become affected when more and more pillars of social and communal service are violently removed.

Finally, beside all these considerations, civilians always have the option to flee if civil war violence occurs. But becoming refugees as a way out might not always be possible and strongly depends on resources and capabilities (e.g. P. Adhikari 2012). Leaving the area or even the country to escape civil war violence might be a tough decision often not possible for all members of a family. At the same time standing up with nonviolent actions always inhabits a risk-and-reward logic. The risk might consist of becoming a victim of violence all the more in an effort by armed factions to quell resistance (e.g. Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson 2014). But this might already be the case if relatives became victims, the violence occurred close by, or provisions of communal service were severely affected by violence so that a normal life became unbearable. The cost of possible repression due to standing up against violence with nonviolent methods might be lower in such a situation compared to fleeing or raising arms.

As for example McAdam and Tarrow (2000) or Tarrow (2011) have outlined, besides elections, lobbying, legal complaints or flight, nonviolent action can serve as an alternative tactic to be heard and to strive for a change of a political status quo (McAdam and Tarrow 2000; Tarrow 2011). When a political power situation makes the usage of regular paths of political contention difficult or unlikely to achieve reliable or fast results, the regular path becomes less useful and alternative tactics might offer a way out. Overall, I expect that such alternative ways to pursue a change of a status quo might be more likely to spawn faster results in a conflict setting. However, this does not exclusively imply a nonviolent approach of resistance, as of course taking up arms is also an option outside regular political paths. But if the option is to choose between violent or nonviolent ways outside institutionalized forms of political contention, other features of nonviolent methods might become handy. For example limiting opponents’ reactions to nonviolent tactics,
tying further violent repression to costs for the perpetrator. Indeed, if carried out publicly, nonviolent action can make a violent response costly, thereby possibly limiting opponents' options towards dissident citizens (McAdam and Tarrow 2000). Whereas a violent reaction to a violent uproar can be easily justified, a violent smack-down of unarmed protesters might be accompanied by a loss of support within a conflict faction’s own ranks, inducing defections and alienating other parts of the population not directly affected by the violence (e.g. Martin, Varney, and Vickers 2001; Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson 2014). In addition, nonviolent action puts a lower risk on citizens’ life than for example ongoing armed violent resistance does (Schock 2005). Further, nonviolent action is relatively cheap in terms of material resources in contrast to political lobbying or a violent insurgency. Under such circumstances, the alternative option of nonviolent action might be fruitful, both to raise awareness for the citizens’ plight in making atrocities public but also to possibly prevent further violent retaliation. Thus, the current research tests the hypothesis that direct, one-sided violence within a civil war country is related to the nonviolent action events which spawned during the civil war.

5.3.3 Case Selection - The Case of the Nepalese Civil War

Finding a case to investigate the relation between direct civil war violence and nonviolent action is not easy. A major feature of the current research is that it aims to make statements about all nonviolent events during a civil war, below the level of large nonviolent campaigns, advancing the research in this field by including detailed spatial variation into the equation. For a robust statistical analysis it is therefore necessary that nonviolent action occurs without limitation to certain time-points, campaigns, or locations during the war, which might be obstacles to the generalizability of the findings. Further necessary is detailed data on direct, one-sided violence during the civil war beyond battle-related deaths or fatal incidents, during the whole time-frame of the war and throughout the entire country. I assume that it is more likely to find a fit in these criteria within revolutionary rather than secessionist civil wars as well as in grievance-based rather than greed-based conflicts. Revolutionary, or governmental civil wars in most cases want to conquer the whole nation and not only a small part for secession, therefore observations and statements about the entire country might be more likely possible, within dependent but also independent variables (e.g. Cederman and Vogt 2017; Mason and Mitchell 2016). 'Grievance'-based civil wars in contrast to their 'greed'-based counterparts are also possibly better-suited, as they are fueled by various forms of discrimination, repression, or general tensions between parts of the population, a situation in which it might be more likely to discover nonviolent action, in contrast to 'greed'-based civil wars which spawn out of a conflict faction’s desire to extract resources. This is likely the case not only because grievances are named as motivations of nonviolent action (e.g. Gurr 2000; Nepstad 2011b), but because within such a 'grievance'-based conflict, the rebels might try to win the hearts and minds of at
least parts of the population so they might be more inclined to tolerate nonviolent action than for example a rebel faction which extracts blood diamonds with the help of forced labor in a ‘greed’-based conflict.

These criteria fit well to the Nepalese Civil War (1999 - 2006) which in this investigation is used to test the relationship between direct civil war violence and nonviolent activities in the various Nepalese districts. The Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN - Maoist) started the war with the goal to overthrow the country’s constitutional monarchy to establish their so-called People’s Republic. The Nepalese Civil War constitutes as a good case to test this relationship for the following reasons. First, it was relatively long and over its course the entire country was affected by various degrees of both civil war violence and nonviolent action. Because the Maoists had the goal of a revolution, to step-by-step conquer the whole county, predictions about the entire country can be made in contrast to only the capital or some rural violence-affected districts for example in secessionist civil wars. Second, the relatively long duration should in theory allow for a large number of nonviolent activities, as well as for dynamic variation in civil war violence during the course of the war. This is a requirement to conduct large-N quantitative analysis. Third, a fine-grained, disaggregated database on civil war violence is available for the war and can be used in combination with our unique dataset encompassing all nonviolent activities during the war, created specifically for this investigation. Fourth, the identity-driven civil war in Nepal is comparable to other civil wars as it involved economic grievances that transcended ethnic boundaries. From this perspective, the civil war in Nepal is not dissimilar to the insurgencies in the Philippines, India, Yemen, Colombia, as well as many African civil wars (Joshi and Quinn 2017). This implies that the findings of this paper will be comparable to similar conflicts in other areas of the globe. The reason why civilians were directly attacked in the Nepalese Civil War is still subject to debate. Nepal et al. (2011) found that Maoist killings were primarily directed against Nepali-speaking populations, arguing for ethnic tensions and inequalities as driving factors of direct violence against civilians (Nepal, Bohara, and Gawande 2011). However, Do and Iyer (2011) found no association between ethnic polarization and violence, instead they point to poverty and lower costs for rebels to recruit civilians as driving factors for violence against non-combatants in certain areas (Do and Iyer 2010). During the war, territory shifted between opposing conflict factions. Such changes are likely to have influenced armed groups’ options and strategic decisions, which in turn also affected conflict processes like direct violence against civilians or mobilization (e.g. Holtermann 2016; Kalyvas 2006). Whatever the reasons for the violence civilians had to endure in Nepal, it can be expected that it occurred not evenly distributed across the country and time of the civil war. Civil wars, like the war in Nepal, often start in rural areas where a central government is less present and armed insurgencies have more space to recruit and grow (e.g. Do and Iyer 2010). This strongly
argues for a spatial model to take local particularities into account.

5.3.4 Hypothesis

As outlined, local direct civil war violence as grievances might be a trigger factor, motivating civilians to make the decision to regain lost security outside traditional institutionalized paths of contention (e.g. Nepstad 2011b). Getting affected by or observing such direct violence incidents weakens individual trust in the state to provide security which can push civilians’ decision in favor of acting outside of rules and traditional ways of contention (e.g. De Juan and Pierskalla 2016; Sika 2020). The option to use nonviolent action here might become more valuable, as traditional institutionalized channels of contention or judicial ways to seek justice become more difficult to use alongside diminishing overall state capacity during the civil war (Hendrix 2010; Höglund, Jarstad, and Kovacs 2009; Thies 2010). If the decision to react outside the institutionalized channels is made, the decision to use nonviolent tactics could stem from the overall effectiveness and cost efficiency of nonviolent tactics in comparison to a violent form of dissent. Following this line of argumentation, I therefore expect that an increasing amount of direct civil war violence is connected to an increasing amount of nonviolent activities.

In contrast to battle-related deaths, it is further expected that direct, one-sided forms of violence can lead to more desperation among civilian populations. Deaths of civilians as a result of clashes between conflict factions (such as collateral damage) might for example be framed as necessary by supporters of the conflict or deemed unavoidable. Such forms of violence might overall be easier to bear than their direct counterparts where civilians were deliberately attacked. Such deliberate, but for the population harder to explain forms like beatings, torture, or public killings might more likely impose a situation of having nothing to loose. This could lead to a higher desperation and therefore higher motivation of civilians to consider using nonviolent activities.

Moreover, if such violence against civilians occurs in a district, it is expected that this raises the amount of nonviolent political activities in this district for a certain time. Citizens have to gather, plan, and organize nonviolent resistance (e.g. Masullo 2015). Additionally, information about the nonviolent activities might spread to neighboring villages and cities, igniting and inspiring others with the idea of nonviolent resistance. On the first days of violence, nonviolent activities might occur in and around a village by bystanders, neighbors and relatives or victims of violence. After a certain time, the same or a larger crowd of people might organize nonviolent activities in surrounding communities, where nonviolent activities could reach the attention of state administrative bodies or corresponding insurgency ordinance. Solidarity-based nonviolent activities of citizens not directly affected by the violence are of course also possible, if awareness of successful nonviolent mobilization spreads. This example shows that an investigation
linking civil war violence to nonviolent activities should incorporate not only the actual location of the violence to search for actions by citizens but also the surrounding areas and the district in which it occurred. This in turn speaks for a highly disaggregated analysis taking into account time lags between violence and nonviolent actions, as well as the spatial structure.

5.3.5 Control Variables

To ensure that direct civil war violence is a dominant factor in explaining nonviolent activities in this investigation, several structural and socioeconomic control factors on the district level were included which might have had an influence on the occurrence of nonviolent activism during the civil war. Although direct violence as grievance could be a trigger, there could be other factors generally working in favour or as an obstacle to citizens organizing nonviolent action events. Such factors are a district’s overall size of population, the percentage of disadvantaged groups, wealth, or road infrastructure. Some of these factors could affect nonviolent activities in general, regardless of civil war violence. Specifically, a high amount of disadvantaged groups could lead to cleavages, tensions, and therefore also overall more nonviolent activities (e.g. Nepal, Bohara, and Gawande 2011). Road infrastructure could be an important criterion in organizing nonviolent activities and mobilizing supporters. A higher population size could be related to more nonviolent events. Some rural areas could have serious lacks in these population or road dimensions and therefore make nonviolent mobilizations more difficult and therefore less likely. Wealth in general could affect nonviolent activities in two ways. On the one hand, wealthier citizens could be more likely to care about civil rights and a loss of life quality because of the war, due to higher education they might be more able to organize nonviolent action, which might result in a higher possibility of nonviolent activities in wealthy areas. On the other hand, lower wealth could also be an indicator for economically disadvantaged parts of the population which could have a higher incentive to start nonviolent activities as a result of general economic hardships.

To further tap into the relationship of violence and nonviolent activities, it is necessary to investigate different time intervals of the civil war. There might be crucial events that mark thresholds for civil war violence and turning points in the civil war where violence reached a new level. Investigating whether the relationship of violence and nonviolent activities differs in the time intervals before and after such events can shed further light on the proposed relationship. For the Nepalese Civil War, such a crucial turning point could have been the year 2001, during which the Nepalese Army was engaged against the Maoists to quell the insurgency after peace negotiations failed and a new phase of the civil war started accompanied by a new level of violence (e.g. Hutt 2004). The result was a significant rise of casualties after 2001 compared to previous years of the civil war.
5.4 Method

5.4.1 Data

Data on nonviolent activities in civil wars is still scarce. A recent study focusing on several African countries serves as a step in the right direction towards a more detailed investigation of nonviolent activism in civil wars (Chenoweth, Hendrix, and Hunter 2019a). The corresponding dataset relies on international news agencies like AFP or BBC and search strings to find nonviolent activities in 17 countries and 20 civil wars. It includes about 3,660 incidents of nonviolent actions (ibid.). Although such datasets provide an excellent opportunity for cross-country investigations of nonviolent actions during civil wars, a limitation is that they capture only such events which raised the attention of the international media. This media attention might only occur after a certain impact, number of participants, or violent retaliation against actors. Therefore, in an attempt to capture and include all nonviolent activities during a civil war, the present research innovatively combines two data sources to test the proposed relationship of direct violence and nonviolent activities in the Nepalese Civil War. The data on civil war violence is fine-grained and able to record all known cases of violence against civilians during the conflict. The data on nonviolent activities is based on local, English-language Nepalese newspapers. This approach makes it more likely that a high proportion of the nonviolent activities that occurred during the war is captured in the dataset compared to relying on international news agencies as data sources. The two datasets are combined in a spatial panel regression analysis, accounting for spatial dependencies between the different districts of Nepal over the course of the civil war.

Political Action in Nepalese Conflict Data Data on nonviolent activities stems from the Political Action in Nepalese Conflict (PANC) dataset. It is a new country-specific dataset containing nonviolent political event data with a broadly defined political goal during the period of armed conflict, specifically the time period between 1999 and 2006. All public political events carried out by civilians and organizations are available in the dataset, offering exact information on participants, tactics, whether violence was used by the activists, as well as reactions by the regime’s security forces. Because of its disaggregated nature and focus on the event level, the dataset is able to capture not only major events like large nonviolent campaigns, but also much smaller events like hunger strikes or picketing of offices. In addition, all events include geo-reference information, providing the exact location within the administrative divisions (districts) in Nepal in which they occurred. The dataset allows for the investigation of wartime contentious political activism in unprecedented detail, and offers a valuable data source for future researchers interested in the study of contentious activism in Nepal. The PANC dataset was constructed based on articles in Nepalese English-language newspapers, respectively
the Kathmandu Post and the Rising Nepal. The dataset was hand-coded out of thousands of pages of newspaper articles, resulting in a dataset containing thousands of nonviolent action events. To test if the newspaper reports from the two sources were unbiased compared to each other and report basically the same events, a mark- and recapture analysis was conducted according to Hendrix and Salehyan (2015) for the first coded year of the civil war (Hendrix and Salehyan 2015). The results showed that event-detection capabilities of the two newspapers were more or less equal. Therefore, and due to time constraints, only one newspaper (Rising Nepal) was used for coding the remaining years of the civil war. This extensive coding process took about one year. For an event to be included in the dataset a public observable use of nonviolent tactics had to be reported in the respective newspaper article. This public criterion for example excludes prison riots. Further, the mobilization for the nonviolent act had to be of political nature in a very broad sense, for example an expressed political goal or motive had to be identified. By political, I refer to matters of, or relating to, the state or rebel government or the general public affairs of a country. These criteria excluded cases of non-political activism, religious events, and street brawls, for example as a result to sports events. For the years 1999 - 2006 there exist over five thousand cases of nonviolent action in the PANC dataset. There is a variable 'side' in the dataset which describes at which opponent or addressee an event was directed. For example an event could be directed at the Nepalese government, represented either as the local police or the central government. It could also address the Maoist insurgency. Combinations were also possible if for example an event demanded negotiations between conflict parties addressing both factions alike. Additional information of the variables used in this investigation from the PANC dataset can be found in the Appendix.

**Violence Data - INSEC** Data on civil war violence inflicted on civilians in the Nepalese Civil War stems from the Nepalese NGO ‘INSEC’, a human rights organization working in Nepal since 1988. This violence data is unique, as it is a complete survey of the known population of victims for which information could be collected. During the war and until today, INSEC could rely on a broad network of district-level offices throughout the country. They could rely on close relationships with grassroots and community organizations, civil and police administrations as well as political parties (Joshi and Pyakurel 2015). When information on an incident of violence was received, INSEC members personally visited the site and verified the information about each victim individually. Conflict events were reported and various demographic, sociopolitical, and economic information on victims was collected. The NGO verified this information by interviewing family and friends of victims as well as members of the political and community organizations if the victim was involved in such.
For their commitment to unbiased reporting during the war, INSEC was respected by the rank-and-file members of the Maoist insurgency as well as by Nepalese government officials. This circumstance made the encompassing documentation of human rights violations during the war possible. INSEC also developed informal relationships with local political leaders, school teachers, and business entrepreneurs. The NGO could utilize these formal and informal networks, as well as local newspapers, to systematically collect and document information for all reported victims of civil war violence (Merkel 2022b).

This thorough procedure resulted in a database which contains very detailed data on violence available on the micro level, for each incident, victim, time, and location. At the same time, this approach addresses the problem of biased information, which might be the result of counting casualties during a civil war. It is a complicated task which has the potential for politically motivated leaders to promote false narratives or report inaccurate numbers for example in the media (Seybolt and Aronson 2013). Additionally, there is the possibility that the media do not report about small events with only a low number of casualties or reject detailed reports of incidents where media workers could not reach the site because of the risk of becoming victims themselves. The NGO was able to overcome these considerations to a certain degree.

The INSEC dataset was previously used for example in studies by Nepal et al. (2011) or Johshi and Quinn (2005) dealing with the micro-dynamics of civilian victimization during the Nepalese Civil War (Joshi and Pyakurel 2015; Nepal, Bohara, and Gawande 2011). The data provides information on different levels of violence and various other variables considering the victims' socio-economic background. The complete list of variables and coding can be found in (Joshi and Pyakurel 2015). The dataset comprises of 14,987 incidents of violence where civilians were affected in the Nepalese Civil War. From this number, only 3,923 were related to combat fighting. The other, major part of the incidents are extra-judicial killings, public beatings, abductions, or other forms of violence where civilians were deliberately, selectively targeted (i.e., discriminate violence). The data shows that 88 percent of all victims of violence were killed, and only about 26 percent of those were killed in combat fighting. This suggests that more than two-thirds of those killed in Nepal during the civil war were killed in a noncombat setting (Joshi and Pyakurel 2015). This clearly speaks for this investigation and a focus on direct forms of violence as the driving grievance in civil wars in contrast to just battle related deaths.

### 5.4.2 Control Variables

Acquiring information on socioeconomic factors during a civil war is difficult and of course not available in such fine-grained dimensions as is the information on violence and nonviolent activities in this investigation. Nevertheless, for control variables in the analyses were operationalized with data from a census in Nepal from 2001, a middle year of the
civil war, where information on all Nepalese districts was included (Census Nepal 2001 2001). The control for population here is the overall population of each Nepalese district. Disadvantaged groups was measured as the percentage of educationally disadvantaged groups in the population. Road density was measured as the sum of all categories of roads as a percentage of the total surface area (in km per 100 km²). Wealth was measured as the total regular budget expenditure per capita in Nepalese Rupees, divided by the total population. Further information on these variables can be found in the Appendix.

5.4.3 Spatial Panel Regression Analysis

One of the benefits of using disaggregated, micro-level data is the ability to capture spatial and temporal dynamics of a civil war. Both datasets used in this paper are of that kind, thus a detailed investigation of the relationship between violence and nonviolent events is possible. Violence and nonviolent events vary both between districts and time over the course of the civil war, creating a spatial panel data structure, meaning time-series observations of a number of geographical units (e.g. Elhorst 2014). This speaks for spatial panel regression to test the relationship between violence and nonviolent activities. Spatial panel regression has two central advantages. First, it can account for possible unobserved background variables which differ between spatial units. This is because spatial units like districts or regions within a country differ according to many third, unobserved variables which might affect the dependent variable. In Nepal, as in any other country, the regions and districts differ significantly with respect to background variables like population, infrastructure, media access, or cleavages, which of course could affect the occurrence of nonviolent events also during the civil war. As outlined, control variables in initial pooling and random effects models account for some of the rather static factors. Nevertheless, there might still be additional unobserved factors. To give examples of such unobserved factors, citizens might have it easier to mobilize themselves if proper transportation in a district is still possible and not destroyed by the war, or deliberately blocked by armed factions. Reliable media information on civil war dynamics may be harder to acquire by citizens in remote districts than in urban areas or the capital. Some of these variables are time-invariant, but others might change rather rapidly and multiple times during the conflict. What they have in common is that reliable, consistent data is difficult to acquire during the civil war, where administration in general is struggling and civil war dynamics may change not only demographic statistics quickly. Failing to account for these effects might increase the risk of obtaining biased regression estimates (e.g. Elhorst 2017). Spatial panel fixed-effects models can help to overcome the problem of unobserved background variables between units (e.g. Elhorst 2014).

The second central advantage of spatial panel regression is its ability to test for the existence of interaction effects of variables and error terms across spatial units and time. Related
to that are spatial spillover effects. Spatial spillover or lag effects are a main interest in regional science, economic geography, and related fields (Elhorst 2017). Many theories predict that changes of explanatory variables in a particular unit impact the dependent variable not only in the unit itself, but also in other units. For the current research, this implies that violence observed in one Nepalese district might influence citizens in that district but for example also in neighboring districts, motivating them to start nonviolent activities. A causal chain could be refugees fleeing to adjoining districts, protesting against violence which occurred in their home district. Sympathy of citizens seeing refugees’ plight could be encouraged to start own nonviolent actions (Merkel 2022b). The spatial panel regression analysis can account for district differences in these unobserved background variables and spatial lag effects.

**Weight Matrices** In spatial regression analysis, weight matrices define how the different units of observations, in this case the Nepalese districts, are related to each other. This spatial relation defines the expected spillover effect between the units. Districts within Nepal, similar to other countries, are no closed black boxes. People and information can pass the regional borders and citizens are expected to have started nonviolent activities not necessarily only because of violent events in their district but also maybe because of violence or nonviolent events in neighboring districts. Weight matrices define the intensity of the spatial relation between units. The current research used a distance-based weight matrix (centroids) between districts to illustrate the distance between them.

**5.5 Results**

**5.5.1 Descriptive Results**

**Types of Violence** In the INSEC violence dataset, the variable 'killed-type' is used to discriminate between different kinds of violence civilians had to endure. The variable ranges between the values of 0 - 9, according to the type of violence which in the particular case occurred. Table 1 shows the frequency distribution of the overall kinds of violence in the dataset.

Table 1 indicates that a large majority of the victims (88 percent) died because of the violence. Further, it shows that a vast part of the incidents happened not because of combat fighting, a measure which was sometimes used in previous investigations but accounts for only 26.18 percent of the overall cases in this war. This investigation as outlined will instead focus on the direct cases of violence, where civilians were deliberately targeted, which as our data show was the vast majority of violence in this war.
Nonviolent Activities according to Side    The PANC dataset includes the variable 'side' for each nonviolent event, describing which side the nonviolent activity was directed at. Anti-government activities are understood in a broad sense. It is not necessary that for example protesters demand the resignation of the central government, but that they are protesting against actions made or sanctioned by the government. This includes national, regional, and local authorities’ actions, since the hiring and firing of state employees at all levels of government rests on the people in charge. The label 'NA' denotes that the activity was directed at a domestic or international public or private non-governmental institution (e.g. political parties, foreign countries, international organizations [UN]). Side 'NA'-coded activities for example could have occurred as a protest because of a certain traffic accident or as a demonstration because of the international women’s day. The causal relation between violence and nonviolent activities implies that citizens demand an end of the violence or the persecution of the perpetrator, or an end of the war or similar reasons. For the analysis the 'NA'-coded activities were excluded in order to capture the relationship between violence and nonviolent activities directed at the Nepalese Government and the Maoists. Further excluded were nonviolent activities which were clearly not linked to the conflict and civil war violence according to the issue of the nonviolent activity. Examples are activities against corruption scandals, high petroleum prices, car accidents, or for higher wages. It was decided to exclude such events as they were directed at the state but cannot be easily connected to the civil war and its violence and atrocities. Table 2 shows the distribution of the nonviolent activities according to side. Combinations of categories were also possible.

5.5.2 Spatial Panel Regression

Data Merging    To test the relationship between civil war violence and nonviolent events, political events were selected from the PANC dataset as an indicator for nonviolent activities.
Table 2: PANC Data According to Side

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Side</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti Government</td>
<td>4,183</td>
<td>58.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro Government</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti Maoist</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>3.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro Maoist</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>5.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti Government and Anti Maoist</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti Government and Pro Maoist</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro Government and Pro Maoist</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total for Analysis</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,008</strong></td>
<td><strong>69.88</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1,577</td>
<td>22.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrelated to Civil War</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>8.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,167</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data, which is available on the event level for each incident, time, and location, was aggregated to the district level to match with the violence database from INSEC. At the time of the civil war Nepal had 75 districts in five developmental administrative regions. Data on violence and nonviolent activities is available for all except one district.

In both datasets, incidents of violence and nonviolent activities are indicated according to the day they occurred. In order to form meaningful time units of the war and to merge the two datasets, the data were aggregated to months and years of the civil war. Violence and nonviolent activities vary between the eight civil war years, and 96 months and the 75 Nepalese districts. By aggregating to months of the civil war, it was possible to create relatively short time units in which the effect of violence on nonviolent activities is likely to unfold. However, there are months in the civil war where in certain districts there are zero observations of violence in the dataset from INSEC and/or nonviolent activities in the PANC dataset. Therefore, the data were alternatively aggregated to years of the war to reduce the occurrence of zero observations within districts and time units.

Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of violence and nonviolent activities across the civil war between 1999 and 2006. The red bars depict violence, whereas the green bars depict nonviolent activities for every Nepalese district. It can be seen that violence and nonviolent activities occurred in every Nepalese district, except Malang (district 75) in the mountainous north. There is a concentration of nonviolent activities in the capital Kathmandu, which is represented by the large green bar east of the center of the country. There is also an overall concentration of violence in the South-West and a slightly higher concentration of nonviolent activities in southern districts. It should be noted that for illustrative purposes Figure 1 shows the aggregated occurrences of violence and nonviolent
Figure 1: Overall Civil War Violence and Nonviolent Activities

activities across all time units of the civil war.
5.5.3 Regression Results

**Pooling Model** Analyses were performed in R using the packages plm and splm with a weight matrix based on the distances between district centroids. The panel data included N = 7,200 observations (n = 75 districts, T = 96 months). First, the relationship of violence and nonviolent activities was investigated in an OLS regression, ignoring the spatial panel structure of the data (i.e., pooling model). The model was significant ($F(1, 7198) = 52.02, p < .001$) and showed a positive and significant effect of violence on nonviolent activities ($b = 0.07, SE = 0.01, t(7198) = 7.21, p < .001$). This indicates that across all districts and months of the civil war, an increase in violence was related to an increase in nonviolent activities. This effect was small, albeit significant, showing that for every 100 persons killed by violence, there were seven more nonviolent activities. The presence of individual and time effects was investigated using the Lagrange FF Multiplier test for panel models. The test was significant ($\chi^2(2) = 17498, p < .001$). This implies that differences between districts and months of the civil war should be accounted for in the regression model.

One approach to account for further variables that might explain nonviolent activities is to include control variables varying between districts into the pooling model. Therefore, the time-invariant control variables population, percentage of disadvantaged ethnic groups, road density, as well as wealth were included into the pooling model. This larger model was again significant ($F(1, 7194) = 333.80, p < .001$) and showed that all control variables significantly predicted nonviolent activities (population: $b = 0.000002, SE = 0.00000017, t = 12.61, p < .001$; percentage of disadvantaged ethnic groups: $b = -0.007, SE = 0.016, t = -4.41, p < .001$, road density: $b = 0.0099, SE = 0.0014, t = 7.21, p < .001$, wealth: $b = 0.0003, SE = 0.000013, t = 20.07, p < .001$). More nonviolent activities were predicted by a higher population, a lower percentage of disadvantaged ethnic groups, a higher road density, as well as a higher wealth of districts. Importantly, the effect of violence on nonviolent activities remained significant ($b = 0.06, SE = 0.0087, t = 7.46, p < .001$), indicating that over and above district differences in demographic and structural variables, more violence still explained higher numbers of nonviolent activities. The test statistic of the Lagrange FF Multiplier test was reduced compared to the first model, but still significant ($\chi^2(2) = 6038.30, p < .001$), which indicates that there were spatial and time dependencies in the data that go beyond what the time-invariant control variables can account for.

**Random Effects Model** In a second step, a spatial panel regression model was computed to take the spatial and time structure of the data into account. The model included random effects and a spatial lag of nonviolent activities (i.e., that nonviolent activities in one district are influenced by nonviolent activities in neighboring districts) as well as the control variables. Results are displayed in Table 3. The effect of violence
on nonviolent activities remained significant \((b = 0.05, SE = 0.01, t = 5.66, p < .001)\). The control variables again were significant and in the same direction than in the pooling model \((population: b = 0.0000023, SE = 0.00000033, t = 7.06, p < .001; percentage of disadvantaged ethnic groups: b = -0.0079, SE = 0.0031, t = -2.53, p = .011, road density: b = 0.005, SE = 0.0026, t = 2.47, p = .010, wealth: b = 0.00029, SE = 0.000025, t = 11.35, p < .001)\). The random effect was significant \((\phi = 0.03, SE = 0.008, t = 3.85, p < .001)\), again indicating unaccounted differences between districts. The spatial lag of nonviolent activities was also significant \((\lambda = 0.36, SE = 0.01, t = 23.96, p < .001)\), which means that over and above all predictor variables, nonviolent activities in neighboring districts influenced each other.

### Table 3: Results of the Random Effects Model with Months Aggregation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.0085</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.0000023</td>
<td>0.00000033</td>
<td>7.06</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disadvantaged groups</td>
<td>-0.0079</td>
<td>0.0031</td>
<td>-2.53</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road density</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.0026</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>0.00029</td>
<td>0.000025</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-7.44</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random effect ((\phi))</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.0087</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial lag ((\lambda))</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>23.96</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Fixed Effects Models

As the control variables in the pooling and the random effects models were time-invariant and therefore could not account for differences in districts that might vary over the course of the civil war, in a last step fixed-effects spatial panel regression models were computed as a further approach to test the link between violence and nonviolent activities. By introducing fixed effects for spatial and time units, it was thus controlled for the influence of unobserved variables that vary between districts and months of the civil war and test whether the effect of violence on nonviolent activities is present in each district and month of the civil war. The fixed effects model including both individual (district) and time (months) fixed effects was also significant \((F(1, 7029) = 18.71, p < .001)\). Results showed that the positive effect of violence on nonviolent activities was still significant when unobserved differences between districts and months of the civil war were controlled for \((b = 0.04, SE = 0.01, t = 4.33, p < .001)\). The joint significance test for fixed effects showed that both the fixed effects for districts as well as the fixed effects for months of the civil war were significant \((F(169, 7029) = 21.45, p < .001)\), indicating that there was substantial variation between districts, but also between months of the civil war. Panel Lagrange Multiplier tests for spatial dependence showed that when including both individual and time fixed effects, there was no significant spatial error dependence remaining \(\text{locally robust test: LM} = 3.71, p = .054\), indicating that the disturbances
were no longer spatially correlated (i.e., no residual spatial autocorrelation).

However, there was still a remaining trend towards spatial lag dependence (locally robust test: \( LM = 4.02, p = .045 \)). Therefore, additionally a Durbin model was computed, including not only a spatial lag of nonviolent activities, but also a spatial lag of violence on nonviolent activities (i.e., violence in neighboring districts influencing nonviolent activities in one district). Results again showed a positive effect of violence on nonviolent activities (\( b = 0.04, SE = 0.01, t = 4.02, p < .001 \)). The spatial lag of violence was non-significant (\( b = 0.03, SE = 0.02, t = 1.89, p = .059 \)), indicating that violence in neighboring districts did not predict nonviolent activities over and above violence in the respective district. The spatial lag of nonviolent activities was smaller than in the random effects model, but still significant (\( \lambda = 0.04, SE = 0.02, t = 2.41, p = .016 \)). This means that over and above the positive effect of violence, nonviolent activities in one district were also predicted by nonviolent activities in neighboring districts.

### 5.5.4 Additional Analyses

In additional analyses the data were aggregated according to years instead of months of the civil war in order to reduce the number of zero observations in the dataset. Results were consistent with the months aggregation, but showed stronger effects of violence on nonviolent activities (pooling model with covariates: \( b = 0.12, SE = 0.02, t = 5.23, p < .001 \); two-ways fixed effects model: \( b = 0.09, SE = 0.03, t = 3.56, p < .001 \) and no remaining spatial dependence in the data (fixed effects model: locally robust tests for spatial lag dependence: \( LM = 0.66, p = .417 \), spatial error dependence: \( LM = 0.61, p = .436 \)).

It was further tested whether results were robust when separately analyzing two phases of the civil war: before and after the Nepalese Army was engaged against the Maoists in January 2001. Results of two random effects models (before/after the army was engaged) showed that the effect of violence on nonviolent activities was significant in both intervals, but twice as strong for the months after 2001. These results underscore that civil war violence played a role even in the first more 'quiet' years of the civil war, but sparked more nonviolent activities as the civil war escalated.

In addition, and as a further measure of control, it was tested if there was a significant spike of nonviolent action in the single national election during the Nepalese Civil War. Time-frames before elections are deemed as opportunity structures where nonviolent action might be more broadly used, it was therefore controlled for the election period in the following analysis (e.g. McAdam 2010). This here was not the case, as the single national election during the war occurred in the first official year of the civil war, 1999, where only a very small percentage of overall nonviolent actions occurred. But even if national
elections would have occurred in later, high-intensity civil war years, maybe accompanied by a higher amount of nonviolent action events before them, these nonviolent events could of course not be expected to appear isolated from civil war effects like violence and subsequent grievances as motivators.

5.6 Conclusion

Previous research showed that nonviolent activities can have significant positive effects within civil war environments, both for the citizens who perform them (e.g. Masullo 2015), and in some cases also on a larger scale affecting the whole civil war dynamic (e.g. Hallward, Masullo, and Mouly 2017). It is therefore necessary to understand when and how citizens in civil wars choose to lessen their plight with nonviolent activities instead of fleeing or raising arms to join the fighting. Civil war violence has played a role in some previous case studies as a trigger forcing people to make the decision to use nonviolent activities (e.g. Costantini 2020; Masullo 2015). The present study tests the relation between direct, discriminate civil war violence and nonviolent activities with a new dataset on political nonviolent activities (PANC) within the case of the Nepalese Civil War. A positive relation between direct civil war violence and civilian nonviolent activities was expected within the respective Nepalese districts over the time of the civil war. The conducted spatial panel regression analyses point to a significant positive relationship between such civil war violence and nonviolent activities when using both months and years of the civil war as time units. A basic OLS regression pooled across all districts and months of the civil war provided first evidence that an increase in violence was positively related to an increase in nonviolent activities. The effect showed that for every 100 persons affected by violence, there were seven more nonviolent activities. This was corroborated by a random effects spatial panel regression model, even when demographic and structural variables that might additionally influence the occurrence of nonviolent activities were controlled for.

A fixed effects spatial panel regression model, accounting for differences in unobserved variables between the Nepalese districts with fixed effects for individual districts and time, again showed a positive relation between violence and nonviolent activities. Whereas the effect is relatively small, it proves quite robust as tests for spatial dependence showed that when including both individual and time fixed effects, there was no significant remaining spatial error dependence. This underlines the robustness of the effect in the districts, even when unobserved factors which might have an effect on nonviolent activities were accounted for by the fixed effects.

An additional Durbin model also showed a significant relation of violence and nonviolent activities and a significant spatial lag (spatial spillover) across the districts only for nonviolent activities but not for violence. This finding is similar to the findings by Gleditsch
(2017), showing that nonviolence can spread across borders influencing neighboring populations (Gleditsch and Rivera 2017). This implies that nonviolent activities can be linked to direct civil war violence as a trigger for citizens to conduct nonviolent activities within the districts. Moreover, the positive spatial lag in the Durbin model illustrates that also districts get affected by the nonviolent activities in neighboring districts, and citizens there react with nonviolent activities triggered by other factors than experienced violence.

Finally, a comparison of two time intervals of the civil war (before and after the army was engaged against the Maoists in January 2001) showed that the escalation of the civil war in the later interval was associated with a stronger effect of violence on nonviolent activities.

Implications of this paper are that direct, discriminate civil war violence seems to play a role in the decision of civilians to react with nonviolent activism. This is true not only for large-scale nonviolent campaigns but also for small-scale nonviolent activities which are also included in the PANC dataset.

If citizens have to decide whether to flee, fight, or resist with nonviolent activities, direct civil war violence seems to play a role. This finding is in accordance with some other previous interviews, case studies and analyses (e.g. Costantini 2020; Masullo 2015; Vüllers and Krtsch 2020). As some of them are related to battle casualties and indiscriminate violence affecting civilians, in the case of the Nepalese Civil War, the present study showed this relationship also for discriminate violence. This might explain why we regularly find examples of nonviolent action within different parts of civil war countries also far away from the current battles between the state and the rebels.

Of course there are several limitations of the findings to consider. A first limitation of this research is how the data were structured for the analyses. Having aggregated the data to 96 civil war months and 75 districts implied that there were months in the spatial panel regression analysis in which there was neither civil war violence nor nonviolent activities in a certain district. But because of the event-related nature of the datasets used, zero observations cannot be equated with missing data, but very likely stand for the non-occurrence of incidents of violence or nonviolent activities. In contrast to a ‘sampling’ of incidents of violence and nonviolent activities, the datasets used more closely resemble a full survey. Both PANC and the violence data from INSEC are fine-grained down to a single-person nonviolent activity or violence event and encompass all reported incidents of violence and nonviolent activities during the civil war. If no violence or nonviolent activity was reported in a certain month and district, it is relatively likely that there actually was none. Therefore, zero observations should be less of a problem for the spatial panel regression analysis. However, to lessen concerns of zeros in the dataset, a year-wise data
aggregation - without zeros - delivered similar results as the models with months-wise aggregation.

A second limitation is the correspondence of nonviolent activities within the PANC dataset to actual civil war violence. All political activities which were directed at a conflict faction were used in this analysis. It is theoretically possible that civilians used nonviolent activities not necessarily because of the violence but because of other variables not included in the present study (although several time-invariant demographic and structural variables were controlled for). For example even when civilians start to organize protest as direct results of the violence, after a week the same protest group could incorporate various further, additional goals into their nonviolent activities, e.g., safe areas, compensation for losses or changes in the command structure of armed factions. Nevertheless, during a civil war, direct violence should serve as a crucial part of a trigger complex which motivated citizens in the first place. Thus, subsequent research could look into micro foundations of decision processes by civilians to choose nonviolence over violent reactions.

Of course there exist other events and time-points in the civil war which could have affected nonviolent activities, but are not necessarily war-related. National elections for example are such an event where a spike of nonviolent activities is expected because of an opportunity of higher possible influence on electoral candidates. Nevertheless, civil war violence should have also affected those nonviolent activities, as it has proven to be a significant overall predictor throughout the analyses. Further, the fixed effects models accounted for district and time differences in mean levels of nonviolent actions, as they included own intercepts for the districts and months/years of the civil war. Therefore it is possible to account for nonviolent focus points, like the capital district Kathmandu.

Although this study’s investigation is based only on a single civil war, violence is more or less present in all civil wars and could of course trigger similar nonviolent activities also in other cases. The Nepalese Civil War featured an armed insurgency which received a lot of popular support as a result of various economic grievances that overlapped with ethnic tensions. From this perspective, as a grievances-fueled civil war, the civil war in Nepal is not dissimilar from similar revolutionary insurgencies in other parts of the world (Joshi and Quinn 2017). Nevertheless, if the focus is to compare the situation in Nepal to other civil wars, the royal government as well as the Maoist insurgency in Nepal in general were dependent on the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population to win the war, so their behavior towards activists might be different for example in comparison to some greed-motivated armed factions where civilians are mainly used as a tool for example to extort natural resources. Under such situations, there might be a different risk calculation underlying civilians’ decision to use nonviolent action but this in turn might not imply that the connection between violence and nonviolent action is non-existent. It could instead imply that there are less nonviolent action events, or that conflict factions reacted overall
more violently.

As this study shows, civil war atrocities against civilians can be a trigger factor for them to not only flee or fight back traditionally, but also to choose nonviolent action as a response. What was described for single communities and campaigns (Masullo 2015 Hallward, Masullo, and Mouly 2017) is also true on the nonviolent event level throughout a whole civil war. As Vüllers and Krtsch 2020 have hinted towards a relation between combat fighting and nonviolent action, this study found that this is true also for the case of direct violence towards civilians.

While this study underscores the role of direct civil war violence as a crucial motivational factor behind nonviolent activities in civil war, there is still a lot of information missing regarding the actual decision-making of citizens choosing nonviolent activism over for example armed resistance or institutionalized paths of political contention. Many of the stated assumptions regarding options an decisions of civilians are very hard to test on the event level during civil wars due to a lack of data for every time-point or activist group. Data on the availability and accessibility of institutionalized paths of contention assumed, future research could go into the direction to compare the different options including nonviolent action. Also further civil war dynamics, like armed faction dynamics and behavior in an area, could theoretically play a role in the occurrence of nonviolent activity and deserve more scientific attention.

Overall, nonviolent activity always bears a risk-and-reward topic for citizens in civil wars. Speaking out and resisting armed groups after civil war violence could imply being the next target, but as examples have shown it could also lead to an end of the violence or improved conditions for the activists (e.g. Masullo 2015). The positive effect of nonviolent action is especially true if the other option is armed resistance, which is less effective and known to produce more civilian casualties (e.g. Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).

To illustrate this, in the Nepalese Civil War, it was not only the armed Maoist insurgency which forced the monarchy to step down and reinstate democracy. It was at the end to a large extent also an unarmed national uprising by civil society groups and major political parties. They flooded the streets of Nepal’s cities in 2005 with nonviolent activities and forced the King to give up legislative power for a ceremonial status (Hutt 2004). According to Hallward et al. (2017), this serves as an example where a civil resistance movement even persuaded an insurgent group to join it and opt for nonviolent resistance instead of armed revolution (Hallward, Masullo, and Mouly 2017).

Keeping the difficult civilian decision in mind in how to respond to civil war violence, the international community as well as civil society organizations could point out the effectiveness of nonviolent activism as a peaceful form of resistance, to those populations which are or were recent victims of civil war violence.
5.7 Appendix / Materials

5.7.1 Other Weight Matrices

The current analysis used a distance-based weight matrix (i.e., distance between the centroids of spatial units). But also contiguity-based weight matrices were tested (i.e., Queen, Rook) taking into account the common borders of spatial units. The results did not differ from the results reported above.

5.7.2 Additional Information on the Control Variables of the Pooling and Random Effects Models

Population: absolute population in the districts.

Disadvantaged Groups: Percentage of Educationally Disadvantaged Population: Educationally disadvantaged (ethnic) population as a percentage of total population. In the present study, educationally disadvantaged groups in a particular district were assumed to be those caste/ethnic groups among the 103 in Nepal, whose literacy rates were below or equal to 30 percent in that district. In 2001, the educationally disadvantaged groups defined in this way accounted for 2.71 million individuals which is 11.92 percent of the (enumerated) national population.

Infrastructure Development ROAD: Road Density: Sum of all categories of road as a percentage of total surface area (in km per 100 km²)

Wealth: Per Capita Regular Budget Expenditure: Total regular budget expenditure in Nepalese Rupees divided by total population.
6 Beating the Empty Hand: Violent Reaction to Nonviolent Actions during the Nepalese Civil War

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6.1 Abstract

During civil wars the reaction towards nonviolent action differs. In some cases states react violently towards nonviolent action which can have devastating effects on activists. What is still lacking are reliable predictors of violent state reaction to nonviolent activism during civil wars going beyond case-by-case discussions. Knowing what particularities of groups, behavior, or tactics trigger a violent state reaction would allow activists to anticipate a violent reaction or choose a different tactic. During a civil war, states might use violence against groups which appear close to the rebel insurgency or groups which use tactics that disrupt the daily life and therefore the credibility of the state. This paper uses a generalized linear mixed model and a geographically weighted regression analysis to test different predictors of violent state reaction towards nonviolent activism to explain what organizational and tactical particularities increased the likelihood of a violent state reaction during the Nepalese Civil War. The paper utilized a new dataset on nonviolent action on the event level from the Nepalese Civil War. Results showed that nonviolent tactics which disturb the daily life as well as violent interactions between activists and the state significantly increased the likelihood of a violent reaction by the regime. Implications for future nonviolent actions during civil war are discussed.
6.2 Introduction

Whether women are marching against the Islamic State in Syria or communities are establishing safe spaces via non-cooperation in Colombia (e.g. Kahf 2020; Masullo 2015), more and more recent examples have shown that nonviolent actions can be successfully facilitated in the harsh environment of civil wars (Kaplan 2017). Unfortunately and similar to nonviolent action during times of peace, they can face a repressive reaction of the state in an effort to quell the nonviolent resistance (e.g. Demirel-Pegg and Rasler 2020; Yassan 2020). We know that nonviolent action does not happen in isolation, but is rather an interaction process between various actors (Tarrow, Tilly, and McAdam 2001). Thereby, a central predictor of how nonviolent groups and their campaigns evolve is external reaction and perception. Whether and how a nonviolent action is perceived by possible supporters and the general public depends also to a large extent on the reaction of the regime. If the regime reacts violently towards activists, this can crucially influence whether an activist group will use nonviolent action in the future. As for example stated by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), violent repression of unarmed protesters can intimidate participants, destroy activist organizations, and hinder mobilization for future nonviolent actions (e.g. Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). There exist cases, for example outlined by Sutton and colleagues, where violent reactions to unarmed activists fueled the resistance, ultimately even leading to the downfall of a regime (e.g. Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson 2014). But this clearly is not always the case. There exist numerous examples where regimes deliberately and successfully destroyed activist groups to quell their protests (e.g. Davenport 2014a; Demirel-Pegg and Rasler 2020). When protests are crushed in their early stages, this may prevent activists from raising attention, which might be one reason why today, a large part of research is still focused on the successful examples of nonviolent action (Davies 2014) - those nonviolent actions which grew and became massive nonviolent campaigns. Instead, much less is known about the cases where nonviolent action fails to gain momentum and gather massive support (e.g. Davenport 2014a). A harsh state reaction might often have been a cause for that. The question why and when exactly a regime relies on violence against nonviolent action is still broadly debated (Ellefsen 2021; Hess and Martin 2006; Linden and Klandermans 2006; L. Wood 2007). But often these debates of violent repression remain on the single activist group or movement level. Indeed, when repression is mentioned as a response to nonviolent action, then often for a single activist group or campaign (e.g. Masullo 2015). Indeed, if war-affected communities and activist groups face violent repression by the state during a civil war, these cases are mainly observed in isolation, not encompassing spatial variation, meaning possible similar nonviolent actions by other groups in other parts of the country, which may have received a different reaction by the state for various unknown reasons. What is missing is a thorough investigation of all nonviolent action events during a civil war, outlining
which of them received a violent state reaction and which did not. To close this gap, this paper tries to answer the question which particularities of activist groups and their behavior during nonviolent action events triggers a violent state response. When the state is contested by an internal challenger like a rebel insurgency, this might shape how a regime reacts towards nonviolent actions. The regime might perceive activist groups which share similar political standpoints, goals, or ideologies as the rebels as a threat (Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer 2021). This could influence a regime’s reaction towards nonviolent activists, even if they perform their actions in the streets unarmed and in nonviolent ways. Additionally, also the tactical decision of activists might be important for a violent state response. Different nonviolent tactics inhibit the daily life to various degrees. If during the civil war the state is already challenged by a rebel insurgency, it could try to limit dissent from activists which use tactics that severely hinder the daily life or attack a state’s credibility. Size and consistency of nonviolent events might also play a role.

In an effort to contribute to the emerging study of nonviolent action during civil wars, the current paper offers an investigation of all cases of nonviolent action and violent state reaction to nonviolent activism during a civil war. This paper uses a new, innovative dataset on nonviolent activism coded on the event level, encompassing over 5,000 cases of nonviolent action during the Nepalese Civil War. Results showed that certain nonviolent tactics, as well as group and organizational particularities were predictors for the state to react more violently. These results have implications for future efforts to use nonviolent tactics during such conflicts, underscoring the important role of civilians during civil wars. To predict regime violence during a civil war, it is crucial for activists to understand under which circumstances regimes use violence as a reaction to nonviolent action. Future efforts could anticipate a violent state reaction and try to choose tactics and behaviors accordingly to avoid it or at least assure proper documentation and preparation.

6.3 Theory

6.3.1 Previous Research on Regime Repression against Nonviolent Action

Nonviolent tactics can be seen not only as isolated political statements, for example about civil rights, but also as a form of dynamic interaction between the groups that facilitate nonviolent action and the groups that are competing and are addressed by them (McAdam and Tarrow 2000; Tarrow, Tilly, and McAdam 2001). One major recipient of nonviolent action is of course the state as the major holder of power or the regime in a more authoritarian form of government. The different actors influence each other in their actions, as the state wants to react to nonviolent actions according to own goals and strategies, similar to the activists (Tarrow, Tilly, and McAdam 2001). Often these strategies also include forms of repression by the state, whether directly administered during nonviolent events for example in terms of arrests and/or use of violence against activists, or indirectly
by harassing members of activist groups before or after the nonviolent events (e.g. Carey 2010; Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017; Hess and Martin 2006). Tilly for example quite broadly defines state repression as actions that overall increase the costs of protest (Tilly 1978). Davenport more narrowly argues it deals with applications of state power that violate First Amendment–type rights of own citizens and mostly tangles personal integrity or security (Davenport 2007). Such forms of repressive interactions can have consequences for current and future nonviolent actions by those groups and other groups planning to use nonviolent tactics. In the academic literature, repression against nonviolent action by the state was studied intensively. Studies are known where violent crackdowns of largely nonviolent protests led to greater mobilization and in some cases even to the toppling of the regime they were struggling against (e.g. Davenport, Johnston, and Mueller 2005; Martin, Varney, and Vickers 2001). Sharp and Finkelstein early labeled the effect of regimes loosing support due to violence against nonviolent campaigns as a political jiu-jitsu effect and a strategy of nonviolent action (Sharp and Finkelstein 1973). The name is related to the Japanese martial arts technique where unarmed techniques are used to defeat armed opponents, while directing their attack energy against them. Francisco (1995) described a so-called ‘backfire’ mobilization which contributes to previously not involved parts of the population becoming aware of nonviolent events particularly because of the violent repression (Francisco 1995). Repressive actions, for example against unarmed, peaceful protests, which are perceived as unjust by the population can have the potential to generate enormous public outrage against those seen as responsible (Hess and Martin 2006). In such cases, repressive events inhabit the possibility to transform nonviolent campaigns into massive nonviolent uprisings (ibid.). Subsequently, people become motivated to join a nonviolent campaign or to initiate similar nonviolent actions. National and international supporters of the state might be dissatisfied with violence against unarmed civilians and members of security forces might even desert their ranks because of it (Nepstad 2013). Popular examples are some of the ‘Arab Spring’ protests which experienced massive growth after the government used vast, indiscriminate violence against protesters (e.g. Kurtz and Smithey 2018; Pearlman 2013). Other cases where ‘jiu-jitsu’ effects played a role are the Indonesian anti-communist massacres from 1965 to 1966 and repression in East Timor, two cases where nonviolent resistance was less visible and less effective before violent repression occurred (Martin, Varney, and Vickers 2001). However, nonviolent campaigns gaining more momentum is not the only reason why violent repression can backfire. According to Nepstad, violence against own citizens can alienate internal as well as external supporters of a regime. Previous supporters may switch sides, and possible subsequent defections of army or security forces may contribute to a regime’s downfall (e.g. Nepstad 2011a, 2013). Although the examples outlined above paint violent regime reaction as somehow positive for overall nonviolent action, this effect is anything but deterministic. Not only are the direct victims of the violence to consider, namely the participants of nonviolent
events and activist group leaders which get beaten, jailed, mutilated, or killed and on which a group organizing nonviolence can no longer rely on in the future (e.g. Yassan 2020). But beside that, there exist numerous examples where a regime was able to quell nonviolent resistance using violent repression (e.g. Davenport 2014b; Demirel-Pegg and Rasler 2020; Sullivan 2016). Overall, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) find that violent repression decreases the likelihood of success for nonviolent campaigns by nearly 35 percent (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Although this finding is related to nonviolent campaigns, a series of nonviolent events, the mechanisms are transferable to the single nonviolent event as well, as it intimidates participants, removes central figures, and raises the costs for future participation.

Thus it is not only the number of repressive actions an activist group might receive which is critical for its future. Davenport (2014) outlined how a single repressive event can bring destructive consequences for a social movement organization (Davenport 2014b). Violent actions against activist groups can exacerbate internal tensions contributing to their decline (ibid.). After violent incidents with the state, some participants might stop their engagement with the group due to personal risks, others might be attracted to join because of the violence and are willing to retaliate violence with violence, disrupting the member structure (e.g. Davenport 2014b). Especially at an early, vulnerable stage where activist groups are young and maybe not able to attract many followers, where leadership and goal structures are fluid, violent repression can cause tensions within movements, ultimately leading to their end.

But of course also systematic, long-term repression can bring disruptive results for activists, as Sullivan (2016) has shown with the help of documents from the Guatemalan police archives outlining how activists were strategically harassed (Sullivan 2016). Another recent case study from the Gezi-Park protest in Turkey illustrates how the Erdogan government confronted the protesting dissidents repeatedly with repressive strategies of arrest and detention targeting activist group leaders and protest participants alike (Demirel-Pegg and Rasler 2020). In doing so, the state was able to significantly decrease the overall rate of nonviolent protest actions, in the long run quelling nonviolent resistance in the Gezi-Park (ibid.). On a larger scale, Bramsen (2019) investigated the micro-sociological dynamics of how, despite great numbers and momentum, the Arab Spring uprising in Bahrain was successfully repressed by its regime (Bramsen 2019). She concluded that some forms of repression make people gather in solidarity and outrage, energizing further counter-action, whereas other forms of repression involving torture, imprisonment, and injuring, but no visible, lethal violence, can choke a protest movement (ibid.). She further emphasizes that having large numbers of activists during nonviolent action is no guarantee that nonviolent activism receives less repression. Girod, Stewart and Walters (2018) hint in the direction that the effectiveness of repression in quelling protests varies depending on the income
sources of regimes. Oil-rich autocracies for example are able to withstand domestic and international criticism more easily, and this gives them a greater capacity to quell protests with the help of violence (Girod, Stewart, and Walters 2018).

6.3.2 Violent Repression of Nonviolent Action during Civil Wars

As described in the previous section, there exist detailed examples of cases where regimes reacted with violent repression towards nonviolent actions and activist organization, and subsequent effects repression had in terms of development of nonviolent activism. But a central problem is that there exist different case-dependent assumptions regarding structure, agency, and strategic choice in each case which make it unclear if and when regimes successfully deter nonviolent dissent, and specifically under which conditions repression intensifies (Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017). In addition, most case studies concerning repression of nonviolent action mostly stem from self-determination disputes in autocracies or nonviolent action within democracies in times of peace. The civil war context is still underrepresented in studies of repression of nonviolent action. However, it is known that civil nonviolent action as well as repression appears more than just sporadically in civil wars (e.g. Chenoweth, Hendrix, and Hunter 2019a; Hallward, Masullo, and Mouly 2017; Leventoglu and Metternich 2018). Further, nonviolent actions might not start as massive nonviolent uprisings but rather as local, small scale forms of non-cooperation or protest, and if we just observe the final massive stages of protest, we miss the beginnings and possible mechanisms to explain the performance and development of nonviolent action. This lack of knowledge is particularly problematic concerning the positive aspects of nonviolent resistance in terms or civil war development or duration (e.g. Chenoweth, Hendrix, and Hunter 2019a).

6.3.3 A Focus on the Nonviolent Event Level

Overall, what is lacking in the debate on repression of nonviolent activism during civil wars are reliable predictors of violent state repression which are not exclusive to a single activist group or campaign. Nonviolent campaigns fighting for a common cause during a civil war are at a closer look no homogeneous entity, but consist of different groups that might use different tactics at different places and times (e.g. Routledge 2010; Tarrow 2011; Tilly and Tarrow 2015). Indeed, they may consist of different factions, with internal divisions regarding organization, strategy, ideology, and/or the adoption of radical flanks or direct violent mobilization (Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017). Thus, the focus on when a state uses violence on the campaign level might obscure what particular tactic, which radical flank or organizational pattern might trigger violent state reaction. Breaking up the black box of the single case or campaign during civil wars might shed light on the question when exactly the state decides to use nonviolent tactics. Therefore, a major
The contribution of this paper is to focus on the event level of nonviolent action and how the state reacts to it. This might outline if tactical choices and changes, visibility of the nonviolent event, behavior of the activists, or violent interactions between activists and the regime might play a role for whether violent repression is used by a regime. Consequently, this paper investigates under which organizational and tactical particularities the regime reacts violently to nonviolent action during a civil war. To answer these questions we rely on new event-based data of political nonviolent activities.

6.3.4 Theoretical Reasons for Regime Repression of Nonviolent Activism during Civil Wars

States have to weigh the costs and benefits of repression, often comparing their own strengths with the perceived threat to their leadership (Poe 2019). Dealing with activism, repression aims to convince activists that the costs of continued dissent are high, it deters other parts of the population from joining the activists’ cause, and possibly convinces segments of the own security apparatus that the government is taking a strict approach (Lichbach 1987). Within a civil war, this might be more than ever critical to a regime’s power position, as the government is already openly contested by an ongoing armed insurgency. In such a situation, the state might no longer be the sole provider of services and security and the rebels try to make their own offers towards civilians (e.g. Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Tarrow 2011). For the state, every decision to use violence against the civil population bears risks and benefits according to own supporters and support of the insurgency. A benefit could be the possible intimidation of an activist group which may result in less future nonviolent events or intimidate similar activist groups. Another benefit to use violence could be the perception among own supporters that the state is capable to uphold law and order in a situation where it is contested by an armed insurgency. A risk of state-induced violence against activists could be a subsequent radicalization of those (e.g. Ellefsen 2021; Ives and Lewis 2020). During a civil war, the costs of radicalization for the activists are relatively low. An armed insurgency already exists and possibly is actively trying to attract new members. Escalating violence against activists could therefore result in peaceful activists taking up arms and in the end bolster rebel recruitment. In addition, a state has to fear to loose support amongst moderate officials as well as national and international supporters, who maybe do not endorse the use of violence against unarmed civilians. In the worst case this can lead to defections among military and security forces, which can lead to a regime’s downfall (e.g. Nepstad 2013). To prevent this, a state will therefore estimate whether the use of violent repression against activists is in his benefit depending on the situation. This may depend on the kind of activist groups which are involved but also how the nonviolent event progresses, meaning which tactics the activists use and their behavior.
For the activists, nonviolent events serve as a strategy outside conventional political channels like for example institutionalized forms of citizen participation like elections and lobbying (McAdam and Tarrow 2000). They can be legal as well as illegal, according to the political system they are conducted in. Although theoretically the state can decide to respond with violence towards every single nonviolent event, in practice this is not the case and a state chooses his reaction carefully for every nonviolent event. But there are several factors and situations which favor a state’s decision to use violence against activists during civil wars. First, a violent state reaction is more likely if the nonviolent action is not allowed in the current political setting. A violent behavior by activists of course here comes to mind, for example the destruction of property, which is generally less tolerated and is often the reason for a violent state reaction towards activists (e.g. Ives and Lewis 2020). But in general, nonviolent events to a certain degree interfere with the daily life and general functioning of the state according to the respective tactic (Huff and Kruszewska 2016). If nonviolent tactics disturb the daily life, by paralyzing infrastructure or crippling major industries, this severely challenges the legitimacy of the state. During a civil war, when a state is contested by an armed insurgency, such a situation might become harder to bear compared to the state of peace. A violent reaction might here serve as a effort to retain control and show an image of strength and order. This effort of the state might go hand in hand with an effort of the armed insurgency to undermine the state’s credibility, for example by supporting protest events on the streets (Leventoğlu and Metternich 2018).

Further, if the state recognizes that certain nonviolent events grow in group size and represent broader parts of the population, this could be interpreted as a higher threat. Indeed popular activism, which is transported by larger parts of the population, can serve as a screening device to inform the insurgency about the strength of the incumbent regime (e.g. Leventoğlu and Metternich 2018; Pierskalla 2010). Such nonviolent events could more likely lead to a higher willingness of the state to react violently in an effort to deter further activism and try to stop the activist groups from growing, compared to a nonviolent event which is stated by a single group.

Second, during nonviolent events, activists but also the insurgents would certainly try to monitor and document every reaction of the state and of course use a violent state reaction against unarmed civilians for their own propaganda efforts. For the rebels the incentive is to present themselves as an alternative to the state and to bolster own recruitment efforts (Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015). Consequently, if the violent repression towards activists is visible to a broader population, this might be important for a subsequent outrage and a possible rise in activism and perhaps also rebel support. If the state wants to prevent this, it could try to limit visibility of own violence incidents, or alternatively use violence during nonviolent events where a documentation of it is less likely.
Third, a weakened position of power due to the civil war might already have caused defections and a certain part of the population may be keen to take the side of the insurgents. Consequently, the strategic decisions of regimes to use violence at activist events might include third parties like the military or hard-liner factions inside the government and security forces (Pierskalla 2010). Repression and escalating violence against activists can result from the state’s desire to appear tough in the perception of these (ibid.). This mechanism could be emphasized if the government is contested nonviolently on the streets by activist groups which have closer ideological ties to the insurgency. For a state an incentive could be to prevent the spread of the armed insurgency towards the civil society on the streets in order to prevent a situation where parts of the population get involved, fighting for the same ideologies and goals that the insurgency is already trying to achieve in an armed uprising (Leventoğlu and Metternich 2018). For a state, activist groups that share such similarities could therefore be more likely a target of violent repression. Activist groups with general ideological ties to the rebel insurgency might more likely spawn a harsher, possibly also more violent reaction of the state than groups which are closer to the state’s own ideological and political standpoint.

6.3.5 Expectations

For the event-based analysis, I relied on specific direct state responses to every single nonviolent event, respectively if violent forms of repression against activists were used. This serves as the most logical application for a measurement of nonviolent repression, as repression can be directly attributed to the state if it is administered by the police or security forces during the nonviolent event. In addition, particularities of the nonviolent tactic can be considered. If activists get repressed outside nonviolent events, there exist numerous possibilities of the state to obscure direct attribution for example in using hired thugs. Further, if an activist group uses different nonviolent tactics within a short time, it would be no longer possible to argue for a certain tactic to have resulted in a violent regime reaction if repression outside nonviolent events is used as measurement.

Consequently, the dependent variable in the current research is based on direct violent responses to nonviolent events by state police and security forces acting as an executive agent of the state. Concerning predictors of violent state reactions against nonviolent action, the following expectations are tested. To rely on the fact that state violence might be attributed to organizational as well as tactical considerations of nonviolent events, the expectations were divided according to these dimensions. It is expected that this violence by the state varies during a civil war according to different tactical and organizational choices and attributes of the activist groups which perform the nonviolent act.
Organization/Group-based Predictors of Regime Violence   The first expectation deals with the fact that regimes might target activities more violently by groups which have a higher ideological threat potential for the state. Those are groups which are ideologically close to the rebel insurgency. For the state, being close to his armed challenger during a civil war could be a trigger for a violent state reaction. A state could more likely target such groups that share the same ideological standpoints as the rebels. During a civil war, hatred because of ideological differences and pressure to look tough in the eye of hard-line factions could additionally limit inhibitions to use violence against such enemy groups (e.g. Pierskalla 2010). In addition, from those groups future political cooperation is the least likely, thus violent repression is unlikely to inhibit a possible future relationship.

Expectation 1: Regime violence is more likely used against nonviolent activities by groups which have a higher ideological threat potential against the regime.

The second expectation focuses on the higher threat potential of nonviolent actions for a regime if more than one part of a population is facilitating a nonviolent action together. Larger events are more likely able to confront the status quo and induce defections separating the regime from its major pillars of support (Chenoweth 2020). Further, movements showing diversity and growing in size are more likely to succeed, particularly if they are able to maintain momentum in threatening the regime (ibid.). In addition, if more than one group acts together this might indicate to the regime that the groups facilitating a nonviolent event are able to attract further parts of the population (Wang and Soule 2012). For a regime during a civil war this can be an indicator that the dissent on the streets spreads to larger parts of the population which is a also a goal of the rebel insurgency (Leventoğlu and Metternich 2018). Armed rebel organizations need to trigger widespread anti-government behavior to reach a favorable settlement with the government (ibid.). For instance, a nonviolent event mobilized by a coalition of different political parties and unions might be a higher threat than an event mobilized by only a single refugee group.

Expectation 2: Regime violence is more likely used against nonviolent activities which are organized by multiple groups.

The third expectation addresses the fear of a regime of backlash or ‘jiu-jitsu’ effects to a violent reaction by the regime (Martin, Varney, and Vickers 2001). Activists must communicate government brutality to potential participants in an environment where state media will suppress the release of information or claim that violence was used by the regime in self-defence (Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson 2014). Media institutions enable activists to communicate the repressive incident to potential allies and supporters but also to the international community. During a civil war, a national or international backlash due to state violence could be devastating to the regime while at the same time attracting...
sympathy for the ongoing rebel insurgency. Consequently, if a nonviolent activity is supported by journalists or similar media personnel on the ground, the regime might be less willing to use violence against it because of a higher risk of media backlash. States have a motivation to hide their connection to the violence or even killing of journalists (Gohdes and Carey 2017). The same might be true if activists are accompanied by nongovernmental organizations which have international ties and high capabilities to communicate violence. Such nonviolent events are considered to be highly visible.

*Expectation 3: Regime violence is less likely used against nonviolent activities when visibility is high.*

**Activity-based Predictors of Regime Violence** The fourth expectation addresses tactical considerations. Tactical choice of nonviolent action might be a response to changes external to movements, or shifts in political authority, or due to internal processes such as the characteristics of movement organizations and actors (Wang and Soule 2012, 2016). Overall, a regime is expected to react more violently if nonviolent activities disrupt the daily life (e.g. Huff and Kruszewska 2016; Ives and Lewis 2020; Jaskoski, Wilson, and Lazareno 2017). For example, techniques of noncooperation, such as general strikes, can be much more disruptive to economic life and thus elicit more immediate concessions (Chenoweth 2020). If the public life is severely affected and perhaps limited due to nonviolent activities, this might undermine a regime’s position of power, especially if it is already challenged by an internal armed challenger. It might turn pressure groups and supporters against the regime and might induce a violent regime reaction. For instance, if activists enforce the lockdown of economic centers or even whole cities, interest groups loosing revenue will put pressure on the government to reopen businesses. In such a situation, state officials might lose inhibitions to use violence against activists, even if they are unarmed. The same mechanism might occur for closed-down educational institutions, picketing of administrative offices, or burning down tires in the streets causing a traffic jams.

*Expectation 4: Regime violence is more likely used against nonviolent activities which disturb the public order.*

The final, fifth expectation focuses on a possible violent interaction between activists and the regime. Violence is not a one-way street. Violent incidents by activists, for example throwing stones at the police, tends to increase violent repression against participants and sympathizers while at the same time making it harder for the activists to paint participants as innocent victims of this brutality (Chenoweth 2020). Indeed as for example Nassauer (2016) has shown, in some cases, civil resistance movements began nonviolently but then shifted towards violence (Nassauer 2016). This does not always happen intentionally but for instance might be a result of a crackdown forcing protesters to fight back violently due to a lack of training, discipline, or strong leadership (Pearlman 2012). It might also be the
result of activists’ frustration with few concessions by the state and a generally slow pace of change (Maney 2012). Moreover, there are cases where regimes have even infiltrated movements to provoke them into adopting violence at the margins during nonviolent actions, thereby giving the regime justification for using repressive tactics (Chenoweth 2020). Whatever the cause of the violence, it is expected that the regime retaliates with violence, if violence is used by activists.

*Expectation 5: Regime violence is more likely used if nonviolent activists themselves show violent behavior.*

### 6.3.6 Case Selection: The Nepalese Civil War

The analysis is based on a revolutionary civil war, where the insurgency wants to conquer the whole country and tries to overthrow the incumbent government, instead of a secessionist conflict. This was decided to make sure that the war step-by-step affects the entire country and is not limited to the area where the insurgency wants to secede from the nation state (e.g. Cederman and Vogt 2017; Mason and Mitchell 2016). This was necessary to avoid possible biases of state reaction towards nonviolent action between the area which the insurgency wants to claim for their own nation and the rest of the country. It was further decided to look for a civil war which is based on grievances instead of greed-based factors (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Thies 2010). This is also due to the fact that greed-based civil wars sometimes center around resource-rich areas, intensifying the civil war in one location producing possibly the same biases concerning state reaction to nonviolent action.

For robust results of the desired quantitative analysis, it was further necessary to choose a civil war which showed a relatively large quantity of nonviolent events for the state to react to. It was therefore searched for civil wars where previous studies had already hinted to large numbers of nonviolent action during the war.

All these criteria fit to the Nepalese Civil War. The civil war took place between the Maoist Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-Maoist) and the country’s Monarchy. The Maoists started their revolutionary insurgency aiming to overthrow the constitutional monarchy in favor of their proclaimed ‘People’s Republic’. After several failed attempts to reach negotiations between the conflict parties, the ten-year civil war has lead to the death of more than 13,000 people in addition to a vast destruction of property, displacement of citizens, and vast human rights abuses (Lawoti 2010; Pettigrew 2013). This civil war was selected for the following reasons. First, compared to other civil wars with a shorter duration, the ten-year duration created opportunities for development of nonviolent events and subsequent possible violent state reaction which would not be possible to observe in shorter civil wars. Second, this long duration resulted in a relatively large amount of cases necessary for robust results in respect to the quantitative analyses. In addition, case studies revealed that large amounts of nonviolent action events occurred during this civil war which
were not limited to certain areas or time-frames during the conflict (e.g. Routledge 2010). Third, the civil war in Nepal in contrast to other civil wars was not restricted to certain isolated areas of the country. Although it started in rural, less developed parts of the country, it step-by-step spread throughout the whole nation affecting all Nepalese districts after 2001 (Hutt 2004). This implies that nonviolent action events and subsequent violent state reaction can be observed for several years across the entire country and not only in isolated urban centers or limited to certain large political campaigns which themselves probably would make broad generalizations of the results difficult. Therefore, conclusions for the whole country and civil war can be made. Fourth, the highly disaggregated dataset for this war concerning nonviolent action and state reactions on the event level makes detailed statements about the relation between variables possible. This unfortunately is not yet the case for most civil wars. The dataset includes all the various small local nonviolent events which occurred throughout the country and even outside large nonviolent campaigns. Of course those nonviolent events might also produce a violent state reaction, which would not be possible to investigate in a dataset for example limited to large nonviolent campaigns in urban centers of other conflicts. Fifth, the Nepalese Civil War was an identity-driven conflict influenced by economic, developmental, and inequality-related factors, which was not different from similar violent conflicts in the Philippines, Yemen, or Colombia, as well as many civil wars in Africa (Joshi and Quinn 2017). Therefore findings from this civil war are not too exotic to be compared to similar conflicts across the globe.

6.4 Methods

6.4.1 PANC - A new Dataset on Nonviolent Action

The dataset used in this paper is a disaggregated, country-specific dataset containing detailed information about political nonviolent action events throughout the Nepalese Civil War. The PANC dataset contains all political nonviolent activities during the Nepalese Civil War, for this investigation providing over five thousand cases of nonviolent action of which about one fifth received violent repression by the regime. It provides detailed information on actors, tactics, time, and location - and important for this paper - whether violence was used by activists or used as a form of repression by the regime. All this information is available for every single nonviolent action reported by the newspapers between 1999 and 2006 in Nepal. Data coding started for the year of 1999 because the Maoist insurgency until 1999 was mostly limited to several small-scale attacks on police stations in only three of the 75 Nepalese districts (Thapa and Sijapati 2004). The dataset is hand-coded mostly by myself based on articles published in English-speaking Nepalese newspapers. It here was important to choose newspapers which reported for the complete duration of the civil war, were able to cover the entire country, and provided access to
their data. Investigations showed that the 'Kathmandu Post' and the 'Rising Nepal' fit these criteria. To make sure that the used newspapers reported the same amount of events, a mark- and recapture analysis was conducted for the first coded year of the civil war (Hendrix and Salehyan 2015). Results showed that event-detection capabilities of the two newspapers were about the same size. Therefore, due to time constraints for the remaining years of the civil war, only one newspaper (Rising Nepal) was used for coding.

From a single-person hunger strike to the massive street protest with hundreds or thousands of people, every reported incident is included and contains information about whether the regime reacted violently during the event or not. By using country-specific, English-language newspapers for this dataset, also small nonviolent actions could be included in this investigation. This is advantageous compared to international news agencies which might over-report on large or disruptive events while at the same time fail to report events which are too small and possibly unimportant for their international audience. This form of gathering information is certainly not perfect, as journalists in general have to resort to third parties for information gathering about nonviolent events. They might under-report certain events or report events with biased personal viewpoints and opinions. However, these concerns were addressed by using multiple newspapers to see if more or less the same events were reported. This was the case for the newspapers used in this dataset.

During the coding procedure, only events were included into the dataset which were performed publicly and which had an observable political motive in the respective newspaper articles describing the event. This was done to exclude non-political events which for example had religious motives or which occurred as celebrations after sports events. The public criterion assures that third parties like the state can react to the event. The events were coded for every day for which they were reported in a newspaper article. A protest or sit-in which occurred for five days at a certain location was entered five times in the dataset, as long as the newspaper mentioned it every day. By incorporating all cases of nonviolent action, the PANC dataset allows for the investigation of civil war political activism in unprecedented detail, and offers a valuable data source for future researchers interested in the study of nonviolent activism in Nepal. Besides the 5,470 cases included in this investigation, there exist further cases within PANC in which 'Maoists' were labeled as organizers or members of an event in the newspaper. There might exist a reporting bias within newspaper articles regarding whether members of the rebel faction itself or for example Maoist-affiliated students conducted the events. In some cases, other variables could provide a hint about the actual perpetrator but sometimes this was not possible. It was therefore conservatively decided not to included these additional cases into the analysis.
6.4.2 Variables

This chapter describes which variables were chosen from PANC and how they were coded for the following analyses. A general overview of the final coding is provided in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multi-group event</td>
<td>3,055</td>
<td>55.85</td>
<td>2,415</td>
<td>44.15</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visibility of violence</td>
<td>5,205</td>
<td>95.16</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political threat</td>
<td>3,593</td>
<td>64.70</td>
<td>1,877</td>
<td>34.31</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disturbance</td>
<td>1,636</td>
<td>29.91</td>
<td>2,258</td>
<td>41.28</td>
<td>1,576</td>
<td>28.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence by activists</td>
<td>4,494</td>
<td>82.16</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>12.87</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>4.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent regime reaction</td>
<td>4,449</td>
<td>81.33</td>
<td>1,021</td>
<td>18.67</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Regime Repression**  The dependent variable was violent repression of nonviolent action by the regime during a nonviolent event. This investigation relied on PANC and its coded information by news reports whether violence was inflicted during an event to activists by the police or the security forces of the regime. The PANC dataset in its original coding contains a variable describing the level of violence that was used by the regime for every single nonviolent event. Regime repression was coded 0 if no information on violence was present, 1 if police or security forces were present at an event, 2 if violence was used by those state forces, and 3 if the violence used was lethal. If violence was used against activists, it mostly took the forms of beatings, violently dissolving nonviolent action, and arrests of participants. Lethal violence during nonviolent action was the exception (e.g. Davenport 2007). For the analyses in the current research a binary variable was created which was coded 0 if security forces were just present and/or no violence was used, and 1 if any violence was used against the activists.

**Ideological Threat**  Ideological threat describes if an event was facilitated by organizations which were coded as close to the rebel organization and in radical ideological opposition of the state. They have a higher chance to become dangerous for the state, as they reside on the opposite political spectrum and threaten his position of power. The PANC dataset includes information about the participants and in some cases also the organizers of its nonviolent events. A possible problem here could be that groups might change their ideological and political standpoint in relation to the state and the rebels also during the conflict, according how the civil war develops and which side is likely to win. A state could change his reaction towards activism by these groups accordingly. Still this would
also be subject to debate and relatively impossible to estimate for every single nonviolent
group during the war. A binary coding was therefore chosen for this variable. During
the civil war, events which were categorized as ideological threat to the regime (coded as
1) were for example events organized or facilitated by one of the over 20 left or extreme
left-wing political parties (e.g. Hutt 2004). Most of them were opposing the King and his
government and had closer connections to the Maoist insurgency (e.g. Routledge 2010).
Further, organizations with close ties to the Maoist insurgency fit into those categories.
In contrast, nonviolent events for example facilitated by royalists, refugees, or general
activists were categorized as no ideological threat (0).

**Multi-group Events**  Events were categorized as multi-group events (1) when more
than one group came together for the action and otherwise as single-group events (0).
There exist reporting biases when the actual number of participating groups is used,
therefore a binary variable was computed for this indicator. Similar to the numbers of
participants, the actual number of groups within a nonviolent event is increasingly difficult
to estimate by journalists the larger the event and some groups might not be mentioned if
they are small. Additionally, the newspapers in many cases were not able to track down
the actual names of all participating groups. As a result, they reported for example a
nonviolent event stated by 'multiple human rights groups' or 'an alliance of several left
parties'. In such cases it would be difficult to estimate the actual number, thus a binary
variable seems more appropriate to avoid inaccurate estimates.

**Visibility of Violence**  Visibility accounts for the possible strategic decision to refrain
from using violence if a backlash might occur more likely, including a possible fear due to
the jiu-jitsu effect of nonviolent resistance, when for example journalists are able to report
and show pictures of violent repression of unarmed protesters and activists might gain
support among other parts of the population accordingly. During a civil war, the rebel
insurgency could try to frame such events to their advantage, and the state would perhaps
loose moderate external supporters. For the most parts of the population, but also the
international community, a central information regarding violence within nonviolent action
is the media (Bock 2012). Consequently a state would refrain from exerting violence more
likely if media personal is documenting the cases. Another possibility would be that the
presence of nongovernmental organizations during nonviolent events prevents the state
from reacting violently against activists, fearing an national and international backlash as
well as those organizations capability to distribute reports about violence. Respectively,
nonviolent events were categorized as highly visible (1) if journalists, media workers, or
NGOs participated, and otherwise as less visible (0).
Disturbance of the Public Order  The level of disturbance of the public order was categorized according to how much a nonviolent event disturbed the public order and therefore posed a higher threat of legitimacy to the regime. In this event-based investigation, a single event of nonviolent action can consist of multiple different nonviolent tactics. Tactics can even change during an event, in accordance with the behavior of the regime (e.g. Huff and Kruszewska 2016). For example, it could be the case that newspapers reported an event at which activists organized a demonstration at an administrative building, in front of which a sit-in occurred and barricades were constructed to block traffic. This would imply that the event had three different tactics, a demonstration, a sit-in, and blocking of roads. Overall, there exist hundreds of known tactics of nonviolent actions (e.g. Schock et al. 2015; Sharp and Finkelstein 1973). Naturally, the Nepalese Civil War is no exception in terms of variety of nonviolent action. There exist examples of hunger strikes, sit-ins, picketing of offices, street plays, and dramas. There were regular strikes, burning of effigies of politicians as well as every kind of procession, demonstration, or protest rally. Further examples are black band protests where participants wore black clothes like masks to show dissent, or silent, candle, or mourning processions, where mourning is the only sound which was heard.

Some nonviolent tactics even originated in Nepalese culture (Routledge 2010). Examples are ‘gheraoes’ which can be best described as picketing, where activists gathered and surrounded a certain place, trying to prevent certain individuals like officials from reaching it (De and Srivastava 1967). Another example were ‘bandhs’, a kind of general strike, where a certain area was brought to a complete standstill. There were ‘bandhs’ during the Nepalese Civil War where entire cities were locked down by activists. In such cases all educational institutions were closed, including markets and most private companies. Such an event has a very high effect on a regime’s economic and political credibility. For example, shutting down an economic center or even a city will put economic pressure on the regime to reopen businesses and appease angry businessmen and groups dependent on the facilities of daily life which remain closed. To a lesser degree the same is true for traffic jams due to barricades or preventing state officials from reaching their offices. Every event has a different threat potential in terms of disturbance regarding the functionality of a government and its credibility to being able to ensure a normal life for its citizens (e.g. Tarrow 2011).

For the Nepalese Civil War, there exist thousands of different combinations of tactics of nonviolent events of which all had to be categorized according to the disturbance factor they had to the daily life. Consequently, three categories were formed as a compromise between comparability of tactics and requirements for subsequent data analyses.

Events categorized as no disturbance of the public order (0) included nonviolent events like hunger strikes, silent processions, street dramas, sit-ins etc. Those are events which
disturb the public life the least, although they might be nonetheless impressive and can gather massive public attention if orchestrated efficiently. Still, they do not obstruct or challenge state functionality or legitimacy like tactics found in higher categories.

Events categorized as medium disturbance (1) were events like regular demonstrations, rallies, or protests. Those events might disturb the public life to a certain degree but are still bearable from the regime’s point of view.

Events categorized as high disturbance (2) include events encompassing general strikes like 'bandhs', where entire cities came to a standstill. Also coded as high disturbance were 'gheraos', picketing, the blockades of offices, burning of tires, or torch processions and similar disruptive events including fire. Those are disruptive as they are for example in the cases of 'bandhs' crippling local economies, possibly embarrassing a regime which is currently challenged by an armed insurgency. The same is true for 'gheraos' and similar forms of blockades, which have a higher desire to hinder the functioning of a state’s administrative infrastructure. They are posing a higher threat towards the state’s legitimacy than for example regular demonstrations, which in most cases are over after a couple of hours. Further, even if a demonstration takes place in front of an administrative building, it can still continue to function. A 'gherao', picketing, occupation etc. often tries to hinder officials from entering the place or building, preventing normal work within.

If one event consisted of different tactics which fit in more than one category, the event was attributed to the higher category. Consequently a 'bandh' at which also a sit-in took place was coded as 2.

Violence by Activists Violence by activists accounts for violent incidents among nonviolent events. Only if no violence was reported for an even it was categorized as 0, which was true for the vast majority of the events in PANC. If property damage was reported, like the destruction of windows or cars, the event was categorized as medium violence by activists (1). If personal damage occurred, like violent brawls with security forces, an event was categorized as high violence by activists (2).

6.4.3 District-Level Control Variables

There is also the possibility that the state reacted violently against nonviolent action in some parts of the country while not in others. To achieve a higher level of control for our analysis, another level of analysis was included for the 75 Nepalese districts which existed during the Nepalese Civil War. On this second analytical level data from a census in Nepal was used from 2001, a middle year of the civil war, to control for different socio-economic factors like ethnic cleavages among the population, wealth, or population density, which might have had a general, district-level effect on the likelihood of nonviolent
action occurrence and/or subsequent violent state reactions to those (Census Nepal 2001 2001). Unfortunately there exist only two time-frames during the war for which such data exists for all regions and districts of Nepal. The year of 2001 was the only time-point were data was available for all the desired control variables, so it was decided to use data from this year.

Wealth of districts could play a role in that the state might be reluctant to use violence against activists in richer districts. This could result out of a fear to loose the support of wealthy elites, if violence is used against such citizens. Ethnic tensions or cleavages among the population in certain districts could maybe implicate different state reactions towards nonviolent actions as well. The state could for example be more inclined to use violence in districts where a large portion of discriminated groups live. In case of state violence, the state would be less dependent on the support from groups which are already oppressed.

Population density was coded as the number of hundreds of persons per square kilometer in the districts. For ethnic cleavages the relative proportion of educationally disadvantaged ethnic groups in the population in the districts was used. For Wealth the personal budget expenditure in thousand Nepalese Rupees divided by the total population of a district was used.

6.5 Results

6.5.1 Descriptive Results

Table 4 displays frequencies for all event-level variables, Table 5 displays descriptive statistics and zero-order bivariate correlations between all variables. As can be seen in Table 4, there were almost as many nonviolent events conducted by single groups (56%) as events which were a common effort of more than one group (44%). In contrast, concerning visibility only at about 5 percent of events journalists, media workers, or NGO personnel was mentioned, indicating that overall, visibility of violence on nonviolent events during the Nepalese Civil War was relatively low.

Concerning political threat, 65% of events posed a high threat to the regime as they were facilitated by the political opposition, whereas for 34% of the events political threat was coded as low. Disturbance shows that medium disturbance, like regular demonstrations, constituted the major part of the nonviolent events during the civil war (41%). A high disturbance level like for example general strikes was coded in 29% of the cases, whereas low-level disturbance like hunger strikes occurred in about 30% of events.

Violence by activists shows that in most cases (82%) activists acted peacefully, whereas in 13% of events property was damaged (medium violence by activists) and police and
security forces were attacked in only 5% of cases (high violence by activists).

Finally, the regime reacted in 19% of cases violently to nonviolent action, while in the large majority of cases (81%) no regime violence was reported.

6.5.2 Correlations

As can see in Table 5, most of the predictor variables used in this paper were significantly and positively associated with regime violence. These positive correlations imply that all predictors except visibility are associated with regime violence to a certain extent. Also noticeable is that in most cases the correlations between the predictor variables were relatively low (< .20) (e.g. Cohen 1988). This indicates that the predictors mainly provide independent explanations for violent regime repression. However, the following predictors were highly correlated: multi-group events and political threat ($r = .71$) as well as wealth and population density ($r = .96$). The first correlation indicates that events that were in political opposition of the regime were to a large extent also conducted by more than one group. The latter correlation indicates that wealthy districts were also more densely populated. The fact that visibility of nonviolent events does not significantly correlate with regime violence can be explained by the overall low number of cases (5%) coded as highly visible.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Multi-group event</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Visibility</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Political threat</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Disturbance</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Violence by participants</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Regime reaction</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Cleavages (L2)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Wealth (L2)</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>8.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Population (L2) density</td>
<td>9.77</td>
<td>11.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: M and SD represent mean and standard deviation, respectively. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each correlation. Disturbance and violence by participants are coded multi-categorical (0, 1, 2), all other event-level variables are coded binary (0, 1). L2 = district-level variables. *p<0.5; **p<0.01
6.5.3 Generalized Linear Mixed Model

To account for the fact that nonviolent events (Level 1) were clustered in Nepalese districts (Level 2), a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) was computed with the R package lme4. The dependent variable was regime reaction (0 = no violence, 1 = violence). Predictors on the event-level were multi-group events, visibility, political threat, disturbance of political order, as well as violence by activists. The latter two predictors were coded as multi-categorical and were thus entered into the regression model with two dummy variables each. Additionally, a random intercept was included for the cluster variable of districts and the following Level-2 control variables were introduced to account for differences between districts: Cleavages between ethnic groups, wealth, and population density. There were 58 events which took place in more than one district, thus these cases were excluded from the analyses as they could not clearly be assigned to one Level-2 unit. Results are displayed in Table 6. The model explained significantly more variance in violent regime reaction compared to a null model without any predictors, Wald $\chi^2(10) = 879.27, p < .001$. Multi-group events did not significantly predict regime reaction, all other event-level predictors were positive and significant. Disturbance of the public order had the largest effect: Activities with medium disturbance (i.e., activities that involved rallies or demonstrations) were 18.29 times more likely to receive violent regime reactions than activities with no disturbance (i.e., sit-ins, hunger strikes, or peace processions). In turn, high-disturbance activities (i.e., torch rallies, road blocks, or picketing) were 16.36 times more likely to receive violent regime reactions. The overall effect of disturbance was significant (Wald $\chi^2(2) = 248.50, p < .001$). The second-largest effect had violence by the participants: Compared to no violence, events with medium violence by participants (i.e., property damage) were 3.12 times more likely to receive violent reactions by the regime. In turn, for high-violence activities (i.e., people injured or killed), a violent regime reaction was 8.63 times more likely. The overall effect of violence by participants was also significant (Wald $\chi^2(2) = 207.38, p < .001$). The likelihood of a violent regime reaction was additionally positively predicted by political threat (Odds Ratio = 2.78) and visibility (Odds Ratio = 1.90). Among the district-level control variables, ethic cleavages and wealth did not significantly predict violent regime reactions, whereas population density had a small, but significant positive effect (Odds Ratio = 1.04), indicating that violent regime reactions were slightly more likely in districts with higher population density.
Table 6: Results of Generalized Linear Mixed Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violent regime reaction</th>
<th>Coefficient (SE), (p)</th>
<th>OR [LLCI, ULCI]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>District-level fixed effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic cleavages</td>
<td>(-0.09 (0.49), .856)</td>
<td>0.92 [0.35; 2.38]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>(-0.01 (0.03), .674)</td>
<td>0.99 [0.93; 1.05]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>(0.04 (0.02), .041)</td>
<td>1.04 [1.00; 1.08]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Event-level fixed effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-group event</td>
<td>(-0.11 (0.12), .373)</td>
<td>0.90 [0.70; 1.14]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visibility of violence</td>
<td>(0.64 (0.17), &lt;.001)</td>
<td>1.90 [1.36; 2.67]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political threat</td>
<td>(1.02 (0.12), &lt;.001)</td>
<td>2.78 [2.18; 3.54]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disturbance 1</td>
<td>(2.91 (0.19), &lt;.001)</td>
<td>18.29 [12.69; 26.36]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disturbance 2</td>
<td>(2.80 (0.19), &lt;.001)</td>
<td>16.36 [11.36; 23.56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence by participants 1</td>
<td>(1.14 (0.13), &lt;.001)</td>
<td>3.12 [2.42; 4.03]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence by participants 2</td>
<td>(2.15 (0.17), &lt;.001)</td>
<td>8.63 [6.17; 12.06]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>(-4.96 (0.20), &lt;.001)</td>
<td>0.01 [0.01; 0.01]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Random effect</strong></th>
<th><strong>Coefficient (SD)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District intercept variance</td>
<td>0.09 (0.30)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Confidence intervals for odds ratios are displayed at the 95% level. \(N = 74\) L2 observations (districts), \(N = 5,412\) L1 observations (events).
6.5.4 Geographically Weighted Regression

As an additional robustness check, a geographically weighted regression (GWR) model was computed to account for possible geographic variability in results. Geographically weighted regression allows the exploration of spatial non-stationarity of effects, that is the relationships between the criterion and the predictor variables varying across space (Fotheringham, Brunsdon, and Charlton 2003). In addition to a global regression, representing the average relationships over the entire space of observations, geographically weighted regression also computes local estimates of parameters. To do so, the spatial coordinates of the events were included into the model. Thereby, spatial variation was introduced into the model in more detail than only accounting for the district in which the nonviolent action event took place (as in the GLMM reported above). In other words, the local statistics can be understood as a spatial disaggregation of global statistics (Fotheringham, Brunsdon, and Charlton 2003).

The geographically weighted regression model was computed with MGWR 2.2 (Oshan et al. 2019). The model type was binomial, the spatial kernel was fixed Gaussian. The latitude and longitude of the non-violent events were entered as spherical location variables. Violent state reaction was the outcome variable, the predictors were similar to the GLMM described above. The optimization criterion was Akaike Information Criterions (AICs). Model coefficients were unstandardized to increase comparability to the GLMM. The model explained 19% of the variance in violent state reactions. The computed bandwidth was 52.44. Results of the global regression model (Table 7, upper section) were very similar to the GLMM. Disturbance of the public order and violence by participants had the largest, positive and significant effects. Smaller contributions were made by political threat and visibility of violence. Population density was also a significant predictor, but with a very small effect size. Multi-group events, ethnic cleavages, and wealth were non-significant.

In addition to these global coefficients, the GWR model also included local coefficients, meaning estimations of regression slopes for the predictors at the different local observations of events. Thus, in Table 7 (lower section) the summary statistics for the GWR parameter estimates are displayed. Results of these summary statistics show local variability in effect sizes. For the predictors with the largest effect sizes (i.e., disturbance of the public order, violence by participants, and political threat), the minimal and maximal effect sizes were positive in all regions, meaning that higher values on these predictors consistently predicted a higher likelihood of violent state reaction throughout the entire country. The effect sizes for political threat were positive on average, but ranged from null effects to positive effects, indicating that political threat predicted higher violent state reactions in most regions, but in some regions it did not contribute to the prediction of violent state reactions. The mean coefficient of visibility of violence was also positive, but the minimal coefficient was
negative, indicating that in some regions, higher visibility of violence contributed to lower violent state reactions. Because of the overall low frequency of visibility of violence, this infrequent negative effect should be interpreted with caution.

Table 7: Results of Geographically Weighted Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violent regime reaction</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global regression results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic cleavages</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>.587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>.749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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Summary statistics for GWR parameter estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</table>

Notes: Parameter estimates are displayed as unstandardized coefficients.

Local variability in regression parameters for the most influential predictors are depicted in Figures 2 to 4. Figure 2 shows that the association between high disturbance of the public order (coded as 2) and violent state reaction was positive in all regions, but smaller in the central region of Kathmandu compared to more rural regions. Figure 3 shows that the effect sizes for high violence by participants (coded as 2) were larger in central Nepal than in more rural areas, with the exception of particularly large effect sizes in the North-West of Nepal. Figure 4 shows that the effect sizes for political threat were largest in the Southern central region of Nepal, but smaller in the West/East.
Figure 2: Local Parameter Estimates for Disturbance of the Public Order 2 in Geographically Weighted Regression

Figure 3: Local Parameter Estimates for Violence by Participants 2 in Geographically Weighted Regression
In sum, the GWR model substantiated the results from the GLMM, but showed that there was regional variability around the global regression results. However, for the significant predictors with the largest effect sizes (i.e., political threat, disturbance of the public order, and violence by participants), results were consistently positive and significant throughout the different regions of Nepal.

6.6 Discussion

6.6.1 Summary of Results

This paper investigated if organizational or tactical patterns of nonviolent activism predict the likelihood of violent reactions by a regime to nonviolent activist events during a civil war. Relying on a new dataset of nonviolent activism during the Nepalese Civil War on the event level, results were mostly in line with expectations. Descriptive results showed that the regime used violence during nonviolent events for about every fifth event. Data were analyzed first with a generalized linear mixed model, taking into account that nonviolent events were clustered in Nepalese districts and including district-level control variables. Whereas control variables had non-significant or small effects on violent regime reactions, most of the event-level variables significantly predicted the likelihood of violent regime reactions. The small effects of the population density could be explained by a higher amount of overall nonviolent action in high populated areas. In line with Expectations 4 and 5, disturbance of the public order and violence by activists were the most influential predictors. If nonviolent events posed a moderate disturbance of the public order (e.g., activities that involved rallies or demonstrations), the likelihood of a violent regime reaction was 18 times higher compared to nonviolent events that did not disturb the public order (e.g., sit-ins, hunger strikes, or peace processions). In turn, for nonviolent events that
were a high disturbance (e.g., torch rallies, road blocks, or picketing) the likelihood of violent regime reactions was 16 times higher. The larger odds ratio for medium levels of disturbance compared to high levels might be attributed to the overall higher frequency of nonviolent events with medium disturbance (41%) compared to high disturbance (29%) in the dataset. These results speak strongly for the importance of different nonviolent tactics as a reliable predictor for the likelihood of violent regime reactions during a civil war. Challenging the regime with nonviolent events which disturb the daily life might explain why a regime reacts violently more reliably than a possible fear of the jiu-jitsu effect, a media backlash because of the violence. This is in line with the small but positive effect of visibility on regime repression, which is in contrast to Expectation 3. This unexpected effect might be explained by the behavior of journalists and media workers during the Nepalese Civil War. As the regime limited freedom of the press and began to repress journalism significantly, journalists themselves became activists and even started their own nonviolent action campaigns (e.g. Merkel 2022b; Routledge 2010). This implies that especially during a later stage of the conflict journalists acted not as impartial, innocent observers of nonviolent events, which a state might spare from violence, but themselves became challengers of the regime (Merkel 2022b). It is therefore not surprising that they received violent retaliation by the regime and events with journalists present were targeted by the regime as well.

The disturbance level of tactics of nonviolent action seem to play a much larger role than activists being the political opposition or several groups acting together. Although in line with Expectations 1 and 2 these variables significantly predicted the likelihood of violent regime reactions, they produced much smaller odds ratios. In addition, the effect of violent behavior by activist on violent state reactions is about three times larger if people get injured (high violence) compared to when property is damaged (medium violence).

The geographically weighted regression model substantiated these results, but also showed local variability in effect sizes. Nonviolent events with a higher disturbance of the public order predicted a violent state reaction across all Nepalese regions, although the effect was slightly less strong in the urban center in and around the capital in Kathmandu Valley. This indicates that a higher disturbance within and around the capital would have been more likely tolerated by the state than in for example in South Western and South Eastern Regions. This could for example be explained by a higher desire of the state to not escalate violence against activists in the capital in more open sight of the international community, with its embassies and foreign NGOs around.

Violence by participants also positively predicted violent state reactions consistently across the country, but the effect was particularly strong in the far North-West. The larger effect sizes in the far North-West could perhaps be explained by the fact that nonviolent events were much less frequent in those mountain districts. For example in districts which have
only small amount of overall nonviolent events, violence by participants could more often spawn a violent regime reaction because nonviolent action is in general more uncommon and therefore violently retaliated if not particularly peaceful. An inexperience of a local administration and police with how to deal with violence and de-escalation could be another reason for the particularly strong association in these remote regions.

As expected, for nonviolent activities that posed a political threat to the regime, the GWR model also found a positive relation to violent state reaction across the country. Although the effect is rather small, the model showed largest effects for nonviolent events which were conducted in Kapilbastu, a central Southern district where a large part of nonviolent events during the war was carried out by activist organizations with close relation to the Maoist insurgency, which might explain the higher likelihood of the state to confront those activities with a more violent reaction, in contrast to other districts where the nonviolent events were carried out by more diverse groups from different political standpoints.

6.6.2 Limitations

A first limitation is the data source of PANC, which were local newspaper reports on nonviolent activism. A general shortcoming of newspaper reports is the reliance on journalist information about violence by activists as well as by the regime. Respectively, violent incidents could be downplayed as well as exaggerated in the reports, depending on whether journalists were present themselves or had to rely on information by activists or the police. To address this, a binary dependent variable was created indicating whether violence occurred or not instead of using casualty numbers or further differentiation which might include over- or under-reporting. For the same reason information regarding numbers of participants was not included into the analysis, as the resulting information bias might be high or at least the accuracy of the reported information could not be determined. Despite these shortcomings, reports by local newspapers are likely still the best known source for reliable quantitative event-based information on nonviolent activism, especially in light of a general data scarcity during a civil war.

As second limitation concerns the variable violence by activists. For this predictor, it is not possible to rule out a reverse causality or a bi-directional relationship. With the present analysis, it could not be determined whether violence by activists triggered violent regime reaction, or whether activists just defended themselves when the regime started for example to beat up and arrest activists. In both cases a journalist would report the occurrence of violence by both parties. Cases are known where regimes have infiltrated activist groups to provoke them into adopting violence at the margins during nonviolent actions (e.g. Chenoweth 2020). Results on the relationship of violence by activists and violent regime reaction should therefore be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, it can be easily argued that violence predicts violent reactions, which is in line with previous
findings on nonviolent activism (e.g. Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson 2014).

Third, this study did not include data on regime repression of activists occurring outside of the actual nonviolent event, as this cannot be measured by newspaper reports on nonviolent activism and other data is not available. In general, and as mentioned in previous case studies, there are multiple additional options for regime forces to deter nonviolent activists from carrying out their protests. Possible examples are targeting clandestine activities to develop and sustain an activist groups, like activist meetings, training of participants, or campaigning for funds (Sullivan 2016). Case studies revealed that this occurred also during the Nepalese Civil War, were severe incidents of activist harassment by the regime were reported (e.g. Merkel 2022b; Routledge 2010).

6.6.3 Conclusion and Outlook

For a nonviolent activist groups during a civil war, the results of this investigation point to the recommendation of not relying on tactics with high disturbance of the public order if violent regime repression needs to be avoided. Although the possibility of a backlash on the regime via jiu-jitsu effect exists, there is still a higher possibility that nonviolent activism fails if regimes react violently. In general it might be smart to use tactics which provoke less retaliation, and not to rely on violence as this not only contributes to regime repression but to overall failure of nonviolent resistance. Some might argue that state violence is a necessary factor to spark the public outrage which fuels nonviolent action to become massive campaigns. But overall only activists which use mainly nonviolent tactics are more successful in reaching their goals (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Therefore, the results of this investigation are in line with previous findings concerning effectiveness of activism and nonviolent campaigns (e.g. Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013). Additionally, if a high disturbance effect of nonviolent activism is desired to get attention and possibly higher participant mobilization, the results of this paper can help to anticipate and prepare for possible regime repression. For activists, proper documentation of violence to spur visibility as well as medical and judicial assistance might be suggested in such a case.

For future investigations regarding regime repression during civil wars with more fine-grained data, it could be fruitful to disaggregate repression in its multiple forms and include additional efforts beyond violence, as they might have additional effects on activists’ future mobilization success (e.g. Demirel-Pegg and Rasler 2020). Furthermore, during a civil war repression could also be administered by other conflict factions as well as other activist groups loyal to those. Unfortunately this is not investigated in this paper but could be an interesting approach for future efforts discovering activist repression predictors in civil wars.
7 Interaction and Nonviolent Infusion: How Nonviolent Activism was Supported by NGOs during the Nepalese Civil War

Status: Manuscript in Revision (Nonviolent Resistance Journal) Author: Kai Merkel

7.1 Abstract

This paper uses an organizational approach to help explain nonviolent action in civil wars with the example of the Nepalese Civil War (1996 - 2006). It shows how non-governmental organizations offered a helping hand to support and train conflict-affected groups sometimes from the beginning on, enabling them to organize themselves and choose nonviolent tactics to reach their goals. Although not always directly visible in news-reports concerning nonviolent actions in civil wars, such NGOs could have served as a important third actor, making nonviolent action possible and as such being influential in civil war dynamics. The paper uses expert interviews of leading representatives of NGOs active in this regard during the Nepalese Civil War. Tested expectations relate to NGO motives to train activists regarding civil war violence, war intensity, distributed tactics, and financial considerations. Findings show different but intense efforts to promote the use of nonviolent tactics to achieve groups’ goals. The paper contributes to the study of nonviolent action during civil wars. It provides insight concerning the puzzle how nonviolent actions can flourish under the harsh environment of a civil war and where the idea as well as the capability to use nonviolent tactics stem from.
7.2 Introduction

Today, it is easy to find media reports of citizens who raise their voices against worsening social or security conditions in civil wars (e.g. Africanews.com 2019; AlJazeera 2019). Whether it is a peace demonstration, a sit-in in front of government offices or a street drama performed by children, nonviolent tactics are as numerous as the citizens who organize them (Schock et al. 2015). Studying such actions is important as they might impact war dynamics, reducing violent retaliation and casualties (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Still, it remains an ongoing puzzle how conflict-affected citizens are able to organize themselves during a progressing civil war and how the decision for nonviolent tactics is made instead of fleeing or joining a conflict party (Chenoweth, Hendrix, and Hunter 2019b). Although scientific efforts to explain nonviolent action during civil wars have grown during the recent years, previous research is still sparse and focused on factors like grievances resulting from civil war violence, cultural particularities encouraging nonviolent action, or religious factors favoring nonviolent ways of dissent (e.g. Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; S. J. Barter 2015; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017; Kaplan 2017; Masullo 2015; Merkel 2022a; Vüllers and Krtsch 2020; Wallace 2016).

This paper provides evidence from interviews with representatives from NGOs active during the Nepalese Civil War (1996 - 2006). It shows how activist groups were systematically build up from scratch by these organizations and how the idea to use nonviolence was infused among war-affected citizens. Expectations include short-time behavior of NGOs, the decisions where and when to offer training and resources, as well as possible long-time effects of trained groups. It illuminates NGOs’ motives to offer support and shows how they shaped the goals and actions of their clients. The empirical approach to interview NGOs involved in nonviolent action training offers insight into strategies, circumstances, and problems in supporting nonviolent actions, shedding light on a phenomenon which has not been studied sufficiently in the civil war environment. Some first quantitative analysis appeared linking external factors like civil war violence towards grievance-based motivators for nonviolent action (e.g. Vüllers and Krtsch 2020). But in most cases nonviolent action in civil wars was studied on a case-by-case basis focusing of successful examples (e.g. Kaplan 2017; Masullo 2015). This paper contributes to an alternative explanation for civil war nonviolent action, looking beyond situational external factors like violence but instead including inter-organizational relations. It broadens the lens outlining that activist groups using nonviolent action on the streets might only be the end result of interaction between other actors which might have contributed to the success of nonviolent action but might not be mentioned in media reports about the actual nonviolent events.
7.3 A Theory for Nonviolent Action in Civil Wars

Today, nonviolent resistance is a well-known phenomenon (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). After the Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring the topic received new scientific attention (Nepstad 2011b). Empirical investigations looking beyond large campaigns and especially into the violent environment of civil wars are still underrepresented. In the Nepalese Civil War (1996 - 2006) between the monarchy and the Maoists, it was not only the armed insurgency of the Maoists which forced the King to reinstate democracy. It was also an unarmed national uprising by civil society groups and major political parties. They flooded the streets of the cities with nonviolent actions and forced the King to give up legislative power for a ceremonial status (Hutt 2004). Another example from the Colombian Civil War shows how communities in conflict-ridden areas used nonviolent forms of noncooperation to defy armed state and non-state factions (Masullo 2015). Other examples from Afghanistan and Syria showed that nonviolent action can be used in different conflicts to resist various opponents (e.g. Kahf 2020; Kaplan 2017). Further, violent retaliation on nonviolent actions during a war can influence national and international support of conflict factions (e.g. Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson 2014). It can pave the way for negotiations by third actors or bring conflict parties to the negotiation table (e.g. Chenoweth 2020). Consequently, nonviolent action during civil wars deserves the scientific attention it has already raised in the state of peace or as a tool to overthrow autocratic regimes (e.g. Nepstad 2011a).

7.3.1 Origins of Nonviolent Action in Civil Wars

Previous studies found evidence for nonviolent diffusion, a spillover effect of nonviolent activism between countries (e.g. Gleditsch and Rivera 2017; Weyland 2012). These studies focus on waves of nonviolent dissent like the Arab Spring where one country ignites its neighbors. But what about nonviolent groups and tactics in civil war countries when neighboring states remain peaceful? Following some common explanations, citizens suffer because of grievances, violence, shortages of goods, a collapse of the administration, or a general lack of security (e.g. Kalyvas 2006). But this only explains citizens’ motivation to find a way out of their misery and remains abstract. It does not necessarily explain the decision for nonviolent methods, and especially not how citizens were able to overcome a lack of resources and experience with nonviolent tactics during the war.

Nonviolent action can be perceived as a result of resources and their mobilization (e.g. McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978). NGOs in such a situation can serve as an opportunity for civil-war affected populations to make the decision to use nonviolence instead of violence to follow their political goals. A theory which explains this is the opportunity structures approach introduced by McAdam (e.g. McAdam 2010). In this approach, the resource mobilization explanation is enriched with further external restrictions and chances. The decision to use violence or nonviolence is influenced by the broader political context.
While this is similar to the already depicted description of nonviolence as a form of political contentions, opportunity structures include structural factors such as regime type, elections, post-Cold War period, human rights organizations, and international support as some influential factors in promoting nonviolent resistance (Karakaya 2018). Especially mentioned here are human rights organizations and international support.

This paper follows an inter-organizational perspective to explain how and why actors develop nonviolent methods and tactics during a civil war. This inter-organizational perspective focuses on non-state organizations present or emerging in civil war societies which might support nonviolent resistance. They might guide the way to nonviolence instead of violent retaliation or offer crucial support to activist groups.

### 7.3.2 NGOs as a Cause for Nonviolent Action in Civil Wars

First, today various organizations promote nonviolent resistance globally. The 'Albert Einstein Institution' or the 'Center For Applied Nonviolent Actions and Strategies' are examples of such organizations that search for oppressed civil society groups and train them in nonviolent tactics to resist oppression. Between 1953 and 2003 the number of organizations promoting nonviolent activism increased from about 100 to over 1000 (Schock et al. 2015). This development may stem from the fact that nonviolent tactics produce less casualties compared to violent forms of regime change (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). The 'Albert Einstein Institution', besides supporting studies concerning nonviolent action, provided training to activists working against autocracies in Burma, Thailand, Egypt, Tibet, and Palestine (Schock et al. 2015). If such NGOs want to empower citizens with nonviolent methods, they might also promote these tactics in civil wars, where high repression and atrocities by conflict parties are to be expected.

NGOs could promote nonviolent action in civil wars for several reasons. The push factors, the reasons for organizations to train others, may range from altruistic, ideological commitments to interests of regime change or a change in the civil war dynamics. For example, third parties could promote grass-root activism in favor of a conflict party by directly or indirectly funding and supporting nonviolent organizations (Schock et al. 2015). Another reason could be to raise awareness among the international community for suffering citizens protesting on the streets, triggering interventions by third actors not yet involved in the war. If there is pressure of successful nonviolent activism, international actors could be motivated to negotiate, offer mediation services, or even withdraw support of conflict parties.

Support of nonviolent actions might vary on directness, constitution of the recipient, and an NGO’s capabilities and objectives. In addition to direct methods like workshops and counseling, indirect ways like background funding for programs are possible. Promoting
nonviolent tactics in local media might be another less invasive option (e.g. Howes 2013). However, this implies that organized groups already exist and transform that information into collective action. Instead, helping war-affected citizens might first require counseling on how to form and organize groups before they can become activists (e.g. White et al. 2015).

Support may also include the financial dimension. Outside the civil war context, the Serbian resistance group "Otpor!", which spearheaded the campaign against the Milosevic regime after 2000, was financially supported by organizations like the 'National Democratic Institute' or the 'Open Society Institute' (Schock et al. 2015). It should be expected that financial support during civil wars gives activists a similar advantage to conduct their activities.

In developing countries and conflict areas, already established NGOs might promote human rights or monitor human rights violations (e.g. Rodio and Schmitz 2010). NGO activity in this field increased over time, promoted as a cost-effective method of conflict prevention (Bakker 2001). These human rights NGOs have shifted gradually from reactive 'namming and shaming' strategies to more proactive efforts (Rodio and Schmitz 2010). During a civil war, when citizens suffer from human rights violations, these organizations could feel encouraged to animate citizens to resist with nonviolent tactics. Excessive civil war violence affecting civilians could serve as a trigger factor for NGOs.

But what about the perspective of receiving activist groups in civil wars? During the state of peace, research has shown that activist groups are often linked to other organizations striving for the same goals (e.g. McAdam and Rucht 1993; Soule 2004). Activist groups are open to collaborate, observe other groups’ activities, and are able to spread and mutually adopt tactics and frames (Wang and Soule 2012). Motivation can be to reach effectiveness in numbers, or receive funding and support in an environment that relies largely on donations and volunteers. They also need information on available tactics and their application (Tarrow 1989). Cooperation with an organization which has already used them successfully can significantly increase the chance to mobilize and apply tactics (Della Porta and Kriesi 1999).

In a civil war, those pull factors to seek support should increase due to scarcity of resources. Citizens should have less to contribute in activist groups’ fundraising or donation campaigns (e.g. Humphreys and Weinstein 2006). Volunteers for activist groups might be limited as they fear conflict parties to retaliate more violently during civil wars compared to the state of peace (e.g. Balcells 2010; Downes 2008). Further, state programs to fund civil society groups might not be available during a war, where dwindling state capacity cripples administration or the state itself acts as a conflict party (e.g. De Ronen Jr and Sobek 2004; Sobek 2010). In sum, civil society groups in civil wars should welcome or even actively
seek support by NGOs.

Concluding, this paper aims at investigating training and support from NGOs donated to civil society groups during a civil war, showing its effect on the organizations’ development. The following expectations might determine the behavior and effects of NGO training in nonviolent tactics.

### 7.3.3 Expectations

First, organizations might provide training and support in localities which are most affected by the war. This is because citizens in such localities might want to retaliate against conflict parties and are probably more in need of help than people not yet or less affected by the war. Training workshops are more useful if possible activists or at least war-affected citizens (refugees, orphans etc.) are present in the locality and interested in learning new tactical skills. Civil war effects like violence against civilians could explain where NGOs search for such dissatisfied groups.

**Expectation 1:** The likelihood that NGOs offer training and support on nonviolent activism increases in localities where citizens got affected by civil war violence.

Second, the international community and NGOs get indirectly affected by civil war effects. Reports about civil war violence spread via media or connections to other NGOs (e.g. Bennett, Flickinger, and Rhine 1997; Keck 2011; Minear, Scott, and Weiss 1996). Reports about a deteriorating humanitarian situation in civil war countries might motivate the international community to react. Consequently, more of such third actors are likely to become involved as the civil war aggravates. Citizens in countries not necessarily tangled by the war might receive media reports about suffering populations and donate to NGOs which want to, or are already offering training and support. Michelle Keck for example showed that U.S.-based NGOs engaged in civil wars after they showed a large number of displaced people and refugees (Keck 2011). As NGOs might largely rely on international funds and donations, attention on a war because of violence and atrocities could motivate them to engage (e.g. Nunnenkamp and Öhler 2012). Simultaneously, organizations already supporting groups during the war might allocate more resources to them as the civil war aggravates.

**Expectation 2:** The extent of training and support donated to civil society groups increases as the civil war aggravates and more people suffer because of civil war effects.

Third, there exist over 200 tactics of nonviolent action (Sharp and Finkelstein 1973). It is unlikely that organizations offering training have achieved application experience in all of them. Organizations might rely on a limited pool of tactics according to their capabilities,
member structure or financial situation (e.g. Gallo-Cruz 2019; Jaskoski, Wilson, and Lazareno 2017; Masullo 2015). An organization which is for example proficient in peace processions and sit-ins donates those tactics to possible receivers.

*Expectation 3: NGOs donate tactics and methods of nonviolent resistance which they have already applied themselves and are most familiar with during a civil war.*

Fourth, if activist groups have reached their goals they might dissolve, but they could also look for new tasks and a reason for further existence. Some groups that received training and successfully applied nonviolent strategies could try to spread knowledge and experience to others in similar situations. The 'Centre For Applied Nonviolent Actions and Strategies' (CANVAS) was founded by former ‘Otpor!’ activists after own goals were reached, it now promotes activism during workshops with civil society groups. These workshops include theory and tactics of nonviolent resistance, but also strategy development, fundraising, overcoming effects of fear and getting ideas how to use humor, symbols, and media (Schock et al. 2015, p.145).

*Expectation 4: Trained groups which have successfully applied nonviolent tactics might train others and spread nonviolent tactics after they have reached their goals during a civil war.*

### 7.4 Case and Method

#### 7.4.1 The Nepalese Civil War

This paper uses qualitative expert interviews with leading members of organizations active in nonviolent activism training and support during a civil war. A suitable case is a civil war that is over to safely acquire information, where nonviolent activism occurred over a long time and organizations are still available for interviews. The Nepalese Civil War (1996 - 2006) fits these criteria. It started in 1996 after the Communist Party of Nepal Maoist (CPN-Maoist) started their insurgency to overthrow the constitutional monarchy of the country in favour of a 'People’s Republic' (Gobyn 2009). The following identity-based civil war between the Maoists and the country’s monarchy represented by the Nepalese King lasted relatively long and the entire country was affected (e.g. Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii 2014; Hutt 2004). After several failed attempts to reach peace by negotiations between the conflict parties, the war finally ended with the Nepalese King giving up legislative power in favour of a ceremonial role in 2006, reinstating democracy. Until that time-point, the war had produced more than 13,000 victims, in addition to a vast destruction of property, displacement of citizens, and various human rights abuses (Lawoti 2010; Pettigrew 2013). The toppling of the King was escorted not merely by a military
victory of the Maoist insurgency, but was also a result of a public mostly nonviolent uprising in the streets across the whole country, strongly hinting at the importance of nonviolent action for the conflict (e.g. Routledge 2010).

Reports in Nepalese newspapers refer to workshops on nonviolent tactics and the promotion of human rights by NGOs during the war. Therefore the Nepalese Civil War seems like a promising case to discover effects of NGO nonviolence training. The relatively long duration of the war is a benefit to investigate organizational development, goal-setting and inter-organizational transfer compared to a shorter war. Another feature of the civil war was the amount of nonviolent action. The involvement of various groups implies a large pool of organizations available for interviews. As the war ended in 2006, organizational and individual memory loss could have occurred. However, interview partners can now speak more freely about programs and cooperation compared to the fragile environment immediately after a conflict.

The goal of the interviews was to collect information on training of nonviolent tactics and support between NGOs and civil society groups (e.g. distribution of information, training, guidance, workshops, or other support from 'donor' organizations to 'receiver' organizations). Organizations may both be donors and receivers, for example when NGOs received support by international cooperation and distributed their knowledge and funds to regional groups. Thereby groups might be consulted at different stages of organizational constitution, early during group formation or later, convincing existing organizations to use more successful nonviolent methods.

7.4.2 Selection of Organizations

The paper followed two strategies to select organizations for interviews. First, the year 1999 was selected to search for articles about workshops and promotion events on nonviolent activism in national Nepalese newspapers (Kathmandu Post and the Nepali Times). 1999 was in the middle of the civil war, when the insurgency already posed a certain threat and civil war violence was affecting the population, which might have lead to nonviolence training (e.g. Hutt 2004). With this information about 50 organizations which participated in or organized such workshops were contacted. Second, Dr. Prakash Bhattarai, a researcher and president of the 'Centre for Social Change', a non-profit research and advocacy NGO in Kathmandu, provided five further organizations.

There were several difficulties when selecting organizations for interviews. First, only still existing NGOs could be contacted. This excludes organizations which dissolved after the war. Thus, for the NGOs interviewed the importance of the training and support was assessed by asking how vital it was for their organizational development.

Second, experts well-informed in NGO programs during the civil war were required. Third,
distribution of information, funding, and support are sensitive topics. Admitting that an organization received help in conducting nonviolent activities implies that success has to be shared to a certain extent with its donor organizations. This raises questions of independence, decision-making, and capabilities. It had to be made clear that the interviews had an academic background and it was not the objective to discredit organizations or achievements. Fourth, many activist NGOs in Nepal are still under close government observation. NGO members were often repressed, imprisoned, or killed for their work during the civil war (e.g. Murdie and Stapley 2014). By admitting links to other, for example international organizations, interview partners opened possibilities for being stamped as foreign agents and possible harassment (e.g. Zunes and Ibrahim 2009). The interviews were conducted in Kathmandu Valley in March 2018. A list of participating organizations, interview questions, and interview partners can be found in the Appendix.

7.5 Results

This section presents the information gathered from the interviews in a condensed and comparable way. It shows each NGO’s nonviolent training and support efforts and whether expectations were met.

7.5.1 Nagarik Aawaz

The interview partner was S. Risal, C.E.O. (since 2003) of Nagarik Aawaz (NA). The NGO was founded during a peak of the civil war in 2001 to empower refugees, especially women and youth, who were forced to flee to the relatively safe capital Kathmandu during that time. This supports Expectation 2, as the organization was founded as a response to the refugee crisis resulting from the escalating civil war. Expectation 1 is not supported, as the NGO trained refugees in the relatively safe capital, instead of locally in rural, violent areas. The refugees had lost everything and in most cases their only belongings were their clothes. Observing desperation, anger and helplessness, NA’s leaders wanted to ‘transform the people’s opinions on violence’ to reduce war trauma and fear to remain victims.

The refugees’ initial objective was to achieve compensation for losses and later retaliation against perpetrators of violence. NA’s motivation was to change the refugees’ retaliation mindset into one of peaceful nonviolent activism. NA perceived nonviolence as of ‘ultimate importance’ for the refugees to be effective and prevent repression. Mentioned were Gandhi and Martin Luther King as role models of nonviolent resistance.

NA conducted workshops for refugees in groups of twenty, according to age and origin, where they learned how to work together and develop achievable goals. The NGO accompanied the groups closely during their development for approximately one year. Lacking even basic resources, the NGO equipped the refugees with housing and a small endowment. With
NA’s help the groups organized protests, signature campaigns, peace procession and more. Nagarik Aawaz participated in the events until the groups could work independently.

Initially a central problem was to fund NA and its clients. They wanted to attract international donors, but those wanted to spend their money in conflict-affected regions and not to Nagarik Aawaz, which worked in Kathmandu valley, a relatively safe area during its founding years. Ms. Risal emphasized that the problem of internally displaced persons was not recognized initially by donor NGOs. After negotiations, the NGO was later able to form an international donor network supporting them and their refugee groups during the war. Moreover, NA established self-sustained activist groups of which some themselves trained similar youth groups during the war. In their workshops they designed tactics according to their clients’ demands and capabilities. This capability-centered approach does not support Expectation 3. Expectation 4 is supported, as some newly formed groups later trained others independently. Until today NA keeps close contact to the trained groups. They currently serve as a network to be activated if NA plans own campaigns for example to promote women’s rights.

7.5.2 Federation of Nepali Journalists

Interviewed was Mr. H. Joshi, the organization’s current program manager. This organization (FNJ) perceived itself as impartial until a certain time of the conflict, when the King took over absolute power. This was accompanied by curfews and severe repression of the press which enraged journalists and media workers. As journalists became increasingly repressed including physical attacks by the regime, they reacted with various forms of street protests, non-cooperation, and media activism which was carried out by FNJ. At the final stages of the war, Mr. Joshi described FNJ as the eighth party in the seven-party alliance which toppled the King with nonviolent actions on the streets. FNJ’s goal was to restore democracy and freedom of the press. Nonviolence from the beginning on was necessary for the organization as an effective way to prevent retaliation. During the war they could rely on a country-wide network of 5,000 members. To achieve their goal of press freedom, they trained local journalists including skill training and information on how to build pressure against the government in the press and on the streets. There is no support for Expectation 1 but for Expectation 2 as FNJ used nonviolent training only at a later stage of the conflict, as media workers became affected by repression. In contrast to Nagarik Aawaz, FNJ trained journalists according to what they thought was effective, namely putting pressure on the government, what they already did themselves. This supports Expectation 3. There is no evidence for Expectation 4. They also started interaction programs and awareness training for human rights violations. For effectiveness, they united unions, lawyers, and teachers to fight for peace and democracy. They cooperated with international journalist NGOs like the ‘International Federation of Journalists’ or ‘Reporters sans Frontieres’.
7.5.3 Amnesty Nepal

The interview partner of Amnesty Nepal (AN) was Mr. R. Nepal, the organization’s former president during the war. This well-established branch of Amnesty International exists since 1969 in Nepal.

During the civil war its main activities were empowering and training of victim families with workshops and counseling. They helped victim groups to organize themselves, lectured them on human rights and provided support in conducting protests and rallies. Mr. Nepal told that "our victim families went to the streets in the city centers in the districts against topics like extra-judicial killings, disappearances of people and sexual violence by conflict parties". A top priority for AN were human rights violations. The NGO’s campaign 'Truth, Reparation and Justice' included workshops with victim groups and government representatives. The goal was to establish a common ground for the victim groups to be perceived by the government, united in their fight for compensation or against atrocities. Empowerment was a key factor, without Amnesty Nepal the victim groups were largely ignored "Primarily the issues of the victims were only the issues of the victims, nobody listened to them" [R. Nepal].

AN increasingly provided training and support from the background and kept a low profile, letting victims be the center of the protests. "When we initially spoke out (for the victims), the reaction of the government was: This is not your issue, you are not a victim, you are not affected, you are an NGO" [R. Nepal].

When asked about groups which started to train others after own goals were reached, Mr. Nepal told the story of Suman Adhikari, who is leading the Conflict Victims Common Platform NGO today. "Suman begun his conflict victim organization with our help. He was alone initially...His father was a teacher, and he was dragged by the Maoists from the class...He was tied to a tree and shot. He was (a) minor...And he started this (orphan) campaign, and later several others. We did several workshops with him...to empower him with the knowledge to expect the solidarity, look we work together with you" [R. Nepal].

The following was told during the workshops with conflict victims.

"We told how similar conflicts had happened in other countries and how the families there were organized and justice was delivered. What were the principles behind the best practices what could be a successful strategy. What are pillars of transitional justice, what are the rights involved in it. How the victim families are entitled to compensation, reparations...Those were really kind of innocent people...If I receive 10,000 (Nepalese) rupees instead of losing my bread owner, this is luck, and this is it. They (the victims) thought that the responsibility of the state is just giving money, but no. There were other organizations with large budgets, (help) from the U.N., the E.U. and some embassies that
The idea behind Amnesty’s workshops was not only to build up victim groups for financial compensation but also to show them what their rights were and that there are greater goals besides some rupees for compensation. Thereby they helped to keep groups active even after their initial goals were reached. Groups started to strive for greater, systematic improvements of their circumstances.

A second function of Amnesty Nepal was to raise awareness among the international community about the victims’ situation. Thus, they exerted indirect pressure on Nepalese conflict parties to refrain from atrocities against civilians. Mr. Nepal emphasized that they successfully triggered several national and international investigations concerning civil war atrocities. Additionally, AN sent trained Nepalese victim activists abroad to conduct presentation and marketing tours for their cases. They conducted special international fundraising campaigns for the conflict victims.

"We told them (the victims) you are not alone... We mean the whole human rights community, the international community. If you want you can come out (we will help you), but it is your decision whether to come out or leave this thing... If you want to come out we will stand up with you and support you in all means." [R. Nepal]

AN cooperated with local human rights NGOs and the U.N. office in Kathmandu during the civil war. They had a full-fledged network of branches in almost every district in the country on which they could rely to get information on atrocities as well as to organize workshops and mobilize groups.

There is evidence for Expectation 1, as the organization conducted nonviolence workshops and consultation of conflict victims in the war-affected districts. There is some support for Expectation 2 as AN initiated foreign fundraising programs to expand their efforts to support conflict victims as the civil war aggravated. There is no support for Expectation 3, as Amnesty Nepal prescribed different tactics according to groups’ capabilities and needs. One victim group started to train others, so there is small support for Expectation 4.

7.5.4 Informal Sector Service Center

Interviewed was R.C. Paudel, the NGO’s general secretary. Established in 1988, the Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC) is a relatively old and well-established Nepalese NGO. One of INSEC’s main functions was to document human rights violations during the civil war. Its database of human rights violations today serves as a valuable resource for researchers and activists. During the war it conducted awareness campaigns like radio programs to put pressure on conflict parties to stop violence against civilians. Similar to Amnesty Nepal, it empowered victim families to build capacity and use nonviolent tactics to reach compensation for endured violence or prosecution of perpetrators. Furthermore,
they actively hid and protected human rights activists during the war. Another interesting aspect were countrywide rural education programs, where INSEC used human rights issues and nonviolent tactics to educate illiterate citizens in conflict zones. When teaching the alphabet, they explained the letter ‘R’ with the example ‘rally’, ‘E’ for ‘election’, and ‘S’ for sit-in. Thus, they made illiterate citizens aware of ways to stand up for their rights unarmed.

Similar to Amnesty Nepal, the behavior of INSEC supports Expectation 1 but not Expectation 3. The NGO built up and trained victim groups in nonviolent tactics throughout the districts where civil war atrocities occurred but prescribed different tactics according to groups’ capabilities. There is not much evidence for or against Expectation 2 and 4.

7.5.5 Conflict Victims Common Platform

The interview partner was Suman Adhikari, one of the founders and chairman of the Conflict Victims Common Platform (CVCP). The CVCP was founded by a group of lawyers in 2000 when the civil war escalated to a new level of violence. The goal was to protect and empower conflict victims. Their objective was to unite victim groups, as there was a huge mistrust among conflict victims, whether they were victims of the Maoists or the State Security Forces. So they organized and mobilized victims in groups. They formed nationwide committees where groups received responsibilities according to regions and localities. Similar to Nagaarik Aawaz, the CVCP was founded because of civil war effects threatening citizens during a high phase of violence, this supports Expectation 2.

Representatives from the CVCP confronted state commissions together with victims on the district level, they organized gatherings and helped victims to formulate common grounds, overcome distrust and fear of oppression in raising their voices. Consequently, in the five regions of Nepal, the CVCP monitored the work of state officials and committees responsible for the compensation of conflict victims. They helped to issue their complaints, to deal with security concerns after statements, to address corruption and in general how to behave to be heard. In many cases they organized mass protests of victims on the streets to enforce their demands in the district headquarters.

Suman Adhikari stressed that all of the NGO’s actions were nonviolent for effectiveness. In total they worked with over three thousand victim groups during the war. He further stated that campaigns were most efficient in district headquarters and in Kathmandu Valley. Initially they did not receive much support from international donors but this later changed. He named UNDP, Amnesty International and INSEC as cooperation partners in a later state of the war. Cooperation entailed practical and tactical support. Partners were consulted to decide what tactic to choose. Mr. Adhikari said that program issues, morality and feasibility were discussed.
The CVCP case speaks against Expectation 1, as the NGO did their training in the safe capital, although the nonviolent tactics were conducted by their clients countrywide. There is no evidence for or against Expectations 3 and 4.

7.5.6 Advocacy Forum

This organization (AF) was established in 2001 by activists focused on the protection of conflict victims. The interview partner was Mr. Basnet, the organization’s program manager. During an early spark of violence of the war, the NGO worked together with conflict victims to help them issuing their cases in front of the courts. Again this organization was founded at a peak of civil war violence in 2001, and tended to conflict victims, supporting Expectation 2, but not necessarily Expectation 1 as they worked in the safe capital. Initially the support did not include tactics of nonviolent resistance. The AF tried to persuade conflict-affected citizens to use the legal path instead of retaliation in joining the conflict parties. At a later state the AF organized numerous ‘gheraoes’ in Kathmandu when their cases were not processed by the courts. This is a peaceful form of blocking the entrance of public buildings to raise attention and hinder state officials from reaching their offices. They worked with various victim groups to develop their organizational capacity and raise funds for the groups. The support included video monitoring of repression by security forces or legal support if the victims got arrested. The Advocacy Forum did not support violence but Mr. Basnet stressed it was difficult to convince victims to refrain from violence, especially when nonviolent actions were violently repressed by state forces. The organization cooperated with INSEC, COCAP and smaller local NGOs. There is no evidence for Expectations 3 and 4.

7.5.7 Collective Campaign for Peace

The interview partner of the Collective Campaign for Peace (COCAP) was the program manager Mr. S. Nepal. The organization formed a network of 43 human rights NGOs in 29 Nepalese districts. It was founded in 2001 when collective suffering occurred because of aggravating atrocities by both conflict parties. This supports Expectation 2. The NGO initially consisted of activists who previously worked for other human rights organizations. They started to advise groups how to organize campaigns and mobilize supporters. They discovered that many groups were hindered by inefficient structures, difficult decision-making or corruption. COCAP offered campaigning assistance across the country. Wherever they sensed a need for consultation, workshops on capacity building and nonviolent tactics were organized. Those were not limited to a single form of nonviolent action like street protests, but included various tactics like street dramas, picketing, and more. This speaks against Expectation 3.

COCAP educated own trainers in nonviolent methods in five regional offices across Nepal.
which then were sent directly to groups affected by human rights violations. They organized peace campaigns with citizens and radio talks to inform the population about human rights. COCAP equipped their clients with computers or cameras to monitor repression during their activities. The NGO evaluated their clients on a four-point scale from weak to strong and tried to increase the groups’ ratings each year.

COCAP recognized that their clients were often struggling for similar goals across the regions but on a small local scale. Even if one perpetrator was punished or a situation was improved by nonviolent actions, another violation would emerge in different location with other victims. Consequently, in a second phase during the war, COCAP aimed to unite the different clients with common goals. They tried to find common grounds with the intention to agitate less against local perpetrators but against the leadership of the conflict parties and for peace.

When the King took over absolute power and the human rights situation aggravated in 2005, the organization had united many of the leading human rights NGOs from various districts. Mr. Nepal stressed that initially the political parties were scattered and not united to form a large campaign against the King’s seizure of power, so leading human rights NGOs and civil society took the initiative. In this third phase, COCAP served as a coordinating platform for the NGOs’ massive protest rallies in the capital where they organized the numerous groups from the districts together on the streets. Common actions were sit-ins, peace rallies, or public fake parliaments where democracy was simulated to contest the King.

Mr. Nepal stressed the NGO’s informal connections to European embassies which supported human rights activists during the civil war. The concept of nonviolence was very important for COCAP. Mr. Nepal stated that youth among their clients were often prone to violence because of political party propaganda, although violence was in most cases inefficient. He stressed the organization’s nonviolence training and the importance of harmony to achieve their goals. After the war the organization switched goals and programs in the direction of human rights monitoring.

7.6 Discussion

The interviews supported some of the expectations but not others. Table 1 shows evidence for or against the tested expectations. Not all of the NGOs offered direct training in nonviolent tactics when they were founded. The Advocacy Forum (AF) offered capacity building and legal support in the beginning but only later directly taught how to orchestrate tactics. For others like INSEC, Nagarik Aawaz, Amnesty Nepal, COCAP, FNJ or the CVCP this was a central objective. Organizations like Amnesty Nepal or INSEC existed long before the civil war, others like COCAP, NA or AF were founded during the conflict.
to support war-affected citizens. This shaped how and where they trained activist groups. Organizations like FNJ or COCAP started with single goals and transformed or extended their objectives as their own and their clients’ capacity expanded. INSEC or COCAP conducted radio programs for human rights or indirectly used educational programs to infuse the population with nonviolent tactics.

**Expectation 1:** The likelihood that NGOs offer training and support on nonviolent activism increases in localities where citizens got affected by civil war violence.

Support for Expectation 1 is mixed. Amnesty Nepal, COCAP or INSEC worked in conflict-affected regions. They empowered victims with knowledge about mobilization, capacity building and nonviolent tactics. Other NGOs like Nagarik Aawaz or Advocacy Forum worked with refugees who fled to the capital. These different approaches might be attributed to organizational capacity. Amnesty Nepal or INSEC are well-established organizations which worked before the civil war in human rights promotion or monitoring of human rights violations. They could rely on established branches throughout Nepal as their programs shifted from monitoring to a more offensive approach. They could use existing networks in the district headquarters to organize counseling and workshops. First meetings with victims occurred sometimes in rural villages, but training and organization of groups was done mostly in the district headquarters. Possible reasons were security concerns and existing central infrastructure to unite groups. INSEC further conducted nonviolent education programs in rural areas affected by war atrocities. But those programs were covert nonviolent infusions targeting a general population. Therefore this was probably not perceived as a threat to repress by the conflict parties.

The other NGOs (NA, FNJ, CVCP, AF) trained their clients in Kathmandu Valley, relatively safe until the last two years of the war. Despite occasional bombings of state property there were no massive atrocities and clashes like in rural areas (Hutt 2004). These organizations were founded because of civil war effects but were not working in conflict-affected areas. Initially just a handful to three dozen activists, they were not able to have cross-county programs like established NGOs. Both approaches were highly effective and training in the capital did not imply that trained activists carried out their nonviolent activities only there. Being located outside the conflict zones had sometimes financial

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Table 8: Support for or against Expectations

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<th>NA</th>
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consequences. Nagarik Aawaz had problems to acquire support because of their location in the capital as international donors wanted to invest in conflict-affected areas.

In sum, it can be argued that organizations worked increasingly with conflict-affected groups as their number increased because of the civil war, but those groups remained not necessarily in regions where the atrocities occurred. Instead, training was mostly conducted in the district headquarters or even the capital.

**Expectation 2: The extent of training and support donated to civil society groups increases as the civil war aggravates and more people suffer because of civil war effects.**

The interviews support Expectation 2. The relatively ‘young’ organizations interviewed were founded around 2000 - 2002, when state forces struggled against the Maoists and the army was first used against the insurgents (Hutt 2004). This was accompanied by a rise in civil war violence including atrocities among civilians. Consequently, more refugees fled to Kathmandu and were empowered by NGOs like Nagarik Aawaz or the Advocacy Forum. Also the more established human rights monitoring NGOs (INSEC, AN) concentrated their efforts on conflict victims as their numbers increased. Programs shifted from monitoring and naming of perpetrators to active support and prescription of nonviolent tactics. Thereby they risked retaliation by conflict parties and ultimately some activists were killed or fled the country. Amnesty Nepal started international awareness and fundraising campaigns to intensify support of victim groups at that time. Initially several NGOs had difficulties getting funded, but later it became easier to receive donations mostly from the international community and its state and non-state actors. This underscores the international community’s willingness to fund NGOs as the civil war reached a certain intensity (e.g. Keck 2011).

**Expectation 3: NGOs donate tactics and methods of nonviolent resistance which they have already applied themselves and are most familiar with during a civil war.**

Expectation 3 was not supported. Organizations used various nonviolent tactics mostly tending to the capabilities and goals of their clients. Those could also shift according to the development of groups and new goals. Some initial tactics included legal actions and protests for financial compensation and sit-ins in front of offices to confront decision makers (e.g. AF). Later tactics included peace processions for an end of the war (e.g. COCAP). The FNJ might be the exception, their pressure-building campaigns focused on journalists with the constant goals of democracy and press freedom. Nagarik Aawaz’ efforts best illustrated a client-centered approach. They organized street dramas for
adolescents, containing peace-songs for small children, whereas regular protests and sit-ins were conducted with young adults and women. Most organizations made strategic decisions regarding which tactic to use together with the receiving organization.

*Expectation 4: Trained groups which have successfully applied nonviolent tactics might train others and spread nonviolent tactics after they have reached their goals during a civil war.*

Like the OTPOR! and CANVAS examples, the concept of nonviolent action sometimes spread after it was taught. Groups who achieved their goals with nonviolent action might spread their tactics to similar groups in need. In two examples trained groups acted as such envoys of nonviolence. First, Suman Adhikari founded his orphan organization with the support and training from Amnesty Nepal. As his organization progressed and gained more capability he founded the Conflict Victims Common Platform which then trained and united other victim groups using nonviolent tactics. Second, Nagarik Aawaz build up youth groups from scratch. Many of the groups formed own organizations after being trained by Nagarik Aawaz, and some of them continued to train similar conflict-affected youth during the war. Today, they have close ties to Nagarik Aawaz, a network to rely on if NA starts own nonviolent campaigns.

The Appendix contains additional findings from the interviews which were not expected but should be mentioned as they could be important for future studies concerning nonviolent actions during civil wars.

### 7.7 Conclusion

This paper aimed to show evidence of NGO training of nonviolent tactics and support during a civil war. Based on the interviewed NGOs, it does argue that this occurred systematically in the Nepalese Civil War. This does not mean that nonviolent activism in the Nepalese Civil War resulted exclusively because of training by NGOs. Instead it illuminates examples of training and what the motives for training and support were. Further, the findings illustrate the value of such training when fledgling refugee groups become activist organizations. Concerning successful examples of nonviolent tactics in a rough civil war environment, future research could consider whether third actors like NGOs might have offered a helping hand. Thus in addition to civil war effects like violence combined with pacifist ideologies, inter-organizational relations might contribute to why people refuse to take up arms and rely on nonviolent tactics in civil wars.
7.8 Appendix

7.8.1 Additional Findings

This chapter includes additional and sometimes unexpected findings from the interviews which should be mentioned as they seem important for future studies related to nonviolent action during civil wars.

Concerning organizations’ support, there is a possible further expectation testable which does relate to funding and dependency. This fifth expectation relates to large financial support might lead to a certain dependency and can affect the independence of NGOs and trained activist groups (e.g. Vincent 2006). Although maybe helpful in the beginning, over time financial dependency on NGOs and external funding might influence decision-making processes within an activist organization, a dictation of programs or hinder them to successfully establish own funding channels.

*Expectation 5: Excessive external funding leads in the long term to a loss of independence of activist groups and external interference in programs and a lack of own funding mechanisms to sustain themselves.*

Nagarik Aawaz
During the war NA was funded by NGOs mainly from Germany and the United States, for example the 'U.S. Women’s Fund’. Ms. Risal emphasized NA’s independence, as it rejected funding if NGOs wanted to interfere or dictate certain programs. Ms. Risal mentioned one German donor in this regard. This indicates mixed support for Expectation 5, as donors interfered into programs but the NGO perceived itself as independent and occasionally rejected donors.

Federation of Nepali Journalists
Membership fees during the war made up a large extent of overall funding, in addition to funding by ‘USAID’ and the European Union. As FNJ was largely funded by membership fees, external support played a lesser role, so Expectation 5 is not supported.

Amnesty Nepal
AN was funded by membership fees, private donations and donation campaigns mainly from the E.U., the U.S. and Canada. Expectation 5 is not supported, as AN’s funding largely consisted of own membership fees and donations, it could therefore operate relatively independently.

Informal Sector Service Center
INSEC personnel received training in workshops by the Norwegian embassy. Moreover it was to 86 percent funded by this international actor. The remaining 14 percent of the budget came from the NGO ‘Bread for the World’. The extensive funding lead to a certain
dependency on foreign donations which showed itself in programs designed by cooperative partners and just carried out by INSEC, supporting Expectation 5.

Conflict Victims Common Platform
Funding by cooperating NGOs was essential as the CVCP had almost no own funds. Mr. Adhikari stressed the cooperation as vital for his organization as it increased their impact. Nevertheless, he said that their organization was independent and their non-profit status gave them credibility and less possibilities to get discredited by state officials. The CVCP was completely funded externally which lead to a certain dependency on cooperation regarding program decisions and tactics, supporting Expectation 5.

Advocacy Forum
European embassies provided funding during the war. Mr. Basnet emphasized the logistical and financial support received by the Danish, Swiss and British embassies. Although there seems to be evidence for high financial support during the war, there was not necessarily an interference of external donors into the NGO mentioned, which speaks against Expectation 5.

Collective Campaigning for Peace
Financially, COCAP was supported by private donors and national fund raising campaigns. COCAP itself received capacity training by a German NGO. The Norwegian government was a major initial donor but was later rejected by COCAP for undisclosed reasons. This speaks strongly against Expectation 5, as they were able to reject a major donor who might have interfered in decision making. It seems like their own national fundraising programs enabled them to compensate for external donations. Later during the war they received funding by the German NGO MISEREOR. COCAP has very strong connections to MISEREOR since a chairperson of COCAP was kidnapped by state security forces and had to leave the country with their help.

Summary
I found evidence for financial dependence but also efforts to sustain independence of programs and decision-making. Almost all of the NGOs received support from international entities ranging from capacity building or leadership training workshops (Amnesty Nepal, Nagarik Aawaz, COCAP) to extensive financial support, making independence difficult to defend (INSEC, Advocacy Forum). Nevertheless, most of them argued for their independence and some were able to reject donors who interfered in program decision despite scarce resources (COCAP, Nagarik Aawaz). Amnesty Nepal additionally established mechanisms to reject funding efforts if they exceed a certain percentage of the total annual budget. The funding was in most cases desired and necessary as own financial resources were limited or nonexistent.

A loss of independence might occur if NGOs like INSEC were largely dependent on
financial support. INSEC tried to raise funds locally which might have helped to a certain extent. But even though some NGOs relied on membership fees or local fundraising, those campaigns would never have sustained the organization in its form without international donations. For example, local fundraising campaigns by Amnesty Nepal accounted for about fourteen percent of the annual budget, the rest came from European fundraising campaigns. This highlights that the projects probably would have had much less impact without international support.

The perception of nonviolence
An important additional observation is the importance of the concept of nonviolence which was stressed more or less by all NGOs. For some it was even the ultimate precondition for their help and support (COCAP, INSEC, AN, NA), whereas one organization struggled to keep their clients from acting in a violent manner (AF). Further it can be distinguished between normative and practical constraints to rely on nonviolent tactics. Nagarik Aawaz for example mentioned the role models Buddha and Gandhi, which relied on nonviolence for motivations. Others like COCAP and AF stressed the ineffectiveness of violent methods some of their clients used which resulted in violent retaliation of conflict parties without substantial achievements of the activists. Nevertheless, the concept of nonviolence played a crucial role in the activities for most organizations, as it was seen as a necessary factor to gain solidarity among the general population, to achieve commitment of members as well as to avoid repression by opponents. Further, it seems that the effectiveness of nonviolent methods and tactics was well known even if normative consideration played a role.

Additional important is that some of the NGOs who engaged heavily in training and support of nonviolent tactics during the war were previously engaged in human rights monitoring and respective awareness programs. These examples show that NGOs active in developing countries as a form of passive conflict prevention might become more active, teaching nonviolent resistance when a conflict emerges. After the war those NGOs returned to the more passive task of monitoring and human rights promotion (Amnesty Nepal, COCAP, INSEC). To discover nonviolent training during other civil wars it might be fruitful to investigate in this direction.

Further, there is evidence of indirect and unofficial methods to support activism by the international community. Examples are false flag protection or a hidden room to protect harassed activists. To give an example, one interview partner mentioned the Swiss government established a 'safe-house' next to the compound of the Swiss embassy in Kathmandu. This so called 'human rights room' served as a safe haven for leading Nepalese activists which were hunted by the conflict parties. Several interview partners told similar unconventional stories of support by the international community. The U.N. office in Kathmandu in this regard had a secret task force to support activists and especially several European embassies were mentioned. Unfortunately, it was not possible to verify those
anecdotes with additional interviews including those organizations.

Concerning motives of NGOs, I found that at the beginning in most cases it was empowerment and helping conflict affected citizens to raise their voices with nonviolent tactics. At a later stage of the conflict it was in some instances a unification attempt to unite different voices for an end of the civil war or in general a striving for greater goals. Other organizations also transformed their motives over the civil war years from being a helping hand to overcome war trauma to an active fight for peace.

As argued and in accordance to findings, training occurred mostly in the capital or district headquarters, in relation to organizational capacity of NGOs. But even if the capital was relatively secure for refugees, this security did not necessarily encompass NGO personnel. All NGOs reported incidents of harassment by the insurgents and the government alike.

7.8.2 Organizations and Interviewed Personnel

The following list shows interviewed experts, organizations and their abbreviations:

**S. Adhikari** Chairman. Conflict Victims Common Platform (CVCP)

**B. Basnet** Program Manager. Advocacy Forum Nepal (AF)

**H. Joshi** Program Manager. Federation of Nepali Journalists (FNJ)

**R. Nepal** Former President. Amnesty International Nepal (AN)

**S. Nepal** Program Manager. Collective Campaign for Peace (COCAP)

**S. Risal** C.E.O. Nagarik Aawaz (NA)

**R.C. Paudel** General Secretary. Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC)

7.8.3 Interview Questions

The following central interview questions were designed according to an open-ended interview style which is on the one hand structured in terms of the wording of the questions while still the respondents are free to chose their style of answer. Participants were always asked identical questions, but the questions are worded so that responses are open-ended. This allows the participants to contribute as much detailed information as they desire and it also allows the researcher to ask probing questions as a means of follow-up (Rubin and Rubin 2011).


2. How was the decision making process in your organization during the civil war years?
3. Did your organization help/support others in conducting activism by doing workshops / other programs during the civil war years? What / How / When / Where / with whom?

4. Did your organization receive help/support in conducting activism during the civil war years? What / How / When / Where / with whom?

5. Was your organization in partnerships with other organizations? Cooperations/Common Programs etc.?

6. How did your organization finance itself during the civil war years?
8 Discussion and Conclusion

This thesis uses a combination of different quantitative and qualitative methods to investigate three research questions about nonviolent action during civil wars. In doing so it follows a rising and broad demand for the combination of different methods in civil war and (non-)violence research, as they all have their merits and allow to observe questions from different viewpoints (e.g. Greene 2005; Thaler 2017). It utilizes state-of-the-art quantitative methods (spatial panel analysis, generalized linear mixed modelling, geographically weighted regression) in a new disaggregated dataset to investigate the research questions for the first two papers. It further uses qualitative expert interviews to investigate the research question for the third paper.

8.1 Countering Guns Unarmed: Summary and Discussion of Results

The first paper of this thesis investigated Research Question 1, namely the relation between civil war violence and nonviolent action, with a spatial panel regression analysis. Previous research has shown that violence-related grievances played a major role as a motivating factor for nonviolent action, also during civil wars (e.g. Masullo 2015; Vüllers and Krtsch 2020). The data which were used to test the relation between civil war violence and nonviolent action was provided by INSEC, a human rights NGO from Nepal, and the PANC dataset created as part of this thesis.

Descriptive findings in the violence data showed that a large majority of the victims (88 percent) died because of the violence administered during the civil war. More importantly, it showed that a major part of the violent incidents did not happen because of combat fighting between civil war factions, a measure which was used in previous investigations linking civil war violence towards nonviolent action (e.g. Vüllers and Krtsch 2020). Combat fighting instead accounted only for 26 percent of the overall cases of violence in the Nepalese Civil War. Instead, over 70 percent of the violence civilians had to endure during the war was categorized as direct violence (i.e., extra-judicial killings or disappearances). These findings underscore the approach to focus on the direct incidents of violence in the analysis instead of incidents of combat fighting, where civilian casualties occurred due to conflict factions engaging each other. As expected, many civilians became victims of civil war violence outside of direct combat operations. Consequently, it was expected that these incidents of violence may motivate them to start nonviolent events.

A first analysis investigated the relationship of civil war violence on nonviolent activities in an OLS regression, ignoring the spatial panel structure of the data (i.e., pooling model). This model showed a significant effect indicating that across all districts and months of the civil war, an increase in violence was related to an increase in nonviolent activities. This effect was small, albeit significant, showing that for every 100 persons affected by
violence, there were seven more nonviolent activities. Further, several spatial panel regression models were computed to take the spatial and temporal structure of the data into account. The models included random effects and a spatial lag of nonviolent activities (i.e., that nonviolent activities in one district are influenced by nonviolent activities in neighboring districts) as well as different control variables for the various Nepalese districts. The first approach to account for further variables that might explain nonviolent activities was to include time-invariant control variables varying between districts from a census. These control variables were population, percentage of disadvantaged ethnic groups, road density, as well as wealth. The effect of civil war violence on nonviolent activities remained significant when these control variables were included in the pooling model and the random effects model.

As the only control variables for which data was available during the Nepalese Civil War were time-invariant and therefore could not account for differences in districts that might vary over the course of the civil war, additionally fixed-effects spatial panel regression models were computed as a further approach to test the link between violence and nonviolent activities. By introducing fixed effects for spatial and time units, the influence of unobserved factors that varied between districts and months of the civil war was thus controlled for and it was tested whether the effect of violence on nonviolent activities was present in each district and month of the conflict. Again, the model showed a positive relation between violence and nonviolent activities. Although the effect is relatively small, it proves quite robust as tests for spatial dependence showed that when including both individual and time fixed effects, there was no significant remaining spatial error dependence. This underlines the robustness of the effect even when unobserved factors which might affect nonviolent activities were accounted for by the fixed effects.

To summarize, a positive relation between civil war violence and civilian nonviolent activities within the respective Nepalese districts was expected over the course of the civil war. The conducted spatial panel regression analyses point to a significant positive relationship between civil war violence and nonviolent activities when using both months as well as years of the civil war as time interval units.

This finding is in line with previous research on motivation for nonviolent action and also with some case studies investigating nonviolent action in civil wars (e.g. Gurr 2000; Masullo 2015; Nepstad 2011b). It is also in line with the few quantitative studies investigating combat fighting effects on nonviolent action in civil wars (e.g. Vüllers and Krtsch 2020). What is unique in the present analysis is the inclusion of direct incidents of civil war violence instead of focusing on combat fighting. Direct violence is at the same time the major part of violence civilians had to endure, at least for the civil war under study. What many case studies for example from Masullo (2015) or Hallward et al. (2017) or Kaplan
(2017) showed is a clear connection between life-and-death threats as a result of civil war violence or violent repression and atrocities by conflict factions in the decision by citizens to refer to nonviolent tactics (Hallward, Masullo, and Mouly 2017; Kaplan 2017; Masullo 2015). The present research now constructs a link between the overall civil war violence directed at civilians in every month and district of the war and the number of nonviolent events. Although not deterministic, this relationship shows that civil war violence could be a driving factor in the decision of war-affected civilians to conduct nonviolent action. It shows the effect not only for single successful cases which might have spawned a large nonviolent campaign, but also for small-scale nonviolent actions which might be limited to a certain rural locality and corresponding atrocities by conflict parties. Linking also those small incidents of nonviolent action to respective violence is a major benefit of the paper. Overall, this finding further emphasizes and strengthens the perspective to see citizens not merely as victims but also as pivotal actors in a civil war, who are able to react and even in some cases protect themselves.

From a policy perspective it should be noted that nonviolent action always bears the risk of violent retaliation. So to advise war-affected populations to use nonviolent tactics in every situation is certainly difficult. Nevertheless, the overall benefits of nonviolent action seem to outweigh the costs (e.g. Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Moreover, doing nothing might not be an option for many war-affected civilians, as inaction might possibly result in becoming the next victim. Thus, in terms of violence and civil-war nonviolent action it could be helpful to be aware that when violent incidents during a civil war occur, citizens in the respective localities might consider nonviolent tactics, weighing their options to use nonviolent action instead of joining a conflict faction for retaliation or fleeing the area. In such a situation, for example the distribution of information about the chances and possibilities of nonviolent action could be helpful to offer a way out of further violent persecution, raise awareness for the violence, and offer a change for compensation or even try to strive for an end of the conflict.

In general, the motivations to use nonviolent activities during a civil war might be a combination of desperation due to civil war violence and increasing difficulty to use conventional, traditional political means (e.g. Gustafson 2020). Further research in this regard could for example investigate more detailed patterns of how civilians’ access to regular political channels is hindered during the conflict and how this affects civilians’ tendencies to choose pathways of nonviolent action. Of course a precondition for such future research would be data availability on this issue, which is often severely limited during civil wars.
8.2 Beating the Empty Hand: Summary and Discussion of Results

The second paper of this thesis investigated Research Question 2, namely under which tactical or activist group particularities a state reacts violently to nonviolent action during a civil war. To do so, the paper used the disaggregated PANC dataset to its fullest extent, focusing on the single nonviolent events recorded during the Nepalese Civil War.

States reacting violently against nonviolent action is a constant threat for activist groups (e.g. Demirel-Pegg and Rasler 2020). Violent repression of unarmed protesters can intimidate participants, destroy activist organizations, and hinder mobilization for future nonviolent actions during the war (e.g. Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). We know much less about cases where nonviolent action fails to gain momentum and gather massive support (e.g. Davenport 2014a). In addition, many findings from the quantitative literature on state repression have not yet found their way into the literature on civil resistance (Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017). Investigations from the civil war dimension are especially sparse, where violence against activists might not be perceived amidst the ongoing war and violence-related news. A central predictor of how nonviolent action performs and evolves is its external perception and reaction. Whether and how nonviolent action is perceived by possible supporters and the general public depends to a large extent on the reaction of the regime. It is therefore important to anticipate under which conditions a regime reacts violently towards activists using nonviolent tactics during a civil war. An investigation of these conditions can serve as an indicator for activists to prepare and protect themselves. Moreover, it opens up possibilities for them to choose or prevent certain behavior and tactics which have less of a chance to induce violent regime reactions.

To test several predictors of violent regime reactions to nonviolent action, a generalized linear mixed model was computed. This model investigated the nonviolent events conducted by activists (e.g. demonstrations, strikes, picketing, blockades etc.) while taking into account that these events were clustered in Nepalese districts. Factors on the event-level expected to predict the likelihood of a violent regime reaction were whether an event was organized by multiple groups, whether it was highly visible due to participation of media representatives or international NGOs, whether it posed a political threat to the regime, the degree to which it disturbed the public order, and the degree to which violence was used by activists.

Descriptive results showed that the regime used violence during nonviolent events for about every fifth event recorded in the PANC dataset. Factors most strongly predicting a violent regime reaction were a moderate or high disturbance of the public order and moderate or high violence employed by activists. If nonviolent events posed a moderate disturbance of the public order (e.g., activities that involved rallies or demonstrations), the likelihood of a violent regime reaction was 18 times higher compared to nonviolent events.
that did not disturb the public order (e.g., sit-ins, hunger strikes, or peace processions). In turn, for nonviolent events that were a high disturbance (e.g., torch rallies, road blocks, or picketing) the likelihood of violent regime reactions was 16 times higher. The larger odds ratio for moderate levels of disturbance of the public order compared to high levels might be attributed to the overall higher frequency of nonviolent events with medium disturbance (41%) compared to high disturbance (29%) in the dataset.

Also noticeable was that in most cases the correlations between the predictor variables were relatively low ($r < .20$). This indicates that the predictors mainly provide independent explanations for violent regime repression.

Among the district-level control variables included in the generalized linear mixed model, ethic cleavages and wealth did not significantly predict violent regime reactions, whereas population density had a small, but significant positive effect, indicating that violent regime reactions were slightly more likely in districts with a higher population density.

The level of disturbance of the public order and the level of violence employed by activists seem to play a much larger role in predicting violent regime reaction than activities being in political opposition to the regime or activities being highly visible. Although these variables also significantly and positively predicted the likelihood of violent regime reaction, they produced much smaller odds ratios. In addition, whether an event was organized by single or multiple groups did not significantly contribute to whether the regime reacted violently to nonviolent action. However, this result should be interpreted with caution due to the overall low number of events with high visibility.

The findings of the generalized linear mixed model were corroborated by an additional analysis that did not only take into account that nonviolent events were clustered in Nepalese districts, but included an analysis of geographic variability in effects. Results of the geographically weighted regression showed that in a global model, results were very similar to the results of the generalized linear mixed model. Furthermore, local regression analyses showed that for the most influential predictors, effects were on average positive and significant and even the minimal local effects were positive. This means that for political threat, disturbance of the public order, and violence by participants of the nonviolent events, there was geographical variability in effect sizes, but on a local level the effects pointed always in the same direction.

In sum, the results of the second paper speak strongly for the importance of certain tactical and activist group particularities of nonviolent events as reliable predictors of the likelihood of violent regime reactions during the Nepalese Civil War. Challenging the regime with nonviolent events which disturb the daily life might explain why the regime reacts violently more reliably than a possible fear of the jiu-jitsu effect, which describes a public backlash because of the violence which can result for example in an regime loosing
popular support.

For nonviolent activist groups during a civil war, the results of the second paper point to the recommendation not to rely on tactics with high disturbance of the public order, if it is desired to prevent a violent regime reaction. Although the possibility of a public outrage or a loss of regime supporters exists, there is still a high possibility that nonviolent activism fails if regimes react violently. In general, it might be smart to use tactics which provoke less retaliation, and not to employ violence as this not only contributes to regime repression but to overall failure of nonviolent resistance. Some might argue that state violence is a necessary factor to spark the public outrage which fuels nonviolent action to become massive campaigns. But overall activists which use mainly nonviolent tactics are more successful in reaching their goals (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Masullo (2015) in investigating nonviolent actions during the Colombian Civil War found that those communities which were acting in a completely nonviolent manner were more successful in resisting the conflict factions (Masullo 2015). In this case, it means the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) did not attack and kill them during the war (ibid.). His finding is in line with the findings of the second paper in this thesis, which found violent behavior of activists as one predictor of a state trying to attack the activists. Therefore, the results of this investigation are in line with previous findings concerning effectiveness of activism and nonviolent campaigns (e.g. Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013). Additionally, if a high disturbance of the public order by nonviolent activism is desired to raise attention and possibly higher participant mobilization, the results of this paper can help to anticipate and prepare for possible regime repression. For activists, proper documentation of violence to spur visibility as as well as medical and judicial assistance might be suggested in such a case.

8.3 Interaction and Nonviolent Infusion: Summary and Discussion of Results

The third paper of this thesis investigated Research Question 3, namely whether and how NGO support affected the development and organization of nonviolent events and campaigns during a civil war. Building on the findings of the previous two papers of this thesis concerning the relation of civil war violence, nonviolent action, and violent regime repression, the third paper used a qualitative approach based on expert field interviews to gain more detailed insights into the role of NGOs for nonviolent action during the Nepalese Civil War.

It remains an ongoing puzzle how conflict-affected citizens were able to organize themselves and facilitate nonviolent action during a progressing civil war, and how the decision for nonviolent tactics is made instead of fleeing or joining a conflict party (Chenoweth,
Hendrix, and Hunter 2019b). A possibility to investigate this is to incorporate external factors, namely organizations which might have had a supporting status, helping activists to make the decision for nonviolent instead of violent action but also could have supported activists groups over a longer time. This is explained for example by the opportunity structures approach (e.g. McAdam 2010). In this approach, the decision to use violence or nonviolence is influenced by the broader political context. While this is similar to the already depicted description of nonviolence as a form of political contention, opportunity structures include structural factors such as regime type, elections, post-Cold War period, human rights organizations, and international support as some influential factors in promoting nonviolent resistance (Karakaya 2018). Especially concerning human rights organizations and international support of nonviolence, we now know that on the international level countless organizations are engaged with actively promoting tactics of nonviolence to oppressed citizens in need. The 'Albert Einstein Institution' or the 'Center For Applied Nonviolent Actions and Strategies' are examples of such organizations that search for oppressed civil society groups, training them in nonviolent tactics to resist oppression. Between 1953 and 2003 the number of organizations promoting nonviolent activism increased from about 100 to over 1,00 (Schock et al. 2015). Therefore, it can be expected that such organizations would be inclined to offer their knowledge and support also to conflict-affected populations in civil wars where oppression by conflict factions occurs. This was investigated for the Nepalese Civil War with interviews with leading representatives of NGOs involved in supporting and training of activists during the conflict. With a sample of seven NGOs, several expectations about the role of NGOs in nonviolent action were investigated.

The interviews supported some of the expectations but others were not met. Not all of the interviewed NGOs offered direct training in nonviolent tactics when they were founded. For example the Advocacy Forum (AF) offered capacity building and legal support in the beginning, but only later directly taught how to orchestrate tactics. But for the other NGOs (INSEC, Nagarik Aawaz, Amnesty Nepal, COCAP, FNJ, and the CVCP) this was a major, central objective. Organizations like Amnesty Nepal or INSEC existed long before the civil war, others like COCAP, NA or AF were founded during the conflict to support war-affected citizens. This shaped how and where they trained activist groups. Organizations like FNJ or COCAP started with single goals and transformed or extended their objectives as their own and their clients’ capacity expanded. INSEC or COCAP conducted radio programs for human rights or indirectly used educational programs to infuse the population with nonviolent tactics. In sum, it can be argued that the interviewed organizations worked increasingly with conflict-affected groups as their number increased because of the civil war, but those groups remained not necessarily in regions where the atrocities occurred. Instead, training was mostly conducted in the district headquarters or
even the capital.

The relatively 'young' organizations interviewed were founded around 2000 - 2002, when state forces struggled against the Maoists and the army was first used against the insurgents (Hutt 2004). This was accompanied by a rise in civil war violence including atrocities among civilians. Consequently, more refugees fled to Kathmandu and were empowered by NGOs like Nagarik Aawaz or the Advocacy Forum. Also the more established human rights monitoring NGOs (INSEC, AN) concentrated their efforts on conflict victims as their numbers increased. Programs of human rights NGOs shifted from monitoring and naming of perpetrators of atrocities to active support and prescription of nonviolent tactics to victims. Thereby they risked retaliation by conflict parties and ultimately some activists were killed or fled the country. Amnesty Nepal for example started international awareness and fundraising campaigns to intensify support of victim groups at that time.

Regarding what was taught to citizens, the interviewed organizations used various nonviolent tactics mostly tending to the capabilities and goals of their clients. Those could also shift according to the development of groups and new goals. Some initial tactics included legal actions and protests for financial compensation and sit-ins in front of offices to confront decision makers (e.g. AF). Later tactics included peace processions for an end of the war (e.g. COCAP). The FNJ might be the exception, their pressure building campaigns focused on journalists with the constant goals of democracy and press freedom. Nagarik Aawaz' efforts best illustrated a client-centered approach. They organized street dramas for adolescents, containing peace-songs for small children, whereas regular protests and sit-ins were conducted with young adults and women. Most organizations made strategic decisions regarding which tactic to use together with the receiving organization.

Additionally expected and discovered was that the concept of nonviolent action sometimes spread after it was taught. Groups who achieved their goals with nonviolent action might spread their tactics to similar groups in need. In two examples trained groups acted as such envoys of nonviolence. First, Suman Adhikari founded his orphan organization with the support and training from Amnesty Nepal. As his organization progressed and gained more capability he founded the Conflict Victims Common Platform which then trained and united other victim groups using nonviolent tactics. Second, Nagarik Aawaz build up youth groups from scratch. Many of the groups formed own organizations after being trained by Nagarik Aawaz, and some of them continued to train similar conflict-affected youth during the war. Today, they have close ties to Nagarik Aawaz, a network to rely on if the organization starts own nonviolent campaigns.

Based on the interviewed experts, the results show that training and supporting of activists by third actors, here in the name of nongovernmental organizations, occurred during the Nepalese Civil War. The paper explains with the seven examples how training was
orchestrated, where it happened, how targets were chosen as well as how citizens were accompanied during the activism phases. From goal-setting to mobilization, support of housing and to overcome war trauma support was provided, as well as legal support and the backing of the international community.

This does not mean that nonviolent activism in the Nepalese Civil War resulted exclusively because of training by NGOs. Respectively, there would not be enough NGOs in Nepal to explain the emergence of the thousands of nonviolent action events during the war. Instead, the paper illuminates examples of training and what the motives for training and support were. Further it is expected that the organizations interviewed were not the only organizations which were involved in nonviolent action promotion and support during the Nepalese Civil War. The results show that most interviewed NGOs tended especially to victims of civil war violence, namely refugees who fled to the urban, still more or less secure hubs of the country during the civil war. This is in line with the findings of the first paper, where a connection between civil war violence and nonviolent action in the Nepalese districts was discovered. Findings from the third paper added support of NGOs as a form of mediator and helping hand for some of the refugees who decided to become activists. The interviews outlined how valuable the support for the respective groups was, how it influenced their goal-setting, and their choice of the path of nonviolence. Some organizations started for example with local demands for compensation due to losses by conflict factions, this extended to demands for persecution of perpetrators of war atrocities and incorporated in the end also a demand for ceasefire, negotiations, and an end of the war. In the interviews it was mentioned that other parts of the society like personnel of European embassies played an additional role in active protection and support of human rights activists. Thus, focusing on NGOs is only the first step in investigating support of nonviolent activism during civil war. Religious organizations were mentioned in other cases responsible for the decision to use nonviolence (e.g. Masullo 2015). Some of the trained and built-up activist organizations are still active today, more than ten years after the war, monitoring and fighting for human rights and for the uplifting of minority groups. This is a win-win situation for the NGOs who supplied support and training, as they can now rely on the groups they helped to create during the war for example as support for their own human rights campaigns. This speaks strongly for the long-term positive effects of civil nonviolent action both for the active civilians during the war and also for the current Nepalese society.

8.4 Limitations and Generalizability of Results

The investigations conducted in the three papers presented for this thesis are not without limitations. First, the PANC dataset created for the first two papers in this thesis is based on local newspaper reports. These local data sources allow a new level of detail
regarding nonviolent event research compared to only relying on reports of international news agencies. Nevertheless, one limitation of the PANC dataset is its reliance on English-language local newspapers. It would have been ideal to also include reports from diverse, local-language newspapers, which was not feasible due to language barriers. Further, it was crucial to find newspaper sources which reported throughout the country over the whole time period of the civil war, which many of the smaller, local newspapers did not do. However, although local newspapers capture more nonviolent events than international news agencies, they might nevertheless have similar reporting bias concerning events which included clashes for example with police and security forces (Barranco and Wisler 1999).

In addition, newspapers are known to under-report certain nonviolent activities, especially dispersed tactics such as occupations or boycotts (Day, Pinckney, and Chenoweth 2015). If for example a boycott or strike is reported for a single day and continues for a number of days, it is not certain that a newspaper reports on every consecutive day about the event. This might be due to space constraints in newspapers but also maybe due to concerns about loosing interest of readers who might not want to read about the same event every single day. Further, if a lot of violent incidents occurred during a day, for example terrorist attacks, there is less space in newspapers for other news like nonviolent events (Scott 2001). Consequently and certainly, there might have been more nonviolent events in Nepal during the Civil War than captured in the PANC dataset.

Further, the Nepalese district-level control variables in the first and second paper are based on a census in Nepal from 2001. Unfortunately, this data is only a snapshot during the civil war and due to war restrictions and a lack of useful data, getting additional demographic control variables for every district, for the first paper even on the month level, was not possible. This implies that for the first paper, the control variables respectively did not vary between the district/month analysis in the spatial panel model, meaning the amounts of violence and nonviolent events did change much more across the civil war months than the control variables. This was also the reason that the control variables could only be introduced as time-invariant predictors in the random effects model. Ideally, time-varying control variables like numbers of refugees per district and month of the civil war should have been included in the analysis. The same is true for other variables like monthly data on destruction of infrastructure or the availability of information channels for example about rebel behavior in contested areas. However, such data was not available to a sufficient extent for the Nepalese Civil War, similar to other civil wars, as public administration structures (e.g., to conduct regular demographic surveys) are often disrupted during periods of civil war.

Another limitation concerning the reliance on newspaper reports as a data source, especially with regard to the second paper, is that violent regime retaliation during nonviolent events
could have been downplayed or even exaggerated in the newspaper reports, depending on whether journalists were present themselves or had to rely on information by activists or the police. To address this, a binary dependent variable (i.e., whether violence occurred or not) was computed instead of using casualty numbers or further differentiations which could imply over- or under-reporting. Information regarding numbers of participants of nonviolent events was not included in the analysis for similar reasons, as the resulting information bias might be high or at least the accuracy of the reported information could not be ascertained. Indeed, for most nonviolent events receiving information about the actual number of participants is difficult as the activists, their possible antagonists in regime and media, as well as the police are known to increase or decrease activist numbers in their respective favor. Despite these shortcomings, it is likely that reports by local newspapers are still the best known sources to acquire reliable quantitative event-based information on nonviolent activism, especially in light of the general data scarcity during a civil war.

Further, regarding the second paper and violent state reactions towards activism during a civil war, it has to be noted that generally speaking, a lot of harassment occurs not only during the nonviolent events, but also afterwards or between events. Research concerning activist repression has shown that this is often the case (e.g. Demirel-Pegg and Rasler 2020). There exist examples where movements get infiltrated, activists get harassed by the regime and arrested or even killed not just during the protests (e.g. Davenport 2014b). Respectively, as the investigation and database is event-based, it was not possible to cover regime violence or repression against activists outside the actual nonviolent events. During the interviews conducted for the third paper, most interview partners told stories of severe harassment of activists by the regime as well as the insurgents during the Nepalese Civil War. Some told anecdotes of how leading human rights activists and activist group leaders were abducted, jailed, disappeared, or even had to flee the country, and as expected not all forms of mentioned harassment occurred during the nonviolent events. Linked to that point would be the inclusion of insurgent violence towards nonviolent activist events which was also not included in the second paper. Although it would have been ideal to also include violent insurgent reactions towards activists into the analysis, the newspaper sources did focus mostly on interactions between activists and the police and other state security forces. If violence towards activists from the side of the Maoists insurgents occurred, this might have taken place mostly outside the nonviolent events, so it was not possible to cover it in the paper due to the event focus. Focusing on insurgent violent reaction towards activists indeed could be an additional question for a further research project, which could rely for example on qualitative methods.

A limitation of the third paper is its very small sample of NGOs interviewed. In addition, the kinds of interviewed NGOs were relatively narrow. Most of them deal with human
rights promotion or legal advice. These kinds of NGOs were theoretically expected to be the central actors in the field of nonviolent action promotion. However, initially, a broader sample of organizations was desired and contacted (for example including Unions), but the final selection of interviewed organizations represent those which were willing to talk about their investment in nonviolent action promotion during the civil war. In general, as the civil war has been over for more than ten years, speaking with contemporary witnesses of activists and NGO personnel involved in support and training was difficult. However, the time passed since the end of the civil war made interview cooperation perhaps more likely as interviewed persons could talk more freely about events and programs in the distant past than maybe shortly after the war, without having to fear personal disadvantages or even harassment by certain parties involved in the war. Speaking about topics and training programs that took place ten years ago of course poses other difficulties regarding available NGO personnel to be interviewed as well as memory issues of the persons interviewed. Expert interviews were chosen due to the fact that detailed knowledge about decision structures as well as operational processes within an NGO was necessary to investigate Research Question 3 of this thesis. This restricted interview possibilities, for example interviewing multiple people from every NGO to verify the information stated in the interviews.

Another shortcoming of the third paper is that it was not possible to interview activist groups which were trained but ceased to exist because of failure of training or their inability to facilitate nonviolent events. Like for example case studies investigating successful campaigns or groups’ nonviolent action, this paper can only show positive examples of training of nonviolent activists. However, it was told during some interviews what there were difficulties during training for example in overcoming war trauma and some refugees’ desire for violent retaliation against their perpetrators of atrocities. It was not reported that NGOs utterly and generally failed in their attempts to support activist groups, which clearly stems also from the fact that present and former representatives of NGOs were interviewed which are expected to present the organizations which they worked for in the best light possible, rather reporting examples of success than failure. It was tried to lessen this possible positive storytelling bias by interviewing NGOs with diverse backgrounds.

Last, particularities of the case of the revolutionary, grievance and identity-based Nepalese Civil War may hinder generalization of the findings to for example some greed-based civil wars, where the conflict factions are more inclined to use harsh violence against opposing civilians probably even if they use nonviolent action to raise their voices. The tolerance of the conflict factions to not outright kill every nonviolent activist in the Nepalese Civil War was probably also partly due to the fact that the Maoists wanted to win the ’hearts and minds’ of the population (e.g. Pettigrew 2013). They had a strong political goal, the
establishment of their so-called 'People’s Republic' for which they to some extent needed a broader support of the population. Respectively, in the newspaper reports coded for the PANC database, there exist examples where the Maoists punished lower-level officers for mistreatment of civilians after nonviolent action.

In cases of 'greed-based' civil wars, where conflict factions are merely interested in controlling a small part of the country for example to extract natural resources, the cost/utility calculation for civilians to start nonviolent action in this terrain would have maybe been different in terms of personal risks and security, if a conflict faction is less concerned with its reputation among the local population. This does of course not imply that nonviolent action is doomed to fail under other civil war conditions. In contrast more and more successful cases were revealed in recent years from varying civil war settings and against different opponents (e.g. Kahf 2020; Kaplan 2017; Masullo 2015). Nonviolent tactics could be successfully used against the FARC in Colombia, which relied on ransom, illegal mining, and drug distribution to fund itself despite its Marxist ideology background (e.g. Masullo 2015). Further, protests can be successfully organized against ‘Daesh’ (the Islamic State) which had arguably less inhibitions to kill dissident civilians than the Maoists in Nepal (e.g. Kahf 2020). Maybe different tactics and security considerations are necessary though, depending on the situation, the visibility of possible retaliation, and the violent capability of conflict factions. This might also be relevant for the other findings of the papers. Nongovernmental organizations encouraging war-affected populations to facilitate nonviolent action might be to a large extent dependent on the tolerance of conflict factions and the current regime of the country affected by the civil war. If they are not tolerated in an area, they might work not less efficient from less violent neighbor areas or the capital. If allowed, their benefit for the encouragement of nonviolent action might be universal.

8.5 Policy Implications

The first paper of this thesis has shown that civil war violence does not only produce victims and devastation, but can also be linked to nonviolent events which could follow shortly afterwards. This strengthens the pivotal role of ordinary citizens during a conflict, besides being victims and recruitment pools for conflict factions. It shows that they are not necessarily passive recipients of violence or other forms of repression during the conflict. Further, if they decide to react not solely with a decision to flee the area, endure the violence, or join the conflict as fighters, but to stand up with nonviolent means, this can have important consequences for the course and outcome of the civil war.

From a policy perspective it can be desirable to encourage a civilian decision to use nonviolent tactics which can have both positive effects for them as well as for the conflict resulting in less further violence and casualties (e.g. Chenoweth 2020). Indeed, various
nongovernmental organizations as well as the international community are already invested in the promotion and support of nonviolent action which could be encouraged. As the third paper has illuminated, for the Nepalese Civil War nonviolent action support happened during the conflict and outlined which positive effects this had for the trained groups which received support. In the second paper it was found that closeness to rebel organizations and high disruptive behavior lead to a higher possibility for the state to react violently. For future activists in similar situations, this can certainly be used as a hint how to behave, frame or organize nonviolent action events, if the goal is to avoid a violent state reaction. Especially in an early state, when activist groups do not have a certain strength in numbers or public attention, this might be helpful for them to survive (e.g. Demirel-Pegg and Rasler 2020).

Citizens using nonviolent action during conflict in general is a desirable development considering the broadly recognized positive aspects of nonviolent action in contrast to a violent reaction, which may induce further violence from conflict factions and maybe even prolong a conflict. This goes hand in hand with for example the democratic effects and further long-term benefits of nonviolent resistance. For example Bayer et al. (2015) outlined that democratic regimes which experience nonviolent resistance during their transition phase survive substantially longer than regimes without having nonviolent resistance in their transition period (Bayer, Bethke, and Lambach 2015). An active civil society using nonviolent tactics during a time of conflict could have similar effects for a subsequent peace process. For the Nepalese Civil War, the overall existence of civil nonviolent resistance was certainly a benefit, not just as its massive street protests helped to end the conflict in 2006 but also in a small personal matter like for the activist groups which received compensation for civil war atrocities due to their protests (e.g. Routledge 2010; Subedi and Bhattarai 2017).

Concluding, the decisions to use nonviolence during a civil war should be further encouraged by human rights organizations, state officials as well as the international community. The ongoing scientific efforts to understand the surrounding particularities involving decisions and causalities are heartily welcomed in this still relatively young field of research.

8.6 Further Questions and Future Perspectives

It would be fruitful to incorporate data concerning internally displaced persons (IDP) within a civil war country into the investigation concerning nonviolent action onset. In the third paper, the results showed that some NGOs tended especially to internally displaced persons, on the one hand motivating and supporting them to choose nonviolent tactics and on the other hand supporting them in their orchestration of nonviolent action. It would be interesting to see if nonviolent action onset corresponds with rising IDP numbers in certain areas during a civil war.
Future investigations linking civil war violence and nonviolent activism could include more information on victim particularities and background information, maybe also differentiating between different kinds of atrocities, if corresponding data is available. For example it could be interesting to investigate whether targeting certain demographics violently produces more nonviolent events than others, or whether lethal violence produces more or less nonviolent events than non-lethal violence.

For the investigations of violent reactions to nonviolent action, it would be interesting to investigate not only state reactions towards nonviolent action but also to incorporate reactions by other conflict factions. During the PANC coding, I came across examples from incidents where the Maoists reacted violently against nonviolent action, but these incidents were sparse and it was seldom reported, too seldom to conduct a quantitative analysis so such an additional variable was not created in the dataset. It might be the case that a large percentage of the violent reactions towards activists performed by the Maoists happened outside the nonviolent events, but this certainly could as well be true for actions of the regime's security forces. Still, although a large majority of the nonviolent action was directed against the state or its entities, it would be interesting to discover particularities like other conflict party reactions.

In general, it would be desirable to extend this research contribution to further civil wars, conducting similar disaggregated analyses in other conflicts. Some interesting investigations are already conducting such efforts (Vüllers and Krtsch 2020). This thesis investigated nonviolent event onset in relation to civil war violence, state reaction towards nonviolent events, as well as third-party support of NGOs of activist groups. These are only a small fraction of research questions that are theoretically possible regarding nonviolent action in civil wars. For the Nepalese Civil War, the dataset (PANC) still offers valuable information on other variables that were not part of the present analyses, which can hopefully be utilized in further studies concerning nonviolent action in the Nepalese Civil War and civil war in general.

Much still remains unclear concerning the link between citizens' motivation and facilitation of nonviolent action. Although the last paper showed how NGO training and support occurred during the civil war, it is likely only a fraction of the overall efforts which existed not just by NGOs but maybe also like for example Masullo (2015) in his case study outlined for religious organizations (Masullo 2015). Thus, future studies should broaden the scope to other organizations that might have supported nonviolent action during the Nepalese Civil War.
9 Author Contribution

For my thesis, respectively for the first two papers of my PhD, I built a new dataset for the analyses. For the civil war context, no disaggregated nonviolent dataset on the event-level was available at the start of my PhD. Consequently, I had to build up a dataset for which I decided together with my first supervisor Dr. Johannes Vüllers, to choose the Nepalese Civil War, as he was previously able to acquire the raw data, the newspaper articles during a field trip in Nepal. I coded all of the nonviolent events within PANC from scratch and by hand with the help of thousands of pages of Nepalese newspapers. I was assisted in the planning of the project by my supervisor, but the coding and cleaning of the dataset took me about one year and was exclusively done by myself. During that time I developed the research questions I wanted to investigate with the dataset concerning patterns and origins of nonviolent action during the civil war. My second supervisor, Dr. Karsten Donnay, advised me that the dataset would be suitable to make unique contributions about spatial and time dependency regarding nonviolent action in a way that I would be able to conduct a spatial panel analysis to answer my first research question. I familiarized myself with the required statistical software R and subsequent spatial analytical tools like 'Qgis' and 'geoda' and learned to conduct a spatial panel analysis testing the relation between civil war violence and nonviolent action which resulted in the first paper of my PhD. I conducted the spatial panel analysis, did robustness checks, and inclusion of control variables. I wrote the manuscript for the first paper and received feedback from my supervisors.

For the second paper I again relied on the PANC dataset to conduct a multi-level analysis/geographically weighted regression on the nonviolent event-level investigating under which circumstances the state reacted violently to nonviolent action. I developed the idea for this paper together with my first supervisor Dr. Vüllers. The data transformation, development of expectations, operationalization, inclusion of second-level control variables and subsequent analyses were done by myself. I wrote the manuscript for the second paper and received feedback from my supervisors.

From the beginning of the PhD I wanted to go beyond the PANC dataset and additionally use qualitative research methods, as not all questions which appeared concerning early nonviolent action motivations could be investigated with the PANC dataset and quantitative data analyses. The question that interested me the most for the third paper was how the idea to choose nonviolent action gets in the mind of citizens during a civil war. I realized that a direct approach to speak with actual activists would be fruitful to answer this question. Consequently, I planned a field trip to Nepal to interview organizations and activist groups which conducted nonviolent actions or provided support or training in nonviolent action during the Nepalese Civil War. This field trip was funded by the DFG project of Dr. Vüllers. I developed the expectations and interview questions to
investigate the third research question. I made contact with NGOs and activist groups and travelled in March 2018 to Nepal to conduct the expert interviews, together with Dr. Vüllers who was engaged in a different field research himself. I was accompanied to my first interview by Dr. Vüllers and did all following interviews by myself. I contacted my interview partners, conducted the interviews, analyzed and transcribed the collected interview material, and wrote also the manuscript for the third paper. The manuscript was submitted to Nonviolent Resistance Journal, where it is currently in revision.
10 References


