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Urban Development in Mega-Cities in Developing Countries
Potentials of Citizen Participation in Planning and Managing Urban
Development

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List of Abbreviations

BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit
CBO	Community Based Organization
CDS	Cities Development Strategy
e.g.	exempli gratia (for example)
etc.	et cetera
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
Ibid	ibidem
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PB	Participatory Budget
POSDCORB	Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordination Reporting, Budgeting
PT	Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores)
UMP	Urban Management Programme
UNCHS	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNPD	United Nations Population Division
WCED	World Commission of Economic Development
WDR	World Development Report

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1. Potential Benefits of Citizen Participation in Planning in Mega-Cities

1.1 Approaching the Topic

Continuing urbanization and especially the growth of large cities are going to be among the most important challenges for developing countries in the future. Within the next 30 years, urban areas in developing countries are forecasted to double the number of their inhabitants by gaining 2 billion new urbanites. The number of large cities in developing countries¹ is expected to rise from 274 in the year 2000 to 426 by the year 2030 (UNPD (United Nations Population Division) 2001). On the one hand, urbanization and growth of large cities offer potential benefits for developing countries, but on the other, urbanization comes along with huge problems and challenges. It is crucial for developing countries to respond to and to cope with urbanization and fast growth proactively and effectively.

In this paper I am suggesting that effective and efficient management and planning of urban affairs is the most important variable in responding successfully to the challenges of fast growth. In doing so I am following recent theoretical approaches which are suggesting that urban management and planning are the critical variables which decide on the future success or failure of the gigantic urban areas in developing countries (Prud'homme 1996:100). This new approach is contrary to former believes, which pictured city size alone as the most important variable determining the effectiveness and efficiency of a city. It was thought that mega-cities were simply too big to be well managed, therefore the goal was to limit the growth of cities in order to gain the most benefits and keep the deficiencies as low as possible. Evidently the growth of mega-cities is accompanied by positive and negative externalities, but empirically no maximum (or ideal) city size, which would support the arguments for limiting the growth of cities, was found (e.g. World Development Report (WDR) 2003:Ch.6:2).

1.2 The Need for New Management and Planning

Undoubtedly the fast changing and manifold environment for planning and managing the development of mega-cities is characterized by a high level of complexity, dynamic and uncertainty (Frey 2002:96). But instead of arguing that it is the size which makes management and planning unfeasible the search should be for adequate management and planning techniques to counter these phenomena².

¹ Cities with more than 1 million inhabitants.

² Therefore the paper will be mainly concerned with management and planning and not with spatial rearrangements of the city or spatial city planning techniques and guidelines (like ideal population densities or techniques for preventing settlements from sprawling etc.).

While seeking solutions it has to be kept in mind that global, national and local influences make every mega-city unique within its special context, so that ideal solutions (which are supposed to work everywhere) for metropolitan management and planning are an illusion (World Bank 1996:9). Solutions should rather be tailored to the specific needs of different places in order to maximize their potentials (OECD 2001:12/Rakodi 1997). But nonetheless there are still some common characteristics and challenges for all mega-cities, such as complexity, dynamic, fast growth and uncertainty. These circumstances are representing a clear call for techniques that are flexible and open to changes (OECD 2001:12). Flexibility is a prerequisite to cope with and respond proactively and effectively to constant changes (Frey 2002:96/Stubbs/Clarke 1996:1). Current management systems in mega-cities are not able to counter the challenges they are facing; and even worse, they are neither able to respond to the citizens' demand for adequate shelter, housing and water supply nor to utilize the full economic potential of their cities. This statement implies that the task of urban management in this paper is seen in reaching two goals at the same time: on the one hand potential economic prosperity might be attained for these agglomerations and on the other social cohesion and livability for the inhabitants has to be maintained and established. Adding the dimension of sustainable use of resources makes the mission even more complex. As I will show, the management and planning modes used for urban development are not satisfactory for the dynamic and manifold environment found in mega-cities. The result of the "*daunting management systems in place*" (Hall 1998:17-36) are vast areas of shanty towns, unequal distribution of services and a growing fragmentation within the mega-city area. The bad service provision and lack of investment in infrastructure is spatially unequal distributed along socio-economic division lines throughout the cities. Overall the systems in place are threatening the economic and social base of the mega-cities (OECD 2001:12).

The most evident disadvantages of current management are seen in the fact that³ (1) responsibilities are unclear or divided among jurisdictions and functional sectors, (2) that the administration's enforcement power and revenue collection capabilities are daunting, (3) that decisions and plans are made on top of the hierarchical state or city government apparatus and are neither transparent nor accountable, (4) that access to decision-making and planning processes is unequally distributed among rich and poor citizens, (5) that adequate informational input in planning processes is missing, (6) that rigidity and long time frames make plans

³ The arguments listed here are mainly taken from: (Aguilar/Ward 2003), (Clarke 1996), (Drakakis-Smith 1993) (El-Shaks 1997), (Gilbert 1996), (Gilbert/Gugler 1992), (Happe/Sperberg 2000), (OECD 2001), (Prud'homme 1996), (Rakodi 2001), (Samol 1999), (Wekwete 1997). For a more detailed description and quotes please see the relevant sections below.

unrealistic and unresponsive, (7) that “*the knowledge and practical skills*” available to city government “*for managing complex situations are insufficient*” (Genov 1998:102) and (8) that social capital is not enhanced or even destroyed.

The current unsatisfactory situation and the complex environment show that there is a strong need for new, more flexible approaches to planning and management of urban development. There is a wide array of prerequisites and demands for a new planning and management method. Among others it should make the urban planning process more flexible, dynamic, integrated, adaptable, responsive, realistic, local community based, democratic and city-wide integrated (El-Shaks 1997:513-521/Rakodi 2001:209-223/Wekwete 1997:574/Aina 1997:420).

1.3 Research Question and Development of a New Model of Participatory Planning

The focus of interest in this paper will be on the question which potentials a participatory approach to planning and management in urban development has for overcoming or coping with major obstacles and inadequacies found in mega-cities of developing countries. To highlight the potentials of a participatory approach and to show its superiority over current approaches a model for participatory urban development in complex and dynamic environments will be developed throughout the paper. Evidently, there is no solution which might solve all problems of mega-cities but it is my goal to suggest that participation in planning and management would be able to bridge current deficits, increase social cohesion and use the social capital of the mega-city more efficiently than it is done now. The goal here is not to compile a fixed concept of participatory development but to delineate a “*framework in which metropolitan areas can be empowered to respond on an individual basis more vigorously to complex economic, environmental and societal problems*” (OECD 2001:17). The concept developed for participatory planning in this paper foresees several enlargements of existing concepts and terminologies and relies on some basic assumptions.

Firstly, in the new concept, planning and management of urban development are closely related, as urban planning is seen as planning in general and not in a narrow spatial context. Therefore the concept of urban planning will be redefined and enlarged to be capable to respond to the environment found in mega-cities. So far urban planning was seen as an expert-based linear enterprise, which derived rigid long range plans and excluded citizen participation in making plans. But urban planning has to be a continuous process, to which all citizens are having equal access. Solely, a continuous and open process with integration of urban planning and management will assure that the positive externalities of agglomerations are fully utilized and that the negative externalities of agglomeration are effectively coped with. It is claimed that

citizens' participation in the whole planning and management process of urban development⁴ can lessen the major defaults of current approaches.

Secondly, the integration of citizens into the urban planning process will follow the already existing theoretical concept of communicative planning⁵ (Healey 1996a/1996b/1998/1999). A thorough analysis of the multifarious internal structure of mega-cities and the strong outside influences will built the background in front of which participatory planning will have to function. Therefore the existing theoretical concept of communicative planning has to be enlarged and more importantly conceptualized to fit the real circumstances found in mega-cities. The notion of communicative planning is based on the theories of deliberative democracy and communicative rationality. These two theories are also going to be the main pillars of the new approach, as the creation of a communicative rationally through deliberative efforts has innate potentials to bridge current deficits in planning for urban development. Until now the concept of communicative planning has remained very theoretical and extremely vague in practical terms. But as the concept is based on political theory (democratic theory), it has the innate potential to open planning for urban development up for politics and power⁶ as crucial contextual variables. Including power and politics into urban planning is a turning point in approaching planning for urban development. Traditionally urban planning was seen as neutral and apolitical task and therefore politics and power were mainly neglected as a potential factor of influence.

Thirdly, city government will have a central role in the new approach as catalyst for the implementation of the process and the development of civic interaction and civil society. Therefore the new concept will follow Evans (1997) by implying that state-society interaction is not a zero sum game but that a certain "*state-society synergy*" exists. City government will be seen as facilitator and external agent to the participatory process.

The focus of this paper is on the development of a new enlarged concept of participatory planning and management for urban development and its application in the mega-city context. Undoubtedly, citizen participation is closely linked to other concepts, such as decentralization, sustainable development, governance or the huge literature of social capital, but in this paper other concepts will only be introduced as far as they are necessary to advance the argument for citizen participation. Obviously citizen participation cannot be the single cure to the problems of

⁴ This should relate to participation in decision-making, implementation, benefits and evaluation (Cohen/Uphoff 1980).

⁵ In this paper the terms participatory, communicative and collaborative planning will be used interchangeably.

⁶ In this paper power refers to Max Weber's (1972:28) definition: "die Chance innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf diese Chance beruht.". In English: "the probability that one actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests." (translation taken from <http://www.socsci.mcmaster.ca/soc/courses/soc2r3/weber/weberidx.htm> on 12.04.2003).

mega-cities, but it has to be part of a wider, holistic reform of how urban development management and planning is done. Especially good urban governance and decentralization are crucial approaches which have to be seen in close connection to participation. But the concentration of this paper is on the integration of people into planning and management processes in order to make them more responsive, efficient, just and realistic to ensure an effective development of the city and to cope more efficiently with the mega-cities' problems than the systems in place.

1.4 Main Underlying Hypothesis and Expected Benefits

The underlying hypothesis of the concept developed here is that broad citizen participation increases the efficiency and efficacy of planning and managing urban development in a complex environment such as in mega-cities. The approach of having broad citizen participation to counter complexity is contrary to older beliefs favoring technocratic specialization as means to deal with complexity (Utzig 1999:20). But it is assumed that only a complex solution, relying on deliberation among all actors and the creation of a common perception of reality offers the potential to respond effectively to the multifaceted problems urban development is facing. Besides the expected efficiency and efficacy gains, it is assumed that participation has the potential to augment social equity in service provision throughout the city.

In this paper urban management is considered to be efficient and effective when it is (according to Davey 1996a:1) (1) responsive to the consequences of fast growth and fosters the ability to plan and deliver service in pace with the changing circumstances, (2) sensitive to the needs of the urban poor (shelter, basic needs, employment), (3) technically competent in investment operation and maintenance of infrastructure, (4) efficient in use of financial, human and physical resources and (5) financially viable. Furthermore a redirection of the flow of resources towards communities and neighborhoods of the city which were excluded until the introduction of participatory processes are considered as rough indicator for a more equitable and socially just urban landscape. Additionally to the positive effects on urban planning and management, participation also has the potential to enhance social cohesion and provides a crucial contribution to democratic learning among the citizens.

I will show that citizen participation might increase efficiency, efficacy and equity in the light of a complex and dynamic environment found in mega-cities due to several reasons innate in deliberative processes. Participation of all inhabitants has the potential to⁷:

- (1) Improve the information and knowledge base for planning and decision-making.

⁷ The arguments listed here are mainly taken from: (Berry et al. 1993), (Cole 1973), (Dienel 1991/1978), (Frey 2002), (Healey 1996a/b/1998), (Link/Federwisch 1995), (OECD 2001), (Potter 1985), (Pretty 1995), (Prud'homme 1996), (World Bank 1996). For a more detailed description and quotes please see the relevant section below.

- (2) Increase the planning capacity of urban government (quantitatively and qualitatively).
- (3) Create citizens' ownership and commitment to plans and projects.
- (4) Enhance the relevance and responsiveness of the planning process.
- (5) Promote social cohesion and a sense of community.
- (6) Change the power relations in the city.
- (7) Foster legitimacy as well as transparency and accountability.
- (8) Be a first step in democratic learning and acceptance of different world views.

The claim that a deliberative effort has the innate potential to increase efficiency and efficacy of planning and to guarantee a more equitable planning and management outcome will briefly be empirically tested in a concluding section on the Participatory Household in Porto Alegre, Brazil.

2. Seeking Conceptual Clarity: Urban Planning, Urban Development and Urban Management

As this paper is going to promote the idea that citizen participation in planning for urban development might be a solution for tackling the complex problems cities in developing countries are facing, it is necessary, in the first place, to specify what exactly is meant by planning for urban development, so that it becomes clear in what citizens are intended to participate.

To shed light on the new approach developed here I have to explain in more detail the intermingled concepts of urban management, urban planning and urban development. Unfortunately, the literature on developing countries provides only blurred boundaries between the overlapping definitions for these concepts, as urban problems have been approached from various fields of study.

2.1 Urban Planning – Leaving Architecture and Engineering

The origin of urban planning is primarily associated with physical and spatial planning (Rakodi 1997:568). It has its roots in architecture and engineering and was primarily concerned with the “*orderly, aesthetic and healthy layout of buildings and land uses*” (Devas/Rakodi 1993:41). From this perspective urban planning is “*concerned with the spatial development of a town or city (...)*” (Evert 2001:593) e.g. its “*(...) land use and space-dependent social and economic policies*” (Johnson 1997:9). This view on urban planning is very narrow and the sole concern with “*spatial distributions of human activities*” (Albers 1983:2) is neglecting the important economic and political dimension of any planning decision.

In its original application urban planning was trapped in the so called “*rational paradigm*”⁸ (Rakodi 2001:210-212). According to the “*rational*” paradigm planners would use neutral, scientific methods and knowledge to derive desirable goals for cities; afterwards they would compile neutral plans to reach these goals and then implement them (Johnson 1997:10-11). Citizen participation is not foreseen in this way of thinking.

Over time scientific rationalism was severely criticized and the importance of economic, social and political factors was recognized. Urban planning was then rather seen as “*a means of organizing the public good of society*” (Devas/Rakodi 1993:41). Today scholars in the field of urban planning are calling for a wider conception of planning and a shift of focus towards recognition of politics, power and governance (e.g. Rakodi 2001).

Furthermore there is a demand for connecting urban planning to other crucial urban management functions such as budgeting, as in the past a lack of connecting was leading to unrealistic and financially unfeasible master plans (McGill 1998:465).

Following Rakodi (2001) the view on urban planning in this paper is going to be wider and more inclusive as the original limited spatial considerations. The full approach of participatory urban planning will be presented at the end of this section.

2.2 Urban Development – From Master Plans to Urban Management and Governance

The notion of urban development is by far more inclusive than the one of urban spatial planning. Urban Development is “*dependent upon demographic, economic and cultural factors and requirements of a city*” (Evers 2001:591). Therefore it includes the development of all functional aspects of a city like urban economics, social services, culture and education, housing, mobility and leisure (Müller-Ibold 1996:52). Obviously any urban development has a spatial dimension and therefore the connection to spatial planning has to be recognized (Rakodi 2001:574).

The theories and policies for urban development have undergone considerable change in the last 40 years. In the beginning urban development for developing countries used to be closely associated with spatial planning and the modernist idea of rational planning (Rakodi 2001:213/Werna 1995:354). In the 1960s and early 1970s large scale master plans for huge projects were set up and the integration of the community and participation of citizens was neglected. This “*master plan approach*” to urban development did not produce satisfying results. The response to the failure of “*big plans*” was that the 1970s until the mid 1980s saw the attitude changing towards a small scale (self help) projects approach. Now the community was integrated in the implementation of the projects and some local design questions (Burgess et al. 1997:152), but of course still excluded from decision and plan making. In the second half of the 1980s the

⁸ This idea will only be briefly introduced here but presented in more detail further below.

focus shifted again and long term city-wide processes became the focus of urban development with special focus on local capacity building and institutional strengthening. Since the mid 1990s the idea of urban management and governance is at the core of urban development thinking (Werna 1995:354). But still master planning with scientifically defined goals and tools to reach them is very common (Ortiz/Bertaud 2001: 239).

2.3 Urban Management - An Elusive Concept

The term urban management is frequently used but only occasionally defined and mostly poorly specified, so that there is no commonly accepted definition (McGill 1998:463). Not even the Urban Management Programme (UMP)⁹ defines the term closely. The concept is remaining vague and elusive (Werna 1995:353-356).

The confusion stems from a wide variety of academic disciplines dealing with the concept of urban management. Devas and Rakodi (1993:41) identify three major roots of existing approaches: 1) town planning 2) economic development planning and 3) municipal management. Town planning and economic development planning changed considerably from compiling rigid blue print plans to more implementation-oriented and responsive ways of executing their task (ibid). The original tasks of municipal administration are seen in maintaining the public order by relying on “*legality, rationality and authority*” (ibid:42). The classic conception was similar to the classic conception of urban planning: disinterested (“*neutral*”) experts are executing decisions made elsewhere (ibid:48).

Getting specific on Urban Management

In his more specific definition Evert (2001:591) is concluding that urban management is the steering and “*control of the development of a town or city by the means of urban development planning, due to socio-economic change*”. In a very broad sense urban management is necessary for the functioning of the city and is aimed at economic and social goals: It “*aims to ensure that the components of the system are managed so that they make possible the daily functioning of a city*” (Rakodi 1991:542) and simultaneously encourages “*the social, physical and economic development of urban areas. The main concerns of urban management then, would be intervention in these areas to promote economic development and well being, and to ensure necessary provision of essential services*” (Sharma 1989:48).

The approach towards urban management taken by the two scholars cited above is concerned with the functional dimension of the term management, but is not concerned with the

⁹ A program set up in cooperation of the World Bank, the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNHCS) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

institutional aspect of it. Adding an institutional to the functional perspective on management would imply that “*urban management refers to the political and administrative structures of cities and the major challenges they face to provide both social and physical infrastructure services*” (Wekwete 1997:528-529).

Traditionally urban management has been seen as the task of “*city hall*” and the government. But more recently this supply side approach was broadened into a more governance oriented one. This implies that the management process is opened up to the influence of civil society, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Community Based Organization (CBOs) and other stakeholders (ibid:529). This is accompanied by “*a shift from master plans to a more dynamic process of managing*” cities (ibid:529). Similarly to urban planning and development we can see an opening up towards various input groups and more flexible view of a formerly technocratic and rigid approach.

2.4 Relation Among the Concepts

There is also considerable confusion about the relation among the three concepts introduced so far, stemming from different connotations of the terms. For McGill (1998:463-467/2001:347-354) urban management is an overreaching holistic concept encompassing urban development and institution building. In his view urban development is concerned with network infrastructure development, formal/informal sector development, buildings, services and finance whereas institutional development deals with integration, decentralization, sustainability, organizational, financial, budgetary and policy development. (McGill 2001:348). For Werna (1995:353) on the other hand urban management is the most important concept *within* urban development.

Chakrabarty (2001, 331) defines urban planning as part of urban management. His perspective is in line with the content of the classical functional view of the term “*general management*” (comparable to a POSDCORB¹⁰ approach, see: Steinmann/Schreyögg 2000:8). Therefore urban management is including urban planning, organizing, staffing, leading and controlling¹¹.

Similarly to Chakrabarty, Clarke (in Devas/Rakodi 1993:43) is calling for a unification of the concepts of planning and management, whereas planning is rather concerned with anticipating and preparing for the future and urban management is the immediate range of services and a wide variety of public interventions (Devas/Rakodi 1993:44).

¹⁰ Stands for: **P**lanning, **O**rganizing, **S**taffing, **D**irecting, **C**oordination, **R**eporting, **B**udgeting.

¹¹ It is crucial to keep in mind that urban planning in Chakrabarty context has a completely different meaning than the spatial oriented approach described above.

2.5 New Approach to Planning for Urban Development - A Synthetic Concept

This section is going to delineate a new approach towards urban planning and management which will serve as fundamental component in the development of a concept for participatory planning of urban development. It is necessary to depict the new approach in detail as this defines the frame and scope in which citizens are going to take part in urban planning and management.

For the purpose of this paper urban development is defined to include the spatial, economic, social and environmental development (see above: McGill 2001) of the city. Urban management and planning are related processes responsible for the steering and controlling of the process of urban development (see above: Evert 2001/Chakrabarty 2001). In this conception urban planning and management are amalgamated. It is crucial to integrate urban planning with other management tasks, such as e.g. budgeting, as they are inherently intermingled and interwoven and a lack of coordination might lead to unrealistic and unfeasible plans.

The approach to planning which is taken here is a very wide one as the paper is concerned with the possibilities of citizen participation in the whole spectrum of management and planning of urban development. When urban management and planning are seen as intermingled then urban development has to depart from its old conception as linear process, consisting of: survey, analysis, plan and implementation, which is based on a differentiation between the steps of the process. It rather has to be defined as a kind of *cycle* of urban planning, management and policy (Devas/Rakodi 1993:45). Before this cycle is going to be introduced it is necessary to explain why policy and politics also play an important role in urban development.

Planning and managing the urban development process implies to choose between alternative development possibilities. This entails that urban planning is a form of decision and policy making as policy making is the “*process by which decisions are made about the objectives to be pursued and the actors to be taken in order to realize these objectives*” (Devas/Rakodi 1993:44). In this light any form of urban management, planning and development has a political base as it requires the selection among alternative possibilities (Wekwete 1997:547). Furthermore “*urban management and planning are political not only in the sense that they produce outcomes from which some gain and others lose but also in the sense that they are political processes for conciliating interests which cannot all be equally satisfied*” (Batley 1993:177). The traditional split between technocratic (neutral) planning by experts and political decision-making by politicians has to be seen as an artificial one, as any preference for an alternative within plan making is a political decision. Consequently it is crucial to include political and power considerations into planning.

Therefore citizen participation in planning as it will be advocated in this paper involves a certain permeability of city government for the input of civil society in decision-making processes. As a result planning and management of urban development will be seen from a governance perspective. As it was indicated in the descriptions above, the three concepts¹² have evolved over time towards a more flexible and governance oriented approach. The envisaged new model consists of a smaller role of central government, the involvement of more actors, the rejection of master plans¹³ (Wekwete 1997:537/538) and a new role of the administration as an enabler of local initiatives and civic association instead of controlling and limiting them (McCarney 1996:4). Here “*governance is the interactive relationship between and within government and non-governmental forces. It implies a blurring of differences between state, market and civil society*” (Stern 1998:38/Chaskin/Garg 1997:632 in Rakodi 2001:216)¹⁴. Therefore a governance oriented perspective on urban development is concerned with political arrangements to ensure that civil society has a say in resource allocation, decision-making is transparent, political agencies are accountable, and many different actors, formal or informal, are included (Rakodi 1997:568-570).

Up to now the point has been made that urban planning and management are converging into one intermingled concept and that a new model of urban planning and management has to consider political factors to respond more effectively to the complex urban environment.

As mentioned above urban development has to depart from its old conception as linear process towards a *cycle* of urban planning, management and policy (Devas/Rakodi 1993:45). This implies to see urban planning and management as a process embedded in politics rather than as a technical goal or product (Batley 1993:180). Besides the political implication the new cycle approach implies that planning and management are not sequential steps which can be dealt with separately. The process of urban planning and management is a continuous one, which does not have well defined beginning and predefined final stages. To act in response to the high level of complexity in mega-cities the urban planning and management process has to be open and flexible. Planning therefore is a continuous procedure which has to be flexible enough to even question its own basic assumptions, as they might be subject to change as well. Planning for urban development is no longer an act of compiling specialized, long range plans which are then implemented whatsoever; but planning is a continuous task spread throughout the management

¹² Urban Planning, Management and Development.

¹³ Instead more flexible, incremental plans.

¹⁴ More generally governance refers to “*the relationship between civil society and the state, between rulers and the ruled, the government and the governed*” (McCarney 1996:4).

process. This allows having permanent modifications and feedback loops, according to changes occurring in the environment. Implicitly, as mentioned above, a cycle approach to urban planning and management would also ensure an integration of planning with other management functions (e.g. budgeting), as the different parts of the process cannot be seen separately anymore. Such a planning, management and policy making cycle may include (according to Devas/Rakodi 1993:45):

1. Survey and Analysis

Including: e.g. estimation of needs, survey of existing situation, analysis of potential

2. Development of Strategy and Policies

Including: e.g. clarification of goals/objectives, identification of key issues, alternative strategies, benefits, consequences, prioritizing of alternatives

3. Implementation

Including: e.g. identification of implementing agencies, mobilization of resources, co-ordination of activities, specification of projects, performance measures, supervision of routine operation and maintenance figures

4. Monitoring and Evaluation

Including: e.g. monitoring of performance against targets, ex-post evaluation of performance and impact, feedback into previous stage of the cycle through information systems

The logical steps of the cycle are not meant to be necessarily sequential. The process is rather iterative with feedback loops and “*short circuits*” (Devas/Rakodi 1993:45).

Besides the gains in responsiveness and flexibility the new approach to “*urban planning, management and policy making*” does still not specify who is to carry out the planning task and how to solve conflicts over strategies and goals and where to get the needed accurate input in information from (Devas/Rakodi 1993:46). This paper suggests that this should be the shared task of all actors in the city. It implies opening up the closed, rational, scientific, expertise based decision-making and planning process of urban development to the input of all potential actors involved, such as the general public (individually and collectively), external agencies, expert consultants and expertise as well as the elected representatives and the public servants (Batley 1993:192).

Defining planning and management of development as a continuous process and calling for participation at the same time implies that the input of all actors in the city is constantly needed throughout all steps of the process. Consequently citizens cannot solely be seen as participants in

one stage of the process or just as top down information recipients, but they are full participants throughout the process with influence on the setting of the urban agenda. Planning as a permanent and interwoven enterprise needs citizen participation in all steps of the process, as it is not possible to single out steps and in contrary it would lessen the responsiveness and changeability of the process¹⁵.

Similarly to the cycle introduced here, the concept of participatory and communicative planning (e.g. Healey 1996b/1998) is arguing that a rationalist top down approach, which is relying on technocratic problem solving (Devas/Rakodi 1993:55) is not feasible anymore. Participation of all citizens is seen to provide benefits which are matching the current problems of management and planning and they will enhance the development of civil society and the process of democratization. Moreover participatory planning is also a mechanism of “*reaching decisions between differing views, claims and conflicting interests*” (Devas/Rakodi 1993:52-53).

In this part of the paper it has been shown that urban development plans cannot be static and apolitical. It has to be the result of continuous management and planning cycle with participation and input of all interest groups and civil society in the city. An urban development plan is therefore “*the product of processes of interaction between a range of parties, and in turn becomes an object, a point of reference for continuing interactions*” (Healey 1996a:282). Participation has a central role in this new approach to management and planning. In the next chapter it will become clear that participation can be advocated for different purposes and that what actually is understood as citizen participation can range from empowerment to manipulation.

Box 1: Arguments for Planning and Government Intervention

This paper is advancing the idea that city government should rely on popular participation in urban planning and development. Critics might argue that neither urban planning nor a participatory process for urban planning are needed in cities, as free markets and the free interplay of interests might reach more valuable results than an initiated participatory planning process (see Klosterman 1999). To counter these critiques I will briefly review arguments for planning and citizen participation from a pluralist and economist point of view. From an economists’ point of view one might argue that planning is unnecessary as the market is able to derive a pareto-optimal solution and any external influence might distort the optimal equilibrium, while from a pluralist point of view a free bargaining process among all actors in the city might be more efficient than one in which government intervenes. Economists are recognizing that it is necessary to intervene in markets because of market failures, public and merit goods. The most

¹⁵ Participation will be conceptualized and theorized further below.

commonly quoted reasons for government intervention are (see Klosterman 1999:151-152/Samuelson 2001:372/Batley 1996:8-10):

(1) *Public goods*, which are characterized by joint, non-rivalry consumption and non-excludability of users. Public goods cannot effectively be delivered in sufficient quantity by a market, as the possibility of free riding exists.

(2) *Externalities*, which are spillover effects of production or consumption. These side effects of production are imposing involuntary costs (negative externalities) or benefits (positive externalities) on others. Externalities are not sufficiently reflected in market transactions.

(3) *Distributional Questions*, as a pareto-optimal distribution of benefits is not a criterion for the distribution of these benefits in society. It only means that no one can gain any further benefit without making anyone else worse off, which might imply few having nearly all and the majority having little.

(4) *Merit Goods* which are regarded as beneficiary for all people and which should therefore be accessible for all citizens.

From a pluralist point of view government involvement in bargaining processes within a city is desirable for reasons of fair representation and to overcome uneven capabilities to get organized (see Klosterman 1999:156-158/Abers 2000:115-120). Main arguments for government intervention are:

(1) *To counter a systematical exclusion* of minority or low income groups. Free bargaining processes would be systematically skewed and no fair representation of all groups would be possible.

(2) *Collective Action*: It is hardly possible to provide collective goods or services that endow a large number of people with only marginal benefits through free competitive bargaining processes. The reason is that for individuals in large groups the benefits are so small that the costs of getting organized are outweighing the benefits. Consequently, small groups with special interests are able to get organized more easily than larger groups, as individual profits in small groups are quite often higher than their costs. This excursion was necessary as participatory urban planning is exactly facing the problems described here (this will be elaborated further below). Urban development causes externalities, urban services, infrastructure and plans have characteristics of a public good and problems of collective action arise when it comes to citizen intervention in the planning process (Hopkins 2001:170-186).

3. Participation – A Multidimensional Concept

3.1 Participation - Means or Goal?

In the literature (and in practice) a growing general interest in participation and participatory governance (Baiocchi 2001:44) can be ascertained and many different interpretations of the term participation exist. For the purpose of participatory and communicative urban planning the term participation has to be defined according to the participants' role in urban development.

So far the potentials of citizen participation have been shortly introduced and the concept of urban planning as a continuous process has been specified. Besides the process approach to planning it was emphasized that citizens should be participating in all stages of the planning and

management cycle. The argument here is that citizen participation has the potential to improve the efficacy, efficiency and equity of urban planning and its outcomes. But citizen participation can only lead to equitable results if all parts of the community are able to access the process of planning. On the one hand citizen participation seems to be a goal in itself as a just access to decision-making will ensure that all voices in the city are heard. On the other hand citizen participation is also a means to reach better planning.

In the theory of urban development two different schools promoting participation can be found, either seeing participation as a means to increase efficiency or as a goal and fundamental right in itself (Pretty 1997:1251). The first school, called “*instrumentalist or cost reducing perspective on participation*” (see Abers 1998b:39/Goulet 1989:166) advocates participation in order to increase efficiency and (in the context of planning) to improve the content of plans. The other school, named “*empowering or teleologist perspective on participation*” (ibid) sees participation as the fundamental democratic right of the people and stresses the superior moral value of any democratic decision over elitist decision-making.

3.1.1 The Instrumentalist Perspective – Participation as Means

The first school of “*instrumentalists*” is especially focusing on the efficiency merits of participation. Their main arguments for promoting participation are an increased mobilization and ownership of places and projects, more cost effective service delivery, greater transparency and accountability, strengthened ability of people to learn and act. The merits seen here are (see Diemel 1991:174-177/Pretty 1997/Berry, et al. 1993): (1) citizen participation improves the data basis for decisions due to a greater amount and variety of input of information, which consequently (2) increases political rationality of decisions due to heterogeneous sources of input. The involvement of citizens (3) creates a higher responsiveness and more flexibility due to new and more direct information channels from the people to the government. People are very close to the everyday project and experience the changes and deficiencies more quickly than a very rigid and remote state apparatus. The inclusion of a wide variety of actors is also expected to (4) encourage a higher rate of innovations owed to diverse inputs and discussions among different views and approaches to problems and projects. Furthermore participation of citizens in developing plans and projects bolsters the (5) legitimacy of the projects which in turn might (6) lead to an easier and faster implementation. The plans and projects are made by the people and for the people and therefore protests and differences are already eliminated or compromises have been found in the decision-making phase. It has to be seen that the merits of faster implementation are clearly related to longer efforts in the decision-making process (e.g. more time intensive). But these costs are potentially outweighed by a faster and less costly

implementation¹⁶ (Potter 1985:154). Additionally it is argued that the participatory process provides people with the possibility to (7) learn and improve their acting abilities in the framework of planning, decision-making and project design.

3.1.2 The Empowerment Perspective – Participation as Goal

The empowerment school's perspective is rather concerned with participation as the fundamental right of all citizens to get involved in determining decisions affecting their everyday lives. Principal merits of the participation process are an increased empowerment of the disadvantaged and the poor, greater reciprocal understanding and strengthened social cohesion.

The intrinsic worth of participation is identified as follows (see Dienel 1991:187-191/Pretty 1997/Berry, et al. 1993): People are (1) steering their city or administration themselves by participating in choosing the goals and projects as well as the ways how to realize them. It is the people who are in control of their administration and the progress of their projects. Partakers are gaining (2) a feeling of influencing the system. Furthermore active involvement (2) buttresses the political socialization of participants, while they are (3) exercising actively a central role in a democratic system. By participating, (4) people are learning to articulate their own interests and views and they are acquiring the ability to think in the long run about the general benefits for society. Social interaction (5) creates mutual respect and understanding for diverging world views. Interaction enables people to develop what Jean Jacques Rousseau coined "*common will of all*" (*volonté général*) instead of only an "*aggregation of all wills*" (*volonté de tous*). By collaborating (6) community cohesion is potentially enlarged and neighborhood leadership might develop. The possibility of participating (7) encourages civil society to get organized and finally (8) the balance of power within the city is changed as formerly excluded social strata or groups get organized and have access to the decision-making process.

3.1.3 Participation – Means and Goal at the Same Time

The two schools described above are not mutually exclusive. The split is rather a theoretical one. There are overlapping areas and employing participation as a means also furthers to some degree participation as goal and vice versa. The two concepts are affecting each other and are therefore interlocked. The consequences of participation cannot be seen separately: A better basis of data and higher political rationality can only be achieved by inclusion of different people and different groups, which then in turn has an effect on the social interaction within communities, learning and steering possibilities. Evidently a greater mobilization and ownership in a program

¹⁶ For a detailed example in a developed country see Carius (1997).

might lead to a greater social cohesion, a broader inclusion of more strata of society, a greater empowerment, higher transparency and accountability.

For participatory planning participation is seen from an instrumental perspective, but combined with stressing the importance of the empowering aspect. It is only through equal access to power and decision-making (empowerment) that participatory planning can unfold its big potentials (instrumentalist) to reach better urban planning and management. For participatory planning the goal is to arrive collectively at better planning for the city, but at the same time the approach emphasizes the need of taking care that just and equal access to the process of reaching the goal is crucial for the success of the planning enterprise. Therefore participation is an instrument for urban development and at the same time a special mode of urban development (Goulet 1989:172). Participatory planning implies a people centered approach to urban development, which is oriented towards basic human needs, self reliance and active presentation of cultural diversity (Goulet 1989:168). As mentioned above participation has the potential to increase efficiency, efficacy and equity at the same time.

3.2 Participation - A Wide Continuum from Neglect to Access to Decisions

After having shown the two main theoretical approaches towards participation in town development the question remains, what in fact is considered as citizen participation in general and especially for participatory planning?

The connotations behind the term participation are multifaceted. Additionally a lot of “*lip service*” and growing faddishness have led to the fact that participation very often has become drained of substance and relevance (Cohen/Uphoff 1980:213). Most definitions of citizen involvement would regard a wide array of activities as participation including for example voting, attending public meetings, paying taxes, office holding, contributing the own labor force in implementation as well as making decisions (Cohen/Uphoff 1980).

Besides the wide array of different categories of participation George (1985:192) has identified four different theoretical sources for contradictory views on participation. In relying on Cohen/Uphoff/Goldsmith¹⁷ he indicates that political scientists are mainly concerned with participation in decision-making and evaluation, while administration specialists are rather engaged in participation in implementation and economists are focusing on participation in benefits.

In order to highlight the whole scope and spectrum of different kinds of community participation I will briefly introduce and contrast the key elements of two complementary typologies

¹⁷ Feasibility and Application of Rural Development Participation: A State of the Art Paper. Monograph Series, No. 3, p. 6. Rural Development Committee, Center for International Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., 1979.

especially set up for community participation in developing countries (Choguill 1996) and for development (Pretty 1997). This exercise will be useful for identifying the standing of the idea of participatory planning in relation to other conceptions of participation.

Choguill (1996) has compiled a “*Ladder of Community Participation for Underdeveloped (sic!) Countries*” (see table 1), where

Table 1: A Ladder of Community Participation

Rung of the ladder	Kind of participation	Role of government
1	Empowerment	Support
2	Partnership	Support
3	Conciliation	Support
4	Dissimulation	Manipulation
5	Diplomacy	Manipulation
6	Informing	Manipulation
7	Conspiracy	Rejection
8	Self-management	Neglect

Taken from Choguill (1996:442): A Ladder of Community Participation for Underdeveloped Countries

she brings to mind that the term participation encompasses the whole range from state ignored self-sufficient community management to full empowerment of the community. The rungs of her ladder are defined according to the role of city government in relation to community participation. The attitude of the state towards citizen participation may range from real support over

manipulation and rejection to neglect of community efforts.

Beyond that Pretty (1997:1252) has set up a typology of “*how people participate in development programs and projects*” ranging from manipulation (category 1) by the government over passive participation, consultation, interactive participation to self-mobilization (category 7).

Table 2: How People Participate in Development Programs and Projects

	Typology	Characteristics of Community Participation
1	Manipulative Participation	Simply pretence, no power and influence
2	Passive Participation	Unilateral announcements by government about what happens
3	Participation by Consultation	Consultation, information input, no decision-making power
4	Participation for Material Incentives	People contribute resources (labor) in projects, but they are not included in decision-making or the definition of projects
5	Functional Participation	Influence on how projects are implemented, but no major decision-making power
6	Interactive Participation	Joint analysis and development of plans, decision-making power
7	Self-Mobilization	Community is taking own independent initiatives, external agencies provide technical support

Source: Pretty (1997:1252): A Typology of Participation

It is beyond the scope of this paper to introduce both typologies at length¹⁸ but instead a synthesis of the two will serve as reference for different types of participation here.

The most participatory ranks of the latter and the categorization consist of self mobilization, interactive participation, partnership and empowerment. Combining both approaches the highest level of participation is reached when the government is supportive and actively encouraging citizens to participate and is shifting the power relations in favor of the citizenry. Here the people are able to take part in analysis, development of plans and formation of local institutions and they are enabled to take own initiatives independently.

The rungs further down on the latter or further up in Pretty's typology are getting more and more towards manipulating the community instead of empowering it. A more manipulative role of the government would imply placing people in "*rubber stamp advisory committees*" (Choguill 1996:438) or passive participation through an exclusively top down information flow. For Choguill the government very often pretends that citizens have a say, but in reality it is just lip service. Manipulation here refers to the fact that the government tries to give the community the impression that they have influence, but in reality it is the government which decides. In Pretty's typology in these approaches¹⁹ people are contributing resources (e.g. labor) in the implementation of projects, they are on non-decisive advisory committees or they are just passive recipients of information; but they do not have access to decision-making nor the right to initiate large scale own initiatives. Relying on the sections above it can be said that governments here are trying to exploit (pseudo) citizen participation as a means to reach the government's goals without giving any power to the people.

The last two rungs of Choguill's ladder have no counterpart in Pretty's categorization and cannot really be seen as participation as government there rejects citizen participation or simply ignores the citizens' needs and opinions.

3.3 Participation in Urban Planning - First Insights

So far it has become comprehensible that there is a vast continuum of connotations for the term participation. The whole concept of participatory planning and the need for and consequences of participation in planning are going to be developed further below, but up to this point some first approximations to participatory planning can be made.

Participatory planning, which encompasses participation in all stages of the planning and management cycle implies involvement in decision-making, implementation and evaluation. Participation in planning serves as goal in itself and means for reaching better planning at the

¹⁸ For a lengthy insight see Choguill (1996) and Pretty (1997).

¹⁹ Corresponding categories are "*functional participation*", "*participation for material incentives*", "*passive participation*" and "*manipulative participation*".

same time. Furthermore it is unambiguous that participation in decision-making is a form of partaking which is ranking on the higher rungs of Choguill's ladder of participation and is found within the categorizations five to seven in Pretty's typology.

Therefore it is apparent that full participation in the urban planning and management process "*means to influence decisions in the political arena about issues that effect people*" (Choguill 1996:431) and "*to increase control over resources and regulative institutions in given social situations on the part of groups and movements hitherto excluded from such control*" (Wolfe in Goulet 1989:165). It is also obvious that participation in urban development is "*a process where people are actively and decisively taking part in making decisions about their own lives*" (BMZ 1999:2). Furthermore participatory planning envisages citizen involvement for reaching efficiency and equity goals, which inherently implies real empowerment.

Now as the concepts of participation and urban management have been delineated it is necessary to introduce the context in which the new approach to participatory planning is to be set up: urbanization and the growth of large cities. Therefore the following chapter will start by introducing theoretical concepts of cities and then highlight the most important trends in urbanization.

4. Mega-Cities, Urbanization and Growth of Large Cities in Developing Countries

4.1 Mega- or Global City – Size vs. Function?

In today's world of urban studies there are different classifications and notions about cities. Depending on the point of view and the approach chosen cities are qualified as "*mega-cities*", "*world cities*" or "*global cities*", but there are no clear boundaries and specific definitions of these terms.

In general, conceptual approaches to cities can be separated into two basic categories: the "*demographic*" and the "*functional*" approach (Beaverstock et al. 1999:445). The demographic approach is purely focusing on the size of the city in terms of inhabitants. The functional approach is mainly concerned with the functions carried out by cities for their hinterlands, regions, countries, continents or globally (e.g. highly specialized financial services, which are important for the world economy). The term "*mega-city*" is located in the demographic approach whereas "*world city*" and "*global city*" are classifications within the functional approach.

4.1.1 Functional Approach - World Wide Economic Importance

The first author to mention and define world cities was Patrick Geddes as early as 1915 (Hall 1998:17). More recently Peter Hall's book "*The World Cities*" from 1966 (ibid) can be seen as a

starting point for defining world cities in terms of their multiple roles (e.g. centers of political power and centers of national and international trade)²⁰.

It is typical for research scholars of this field to compile lists where cities are ordered in a world system according to their importance. Within the functional approach, Beaverstock et al. (1999) identify four major perspectives on cities which have dominated the literature on world cities: (1) cosmopolitan characteristics and multinational corporate economy, (2) world cities and the new international division of labor, (3) the internationalization, concentration and intensity of producer services and (4) world cities as financial centers.

Table 3: The Two Related Concepts of Global and World City

Concept	Global City	World City
Author	Saskia Sassen	Peter Hall
Characteristics	Worldwide role in: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Accountancy •Advertising •Banking/Finance •Law 	Importance (nationally and internationally) in: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Political power •Trade •Banking/finance •Education •Law

Taken from: Sassen (2000:1-31) and Hall (1998:17)

Examples for categorizations (table 3) are either Saskia Sassen's "Global Cities" which are classified according to their world-wide leading role in accountancy, advertising,

banking/finance and law (Sassen 2001:329-344/Sassen 2000:1-31) or Peter Hall's "World Cities", which are defined according to their national/international political power, their national/international trade, their importance in banking, finance, education, media, law, consumption for the world or their corresponding regions (Hall 1998:17). It is common to the definitions of world or global cities that the cities have a certain function in the world economy and that a network of these important cities exists (Lo 1998:9/Sassen 2002:1-31)

But despite the different foci and approaches Beaverstock et al. found evidence that there is consensus among various authors about the inventory of leading world/global cities. Most of these first order cities are situated in the more developed world (e.g. New York, Tokyo, and London), but some of them can also be found in developing countries, such as in Brazil (Sao Paulo) or in India (Mumbai) (Beaverstock et al. 1999). The only region in the world without any world or global city is Africa (Rakodi in Lo 1998:7).

²⁰ John Friedman's famous "World City Hypothesis" is also rooted in this theoretical approach (Friedman 1995). For John Friedman the number of headquarters of international companies, the growth of the business service sector, the importance as transportation node and as a major financial center are defining categories (Friedman in Stubbs/Clarke 1996:60).

4.1.2 Demographic Approach - Much Variation in Definitions

The demographic approach is basically concerned with the definition of minimum sizes for categories of cities. In 1986 the United Nations defined mega-cities as cities which were expected to have at least eight million inhabitants by the year 2000 (see Gilbert 1996:Ch.1²¹ or Chen/Heligman 1994:17-31). Unlike the definition of global or world cities²², there is no real conceptual basis for setting an eight million threshold as minimum size for mega-cities or as Gilbert puts it: “*this minimum size seems to have plucked from the air*” (Gilbert 1996:Ch.1). Other authors and institutions have either confirmed the eight million definition or chosen different numbers ranging from four to ten million inhabitants as minimum size (Richardson 1993:47; Dogan/Kasarda 1988 in Gilbert 1996; BMZ 2000:ii). As we will see further below many of these very large cities can be found in developing countries (Gugler 1988:1).

4.1.3 Overlapping Concepts – Integrating Size and Function

It has to be kept in mind that the split between mega-cities and world/global cities outlined above is a theoretical one. For most mega-cities population growth is accompanied by increased prosperity of the city’s economy and with it an augmented importance for the region or hinterland²³. Therefore scholars have enlarged the concept of mega-cities from pure demographic size to additionally encompassing its role in comparison to other national and regional cities and changing functional relationships (e.g. Rakodi 1997). Rakodi points out that cities are primarily places of economic exchange with relations to their hinterland and the global economy (Rakodi 1997:4) and that therefore a definition by size is not sufficient. Other indicators have to be included as well.

Following Rakodi’s call for a larger definition of mega-cities (e.g. including economic indicators) it becomes apparent that there is an overlap between the functional and demographic concepts. Many very large cities carry out worldwide, nationally or regionally important functions, so that they fall within both categories, according to size and function. But of course it is no necessity that size implies increased importance²⁴.

So far we have seen the theoretical aspects of defining categorizations of cities. As this paper is mainly concerned with mega-cities in developing countries, the next sections will describe characteristics of developing countries and their rapid urbanization and especially the fast growth of large cities.

²¹ Unfortunately it is not possible to give page quotes for Alan Gilbert’s book, as I accessed an online version and the page numbers depend on the size of the screen and the size of the printout. Instead I will note the Chapter where the quote is found.

²² Where the amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), the number of transnational companies etc. are measured.

²³ The only part of the world for which urbanization without economic development is found is Sub-Saharan Africa (BMZ 2000:4).

²⁴ For this paper mega-cities will be defined according to criteria specified in chapter 4.3.

4.2 Patterns and Reasons for the Urbanization and the Growth of Large Cities in Developing Countries

4.2.1 Developing Countries – Main Characteristics

Before recent trends in urbanization and growth of large cities are going to be introduced it is necessary to give a characterization of developing countries.

For the purpose of this paper, developing countries will be defined according to economic, socio demographic, ecological and socio cultural/political indicators. As Gareis and Varwick (2002:215) note, there is no real consensus about what exactly the definition of developing countries is. But they remark that (ibid) the following characteristics can (in varying combinations and strength) mostly be found throughout all developing countries:

- *Economic indicators*: low per capita income, extremely uneven income distribution, low productivity, insufficient supply with infrastructure, self supply oriented traditional sector, exports based on raw materials for markets in industrialized countries, dependence on few export goods.
- *Socio demographic indicators*: low life expectancy (due to general bad supply with medicine), no or insufficient education, rapid population growth, strong rural-urban migration.
- *Ecological indicators*: destruction and depletion of (fragile) environment and natural resources.
- *Socio cultural and political indicators*: orientation towards primary groups (family, group, ethnicity), lack of loyalty towards state institutions, low mobility, authoritarian and weak state, lack of legitimacy for political leaders and insufficient human rights situation, high rate of corruption, implementation problems of political programs, often violent conflicts within the country or with neighboring countries.

Further below we are going to see that the main problems found on the national level of these countries are equally and even more accentuated found in their large cities. In the following I am presenting the urbanization of the developing countries and especially the growth of their large cities. The urbanization of the developing world has just begun and the processes of rapid urbanization which commenced in the second half of the 20th century are set to continue.

4.2.2 Urbanization Trends – Rapid Growth of Urban Areas²⁵

Table 4 shows that the population growth of urban areas in developing countries has set in after 1945 and gained enormous pace. From an urbanization level of only about 18 percent in 1950 the urbanization level of developing countries has now reached 40 percent. Throughout the literature

	1950	1975	2000	2030
World	29,8	37,9	47,7	60,2
Less Developed Regions	17,8	26,8	40,9	56,4
More Developed Regions	54,9	70	75,5	82,6

Data taken from: United Nations Secretariat (2001): World Urbanization Prospects. The 2001 Revision

the level of urbanization in developing countries is forecasted to continue to grow. As the data verifies the more developed part of the

world is already highly urbanized and is only set to grow incrementally (7% over 30 years),

		1950	1975	2000	2030
World	<i>Urban</i>	0,75	1,54	2,86	4,98
	<i>Rural</i>	1,77	2,52	3,19	3,29
	Total	2,52	4,07	6,06	8,27
Less Developed Regions	<i>Urban</i>	0,3	0,81	1,96	3,98
	<i>Rural</i>	1,4	2,21	2,9	3,08
	Total	1,7	3,02	4,87	7,05
More Developed Regions	<i>Urban</i>	0,45	0,73	0,9	1
	<i>Rural</i>	0,37	0,31	0,29	0,21
	Total	0,82	1,04	1,19	1,21

Data taken from: United Nations Secretariat (2001): World Urbanization Prospects. The 2001 Revision

while the process of urbanization in developing regions is very strong. Over the next 30 years the urbanization level in developing countries is expected to grow by factor 1.4 to 56 percent.

A growth of just 16% (from 40 to 56%) from the year 2000 to 2030 does not look impressive, but the rapid growth of the developing world's urban regions is unveiled when real numbers of inhabitants are considered instead of percentages. The real numbers (table 5) show that most of the population growth in the world will be absorbed by urban areas and that almost all will be concentrated in developing countries (UNPD 2001:1).

The total population of developing countries is estimated to grow rapidly (by about 2.2 billion over the next 30 years). According to UN statistics, urban areas in developing countries were holding a population of about two billion people in 2000. By 2030 these areas are predicted to

²⁵ Urbanization is measured as the percentage of the population of a country living in urban areas. The data provided for less and more developed countries follows the definition of the UNPD (2001). The category of more developed countries contains North America, Europe, New Zealand/Australia and Japan, whereas Asia (except Japan), Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, Micronesia, Polynesia and Melanesia are found in the group of less developed countries. It is clear that this categorization is very rough (and even the UNPD admits that it is made for "statistical convenience" (2001)).

reach a population of about 4 billion people (table 5). This means that the number of urban dwellers in the developing world is going to double throughout the next 30 years. In other terms: the urban population in the world is going to increase on average by 200'000 people²⁶ daily (Töpfer 2002). This exorbitant pace of growth is going to put a major pressure on any developing country and urban management system experiencing this dynamic change.

4.2.3 The Growing Importance and the Rise of Large Cities

While the urbanization process of developing countries in itself is already impressive, there is additionally another phenomenon within the urbanization of developing countries, which is of overall importance: the growth of large cities and their increased importance for the national economy.

Within the process of globalization²⁷, which draws together different parts of the world economically, large cities, especially in developing countries are becoming more and more important focal points for investments (Sassen 2000:39). Globalization as new form of economic internationalization is characterized by an increasingly decentralized global network of factories, service outlets and financial markets (ibid:45-46). Large cities are providing technical and social infrastructure for multinational companies for executing the firms' complex functions in a decentralized and ever more dispersed world economy. The growing importance of cities changes the relationship between cities and their nation states²⁸. Taylor (2000:5-32) underlines this view by concluding that under conditions of contemporary globalization the most important opportunities for large cities may not lie within their own state's territory, but in the world economy. In the following we will see that the growth of large cities is a common pattern in developing countries.

The 20th century has seen the world-wide growth of large cities. While in 1900 there were only 11 cities with more than 1 million inhabitants, by now, the year 2000, there are about 400 of them world-wide (Lo 1998:7/BMZ 2001:9, table 6).

When considering the distribution of large cities in the world it is found that the growth of cities in developing countries has set in after 1950, but really intensified after 1975 (Lo 1998:7): While

²⁶ The calculation is confirmed by the United Nation figures: 2.2 billion divided by 30 years is an average increase of 73'333333 people per year, divided by 365 days a year is about 200'000 people per day.

²⁷ Different authors are having different foci when looking at globalization. Most commonly globalization is described as a historical process which implies a "worldwide spread of modern technologies of industrial production and communication of all kinds across frontiers – in trade, capital, production and information (...). Nearly all economies are networked with others throughout the world" (Gray 1993). For other scholars like Anthony Giddens (ibid) the economic aspect is not the most important so that "globalization can (...) be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant realities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice versa".

²⁸ See box 3 further below for details.

in 1960 nine out of the 19 largest cities in the world were in developing countries, by the end of the 20th century there were already 50 out of the 66 largest cities in developing countries (Hall 1998:31).

When looking at the largest cities in the world (ten million inhabitants and more) it can be seen

		Inhabitants	1975	1990	2000	2015
World	10 million and more		5	12	16	21
	5-10 million		16	19	23	37
	1-5 million		174	285	348	496
Less Developed	10 million and more		3	8	12	17
	5-10 million		8	14	18	31
	1-5 million		99	186	244	378
More Developed	10 million and more		2	4	4	4
	5-10 million		8	5	5	6
	1-5 million		75	99	104	118

Data taken from: United Nations Secretariat (2001): World Urbanization Prospects. The 2001 Revision.

from table 6 that from 1975 on, the share of cities in less developed countries has increased. While in 1975 three out of five of the largest cities were from the less developed

part of the world this ratio was already 8 out of 12 (about 66%) in 1990 and 13 out 17 (about 75%) of the largest cities in 2001 and is set to be 17 out of 21 in 2015 (about 81%) (tables 6/7).

Year 1975		Year 2001		Year 2015	
City	Population in million	City	Population in million	City	Population in million
Tokyo	19,8	Tokyo	26,5	Tokyo	27,2
New York	15,9	Sao Paulo	18,3	Dhaka	22,8
		Mexico City	18,3	Mumbai	22,6
		New York	16,8	Sao Paulo	21,2
		Mumbai	16,5	Delhi	20,9
				Mexico City	20,4
				New York	17,9
				Jakarta	17,3
				Calcutta	16,7
				Karachi	16,2
				Lagos	16

Data taken from: United Nations Secretariat (2001): World Urbanization Prospects. The 2001 Revision..

The extreme pace of growth becomes apparent when it is recalled that it took New York City 150 years to

reach 8 million inhabitants, while Sao Paulo or Mexico City made this growth in a few decades (Kasarda/Parnell 1993:x).

Additionally the growth of cities on the levels below the largest cities is going to play a crucial role in future urbanization. Indeed, authors argue that the growth of the very large cities is going to be significant in the future, but that it will even be modest in comparison to the growth of “smaller” cities, which are going to accommodate a bigger share of the new urban population (UNPD 2001:3). The data shows that the more developed world is only going to gain very few new cities in the categories of 1 to 10 million inhabitants in the next 15 years, but that the

developing world will gain 147 new cities in the category of 1 to 10 million inhabitants. From this data it can be inferred that the growth of very large and large cities seems to be a major feature of future development of less developed countries.

Box 2: Differing Urbanization Levels among Developing Regions

So far the data analyzed is on an aggregate level for developing regions, but it is noteworthy that there are huge differences in the degree of urbanization in different developing regions of the world. Furthermore it is crucial to see that the kind of urbanization in the different parts of the world is also very diverse. By the same token as there is no “one” developing world (Chakravarty 2000:57) very different patterns and levels of urbanization are found when Africa, Asia and Latin America are considered solely.

Latin America is a highly urbanized region with an urbanization level of 75%, which is quite close to the one of developed regions. The data below shows that the process of urbanization in Latin America is very rapid and that the percentage of urban dwellers has doubled in course of the last 50 years. In total numbers of urban population Latin America has even increased more than five fold: from about 70 million people in 1950 up to about 400 million in 2000. The future growth of urban areas in Latin America is seen to be only modest in terms of the percentage increase (only about 10% from 2000 to 2030), but due to the overall countrywide rapid population growth the real number of urban dwellers is likely to increase by 50% from the year 2000 to 2030 (from 400 million to 600 million people). A distinctive feature of urbanization in Latin America is the fact that migrants to cities are often losing or abandoning the contact with their village or region of origin. With Sao Paulo, Mexico City, Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro four of the world’s largest cities are in Latin America (for a detailed overview see Gilbert 1996).

In contrast to Latin America *Africa* has a very modest urbanization level of only 37%. The percentage of urban inhabitants has more than doubled in Africa from the year 1950 to 2000 and the total number of persons living in an urban setting has nearly increased ten fold in this period: from 33 million to 300 million people. For the future the total urban population in Africa is going to increase more than 100% to 800 million urban dwellers and the percentage of people living in urban regions is going to cross the 50% mark between 2020 and 2030. An important feature of African urbanization is that the migrants to urban areas and even their children keep close links to the village or region they came from (Gilbert/Gugler 1992:157). Currently no city with more than 15 million inhabitants can be found in Africa. It has to be noted that Africa shows a very uneven pattern of urbanization among its countries (Rakodi 1997:32) and an especially high functional primacy of its mega-cities in relation to the rest of the country (Smith 1996:48-51).

For *Asia*, the most populous of the three developing regions, the data suggests a huge increase in the number of urban dwellers. Asia seems to be the most dynamic part of the developing world and the rapid process of growth is in many parts accompanied by rapid industrialization and economic prosperity. The number of people living in cities has increased by the factor six in the last 50 years and is forecasted to nearly double in the next 30 years, which means that the urban population is going to increase from 1.4 billion to 2.6 billion people. In percent more than half of all people in the Asian region are going to live in cities in the year 2030, while only 17% were urbanized in 1950. In absolute figures this means that Asia has to accommodate about 1.3 billion people in its (fast growing) cities over the next 30 years. This underlines the immense task for city development and planning in these countries. Most large

cities in the world can and will be found in Asia: Mumbai, Delhi, Dhaka, Calcutta, Jakarta, Metro Manila and Karachi are already holding over 10 million people and are going to aggrandize. The fast growth of these cities might even jeopardize their huge economical potential.

Table 8: Urban Population from 1950 to 2030 (expected in 2001)

		1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2020	2030
Africa	<i>percentage of population</i>	14,7	18,5	23,1	27,4	31,8	37,2	47,9	52,9
	total number (in thousands)	32398	51149	82387	128048	197246	295228	589408	787235
Latin America	<i>percentage of population</i>	41,9	49,5	57,6	65,1	71,1	75,4	81,8	84
	total number (in thousands)	69961	108082	163926	235052	312947	391342	543166	607654
Asia	<i>percentage of population</i>	17,4	20,8	23,4	26,9	32,3	37,5	48,7	54,1
	total number (in thousands)	234845	353641	501320	707036	1023117	1375519	2231108	2678680

Data taken from: United Nations Secretariat (2001): World Urbanization Prospects. The 2001 Revision

4.2.4 Reasons for the Urbanization of Developing Countries

The last section has shown that the developing countries experience a very fast urbanization and an extraordinary growth of their largest cities. There are various reasons for this rapid urbanization, the most renowned are:

(1) A general growth in population in these countries. The total population (urban and rural) of developing countries has nearly tripled since 1950 (1.7 billion to 4.8 billion, see table 5). A major fact is that the mortality rate in developing countries has declined sharply after World War II while the fertility rate remained high (Oberai 1993a:61).

(2) A fast growth of the number of cities' inhabitants due to (in comparison to rural areas) the young age of urban dwellers, comparatively low death rates, relatively better living conditions and medical care in cities (Gugler 1988:8/Gilbert 1996:Ch. 2). The natural growth of the urban population is the most important factor contributing to the fast growth of cities and has outnumbered the effect of rural-urban migration (Gugler 1988:8/12; Gilbert 1996:Ch. 2).

(3) A strong rural-urban migration due to uneven development within developing countries. Big cities in developing countries often have a strong primacy role in relation to the rest of the country (Hall 1998:12/Münz 2002). Very often investments are concentrated on the largest cities. Due to this, jobs are mainly created there and the standard of living is much higher in cities than in the countryside. Potentially, access to education, jobs, income and services is much higher in cities than in rural areas, so that many people are attracted to urban regions (Gilbert 1998:Ch.1). "The offer of new opportunities and a better life is what often draws migrants to towns" (WDR 2003:Ch. 6:4). Besides the attractions (pull factors) of urban areas over rural parts, there are also so called push factors (Oberai 1993a:63-65) which make people leave the rural areas, such as rationalization of agriculture, population growth which cannot be absorbed by the

rural areas, unequal land ownership (especially for Latin America), limitations of productivity in agriculture and the bad supply with goods to satisfy basic needs (Münz 2000/Gilbert 1996:Ch.1). For Sub-Saharan Africa it is documented that push factors, stemming from a climatically fragile agricultural base, are more important for the growth of cities than urban pull factors (Oberai 1993a:64).

(4) Overall the factors above are accompanied or embedded into an economic structural change on the global scale (Lo 1998:1), which is driven by technological change, a diminishing of the importance of natural resources in location decisions as well as a growing importance of financial transactions (Yueng 1998:132-134). The forces of globalization have led to an increase in flexibility of capital: the growth of the financial market, the expansion of international trade in services and the re-patterning of foreign direct investment (FDI), especially towards Asian countries, but also generally towards developing countries (see: WDR1999/2000:Ch.3).

(5) Furthermore it is well-known that the statistical growth of the urban population is also due to a “reclassification” of former rural into urban areas. This is a result of the expansion of large cities into other jurisdictions whose former rural population is now added to the urban area population, even when they did not move at all (Oberai 1993a:62-66).

Box 3: Large Cities: Opportunity for Development or Waste of Resources?

Many developing countries focus and focused their development efforts on their primate cities, as they seem to have the biggest potentials for development (this phenomenon is referred to as “large city bias” (Gilbert 1996:Ch.1/Oberai 1993a:65)). Large cities are seen to provide economies of agglomeration for the industrial and service sectors (Rakodi 1997:36) as well as economies of scale, which are inherent in urban service provision, such as water and electricity (Oberai 1993a:67). Economies of agglomeration imply that more skilled workers, closer distances to airports or important harbors, better infrastructure and a denser network of companies can be found in large cities, which hold potential benefits for economic activity in these areas in comparison to smaller cities or rural areas.

Today, mega-cities in developing countries have the potential of integrating their countries into the world economy. They are national and regional engines of growth and centers for technical and cultural activity (Rakodi 1996:1). About 60% of the developing countries’ Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Parker 1995:3/4) and 80% of their economic growth can be attributed to cities (BMZ 2001:9). Furthermore the mega-city’s share in the national GDP of its country is mostly bigger than its share in national population, which indicates that mega-cities boast a higher productivity than the rest of the country (Prud’homme 1996:103).

As the process of globalization has brought about a higher flexibility of capital and traditional factors of location decisions have weakened the large cities of developing countries have the opportunity to become interlinked into the world-wide system of cities (Lo 1998:4). Today it is important for transnational

companies to have access to information, technology and capital, which can also be provided by large cities in developing countries. The process of dispersal of important functions all around the world into major economic centers is referred to as “*a dynamic dispersal of concentration*” (Lo 1998:4/Sassen 1999/2000/2001). Bangalore in India for example is a major location in the global information technology (BMZ 2001:10). But this does not mean that urbanization necessarily creates development or benefits (Gugler 1988:8). Frequent arguments for the negative effects of mega-cities are that they are drawing resources from the rest of the country, they absorb the young and enterprise labor force and they are notorious in environmental pollution (Gilbert 1996:Ch.1). The main discussion focuses around the question if mega-cities are either a merit or a parasite for their country. For Sub-Saharan Africa for example it is found that only feeble economic development is associated with the urbanization process (BMZ 2001:4).

4.3 Large Cities – Their Main Characteristics

So far it is evident that the growth of large cities in developing countries has been very rapid and is set to continue. Furthermore it has become obvious that the theoretical definition (exclusively by size) of mega-cities is not sufficient.

Fast growth and territorial expansion are among the key characteristics of large cities. (1) By growing larger the system’s complexity is increased, (2) the growth over jurisdictional boundaries makes government and citizen consultation more difficult and (3) issues of internal equity seem to be more unbalanced in mega-cities than in smaller cities (Gilbert 1996:Ch.1). I will go on by explaining those factors more detailed.

Firstly, effects of fast growth, city size and complexity seem to be correlated, as the size and pace of growth is estimated to have an important effect on urban management. Growth increases the complexity of the system which has to be managed. The larger the cities the larger the diversity of life styles, cultures, potential sectoral interactions, interest groups, administrative districts, NGOs and CBOs. “*The potential number of relationships that have to be coordinated between actors increases as the square of the number of actors. If city A is ten times larger than city B, then the potential number of relationships to coordinate is theoretically a hundred times greater in city A than in B*” (Prud’homme 1996:100). The large number of actors, dimensions and concerns lead to a very complex coordination effort to reach an efficient result for the mega-city. City size potentially increases complexity (ibid:96-100)²⁹.

²⁹ But this does not mean that a large city is too multifarious to carry out management and planning tasks effectively and efficiently (Prud’homme 1996:96-100).

Secondly, territorial expansion over jurisdictional boundaries is typical for fast growing large

Table 9: Distribution of Population in Mega-Cities (million inhabitants)

City (year)	Administrative Inner Circle	Agglomeration	Metropolitan Region
Beijing	5.4	6.3	10.8
Bombay(199)	9.9	12.8	14.4
Cairo (1986)	6.0	8.7	13.0
Delhi (1991)	n. a.	9.2	25.4
Mexico City (1990)	1,93	14.9	18.0

Taken from Jones (2000:44)

agglomerations. Very often, the majority of the population does not even live in the core administrative region of the mega-city (table 9). In such huge agglomerations it is especially difficult to govern the whole agglomeration and to integrate the population. This phenomenon is

not limited to the largest cities, as Devas (in Gilbert 1996:Ch1) points out Recife and Porto Alegre³⁰ are smaller cities within agglomeration regions of 12 respectively 22 municipalities.

Finally, issues of equity are more complicated in large cities as large cities experienced greater processes of social divergence due to international and national investment. The consequences of investments are that on the one hand a pool of skilled labor and access to new technologies and world markets exist, while on the other high levels of unemployment, informality and social, economic and spatial segregation can be found (Carmona 2000:57). Sassen (2001:335) for example identifies a growing social gap between the unskilled low wage workforce or jobless people in global cities and the salaries of high skilled specialists.

In chapter 2 it has already been emphasized that urban planning always comprises political decisions. Consequently it is important that planning and management responses have to take into account the economic, political and social structures and power relations found in cities. Therefore the following chapter will investigate the structure of fragmentation and segregation within large cities.

5. The Internal Structure of the Mega-City

5.1 *Characterization of the Urban Landscape - From a Colonial Past to a New Fragmented Pattern?*

In order to deal with the political, economic and social structure of a city, any planning concept for large cities has to recognize the outside forces on cities described so far, but as city planning and management is a local task, it is crucial to acknowledge *“the effects of the interaction of global forces with local circumstances which produce a unique socio economic, political and*

³⁰ Academics are forecasting that the enormous growth of mega-cities will even be modest in comparison to the future growth of “smaller” sized cities (this phenomenon is known as concentration reversal (Richardson 1993:35-37).

spatial result at (...) city levels” (Rakodi 1997:5). At the local level nearly all fast growing cities are experiencing processes of fragmentation and polarization (Graham/Marvin 2001/Lo 1998). In the following the main characteristics and reasons of fragmentation and the special situation of the urban poor in mega-cities in developing countries will be presented.

5.1.1 Colonial Heritage

Many mega-cities in developing countries experienced a colonial past. Colonial planners designed cities purposely with uneven service provision and segregated areas (Chakravorty 2000:67). They wanted to separate their settlements from the native peoples’ places of living. There are of course variations found in the level of segregation between different countries as local differences, traditions and cultures had an influence on the way the colonizers built their cities (Devas 1993:64), but segregation can be found as a general feature. After the colonial powers had left new local elites very often maintained the spatial “*tradition of segregation*” (ibid:64). This does not mean that the colonial past is the single reason for uneven development in these cities, but that the pattern of uneven access and service provision existed for a long time in many cities.

5.1.2 Splintering Urbanism Today - Between Citadels and Constraining Ghettos

The strong forces influencing the growth of large cities today (e.g. natural population growth, migration, globalization) have a direct influence on the splintering of activities, infrastructure and settlement structure in large cities in developing countries (Graham/Marvin 2001:276-287). According to Lo (1998:11) the effect of globalization is a rapidly growing social and economic polarization within cities with the consequence that cities represent an acute contrast of poor and rich (Drakakis-Smith 1993:5). Segregated areas are geographically close, but nonetheless these areas are worlds apart. They are presenting a striking difference between modernity and affluence on the one side and extremely poor surroundings on the other (Hall 1998:31). This “*socio-spatial segregation*” (de Queiroz/Telles 2000:92) implying a duality of social and spatial structures (El-Shaks 1997:502) is most obvious in mega-cities of developing countries.

Graham and Marvin (2001:5) argue that the spatial structure of mega-cities is directly interrelated with the economic, social, cultural and political indicators within a society. Buttressing this argument Happe/Sperberg (2000:99) show³¹ that deficiency of supply with social and physical infrastructure are good indicators for poor urban areas. The aspects of internal division and fast growth are closely interwoven. For this reason the future growth in the

³¹ For the case of Brazil.

light of already existing polarization is expected to bring along “*gargantuan problems*” (Lo 1998:11).

It is evident that mega-cities are not solely constituted of strictly polarized citadels and ghettos, but for the ease of presentation and argument in this paper, I am following authors like Graham and Marvin (2001) who are supportive of a polarized³² development within cities³³. Rich and Poor are serving as extreme poles of a continuum of groups within a city. This wide continuum highlights the huge disparities which should be considered by urban development agencies.

Getting Specific: Citadels and Constraining Ghettos

On the one hand mega-cities accommodate highly advanced industrial and service companies. These companies are internationally connected and included into the world-wide trade of goods and services and rely heavily on their specialized and well trained employees (Carmona 2000:57). The spaces created for transnational companies, government agencies and their staff are very often high rise buildings in city centers and gated communities or citadels for living and shopping without connection to the outside poor surroundings (Graham/Marvin 2001:1-13/276-284). On the other hand, outside of these citadels or enclaves, constraining ghettos for the poor, less educated and newly arrived can be found (ibid:1-13). The major characteristics of these places are going to be the subject of the following sections.

Box 4: The Dual City

A “*geographical differentiation within cities*” (Davey 1996b:51) can be found in terms of infrastructure provision: Relatively high standards of service may be provided in some parts of the city – well lit and paved roads, adequate cleaning and refuse collection, piped water and sewerage, established schools clinics, parks sports facilities. In others roads are unpaved, refuse collected only from communal dumps, water only supplied to standpipes, schooling confined to makeshift shelters, and parks and playing fields nonexistent. In other words looking at the distribution of costs and benefits of urban life Gilbert (1996:Ch.1) concludes: “*The rich certainly gain more from living in large cities than the poor. The rich are more likely to get jobs, (...) service provision for the rich is good (...). Critically, the rich are able both to benefit from the advantages of large cities and to escape most of the diseconomies. (...) In sum,*

³² I am well aware that there are authors who do not support the argument of a increasingly splintered and polarized city (e.g. Marcuse/van Kempen 2000:270).

³³ It has to be remarked that the polarization described here -between the group of rich and the group of poor people- is only a categorization along one dimension in order to show major differences. This does not imply that rich and poor are completely segregated within mega-cities. Furthermore I do not want to imply that the rich and the poor are internally homogeneous groups with one common interest. Urban communities are internally heterogeneous and hierarchically structured (Rakodi 1997:428). The “rich people” and the “poor people” are categories which do not exist as closed groups with common characteristics and interest. These “groups” are heterogeneous along a wide variety of categories: socio-economic status, level of organization, gender, communities, interest and power (Devas/Rakodi 1993:52).

urban problems in large cities affect rich and poor in very different ways.”

5.2 Urban Poverty, Marginality and Vertical Political Integration

5.2.1 Marginality – Still a Valid Concept

During the 1950s and 1960s the term “*marginality*”³⁴ was marked for the economically, socially and politically peripheral position of the poor in developing countries (Happe/Sperberg 2000:84). The term *marginality* is mainly used in connection with Latin American cities³⁵ and implies that marginals are people who are at the fringe of any category (Nelson 1979:128), contributing and gaining little from the economic system³⁶. While other concepts, such as “*culture of poverty*” (Lewis) were heavily contested³⁷ and rejected over time, the concept of *marginality* still offers some useful insights (Nelson 1979:130). Marginal strata of society are characterized by special living conditions and settlement structures (Berg-Schlosser/Kersting 2000:11).

Many different terms have been coined for marginal settlements all around the world: *favelas*, *poblaciones*, *bidonvilles*, *quartier précaires*, *slums*, *Squattersiedlungen*. Marginal settlements³⁸ are described by their precarious geographical position (e.g. areas prone to flooding or on steep hills), an illegal status and therefore a very bad supply with physical and social infrastructure (Berg-Schlosser/Kersting 2000:11). Occupants of marginal settlements are described by social and economic distinctiveness which results from their living conditions³⁹. They often draw on various sources of income, all members of the family are included into the “*reproduction process*” (Lloyd 1979:60/62) and are using formal and informal incomes. Marginal occupations yield insecurity and only minimum levels of subsistence (ibid). A lack of social security fosters social relations within the marginal milieu. Political marginalization implies that the marginalized cannot participate fully in the political (democratic) process in relation to others (Lloyd 1979:60/62/Ward 1996 in Gilbert 1996:Ch.3).

In the next section it will be shown that the urban poor are characterized by special problems in employment, housing and access to decision-making. The focus is laid on decision-making and

³⁴ During the 1980s international organizations (World Bank, UNDP) replaced *marginality* by the more neutral term “*poverty*” (According to Happe/Sperberg 2000:85).

³⁵ But is also used beyond: e.g. in Marcuse/van Kempen (2000) or Lloyd (1979).

³⁶ This does not imply that migrants are worse off in cities than in the rural areas they left, but that within the urban setting the poor are often found in precarious positions.

³⁷ See for example Potter (1985:95) or Berg-Schlosser/Kersting (2000:14-15).

³⁸ The following paragraph on marginal settlement and marginals is mainly taken from Berg-Schlosser/Kersting (2000:10-17).

³⁹ The concept of *marginality* has been heavily criticized on the basis that it pictures people being passively marginalized by the prevailing societal conditions (for further details see Nelson 1979:130). For an in depth critique of *marginality* see: Perlman (1976).

political exclusion⁴⁰ of the poor, as these insights have to be considered if a participatory planning process is to be set up.

5.2.2 Deficient Supply of Affordable Housing and Infrastructure

The areas of the city where the very poor live are mainly informally or illegally inhabited (or taken into possession) during the explosive unplanned⁴¹ growth of the city. The vast shanty town areas and squatter settlements are chiefly due to insufficient housing provision and excess of demand for inexpensive housing, which is not met by the supply by city government or private agencies (Potter 1985:86). Consequently housing is built informally and therefore rarely served by clean water or sewage. Only 44% of all housing in developing countries is served by sewerage and 50% of the garbage is not collected at all (BMZ 2001:4-6). In terms of infrastructure and services these areas are nearly un-served. Furthermore these settlements are regularly found in the most vulnerable areas of mega-cities, where they are prone to environmental pollution or catastrophes⁴².

The inhabitants often try to provide services and other tasks informally, but according to the BMZ (2001:5) and the WDR (2003:Ch.6:9) the investment in these efforts is higher than a coordinated city-wide provision would be. Furthermore inhabitants of these areas have poor access to jobs, income, education and the amenities of urban life (Gilbert 1998:Ch.1) and due to the settlements' illegal status security of tenure is a predominant problem (e.g. Lall et al. 2002). In 2001 UN-Habitat estimated that 837 million people world-wide lived in slums⁴³ (WDR 2003:Ch.6:18).

5.2.3 Characteristics of Informal Employment

A big part of the urban poor (especially newly arrived migrants) without any or few qualification and education for the urban labor market can only find employment in the informal sector (BMZ 2001:5). Bromley (in Kasarda/Parnell 1993:125) notes that from its "*invention*" in the early 1970s the term informality has had definition problems. But it can be said that informal jobs are mainly activities that are small in scale and labor intensive. Self-employed vendors and artisans,

⁴⁰ It is important to mention that urban poverty does not only mean that people cannot participate economically but that they are also socially and politically excluded (Kersting/Sperberg 2000:215).

⁴¹ Unplanned means that these developments were not intended by city government. The land taking (timing, location etc.) itself is regularly carefully planned by the occupants (see: Gilbert/Gugler 1992:193).

⁴² The fast growth of cities and environmental degradation are closely interlinked. Insufficient supply with infrastructure, especially sewerage and garbage collection lead to a destruction and contamination of the environment (El-Shaks 1997:503). Crucial green spaces are lost to new informal settlements, vulnerable areas are occupied by the poorest and environmental resources (e.g. potential fertile agricultural land) are destroyed by the inhabitants (El-Shaks 1997:503 Muttagi 1998:45/46). The urban poor are experiencing the urban environmental problems the most as they are frequently living in the less favored areas of the city (Samol 1999:98).

⁴³ It is estimated that 56% of all African urbanites, 37% of Asian urban dwellers and 26% of the urban population in Latin America are living in slums (Cities Alliance 2002:20).

manufacturers or family owned enterprises are predominantly found in this sector (Gilbert/Gugler 1992:96). Regulations within the informal sector are minimal and the access to these jobs is, due to a low qualification profile, usually easy (Nelson 1979:25-27). Nelson (ibid) shows that estimates for the informal work force in cities are ranging from one to two thirds of the labor force. On the one hand the informal sector requires little formal skill and is not capital intensive, but on the other it offers only low and often irregular income and as it is neither officially registered nor regulated it offers no social or law protection for workers (Oberai 1993b:108). But this does not mean that all informal workers are among the very poor. The informal sector is in itself very heterogeneous and sometimes it is even found that incomes and social protection in the formal sector are on the same level or even lower than in some informal activities (Gilbert/Gugler 1992:98-100). But in general there is a certain correlation between poverty and informal activities (Potter 1985:108-118).

5.2.4 Political Exclusion and Vertical Integration – Patronage-Client Relationships

Older descriptions of the urban poor have found a lack of social contacts and social interaction within marginal settlements as well as with the outside. Inhabitants of slums were seen to be political apathetic and potentially violent. But these findings were heavily challenged and proven wrong by other researches (Berg-Schlosser/Kersting 2000:13/14/Lloyd 1979:182-183). Today's view on the urban poor is that they are neither apathetic nor violent (Kersting/Sperberg 2000:209) but that they are still politically marginalized as they cannot participate fully in the political (democratic) process in comparison to other groups in the city (Lloyd 1979:60/62/Ward 1996 in Gilbert 1996:Ch.3).

This is a direct implication of the highly fragmented and diversified structure within mega-cities. The rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and powerless on the other side have different interests in urban development and management (Clarke 1996:65) and different levels of access to decision-making. Access to decisions in the city is rarely open for the less wealthy people. About 50% of the worlds absolute poor live in cities (Clarke 1996:65) and are greatly excluded from decision-making and the policy processes there. Very often the urban poor are part of patronage-client relationships, in which they offer political support for potential (material) benefits (Gilbert/Gugler 1992:178-182).

While exploring political participation of the urban deprived it is crucial to keep in mind that they cannot be seen as a homogeneous group with common interests but are highly stratified themselves (Nelson 1979:4/129). The urban poor are a heterogeneous group with differing interests, problems and characteristics (Samol 1999:97). Many different life-styles exist in poor urban areas and a wide variety of different networks of people according to kinship, home

region, religion or political affiliation can be found (Gilbert/Gugler 1992:163). According to Nelson (1979:93) family and ethnic networks as well as contacts to former co-villagers are a primary source of aid⁴⁴. In line with Happe and Sperberg (2000:102) Nelson (ibid) stresses the superior importance of kinship over neighborhood, ethnicity or social class. Trust and loyalty towards the own group or affective friendships is much higher and more important than trust in and loyalty towards formal institutions (Frey 2002:85). Additionally it is crucial to see that slums are not static and that their inhabitants are changing over time (Lloyd 1979:16). Especially new arrivals seem to be more politically passive as they very often have plans to return home and therefore do not have any commitment to the city (Nelson 1979:112-121).

As mentioned above the urban poor are neither radical nor apathetic, but they are mainly not acting collectively to pursue their interests and are rather integrated vertically into patronage-client relationships (Gilbert/Gugler 1992:179/180/Happe/Kersting 2000:161). Clientelist relationships are characterized by (1) a dyadic personal relationship between two people, (2) which are exchanging political support (from client) against help or petty resources (from patron) reciprocally, (3) without a formal contract and in the face of (4) an unequal distribution of power among patron and client (Gilbert/Gugler 1992:181/Abers 2000:33-34/157). According to Gugler and Gilbert (1992:182) patronage is the answer to a lack of institutional guarantees and functioning⁴⁵. “*Cultivating a patron*” (ibid:181) is the response of the poor to deal with their situation, as this vertical integration into society provides them with protection and assistance. But on the other hand it also gives way to coercion, exploitation and manipulation of the client (Nelson 1979:168). The interests of client and patron are mainly diverging as goals such as political support for the patron are opposed to a special interest of the client (ibid). There is a wide array of urban patrons, but the most likely are employers, important customers or suppliers, officials, politicians, neighborhood leaders (or other better off people), shopkeepers or priests (Nelson 1979:182).

One of the main problems of these unequal relationships is that horizontal interaction among peers is discouraged, as vertical relationships are potentially more beneficial. According to Putnam (1993:174) vertical networks cannot sustain trust and cooperation, as “*lopsided friendship*” always involves dependence and inequality. An example would be that a client in such a relationship will never offer complete information or insight about his position as his information is a potential hedge against the power of the patron (Putnam 1993:174), so that no

⁴⁴ These patterns of mutual aid appear in reaction to the prevailing inadequate circumstances in slums (Gilbert/Gugler 1992:163).

⁴⁵ If there were rules and the provision of infrastructure and services by institutional actors, then the client would receive the services and resources as “rights” delivered to him rather than as favor or gift from a patron (Abers 2000:30).

completely trustful relationship will develop (Abers 2000:159). Putnam (ibid) argues that vertical relationships undermine potentials for horizontal organization and solidarity⁴⁶. This means no real trust can form among inhabitants of slums, as they do not interact (Abers 2000:159).

Besides patron-client relationships and lack of trust there are also other reasons why it is difficult to get organized horizontally among the urban poor. I have already explained that the urban poor tend to be very heterogeneous and many researchers are stating that costs are higher for getting organized collectively in heterogeneous groups (Lloyd 1979:193/Lall et al. 2002:7). In this context it additionally has to be seen that the very poor are dedicating most of their available time and other resources to provide for their daily basic needs, so that there is not much time left for other activities, such as e.g. political participation (Samol 1999:102).

5.2.5 Bearing the Mega-City's Disadvantages without Access to its Benefits

The situation of the urban poor is not sufficiently described by their ability to find work, housing and their political activity; there are a number of further indicators which have to be included into consideration, such as access to education, health, life expectancy and access to resources such as water, energy (Samol 1999:97).

In fact, most poor inhabitants cannot even access (socially and geographically) the potential benefits the mega-city offers (jobs, health care, education, income etc.). Shanty town dwellers largely have long journeys to work, informal un-serviced housing and problems to absorb the urban lifestyle (Clarke 1996:65). In the words of Gilbert (1996:Ch.1): "*Large cities may have excellent hospitals, clubs, restaurants, and universities, but most of these are open only to those with money. The poor may as well be living in a different city as far as these kinds of facility are concerned*".

It is in the poor areas where the mega-cities of the south "*present some of the worst symptoms of underdevelopment*" (Gilbert 1998:Ch.1). The most severe and accentuated problems seem to be (among others) (Kasarda/Parnell 1993:x/Findley 1993:18): high rates of unemployment, soaring urban poverty⁴⁷, insufficient shelter, inadequate sanitation, deficient and constrained water supply, air pollution and environmental degradation, congested streets and overload of public transit (Vasconcellos 2001). These areas prone to poverty and exclusion are also seen to be potential breeding grounds for crime (Clarke 1996:71). In general it is the urban poor who carry the burden of external negative spillovers (*negative externalities*) of the concentration of industry and people in cities.

⁴⁶ Putnam's concept of social capital will be introduced further below.

⁴⁷ At least 25% of the urban population is living in absolute poverty (Oberai 1993a:58) and 50% live below the poverty line (BMZ 2001:4).

5.3 Implications for Participatory Planning

It has become evident that the living conditions of the urban poor in mega-cities represent some of the worst symptoms of developing countries⁴⁸. Obviously the urban poor are less likely than the rich to gain potential benefits of large agglomerations, but they are also more likely to experience the negative externalities of agglomeration.

For participatory planning this means that a huge continuum of people between rich inhabitants with access to power to very poor marginalized groups have to be integrated into one deliberative effort of plan making. Especially the urban poor would have to get organized in order to be represented in decision-making and planning. The areas inhabited by them boast some of the most urgent problems of mega-cities and it is the poor who are most likely to be not collectively organized. A participatory planning process should include the poor and their demands and it should be a mode of institutionally assuring the provision of infrastructure and services to the poor; rather than leaving them as a favor or gift from a patron (Abers 2000:30).

The next chapters are going to highlight the problems inherent in current management approaches which make them unable to deal with fast growth, complexity, fragmentation and growing disparities.

6. Urban Management – Institutional Constraints and Problems with Technocratic Planning

As outlined in chapter 1 the formerly held assumption that mega-cities are too large to be managed successfully and that smaller cities are more efficient by nature⁴⁹ could not withstand empirical testing (Potter 1985:116-119/Prud'homme 1996:99-107). Today city management (including urban development) is judged to be the key critical variable for success or failure of urban agglomerations (Kasarda/Parnell 1993:x-xi/Richardson 1993:52/Rakodi 2001). It has become clear that small cities can be managed and developed badly so that their problems are by far more severe than the ones of large cities (Prud'homme 1996:99-107). The goal for urban management has to be to cope with the negative implications of mega-cities and to further and utilize the positive externalities of agglomeration⁵⁰ (WDR 2003, Ch. 6:1).

Consequently the not-satisfying results of mega-city management can no longer solely be attributed to “*a plethora of unsolvable problems*” outside of the influence of city agencies (Hall 1998:32). Reasons for failure are to be found in the daunting management and government structures and the planning and management processes themselves. The focus of attention shifted towards technocratic administrative, political and management procedures as well as institutional

⁴⁸ Please see the characteristics of developing countries according to Gareis/Varwick (2002:215) mentioned earlier.

⁴⁹ The result was that planners made plans for a fixed number of maximum number of inhabitants which had to be achieved and then held stable (Devas 1993:77).


⁵⁰ For a more detailed description of the negative and positive implications of large cities see box 3.

settings, which make mega-city management and planning for development greatly inefficient and ineffective⁵¹. According to Ward (1996 in Gilbert 1996:Ch.3) in the past governmental structures were often perceived as given or were ignored altogether, but “*how cities are governed tells us much about the nature of power relations and about the opportunities for citizen involvement in the management of the city*” (ibid). Before the failures and problems of managing urban development will be analyzed the next section will shortly highlight the main tasks urban government is facing.

6.1 The General Task of Urban Government and Sustainable Development⁵²

Fast change and growth of mega-cities has the potential to accelerate well being, but it can also exacerbate existing socio-economic disparities and destroy social cohesion and social capital (Putnam 1993:163-186) as well as the city’s environment (OECD 2001:12).

As shown above more and more people are migrating to cities and natural growth has also gained momentum. The increase in population leads to an increased demand in jobs, adequate



shelter, housing, garbage collection, access to water, sanitation, education and transportation. More inhabitants imply an augmented delivery of urban services and infrastructure and are causing a higher complexity of the task of urban government⁵³.

Rondinelli (1990 in Davey 1996b:47) has defined four essential functions urban

government should be able to carry out: “(1) *Providing infrastructure essential to the efficient operation of cities, (2) provision of services that develop human resources, improve productivity*

⁵¹ Here again the colonial past of cities has an influence as often rigid urban administrations and planning systems, mainly designed for the colonizers’ goal to assure public order, were inherited (Devas 1993:92).

⁵² The concept of sustainability for cities which is provided here is different from the one used by the World Bank for its Cities Development Strategy (CDS). For the CDS sustainable development is the overlap of manageability, bank-ability, livability and competitiveness (Campbell:2000).

⁵³ The existing problems are already huge: Who can imagine managing a city like Dar es Salaam effectively where the population doubles every 13 years (Töpfer 2002) or Cairo where the city infrastructure was planned for 4 million inhabitants but has to serve 14 million by now (El-Shaks 1997:503)?

and raise the standard of living of urban residents, (3) regulating private activities that affect community welfare and the health and safety of the urban population, (4) providing services and facilities that support productive activities and allow private enterprise to operate efficiently in urban areas.” Urban management and planning should fulfill these tasks by bridging the innate antithetical nature of economic competitiveness and social cohesion (OECD 2001:13) in a sustainable way “*that meets the needs of the present without comprising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs*” (WCED 1987:43).

This implies that sustainable development, which has to be steered by city government is threefold: On the one hand city government should try to further (1) economic development in order to gain financial resources and jobs. On the other it has to provide (2) services, increase livability and equity for the mounting number of citizens. The two development tasks should be carried out without harming the (3) ecological base for future generations⁵⁴ (see Exhibit 1). Importantly sustainable development has to be ensured in the face of a fast changing and highly uncertain environment (Stubbs/Clarke 1996:1). Current urban government faces two sets of problems which make it impossible to counter these challenges effectively. On the one hand their institutional and organizational difficulties and on the other problems of technocratic management and planning which are impeding a successful sustainable urban development.

6.2 Organizational and Institutional Shortcomings

The fundamental organizational and institutional impediment to effective city-wide urban development is the lack of an agglomeration-wide coordinating authority⁵⁵ with sufficient power and resources (financial and informational) to govern the city area as a whole without losing contact to its constituting parts (Gilbert 1998:Ch.2/El-Shaks 1997:502). Various reasons and problems for the failure of current systems can be found.

6.2.1 Lack of Coordination – Horizontal Splintering vs. Vertical Centralization

Splintering responsibilities and shortcomings in coordination among levels of government are a widespread feature in mega-cities in developing countries. Two different phenomena are commonly found. The first one are splintered horizontal jurisdictions which are not integrated on a city-wide level and the second one is related to direct management of mega-cities by national governments, which integrate city government functions into the national administration.

Sao Paulo is an example for horizontal fragmentation. The agglomeration is split into 39 municipalities on the local level which makes it very difficult to manage and bring together the

⁵⁴ Sustainable development in this case means that “*any economic or social development should improve, not harm, the environment*” (Newman/Kenworthy 1999:1).

⁵⁵ Ideally built voluntarily on a democratic basis by several jurisdictions and administrative sectors.

fragmented city. The existence of several jurisdictions is a problem encountered by nearly all mega-cities, as the fast uncoordinated spatial expansion ultimately includes growth over jurisdictional boundaries (Aguilar/Ward 2003). The resulting multifaceted institutional structure without a vertical integration in management makes city-wide planning and management for development a very time consuming, difficult and confusing task⁵⁶. Additionally separate local service provision within splintered jurisdictional areas does not utilize the big potential for exploiting city-wide natural monopolies and economies of scale, which are innate in some urban services (e.g. water distribution) (Samuelson/Nordhaus 2001:345). Furthermore conflicts might arise due to spillover effects of services as some communities (or better their inhabitants) will free ride in consuming the services provided by other jurisdictions. Additionally there might be huge disparities in terms of financial power between different jurisdictions. The solution would be to establish institutional channels of coordination and cooperation which could overcome the problems of horizontal particularism (Prud'homme 1996:124)⁵⁷. Attempts to integrate all jurisdictions have been made but very often local governments are reluctant to give real power to new institutions.

Another example for deficient coordination can be pictured by the case of Mexico City where the responsibilities for the agglomeration area are split between the Federal and State government (Gilbert 1998:Ch.2). It is common that national governments try to influence the development of their large cities, especially when they are also national capitals. As a result very often competencies for mega-cities are integrated into the centralized state apparatus, which ensures that the central state government remains in control⁵⁸. This implies that without any good coordination and communication between the central state apparatus and other levels of government effective city management and development are not possible. Additionally an integration of urban government functions into the state apparatus suggests that crucial functions for the city are managed far away from the cities' inhabitants and their real needs. Public state apparatuses are often too hierarchical to have efficient information flow and coordination with lower levels of administration and the citizens. (OECD 2001:34).

Overall there is a strong need for an autonomous body governing the whole agglomeration area with contact to the local level and without interference from higher levels (Ward in Gilbert

⁵⁶ It has to be mentioned that small horizontal local entities are not negative per se. They are crucial and necessary as a link and communication channel for and with the inhabitants (Prud'homme 1996:123).

⁵⁷ This does not imply to dissolve local jurisdictions, but institutional channels of coordination and cooperation should be established ideally on a hierarchically higher level.

⁵⁸ Please see the section on limited financial resources for further examples of direct national influence on large cities.

1996:Ch.3), but unfortunately most large cities are not only managed by those living or holding office locally but also by outside interests (Drakakis-Smith 1993:10).

6.2.2 Competing Functional Responsibilities

Besides the lack of jurisdictional integration fragmented responsibilities on the functional level are a main institutional problem. Functional overlap and fragmentation are closely linked to the intervention of different levels of government in mega-cities. According to Ward (1996, in Gilbert 1996:Ch.3) *“sometimes a multiplicity of agencies with competing or parallel responsibilities”* can be found in mega-cities. The problems encountered are poor coordination among different overlapping government agencies and government levels for and within the city⁵⁹ and a lack of interlocking among these bureaucracies in planning and managing urban development. There is no joint planning, monitoring nor implementation of city development projects (Clarke 1996:82). The investments and operations are solely seen from a functional perspective, which leads to a narrow departmental world view (*silo thinking*) (Prud’homme 1996:111) and a loss of potential effects of synergy. A negative example can be found in Bogotá (Columbia), where the *“national housing agency frequently built homes in areas that the local planning and servicing agencies did not want to be developed. The housing agency was forced to develop cheap land in the periphery of the city even though the public utilities did not want to provide infrastructure in such areas. In one notorious instance, a housing estate went without water for three years when the municipal company refused to supply it”* (Ward 1996). Very often the diverse agencies are also having different time frames for their actions (Prud’homme 1996:111) and dissimilar modes of thinking and approaching a problem or task.

In summary functional policies are rarely integrated or coordinated (OECD 2001:34). This underlines that urban development is not an integrated process, but a fractionized enterprise. Furthermore little coordination among crucial management functions such as infrastructure provision and the city’s budget puts the feasibility of any project or plan into jeopardy (Prud’homme 1996:114).

6.2.3 Limited Resources and Narrow Enforcement Power

The institutional difficulties for managing the development of mega-cities are moreover aggravated by a high dependence of local authorities on national or higher level resources⁶⁰. The financial resources provided by higher levels habitually constitute the largest source of income for the mega-city (Ward 1996 in Gilbert 1996:Ch.3), as very often the local level does not

⁵⁹ Sometimes even the centralized national state sectorally integrates responsibilities which leads to a blurred understanding of responsibilities among city and state departments as well as within the state administration (Gilbert 1998:Ch.2).

⁶⁰ This problem is of course also related to the splintering responsibilities described above.

possess a proper financial base (Rakodi 2001:9). The nation state is reluctant to delegate sufficient resources and with it powers to lower levels of administration which might be controlled by mayors, who are in opposition to the national government (Gilbert 1998:Ch.2). The nation state simply fears to loose power (Rakodi 2001:217). For reasons of direct control over the major city, which mainly is an important control point of the national economy, it is directly managed by the head of state or powerful relatives (e.g. The Philippines, where Imelda Marcos governed Metro Manila (Drakakis-Smith 1993:10)).

Overall an inadequate financial situation is found on the city level (OECD 2001:34), which is not solely due to a high dependence on national funds but also to lacking powers to enforce regulations and to collect taxes, user charges or fees (Rakodi 2001:211). City governments regularly do not have the resources and means to enforce their plans and programs and to prohibit development which does not correspond to the plans made. Another aspect of lacking resources is the insufficient education and training of local level authorities⁶¹ and their limited policy making capacity (Rakodi 2001:210).

6.2.4 Formal and Informal Actors – An Antagonistic Relationship

The difficult relationship between formal and informal actors is another important source of institutional deficiency. Regrettably there seems to be no, or not sufficient coordination between formally elected (or even appointed) representatives of a city and informal organizations, such as NGOs and CBOs.

A major difference between formal city government and NGOs and CBOs is that the latter ones are mainly voluntary organizations based on interest, friendship or neighborhood relations and are acting within a limited (local) scope of interest (Happe/König 2000:134). Local government in contrast provides public goods and potentially covers many functions for the whole city area. NGOs and CBOs mainly have limited objectives and are catering for the special interest of their members (Prud'homme 1996:109-110). Very often city government refuses to cooperate with NGOs and CBOs as it is reluctant to recognize them as proper formal ways of political articulation (ibid). The CBOs and NGOs on the other hand tend to see formal institutions as “*corrupt, aloof, irrelevant, and indifferent*” (ibid). According to Prud'homme (ibid) these two main representation mechanisms within cities are having an antagonistic relationship. No information flow between these two sectors is possible and important potentials for synergy effects in urban development are lost. As we will see in the following section the informal groups are also mainly excluded from decision-making and cannot supply the process with their local knowledge.

⁶¹ This problem will be dealt with in greater depth in the section on technocratic decision-making.

6.3 Deficiencies in Managing and Planning Urban Development

Even if the impediments and shortcomings in the institutional realm could be overcome the mode of decision- and plan-making in most large agglomerations in developing countries represents a problem in itself. Again it has to be mentioned that much of the planning system is inherited from a colonial past without adaptation to the context of developing countries. Still today many techniques are transferred from developed countries to developing countries without alteration according to different circumstances (Devas 1993:65-70).

6.3.1 Technocratic Planning and Decision-Making

In the paragraphs above it was shown that urban responsibilities are splintered and fragmented mostly along jurisdictional and functional criteria. It has become apparent that centralized governments (on the city and national level) want to maintain control over the city and therefore exclude other actors⁶² from consultation and decision-making.

This phenomenon is closely connected to the characteristics of technocratic planning and management of urban development. In this approach technocrats within the administration are deriving development goals for the city and decide on the means how to reach the goals⁶³. Making decisions within a highly centralized system of urban management and planning does not only mean excluding the public from decision-making but it also implies that crucial information input from the inhabitants is not possible. The influences of the general population and its organizations (NGOs and CBOs) are either completely excluded from city management and planning (Stubbs/Clarke 1996:3) or participation is only possible in implementation, when the crucial decisions are already made (Wekwete 1997:537). Today community participation is not totally excluded in all steps of urban management and some attempts were made towards community integration, but real decision-making and planning power was not handed down to the citizens at any time. To illustrate this I will briefly reflect the major changes in the role of the community in urban development and show that despite all efforts the main planning and decision-making responsibilities remained within the upper ranks of administration.

6.3.2 Changing Theoretical Approaches – Prevalence of Technocratic Planning in Practice

As Burgess et al. (1997:151) note there has been some change in the attitude towards community participation in urban development. In the 1950s and early 1960s policy makers refused to integrate citizens and their organizations into mainly centralized planning procedures. In those days there was a strong belief that “*scientific rationality*” was an effective way for delivery of physical and social services. Fringe groups, such as the urban poor were not integrated. Instead,

⁶² Those who constitute a substantial part of society.

⁶³ Technocratic Planning will be described in detail in chapter 8.

these groups were stigmatized by the administration. “*Often the failure to accept participation was attributed to the egoistic and anomic values and attitudes of the poor, which were identified as the social psychological traits of a condition of ‘culture of poverty’ ...*” (ibid).

In the 1960s this approach changed by adoption of the so called “*sweat equity*” concepts of community participation. This concept sees the community vertically integrated into the state hierarchy and dependent on the central state. Resources were given to communities if they were able to contribute their own labor and assets for self-help initiatives. In the 1970s this approach was enlarged by “*site and service*” programs, which relied mainly on local labor input and self-help within given geographical areas (Burgess et al. 1997:152). In the 1980s this methodology changed again and a project approach was chosen towards urban development. Community involvement was mainly regarded in implementation and design issues (Burgess et al. 1997:152). Even if the changes in urban development described here are getting closer towards the recognition of participation of citizens it still remained in implementation of already defined projects and it was not accompanied by participation in choosing programs and projects. The projects and programs were designed outside the communities, the location for the projects were determined by the administration and the whole steering and influencing of the projects or programs was in the hand of central administration agencies (ibid:153). The community was seen as an object in planning and it was not able to determine its “*own social destiny*” (Goulet 1989:165). In the 1990s the attitude towards participation of the community changed considerably and it became apparent that “*communities should rather be subjects than objects of planning*” (Burgess et al. 1997:153) and that they should have access to power and ought to be represented at the center of decision-making⁶⁴. But these changes mainly occurred in theoretical discussions on urban development (Utzig 1999:24). In very general terms the model of planning for city development which is in place practically remains oriented towards blue print master plans steered from above (Utzig 1999:24)⁶⁵. The idea is still one of “*government regulates and the public complies*” (Davey 1993:154).

There are several reasons why these systems are still in place and resisted over such a long time (according to Devas 1993:73/74). Firstly, the professional training and ideology of urban planners is very often not concerned with participation of citizens and with compiling real world plans which might be sensitive to outside circumstances⁶⁶. They are still more focused on design

⁶⁴ This approach is going to be picked up in the idea of communicative planning.

⁶⁵ Even if there are some changes to making them more responsive and include citizens in implementation.

⁶⁶ It has also to be noted that many of these experts were educated in foreign, mostly western, countries where they were not sufficiently prepared for their work in a developing country. Their education was mainly focused on industrialized countries, their problems and the solutions provided were according to western methods and the technical tools available (Friedman 1973:287-299).

and scientific methods. Secondly, there are vested interests of planners and the administration (public works engineers, financial directors etc.) who are interested in keeping up the system of specialists in the city and who want to ensure their work in the future; citizen participation is a threat to their role as experts. Thirdly, very often planning legislation would have to be changed in order to change the approach towards urban planning. Fourthly, governments often do not want to work according to plans and so plans are not made to be implemented, but just to remain plans, in order to suggest that action is on its way or to attain financial resources from donors (ibid).

For various reasons the idea of master plans is still in place, and with it all its shortcomings. The master plans foresee a given development pattern for 15 to 20 years ahead (Rakodi 2001:209). In this approach to management and decision-making neutral experts and technocrats are supposed to analyze the problems of the city and to compile plans and solutions according to scientific criteria (Rakodi 2001:209). Urban planning is still seen from a problem oriented technocratic perspective (Devas/Rakodi 1993:55). The technocrats systematically use their knowledge to reach plans which are in the public interest (which is defined by them as well) (Hopkins 2001:170). These experts do not meet the real needs of investments and provision of infrastructure for the majority of inhabitants. Habitually they do not care about realistic resource requirements and their implementation. As Devas (1993:74) notes *“the mere preparation of plans serves the interest of politicians and other agencies without any intention to implementing them”*. Furthermore the planning task is not integrated with other agencies or into other processes in the city, such as budgeting (Devas 1993:73).

As already noted above the long range plans are to be implemented on the hierarchically lower levels, which are mainly not included in the decision-making process or deriving the plan (Rakodi 2001:210). As a consequence these plans often lack sufficient information input and are therefore far away from the reality and realistic conditions. Richardson (in McGill 1998:466) puts it more drastically: *“these plans are almost useless. They usually involve widely inaccurate population projections and land use zones that deviate, often dramatically, from reality”*. Additionally many plans are not only unrealistic but also too ambitious to fit the environment or problems they are made for⁶⁷.

⁶⁷ Recent examples for failure of technically advanced and ambitious plans can be found in Bangkok and Dar es Salaam where Geographical Information Systems (GIS) were to be implemented and failed (see Rakodi 2001 or El-Shaks 1997).

6.3.3 Illusionary Assumptions – Excluding Power and Politics

It is an illusion of the technocratic approach that urban actors can be steered from above in a planned manner (Prud'homme 1996:100) and that the city is functioning by command and control (Clarke 1996:93). Additionally, it is a false impression to assume that neutral professionals derive plans through neutral scientific methods which are set up in order to reach public welfare. The assumption of scientific rationality which is solely relying on experts has to be questioned. The results of centrally steered approaches to planning have proven to be unsuccessful in a dynamic, uncertain and complex environment, as the one of a mega-city. An important limitation of technocratic planning is that this view on city planning is neither sensitive to political nor power structures found in mega-cities. It has already been shown that politics is a very important in the urban planning and management context (Rakodi 2001:216). Urban planning can no longer be seen as a solely technical task (Devas/Rakodi 1993:48), but for being successful it has to recognize that it is embedded in a political environment.

6.4 Integration of Functions, Jurisdictions and Citizens

In this chapter it has become evident that the current systems in place are not able to respond to the challenges they are facing. The main consequences for a new approach to planning and managing urban development are the need for an agency covering the whole agglomeration area, which functionally integrates all relevant sectors and enlarges its institutional capacity by relying on the input, information and involvement of the mega-city's citizens.

The following chapter will highlight the major deficiencies of the urban management and government models in place.

7. Negative Consequences of the Daunting Systems in Place

7.1 Insufficient Information and Knowledge Exchange - Rigidity and Unresponsiveness

Overall the most significant negative consequence of the management system in place is that it hinders the flow of crucial information and knowledge for management and planning throughout the city. Due to the institutional setup and technocratic planning the information available for agglomeration-wide development agencies is very limited in mega-cities of developing countries. Restricted here refers to the quality and accuracy of information as well as to the quantity of different sources the information is drawn from.

In more detail this means that, firstly, the planning and management process does not have any information input from the local level as plan and decision-making are generally very centralized. This is aggravated as the state sector very often does not cooperate with informal actors, because public agencies are reluctant to recognize informal organizations officially (Prud'homme 1996:110). The public and informal sectors are seeing each other as opposites

instead as inclusive complements. (Prud'homme 1996:110). Therefore city administration experts do not have adequate contact to the citizens at the “base” and everyday life (Stubbs/Clarke 1996:2). The citizens (or their organizations) “on the ground” to whom information and knowledge the administration is lacking comes naturally are excluded (Cohen/Rogers 1992:441). Deficient flow of information from the base to the decision-making circles is a main factor which leads to unrealistic planning and management proposals (Rakodi 2001:210-213).

Secondly, the information flow is impeded by different, splintered jurisdictions or among administrative sectors and functions. Furthermore there is insufficient vertical information flow between different levels within the administration (Prud'homme 1996:126-128). A lack of information flow and a deficient coordination of investments lead to haphazard decisions resulting in inadequate resource allocation throughout the city and prohibit many possible effects of synergy⁶⁸ (Rakodi 2001:210).

Thirdly, inadequate information not only fosters unrealistic planning, but also impedes the city's ability to be proactive and to anticipate future problems. It takes a long time until centralized agencies recognize problems and deficiencies, so that if they identify a problem it is most likely that they can only react to already changed circumstances (Rakodi 2001:211)⁶⁹.

Above and beyond inadequate information the central output of technocratic planning, the long range master plan, is too rigid for the dynamic and uncertain environment of mega-cities. Isolated central planning or managing agencies cannot foresee the future of cities for 10 to 15 years. The pace of urbanization and the rapid changes in globalization and population patterns make it impossible to have detailed plans, as they are impeding effective reactions and responses to changes. The unresponsiveness and rigidity of the plans make them unrealistic and outdated as soon as they are in place (El-Shaks 1997:505). Long range plans are too rigid for the dynamic environment of mega-cities in the south, as are not responsive to changes or to any deviation from the planned norm⁷⁰.

In conclusion it can be said that master plans are “*static in nature, attuned to a scenario of slow urban growth in which major investments in infrastructure, roads, services and other public investments could be carefully planned in the context of a finite long term plan*” (Clarke in McGill 1998:466), which can definitely not be found in fast growing mega-cities.

⁶⁸ Just call into mind the example on Bogotá, given in 6.2.2.

⁶⁹ Additionally, adequate information is crucial as very often city managers and planners were educated in foreign countries or lack in education for the problems of mega-city conditions in developing countries (El-Shaks 1997:505).

⁷⁰ The fact that plans are setup with insufficient data input from below exacerbates the impossibility of their implementation.

7.2 Poor Implementation, Deficient Enforcement Power and Lack of Ownership

Besides the weakness of unrealistic plans problems in implementation and enforcement of regulations impede effective service and infrastructure provision throughout the city. The main reason is rooted in the fact that citizens are not consulted during the plan and decision-making process. This results on the one hand in insufficient knowledge about the plans by the people, on the other the plans, projects and regulations are perceived as “*the government’s*” ideas. Implementing ideas and plans from above hinders the potential development of ownership in projects and plans by the people. Additionally these plans are often unrealistic and not tailored to the real needs of the inhabitants which leads to the result that citizens do not have the feeling of profiting from the plans.

There is no consultation and citizen input in deriving the plans and goals and no real benefit for them, so these plans are simply not accepted and legitimized in the eyes of the people (Rakodi 2001:211/El-Shaks 1997:507). The legitimacy of the actions of city administration is heavily contested as people reject the government monopoly on defining and solving social and economic problems (Batley 1993:179). The result of non-acceptance and non-compliance to the plans is that informal and illegal development outnumbers the planned and authorized one by far in mega-cities of developing countries. If development is to occur in a planned way the government would have to get the commitment of the people (Rakodi 2001:212/213). It is crucial to remark that even if good plans were made by the technocrats it would be very difficult to implement them, without getting the support of those who have to comply with them in daily life.

The only way to realize the current plans is coercion and control by city authorities. Due to a lack of financial resources and administrative capacity the government has not sufficient power to monitor projects throughout the city (Clarke 1996:82). The weak enforcement power (e.g. tax collection or general regulations) in mega-cities is a general problem which is only accentuated in the realm of urban planning (El-Shaks 1997:505). Besides the narrow capacity of city government to enforce plans low moral among their own staff often reduces the efficacy of plans additionally, as they themselves do not respect the plans made (Clarke 1996:82/El-Shaks 1997:506).

The lack of enforcement power of the government also weakens satisfactory revenue collection from successfully implemented projects (Rakodi 2001:212/213). An insufficient financial base leads to a lack of investment in crucial infrastructure projects, so that the city cannot provide adequate services and access to them for all inhabitants (OECD 2001:35). This in turn leads to huge disparities in level of service and connection to infrastructure between different parts of the city (OECD 2001:35).

Including citizens and informal organizations would not only improve the accuracy of information but would also allow to work together with them in monitoring and enforcing policies, as they can often draw on wide scopes of different sources of authority (Cohen/Rogers 1992:440-442).

7.3 Lack of Accountability and Transparency

Due to the strongly hierarchical public sector, the unclear distribution of tasks and competencies as well as unresponsive technocratic decision-making the urban management process is lacking transparency and accountability (OECD 2001:34). Accountability here refers to “*any situation in which individuals who exercise power are expected to be constrained and in fact are reasonably constrained by external means (e.g. reversal of decisions, dismissal and judicial review) and to a degree by internal norms (e.g., codes of ethics or professional training)*” (McKinney/Howard 1998:37). The big distance between the responsible governing bodies for the mega-cities and their inhabitants lead to mistrust as the use of resources and the way of decision-making are neither transparent nor understandable.

In technocratic systems bureaucrats and local representatives largely do not have to be accountable to the citizenry. They are able to veil their interests and actions behind scientific rational arguments for their action. They are the specialists, who have the technical knowledge and expertise in comparison to laymen citizens. Additionally they are frequently appointed by external agencies e.g. the national government and are only accountable towards these agencies, if at all.

Another problem of accountability can be found in the relation between elected representatives (if elections take place) and the bureaucrats, who may be technically very powerful and not accountable to the elected representatives. The bureaucrats can escape the control of elected representatives as the delegates are having a weak position in relation to the full time professional bureaucrats (Prud'homme 1996:111). A last dimension of lack of accountability is the relation between elected officials and the citizens they should represent and be accountable to. It is found that citizens are often having a very hard time to control or influence their elected representatives outside of elections (Blair 2000:27-29).

More accountability and transparency could improve the commitment of the people and the implementation and so the whole planning process (Clarke 1996:84). Once again the flow of necessary information, this time from the administration and politicians to the citizens is key to an improvement for urban development. Higher accountability and transparency would require more and adequate information flow towards the citizens.

7.4 Erosion of Social Cohesion and Sense of Community

Exclusion of citizens and their organizations (NGOs and CBOs) from the urban development process and general decision-making on their daily lives impedes the development of feelings of belonging to the city. Furthermore as the systems in place are not able to deliver services and infrastructure to the city, inhabitants have to rely on other sources for obtaining them. As mentioned earlier “*cultivating a patron*”, who provides the basic needs as exchange for political support is an immediate solution of the problem. The consequence is not only that planning decisions are implemented vertically (top down), but that citizens also have to rely on vertical networks to receive necessary benefits. Horizontal communication among the citizens is not fostered and they are more likely to get involved in vertical patron-client relationships. The lack of horizontal communication and interaction might lead to a destruction of social cohesion and solidarity among the inhabitants (OECD 2001:35). No sense of community can develop as active interpersonal communication or possible building of CBOs is not enhanced by the way people are integrated in the system. Citizens cannot develop own competencies in handling their own issues and therefore new forms of mutual respect, tolerance and reciprocity cannot develop (White 1999:29-31). The current systems in place are wasting or are not utilizing valuable social capital⁷¹ and are threatening social cohesion (OECD 2001:44).

7.5 Overall Failure of Urban Planning

Overall there is a huge gap between what urban government should accomplish and what it actually reaches. Technocratic planning is producing unrealistic plans, is often misused by those in power (Kunzmann 1994:15) and seems to be trapped in a “*vicious circle*”. Insufficient data input into central planning leads to unrealistic plans and hinders citizen ownership and commitment. This results in problems in implementation, which is exacerbated by a lack of coordination of different investments and the bad quality of plans. The consequence is a deficient resource allocation and a poor provision of services and infrastructure. (Rakodi 2001:212-213/OECD 2001:35). The inadequate service provision and plans foster mistrust of the people towards city government. The lack of trust in the administration in turn leads to more (self-sufficient) informal activities and development. This again reduces the efficacy and compliance with plans⁷².

⁷¹ Which means that horizontal norms of reciprocity, networks of civic engagement and mutual trust cannot develop, which would e.g. allow overcoming problems of collective action more easily.

⁷² Rakodi calls this a self-enforcing viscous circle (Rakodi 2001:212-213).

8. Towards a Participatory Model of Planning

8.1 Requirements for a Participatory Model in Mega-Cities

Until now I have described the complex outside influences on mega-cities and their multifaceted and splintered internal structure. Additionally it has become clear that current modes of urban development are not successful and cannot succeed within a mega-city environment. The question is what would a new approach to urban planning look like in order to improve the process of planning and lessen the harmful results of deficient planning?

It has already become apparent that planning and management of urban development will only have a chance if they are understood as a continuous process. Besides the process character planning should be able to fulfill following requirements⁷³:

- (1) It should embrace all players and stakeholders (BMZ 1999:5) in the city building process in order to get multifaceted views and information. This signifies that there should be a possibility to “*articulate the internal structure*” (El-Shaks 1997) of the city and to bring different stances together.
- (2) The process has to be democratic and allow all stakeholders to participate equally at all levels.
- (3) It should harness local community initiatives and their ability to contribute to the process in all stages. Therefore devolution of powers to lower levels and decentralization of government have to take place in order to promote more local autonomy, participation and self reliance.
- (4) Furthermore it should be horizontally integrated. The meaning of horizontal integration is twofold: Firstly in terms of overreaching jurisdictional borders and secondly to overcome functional splits within the city administration. This means that planning and administration of urban development have to be better incorporated⁷⁴. Especially a combination of planning and budgetary matters is highly appreciated, as the creation of plans cannot be realistic without financial means to implement them (Devas 1993:74).
- (5) Additionally to a horizontal amalgamation of activities the process has to be vertically integrated among different levels of government. This means that compliance and coordination between plans and ideas on the local and aggregated level have to be reached.
- (6) The horizontal and vertical integration imply that a system-wide coordination is needed, which means that actions have to be coordinated throughout the city with city-wide responsibility on the level of a metropolitan-wide coordinating organization.

⁷³ The requirements are formulated according to problems described above as well as to McGill (1998:466) and El-Shaks (1997:512-522).

⁷⁴ A recent example can be found in Shanghai, where new overreaching managing structures are created (Speer:2003).

(7) The process should be capable to respond quickly and adapt to opportunities and changing circumstances. This means that planning has to be flexible and open enough to effectively react to changes in the environment.

(8) There should be a certain level of stability and continuity to ensure the success of projects and the realization of goals set.

8.2 Participatory and Communicative Approach

It is suggested that a participatory and communicative approach to planning urban development, which is sensitive to the political nature and complex environment of planning, could help to provide a crucial contribution to advance the current situation towards the claims made above.

It is obvious that participatory planning can only be one measure among others which would have to be considered as well in order to improve the current fallacy of urban management and planning. But nonetheless participation carries many potentials and basic values which may help to make advancements in solving several urban problems. In the section on the hypothetical setup of a participatory model I will implicitly take this question up and try to practically connect citizen participation to important other questions such as area-wide coordination, horizontal and vertical integration, as well as devolution of power and resources, but first I will introduce the theoretical concept of communicative planning.

8.3 Theoretical Approaches to Urban Planning - Planning Theory and Political Theory⁷⁵

The paragraph below will show that urban planning theory has for a long time not really been concerned with politics and the political base of planning (Baum 1996:366). But over time the sole focus on technical planning contexts (land use, population density etc.) has given way to political influences (Brooks 1996:118). More recent approaches such as communicative planning are concerned with a more political perspective. It is crucial to see that participation in planning has to do with access to decision-making and power; or as Thomaßen (1988:16) puts it provokingly: *“Wer herrscht, plant, und Planung ist immer eine Form politisch-herrschaftlichen Handelns“* (“Those who are in power make plans and planning is always a way of exercising power”⁷⁶).

In general urban planning has been primarily concerned with administrative or technical improvements and only recently dimensions such as power, resources, accountability and legitimacy have been recognized (Rakodi 2001:216). In the description of the internal structure of mega-cities it became apparent that power relations, exclusion and marginalization of the poor

⁷⁵ Regrettably there are not many sources in the literature which are making a connection between planning and political theory.

⁷⁶ Own translation.

are important factors within the urban setting and are structuring the access to decision-making processes.

Having citizens participate effectively in urban planning means to give them access to power and decision-making. Furthermore it would be required to give them adequate resources which they can use in order to fulfill their participatory work and assets to implement their decisions.

In the following I am going to give a brief overview of the recent development of planning theory and I will introduce the concept of participatory and communicative planning. This approach will form the theoretical base of my model for participation in planning and managing the mega-city development process. As I have identified politics as an important variable (and it is argued that politics is an important aspect of any kind of planning) I will briefly mirror planning theory with potentially corresponding thoughts in political theory. Regrettably there are only few texts in planning theory which are concerned with political theory⁷⁷.

Planning theory in the second half of the 20th century was influenced by four main paradigms: the rationalist/modernist planning, muddling through, equity/advocacy planning and communicative planning.

8.3.1 Rational Planning and Technocratic Theory⁷⁸

The traditional or rational approach to planning⁷⁹ portrays the urban planning agency as neutral and expertise driven without political interests (Baum 1996:366-367). In the rational model the planning agency determines goals and means of the urban planning process (Fainstein/Fainstein 1999:266) and it derives the public interest rationally and scientifically as it has access to infinite information (Baum 1996:366-367). There are clear dimensions of right and wrong, which can be established technically. The scientific data determines the development needed and planners are perceived to be free from any special or class interests. Particular attention is given to the internal logic and analytical coherence of plans (Healey 1996a:264). Planning is seen to be abstract and non-disputable and therefore political context, interest and power are disregarded (Baum 1996:366-367) or even seen as “*dysfunctional external disturbance*” (Brooks 1996:117)⁸⁰.

According to Fainstein the political concept of technocratic theory is closest to the idea of rational planning. Technocratic theory⁸¹ is a product of the industrial era. Technology is welcomed as a cure for the ills and anarchy produced by the arrival of capitalism and the

⁷⁷ Which is another indicator that no real connection has been made.

⁷⁸ As mentioned the categorizations are taken from Fainstein/Fainstein and the kind of political theory referred to is also called “utopian socialism”.

⁷⁹ The dominant theory until middle of the 1960s.

⁸⁰ The problems of rational and technocratic planning have been shown before.

⁸¹ According to Fainstein the most significant thinkers in this paradigm are: Comte, Saint-Simon, Owen and Fourier.

dissolution of old paternalistic elite driven economies (Fainstein/Fainstein 1999:273-275). The motto associated with this kind of thinking is “*order and progress*”. Technology is seen as a means to ameliorate the conditions of the lower class. The society envisioned here is hierarchical and the managerial-scientific elite is protecting the lower classes by neutrally identifying the common public interest. In this approach social change is engineered from above based on rationality in order to ensure benefits for all (ibid).

Common roots for both technocratic theory and rational planning are the belief in progress through science and rationality. Both approaches seek to “*replace politics with scientific administration*” (ibid:274). The main critique to these approaches can be seen in the fact that the emphasis on science and neutrality is in reality masking the interests planning really serves (ibid:268). It is argued that plans are not only technical, but also political and are guided by the interest of those in power (Healey 1996a:264).

8.3.2 Incremental Planning –Muddling Through Instead of Planning

In his famous essay “*The Science of Muddling Through*”⁸² Charles E. Lindblom (Original from 1959 but its influence only started to rise in the second half of the 1960s) has laid the foundations for this mode of urban planning. In this approach policy makers are moving ahead through incremental adjustments and marginal advantages of different alternatives. There are a multitude of atomized interests, influences and actors and the political context of planning plays an important role (Brooks 1996:117). Problems are too complex to be sufficiently understood or managed (Fainstein/Fainstein 1999:272-273). The solution is a strategy of coping which only allows incremental changes. Power and interest are considered here and power/interest relations among stakeholders are defined in a market like arena. Political interaction for Lindblom is a clash of atomized interests which desirably will come to a more or less harmonious state of pareto-optimality, where no group can win without another loosing out (Fainstein/Fainstein 1999:272-273). The result is the process of muddling through with only incremental changes from the equilibrium.

The closest equivalent in political theory to Lindblom’s incrementalism would be liberal theory in the sense of Locke and Bentham⁸³. They picture an atomistic concept of society with rational actors who can best judge their own interest. “*The public interest is accepted as real but is regarded as resulting from the interplay of a multiplicity of private interests within the confines of the political marketplace*” (ibid:281). In this conception of the state, government has no other

⁸² Lindblom, C. E. (1999): *The Science of Muddling Through*. In: Fainstein, S./Campbell, S. (Eds.): *Readings in Planning Theory*. Third Edition. Malden: Blackwell Publishers.

⁸³ Fainstein/Fainstein mention Locke as the father of liberal thought, which was developed by Bentham and Spencer in the nineteenth century (1999:281).

role than guaranteeing the rule of law and it is not concerned with interventions to lesson social inequality. Power is diffused throughout society; neither a technocratic elite nor other groups should have absolute control. *“Incrementalism, like classic liberalism, is based on a procedural value of maximizing individual freedom”* (ibid).

But in a classical sense *“muddling through”* is not planning as no ends and means are specified and outcomes are only mutual adjustment. The importance of this approach lies in the emphasis of political context (Brooks 1996:117), even if that context is highly constraining for the feasibility of any kind of planning.

8.3.3 Equity Planning – Expertise without Access to Power

The goal of equity or advocacy planning (also gaining importance in the late 1960s) is the distribution of gains to those who have few. In this approach it is obvious that all public programs create losers and winners according to their powers within the urban setting. The urban arena is seen to include multiple interests with different levels of access to power, which are inherent in any society (Fainstein/Fainstein 1999:270-271). The idea is to provide the powerless with planning capacity, knowledge and tools in order to improve the representation of the poor (Brooks 1996:117). Equity planning can be seen to be rooted within a reformist socialist theory, which emphasizes the shift of power and benefits towards the poor. Social strata of society are having diverging interests, which are determined by their class situation (Healey 1999:234/235). There is a structural conflict between capital-owning class and working class. The emphasis is laid on material equality (Fainstein/Fainstein 1999:279). This approach to planning clearly includes political and power constellations in its analysis; but the solution of providing the hitherto excluded with planning knowledge and expertise falls short of the theoretical demands made. Enlarging planning knowledge and planning capacity of the poor without any access to power and decision-making is not fully acknowledging the political context and therefore not changing the power constellation (Brooks 1996:117).

8.4 Communicative Planning - Deliberative Democracy and Communicative Rationality

Communicative planning is an approach within the realm of democratic planning. It underlines the importance of information input from all strata of society into the planning process. This means that community based groups, as well as formerly excluded individuals have to be integrated into the formulation of plans. The content of these deliberatively derived plans is then seen to represent the public interest. It is assumed that the process of negotiation allows the participants to learn about differing world views and to create a common interest which is more than the sum of all special interests. It is the public which chooses the ends and means of the

planning process, whereas the planning agency is only guiding the shaping of potential alternatives (Fainstein/Fainstein 1999:275-278).

This approach to planning allows including different competing political interests. It puts an emphasis on context, as all problems only exist in and are defined by a certain environment (Baum 1996:369). The different stakeholders and their interests are recognized and they are included into the deliberate effort of deriving plans (Baum 1996:369). Ideally the real power of the actors in the outside world is neutralized by relying on the power of the better argument (for further details see below).

Deliberative Democracy and Communicative Rationality

The equivalent in political theory and theoretical base for this kind of planning is deliberative democracy, which had a revival in political theory in the 1990s (Dryzek 2000:v). This approach advocates that “*all individuals subject to a collective decision...*” should “*...engage in authentic deliberation about the decision*” (ibid). Recent discussions on deliberative democracy are putting an emphasis on empowering civil society and reevaluation of communicative processes (Frey 2002:89). The underlying idea is that teleologic and strategic actions are traditionally guided by instrumental (“*scientific*”) rationality, which causes negative side effects or outcomes. To overcome the negative impacts, instrumental rationality has to be replaced by a communicative one. This can be done by emphasizing the values of deliberative democracy and the creation of an “*inter-subjective*” understanding through dialogue (ibid:89/90). In the background of deliberative approaches stands the idea that “*democracy evolves around the transformation, not the aggregation of preferences*” (Elster 1998:1). The thought of deliberative democracy is not new, but can be traced from the ancient *polis* of Athens, over the ideas of the French Revolution and John Stuart Mill to more recent philosophers, such as Habermas (Dryzek 2000:1-8). The design of deliberative democracy is not about democratic elections, “*but of proposing, listening, concerting, changing one’s opinion in order to form in common a common will*”⁸⁴. If a political choice is to be legitimate it has to be the result “*of deliberation about ends among free, equal and rational agents*” (Elster 1998:5). The central actor for Habermas is civil society and the political public as they have to identify latent problems in society and to make them subject of discussion and introduce them into the political arena (in Frey 2002:90). Civil society is seen as a driving force for the political system by introducing new perspectives and world views into the political system. For Habermas the two spheres of state and civil society are separated and the discursive process is solely anchored within civil society (ibid:91/92).

⁸⁴This quote is taken from “Archives Parlementaires. Serie 1:1789-1799 (Paris 1875-1888), 8:595” quoted in Elster 1998:4).

As indicated above at the center of communicative planning is the notion of communicative rationality (Hoch 1996:39). Habermas holds on to the notion of rationality but he enlarges it from a concept of instrumental rationality to a rationality created through communication between different individuals. “*For Habermas the three ‘cultural spheres’ of the Enlightenment (science, morality and art) have become dominated by instrumental rationality*” and “*these three spheres have increasingly distanced themselves from the ‘life-world’ under the growing dominance of ‘experts’*” (Tewdwr-Jones/Allmendinger 1998:1975). As an answer to the increasing invasion of the life world by instrumental rationality Habermas presents communicative rationality. Communicative rationality is the most effective way of dealing with complex problems (Frey 2002:90), as rationality is inter-subjective and therefore including numerous perspectives of the complex environment. It weighs beliefs, principles and conditions under multiple frames for interpretation (Dryzek 1996:214). It is believed that the complexity of the environment can only be unveiled through group interaction (Pretty 1995:1251). The “old” instrumental definition of rationality was rather seen as “*determining the one best means to meet a given end*” (Dryzek 1996:213). The role of language and undistorted communication are the basis for consensual action (Tewdwr-Jones/Allmendinger 1998: 1976).

Comparably to Habermas the theory of communicative planning is leaving the idea of narrow scientific rationalism (Healey 1999:234), which is seen to be dominant in technocratic and rational planning. It proposes that all forms of knowledge are socially constructed and it assumes that individuals are developing their world views through social interaction. People are having different perspectives, diverse interests and varied expectations, therefore urban planning and policy should rely on all forms of knowledge drawn from various sources (Fainstein 2000:6)⁸⁵. It is crucial that the expert knowledge of the planning agency or administration is just one way of seeing issues and that it is open to be challenged by differing views. This is a clear turning point away from the technocrats’ scientific “*instrumental rationality*” towards a collective rationality. Various systems of morality, culturally specific traditions, experiences and various “*life worlds*” are present within such a collective reasoning approach (Healey 1999:243). There are no pre-defined categories for right and good actions. But “*right and good actions are those we can come to agree on, in particular times and places, across our diverse differences in material conditions and wants, moral perspectives and expressive cultures and inclinations*” (Healey 1999:243). Shared perceptions of problems and solutions have to be negotiated (Pretty 1995:1251).

⁸⁵ Quotations from Fainstein (2000) are based on the online version of the article which appeared in Urban Affairs Review. Therefore page numbers do not correspond to the numbers in the journal.

This approach takes into account the differing life worlds of people, differing styles of reasoning as well as different forms of argumentation (Healey 1998:1539). It reflects different social worlds and the (formerly dominant) planning agencies' technocratic way of knowing is just one way and has to recognize and incorporate challenging arguments (ibid:1539).

Like in deliberative democracy the focus is on communication across difference without erasing the differences (Dryzek 2000:3). The notion proposed by communicative planning is one of "*living together but differently*" (Healey 1999:242). "*People inhabiting different life worlds... (can) ... have a genuine and reciprocal impact on one another... The first step is usually to accept the depths of the difference, the second to understand what these differences are, and the third to construct some sort of vocabulary in which they can be publicly formulated*" (Geertz in Healey 1996:286). Decisions are made after debate and the background of the participants does not matter in the light of the power of the better argument. In dialogues the participants can learn about others and themselves, and the goal is not compromising but transforming views and beliefs (Forester 1998:213-218). This statement can be compared to a change of "*theories in use*" (Argyris/Schön) which is brought about through communication, negotiation and openness for other positions and interpretations.

It is important that the discourse is kept open and that coercive measures are excluded (Dryzek 2000:3). This is a crucial prerequisite of communicative planning, as only when an "*ideal speech situation*" (Habermas) is achieved and coercion, manipulation and deception are overcome (Dryzek 2000:2) it can unleash its big potential. In the situation of ideal speech, "*communication will no longer be distorted by the effects of power, self-interest and ignorance*"⁸⁶ (Tewdwr-Jones/Allmendinger 1998:1976). The five key conditions of ideal speech are according to Flyvbjerg (1998:188) that (1) no one should be excluded, (2) the participants are autonomous, (3) power neutrality, (4) transparency and (5) ideal role taking.

The focus is not primarily lying on the outcome of plans but a process route is taken emphasizing the procedure of creating plans. Reasoning is happening through discursively established principles of validity (Healey 1999:243).

The difficult task is that communication arenas have to be built where all people have voice and where they are effectively listened to (Healey 1998:1539) and a process of common understanding and trust may develop.

⁸⁶ This is also one of the most contested points about communicative planning (see below).

8.5 Enlargement – Crucial Questions on Power, Participants, Consensus and Participation

The model of communicative planning has been subject to critique from various perspectives. The main focus of critique was on the existence and desirability of communicative rationality. It is beyond the scope of this paper to delineate all discussions and diverging views on the concept of rationality. Instead the concept will be enlarged by concentrating on some main points of critique which are highly relevant in the arena of a mega-city for the effective implementation of a participatory model. The enlargements deal with criticism and potential mischief of communicative planning which have to be kept in mind when it is tried to put the theoretical concept into practice. Those weaknesses of communicative planning and especially deliberative democracy have to be considered before formulating a more practical and specific model of citizen participation in planning in mega-cities.

8.5.1 Omnipresence of Power⁸⁷

At the core of communicative planning lies a pluralistic model of reasoning which is based on the belief that the public interest is achieved by free undistorted communication among all participants (Day 1997:426). For this purpose all strata of society have to have equal access to decision-making, should have equal capacities to get organized and to speak out. From the discrepancies depicted in the section on the internal structure of mega-cities it is obvious that equal access and equal organizational capacity is not found in large cities in developing countries. There is a bias in the pluralist arena, or as Day (1997:427) puts it sarcastically: “*the flaw in pluralist heaven is that the chorus has an upper class accent*”. In a mega-city there are “*systematically skewed conditions of access, voice, power and authority*” which are inherent in its context (Forester 1996:254). Participatory planning is by no means free of distortions and it does not have to lead to desirable outcomes (Tewdwr-Jones/Allmendinger 1998:1978). It is only when we “*come to understand the influence of power we see that we cannot rely solely on democratic procedures based on deliberate rationality to solve our problems*” (Flyvbjerg in Fainstein 2000:12). Without any other precautions the result would be a “*continued dominance of the already powerful*” (Fainstein 2000:12). Groups with the greatest access to capital or with the greatest organizational capabilities would dominate the arena. According to Flyvbjerg (1998:192) Habermas’ communicative rationality is based on a misconception of power. Power can never be completely eliminated and it is always present, even in open discussions, where differences in eloquence, hidden control, charisma, dependency relations and rationalization processes are always more or less existing (Flyvbjerg 1998:194). Power is always present as

⁸⁷ Power was already defined in chapter one as “*the probability that one actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests*” (Weber 1972:28).

“every social act is an exercise of power, every social relationship is a power equation and every social group or system is an organization of power” (Hawley in McKinney/Howard 1998:34).

Above and beyond these aspects the power of technocrats in the city administration is also very relevant. In the sections above it was emphasized that in communicative planning the knowledge and world view of planners and experts should be just one among others. It is important that it is assured that administrators and planners actually cooperate with the citizens and do not misuse their expert knowledge to dictate the right solutions⁸⁸.

Participation is an appealing mode of planning in complex environments, but it has to be supported by access to resources, expertise, effective organizing capabilities and some kind of control (Fainstein 2000:18-30), e.g. by the state or another external agent. The role of city government as external agent and the problems of power and organizing capabilities will be described in more detail in the following sections.

8.5.2 Clarifying the Role of Government – Initiator, Enabler and Facilitator

The city government or a metropolitan planning authority is going to have the central role in dealing with potential problems and mischief of participatory planning. Before the specific enlargement of the model will be presented the crucial role of city government within the process of participatory planning should be clarified.

The section on deficient knowledge and information flows in technocratic plan making has shown that information, input and commitment of citizens is a decisive factor in the effective and efficient urban development. Even if city government might be reluctant to devolve power to citizens, the current circumstances and problems emphasize that it needs participation as much as it fears it (Pretty 1995: 1251). City government is the actor which is currently holding major power resources and therefore has to have an important role in guiding the participatory planning process. Government's willingness to hand over power to the people is a crucial and necessary prerequisite for participatory planning.

It has already been mentioned that participation can range from authentic participation to pseudo participation including manipulation of masses by coercion and fear (Goulet 1989:168). For a deliberative process of planning it is clear that government has to transfer substantial powers over decisions to the communicative arena and it has to guarantee that the decisions made through the communicative process are really implemented and executed. This means that the government really has to acknowledge and support the participatory process.

Here it is suggested that the participatory process is introduced and supported by a governing body for the whole city. This might either be the case when several city jurisdictions come

⁸⁸ In the section below it will be shown that the government might play a crucial role in ensuring this.

together and form this body anew or when an already existing city government is fulfilling this position. The envisaged agency is to function as initiator and catalyst for the participatory process (Goulet 1989:167). The government is seen to be facilitator and external agent trying to overcome potential mischief in the participatory process, such as unequal access and domination by interest groups or experts (Abers 2000:136-137). Government's role has a dual function, as constructor of an enabling environment for community participation and civic engagement on the one hand and as controlling force ensuring that the administration is credible and willing to work with the population on the other (Abers 2000:148). In this approach it is the benevolent government which is encouraging civil society to get organized and involved. City hall has to inform citizens actively about possibilities to get organized and it has to provide training, knowledge and organizational capabilities for the hitherto excluded citizens.

This conception of an enabling government fostering civic engagement is departing from the older commonly held belief that the "*organization of civil society is a prior condition for democratization*" (Abers 1998a:512). It suggests that civic engagement can be bolstered by the intervention of a benevolent government, which for its part in the case of participatory planning is hoping for more efficient and effective planning outcomes. The government itself can be the transformative engine in encouraging civic interaction. The approach taken here is clearly a top down approach in the first phase as reformists in the government are creating and supporting institutions and institutional arrangements favorable for bottom up activities. Here I follow Evans (1997) who assumes that government and civil society relations are not a zero sum game but that a certain "*state-society synergy*" exists. The underlying assumption is that "*active government and mobilized communities can enhance each other's developmental efforts.*" This synergy effects are "*constructible even in the more adverse circumstances typical of Third World countries*" (ibid:178). The government works as external agent to encourage and help not organized strata of society. The idea is that civic groups are strengthened and that they are gaining political capacity to start "*to pressure for government accountability and effective policy themselves*" (Abers 1998a:514). So the process which has been commenced and introduced from above is becoming a process owned and steered by the people. They are enabled to transform and alter the course of action by themselves. Citizens are taking over the process and it is becoming their own course of action, which is just supported and facilitated by the government. It is important to stress that government is only an outside agent and especially active to get the process started, it does not have a leading role within the participatory arena and it has to leave the contents and the steering of the process to the participants.

8.5.3 Who Participates – Overcoming Unequal Access

The first question with reference to the participants of the process is closely associated with access to power and is concerned with who effectively can participate in the communicative planning arena in a mega-city? This paragraph deals with unequal predispositions among groups or individuals for participating, which have to be recognized and dealt with while proceeding towards a participatory model.

In the concept of communicative planning it has been shown that only deliberation among all actors within a city seems to be able to provide an adequate solution to counter the high complexity and fast change of the urban management task. Problems should be open to the interpretation from different angles and world views, as there is no single correct way of knowing (Petty 1995:1251). It is necessary that all groups and individuals should have access to the process of planning to create a common rationality, which is the most rational and effective way of unveiling the complexity of the planning task. Characteristics such as sex, family status, education, social division, age, occupation, income, length of residency, security of tenure (Cohen/Uphoff 1980) should not play a role for accessing the deliberative arena, as all categories can contribute important information and views into the process. Therefore all whose interest is or might be at stake should be included (Stubbs/Clarke 1996:92/Wekwete 1997:532) into the process of participatory urban planning. This also implies that the arena has to be open to collective organizations as well as to individuals.

An important problem which is encountered even when a process with free access for all is set up is the distribution of costs and benefits of participation. Unfortunately differences in the capacity to get organized among different groups may lead to the effect that some get heard and others cannot bring in their interests in the deliberative arena. On the one hand the question is how to integrate hitherto excluded strata of society and on the other how to assure equal access even among the hitherto excluded. Furthermore, groups within the previously excluded strata of society, are also having different potentials for getting organized and the possibility exists that some “*radical organized*” groups or informal community leaders are dominating local arenas even within formerly excluded strata of society (Abers 2000:220).

Happe (2000:220), Goulet (1989) and Abers (2000:118) are pointing out that the costs of participation, which are time, energy, resources as well as social costs are not distributed evenly among all potential participants. Well educated and rich people might find it easier to speak out and to participate. Women might be less likely to participate and speak, as they would have to overcome traditional conventions which do not foresee an active role of women in society, poor people might encounter a lack of confidence in speaking out, as they are not used to do so or as pointed out above they might have less free time to go to meetings or to acquire the necessary

knowledge⁸⁹ to discuss. Therefore it is argued that the costs for the less educated, the women and the poor are higher and that their capacity to get organized is lower than for better off people. This in turn means that the benefits for these disadvantaged groups have to be high enough to make them participate, as a “*rational self-interested individual will not participate if the benefits do not eclipse the enormous costs*” (Olson in Abers 2000:115). In terms of potential benefits not only material benefits should be recognized, but also the participants’ self-esteem, social status, experience and other individual values (ibid:116). It should be the task of city government or another external agent to help to shift the costs and benefits so that it is feasible for all to get organized and to participate (ibid:157). Only if the incentives are strong enough poor residents will become participants (Nelson 1979:134).

Another important aspect in terms of who is going to participate is the problem of potential “free-riders”, which is always present when goods with positive externalities or public goods⁹⁰ have to be provided (Abers 2000:115). Urban plans themselves and the provision of infrastructure (social and physical) are having clear characteristics of a “public good” (Hopkins 2001:171), as for example people cannot be excluded from using and benefiting from a newly paved street. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze all aspects of plans as public goods and the potential way to overcome the problems of collective action⁹¹, but the classical solutions for overcoming these barriers are selective incentives for participants, lower costs than benefits or a small group whose benefits are so huge that they let the others free-ride (Abers 2000:65).

Yet another impeding aspect seems to be the lack of trust and social cohesion within heterogeneous neighborhoods and areas. Recent studies show that it seems to be harder to get organized in heterogeneous groups than in homogeneous groups (e.g. Lall 2002). The urban poor do not exist as a class with common interests, but they are “*socio-culturally heterogeneous*” (BMZ 1999:6) and very often they are not experienced in acting outside their traditional ties, such as kinship, region of origin etc. Furthermore the institutional history and experience in horizontal interaction are very important for creating trust and mutual interaction (Abers 2000:118)⁹². It is possible that the introduction of a deliberative arena might start a kind of virtuous circle of interaction and trust. Interaction which leads to a benefit for all or a success might increase trust which in turn increases mutual interaction and so forth (Abers 2000:160).

The problems of unequal access presented here are all problems which were already introduced in box 1. They are all representing circumstances where government intervention is welcomed

⁸⁹ This might be due to a lack of free time or insufficient education in reading etc.

⁹⁰ Which is (per definition) a special kind of positive externality (Samuelson 2001:272).

⁹¹ For an analysis of problems of collective action in informal settlements see Mummert (1998).

⁹² The benefits section on social capital will elaborate this point further.

from pluralist and economist perspectives to lesson the deficiencies of free interplay of forces. This does not mean that a central body should take over the participatory arena, but that it should try to level the field among the different players and therefore assure equal access to the process. The negotiations and deliberation itself remains completely free of government intervention. The role of government is just helping to overcome structural problems with access to the communicative arena.

8.5.4 How to Participate - City-wide Articulation and Aggregation of Preferences

An additional central question for a practical implementation of participatory participation in mega-cities, is how citizens could effectively participate in the process of planning. Should it be directly as advocated by communicative planning or by representation? And might solutions be found by effective discussion or by aggregating preferences by voting? And should it be initiated from above or from below?

In the discussion on the informational shortcomings in the planning process it became evident that it is the local people who know their neighborhoods and their areas much better than the central administration or the city government. Therefore it is understandable that the scope of participation should start at the local level (Happe/Sperberg 2000:220), as one of the strengths of citizen participation is the provision of local information to make service provision more adequate. According to Abers (2000:220) citizen participation is expected to be most effective when it starts at a level close to “*everyday life*”. Furthermore it is evident that an effective local interaction should include communication beyond family members and close relatives (Goulet 1989:166-167), but it should still be on a level close enough to peoples everyday living sphere, as a sense of community can more easily develop in smaller (potentially homogeneous) groups (Berry et al. 1993:290/Goulet 1989:168). Additionally it is obvious from the unequal distribution of costs that meetings close to the actual communities will enhance the participation of all people. Poor people would potentially have more problems traveling to distant meetings, as costs in time and money are comparably higher for those than for richer people.

As outlined above the participation process should make it possible to have city-wide interaction and articulation of the internal structure of the city (El-Shaks 1997:140). Therefore an aggregation on higher levels than the local community level should accompany the arenas of deliberation on the local level. This aggregation should happen through elected representatives of the communities. One reason for having representation is that it is impossible to hold central public meetings, where potentially all 4 to 20 million inhabitants of a mega-city might attend and speak out. Another reason is that large central meetings cannot take place frequently and

therefore cannot ensure a constant flow of local information, which is needed to cope with the dynamic and complexity found in fast growing cities.

A crucial point related to the representation of the common interest is how the common will of the community is derived. In the concept of communicative planning the goal would be to discuss as long as is needed to find consensus. In reality it is not always possible to arrive at a consensus; especially in face of a fast changing environment which restricts the time available for discussion and stresses the need for timely decisions and action. Longer processes of discussion might result in a faster implementation and higher relevance of the plans, but nonetheless there have to be procedures for aggregating different preferences in order to decide on controversial issues (Elster 1998:6/14). According to Elster (1998:7) every process of decision-making involves the interplay of the three components arguing, voting and bargaining. Discussion is important as it reveals private information, lessens the impact of bounded rationality, is innovative and increases legitimacy; but there have to be processes which allow the participants to arrive at timely decisions when opinions are diverging or a deliberative consensus has not (or not yet) been reached (Elster 1998:11). So an aggregation of the current preferences in the form of voting is desirable and necessary for a workable participatory process.

From this section it has become clear that community participation is most effective on the local level and that for the purpose of articulating the preferences of all communities throughout the city systems of voting and representation have to be found. Local arenas have to elect representatives for arenas on more aggregate levels. The representatives have to have constant direct contact to the local level in order to bring in the ideas and the visions of their community on an aggregate level. The modes of voting and election for representation should in a first step be set by the initiator of the process, but then become subject of negotiations and change themselves.

8.5.5 Participation in What - Continuous Participation and Decision-making

A further key dimension which is not dealt with in communicative planning is in what and in which function (in relation to city hall) citizens should participate. Are they only to participate in special projects or throughout the whole process of urban planning? Are the outcomes of deliberation just additional information for city hall or are they already binding decisions.

The question relating to participation in projects or throughout the whole process of urban planning can only be answered in favor of the latter. Conditions in mega-cities are constantly changing and therefore a continuous feedback from the base is necessary (Pretty 1997:1250). Furthermore it has become evident that enforcement and implementation of plans might improve when citizens themselves are integrated into these efforts. This implies that citizens are involved

in initial, ongoing and operational decision-making that they might contribute their labor, financial, informational and other resources throughout the implementation and that citizens are also the beneficiaries of the planning effort⁹³. Benefits here refer to social, personal, material and immaterial gains for the citizens. Frey (2002:99) has shown that citizen participation is more likely to be successful if the projects and benefits are closely connected to immediate needs and are therefore representing immediate benefits for the participants.

In addition citizens have to make an input in evaluating current plans and projects and could initiate alterations to current or future efforts. This emphasizes the fact that city government and the administration have to allow sufficient access to insights and relevant information formerly not open to citizens. If citizens are to make reliable and good decisions on issues then they need adequate and reliable information (Harris 2001:60).

For sustaining support of the citizens the most important question is the role of the community towards city government and administration. Do these two public actors allow the citizens real access to decision-making power? Is the community really empowered through the process or just manipulated? Recalling the two typologies of Choguill and Pretty (presented earlier) it is apparent that participation even if all citizens have equal access can mean many things. Citizens could have the final say in bottom up decision, they could have to negotiate their decision with city government, or they might need the final approval of city hall or the administration (Abers 2000:195). As it has become evident earlier it is crucial that people have the possibility to gain benefits for their participation efforts. Participation which does not allow citizens to gain benefits in decision power or outcomes will not have the potential to sustain over a longer period of time. Therefore a practical participatory model has to allow citizens to compile and implement their own plans and investments.

8.6 *Getting Specific – A Hypothetic Model for Participatory Planning in Mega-Cities*

At this time all parts for a new model of participatory urban planning have been introduced and reassembling the insights presented throughout the paper will lead to a new model of citizen participation.


The main demand for the new model is workability and sufficient flexibility in face of a complex background and a wide diversity of specific circumstances within different large and fast growing cities. Fast change, complexity and diversity are the result of uncontrollable outside pressures (e.g. globalization) on mega-cities. Socio-economic and infrastructural fragmentation and splintering is the resulting consequence within the city or city region. Technocratic plan and

⁹³ The dimensions for citizen participation were mainly taken from Cohen/Uphoff (1980), Nelson (1979:129) and Samol (1999:37).

decision-making can for various reasons not sustain a development catering for the needs of all inhabitants and stakeholders and is even a threat to economic and social viability. A new approach to urban management and planning for development has to overcome the deficiencies of the old systems in place. As mentioned earlier it is not the purpose to design a fixed model which might solve the problems of all cities. The goal is to compile a model which is flexible and changeable enough to be altered by local actors and to adapt to differing cities and cultures⁹⁴. The new model of participatory urban planning is based on three pillars: (1) a deliberative open process of negotiation and binding decision-making among all stakeholders and inhabitants with support of the administration on all levels, (2) a new integrative approach to management and planning consisting of a continuous process in the responsibility of the citizens in collaboration with the administration, (3) organization, guidance and initiation in its first phase⁹⁵ by city government.

For the ease of presentation the new model will be introduced in four sections. The first section will present the process of urban management and the latter three will describe the role of the main actors in the process: the citizens and their organizations, the administration and the role of the representatives of the city (mayor and city council).

8.6.1 The Urban Management Process – Continuous and Flexible



As shown in chapter 2 a new approach towards urban management should envision it as a continuous process rather than a linear sequence of tasks. The four steps of urban development foreseen here are according to

Devas/Rakodi⁹⁶: (1) Survey and Analysis, (2) Development of Strategy and Policies, (3) Implementation and (4) Monitoring and Evaluation. These are all crucial and necessary steps for urban management and planning but they are not in a sequential order. They are continuously

⁹⁴ Nonetheless the model has some basic underlying values and pillars, which are definitely not completely transferable over cultures (e.g. the idea of a dialogue of equal participants, without considering their background), but the aim is to show a direction and not to give a rigid solution.


⁹⁵ For a listing of examples where government implemented institutions fostered civic engagement see Abers (1998a: 513).

⁹⁶ For details and content of the steps see chapter 2.

interwoven with each other through short circuits and feedback loops. It is only by adopting a flexible connection among the steps of the process of urban development that large cities can effectively respond to a dynamic and uncertain environment. Here changes can be included into the process immediately and it is possible to adjust to new circumstances quickly. The plans made and agreed upon development goals are therefore only guiding references for future action and future deliberation as they have to be kept open to adjustment and changes. A connection of all steps within the planning and management process also assures a sufficient and repeated information and knowledge flow between different administrative agencies involved in urban planning and management. Furthermore all administrative sectors of the city should contribute to one process of development management in order to reach a maximum of synergy and integrated projects and goals. The process is pictured in Exhibit 2⁹⁷. Obviously the process itself may also be changed through deliberative efforts and decisions.

8.6.2 Participants – Inclusive Process on Different Levels of Aggregation

Potential participants for the new model of participatory planning are all citizens, their organizations and other stakeholders within the city. Participation should take place at the local level close to everyday life. Locally people are having a huge advantage in knowledge and information in relation to the administration. It seems to be unfeasible to have city-wide meetings with all citizens and stakeholders in a mega-city. Therefore a system of representation is needed which would allow to represent the community's will and opinion on a city-wide scale. In order to allow a city-wide articulation of the internal structure it is suggested to have a three tier system. The first level should be community⁹⁸ meetings at the smallest scale, as it seems to



be the easiest way to get organized within relatively homogeneous small entities. The community is free to suggest and decide on their most immediate needs. These needs and

ideas then have to be negotiated on an intermediate level among representatives of several


⁹⁷ Exhibits 2 through 5 are all own exhibits.

⁹⁸ What is considered to be a community has to be left to the local people as central government does not have sufficient knowledge about potential communities.

communities. This might be on a regional level where the different community's efforts and claims are coordinated. On a last city-wide level an assembly representing all regional assemblies should negotiate and decide on the final plan and outcome. Comparable to the urban management process this should not be a linear process, but rather an iterative one, where elected members of higher aggregate levels frequently communicate with their local assemblies. Furthermore it is suggested to limit office holding within this process to a maximum of one year to avoid dependency and power structures to develop. Communities are free to identify themselves as communities, but there have to be some standards to account for differing community and regional sizes, as well as for different levels of participation (e.g. certain number of representatives per 1000 inhabitants or per participants).

8.6.3 Experts and Administration – Advisor and Facilitator

In this new approach the planning and management task which was formerly left to the responsibility of the administration is now shifted towards the public. This represents a substantial change of responsibility and decision power of urban management, which now lies with the citizens. The administration is only fulfilling its function as technical information provider, coordinator and advisor throughout the urban management process. For increasing efficiency and efficacy the administration has to shift the process towards the citizens. By doing so they are gaining better and more adequate informational input in order to deal with complexity and to make more realistic plans and projects. The administration still is the most



competent body as citizens need the expertise of the administration and its coordinating power to arrive at realistic plans and to implement them successfully. There is a reciprocal need between the administration and citizens. The governing bodies need the citizens' input to overcome the threatening prevailing circumstances and the citizens need the

administration to successfully derive technically feasible and financially viable plans and projects. It is very important for the administration to work together with the citizens in all steps of the management process (from planning to implementation and evaluation) as well as with all assemblies on different levels of aggregation. All levels of the participatory process should be able to have support from experts for their plans. Furthermore the administration has to coordinate its internal relations among different functions and different levels of administration.

A viable plan and project does not consist of splintered decisions within different functions of administration or within splintered jurisdictions with a limited scope. A holistic integrative planning process is necessary in order to avoid silo thinking and a loss of efficiency due to a lack of integration of planning in different realms. The participatory process requires that jurisdictional and functional borders are overcome. In order to collaborate with and to consult citizens effectively on all levels of urban government the administration has to have a coordinating agency which assures the integration of all functions and jurisdictions. Therefore a participatory process would foster communication within the administration as well. This would eliminate functional “silos” and enable the administration to negotiate with citizens on all levels as a unified partner with competencies over all functions.

8.6.4 City Government – External Agent and Coordinating Body

Making urban planning and management a deliberative process has inherent potentials but also innate threats, both of them have been introduced above. The biggest problems for practical successful deliberative planning are the dominance or exclusion of some groups or communities⁹⁹ from the process and that the collective decisions made are not implemented by the administration. In both instances city government or a metropolitan planning organization might solve the problem.


Ideally a process of citizen participation should be open to all citizens and the costs for participating should be about the same for all participating individuals or groups. Therefore the city council or the planning agency should actively encourage inhabitants to get organized and to get involved. It could do so by informing citizens about the participatory process and by shifting potential costs and entry barriers. It is clear that nobody can be forced to participate but that it should be a voluntary process. Similarly, as citizens have a right to participate they are also free not to participate (Potter 1985:153).

Additionally the power within and among participating communities has to be balanced in order to avoid the dominance of some groups or communities. A process has to be found which ensures that the most basic problems of living conditions (e.g. running water, sanitation) are tackled with a higher priority than other issues which are potentially less important or not dealing with basic needs for living¹⁰⁰. In the first place these rules, such as higher priorities for investments in needy areas, could be suggested by city government and might be deliberately changed when the participatory process is already on its way for some time.

⁹⁹ Or the systematic structural non participation of some groups.

¹⁰⁰ One could imagine a well organized rich community being powerful enough to potentially push through claims for luxury equipment (e.g. public swimming pool) while other areas of the city still go un-served by e.g. running water.

The role of city government is crucial to get the process started, but even more important is the city governments political will to devolve real power to the people. Only when city government can assure that the plans made by the people are implemented then a participatory process will have the possibilities of succeeding. Citizens will not be willing to get involved, deliver information, time and other resources, when there are no visible changes and benefits for them, their communities or their city resulting from the participatory process. So it is very important that city government is enforcing the decisions of the participatory process. The role of city government or a central governing body is an enabling role, which liberates, stimulates and mobilizes dormant potentials and resources on all levels of society (van der Hoff/Steinberg 1993:30-33). On the one hand it has to assure a certain reliability and stability for the participatory process but on the other it should guarantee free deliberation and decisions by the citizens, including decisions about the setup of the participatory process. (The whole process is pictured below).



9. Potential Benefits for the Management of Development of Mega-Cities in the Developing World

The model described above has the potential to respond more effectively and efficiently to the most severe problems of managing and planning urban development in mega-cities and it potentially creates a more equitable planning outcome. The expected benefits leading to more efficient and equitable planning and management are now analyzed and presented in more detail. In summary it will be highlighted that efficiency and efficacy of urban development might be increased through better information flow, more responsiveness, ownership, commitment and legitimacy of the process, which are innate in a deliberative and communicative process. Furthermore the process will also reach equity goals by integrating all citizens in planning, catering for the peoples' real needs, by fostering democratic learning, social cohesion and

accountability. It is important to keep in mind that efficiency, efficacy and equity goals¹⁰¹ of participation cannot be seen isolated but are intermingled.

9.1 Increased Information and Knowledge Flow - Relevance of Plans and Responsiveness

The most important outcome of a participatory model of planning and management is a sustained and improved information and knowledge flow throughout the mega-city system. This implies a continuous information flow from citizens to the administration and vice versa as well as knowledge exchange within these two groups (among diverse civic communities and among different administration agencies and functions).

As commonly mentioned in the literature, citizen participation gives insight into information and data which is normally not accessible for city hall (Dienel 1978:174). This includes the quantitative amount of data which is available as well as the quality and relevance of data accessible. The citizens' knowledge enlarges the informational base for urban planning and management (Potter 1985:149/Healey 1998:1540) and improves the overall understanding about the complex system (mega-) city (Berry et al. 1993:291). Knowledge about informal arrangements and the possible integration and recognition of informal organizations (Link/Federwisch 1995:14) broadens the data input and information base for urban development. In the model presented above the formal and informal institutions are not opposing, but integrated and complementary (Prud'homme 1996:110). This results in a more efficient use of all informational resources available. More participants and open deliberation mean more heterogeneity of opinions and judgments which potentially entails a plus in ideas and innovations in the planning process (Elster 1998:11), as well as additional (different) criteria for judging plans and potential actions (Dienel 1991:175). It is only by discussion and deliberation that information and implicit assumptions of participants become visible and accessible (Innes 1998¹⁰²) and can be subject to change.

Including new actors into urban planning is crucial for mega-city management. The system in place is not able to acquire and transform information sufficiently which leads to insufficient results in face of a dynamic and diverse environment. The capacity to deal with uncertainty and dynamic in the new model is enlarged by a new quality, quantity and accurateness of information and more actors to locate and absorb changes (Dienel 1991:182).

Moreover continuous citizen participation has also the potential to increase the relevance and responsiveness of plans. These two benefits are closely linked to the information flow described above. A better informational base due to more input sources increases the administration's

¹⁰¹ The first two are representing an instrumentalist and the latter is representing a empowerment view on participation.

¹⁰² The essay of Innes was accessed online and therefore it is not possible to give page citations.

ability to respond to peoples' real needs instead of compiling unrealistic plans (Cole 1973:7/Day 1997:405). Due to the technocrats' limited information and knowledge about the outside world they are not able to recognize the real needs and wishes of the people on their own. Their scientific data is neither accurately reflecting the reality nor showing the preferences of the inhabitants.

Additionally citizen input can help the administration to utilize opportunities for action and changes in plans. Knowledge and information about changes and problems is more quickly and easily unveiled by citizens, as they are exposed to them in their daily lives (World Bank 1996:5). The model of participatory planning has the potential to articulate changes from below and to react to changes more quickly than before. Therefore it is evident that citizen participation cannot be a one time project, which results in a rigid plan but it rather has to be a continuous process with continuing information flow. This calls for a shift from an output oriented view on urban planning to a seamless communication process approach¹⁰³. More communication between the planning and management agencies and the community will increase both the responsiveness and relevance of plans (Berry et al. 1993:289/Day 1997:405). Furthermore the conception of urban planning as a cycle means that citizens are integrated throughout the planning process and therefore a constant input of information from various sources is ensured. So it becomes easier to recognize problems and potential failures early (Dienel 1978:174) and to deal with them proactively rather than sticking to unrealistic plans. A higher relevance and more responsiveness to changes are crucial in a complex, dynamic and fast changing environment as the one of a mega-city.

9.2 Differing World Views and Democratic Learning

Integrating all strata of society in urban planning and management means to gain an enlarged world view and a higher level of rationality. Different perspectives and perceptions of a problem are recognized and discussed (Frey 2002:105/Healey 1998:1540). This suggests that a more holistic picture of the mega-city can be achieved (Dienel 1991:182) which is necessary to derive decisions for the city's future. On an individual level the discussion and exchange of differing perspectives and values provide the basis for changing the underlying (collectively shared) assumptions about reality¹⁰⁴ and therefore strengthens the capacity for people to learn (Pretty 1995:1251/World Bank 1996:4/5). The presence of multifaceted views in the planning process implies that the hidden assumptions about reality of various participants will potentially be unveiled and challenged through discussion. This represents an additional source of learning

¹⁰³The change in approach towards a planning cycle has been introduced in chapter 2.

¹⁰⁴Comparable to "theories in use" coined by Argyris and Schoen.

possibilities (Pretty 1995:1251). It is only through continuous communication that information and assumptions of the participants can become visible. Participants are able to identify by themselves the assumptions underlying their arguments. Their unconscious assumptions are challenged and questioned during the deliberative effort (Innes 1998).

Including more people into urban development processes means to shift from a narrow scientific rationality of experts towards a notion of collective rationality and an enlarged world view created by all citizens and city government (Healey 1996:234-236/Healey 1998:1540).

Furthermore direct participation in urban planning and management can have an educative function (Cole 1973:7) in learning democratic practice. People become skilled in articulating their views and goals (Dienel 1978:189) and they are gaining knowledge of how to organize and participate in democratic processes (Frey 2002:105). By participating, people are in the situation to think about the common welfare and the will of others in the long run (Dienel 1978:189). Participants learn how to make compromises, to negotiate and to arrive at commonly shared goals of all community members (Healey 1996:234-252/Day 1997:405). Participation in a planning and management process can be a “*school of deliberative democracy*” (Baiocchi 2001:55).

As a result of negotiation and deliberation commonly derived and accepted values and goals are guiding the planning and management process. The next section will show that this implicitly leads to a higher legitimacy and better implementation of plans. Citizens gain trust in institutions and insight into the working of city government (Dienel 1978:189) and therefore acquire valuable knowledge about planning and management, which enlarges institutional capacity (Healey 1998:14).

9.3 Fostering Ownership, Commitment, Legitimacy, Transparency and Accountability

Integrating citizens into the urban planning and management process signifies that they can bring in own ideas and perceptions into the deliberative arena. In the new approach people agree on plans and goals only after equal negotiation among all citizens. The plans and programs made are therefore perceived to be the citizens’ plans. In the section on technocratic planning it was shown that inhabitants are reluctant to accept the plans made by technocrats as they are considered to be the “*government’s*” plans. In a participatory effort the commitment to plans made is higher as they are recognized as the peoples’ ideas (Potter 1985:149). The commitment into commonly derived plans is potentially superior and therefore the implementation is supposedly easier than imposing plans by force. This makes the compliance and implementation of plans more efficient and effective (ibid). The administration in mega-cities is very often weak in surveillance and implementation and huge parts of the occurring development do not comply

with plans. Planning with the people leads to an increased mobilization and ownership (Pretty 1995:1251), which fosters a higher compliance with plans and increased citizen surveillance on implementing them. Better implementation of plans and potentially higher credibility towards city government might furthermore lead to increased compliance in tax or fee payment. More efficient revenue collection would therefore make projects financially more viable. Increased ownership and commitment to plans is a crucial dimension in making mega-city planning and management more efficient and effective.

Closely connected to commitment and ownership is the increase of legitimacy of plans and projects. Creating an arena for interest mediation does not only mean to create greater commitment among participants but also means to create a new level of legitimacy (Haldenwang in Frey 2002:96). Including broader spheres of civil society at the local level into the making of plans and decisions increases the decisions' authority. By participating citizens are legitimating, steering and partly controlling the development of their city (Dienel 1978:182-188). More legitimacy and ownership lead to more compliance and efficiency (Dienel 1978:178) of plans. As mentioned above here the plans of the people are implemented and not the government's or the administration's plans. The legitimacy of citizen decisions on special issues is undoubtedly higher than the one of elected representatives making the decisions for the people they represent, but very often cannot be held accountable.

Furthermore including citizens might trigger a virtuous circle. As a higher legitimacy of plans due to citizens input might lead to a better service delivery, the compliance with plans is potentially higher. This in turn might increase the trust and legitimacy of public institutions as they are reliably providing services and infrastructure really needed by the people, which then potentially fosters participation in future plans and their legitimacy (Rakodi 2001:212-213).

Citizen participation has also the potential of making planning and management processes more transparent and accountable. In the suggested process citizens are cooperating directly with the administration on all levels and are therefore gaining information they could not have received before. The plus in information and the close collaboration with the bureaucracy facilitate the accountability of the administration towards citizens and elected officials (Blair 2000:27-29). The regular information flow to people increases accountability and transparency (Harris 2001:60).

As indicated above urban planning has to be seen as a continuous process and so citizens are included not only in planning, but also in implementation and evaluation and therefore have access to information throughout the process (Pretty 1995:1251). The possibility of citizens to guide and influence decisions in their city increases the feeling of efficacy (Cole 1973:7) and the

feeling of actively influencing the system and making a difference (Berry et al. 1993:290). Overall considering citizens and their participation means a shift from area-wide technical capacity to area-wide political structures (OECD 2001:41).

9.4 Horizontal Interaction - Trust and Reciprocity and Access to Power

Additionally to efficiency and efficacy potentials for urban management and planning active citizen participation fosters community cohesion by relying on horizontal relationships among citizens, rather than vertical relations with a patron (described above).

Vertical relationships (as they are found in patron-client relationships) are always only second best solutions as they hinder horizontal interaction and with it the development of social capital (Putnam 1993). The concept of social capital comprises norms of reciprocity, networks of civic engagement and mutual trust. If these elements are found in a society, problems of collective action can more easily be overcome. According to Putnam, the social context is an important variable for overcoming problems of collective action. Problems of collective action are present in any provision of public goods, such as plans or infrastructure (Samuelson 2001:372/Hopkins 2001:171). Putnam (1993:176) notes that social capital can bolster and improve the performance of a polity and the economy and is therefore productive. It can only build up when horizontal interaction takes place. This interaction then intensifies and builds trust and reciprocity for future interactions. Therefore social capital is a resource which increases when it is used rather than being depleted (Putnam 1993:169).

Participatory planning will promote horizontal interaction among citizens and through this interaction trust and mutual support can develop. Active horizontal cooperation and discussion will potentially intensify social cohesion, solidarity and foster a sense of community (Pretty 1995:1251/Cole 1973:7/ Frey 2002:105/Berry et al. 1993:290). Social cohesion, trust and solidarity further the efficacy of service provision and project implementation in a city. In order to participate in the forums people are encouraged to get organized and to articulate their points of view and needs collectively. Citizens are no longer recipients of benefits from patrons in exchange for political support, but they can actively influence the decisions made and they receive the benefits from the projects as rights.

Besides getting first real experiences with democracy, participation in planning and management means a change and shift of power within the city (Berry et al. 1993:286). The participation in planning and decision-making of the formerly excluded inhabitants means a shift of access to power from previously powerful elites and technocrats towards empowering the poor and disadvantaged (Pretty 1995:1251). Spoken in normative terms, citizen participation in planning

fulfills the basic democratic right of all inhabitants to participate in the development of their city (Potter 1985:149).

10. Porto Alegre – A Case that Works

10.1 The City – Background and Characteristics

Regrettably only few large cities in developing countries can serve as a good example for city-wide deliberative efforts in planning. The Participatory Budget (PB) of Porto Alegre can be exemplary, as it represents nearly all of the characteristics described above. This short chapter on Porto Alegre will show that similar processes as the ideal model developed above exist and more importantly, work successfully. Porto Alegre's PB is well documented in the literature, but for the purpose of clarifying some claims made earlier I will only selectively highlight elements of the process and its outcomes¹⁰⁵.

The metropolitan area of Porto Alegre is the 9th largest urban agglomeration in Latin America and has 3.35 million inhabitants (Gilbert 1996:Ch.1), but the city of Porto Alegre itself has only about 1.3 million inhabitants. Porto Alegre experienced a fast population growth over the last 60 years. From 300'000 inhabitants in 1940 the city quadrupled in size until 1990 when it reached 1.3 million inhabitants (Abers 2000:35/36). According to Alfonsin (in Abers 2000:36) more than 250 favelas with 400'000 inhabitants can be found in Porto Alegre. Over 40% of the vacant land in the city is owned by only a few proprietors. In comparison to other Brazilian cities the quality of life in Porto Alegre was and still is relatively high, although during the 1980s the number of people living in poverty increased (from 15% of the population in 1980 to 28% in 1989 (Abers 2000:37)).

Although the central city of Porto Alegre cannot be classified as a mega-city on its own, together with its metropolitan region, the fast growth and the tendencies of divergence between rich and poor residents it nonetheless boasts nearly all characteristics of a large, fast growing city defined above.

The case of Porto Alegre is concerned with participatory investment decisions and is therefore not an example for participatory planning. But there are nevertheless many parallels to urban development. Firstly, investment and budget decisions are very important prerequisites for realistic plans. Additionally participants in Porto Alegre are defining specific future projects in infrastructure and service provision by allocating financial resources throughout their city; this evidently represents an urban development task. Additionally the ideal model proposed above would see financial management tasks as related and integrated within urban planning and

¹⁰⁵ For a more detailed analysis of the PB in Porto Alegre see Abers (2001/2000/1998a/1998b), Baiocchi (2001), Frey (2002), Heller (2001), Marcondes (2001), Utzig (1999) as well as Zimmermann (2002/1998a/1998b).

management and not separated. Furthermore the PB was introduced by a benevolent government which managed to foster civic engagement and civic associations. A last similarity is seen in the fact that in 1989 Porto Alegre was facing many problems described as deficiencies of technocratic leadership above. The government was not making any noticeable profits which could be used to make new investments (96% of revenue went to the administration payroll (Abers 2000:67)) and information about the city's (financial) situation was simply not existing (Abers 2000:70-75).

10.2 Getting Specific - Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre

The PB was introduced in Porto Alegre in 1989 when the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)) was elected into power. It is beyond the scope of the paper to describe the political history and preconditions found in Brazil¹⁰⁶ but it is important to know that traditionally patronage-client relationships are very strong in Brazil and were even seen to be on the rise in Porto Alegre in the late 1980s¹⁰⁷ (Zimmermann 2002:283/Abers 2000:43). Furthermore financial decentralization brought about by a new Federal Constitution in 1988 made cities financially more independent from higher levels of government (Abers 2000:25-29).

10.2.1 How do Citizens Participate?

The process of PB is open to all citizens and it is designed as a continuous process with duration of a budget cycle of one year. Citizens are participating through direct involvement in various meetings on different levels of aggregation. The structure of the PB represents an independent parallel system to already existing local government (Utzig 1999:9).

For the purpose of the PB the originally four administrative regions of the city were transformed into 16 regions with 16 regional budget councils (Zimmermann 2002:283). Boundaries for these regions were negotiated with the people and altered throughout the years to fit the inhabitants' perceptions of belonging to one region or another (Abers 1998b:134). Besides the regional councils six thematic¹⁰⁸ councils, responsible for the whole city were founded. The 16 regional and the six thematic assemblies are in session twice a year¹⁰⁹ and they are open to all citizens (Zimmermann 2002:283). On the city-wide level a "*PB council*" with members elected from the regional and thematic assemblies is established (ibid). The regional, thematic and the PB council meetings are guided by government and administration members.

¹⁰⁶ For a closer look at the circumstances and conditions prior to the election of the PT see Abers (2000/1998a).

¹⁰⁷ Especially budget matters used to be an uncontrollable black box manipulated for purposes of clientelism (Utzig 1999:8).

¹⁰⁸ The thematic forums are having following foci: transport, social and health, education and leisure, city development and organization, economic development/tax and culture and were just introduced in 1994, not at the beginning of the PB in 1989.

¹⁰⁹ In 2002 this mode was changed to only once a year (Zimmermann 2002:283).

The first phase of the PB (in March/April) starts every year with the presentation of the investment decisions made last year and their implementation by city hall. The past investments are assessed and potential future investments are discussed by the participants of the public meetings on regional or thematic level. In the second phase from April to June deliberation about future investments take place on the local level within the regions. The local arenas are furthermore electing delegates for regional and thematic forums¹¹⁰. Thematic forums are boards which are set up to insure continuous communication and coordination between the different communities and regions¹¹¹ and the city administration throughout the year, as region-wide meetings cannot happen on a constant base.

In a third phase from June to July, city hall presents the funds available and the criteria¹¹² for distributing the investments for the next year. The priorities for investment are set on the regional level and then the local communities specify the actual investment to take place locally according to the priorities set.

In a second public regional assembly delegates for the municipal council are elected. They represent the ideas of their communities and regions (Zimmermann 1998b¹¹³) on the city-wide level. Here the budget and investment proposals are compiled and negotiated according to set priorities (regionally and thematically)¹¹⁴. Then in November the legislature (city parliament) approves the budget proposed. The investment plan made is “*treated as the formal contract of the investment that the administration promises to carry out*” (Abers 1998b:138). After that the whole process starts anew and during the first months potential changes to the setup and rules of the whole process are made.

10.2.2 In what are People Participating?

So far the way how people are integrated in the PB has been presented but it is also crucial to see what people are able to decide on. Through the PB citizens are able to decide on all investments of the city, which is about 15-20%¹¹⁵ of the household or the equivalent of 50 million Euros (Zimmermann 2002:284), the other amount of the budget is spent on salaries and maintenance. Civil society is defining the goals and the distribution of the investments (Zimmermann 1998b). The criteria for distribution and investment priorities are set every year anew so that priorities

¹¹⁰ It is important to note that these forums are not the same as the regional and thematic assemblies where all citizens might participate.

¹¹¹ These forums are responsible for coordinating the priority lists of investment throughout the city (Abers 1998b:136).

¹¹² These criteria are elaborated by the participants and not set by city hall (for details see further below).

¹¹³ Regrettably it is not possible to give standardized quotes from this document, as it was accessed on the internet.

¹¹⁴ A special process assures that higher weights of necessity are attached to investments in needy areas.


¹¹⁵ This figure is remarkably high as very often cities in the southern hemisphere are only having about 1 to 2% of their budget available for investment, which was also true for Porto Alegre when the PT took over city hall in 1989.

and target areas may change every year. As indicated above it is possible to change the rules of the process through the first months of every year (Abers 1998b:138)¹¹⁶.

Importantly decisions on investments are taken away from technicians and politicians and are handed over to citizens (Utzig 1999:36). Discussions between citizens and the administration are common and people are actively and effectively challenging the arguments of technical restraints made by technocrats in the administration (Abers 1998b:137). Furthermore citizens are also organizing monitoring commissions for the implementation of the projects, so that they are not only participating in making the plans but also in monitoring and evaluating the implementation (Abers 11998b:37). In summary people are empowered to make real decisions and are participating throughout the whole process from budget making to implementation and evaluation. They are having real access to power (Zimmermann 2002:285).

10.2.3 Who is Participating?

A very important aspect of the PB is who actively participates in the process. Critics of deliberative democracy are often stating that already existing power structures might just be replicated or even exacerbated by an open participatory arena.



Overall it can be said that a real shift of


decision power was reached by the PB. The percentages for participation of groups especially liable for being at the social fringe are shown in exhibit 6. The percentages in general participation replicate the distribution of these groups throughout the city. Only when it comes to elected delegates and councilors it can be seen that the low education group, as well as women seem to be underrepresented. This short section on the PB does not leave space for in depths analysis, but it can be said that the fears of domination by rich and well educated did not materialize (Baiocchi 2001:51-53) and that indeed poor groups are participating equally¹¹⁷ (Abers 2000:125-132).

¹¹⁶ The process of setting these criteria is very complex and tries to balance number of population, necessity of investment and other criteria.

¹¹⁷ Although it was found that the very poor tend to participate and gain less than the poor (Abers 2000:125-132).

Data on participants can also show how the PB has gained trust and credibility with potential participants over time. The number of participants in the public regional assemblies was rising from less than 1000 people in 1989 to more than 19000 participants in 1999. The figures given here are only representing participants in official assemblies, but according to Zimmermann

(1998b) the real number of participants, including informal local activities, lies at more than 100'000 people every year. This means that the majority of the people are participating in local in local neighborhood assemblies. Indeed a significant rise in local associations and co-operation among citizens can be found since 1989. The number of neighborhood associations might serve as an indicator for an awakening civil society and active citizen involvement. The number of neighborhood associations has more than



doubled since the introduction of the PB (from 240 neighborhood associations in 1988 to 540 in 1998 (Baiocchi 2001:55)).

10.2.4 What is the Role of the Government

The role of the city government and especially the mayor in Porto Alegre is very important for the PB. After taking office the PT was setting up an institutional framework which allowed hitherto excluded strata of society to participate. The new institutions are transparent and the investment criteria are defined by the people themselves, so the government has handed over a major source of power to the people (Zimmermann 2002:284). Furthermore city hall takes a central part in the functioning of the PB, as it actively encourages citizens to participate and to get civically organized¹¹⁸ (Zimmermann 1998b). Furthermore city government gives necessary training to the citizens to be able to attend meetings and to deal with technical questions (Marcondes 2001:149). Additionally the government assures that benefits are obtained by the people according to their decisions in the PB as rights and no longer as gifts from leaders and patrons (Abers2000:30). This is very crucial as people are encouraged to stay involved or to get active when they see that their ideas are really implemented and carried out (Abers calls this

¹¹⁸ An example of how city hall sends staff into the neighborhoods to encourage them to get organized is given in Abers (2000:pp.135).

demonstration effect (ibid:138)). The city government acts as an external agent to the community and assures that investments are really made. The rise in neighborhood associations can also be attributed to active encouragement by city government. Another important aspect is that city hall has proven its commitment to citizens' input by actively attending the meetings of the people. This effort by city government created trust and credibility and showed the government's willingness and capability to work with the people (ibid:144/150)).

Overall city hall managed to introduce a process with decentralized decisions by the people under a central oversight (Abers 2000:88). Especially through the thematic forums the PB allowed integrating all administration agencies and their actions in a united policy (Abers 2000:81).

10.3 Efficiency and Equity Benefits of the Participatory Budget

The sections above have shown that the PB is process owned by the people and that decisions are made by them while the government guides the process and assures the implementation of the plans made. The main claim of this paper is that active citizen participation can lead to more efficient, effective planning and more equitable results. Overall it can be said that the PB is a democratic process, stimulates civil society, distributes the resources more equally, reduces corruption and clientelism and increases the governments' performance (Utzig 1999:1/2).

The PB managed to increase transparency and reduce corruption, so that nowadays 98% of the citizens are judging that their city government is not corrupt (ibid). The bureaucracies are perceived to be more accountable as citizens are having a closer look on what technocrats are doing and how they derive public decisions (Utzig 1999:36/37).

A collective process of reasoning among all actors, allowing the creation of a communicative rationality, has developed which allows looking beyond the short term self interest towards long term general goals for the whole city (ibid:39). State-civil-society interaction created trust, mutual support and reliance in several ways: citizens are encouraged to get involved and to become active horizontally and repeatedly with other citizens. Here the citizens experienced city government as enabler. Closely connected to transparency, reliance and pushing back corruption is the fact that increased legitimacy and accountability fostered the motivation to pay taxes and fees increased considerably so that revenues rose by 50%. Utzig (1999:26/39) comes to the conclusion that the fiscal performance and overall government performance is very good. This is remarkable as most other Brazilian cities experienced severe financial crises in this period (Utzig 1999:28). In the words of Raul Pont, Mayor of Porto Alegre (in Marcondes 2001:150): "*In 10 years we have practically tripled the municipal revenues (...) we have not increased taxation and*

there has been no increase in fees and charges. But because of the credibility we have gained over the budget, we have been much better able to enforce the collection of the revenues owing.”

Another important aspect of the PB is that it assures that all investments in the city are interconnected through the thematic forums. These forums assure that investment decisions cutting over all public sectors are integrated in the final decisive budget proposal by the budget council.

In terms of equity goals it has to be highlighted that it is the hitherto excluded strata of society which are now having the possibility to influence investments in their city and that it is them who gained a substantial part of access to power. In terms of overall accomplishments and investments the results of the PB in shifting investments towards poorer areas and to provide basic services looks impressive. From 1989 to 1996 the number of households with access to water services rose from 80% to 98% and during the same time the percentage of households connected to drainage system nearly doubled (46% to 84%) (Utzig 1999:28/Zimmermann 2002:284). While in 1985 only 13 communal schools for 13350 children existed there were already 89 schools with 51500 children in 1999 (Zimmermann 2002:284).

Furthermore it has to be pointed out that the overall investments mentioned above (running water, drainage etc.) were going to poorer areas as these were the un-served areas. Additionally it can be seen that investments in the poorer residential districts of the city exceed investment in wealthier areas (Baiocchi 2001:48). For example 30 kilometers of roads were paved annually in poor neighborhoods since 1989 (Zimmermann 2002:285/Utzig 1999:29). Before the PB Porto Alegre offered housing assistance to 1700 families from 1986 to 1989, during the PB from 1992 to 1995 assistance was offered to 28000 families (Utzig 1999:29/30).

Overall the PB in Porto Alegre fostered a constant information flow throughout the city, from the administration to the citizens and vice versa, among citizens and within the administration. The integration of all actors in the city and all sectors of administration into one process of budgeting enabled the city to obtain more efficient equitable investments in social and physical infrastructure. It was by the introduction of participation in a deliberative arena that both instrumentalist and empowerment goals could be reached, civic interaction was fostered and problems of narrow scientific rationality were overcome.

11. Conclusion

In this paper a new concept of participatory planning for urban development was developed. It is designed to work in face of a complex, dynamic and fragmented environment. An analysis of the external influences on mega-cities and their internal structure has revealed the fast changing and heterogeneous arena in which the new approach is supposed to work. Insights into processes of

marginalization and exclusion within cities, unequal access to power, disparate service and infrastructure provision and the domination of planning by technocrats have highlighted the uneven structure and the importance of the political context for urban development in mega-cities. The management systems in place were found to be neither able to cope with external pressures nor to deliver sufficient basic services and infrastructure to all citizens. Reasons for this failure of current management systems have been found in technocratic planning as well as in the institutional setup. Because of those institutional and technocratic shortcomings the systems are unresponsiveness, rigid, have inadequate information and knowledge exchange, cannot sustain and create commitment and ownership, are insufficiently legitimized and are neither accountable nor transparent.

The new model developed here is supposed to tackle the most severe problems within the management process and therefore to make the process more efficient and its outcome more equitable. The model consists firstly, of a new approach to planning and managing urban development as a continuous and flexible process, which is responsive to changes and open for alterations. A constant input from citizens is seen as crucial for countering the fast change in all its diversity.

Secondly, the concept of communicative planning was introduced and enlarged to fit practically the context of mega-cities. The theoretical roots of this approach, lying in deliberative democratic theory and communicative rationality, were taken up and serve as a central constituent part for the new enlarged model. It is argued that only by integration of all citizens and the creation of a commonly derived perception of reality the complexity of the mega-city's environment can be countered and unveiled. Employing the conception of a communicatively reached rationality enables urban development to respond proactively to manifold changes and to the needs of all citizens. More importantly communicative rationality leaves the narrow scientific rationality of technocratic planning, which was not able to solve the city's problems and even aggravated the fragmentary tendencies. Altogether common deliberation offers huge innate potentials to overcome major shortcomings of management systems in place. The main result of continuous negotiation is a sustained information and knowledge exchange among all actors throughout the city. The concept of communicative planning was enlarged by analyzing its most severe shortcomings and inherent threats, such as problems of power relations, domination or collective action. Furthermore the potentials for an external agent as guide and initiator of a communicative process were investigated. This role of an external agent represents the third main part of the new concept and was assigned to city government, which has a vital interest in encouraging participation in order to deal effectively with the current and future problems of

mega-city growth. Here I followed scholars arguing that active government involvement has the potential to increase and foster civic interaction and the building of civil society.

Overall the theoretical concepts of deliberative democracy and communicative rationality serve as driving forces for linking citizen participation to better planning and planning outcomes. Communicative rationality created by deliberation among all actors in the mega-city allows abandoning the narrow, limited management approach associated with technocratic, scientific planning, which has proven to be inadequate. The results directly related to deliberative efforts among all actors are more responsiveness and higher relevance of plans, better knowledge and information exchange and more horizontal civic interaction among citizens on all levels, which potentially creates norms of trust and reciprocity. Overall it was shown that participatory planning has the potential to increase efficiency and efficacy of planning and can assure a more equitable planning outcome.

These potentially beneficial effects were reencountered while analyzing the Participatory Budget (PB) of Porto Alegre. The PB is relying on broad citizen participation and deliberation and has produced successful results in terms of efficiency, efficacy and equity.

In conclusion it can be said that citizen participation in planning and management and broad deliberation among citizens can improve outcomes of urban development greatly. The huge advantage of a participatory deliberative process is its flexibility and adaptability to different contexts, as the whole process and its rules are steered, determined and changed commonly by all citizens according to their interests and needs. The PB for example is perceived to be so successful that the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul has the intention to adopt it as a state-wide budgeting process (Marcondes 2001:146). Besides the national influence the PB has also found admirers outside the context of developing countries. The city of Paris (France) has signed a treaty of cooperation with the city government of Porto Alegre in order to investigate possibilities of implementing a PB process in the French capital (Frey 2002:103).

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¹¹⁹ This article is a summary of Abers' article from 1998 with the same title.

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