3. Apprenticeship systems in England and Germany: decline and survival

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3.1. Introduction

The issue of how to integrate the next generation into the labour market both quantitatively and qualitatively is common to all nations. In general, vocational education policy in each nation concentrates on its traditional relationship between education/training and employment, and on how responsible companies should be for designing, implementing and financing. The fact that many developing countries and those experiencing economic growth are experimenting with ‘alternating’ or ‘dual/dualistic’ vocational training concepts does not primarily indicate a positive attitude towards the German training model (Deissinger, 2003; Stockmann, 1999). Instead it suggests that their governments have recognised the wisdom of a practical learning approach and the importance of imparting the ‘right’ skills for working life. Despite these aims, vocational training tends to evolve in a way that seriously challenges political and economic traditions and thus tempers passions for excessive reform. However, this by no means excludes adopting ideas from foreign models. While developing countries lack sophisticated institutional differentiation, Europe’s specific national attitudes and cultures ensure continuity, either manifestly or latently.

Comparative educational science is thus assigned the task of collecting data on training structures and furnishing ‘an explicatio’, an analysis of the factors, motivations, tendencies and determinants shaping VET (Schneider, 1961; p. 86). Addressing the origins of schooling, Reichwein talks about the ‘inherent teleology of its functional relationship to the culture as a whole’. He states that training institutions are more than the product of abstract pedagogical ideas and claims it is a whole array of practical impulses which shape educational systems (Reichwein, 1963; p. 89 et seq.). The system theory view, which regards society as an entity seeking to reproduce and maintain its population, also postulates that the whole system claims the services of societal subsystems (Parsons, 1976). Educational institutions are anything but simple mechanical reproductions of their blueprints. They are the result of responses to a society’s needs through its turbulent history (Georg, 1997; p. 83). For this reason, comparative VET research must take a ‘multiplane’ approach. A simple look at the current and historical contexts of national education and vocational training systems provides insight into countries’ idiosyncrasies (Schriewer, 1987; p. 632 et seq.).

This stratified approach is particularly important in places where homologous concepts and notions that have endured through history confront one another. In Germany’s apprenticeships, the basic model of initial vocational training took on new forms under the
dual system to respond to the needs of self-industrialisation and national determination. However, in England, apprenticeships have undergone successive, sustained marginalisation. The following historical analysis attempts to reconstruct the two countries’ different development processes and derive an ‘explanation.’ It will posit reader familiarity with the structural peculiarities of the German vocational training system and make detailed references to developments in England (more details in Deissinger, 1992; 1993; 1994).

3.2. Structural differences between German and English apprenticeship

Classical occupational sociology (Beck et al., 1980) states that Germany’s occupational system has a kind of socialisation function. Social and personal behaviour patterns are taught along with the relevant technical and practical job skills. Since apprenticeship in Germany is embedded in a regulatory framework, both the macro and micro levels of the vocational training system contain structural dictates that ensure training programmes have ‘complex skill profiles’ (Zabeck, 1992; Deissinger, 2001b). Their ordering function implies that the wide range of in-company training activities is considered an organisational and educational unit (Harney and Storz, 1994; p. 355). The system of ‘State-recognised training occupations’ has its own subjective view of employment and a unique relationship to the tertiary sector (Harney, 1985; p. 126).

The principles of dual learning location and dual responsibility are merely a component and a visible manifestation of a training system structured according to the principle of vocationalism. We should mention the ‘organising principle’ of the German training system along with the principle of vocationalism (Deissinger, 1998). The organising principle specifically structures the learning environment and learning processes and clearly differentiates the system’s functions from other training options. The following ‘quality criteria’ are decisive:

(a) apprenticeships are the responsibility of the training enterprise under employment law. This partially releases them from the public sector’s protective and educational obligations;

(b) apprenticeships have a ‘public’ character, since their training mandate separates them from service performance processes. This lifts the concept of ‘vocation’ above the concept of ‘job’;

(c) the articles of apprenticeships require subjecting the learning process to a binding form of didactic regimentation, producing marketable skills;

(d) apprenticeships are organised in a dual system in terms of both institutions and teaching. This facilitates the learning processes which represent various mentalities and philosophies;
German vocational training, including its institutions and teaching methods, can be described as highly structured despite its close ties to business and its market dependence. English vocational training structures, on the other hand, have for decades suffered from excessive market orientation combined with companies’ reluctance to provide training. England exhibits considerable problems in qualifying and integrating young people (Perry, 1976). Gertrude Williams, one of the most committed advocates of training reform in the years after the Second World War, made the following observations on the shortcomings of the English vocational training system (Williams, 1963; p. 7):

(a) in England no external authority supervises training. Since no final examinations are held either, it is impossible to say how many apprentices acquire the minimum skills needed for their occupation;

(b) proper training programmes are very rare. Apprentices are expected to acquire their skills by watching;

(c) classes accompanying apprenticeships are not obligatory and we can assume that not more than 30% of apprentices are given the opportunity to attend school alongside their training;

(d) even if enterprises do allow trainees to attend classes, they are not interested in their apprentices’ progress in the trade school.

Simons suggests that the situation in England’s modern vocational training system is a result of the lack of compulsory further education. She believes that Kerschensteiner’s further education reform established the pattern in Germany. While the Germans were adopting educational policies, the English could not get beyond the planning and discussion stage, even after World War II. The few laws that were passed proved to be ineffective (Simons, 1966; p. 124 et seq.). Instead, England retained a VET system based entirely on business principles.

Looking at the process in Germany, we can see that craft trades again became the normal models of occupational training, thanks to the Handwerkerschutzgesetz (Craft Trade Workers’ Protection Act) of 1897 and the support of policies favouring SME expansion (Lenger, 1988; p. 134 et seq.). Liberalism could not gain as much ground or validation in Germany as in other countries. The weight of conservative legitimisation models of vocational education upheld the anti-industrial position during the free trade period (beginning with the North German Confederation’s 1869 Industrial Code) and later in the 20th century, particularly in the years after the Second World War (Stratmann, 1982; p. 183 et seq.). In contrast to the advanced industrial nations of England and France, this mentality prevailing in Germany guaranteed the survival of the Meisterlehre (apprenticeship with a master craftsman). A second characteristic of the German system is that the institution of the Berufsschule (vocational school) has been a fixture in the vocational training landscape since the end of the 19th century. This has enriched training content but also formally dovetailed theoretical education with practice in a company (Blankertz, 1979; p. 277 et seq.). The craft trades asserted that companies were the ‘correct’ learning location for vocational training. Berufschulen arose as a synthesis of
reactionary vocational training policy, in which craft trades played a leading role as the ‘model of German vocational education,’ and the successful attempt to rehabilitate the German education system with the help of ‘classical German vocational training theory’ (Blättner, 1965; p. 27 et seq.). However, the dual system is not an educational theory construct. It emerged from the practical consideration that in-company vocational training needed to be complemented.

English apprenticeships have suffered a sad fate. To this day, companies are notoriously indifferent to ensuring that their future employees receive thorough training, despite the traditional links between companies and qualification schemes. At no time in the history of VET in England have companies offset the State’s *laissez-faire*, which was statutory until 1964. This failure of free enterprise to fill the gap contradicts the fact that this type of vocational training system is precisely a result of the agreement of the executive and legislative branches of government to limit their interference in the economy, which has been taken for granted since the Industrial Revolution. In 1964 the British government felt compelled to declare vocational training its affair. This commitment was reiterated in 1973 and again in the Thatcher era (Deissinger and Greuling, 1994). The decisive trigger was the dramatic slump in in-company apprenticeships which began at the end of the 1950s (Ryan, 2001; p. 139).

The policy of the Thatcher government aimed less at reforming the structure of training than at providing financial incentives. It did not focus on reviving apprenticeship (Deissinger and Greuling, 1994). The subsequent innovation, Modern Apprenticeships, introduced in 1993/94 (Unwin and Wellington, 1995; Fuller and Unwin, 1998), represented a slight change of direction in vocational training. Ryan describes the motivation and objectives of this initiative, which until now has proved to be a stable, if not fully pervasive segment of the qualification system (Ryan, 2001; p. 133).

‘British apprenticeship is in upheaval. After a protracted decline, a major revitalisation initiative, *Modern Apprenticeship* (MA), was launched in 1994. As MA’s weaknesses have become clear, reforms have been adopted, and proposals for further reform are currently under discussion […]. Government support for apprenticeship is motivated by several factors: low rates of learning and qualification amongst 16-19 year olds; a wish to increase the supply of intermediate skills, with apprenticeship as a favoured means, given its benefits for youth employment; and the failings of previous efforts, notably the 1980s Youth Training Scheme […]’.

Modern Apprenticeships are not merely conceived as a means of fighting youth unemployment, but are intended to fill the ‘qualification gap’ of both white-collar and blue-collar workers (Vickerstaff, 1998; p. 220). However, a closer look reveals that it has not simply reactivated the classic apprenticeship system (Snell, 1996; p. 319). It mirrors two essential features of the Thatcher government’s approach to vocational training. First, Modern Apprenticeships are cofinanced by the public sector, making them a ‘State initiative for revitalising the training system’ (Ertl, 1998; p. 171). Second, it is linked to the national
vocational qualifications system established in 1986, since apprentices have to attain a national vocational qualification of at least level 3. It also differs from the classic English model, and from the dual system in Germany as well, in that although Modern Apprenticeship trainees have a training contract, companies are not obliged to fix a definite duration. Nevertheless, specifying training curricula guards against companies having too much influence and control over vocational qualifications. The scheme does not focus solely on outcomes (operationalisable training results), but also considers approaches to the qualification process and the training content. However, we must not overlook the fact that the Modern Apprenticeship constitutes just one of a range of education options. School-based vocational courses at colleges of further education and university courses are in much higher demand than non-academic in-company training. This contrasts with the situation in Germany. Approximately half the initial training participants in the United Kingdom fell under an in-company training scheme, including apprenticeships (European Commission et al., 1997; p. 62).

Two main trends characterise English vocational training policy of the last 20 years. One reflects the basic understanding that companies are responsible for designing vocational training programmes. This policy has always involved influencing the contours of vocational training paths. Examples are Youth Training Schemes (the name may constantly change, but the concept does not), currently under the guise of Foundation Apprenticeships, and (Advanced) Modern Apprenticeships.

The other trend includes the implementation of a National Qualifications Framework and the development of the all-embracing 16-19 Curriculum in the 1990s (Higham et al., 1996; Dearing, 1995). However, the latter does not shape an independent, self-regulating vocational training system, but the integration of trades based on the concept of lifelong learning. The paths are clearly caught in the conflict between heterogeneous educational requirements and homogeneous training and qualification approaches, and thus constitute ‘individualised’ tracks. The most recent examples are the terminological convergence of youth training schemes and apprenticeships and the renaming of general national vocational qualifications as ‘vocational A-levels’, which is meant to emphasise their similarity to the secondary school certificate needed for university admission and their claim to be a part of the national qualifications framework.

Therefore, we can say that British educational policy has been undergoing ‘vocationalisation’ since the 1980s, but cannot claim that the country has developed an independent vocational training subsystem. The national qualifications framework is clearly a hotchpotch of disjointed approaches, despite the fact that its stated purpose is to integrate and to promote transfer between different education and training paths and to create (formal) equality among qualifications on the same level. Two academic paths and one mainly vocational path exist. The reason for this dichotomy is probably the fact that England has no clear institutional stipulations, legal regulations on training, and that the various training providers act more or less autonomously, competing against one another in a variety of ways on the open training market and forging links with other players. (Reuling, 2001; p. 241). This is demonstrated in
the basic philosophy of British vocational training policy, which advocates modular structures and competence-based training. The continuing lack of a legal framework provides further evidence. One reason for the absence is the dominance of the economic freedom principle, another is that politicians have never made a concerted effort to introduce one (Ryan, 2001).

3.3. The end of the old occupational structure during the Industrial Revolution

The Industrial Revolution, which began in England around 1760, completed a development whose seeds, both intellectual and tangible, had been sown in the pre-industrial era. In the face of the flourishing textile industry, the prescriptive strength of the old economic order could not resist the sudden growth of capitalism, and the importance of an apprenticeship as a prerequisite for working or managing dwindled. It is noteworthy that the Elizabethan Statute of Apprentices that dated back to 1563 (Deissinger, 1992; p. 34 et seq.), which approved and sustained the seven-year training period stipulated by guild code, remained in force, at least on paper, until 1814. It was only at the culmination of industrialisation, starting in 1812, that there was parliamentary debate on the retention of the old English economic order which, in practical terms, had long since become defunct. The old, professionally oriented crafts and the country’s conservative, romantic bastion took a final stand against the representatives of liberal economic thinking (Deissinger, 2001a).

Parliamentary debate revolved around the clauses in the Statute of Apprentices which prescribed a seven-year training period and those which were intended to protect craft trades from the practice of ‘free employment’ as was adopted in cottage industries and factories. The apprentice campaign failed for want of political support and was formally ended by laws passed in 1814 and 1835. The law of 1814 abolished the protected status of the seven-year apprenticeship as an occupational prerequisite. This was the end of de jure guild sovereignty in the occupational and economic order. The abolition of the Statute of Apprentices doomed the ideal of a regulated occupational order to succumb to the challenges and economic temptations that the golden age of industrialisation had to offer. Once again the law was compliant: in 1835 the Municipal Corporations Act was passed. Its intent was to suppress guild malpractice in the realm of town administration where they were still dominant. Although the law did not abolish these bodies, the outcome was a levelling of tax rates for all taxpayers in the interest of unimpeded economic development. The privileges of the guilds were restrained since the practice of a trade was no longer subject to the ‘town charters’ and consequently guild membership.

It is appropriate, with regard to England, to speak of economic and social developments in the late 18th and the early 19th century which were different from those on the Continent, not only in their level of advancement. English industrialism found focal points in the West Riding and Lancashire in the 18th century and in the Midlands in the 19th century. The delayed industrial development on the Continent is closely related to the fact that it underwent
no English-style technological revolution in the 19th century (Landes, 1983; p. 169). Production methods in the cotton industry, in particular, were entirely revised, bringing new types of organisation to the factory system, radically changing the working conditions of the employees. The practice of employing underage, untrained and semi-skilled trained workers in this new trade was unencumbered by the restrictions of the traditional professional code. In 1851, 41% of Manchester’s 12-year olds, 60% of its 13-year olds and 76% of its 14-year olds were gainfully employed (Anderson, 1971; p. 75). Towns grew around the factories. While more of England’s population lived in the city than on the land by 1851, Germany only reached this level at the end of the 19th century, and France only after the First World War. In England, only a quarter of working men were still involved in agriculture around 1850; in Germany farm workers still outnumbered those in industry in 1895 (Landes, 1983; p. 181).

3.4. Liberalism and the tardy social State

Apart from the dynamics of the Industrial Revolution, with its creation of new occupations and its massive influence on the social environment of the workforce, the primary drive that sealed the fate of the old trade order in England was the spirit of the liberal era. Brentano describes an increasing hostility to all forms of state intervention in the freedom of commercial practice during the early 19th century (Brentano, 1871; p. 128). The special destiny of England is deeply rooted both in the national character of the English and in the practical application and economic legitimisation of the anthropocentric social ethics of Calvinism and the Anglo-Saxon Enlightenment. They not only entail the decline of artisanry and the social and economic order that supported them, they also constitute the essence of 19th century social policy.

Evidence of underdeveloped social policy can be seen in two main fields. One is the handling of the ‘social question’, particularly the matter of child labour. The other involves the conception of State organisation. This differs from the German pattern in that the outlines of a bureaucratic State were only tentatively created after half a century of industrialisation (Rohe, 1984; p. 167 et seq.). The professed liberalism of classical economics and political economy were as pervasive in the market place as Puritanism’s moral dictates were in civic life. The thesis of Max Weber on the interrelations of capitalism and Protestantism is pertinent. Sociohistorical indicators corroborate this tenet, and thereby assert the importance of the Protestant Ethic as one of the historical bases of modern individualism (Weber, 1920). The gamut of liberal thought runs from John Locke to John Stuart Mill. From the anthropological premise of man being a creature concerned with his own advantage, liberal thinkers called for the dissolution of those bonds which restrained social progress and thereby restricted the ‘wealth of nations’. It was self-evident to these thinkers that the economy was a ‘field of fair play’ (Freyer, 1966; p. 113) and that the State is a guarantor of individual rights but has no economically interventionist mandate. Such a reduction of state function corresponded above all to economic dictates and challenged both the pre-industrial order and the new welfare-oriented policy of social conservatism (Deissinger, 2001a).
Due to fluctuations in the social order, and given both a social policy that had prescribed the principle of social control since Elizabethan times (Johnson, 1970) and the dearth of socio-occupational integration, education for the ‘lower orders’ was conceived of as entailing nothing beyond the ‘harmless first elements of knowledge’ (Altick, 1973; p. 255). A state church linked to the old social order, and the influences of tendencies from congregation-governed denominations gave rise at the turn of the 18th century to a Protestant mentality (Kluxen, 1985; p. 526-531) with far-reaching consequences for the Victorian Age which seemed to combine socially conservative and embryonic progressive thought without apparent contradiction. In the matter of education, the autonomy of the church led to the primacy of religion in general and vocational education, which explains why it was 1870 before the State could take charge of educational policy, and even then this was part of a compromise. The law permitting state schools to exist alongside denominational and private institutions, where the latter were not in a position to guarantee education, was a harbinger of the ‘British disease’ (Deissinger, 1992; p. 295 et seq.).

In describing the Anglo-Saxon relationship between educational progress and industrialisation, it is axiomatic that economics dictated what was to be done or not to be done in the non-economic field. The lack of education for children and young people was undeniably a product of the demands of factories on their ‘apprentices’. The half-time system of education, a social conservative policy among the factory acts which permitted the combination of school education with factory work, is the most obvious indicator of the subordination of necessary pedagogical and social policy to the value of the human as a commodity in the industrial production system. There is proof that the rate of illiteracy in factory towns was well above the national average and that the half-time system was inadequate in the second half of the 19th century. While the first factory act (the Factory Health and Morals Act of 1802) only made token provisions for school education to supplement apprentice training, the statute of 1901 stated clearly that 12 was the minimum age for factory employment. Young pupils were only allowed to work part-time until the age of 15. These laws are not, however, to be construed as a brief for part-time vocational education. Classes were limited to the traditional primary educational canon of the church and private schools. The scholastic education of workers was only intended to furnish them with such social competences as were necessary for factory morals and discipline. The factory laws were not damned by liberals of the day but were nonetheless viewed with reservation. The limiting of factory work – whether its motivation was humanitarian or pedagogical – was ultimately a macroeconomic question, a matter of the distribution of wealth. Under such premises the half-time system, just as other institutional forms of primary education for the ‘lower orders,’ remained subject to conflict between ‘ideological positions,’ whereby the standpoints and interests of the industrial middle class proved particularly resistant to any welfare-state attempt to establish a national system of education and training (Deissinger, 1992; p. 223 et seq.).
3.5. The adaptation crisis in the second half of the 19th century

There are many reasons to conclude that the English educational system ‘failed’ when the time came to give up traditional educational and social models and redefine the training of workers as a national imperative. Whilst the country was the workshop of the world in the ‘textile phase of British industrialisation’ (Hobsbawm, 1982; p. 111 et seq.) and at the time could use comparatively simple training schemes, in the second half of the century and in the period before the First World War it was increasingly difficult for England to maintain its lead as an industrial power. Contemporaries unanimously remarked that one of the causes of the British Disease was inadequate education which offered hardly any vocational qualifications that reflected the requirements of the economy (Wiener, 1982). Two major historical factors can be blamed for the adaptation crisis in education. First is the traditional limitation of education for those classes of society whose lot was the working world. These, as productive parts of the economy, were assigned values in terms of their predestined places in the production process. Second, this *laissez-faire* in the evolution of society was not tempered by a professional or government code which might have moderated the subjugation of qualifying and integrating new generations to market demand. The tardiness of training progress in England became increasingly visible in the dichotomy between vocational and general education and in the government’s lack of interest in founding an educational system equipped to meet economic, social and industrial demands. It is reasonable to believe that social conservatism, economic complacency and the absence of a renaissance in the teaching profession were the factors adversely affecting English vocational education. The country placed its faith in workplace training. Even the typically English institutional scientific education and technical education had little impact on the training of workers. An example of the ‘failure’ of relevant working-class institutions is that of the mechanics’ institutes, originally founded in the late 18th century (Deissinger, 1992; p. 329 et seq.). From the outset they were intended to offer educational training to craftsmen and skilled workers by teaching them the ‘scientific principles’ of their trades. Their disregard for occupational training and their concentration on higher training of workers and artisans eventually caused the institutes to drift into general education. In the face of growing union agitation, skilled artisans felt obliged to distinguish themselves from the proletariat and to assimilate themselves to the ethical code of tradesmen and industrial entrepreneurs. The mechanics’ institutes neither succeeded in opening their gates to a broad public of unskilled factory workers, nor did they succeed during the 19th century in stabilising or reactivating guild norms such as consolidation of the regulatory institution of apprenticeship. This was because the ‘worker aristocracy’ defined itself as an elite associated with organised vocational training and material advantage. Neither schools nor business had a global strategy to educate and qualify the working classes.
3.6. **Company vocational training at the dawn of the 20th century**

Indirect government influence on the form of ‘apprentice training’ can be seen in the legal framework provided by the factory and school laws in the second half of the 19th century. These defined working conditions and hours for young employees as well as general school attendance rules and the scope of the half-time system of education. The employment of children was, nevertheless, still common practice at the turn of the century. This was the doing of the factory acts themselves, since they did not apply to the small concerns run as sweatshops. Children and young people, particularly in regions and cities with no adequate schooling facilities, took employment at as early an age as possible to help support their families. Although the Factory Act of 1901 provided that children under the age of 13 might not even take part-time employment, this law only covered about one third of children and young people. In the small businesses in towns and cities child labour remained a feature of life.

The social reformer Richard H. Tawney ascertained at the end of the century that there was a knot of vocational training problems which he ascribed to the dichotomy between boy labourers and boy learners (Tawney, 1909).

According to Tawney, in Liverpool in 1901 only 3.4 % of all 14-year olds received training, while 55.5 % worked as casual labourers in all manner of occupations (Springhall, 1986; p. 237). Where there was a tradition of training, its quality was very varied. In the light of stark differentiation between workers and distinct worker hierarchies, Tawney distinguished between the groups of common apprentices, premium apprentices and privileged apprentices in the metal industry. While a tuition fee was necessary for a premium apprenticeship, the third category involved rotating from one workshop to another and learning all metalworking techniques. The ‘deregulated’ nature of apprentice training was not only connected to the transformed structure of the working world, but was intensified by the restrictive control over vocational training held by the ‘worker aristocracy’. Apprenticeships were no longer to be seen as a generally valid standard, but instead as trade specific and negotiable. The training was given according to the principle of ‘following up’ and ‘improving’ – which involved the acquisition of journeyman status without a regular structured examination. This basic requirement to complete training corresponded to the medieval system of time-serving (Aldcroft, 1992; p. 55 et seq.). Two developments played a role here: the decline of classical apprenticeship training in skilled professions and the increasing supply of casual labour and call for untrained hands due to population growth. As ever, the industrial centres of the northern counties showed the greatest demand for boy labourers. Tawney speaks of ‘non-educational employment’ (Tawney, 1909; p. 525), for which young people received no preparation in primary schools and no real tuition except perhaps rudimentary on-site training.
3.7. English further education schools at the dawn of the 20th century

The expansion of English primary schooling to secondary level took place in England around the turn of the century under ‘education efficiency premises’, due to, in the words of Michael Sadler, the absolute necessity of ‘imitation of the educational policy of Germany and the United States’ (Sadler, 1907; p. 13). This led at the end of the 19th century to the continuation schools, most of which were evening schools. They were expected to fulfil a dual function: to extend and elaborate primary education, and to prepare for studies at an institution for advanced learning in engineering and sciences. Despite this, joining the workforce at an early age remained the main cause of inadequate basic education. Given these conditions, it was difficult for a continuation school to establish itself as a valid form of education. Like the skilled worker institutes, the continuation schools were treated either as a belated form of primary school or simply as a form of general education, an ‘annex to the mechanics’ institutes’ (Grothe, 1882; p. 64). In 1894, under the Acland Code, the government opened the evening continuation schools for adult education. From then on, people over the age of 21 could take advantage of these further training institutions. Vocational training was expressly set apart from this and seen as a separate system governed by concepts such as freedom of employment and independence of the employer. The 1901 census testifies to the sorry state of education at the turn of the century. Figures for 12-17 year olds in England and Wales show that 17.7 % attended a public school, 6 % attended a secondary school (either a grammar school or a private school) and only 6.9 % attended an evening school (Sadler, 1907; p. 105 et seq.). Due either to lack of facilities or reluctance to continue schooling alongside employment, the majority of young people had no place in the English educational system. In 1902 the Balfour Education Act formally separated the ‘non-obligatory and therefore ineffective evening further training institutions’ from the primary schools (Metz, 1971; p. 35). They were thenceforth part of ‘advanced education’, like the traditional secondary schools and the varied institutions which offered technical education. The schools remained non-compulsory. This situation differed markedly from the German system. Sadler, an acute observer of tendencies in Germany, noted the conspicuous ‘national interest in education’ in German provinces (Higginson, 1990; p. 247) as exemplary and worthy of imitation. Sadler was a close friend of Georg Kerschensteiner, the ‘father of vocational training’. The English educator admired Kerkensteiner’s ‘Munich Model’, which created further training institutions that were oriented towards both the needs of the civil state and to the ends of training with a view to qualifications (Greinert, 1975; p. 80 et seq.). Sadler recognised that the education of young people beyond elementary school was not only the fulfilment of sociopolitical considerations but was also the result of pedagogical and welfare policy.

In 1908, a Scottish educational law decreed the attendance at a continuation school for those over the age of 14 and stated that it was no longer the duty of parents to guarantee attendance, but that a school board would take over this responsibility. This one step put Scotland a whole decade ahead of England in terms of educational development. In 1909 the Acland Committee was entrusted with the task of estimating the transferable applicability of this law to England.
and Wales, given conditions prevalent there. The Acland Report also made reference to the Munich Model: ‘No one has done more to develop a satisfactory system of continuation schools than the city superintendent of education in Munich, Dr. Kerschensteiner’ (quoted by Metz, 1971; pp. 143-144). The fact that England was nonetheless incapable of realising a school policy that was oriented towards the Scottish model, thereby indirectly drawing on the German example, is demonstrated by the loose and didactically vague structures of its continuation schools. It was noted that in Germany, where a system of further training schools had replaced that of the extended school of the 19th century, the number of uneducated was conspicuously low, while in London unskilled labourers made up 68 % of the total workforce. Nonetheless, the attempt in 1918 to introduce compulsory secondary education within the framework of a new educational bill for the UK was a failure. In 1921 the first 22 of the compulsory further training schools introduced by law were completed and operating in London. It became apparent, however, that the Fisher Education Act was scarcely acknowledged and applied outside the capital. The majority of the schools founded in the early 1920s closed again after one or two years, not least because employers resented giving their young employees and trainees time off. Fiscal restrictions of the 1920s helped extinguish the idea of any public further training school which could not claim ‘rights of seniority’ over other forms of schooling.

It is not possible to treat the entire development of English vocational training in the rest of the 20th century in this article. It is sufficient to say that even the far-reaching Educational Reform Act of 1944 failed to create impetus enough to instigate nationwide compulsory further training school attendance. The planned county colleges, which were never actually founded, (Aldrich, 1992; p. 66), were supposed to assure that young people between 15 and 18 did not entirely fall out of the school system. The Crowther Report referred to this aborted state intervention in the field of post-elementary education and England’s chronic vocational training 15 years later with these words: ‘This report is about the education of English boys and girls aged from 15 to 18. Most of them are not being educated’ (quoted by Perry, 1976; p. 139). The political and educational guarantees of the sort provided by German vocational schools remained alien to the English system. The elements of the German system did not and still do not correspond to the reference points within the Anglo-Saxon interpretation of the vocational training and integration problem.

3.8. **Conclusion**

Education and vocational training should not, and cannot, be separated from the history of a country, its social development and its institutions. The same is true of the radical realignment of educational structures that amount to a systematic approach (Winch, 1998; p. 377; Deissinger, 2001c). The major differences between German and English development in this matter are to be seen in society’s handling of the apprenticeship issue during the period of heavy industrialisation. In Germany, craft trade practice was a standardising factor of professional training (Blankertz, 1969; p. 127) because liberal thought was not as predominant
there as in other countries (Stratmann, 1982; p. 183 et seq.; Gonon, 1998; pp. 260-261). This perpetuated apprenticeship to a master, which in England never played anything more than a marginal role in the field of vocational training. The vocational training specialist Abraham furthermore refers to the ‘difference between work-accompanying and school-based vocational training in Germany’ as a solution to the vocational training problem due to its foundations in presumptions which either did not exist in other countries or at least not to the same extent (Abraham, 1962; pp. 171-172).

Although German and English vocational training face the same challenges, they are of significantly different character. The English system can be seen as decentralised and extremely heterogeneous because of the training and qualifying process provided by the individual businesses involved; this situation persists despite seemingly innovative reform concepts that the environment particularly tried to impose in the form of state regimentation. The prevalent pattern was determined by the socioeconomic conditions of the Industrial Revolution (Deissinger, 1992; 1994; 1999). One of the historical ‘origins’ of the English vocational insularity was the intellectual approach sponsored by the tradition of Calvinism and the Anglo-Saxon Enlightenment. Evidence of underdevelopment of social policy (compared to Germany) can be seen in two main fields. One is the handling of the ‘social question’, the other involves the evolution of state organisation, which differs from the German pattern in that the outlines of a bureaucratic state were only tentatively formed after half a century of industrial development (Rohe, 1984; p. 167 et seq. passim).

England’s ‘decision’ in favour of liberalism also led to the ideological preconditions which paved the way for the legitimisation of a range of welfare functions in the 19th century. It is, therefore, appropriate to name economic liberalism and its theoretical treatment of the production factor ‘labour’ as a culturally significant feature of English development (Biernacki, 1995). Its proponents have also left their mark on the Anglo-Saxon vocational training system due to their essentially ambivalent response to the role of the state. For liberal thinkers, the state’s raison d’être is guaranteeing individual rights, but it has no economically interventionist mandate. In line with such thinking, both forceful ideas and ‘genuine’ sociohistorical ‘drives’ influence the shaping, re-crafting and the reformability of vocational training. Comparison of the German and the English history of vocational training offers much evidence to support this conclusion.

References


