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Peace journalism, terrorism and counterinsurgency

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Von passiv zu aktiv: Das Spektrum des Friedensjournalismus

Eine der größten Hürden, denen sich der Friedensjournalismus gegenübersieht, ist die Vagheit seiner Definition. Der vorliegende Aufsatz schlägt daher ein Verständnis des Friedensjournalismus vor, das sich in einem Spektrum zwischen passivem und aktivem Friedensjournalismus bewegt. Auf Grundlage einer Durchsicht der bisherigen Literatur integriert der Aufsatz die geläufigen Theorien in ein übergreifendes Konzept und plädiert für dessen Übernahme und Weiterentwicklung. Abschließend werden potentielle Vorteile, Nachteile und Kritik des unterbreiteten Vorschlages diskutiert.

Volltext

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From passive to active: The spectrum of peace journalism

One of the biggest hurdles facing the field of peace journalism (PJ) is its vague definition. This paper proposes defining PJ as it operates on a spectrum, from passive to active. Through a review of extant PJ literature, this paper synthesizes current theory into an overarching, explicit concept, and calls for it to be further adopted and expanded. To conclude it considers potential advantages, drawbacks, and critiques of its proposal.

full text

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Kurzfassung: Eine der größten Hürden, denen sich der Friedensjournalismus gegenübersieht, ist die Vagheit seiner Definition. Der vorliegende Aufsatz schlägt daher ein Verständnis des Friedensjournalismus vor, das sich in einem Spektrum zwischen passivem und aktivem Friedensjournalismus bewegt. Auf Grundlage einer Durchsicht der bisherigen Literatur integriert der Aufsatz die geläufigen Theorien in ein übergreifendes Konzept und plädiert für dessen Übernahme und Weiterentwicklung. Abschließend werden potentielle Vorteile, Nachteile und Kritik des unterbreiteten Vorschlages diskutiert.

Abstract: One of the biggest hurdles facing the field of peace journalism (PJ) is its vague definition. This paper proposes defining PJ as it operates on a spectrum, from passive to active. Through a review of extant PJ literature, this paper synthesizes current theory into an overarching, explicit concept, and calls for it to be further adopted and expanded. To conclude it considers potential advantages, drawbacks, and critiques of its proposal.

1. Introduction

The definition of Peace Journalism (PJ) has been a point of discussion since the field's conception by Johan Galtung in the 1970s (Lee, Maslog, & Kim, 2006). The fact that over 40 years later the field still struggles to articulate what makes it distinct from everyday good reporting (Eakin & Fahmy, 2013), is among its biggest obstacles. This paper represents an effort to assist in overcoming this hurdle. To do so it begins with an introductory discussion going over how different scholars and critics have defined PJ, highlighting the need for and importance of this paper's contribution to the literature. Next it argues through a literature review that for PJ to move forward scholars must agree on how the theory and practice is defined. The answer presented is surprisingly simple—and aligns with a general feature found across journalistic practice—PJ operates across a fluid spectrum, from its more passive to active manifestations. The existence of such a spectrum is already implicit in PJ literature, and this paper synthesizes current theory into an overarching, explicit concept and calls for it to be further adopted and expanded.

The likely candidate for the most oft-quoted definition of PJ, put forth by Lynch and McGoldrick, says PJ is when journalists "make choices—of what stories to report and about how to report them—that create opportunities for society at large to consider and value non-violent responses to conflict" (Hackett, 2012: p. 95). Then there are the more moderate conceptions of what PJ is, like Kempf's, which argues against journalists playing an *active* role in the complex 'cat's cradle' that is conflict (Kempf, 2007: 4). And there are the less enthused, who call PJ, at best, little more than "old wine in new bottles"—good journalism, repackaged—and at its worst a form of public relations (Hanitzsch, 2007: 2). Finally, there are the categorically opposed, like BBC reporter David Loyn, who calls PJ, "nothing less than a 'revolution' in journalism practice," and argues that "the opposite of peace journalism is good journalism" (Loyn, 2007: 2). While these notions seem contradictory or irreconcilable at a glance, they simply represent the spectrum of PJ. On the active end, PJ may require a revolution in journalism practice, which from Loyn's privileged perspective at the BBC is clearly negative and unnecessary. On the passive end, good journalism in conflict reporting, even by Loyn's conception, requires employing aspects of PJ. Acknowledging and embracing this spectrum, rather than arguing PJ is either or, would be a simplistic but productive step forward.

In the face of disparate opinions regarding what PJ is and should be, and without accepting their implausible compatibility, there are the scholars who are justifiably unclear as to what PJ is who are calling for clearer indicators to distinguish PJ framing from objective, factual reporting (Eakin & Fahmy, 2013: 14). The problem with such a call is that often, PJ simply *is* objective factual reporting, and it should always include the factual end of that equation. A closer look at PJ literature reveals that there is already an implicit consensus—and the failure to make it explicit has resulted in more tension among researchers than cooperation and forestalled progress. That previously implicit consensus is that PJ operates across a spectrum, which can largely be demarcated by reflecting on two dominant points-of-view in PJ literature.

At one end there are advocates for an interventionist-style of reporting that takes a very active role in its effort to correct the systematic biases in conflict coverage that are the result of prevalent news values (Harcup & O'Neill, 2001; Galtung & Ruge, 1965), like Lynch, McGoldrick, and Hackett (Kempf, 2007: 7). This style of reporting is most-commonly found within the tradition of advocacy reporting, currently most often represented in what is considered alternative media, and aligns with what this paper proposes should henceforth be referred to as *active PJ*. On the other hand are traditionalists, like Loyn, who believe in the tenets of professional journalism, and represent the journalistic tradition of what is considered good, objective, factual, reporting—this represents what

this paper suggests is the *passive* end of the PJ spectrum. Because the intention here is not to weigh in in any definitive manner on the loaded, and necessarily ongoing debate over what 'good' journalism is, this paper only asks the reader to consider it in its normative form—this means it is objective, neutral, and searches for truth in a reflexive way, acknowledging and attempting to correct the inherent issues associated with each of these ideals. The intention here is to reconcile differing viewpoints in PJ, with the goal of forwarding its theory and practice. While a similar spectrum exists in war/violence journalism—ranging from bad (active) to typical (passive)—this paper focuses on the spectrum of peace/conflict reporting, while only briefly noting that war/violence journalism operates on a spectrum as well, essentially from bad to worse.

2. Assumptions, limitations, scope, and methodology

This paper begins with the assumption that more peace in the world is a good thing, and that PJ has some potential, however limited, to contribute to this (Lynch, 2008: xvi, 17, 61, 136, 138), despite the structural (Hackett, 2006), cultural (Shinar, 2000) (Barnhurst, 2011), sociological (RuB-Mohl, 2008) (Schudson, 1989), and political economic (McChesney, 2003), barriers it faces. Further, it takes for granted PJ's premise that current conflict reporting reflects a systematic bias that highlights and sensationalizes war and violence, and that PJ offers a number of valid methods for reporters to work against this systematic bias, (Hackett, 2006; Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Shinar, 2009; Stoiciu & Shinar 1992). This paper is limited in its scope, however. The aim is not to weigh in on the validity of different researchers, practitioners, advocates, and critics arguments about this systematic bias, and/or how to overcome it, nor does it intend to offer any closed-ended definitions or ideas about what PJ is or should be, as this seems limiting and counter productive to PJ's success. Counter intuitively, rather than narrowing it down, a better understanding of the definition of PJ comes from a more open and fluid conception of what it can be; the spectrum approach offered here allows for such fluidity. And finally, the intention is not to pass judgment on the potential for PJ to become a standard aspect of conflict reporting. Rather, the objective is to offer a reconceptualization that accepts the diversity of, and integrates the current, often mutually-exclusive, limiting, combative, and unclear definitions of what PJ is, or should be; as indicated by the ongoing debate and confusion among its scholars, practitioners, and advocates.

The methodology used includes a review of classic and contemporary PJ theory (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Shaw, et al., 2011; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2000; Lynch, 2008; Keeble, et al., 2010; Harcup & O'Neill, 2001) PJ case studies (Ben-Yehuda, 2005; Eakin & Fahmy, 2013; Neumann & Fahmy, 2012; Shinar, 2000; Shinar, 2009; Stoiciu & Shinar, 1992; Wolfsfeld, 1997); critiques (Hanitzsch, 2007; Loyn, 2007); and more (Wickenden & Atton, 2006; Bennett, 1996; Poell & Borra, 2012; Entman, 2003; RuB-Mohl & Fengler, 2008; McChesney, 2003). There are necessary limits on such a literature review. Academics, like journalists, cannot escape the reality of deadlines, and as a result the literature review this paper is based on could hardly be considered exhaustive. What follows is largely a thought-experiment, which first builds on its preliminary argument through additional discussion of the aforementioned literature review, intended to further explicate the need for such a reconceptualization of PJ theory. And it ends exploring the potential benefits and drawbacks of reconceptualizing and reconciling PJ theory to explicitly label its spectrum of support, from passive to active.

Before launching into its main argument, a brief history of notable and salient contributions to PJ is in order—this is not meant to encompass the entire history of PJ literature, nor is it presented strictly chronologically, the ambition is to explain some of the relevant contributions to PJ theory in this specific context. Further, it is necessarily limited to PJ literature. Though there is a breadth of literature that could be included from outside this specific realm regarding the appropriate levels of engagement and role perceptions of journalists, doing so goes beyond the scope here. When limited by time and space, some rabbit holes are inevitably left unexplored. It is worth pointing out that the spectrum, from active to passive, is a feature found and studied across journalism. Observers vs. advocates, participants vs. neutral disseminators of information, those with a view from somewhere vs. those with a view from nowhere... and so on, all represent such a spectrum. As such, it is not that PJ's spectrum is unique; it is that its spectrum is pronounced and seldom acknowledged, and that this combination has slowed the adoption of PJ among researchers and practitioners.

3. Passive to active: Making the spectrum explicit

In 1965 Mari Ruge and Johan Galtung's groundbreaking essay *The Structure of Foreign News* established the problematic way news values and journalistic conventions largely govern how conflict is represented in the news (Lynch, 2008: 19; McGoldrick & Lynch, 2012: 1042). Out of Galtung and Ruge's essay, PJ was born. Conceptualized by Galtung, McGoldrick, Lynch, and others, largely following the 1991 Gulf War (Shaw, et al., 2011 & Hanitzsch, 2004), PJ is meant to provide reporters a toolkit to correct the systematic bias demonstrated by Galtung and Ruge in conflict reporting. Further, PJ attempts to offer a framework for peace theorists and scholars to research and analyze the 'policy implications' of the 1965 study on conflict reporting (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2012: 1042).

As PJ theory has evolved, several key additions have been made in need of mention. First is Galtung's conceptualization of the different elements of peace/conflict oriented reporting, which include: 1) A *peace/conflict*

oriented approach, which provides historical and cultural context behind conflict formation from all (not both) sides, humanizes all sides, and offers a win-win orientation in coverage, among other factors (Shinar, 2009: 453). 2) A *truth-oriented* approach, which, among other features, is meant to deconstruct propaganda and offer audiences the best chance at, in Stuart Hall's terms, oppositional and negotiated readings (Lynch, 2008: 153). 3) A *people-oriented* approach, which includes, among other factors, a focus on people peacemakers, and giving voice to the voiceless; and 4) A *solution-oriented* approach, which is distinguished by defining the road to peace as, non-violence + creativity = peace (Shinar, 2009: 453).

These elements of peace/conflict journalism listed above are almost always presented directly opposite of their antithesis, Galtung's elements of war/violence reporting, which include: 1) A *war/violence-oriented* approach that tends to offer a zero-sum orientation, 'us-them' journalism, and a dehumanization of 'them', among other dynamics. 2) A *propaganda-oriented* approach that attempts to expose 'their' untruths and help cover up 'our' lies, among other features. 3) An *elite-oriented* approach that focuses on elite peacemakers and other factors biasing elites; and 4) A *victory-oriented* approach, typified by its defining the road to peace as, victory + ceasefire = peace (Shinar, 2009). It would be useful to consider these elements on a spectrum as well, from actively bad journalism—particularly represented by the war/violence and propaganda-oriented approaches—to the more typical, passive war/violence coverage—particularly represented by the elite and victory-oriented approaches which are common in conflict coverage.

All of the aforementioned elements have been further operationalized (Shinar, 2007) and consistently used to some extent in research both for content analysis, and to better expound what PJ is, (see Fransius, 2013: 6-14; Shaw, et al., 2011: 71, 109, 169-170; Lynch, 2008: 19-20; Shinar, 2009: 453, and Table 1, for more). Agneta Soderberg Jacobson's study on Swedish news providers' conflict reporting found an overwhelming bias toward male subjects (85 percent), images (75 percent), and sources (89 percent) (Jacobson, 2010: 107). This led to an addition to the table: gender awareness and gender blindness (see Table 1). Normatively, gender awareness should be present in all good reporting, and though it may require an active approach to accomplish, both passive and active PJ should seek to include this awareness in reporting. It should not be acceptable in 2015 for journalists—in and out of conflict reporting—to rely so heavily on male sources, and to offer such skewed coverage of male subjects and imagery. Thus, Jacobson's category is singled out both because it is an addition to the original four elements of peace/conflict journalism, and because its absence from common use in current literature emphasizes the need for its emphasis in an effort to make the category a member of the status quo. As a brief aside, it seems a similar category regarding racial/ethnic awareness/blindness would be another useful addition to the currently accepted elements of war/peace journalism.

Peace/Conflict Journalism	War/Violence Journalism
I. *Peace/conflict-oriented*	I. *War/Violence-oriented*
II. *Truth-oriented*	II. *Propaganda-oriented*
III. *People-oriented*	III. *Elite-oriented*
IV. *Solution-oriented* Peace = nonviolence + creativity	IV. *Victory-oriented* Peace = victory + ceasefire
V. *Gender awareness*	V. *Gender blindness*

Table 1, adapted from Keeble, Tulloch, and Zollmann (2010, p. 114).

As Galtung's classic four elements pertain to the spectrum of PJ, they can generally be correlated with its more active or passive form. For instance, a truth-oriented approach should be most associated with fundamental, good journalism and passive PJ, as it suggests conflict reporting requires reflexivity, and a refusal to echo government propaganda without offering context, encouraging oppositional and negotiated readings. This truth-oriented approach would continue to apply to active PJ, bringing up an important point: The spectrum of PJ generally builds on itself from passive to active, like a pyramid (Figure 1), and in general active PJ will incorporate the base elements of passive PJ, before going a step further. Building off the two base levels, gender awareness and a truth-oriented approach, a peace/conflict-oriented approach could be identified as slightly more active, while people-oriented, and solution-oriented approaches are the most active, and likely to operate mainly in alternative media. These are, admittedly, limited, broad-stroke generalizations discussing where different elements might fit on the spectrum of PJ. It is important to keep in mind that none of these elements is fixed; passive PJ could easily incorporate a people-oriented and solution-oriented approach to coverage.

Simply put, in the overarching, normative concept suggested here, passive PJ is when reporting avoids the use of war/violence journalism, and incorporates some of PJ's toolkit to provide truly competent conflict coverage, but does not generally go further into the realm of intentionally inverting the hierarchy of sources, offering creative

solutions, and actively playing the role of journalist/peacekeeper. This type of reporting is likely to be welcomed in more traditional elite media and Public Service Broadcasting (PSB), like the BBC, where Loyn works. To be clear, this does not mean passive PJ cannot or should not seek to balance the normal hierarchy of sources, or offer creative solutions as they come up in coverage; these activities are just less likely to be sought out in this type of PJ and hence less prevalent.


Figure 1, adapted from Keeble, Tulloch, and Zollmann (2010, p. 114).

This interpretation of PJ is necessary, as journalists like Loyn are unlikely to see themselves as active peacekeepers whose jobs require offering creative solutions to conflict, but are likely to agree that providing historic context of conflicts, and deconstructing government propaganda, are both compulsory features of quality conflict reporting. Whether Loyn wants to call it by name, that is PJ. This demonstrates the overlap between "good" journalism, and passive PJ. Instead of letting this overlap confuse the definition of PJ, the spectrum approach embraces it. Understanding PJ in this way thus overcomes one of the field's major obstacles—rather than distinguishing PJ from good journalism, however, it simply accepts that, at times, the two are the same.

Active PJ, by comparison, is when journalists and media organizations choose to go further, incorporating themselves into peacemaking processes, offering creative solutions, inverting normal sourcing routines, and taking other proactive steps to bring about peace through reporting. Using the pyramid in Figure 1 to visualize this process is helpful to understanding the spectrum in at least three ways: 1) It illustrates how active PJ builds on passive PJ. 2) It represents the likely overall levels of practice of PJ in conflict coverage, with passive PJ operating more commonly than active PJ (Maslog & Lee, 2005; Lee, et al., 2006). And 3) It shows the likely levels of support from journalists (Loyn, 2007) and PJ researchers (Kempf, 2007), with the more mainstream, traditionalists occupying the larger space at the bottom of the pyramid, generally aligned with passive PJ.

Some researchers have already operationalized evaluative criteria based on active and passive indicators of PJ in their research (Maslog & Lee, 2005; Lee, et al., 2006). In this case, passive PJ criteria are considered, "'passive' or 'non-interventionist'—not likely to denote a conscious effort to counter war propaganda and create opportunities to consider and to value non-violent alternative responses to conflict" (Lynch, 2008: 143). While active PJ is considered "the iteration and exploration of backgrounds and contexts; the provision of cues to form negotiated and/or oppositional readings of war propaganda, and the coverage of suggestions and initiatives for peace from whatever quarter" (Lynch, 2008: 143; Keeble, et al., 2010). The suggestion of this paper is not necessarily to reimagine these evaluative criteria, rather, the spectrum of PJ advocated here would incorporate the use of such indicators and encourage their refinement and further use, while expanding the terms active and passive to include a broader conceptualization across PJ.

While some advocates for PJ seem ready to give up its more passive attributes in favor of its more active ones (Shaw, et al., 2011), this would be a mistake. For instance, if what Lynch calls "accidental peace journalism" (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2012: 1043) is occurring, and if, as he says, "there is some, so there could be more" (Lynch, 2008: 232), then work remains on all ends of PJ's spectrum, from the passive, or accidental PJ, to the full-fledged advocacy that represents the top of the spectrum of active PJ (see Figure 1). By more clearly understanding and articulating what elements of PJ are most likely to "accidentally" make their way into

coverage, PJ advocates can make suggestions to mainstream news outlets that are likely to improve the odds of such happy accidents. Further, for active PJ to be a convincing, potent force, it must be rooted in passive PJ, and it must be applied at the appropriate time. This is highlighted by Mogekwu's (2011) consolidation of different scholars' concepts of the progression of conflict, Kempf's two-step process to conflict coverage, and Bläsi's (2009) analysis regarding how and when to implement different types of PJ during these different phases of conflict. Each of which align with the spectrum approach.

Though often used interchangeably in reporting with violence (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2000), conflict and violence are different (Fransius, 2013). Put relatively simply, conflict can be defined as "a process through which two or more actors try to pursue incompatible aims or goals while trying to stop the other(s) from pursuing their goals" (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2000: 6). Mogekwu (2011) goes further analyzing the nature of the term as it relates to PJ in his chapter of "Expanding Peace Journalism: Comparative and Critical Approaches," and fleshes out a few key points worthy of mention.

First, Mogekwu notes the importance that "no limiting definition [of conflict] should be allowed;" this avoids a predetermination of analyzing conflict and allows for the open-ended complexity of the concept (Mogekwu, 2011: 241). This aligns with the suggestion here that PJ should not be limited in its definition, as it must operate alongside the open-ended complexity of conflict. Next, Mogekwu determines that conflict is "rooted in people's beliefs about goals as opposed to facts" (Mogekwu, 2011: 241), demonstrating the need for conflict reporting to offer a truth-oriented approach that helps deconstruct beliefs rooted in myth and propaganda and to build goals based on the facts as they manifest for all sides. Finally, he ties together several scholars' explanations of conflict progression into two categories: 'latent' and 'manifest' conflict (Mogekwu, 2011: 241-243).

The purpose and the importance in distinguishing latent from manifest conflict to PJ, Mogekwu finds, is that conflict has a natural progression, with parties gradually moving from a place of potential negotiation and understanding during the earlier latent stage, to a far-less manageable point during the manifest stage, when the conflict "assumes mythical dimensions" and parties become entrenched and unwilling to negotiate (Mogekwu, 2011: 242). For PJ to have the best chance at successfully fulfilling its normative goal to bring about peace it should focus on latent conflict, where it is most likely to have an impact; this is where active PJ has its biggest role to play.

If conflict is different from violence, as described above, then to make this fully clear the term 'violence' requires further definition to completely distinguish the two and to discuss how these distinctions function in relation to active and passive PJ. Galtung identifies two basic forms of violence, 'direct' or 'personal' and 'structural'; noting an important distinction between the two as is relevant to PJ. While the more familiar direct or personal violence involves physical contact—punching, shooting, bombing, and such—making its effects obvious and immediate, the effects of structural violence are less visible or direct (Lynch, 2008: 51; Keeble, et al., 2010: 124), and thus more elusive for media professionals to clearly understand and articulate, and consequently for its consumers to make sense of. Again, this is where active PJ is apt to be its most effective. Violence in all its forms is inherently destructive. Conflict, on the other hand, can be constructive (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2000: 6), and does not need to lead to violence (Fransius, 2013), it is these distinctions that are of importance to discussions in PJ.

Another important contribution to PJ theory, as it relates to this paper's proposed spectrum, is Kempf's two-step process. Kempf argues, put simply, that PJ should operate in a two-step process depending on whether the ongoing conflict is latent or manifest. Kempf's two-step process, by-and-large, aligns with this paper's concept of passive and active PJ. The first step, *de-escalation oriented conflict coverage*, is meant to take place during the hot phase of conflict, or manifest conflict. This style of coverage is characterized by objective, distanced and respectful reporting, which takes a critical distance from war supporters, and increases public awareness of the high price violent means to ending conflicts demands (Kempf, 2007). These traits correspond with passive PJ. During this stage Kempf says reporters should not propose solutions (Kempf, 2007).

Proposing solutions takes place during the second, aptly named step, *solution oriented conflict coverage*. As the name and logical sequence implies, this step parallels active PJ, and is demarcated by its focus on reconciliation between conflicting parties in a search toward cooperative ways to solve or transcend their differences, and its active search for peaceful alternatives (Kempf, 2007). Kempf argues that this phase of conflict reporting should only happen during the latent phase of conflict, "when the hot phase of the conflict is over and every voice calling for moderation is not automatically perceived as hostile" (Kempf, 2007: 7). Kempf's choice of wording is telling, as it indicates he sees PJ's active role taking place after violence breaks out—referring to the hot phase of conflict in the past tense. Given Galtung's notion of the invisible nature of structural violence, and the natural progression of conflict expounded on by Mogekwu, Kempf's solution oriented conflict coverage, and active PJ, are likely to also be of use *before* violence breaks out.

It may be that Kempf is simply being realistic, however, in assessing the likeliness of active PJ taking place during the nonviolent stage of conflict that precedes a violent one. Burkhard Bläsi (2009) looked in more depth at implementing PJ during different stages of conflict—specifically nonviolent conflict, violent conflict, and in the aftermath of violent conflict—and finds that solution oriented PJ faces the fewest challenges during the latter

stage. At the same time, Bläsi finds the first stage to be more auspicious to this style of PJ than the second. This progression aligns with the spectrum approach advocated for here. Viewing Bläsi's findings through the spectrum, journalists should focus on a mix of active and passive PJ prior to violent conflict, passive PJ during violent conflict, and active PJ following violent conflict.

As the brief discussion above has already shown, there is significant tension between PJ's different levels of supporters, its varying definitions among scholars, and this subsequently leads to confusion for PJ scholars and would-be practitioners (Eakin & Fahmy, 2013). But overshadowing these micro-disputes is one fundamental macro-agreement—more quality journalism is needed in conflict reporting. It is how to achieve this aim that varies. For Loyn the answer lies in sharpening, not altering, the tools of a reporter, like objectivity and a search for truth (Loyn, 2007). For Lynch, perhaps PJ's most prominent advocate, practitioner, and scholar, the answer lies in a much broader change in journalism, both its culture and organizational structure, and ideally a more proactive role for journalists as peacemakers. But the desire for improved conflict reporting is mutual. By using a spectrum approach to understanding PJ, these different points-of-view are largely reconciled and can be seen as complementary in their quest to achieve a shared goal of improving conflict reporting.

4. A branch needs roots: Settling an unsettling debate

Most recently, the debate in PJ has moved toward what has been described as a 'root-and-branch critique', viewing mainstream journalism as 'indissociable' from the war journalism that PJ scholars problematize. Those promoting this approach ask if PJ would, per Lynch and McGoldrick's definition, 'create [more] opportunities for society at large to consider and value non-violent conflict', if it was to *switch* its advocacy and training to focus on alternative, rather than mainstream media (Shaw, et al., 2011: 9, emphasis added). The spectrum approach does not require making such a switch, it only requires acknowledging the existence of this choice.

For instance, in a mainstream news organization, where traditional professional norms and the structural constraints on journalism—on individual (RuB-Mohl & Fengler, 2008; McManus, 1997) and organizational levels, (Bennett, 1996; McChesney, 2003)—are more prevalent than alternative media, advocates of PJ could tailor their approach by suggesting techniques associated with passive PJ that align with traditional good journalism. Whereas in alternative media, advocates could propose more active forms of PJ, like inverting the hierarchy of sourcing that typically favors elites and offering creative solutions to conflict. It is to this discussion, how alternative media and active PJ complement one another, that this paper turns now.

5. Active peace journalism and alternative media

Although some scholars have argued that alternative media will free PJ 'from the mainstream journalism strait-jacket to be able to bring about change' (Mogekwu, in Shaw, et al., 2011: 250), alternative media face challenges that are both unique to the medium (Wickenden & Atton, 2006; Poell & Borra, 2012), and nearly ubiquitous to reporting. Because the active end of the PJ spectrum is likely to largely operate in the realm of alternative media, considering what alternative media is, why active PJ fits here, and what the benefits are to more clearly aligning active PJ with alternative media, is useful. After that, benefits of acknowledging the spectrum of PJ, while keeping its passive aspects, will be discussed in light of the impacts to both active and passive PJ.

The first question that needs to be answered is why active PJ fits with the emerging practice of alternative media. Tony Harcup conceptualizes alternative media as playing a role nurturing, reflecting, and demonstrating active citizenship (Harcup, 2011). If PJ, when it departs from traditional journalism and enters the realm of advocacy must be local and community based, as Mogekwu suggests (Shaw, et al., 2011: 252), then it certainly offers the potential for increasing the population of Mouffe's ideal active citizens: "A radical, democratic citizen must be an active citizen, somebody who *acts* as a citizen, who conceives of herself as a participant in a collective undertaking" (Harcup, 2011: 17 emphasis in original).

Next, if alternative media are concerned with the process as well as the product (Harcup, 2011: 18), then the hands-on methods of active PJ should be at home in this medium. Because current journalistic processes create systematic biases, as PJ scholars have been demonstrating in conflict reporting since 1965 (Galtung & Ruge, 1965), then it seems alternative media would often apply a proactive corrective process. Again, this aligns with the active end of the PJ spectrum, demonstrating that alternative media is an appropriate arena for active PJ to operate. This is not meant to suggest active PJ cannot occur outside of alternative media, just that this is a auspicious area for its proponents to focus and expect to be embraced. At the same time, alternative media might go too far in the direction of a people-oriented approach, leaving out important context and views from policy makers and other elites. Before drawing any conclusions about the effectiveness of active PJ in alternative media, more study is needed, but the potential seems promising.

Finally, as the active end of PJ's spectrum is most represented by the people and solution-oriented elements of Galtung's classic concept of the four elements of PJ, these line up well with alternative media practices (see Figure 1). In the case of a solution-oriented approach, alternative media can "be understood as 'a crucible in

which people could become aware of a range of alternative strategies for understanding and changing the world as they found it'" (Harcup, 2011: 18). Dissatisfied with both mainstream practices of news production and coverage, as well as the epistemology of news, alternative media often challenges these structures (Shaw, et al., 2011). And in the case of a people-oriented approach, alternative media also offer promise to offer a voice to the active citizens who often engage in these public or counter public spheres and challenge existing power structures (Harcup, 2011, p. 18). Further, Wickenden & Atton (2006) found a 'counter-elite' hierarchy of sourcing—or put differently a people-oriented approach—in their case study subject, *SchNEWS*. This type of sourcing offers its own challenges and drawbacks, like a failure to represent the views of citizens who were not part of the politicized, grassroots activism aligned with the political ideology of *SchNEWS*, and thus such outlets should be approached with caution as a potential mediums for active PJ, but they show some promise and challenge mainstream media's overreliance on elite sources.

Highlighting the many challenges faced by alternative media organizations like *SchNEWS*, it is necessary to mention the organization is no longer in existence. The outlet officially threw in the towel on September 24, 2014 due to, "a lack of the people and interest required to keep it going" (SchNEWS, 2014).

The main challenge facing alternative media and PJ, particularly active PJ, is that, despite the disintegrating myth of objectivity (Bennett, 1996; Keeble, et al., 2010: 199), and an increasing awareness of structures common in news media that highlight sensational, war/violence-oriented reporting, advocacy reporting remains largely at the margins of popular media production, consumption, and acceptance (Lee, et al., 2006). By accepting and acknowledging that PJ lies on a spectrum, this challenge is largely negated, as some practitioners, advocates, and researchers can choose to engage with active PJ or not, without needing to abandon PJ altogether.

In her chapter of *Peace Journalism, War and Conflict Resolution,* Jean Lee C. Patindol comes close to advocating for considering PJ on a spectrum, but she misses the mark and instead highlights the problem with making value judgments regarding what qualifies as PJ. Patindol, rather than acknowledging the spectrum, argues for a '*journeying*' of progression in awareness from traditional journalism, to conflict-sensitive journalism, and eventually to outright PJ (Patindol, 2010: 201). Or in the terms used here, from war/violence reporting, to more passive PJ, to more active PJ. It is easy to see how such a denigrating description of traditional journalism could offend hard working, genuinely competent, but traditional journalists. Rather than lump traditional journalism in with war/violence reporting, as Patindol does, a more sensitive and articulate language should be applied: labeling war/violence reporting explicitly as 'typical' or 'bad' reporting. This makes it clear that traditional good journalism, though it is largely the exception rather than the norm in mainstream media, has a place operating alongside PJ, and can be incorporated into conflict reporting in traditional media outlets, most often in its passive form.

For those like Loyn, who cannot overcome their attachment to standard journalistic values, it seems little will convince them to practice the alternative, advocacy style of journalism referred to here as active PJ, or what Patindol calls "outright PJ." This is perfectly okay, and that acceptance is largely where the approach proposed here differs from Patindol's. Journalists like Loyn should look to sharpen their tools of reporting by schooling themselves in the practices of passive PJ; which, unlike active PJ, is little more than a toolkit for good traditional reporting as it manifests in unique ways to conflict reporting. By advocating for an open, fluid, multifaceted, and inclusive spectrum of PJ, rather than Patindol's value-laden conception of a progression through levels of PJ, journalists clinging to standards of objectivity and traditional reporting could benefit from at least some of PJ's passive practices, instead of throwing out the baby of passive PJ, with the bathwater of active PJ. Or put another way, with an open spectrum, rather than an intentional push toward advocacy, the approach offered here is less likely to scare off traditional journalists and media outlets that are averse to advocacy journalism.

6. Final thoughts

Before concluding, some final thoughts to summarize this paper's concept of active and passive peace journalism are essential. Passive PJ is reflexive and aware of the limitations news values, reporting methods, individual motivations of journalists, structural restraints, and many other aspects involved in the broad field of journalism and media, inherent in conflict coverage. Far more than lying dormant, as the name passive might seem to imply, passive PJ takes proactive measures to correct these systematic biases to offer truly competent conflict coverage. Simply put, for journalism to be any good in conflict reporting it must incorporate these basic aspects of PJ; all else lies on the spectrum of war/violence reporting. Further, passive PJ integrates and synthesizes extant theory, like the classic elements of peace/conflict journalism as originally put forth by Galtung, and adapted by others, Mogekwu's concept of conflict, Galtung's two basic types of violence, Kempf's two-step process, as well as current evaluative criteria as originally used by Lee, Maslog, and Kim, and made more explicit by Lynch, and more.

Of equal importance, the concept of passive PJ presented here helps answer the call made by current PJ researchers for a distinction between what is unique to PJ, and what is simply traditional good journalism, by acknowledging that traditional good journalism taking place in conflict reporting *is* passive PJ, as a failure to incorporate the passive aspects of the PJ toolkit inevitably results in incompetent reporting. Finally, passive PJ

should start at the base level of an avoidance of war/violence journalism and build from there, but generally stop short of full-on advocacy, or interventionist reporting. This falls in the realm of active PJ, which deserves a synopsis of its own.

Active PJ builds on the foundation of passive PJ, incorporating the aforementioned characteristics, and represents the advocacy end of the spectrum, or the top of the pyramid in Figure 1. This type of reporting will most often take place within alternative media outlets, something there are advantages and drawbacks to, briefly discussed here. A more thorough analysis that furthers the spectrum approach proposed here is necessary, and a more specific study examining active PJ in alternative media might expand on sourcing routines as (Wickenden & Atton, 2006) did with *SchNEWS*, and (Poell & Borra, 2012) did for Twitter, YouTube, and Flickr, to see how these routines manifest in unique ways in conflict coverage. Where active PJ distinguishes itself from passive PJ—noting again that there is always room for interactivity and movement on this fluid spectrum—is in its further step that views journalism/ists as having an active role to play in peacemaking processes, including intentionally inversing the standard, almost exclusively male, elite-oriented hierarchy of sourcing, as well as going out of the way to offer creative solutions in an effort to help transcend, prevent, and end conflicts.

The tension within PJ literature would largely be reconciled if acknowledging this spectrum became the status-quo, as the conversation would no longer be about which style of reporting qualifies as PJ, and could shift to making recommendations tailored to individual reporters, editors, scholars, media organizations, phases of conflict, and other variables based on what is appropriate for each situation, journalist's individual beliefs, and/or media organization's standards and practices. Practicing PJ would no longer require convincing critics and traditional journalists like Loyn to 'journey' through Patindol's spectrum—a spectrum that starts from a point of insulting what Loyn holds dear (traditional journalism)—nor would it require one to dismiss the more active interpretation of PJ advocated for by Lynch and others. Though not discussed outside of a brief mention, war/violence journalism also falls on a spectrum, from bad to typical, and rather than classify it pejoratively as traditional journalism, as Patindol's does, PJ terminology should apply the terms bad and typical to define war/violence journalism. This creates a more welcoming field, and would encourage PJ's adoption in scholarly research and journalistic practice. Hopefully, this will help to move PJ forward, as the theory and field seems unfortunately stagnant given its ubiquitously noble ideal of furthering peace in the world.

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Liane Rothenberger & Kathrin Müller

Kategorisierung der von der Europäischen Union aufgelisteten terroristischen Gruppen gemäß ihrer Motive

Es existiert eine Fülle an Auflistungen von Terroristengruppen, zusammengestellt von Staaten und Staatenverbünden. Die Liste der Europäischen Union enthält derzeit 44 solcher Gruppen. Die vorliegende Studie analysiert die Motive dieser Gruppen, um daraus Kommunikationsstrategien abzuleiten, wie diesen zu entgegnen sei. Dazu wird eine dreigliedrige Typologie nach Waldmann (2001) zugrunde gelegt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass ausschließlich religiös motivierter Terrorismus lediglich bei fünf der 44 analysierten Gruppen anzutreffen ist. Die meisten Gruppen (n=20) legen nationalistisch-separatistische Motive an den Tag; 19 Gruppen beziehen sich auf sozial-revolutionäre Motive. Es wird vorgeschlagen, je nach Motiv eine unterschiedliche rhetorische Gegenstrategie zu entwerfen, die spezifisch auf die jeweils identifizierten motivationalen und Identität generierenden Faktoren eingeht beziehungsweise diese widerlegt.

Volltext

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Liane Rothenberger & Kathrin Müller

Categorizing terrorist entities listed by the European Union according to terrorist groups' underlying motives

States and international organizations have compiled lists of a great variety of terrorist groups. The current European Union list includes 44 entities. This study analyzes the underlying motives of the terrorist organizations named in this list. In order to understand the groups' motivations and consequently be able to advise on methods of countering them with communication strategies, we employ a three-item typology provided by Waldmann (2001). The results show that only five of the 44 groups were religiously motivated to commit terrorism. Most of the groups (n=20) had nationalist-separatist motives, and 19 groups displayed social-revolutionary motives. Based on the respective motives, differing counter-terrorism strategies are proposed, e.g., developing rhetorical counter-narratives that address and reduce the groups' motivational and identity-generating characteristics.

full text

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Liane Rothenberger & Kathrin Müller

Categorizing terrorist entities listed by the European Union, according to terrorist groups' underlying motives

Kurzfassung: Es existiert eine Fülle an Auflistungen von Terroristengruppen, zusammengestellt von Staaten und Staatenverbünden. Die Liste der Europäischen Union enthält derzeit 44 solcher Gruppen. Die vorliegende Studie analysiert die Motive dieser Gruppen, um daraus Kommunikationsstrategien abzuleiten, wie diesen zu entgegnen sei. Dazu wird eine dreigliedrige Typologie nach Waldmann (2001) zugrunde gelegt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass ausschließlich religiös motivierter Terrorismus lediglich bei fünf der 44 analysierten Gruppen anzutreffen ist. Die meisten Gruppen (n=20) legen nationalistisch-separatistische Motive an den Tag; 19 Gruppen beziehen sich auf sozial-revolutionäre Motive. Es wird vorgeschlagen, je nach Motiv eine unterschiedliche rhetorische Gegenstrategie zu entwerfen, die spezifisch auf die jeweils identifizierten motivationalen und Identität generierenden Faktoren eingeht beziehungsweise diese widerlegt.

Abstract: States and international organizations have compiled lists of a great variety of terrorist groups. The current European Union list includes 44 entities. This study analyzes the underlying motives of the terrorist organizations named in this list. In order to understand the groups' motivations and consequently be able to advise on methods of countering them with communication strategies, we employ a three-item typology provided by Waldmann (2001). The results show that only five of the 44 groups were religiously motivated to commit terrorism. Most of the groups (n=20) had nationalist-separatist motives, and 19 groups displayed social-revolutionary motives. Based on the respective motives, differing counter-terrorism strategies are proposed, e.g., developing rhetorical counter-narratives that address and reduce the groups' motivational and identity-generating characteristics.

1.   Introduction[1]

In efforts to prevent terrorism, it is vital to understand the phenomenon and the communicative, symbolic character of terrorist acts. Through their actions, terrorists try to broadcast a certain message and communicate their guiding interests and priorities. In an audio-tape from January 2010, Al-Qaeda head Osama bin Laden announced: "'If it were possible to carry our messages to you with words, we wouldn't have carried them to you with planes'" (as reported by Walid, 2010). Corlett (2003) attributes terrorism to the demand for political, social, economic, or religious change. Independently of the primary goals, terrorism is also driven by several subordinate motives. In this article, we therefore try to answer the following research question:

According to which motives can the terrorist entities listed by the European Union be categorized?

A motive is the underlying cause of a given behavior, and the sum total of motives is called "motivation." Thus, in the theory of motivation and emotion, causal attributions play a key role (Weiner, 1985). Motivation consists of a) an aspiration for efficacy and b) organization for goal attainment (Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2010). These two characteristics are found in all human undertakings. Motive research distinguishes between implicit motives (such as internalized cultural aspects) and explicit motives, as expressed, e.g., in public statements. This study investigated motives made explicit in various ways, for instance in founding charters. Motive research is a multidisciplinary field, including *inter alia* psychology and criminology (Kehr, Thrash & Wright, 2011; Vecchi, Van Hasselt & Angleman, 2013). Unfortunately, too little attention has been focused on the conceptual classification and empirical investigation of terrorist groups' motives and ways to counter them using rhetorical communication strategies.

Terrorism takes many forms, and terrorists act for a variety of reasons. Terrorist entities pursue various different goals and have different backgrounds. To understand the terrorists' messages – with the aim of dissuading individuals from resorting to terrorism and deterring terrorist acts – we must understand the specific motives and interests of terrorist entities. This paper therefore not only provides insight into definitions and triggers of terrorism, but also discusses the backgrounds and objectives of the 44 entities currently listed as terrorist organizations by the European Union. By classifying the entities' motives according to the types of terrorism identified by Waldmann (2001), the paper reveals the common objectives and backgrounds of contemporary terrorism. This classification is relevant for efforts to frustrate terrorist recruiting strategies – which in most cases aim at arousing specific motivations – by means of rhetorical counter-strategies.

This paper has six sections. The first describes the study's relevance. The second discusses various definitions of terrorism. We then compare these to the EU definition of terrorism, since this study focuses specifically on the EU terrorism list. Fourth, we explain the choice of the Waldmann typology to categorize the terrorist groups on the EU list. We then present the study's results in detail before concluding with a discussion and proposals for possible rhetorical counter-narratives.

2.   Relevance of motivation-based counter-terrorism measures

Because governmental institutions like the European Union are interested in finding measures for countering terrorism, they try to identify active terrorist groups, but often neglect a comprehensive examination of the terrorist groups' different backgrounds and motives. However, as this study shows, terrorists' motives should be taken into consideration when developing counter-terrorism strategies. Hillebrand (2012), who investigates European counter-terrorism networks with a focus on police measures, writes: "Yet many of the EU's CT [counter-terrorism; the authors] actions are of a rather administrative and regulative manner. Prominent examples concern the EU-US exchange of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data as well as the creation of terrorist lists and the subsequent freezing of financial assets of listed terrorist suspects or 'donors'." (Hillebrand 2012, 6)

EU politicians are encouraged not to disseminate a discourse of fear, threat and administrative security measures in the media (cf. Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2008), but rather to offer matter-of-fact presentations and/or discussions of reasoning on the motives, causes and development of terrorism. The alternative discourse that politicians ought to bring to the media should not be based on "a culture of fear" (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2008: 6), but rather on motives of refuting terrorist messages. Furthermore, the Internet offers manifold possibilities for governments to directly communicate their counter-terrorism narratives. Narratives, in this context, are understood as the elements that constitute discourse. "Discourse is a category that belongs to and derives from the social domain, and text is a category that belongs to and derives from the linguistic domain. The relation between the two is one of realization: Discourse finds its expression in text." (Kress 1985: 27) Thus, a concept of narratives should underlie the counter-terrorism discourse that finds expression, e.g., in the statements of the EU or its respective member states.

It is not enough to develop measures that only treat the symptoms (terrorist acts, violent groups), but instead, the goal should be to develop methods of communicating anti-terrorist motives. We need to treat the underlying causes of the "malady," not just relieve its symptoms. Therefore, it is important to categorize the listed groups according to their motivational drives. Relying on his list of varieties of counter-terrorism, Crelinsten (2014: 10-11) concludes:

> Counterterrorism cannot be merely reactive or coercive, otherwise it risks creating a bunker mentality, triggering resentment and backlash that risks promoting terrorist recruitment as a result, and missing the next new development. It must therefore be proactive, looking ahead and trying to out-smart the terrorist, and plan ahead, thinking preventively. It must also be persuasive, convincing terrorists to abandon their destructive paths and supporters and sympathizers to seek other, non-violent ways to achieve their goals.

His concrete suggestions will be presented in the discussion section of this article.

3.   The never-ending problem of defining terrorism

Although terrorism is not a new phenomenon, no comprehensive, universally accepted definition exists (Waldmann, 2001). Hirschmann (2003) concludes that almost no term is as diverse and controversial as "terrorism," and political positions often influence the choice of definition. The *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* includes a selection of more than 250 definitions that emphasize different attributes (Easson and Schmid, 2013).

This paper focuses on non-state terrorism. Therefore, "terrorism" is conceptualized here as an attack on political authorities or a state and its institutions. Waldmann (2001) characterizes terrorism as an act of violence against a political order. These acts are distinguished by arbitrariness and brutality, intended to arouse fear but also create sympathy and willingness to support the terrorists' goals. Furthermore, terrorists plan and organize their attacks clandestinely. As terrorist groups are usually not strong enough to occupy and control a territory or to openly challenge a regime, operating illegally and in secrecy seems to be their only realistic option (Waldmann, 2001). Provocation is another common tactic, in which a weak individual or group challenges a superior and more powerful foe by making sudden surprise attacks and violating social norms (Waldmann, 2001). The weaker party's aim is to provoke the stronger to resort to violence in self-defense, hoping thereby to convince the public that the state is brutal and unjust, and the attacker is the real victim of injustice. This paper, however, does not focus on military defense, but rather on communicative counter-strategies.

Corlett (2003) provides a definition of terrorism similar to Waldmann's (2001):

> Terrorism is the attempt to achieve (or prevent) political, social, economic, or religious change by the actual or threatened use of violence against other persons or other persons' property; the violence (or threat thereof) employed therein is aimed partly at destabilizing (or maintaining) an existing political or social order, but mainly at publicizing the goals or causes espoused by the agents or by those on whose behalf the agents act; often though not always, terrorism is aimed at provoking extreme counter-measures which will win public support for the terrorists and their goals or causes. (Corlett, 2003: 19-20)

Taken together, the definitions of Corlett (2003) and Waldmann (2001) show that terrorist acts promote a message: Through the use of violence, terrorists seek publicity, aim to create awareness of a certain issue, and try to persuade a government to change its policies. Thus, terrorist acts have a symbolic character. Their purpose is not killing, kidnapping, or destruction for its own sake, but rather to gain attention (Waldmann, 2001; see also Hirschmann, 2003; Balagangadhara & De Roover, 2010). Schmid (2013b) therefore defines terrorism as a combination of violence and communication. Terrorists want to make their motives known to the public. Although the terrorist's message is generally addressed to a government (in the case of non-state terrorism), innocent civilians are often the ones directly affected by the terrorists' acts (Schmid, 2013b; Waldmann, 2001; Balagangadhara & De Roover, 2010).

4.   Terrorist groups listed by the European Union

In order to choose a relevant set of terrorist groups for categorizing according to the Waldmann typology of motivations, the European Union list of terrorist groups was used because of its currency, accessibility and European focus. We find a gap in current research, as scholars usually examine only US lists and counter-strategies (The Council of the European Union, 2013. For a critical perspective on the influence of terrorism lists, cf. Kaleck, 2011). The Council of the European Union (2001: 93) defines terrorist acts as:

> intentional acts, which … may seriously damage a country or an international organization … with the aim of: (i) seriously intimidating a population, or (ii) unduly compelling a Government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or (iii) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.

In its definition, the EU emphasizes the terrorists' objective to force/constrain a government to take/refrain from certain actions, and the perspective is clearly oriented toward non-state terrorist groups (see also Baker-Beall, 2014). The definition also accentuates the terrorists' aim of political, social, economic or constitutional change and thus takes into account the variety of motivations of the different terrorist organizations. The European Union's list of terrorist groups includes only organizations that have already committed or threatened to commit terrorist acts, or which support such actions; for example by providing other terrorist entities with financial or technological resources (The Council of the European Union, 2001). Therefore, the list does not include groups that promulgate extremist ideologies or seek radical changes, but do not engage in terrorist activities.

Another advantage of relying on the EU list is its currency. The list of terrorist groups is reviewed and revised at least every six months. Groups that are no longer active can be deleted from the list and new organizations added. The last revision prior to this study was made in July 2013. At that time, the EU identified 26 organizations as terrorist entities according to articles 2, 3, and 4 of the EU Common Position (2001/931/CFSP) on the use of specific measures to combat terrorism. This means not only that these entities are designated as terrorist groups, but also that their financial assets, funds, and economic resources have been frozen and may not be made available to benefit any group designated by the EU as a terrorist organization (Council of the European Union, 2001).

Besides these 26 entities, the EU identified 18 terrorist organizations to which only article 4 of the EU Common Position 2001/931/CFSP applies. The article states:

> Member States shall, through police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the framework of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, afford each other the widest possible assistance in preventing and combating terrorist acts. To that end they shall, with respect to enquiries and proceedings conducted by their authorities in respect of any of the persons, groups and entities listed in the Annex, fully exploit, upon request, their existing powers in accordance with acts of the European Union and other international agreements, arrangements and conventions which are binding upon Member States. (The Council of the European Union, 2001: 94)

As these 18 groups lack the characteristics named in articles 2 and 3 of the Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, the European Union has not taken measures regarding their organizations' financial assets, funds, and economic resources.

Although the European Union offers a definition of terrorism and lists terrorist organizations, it does not give detailed information on the respective groups. Categorizing the different forms of terrorism can help to order the data and make possible a practical application to the political and social realms, thus enabling governments to

develop counter-narratives. Categorizing the listed terrorist groups based on Waldmann's (2001) typology can help to identify similarities between their organizations, reveal the main motives of contemporary terrorism, and increase our knowledge about the motivations that lie behind terrorist attacks and recruitment strategies. This can provide helpful information for counter-terrorism programs, such as developing responses that weaken the respective motivations.

5.   Waldmann's typology of motivation

Typologies of terrorism can contribute to greater conceptual clarity, help to order complex data and can be practically applied to both the political and social realms (Marsden and Schmid, 2013). There are a variety of typologies of terrorism, differentiating for example domestic and international terrorism (Hirschmann, 2003), the execution of terrorist actions (Marsden and Schmid, 2013), non-state and vigilante terrorism (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982), or terrorist group organizational characteristics and goal structures (Piazza, 2009). Rapoport (2004) examined aspects of the history of non-state terror and concluded that there were four "waves": the anarchist, anti-colonial, New Left and religious waves. Rapoport (2004: 47) states that, "a different energy drives each," although he does not use the term "motive."

For the objectives of motive research, however, the present paper uses a typology suggested by Waldmann (2001), and similarly by Straßner (2004). In Waldmann's (2001) typology, the term "terrorism" is interpreted according to the definition explained above and refers to attacks against political authorities or a state's system of governance. It focuses on the terrorists' motives and self-conceptions, takes note of nationalistic and social-revolutionary groups, and considers religiously motivated terrorism independent of political objectives. The typology is based on self-images and ideology as sources of terrorists' motivations, as well as on objectives arising from a specific socio-historical background that also influences terrorists' actions. Straßner (2004) deals exclusively with insurgent terrorism.

Waldmann's typology was introduced in parts in the late 1980s (e.g., Waldmann, 1989) and was fully developed by the late 1990s/early 2000. We take into account past and current criticism of the typology and suggestions for modified or new typologies made by other researchers in the field (e.g., Wilkinson, 1987; Farnen, 1990; Paletz & Vinson, 1992; Liebl, 2006). However, a discussion of the academic debate on the suitability of particular terrorism typologies would go beyond the scope of this paper.

Waldmann (2001) and Straßner (2004) delineate three categories of terrorism: social-revolutionary terrorism, ethnic-nationalistic terrorism, and religious terrorism. In the case of social-revolutionary terrorism, terrorists seek political and social revolution based on Marxist/Leninist/Maoist ideals (Waldmann, 2001). Social-revolutionary terrorists aspire to create a society in which every citizen is equal and has the same rights and opportunities; therefore, radical changes would have to be made in politics, as well as in the economy, administration, and culture (Waldmann, 2001)

> *Social-revolutionary terrorist organizations* rely expressis verbis, as well as implicitly, on Karl Marx and subsequent ideologies. They strive for a radical reformation of political and societal reality, with which they associate armed struggle against capitalism, imperialism and global inequality and injustice. (Straßner, 2004: 360)

The second category, ethnic-nationalistic terrorism, describes terrorist groups that represent a minority or a population group held to be oppressed. The main objective of ethnic-nationalistic terrorists is an independent state or at least some degree of political autonomy (Waldmann, 2001). Often terrorists justify their goals with appeals to their historical background, claiming that their people had a better life before they were dominated by a hostile regime (Waldmann, 2001). They further emphasize their culture, which they view as threatened, e.g., by modernization, immigration, or the increasing power of the centralized state (Waldmann, 2001). According to Straßner, the main characteristic of ethnic-nationalistically motivated terrorist groups results from the fact that "the clientele of these terrorists consists of an oppressed, ethnically allegedly definable minority mostly located in a superordinate state system perceived as an adversary. The core concern of ethnic-nationalistically motivated terrorists thus lies primarily in the creation of an own state entity for the minority that feels oppressed" (Straßner, 2004: 361).

Religious terrorism, the third category, is often related to religious fundamentalism. Although this type of fundamentalism can be found in the history of each of the three chief monotheistic world religions, the currently most violent form is that of Islamist terrorists (Waldmann, 2001). Religiously motivated terrorists often share a millenarian vision. They further criticize the global trend of modernization and secularization and therefore dream of founding a society on religious principles (Waldmann, 2001). In regard to religiously motivated terrorism, Straßner points to a "currently observable tendency of commingling religious motivation with social-revolutionary and ethnic-nationalist contents (Palestine)" (Straßner, 2004: 361).

In the following section, we will apply the presented typology of three major motivations to the European Union lists. We will discuss the limitations of the study before presenting our results in a comparative overview, as well as in the respective motivation categories.

6.   Results

To obtain sufficient information about the terrorist groups' motives, we made an extensive exploratory literature review. The qualitative approach included gathering information from document collections, the groups' own (founding) documents (e.g. the IRA green book or the Hamas founding charter) and websites (e.g. pkkonline.com), scholarly journals (e.g., Perspectives on Terrorism). As well we used as the reports of newspapers and broadcasters in Europe, North America and Asia (e.g. BBC, CNN, German quality newspapers such as the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung* or *Die Zeit*). Important sources for our research on the motives, histories, and activities of the groups were the databases of research institutes. These included the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism of the University of Maryland, governmental institutions like the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), as well as non-governmental organizations like the US-based Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) or the Mackenzie Institute in Canada.

Already at this stage, we want to call attention to the limitations of the study:

- Most of the material that we accessed and gathered was in English. This certainly limits the range of documents and perhaps even prevents a deeper understanding of the terrorists' motives, which would be better traceable if researchers studied texts by terrorists in their native language.
- Moreover, changes in motives can occur over time. We have tried to follow these changes, but we have mainly found only minor changes, while the original underlying motive remained the same.
- Also, we found many cases of groups that could be classified in more than one category, for example the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). In these cases, we assigned a group to the category it shared the most similarities with, and we will explain below why we placed them in the particular category. However, in order to indicate the multi-motive background of certain groups, Figure 1 illustrates intersections. Furthermore, Rapoport (2004), who tried to classify terrorist groups into four "waves" (see above), admits that most groups show a dominant, but not just one unique "feature" (Rapoport, 2004: 47). For example, he places the Tamil Tigers in the "religious wave" category, because they are largely Hindus. However, having examined the declaration of motivational factors on the LTTE website and their recruitment strategies, we cannot agree with this classification.
- Another problem arose with organizations that do not explicitly state their own objectives related to terrorism, but instead support other terrorist groups, for instance through funding. For example, the al-Aqsa Foundation and Stichting al Aqsa portray themselves as charitable organizations dedicated to achieving humanitarian goals, but in fact support Hamas terrorist activities. In such cases, the particular organization was assigned to the same category as the terrorist group it supports.


Figure 1: Motive intersections

Based on the information gathered about the terrorist organizations' motives, we categorized the groups as shown in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 presents the categorization of the 26 entities to which articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply, whereas Table 2 shows the 18 terrorist organizations to which only article 4 of the Common Position 2001/931/CFSP applies. The latter are entities based within the European Union.

Based on our definition of "motives" (see above), in the following sub-sections we will examine the various different terrorist groups and outline the decisions leading to the classifications made above.

Social-revolutionary terrorism	Ethnic-nationalistic terrorism	Religious terrorism
Communist Party of the Philippines, including New People's Army (NPA)	Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO)	Al-Takfir and Al-Hijra
Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan-PKK)	Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade	Gama'a al-Islamiyya
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, NLA)	Al-Aqsa e.V.	İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi (IBDA-C)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	Babbar Khalsa	Hizballah Military Wing and all units reporting to it, including the External Security Organization
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-General Command)	Hamas, including Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem	Hofstadgroep
Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-FARC)	Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)	
Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP/C)	Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development	
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path-SL)	International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)	
	Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF)	
	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	
	Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)	
	Stichting Al Aqsa	
	Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan (TAK)	

Table 1: Categorization of the terrorist groups designated by the European Union following articles 2, 3, and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP

Social-revolutionary terrorism	Ethnic-nationalistic terrorism
Cooperativa Artigiana Fuoco ed Affini-Occasionalmente Spettacolare (Artisans' Cooperative Fire and Similar-Occasionally Spectacular)	Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
Nuclei Armati per il Comunismo (Armed Units for Communism)	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna / Tierra Vasca y Libertad (Basque Fatherland and Liberty-E.T.A.)
Cellula Contro Capitale, Carcere i suoi Carcerieri e le sue Celle (Cell Against Capital, Prison, Prison Warders and Prison Cells-CCCCC)	Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)
Epanastatikos Agonas (Revolutionary Struggle)	Orange Volunteers (OV)
Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre (Antifascist Resistance Groups First of October-G.R.A.P.O.)	Real IRA
Solidarietà Internazionale (International Solidarity)	Red Hand Defenders (RHD)
Brigate Rosse per la Costruzione del Partito Comunista Combattente (Red Brigades for the Construction of the Fighting Communist Party)	Ulster Defence Association / Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF)
Epanastatiki Pirines (Revolutionary Nuclei)	
Dekati Evdomi Noemvri (Revolutionary Organization 17 November)	
Brigata XX Luglio (Twentieth of July Brigade)	
Federazione Anarchica Informale (Unofficial Anarchist Federation-F.A.I.)	

Table 2: Categorization of the terrorist groups designated by the European Union following article 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP

6.1   Social-revolutionary terrorism

Within this motivation group, terrorist organizations often originate in communist parties (e.g. the NPA in the Communist Party of the Philippines, FARC in the Colombian Communist Party, G.R.A.P.O. as the armed wing of the Communist Party of Spain [Reconstituted], DHKP/C as an offshoot of the Devrimci Yol, a splinter group of the Turkish People's Liberation Party-Front). Often these groups can be traced back to student revolutionaries of the 1960s and 1970s (like PKK) or other left-wing intellectuals committed to the spread of Maoist ideology. Sendero Luminoso, for example, was founded by Abimael Guzmán, a philosophy professor and lecturer at the University in Ayacucho (Schmid 2013a). The NLA was founded by urban left-wing intellectuals and oil industry labor unionists, and was later joined by Catholic clergy committed to Liberation Theology. As well, the Nuclei Armati per il Comunismo had its roots in working classes that felt exploited and not fairly represented by the government. Therefore, Nuclei Armati per il Comunismo primarily attacked companies that employed illegal workers.

Social-revolutionary terrorist groups are far-left oriented and based on the ideologies of Marxism, Leninism and/or Maoism. The Columbian NLA, for example, adopts the Marxist ideologies that motivated Fidel Castro and Che Guevara in their 1959 overthrow of the Cuban government. These groups fight for revolutionary change of society, politics and economy, and can conceive of no means other than armed struggle and the overthrow of the nation state and its status quo politics in order to found a new state based on socialism and communism. Thus, many of these groups emphasize their wish for total equality among all citizens. For instance, the PKK claims to have strengthened the social role of women: "Whereas before the women of Kurdistan were ignored and oppressed, today they are leading the way in all the social and political spheres of the struggle and daily life" (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, 2011). The PKK further stresses the role of the proletariat and demands that Kurdish society should be based on the principles of communism, so that it will become "an alternative to capitalist modernity" (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, 2011).

Social-revolutionary groups are opposed to imperialism, globalization, capitalism, and police violence. Thus, they attack political and military installations, diplomatic personnel and facilities, political leaders and institutions, national security and military officials, banks, government and office buildings. Or they extort concessions from foreign investors, businessmen and foreign-owned (often US-owned) companies within their country. They furthermore try to block "capitalist" construction projects and want to ban capitalist companies from their countries. Except for the PFLP, suicide bombings are not at all a common tactic of these groups. Usually, the terrorist groups are dissatisfied with the policies of their respective countries for labor relations and the economy, as well as foreign relations. FARC, for example, is strongly influenced by Marxist ideals and claims that it protects Colombian citizens against the rule of elites, neo-imperialism, and repressive violence by the Colombian government and paramilitary forces. FARC further criticizes the monopolization of resources by multinational corporations and the influence of the United States on Colombian affairs (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013h). Other groups, such as the DHKP/C, criticize modern Western societies and are strongly opposed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and even the EU, as well as to the US, because they believe that their governments are controlled by Western imperialists. Some groups, like CCCCC and Solidarietà Internazionale, express solidarity with incarcerated members of their networks, and proclaim as a goal the liberation of these members. The groups are also closely committed to anarchist and antifascist ideologies.

There have been reports of alliances between the groups, for example between the NLA and FARC. The Federazione Anarchica Informale (F.A.I.) maintains close relations with other Italian anarchist groups such as CCCCC, Brigata XX Luglio, and Solidarietà Internazionale. The F.A.I. links all these groups and functions as an umbrella organization. Many of the groups are based either in Europe (most of them in southern European countries like Italy, Spain or Greece) or Latin America (NLA, FARC, Sendero Luminoso), although the Latin American groups have a much larger membership.

For the religiously influenced social-revolutionary groups operating in the Middle East and fighting to take back Palestine for the Palestinians, categorizing these groups is more difficult (as in fact that they combine all three motives; cf. Figure 1). We have chosen to base our classification on the most important argument with which they try to characterize their struggle. For the PFLP, the second largest faction of the PLO, e.g., the liberation of Palestine is more of a subordinate goal. In fact, the PFLP seems to be influenced mainly by Marxism-Leninism: the organization wants to combine communist ideology with Arab left-wing nationalism in order to eliminate all Western influences from the Middle East (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2014). Left-wing Arabian nationalism is a movement that seeks to unite all Arab nations to form a single state, with the destruction of Israel perceived as necessary to unite the Arab nations and establish communism. The organization's members do not want to destroy Israel because they feel oppressed; instead they want to unite many countries and, based on the ideals of Marx and Lenin, create a nation in which every citizen is equal (http://www.pflp-pal.org/strategy.html).

6.2   Ethnic-nationalistic terrorism

We classify other groups operating in the Middle East in the category of ethnic-nationalistic terrorism. They feel oppressed by Israel and demand the creation of a liberal, autonomous Palestine. ANO, for example, seeks to destroy Israel as a nation and to liberate Palestine. The founder, Abu Nidal, was primarily driven by anger at the expulsion of his family from Palestine in 1948, during the Israeli War of Independence (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013a). The group has opposed any peace negotiations and believes that the total liberation of Palestine can only be achieved by armed struggle (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013a). Strong nationalism can be ascribed to all of the Middle Eastern groups. They seek to expel the Israelis from Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank to create a Palestinian nation-state. Therefore, the organizations' attacks are mainly targeted at Israeli settlers and security forces in the mentioned regions, but also at Palestinians who are perceived to support Israel (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013b). On the other hand, they provide assistance to Palestinian refugees.

Also placed in this category are groups that disguise themselves as "international charity associations" to raise funds for Hamas, and thus agree with Hamas' ethnic-nationalistic motivation: e.g., the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, the Al-Aqsa Foundation and Stichting Al Aqsa. They have collected donations in mosques, Islamic centers, and during demonstrations on the Arab-Israeli conflict (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2002). They are also active in recruitment and providing logistical support (US Department of the Treasury, 2007).

Here, again, the problem arises of categorizing Middle Eastern groups due to their multiple motives. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, for example, features a mosque and Islamic script in their logo, but the creation of an Islamic state is not an explicit goal of the group (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013b). Similarly, in its slogan and charter, Hamas refers to Allah and accentuates Jihad – i.e., war or struggle against those who do not believe in Allah. Although the group draws on Islamic themes, its main objective is the liberation of Palestine from Israel, which characterizes Hamas more as an ethnic-nationalistic terrorist group than a religious one. Piazza (2009: 66) states that Hamas "is functionally a national-liberation movement." And although Hizbul Mujahideen seeks to spread Islam in Jammu and Kashmir, its ethnically-motivated activities primarily concentrate on winning the political independence of Jammu and Kashmir from India, seeking to integrate them with Pakistan. As one can legitimately question why we have not assigned more "Islamist" groups to the religious motive category, we further justify our choice with a last example: the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Even though the PIJ perceives the Arab-Israeli conflict as of a religious nature and promotes Jihad (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013g), the organization does not display the usual characteristics of religious terrorism: The PIJ's objectives are neither the spread of religion nor a society based on religious principles. In an interview with a delegation from the World Federation of Scientists in 2009 (Atran and Axelrod, 2010), PIJ leader Ramadan Abdullah Shallah emphasized that the organization's motives are not of a religious nature: *"We don't want a state based on religious identity"* (Atran and Axelrod, 2010: 4). Unlike religious terrorists, the PIJ does not demand a state based on Islam:

> *I have no problem living with the Jewish people. We have lived together in peace for centuries. And if Netanyahu were to ask if we can live together in one state, I would say to him: 'If we have exactly the same rights as Jews to come to all of Palestine … then we can have a new language, and dialogue is possible.'* (Atran and Axelrod, 2010: 8)

Instead of religious goals, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad focuses on achieving political independence by overthrowing the state of Israel (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013g). As the members of the PIJ perceive the Palestinians as oppressed by Israel and therefore fight for autonomy, the organization, in our eyes, practices a form of ethnic-nationalistic rather than religious terrorism.

Other demands for independent states and political autonomy are voiced by organizations of Sikhs: "Babbar Khalsa", the Khalistan Zindabad Force and the ISYF fighting against India in order to establish a state called "Khalistan." The LTTE feels oppressed by the Singhalese, thus they are struggling against the government of Sri Lanka to gain independence and establish their own Tamil nation. TAK aspires to create a Kurdish state, the ETA a Basque one, and violent Irish Republican nationalist terrorist groups fought against British Army and Northern Ireland Security Forces, seeking to unite Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland. Of course, most of the groups' members belong to the respective ethnic group (Basque, Kashmiri, etc.). To justify their violent nationalist struggle, the groups often appeal to their own history and culture, which differ from the dominant national ones. Members killed in the struggle are revered as saints and martyrs who were oppressed and treated unjustly by the national state.

An exception to the groups listed above – whose objective is their own nation-state – are loyalist terrorist groups that want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom and oppose a united Ireland (Kushner, 2003). Although they do not want to establish their own state, but rather maintain the status quo as part of the UK and were originally differentiated on the basis of religion – Irish nationalist groups are Catholic, UK loyalist groups are

Protestant –, these groups can still be seen as ethnic-nationalistic organizations. The UDA, Orange Volunteers, and LVF want to maintain the current status quo for Northern Ireland and remain part of the UK. They condemn Republican nationalist terrorist groups and the Republic of Ireland for interfering in Northern Ireland's internal affairs, and for the attempted "gallicization" of Northern Ireland, which they perceive as a threat to the country's British culture. Therefore, they have tried to destabilize the peace process and block a political settlement.

Also in this category, we can see the origin of some organizations as splinter groups of political parties, albeit less so than in the social-revolutionary terrorism category: The Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, for example, was established as a military arm of Al Fatah (Anti-Defamation League, 2013). Hizbul Mujahideen was founded in 1989 as the militant wing of the Islamic Pakistani party "Jamaat-e-Islami" (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013e). And Palestinian Islamic Jihad emerged as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. There is often co-operation among the groups, e.g., between Khalistan Zindabad Force and Hizbul Mujahideen. Additionally, many of the ethnic-nationalist groups have influential diasporas – as well in Western countries including Canada, the USA, and European states – that are active in funding and recruitment (e.g. the Tamils and Sikhs). The ISYF was even founded in the United Kingdom as an international branch of the All India Sikh Students' Federation (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2001a).

Regarding the date of foundation, there is no specific time-frame for the emergence of the groups in this category. Most sprang to life after an outrage committed against their respective ethnic group by those in national power. Regarding targets, ethnic-nationalistic terrorist groups are typically of two types: Some operate only within their respective national borders; others have been active in terrorist operations in many countries. The ANU, for example, is allegedly responsible for attacks in 20 different countries, including the US, UK, Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey. The Middle Eastern groups that fight for an autonomous Palestinian state independent of Israel aspire to destroy Israel and thus target all institutions, states, officials, politicians, or religious buildings linked to it. ANO, for example, hijacked a Pan American World Airways flight and was responsible for a shooting spree at a synagogue. Further, accessible public spaces like bus-stops, restaurants, and shopping malls are frequent targets of terrorist attacks – often suicide attacks.

Babbar Khalsa detonated two bombs in movie theaters in Delhi; the Hizbul Mujahideen attack Indian politicians and security forces in the Kashmir region; the ISYF and the Khalistan Zindabad Force target Indian Hindus, symbolic figures like the Deputy Superintendent of Police (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2001b), and also Sikhs perceived as adversaries. The LTTE has attacked politicians, airplanes, banks and Buddhist religious sites, mostly on Sri Lankan territory. TAK contends that the Turkish government finances the oppression of the Kurds, mainly with income from tourism; thus, the organization's terrorist operations concentrate on disrupting tourism in Turkey by attacking Turkish and foreign civilians in popular tourist areas. In sum, we can say that the groups target their "ethnic" enemies, i.e. the groups they think oppress or threaten them. In this way, they vent their motivational feeling of ethnic oppression.

6.3   Religious Terrorism

Even though the main share of media coverage, political debates, and even research deals with religious terrorism, surprisingly few groups are assigned to this category. Those listed are all Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups. They operate on an international level: examples include the train bombings in Madrid, the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands, and bombings at US or French military or government facilities like consulates, embassies or military bases. These attacks are of a symbolic nature, intended to draw attention to and condemn the nation represented by the targets. Except for the Hofstadgroep – whose name was coined by the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service and later adopted by the media (Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, 2008) – all the groups allude to Islam or Allah in their names, e.g., "Islamic Group" (Gama'a's al-Islamiyya) or "Islamic Great Eastern Raiders' Front" (IBDA-C).

The groups' motives stem from a rejection of and opposition to Western globalization, along with modern norms and values that the groups' members consider incompatible with Islamic law. Al-Takfir and Al-Hijra, for example, see Islamic society as mired in a phase of weakness. Therefore, the group began to migrate (to mountain caves or special rented rooms) and isolate itself in an effort to avoid influences it perceived as negative. In unpopulated areas, they strove to create an Islamic community that would realize their understanding of an ideal Islamic society. Gama'a al-Islamiyya, on the other hand, wants to transform Egypt into an Islamic state and fights the Egyptian government by attacking security forces, government officials, Coptic Christians, tourists, and Egyptians who it perceives to oppose Islam (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013c). The IBDA-C seeks the foundation of a Sunni Islamic federated state in the Middle East in which everyone obeys Islamic commandments and laws. Members claim that secularism in Turkey is illegal and call for reestablishing the Caliphate. Judaism, Christianity, and Western societies are perceived as evil (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013f). Likewise, the dominant goal of the Hezbollah Military Wing is to establish a Shi'ite theocracy in Lebanon. The Hezbollah Military Wing wants to destroy Israel and fights against influences from Western societies or other religions (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013d).

These organizations espouse a very strict interpretation of Islam, emphasize the importance of Jihad, and some strive for total withdrawal from modern society. They want to exclude non-Muslims from the public sphere in these countries. Their objectives are based only on Islam, and the groups do not pursue political goals, e.g. political liberation. Some are reportedly financed by Middle Eastern states. In this category there are also examples of terrorist motives that stem not from the poor working classes, but instead adopt the ideas of radical intellectuals: Al-Takfir and Al-Hijra were founded by an agricultural engineer (Gleis, 2005), and Gama'a Al-Islamiyya started as an Egyptian student organization.

7. Discussion and Outlook: Rhetorical counter-narratives

The European Union – like many other institutions – is concerned about terrorism and has taken measures to counter it. For instance, European Union agencies have been commissioned to identify active terrorist groups based on the terrorism definition provided by the Council of the European Union. This definition is similar to many researchers' understanding of terrorism. However, the European Union provides no information on the motives and goals of the different terrorist organizations. But, as presented above, the terrorists' actions are heavily influenced by their motivational ideology, objectives, and socio-historical background. Thus, to understand the terrorists' activities, these aspects must also be considered.

Consequently, the purpose of this paper was to give insights into the motives and ideologies of the 44 organizations listed in July 2013 as terrorist entities by the Council of the European Union. Thereby we wanted to contribute to reducing the "lack [of] a systematic comparison of the aims sought by organizations" (Rapoport, 2004: 73). As the organization of goal attainment is a crucial factor of motivational drives (Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2010), we could deduce the motives from a thorough review of primary and secondary literature, such as terrorist groups' websites and databases. For more clarity regarding the groups' objectives and to reveal trends, the organizations were categorized using terms from Waldmann's and Straßner's typology, which is based on terrorists' motives and differentiates three forms of terrorism: ethnic-nationalistic, social-revolutionary, and religious terrorism. Categorizing the entities identified by the European Union reveals that the majority of the terrorist organizations are of an ethnic-nationalistic nature: 20 groups, i.e., almost half of the listed entities, display characteristics of this type of terrorist motivation. Almost as many (19 entities) display social-revolutionary motives. In contrast, only five organizations are actually motivated by religious goals. This is consistent with Rapoport's observation that "nationalism or separatism is the most frequently espoused cause" (Rapoport, 2004: 65).

Some groups displayed characteristics of two categories. For instance, several groups appealed to Islam or Sikhism, but in most cases, religion was primarily an attribute the members of the group had in common rather than a driver of their terrorist attacks. Often these groups pursued a nation independent of a state currently perceived as an oppressor. In general, this objective was not based on religious motivation, but on pure nationalism and historical or cultural aspects. This finding supports an observation already made by Hirschmann (2003), who stated that many terrorist entities use religion mainly to justify their actions, whereas their goals and motives are mainly of a political nature. This result can be explained by the role of religion in societies: Religion establishes a social framework and is able to create a stronger bond between people than could a political ideology (Hirschmann 2003). Therefore, appealing to religious faith increases the legitimacy of the terrorists' actions and helps to recruit new members and supporters. Another finding of this study is that many of the presented terrorist entities are active in Israel and focus on the liberation of Palestine. This underlines the critical situation of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the need for continuing political dialogue and actions.

In sum, it can be said that although a large number of terrorist organizations appeal to religion, the main driving forces behind terrorism are still ethnic-nationalism and the demand for a social revolution. When countering terrorism, these aspects should be considered as the specific motives influencing not only why, but also how a group operates – in which realm and with which targets – and thus help to achieve a better understanding of terrorism. Knowing the specific motives of a terrorist group can only be a starting point for a more complex analysis of terrorists' communication and – taking into consideration their rhetoric, target audiences, communication channels and communication contents – the development of a strategic communication concept for countering terrorism. This again can help to improve political measures like precautions, prevention, or dialogues with terrorists, which governments have so often neglected (Baker-Beall, 2014). Of course, it remains to be seen whether this analysis gives any justification to argue for the effectiveness of any specific rhetorical counter-narratives. Yet, it certainly is a start to take into account the various motives of terrorism in anti-terrorist communication and to address not only the "symptoms," but also the "malady" and causes underlying the founding of violent groups.

As we have already discussed the limitations of this study (see above), we now want to emphasize the implications of our categorization for anti-terrorism policymaking. Until now, EU anti-terrorism discourse does not focus on motive-based counter-strategies (Baker-Beall, 2014). Crelinsten (2014) identified five different approaches to counter-terrorism: coercive, proactive, persuasive, defensive, and long-term. We suggest that our findings can contribute to persuasive counter-terrorism, which "involves understanding and dealing with the ideas

that underpin the use of terrorism in social and political life. This has ideological, political, social, cultural and religious aspects" (Crelinsten, 2014: 6). Whereas other models such as the coercive approach "rely on the state's monopoly of the use of violence, i.e., the exercise of hard power" (Crelinsten, 2014: 2), the persuasive approach explicitly includes a communication model as one of the most important tools in counter-terrorism measures. Crelinsten's "persuasive communication model" of terrorism response speaks of the distribution of information to different target audiences. The communication narratives have to be "expressive and symbolic as well as instrumental" (Crelinsten, 2014: 6), and in our case have to be designed according to the three different motives identified in our study. That means, for example, that even though Hamas and the PFLP pursue quite similar goals (i.e., the liberation of Palestine), persuasive counter-terrorism efforts should be structured differently. For Hamas, national security and government experts could employ an inter-ethnic understanding counter-narrative, whereas to fight the PFLP an anti-socialist counter-narrative would be more suitable. These counter-narratives could be promulgated via comments on websites that are frequently used by the respective terrorist group's followers. Our research showed that the goals of terrorist groups can be the same (e.g., the liberation of Palestine, the creation of a Kurdish state), even though their motivation may be different (PFLP vs. Hamas; PKK vs. TAK). Consequently, the response to and communication with them must also be different. Whereas the PKK is primarily driven by the desire to establish communism and thus claims to aspire to achieve equality for all citizens, TAK does not emphasize such social-revolutionary goals. Therefore, to deter potentially interested individuals from joining these groups, the EU should write their posts (e.g. on Social Media websites of PKK) not in an explicitly anti-communist frame but should instead emphasize the achievements and benefits of democracy. These differences in motives have sometimes even been the reason for the breakup of groups and the creation of splinter groups, as, for example, is the case with Republican groups (e.g., the IRA) in Northern Ireland.

In order to describe the EU's strategic communication in more detail, we will now focus on the differences between reflective and non-reflective rhetoric. This is important, as terrorists or individuals interested in terrorist groups' ideology often do not feel up to discussing certain assumptions. As Lederman states, "Specifically, the respondent will need to decide to what degree the opposition's rhetoric should be reflected, and which features of it should be mirrored. Those decisions may together constitute a strategy which may, broadly, be termed reflective or non-reflective" (Lederman, 1991: 42). Therefore, to directly and openly contradict ideological assumptions is not viewed as the best and most effective persuasion technique. It is rather "an outmoded and inappropriate model of communication that is poorly adapted to the task of persuading audiences already hostile to the messenger and disenchanted with the message" (Corman et al., 2008: 5). More suitable would instead be non-reflective rhetoric that tries to focus on motives that in fact counter the ones inherent to the terrorist group but does not try to "discredit" them. In the case of Hezbollah, for example, the EU should not attack and denigrate Islam as such, but rather focus on the benefits of secular state systems and religious pluralism. This, as Palmerton says, will have an effect on the actions of terrorist groups, because "the rhetoric of terrorism is created in large part by those responding to terrorist acts" (Palmerton, 1988: 106).

Finally, it must be noted that the above findings are based only on information about the terrorist entities listed by the European Union in July 2013. As the Council of the European Union reviews its list at least every six months, new groups may be added in the future and thus their motives should also be analyzed and categorized. Besides, as discussed above, the motives, objectives and ideology of a terrorist organization may change over time. Therefore, a regular review of the different groups' classification is suggested, preferably including reference to documentary evidence in various different languages. With this in mind, we hope that the general categorization provided by this study can guide future research on terrorist motives.

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Shabbir Hussain & Haseeb ur Rehman
Balochistan: Die Ernte der Leistungen des Friedensjournalismus

Wenn das Ziel des Friedensjournalismus darin besteht, zur Förderung des Friedens beizutragen, indem er die journalistische Qualität der Konfliktberichterstattung vorantreibt, dann zeigen die Ergebnisse dieser Studie, dass die Berichterstattung über den Balochistan-Konflikt den Lackmustest bestanden hat. Die Berichterstattung ist an den Bedürfnissen der Bevölkerung orientiert und die Berichterstatter sind sich ihrer Verantwortung gegenüber der Gesellschaft bewusst. Trotz akuter Sicherheitsprobleme ist es den Journalisten gelungen, den Konflikt auf die öffentliche Agenda zu setzen. Eine Mehrheit der Pakistaner teilt heute die Meinung, dass die Bevölkerung Balochistans von Politik und Armee misshandelt wurde und die Zeit dafür gekommen ist, ihr die Rechte zuzugestehen, für die sie jahrzehntelang gekämpft, tausende Menschenleben geopfert und großes Leid erduldet hat.

Volltext

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Shabbir Hussain & Haseeb ur Rehman
Balochistan: Reaping the benefits of peace journalism

If the focus of peace journalism is to press for quality journalism during conflict reporting which will ultimately contribute to peace, then the findings of this study show that the available reporting on the Balochistan conflict passes the litmus test. The coverage is pro-people, and the reporters are aware of their responsibility to society. Despite acute security problems, the journalists have been able to bring the conflict onto the public agenda. A majority of Pakistanis now agree that the people of Balochistan have been maltreated by both politicians and the army, and the time has come to grant them the rights for which they have been fighting for decades, sacrificed thousands of lives and endured great suffering.

full text

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Shabbir Hussain & Haseeb ur Rehman

Balochistan: Reaping the benefits of peace journalism

Kurzfassung: Wenn das Ziel des Friedensjournalismus darin besteht, zur Förderung des Friedens beizutragen, indem er die journalistische Qualität der Konfliktberichterstattung vorantreibt, dann zeigen die Ergebnisse dieser Studie, dass die Berichterstattung über den Balochistan-Konflikt den Lackmustest bestanden hat. Die Berichterstattung ist an den Bedürfnissen der Bevölkerung orientiert und die Berichterstatter sind sich ihrer Verantwortung gegenüber der Gesellschaft bewusst. Trotz akuter Sicherheitsprobleme ist es den Journalisten gelungen, den Konflikt auf die öffentliche Agenda zu setzen. Eine Mehrheit der Pakistaner teilt heute die Meinung, dass die Bevölkerung Balochistans von Politik und Armee misshandelt wurde und die Zeit dafür gekommen ist, ihr die Rechte zuzugestehen, für die sie jahrzehntelang gekämpft, tausende Menschenleben geopfert und großes Leid erduldet hat.

Abstract: If the focus of peace journalism is to press for quality journalism during conflict reporting which will ultimately contribute to peace, then the findings of this study show that the available reporting on the Balochistan conflict passes the litmus test. The coverage is pro-people, and the reporters are aware of their responsibility to society. Despite acute security problems, the journalists have been able to bring the conflict onto the public agenda. A majority of Pakistanis now agree that the people of Balochistan have been maltreated by both politicians and the army, and the time has come to grant them the rights for which they have been fighting for decades, sacrificed thousands of lives and endured great suffering.

1.   Introduction

Critical scholarship on conflict communication often accuses the mainstream media of producing propaganda and fanning the flames of nationalism in ways that mislead audiences about what is actually happening in war zones. Scholars like Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick have analyzed the media penchant for sensationalism and dramatization of actual events during conflicts. This is equally true for Pakistan's news media, which remained obsessed with escalatory and inflammatory content while reporting on the war against the Taliban in the tribal areas (bordering Afghanistan) (Siraj & Hussain, 2012; Hussain, 2014). Medialogic (the country's premier ratings recording firm for the TV industry) has revealed that news media in Pakistan have outdone the entertainment media in terms of viewership and financial benefits. One reason for the ascendancy of news media may be the prevalence of a plethora of security and political conflicts, which generates dependency on media for information. Media theorists (Altheid, in Baran & Davis, 2009) believe that during conflict periods, dependency on media increases, which may result in stronger effects of media reports, leading scholars like (Kempf, 2012; Ross, 2007; Tehranian, 2002; Lynch 2006) to stress the need for more constructive reporting to produce greater social benefits.

In this study, we analyze how Pakistani media report on the Balochistan conflict and how people react to this. The conflict has been going on since the founding of Pakistan, but now it has turned more violent. Thousands of people have been killed, many more gone missing, and despite peace overtures, there is no reduction in the tensions. A brief discussion of the nature of the conflict is presented to provide a better understanding.

2.   Background of the conflict

Balochistan is the largest Pakistani province in terms of territory, but the smallest in terms of population. According to the 1998 census, the ethnic makeup of the province includes 55 percent Baloch and 29 percent Pashtun tribes. Economically, despite rich mineral and gas deposits, it remains poverty stricken, underdeveloped and receives only a small share of the revenue it generates (Kundi, 2008).

The present insurgency in the province has its roots in history. Soon after the founding of Pakistan in 1947, the integration of Balochistan into it was resented by the ruling dynasty of the Khan of Qalat, who started agitation against it, which was soon suppressed. The unitary form of government (merging of all four provinces) was another bone of contention that ignited resentment (Ziring, 2004). When the One-Unit status was abolished in 1969, the situation in Balochistan took a turn toward normalcy. The next year, Balochistan was declared a separate province. However, after the dismissal of the elected provincial government of Balochistan in 1973 by the then Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a wave of insurgency arose in the province, leading to a massive military operation that took a heavy toll on the two sides (Harrison, 1981). However, the aim of the insurgency was never secession from Pakistan, but rather to gain more influence on national affairs. General Zia ul Haq, who

staged a military coup in 1977, was quick to understand the threat and engaged with local leaders, which substantially improved the situation in the province.

This was a sound strategy, and different projects were initiated to further peace and development in the province. The so-called democratic era of the 1990s saw the political integration of the province, with the center and insurgent movements relegated to the back burner. However, the fourth military coup by General Musharraf in 1999 worked as a spoiler, as the Balochi people from the very outset disliked his policies. The development of army *cantonments* (permanent military stations), the construction of Gawadar Port and the killing of Balochi leader Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2005 all contributed to the present insurgency in the province.

The root cause of unrest among Balochistanis lies in the realization that their resources are being exploited without any benefit to them, states Mir Hasil Bezingo, a nationalist leader from the province (personal interview, May 2013). Reservoirs of Sui natural gas were discovered in 1952 and the facility was extended to the length and breadth of the country, but the only district in that province to receive a gas facility was Quetta, which got one in 1986, and that too was limited to the cantonment areas. Likewise, with other minerals that are being extracted, the center gets a major share of the profits, and the province languishes in poverty and economic deprivation. They fear that the developmental projects are designed by military and bureaucratic elites to colonize their province. Nonetheless, the political and economic grievances are eminently resolvable (greater devolution, permitting Balochistan to control its natural resources, including fixing the price at which these commodities sell, investing in Balochistani human resources development, expanding access to electricity and gas, and so forth).

In the past two decades, the conflict has acquired the new dimension of the 'disappearance of Balochi youth', implemented by the security agencies. Hundreds of mutilated bodies have been recovered so far, while the number of those already in custody is still a secret, though it is feared that they are in the thousands. In a report, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (2011) cited 140 cases of killings and 143 cases of disappearances. Besides the security forces, the report also mentions how the separatist groups are involved in killing ordinary people of Punjabi descent, whom they accuse of colonizing their lands.

After remaining on the back burner for decades, there is a realization in Pakistan that the situation in the province needs to be addressed immediately. Several politicians and the Supreme Court of Pakistan have championed the cause of the Balochi people and produced the best scenario for resolving this conflict. Pakistani media are especially responsive to the issue and prominently report events occurring in the province. This study will explore how Pakistani media frame this conflict, what is the impact of this reportage on the public, and how media discourse complies with the principles of peace journalism scholarship.

3.   Media, War and Peace

Many researchers (Knightly, 2002; Bratic, 2008; Hamelink, 2008; Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2008; Cottle, 2006; Shinar 2004) have found a media penchant to report on violence, due to political, financial and professional interests. *Political* interests may be expressed in the guise of pressure from warring states to use media for winning more friends and deterring enemies (Severin and Tankard, 1992); *financial* interests may also be that people are interested in information about conflicts and hence the opportunity to attract larger audiences (Knightly, 2002), and *professional* interests may be that war stories are more newsworthy and exert a great influence (Howard, 2003; Wolfsfeld, 2004).

In studies of US media, researchers have found cases of media jingoism during the two World Wars, Vietnam war, Cold War, and conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan (Bratic, 2008; Spencer, 2005; Herman & Chomsky, 1989; Ross 2007). Similarly, Dorman and Farhang (1987) found that US media coverage of Iran from 1951 to 1978 took cues from foreign-policy-makers rather than being independent.

Ottosen (1995) found that from 1980 to 1990, Norwegian newspapers' usage of enemy images was consistent with Norwegian foreign policy, in that journalists predominantly expressed patriotism rather than acting as critical observers. Susan Ross (2007) has investigated media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and found that Western media compromised their professionalism and supported Western interests.

The apologies offered by The New York Times, BBC and many other media outlets for their blind support of the Iraq invasion (Lynch & McGoldrick; 2005), indictment of a German radio broadcaster for his involvement in crimes against peace during the Second World War (Hamelink, 2008) and life sentences for three Rwandan journalists for inciting communal discord (Thompson, 2007) point to the fact that journalists don't always remain neutral and can become parties to conflicts.

Interestingly, the realization that media can be used for peace purposes is as old as the fear of its potential for inflaming conflicts. In the first quarter of the twentieth century, the Radio Nations were set up by the League of Nations to promote peace and harmony in Europe. Its successor, the United Nations, also established crisis radios to promote peace in the troubled regions of Europe, Asia and Africa (Becker, 2004). Likewise, there is a growing list of peace media outlets established in modern times to help resolve conflicts. A number of media outlets are

working to promote peace among conflicting parties in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Southern Asia.

Norwegian peace scholar Johan Galtung was the first to systematically analyze how the media report conflicts. In a study done in 1965, he and a colleague studied Norwegian media coverage of international conflicts and found the coverage propagandistic and in line with national foreign policy interests. In further studies, Galtung (1998) found that traditional media thrive on (a) reporting killings, injuries and direct violence (b) highlighting differences between conflicting parties to prepare for tougher competition (c) presenting conflicts with scant regard for the contexts and outcomes, and last but not least (d) maintaining that victory can be achieved if the competitor is defeated or reduced to a subservient position.

Obviously offended by this type of reportage, he proposed media for peace, which he called peace journalism. Galtung believes that if media can intensify conflicts, they have an equal potential to promote peace if properly used. According to Galtung (1998), peace journalism centers on news stories that accentuate peace initiatives; reduce ethnic and religious differences; prevent more conflict; and support conflict resolution, reconstruction and reconciliation.

Jake Lynch (2007) believes that peace journalism should be based on an awareness of the consequences of reportage, even if only facts are reported. The advocates of peace journalism draw on the literature of peace and conflict studies for guidance. Lynch and McGoldrick hold that it 'creates opportunities' for the public to 'consider and value nonviolent responses to conflict' (2005: 5). It is a remedial approach, based on a critical awareness that widespread reporting conventions produce a dominant diet of war journalism, and it is intended to give peace a better chance in public deliberation and debate.

Harvard scholar Etyan Gilboa (2009) has documented how international professional journalists, including "Seale, Koppel, Friedman, Gonzalez, Cronkite, Politkovskaya, Tower, Laguerre, and Scali" have played mediating roles to de-escalate conflicts. Five of them were successful and positively influenced sensitive negotiations. Few of them were appreciated, while others were suspected of spoiling negotiations. According to Gilboa, criticism of media journalists is partly professional (journalistic norms) and partly political (opponents criticize the media because they are not in favor of peace). He believes journalists should not be opposed if they start peace initiatives when other parties are reluctant.

However, many media scholars and practitioners are suspicious of such a role for media. They fear that this approach could reduce professional journalism to public relations or advocacy journalism (Hanitzsch, 2007). Others like Loyn (2007) argue that peace journalism wrongly sees conflict resolution as 'everybody's job', while Wolfsfeld (2004) opines that media and peace are incompatible, and Fawcett (2002) rejects peace journalism as a professionally and financially 'impractical notion'. German researchers (Kempf, 2007; Bläsi, 2004) have documented challenges that block the application of peace journalism, including the treatment of violence as a marketable commodity and hence a media penchant for reporting on it (journalistic cliché: if it bleeds, it leads) overly strict guidelines for journalists, competition to break the story, journalists' obsession with objectivity and a host of other issues. Majid Tehranian (2002) argues that peace journalism can be more successful in transforming national conflicts, but peace researchers have mainly focused on international conflicts and hence literature on the subject is scant. This study is an attempt to examine the feasibility of peace journalism in a national context.

Despite criticism of the notion of peace journalism, the concept is gaining momentum. Ordinary people, government officials, peace workers, national and international agencies, and well-known conflict reporters have joined the chorus to criticize the role of traditional media in conflict reporting and exert pressure for more constructive coverage. Many scholars have developed the theory and practice of peace journalism as a viable model for conflict reporting. German socio-psychologist and pioneer of peace journalism Wilhelm Kempf (2012), after a comprehensive analysis of the leading scholars and critics of peace journalism, has successfully identified it as *quality journalism*, which he believes is responsible journalism that refrains from an oversimplification of conflicts and is about asking the 'right questions'.

Jake Lynch agrees with this proposition that peace journalism does not require a complete departure from traditional journalism, but rather a subtle shift is required to focus on people and peace and show responsibility. This entails that the role of media for promoting peace and harmony must be introduced from within media practice rather than as an external goal imposed on journalists which runs the risk of advocacy (Hanitzsch, 2007; Loyn, 2007; Kempf 2007). Such a proposition, I think, will expand the role of peace journalism and hence increase the chances for its success. In fact, it sounds naïve to expect conflict reporters to practice peace journalism at the front lines of wars when back home they practice conventional journalism. It is, therefore, argued that the ideals of peace journalism like 'the inclusion of the perspective of ordinary people, asking why certain issues are neglected, scope of alternative discourse, win-win orientation, avoidance of incendiary language, emphasis on structural and institutional imbalance' must be learned at home (Tehranian, 2002). Also, there are good chances that the practice of peace journalism during peacetime will significantly minimize the risk of wars and conflicts in democratic regimes.

Relying on the concept of peace journalism as good and professional journalism, this study is designed to investigate the role of media in the Balochistan conflict. The key research questions are:

4. Research Questions

R.Q.1: How do Pakistani media report on the Balochistan conflict?

By applying the conflict escalation and de-escalation models, this question will address what specific themes and frames are highlighted by Pakistani media when reporting on the Balochistan conflict.

R.Q.2: What is the impact of Balochistan conflict reporting on audiences?

This question will address how people from different regions of the country react to media reporting, whether people want more peace-oriented media and whether they consider the present mode of reporting satisfactory.

R.Q.3: What are the key discursive features of Balochistan conflict reporting?

This question will address the important framing strategies adopted by media while reporting on this conflict. Media actors will be interviewed and the stakeholders asked about their take on media representation of this conflict.

R.Q.4: What are essential factors that determine media reporting on the Balochistan conflict?

This question will address the important professional, political and financial issues that impact reporting. Interviews with reporters, editors, analysts and stakeholders will be conducted for a fairer assessment.

R.Q.5: What are the prospects and limitations of constructive journalism in the reporting of the Balochistan conflict?

This final question will address the challenges for constructive journalism in the reportage of this conflict. Drawing on theoretical and methodological scholarship on peace journalism, this discussion will attempt to present this notion as a proper media practice that is advantageous for democracy and at the same time is professionally and financially workable.

5. Research method

Peace journalism frames	War journalism frames
I. Peace oriented	*I. Violence oriented*
• Explore conflict formation, x parties, y goals, z issues, 'win-win' orientation • Open space, open time; causes and outcomes everywhere, also in history/culture • Making conflicts transparent • Giving a voice to all parties, empathy, understanding • See conflict/war as problem, focus on creative conflict resolution	• Focus on conflict arena, 2 parties, 1 goal (win), war, zero-sum orientation • Closed space, limited time periods; causes and exits in arena, who threw the first stone • Making wars opaque/secret • 'us-them' journalism, propaganda, voice, for 'us' • See 'them' as the problem, focus on who prevails in war
II. Truth-orientated	*II. Propaganda-orientated*
• Expose untruth on all sides / uncover all cover-ups	• Expose 'their' untruths / help 'our' cover-ups/lies
III. People-orientated	*III. Elite-oriented*
• Focus on suffering everywhere, on women, the aged, children, giving a voice to the voiceless • Give names to all evil-doers • Focus on people as peace-makers	• Focus on 'our' suffering; on able-bodied elite males, being their mouthpiece. Give names of their evil-doers • Focus on elite peace-makers
IV. Solution-orientated	*IV. Victory-oriented*
• Peace = non-violence + creativity • Highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more wars • Focus on structure, culture, the peaceful society • Aftermath: resolution, reconstruction, reconciliation	• Peace = victory + ceasefire • Conceal peace initiatives, before victory is at hand • Focus on treaty, institution, the controlled society • Leaving for another war, return if the old flares up again

Figure 1: Galtung's model of war and peace journalism

Conflict escalating reporting	Conflict de-escalating reporting
1. Politicization Ethnic and sectarian affiliations are politicized, the victims belonging to political groups are considered worthy, and common people get scant coverage, political wranglings are highlighted. The aggressors and sufferers are identified through their presumed political affiliations; deaths, suffering, rauma in conflicts are neglected, and the emerging conflicting political scenario becomes the focus of media attention, where political statements, controversies appear to be the only news. Vested interests of political parties are ignored, and media are always ready to provide a conduit to blame others, thus creating turmoil.	**1. De-politicization** Focus on the non-political aspects of conflicts; affiliations like politics, ethnicity, religiosity or other considerations are avoided. The social, cultural and economic costs of conflicts are highlighted. Political manipulations and conspiracies are exposed in non-political and less sensational tones; The artificial barriers among conflicting groups produced by politicians are scrutinized, threadbare arguments, agendas and interests of politicians are exposed, examples of different ethnic and sectarian groups having political affiliations that live together peacefully are highlighted.
2. Securitization Conflicts are securitized; they are discussed in terms of threats, dangers, and occupations. Police force, army personnel and elites get the limelight. Conspiracies, issues of national sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, independence, and patriotism are related to the conflict. The system, culture and social values are securitized and feared to be lost if the enemy prevails.	**2. Humanization** Conflicts are humanized, individual sufferings are highlighted, and trials and tribulations of ordinary people get maximum coverage. Plight of women and children and other vulnerable groups is discussed. Conflict is covered from the perspective of ordinary people. Loss to social institutions and local culture is counted and steps urged for their recovery.
3. Otherization Media take sides in conflicts, one party is treated as 'other, alien to our culture, and not belonging to 'us' and hence dangerous if it prevails. Bias dominates media discourse, and the whole conflict story is told from just one perspective. Collective fears are aroused and the 'bad deeds' of aggressors highlighted to send a message 'that the whole nation is united against you'	**3. We'ness** Conflicting parties are treated equally; 'us versus them' notions are avoided. Grievances of aggrieved parties are shared and calls for resolution highlighted. Responsibility for law and order situation is equally shared. Negative attributes are avoided. Conflict itself is treated as a problem and efforts urged for solution. The people are sympathized with, and the concerns of estranged elements are shared and violence is explained from a wider context.
4. Incompatiblity Conflict is presented as a tug of war in which interests are incompatible. Compromises are not possible. The parties involved cannot agree on a single agenda and hence are doomed to a worse scenario in the future. The conflicting parties represent antagonistic interests, each hell-bent to prevail over the other. The antagonistic parties stand for diametrically opposed values where a zero-sum orientation prevails.	**4. Compatability** The commonalities and sameness in the standpoints of conflicting parties are explored and urged for reconciliation. The conflicting parties are encouraged and extolled for overtures that promote dialogue and bring the antagonists closer. History, culture and other interests that forge unity are highlighted. Conflicts are contextualized and mistakes of both sides are exposed for rapprochement.
5. Sensationalism Conflict reporting is dramatized and sensationalized; every unfolding event is treated as mysterious, historic and unprecedented, drama and hostile outbursts are highlighted. Arguments and counter-arguments of antagonists are the major discourses where the opposing group is ridiculed and challenged. Future is predicted to be more violent and ominous, no chances are seem for peace overtures.	**5. Responsibility** Reporters feel responsibility to society, outcomes of unfolding conflicts are given beforehand, damage to society is told and re-told, caution is advised, reporting is devoid of sensationalism, pros and cons of conflicts are presented, and opportunities for peace explored. Contexts and backgrounds and root causes of the conflict are presented with encouragement for peaceful resolution.

Figure 2: Operational Model of conflict escalation and de-escalation

This research study uses both qualitative and quantitative methods to investigate how Pakistani media report on the Balochistan conflict, what are the issues that motivate journalists to report the way they do, how ordinary people perceive conflict reportage and how to develop a more constructive strategy.

For the quantitative part of the study, I did a content analysis of six media outlets, including the country's two leading English-language newspapers (Dawn and Nation), two Urdu newspapers (Jang and Express) and two TV channels (Geo TV and Dunya TV) using both the Galtung model (cf. figure 1) and a context-specific model (cf. figure 2) developed originally by this researcher and recorded the frequencies for both conflict escalation and de-escalation coverage. The Galtung model is based on the war and peace journalism typology (violence/peace, propaganda/truth, elite/people and differences/solution), and the context-specific model is based on the conflict escalating and de-escalating typology (sensationalism/responsible, securitization/humanization, otherness /we'ness).

All the categories in these two models were operationalized, and six coders were trained for data collection. The coders were students of MS media studies and worked closely with the researcher. The inter-coder reliability tests were conducted on the initial two months of data, which yielded more than 80 percent agreement for all categories, which is generally acceptable in empirical studies.

The time period for the study was one year, from November 2012 till November 2013. The period was important because violent incidents increased, the Supreme Court of Pakistan was hearing a number of petitions against the killings, and elections were held in May 2013, with parties vowing to initiate a policy shift on the issue. Only the front and back pages and the 9 o'clock newscasts were selected for newspapers, and TV respectively from Monday to Thursday for the whole year. The idea was to get more representative data.

Similarly, I also conducted a nationwide study to analyze how people react to this type of reportage. As many as 500 questionnaires were distributed among people all across the country (four provinces and the capital city area), from which I was able to collect 453 filled out responses.

For the qualitative part of the study, I conducted a critical discourse analysis, which included textual analysis, discourse practice and socio-cultural practice. For the textual analysis I analyzed 30 news stories, for the discourse practice analysis I conducted detailed interviews of six conflict reporters, and lastly for the socio-cultural practices analysis I conducted detailed interviews of editors from the six media outlets, senior journalists, experts and stakeholders in this conflict. I also conducted a field observation by traveling in the major parts of the province to get personal experience of how the conflict is impacting the daily lives of ordinary people.

6. Research Findings

6.1 How do Pakistani media report on the Balochistan conflict?

All six media outlets were analyzed for the prevalence of war/escalatory and peace/de-escalatory content. Three important themes emerged from the data analysis, which are separately discussed as Peace-oriented, We'ness-oriented and similarity among media outlets.

Peace Orientation: As table 1 shows, both models yielded predominantly conflict de-escalatory journalism, as indicated by the low Pearson chi-square value (.000). These findings are consistent with those of an Indian researcher (Prakash, 2013), who found a predominance of peace journalism on the Balochistan conflict. The unanimous answer that the researcher got from reporters and editors was that the Center's policies have estranged the Balochi people and hence they report events from a Balochi perspective. 'We try to impress upon the policymakers to resolve this issue amicably', said Abdul Khaliq of Geo TV. Likewise, the army and nationalist leaders called for a 'just, amicable' solution for the greater benefits of the Balochistani people. So, it can be argued that a peace journalism approach is concomitant with the urge at the societal level to find a solution to this lingering issue, which has alienated the Balochi people, much to the detriment of national interests. The hierarchy of influences model supports such an approach, where personal, organizational and professional considerations align with the norms of peace journalism.

Models	Escalatory N (%)	De-escalatory N (%)	Total N (%)	Chi-square (df = 1)	p
Galtung	615 (31.70)	1325 (68.30)	1940 (100)	33.49	< 0.001
Operational	405 (24.05)	1279 (75.95)	1684 (100)	29. 97	< 0.001

Table 1: Distribution of escalatory and de-escalatory coverage

We'ness oriented: Similarly, the Balochistan conflict is discussed predominantly from a We'ness perspective, where issues in Balochistan are discussed as 'ours', ordinary people are sympathized with, and violence is ascribed to 'our wrongful and jaundiced policies'. Statistically, a significant number of stories were found in the We'ness category (cf. table 2).

When reporters were asked about such a tendency, they defended it because 'injustices were done to the people of the province', and 'it was their responsibility to play a role by informing the people'. In the survey part of the study, ordinary people expressed concerns over the 'situation in the province' and demanded an immediate halt to 'excesses committed by the establishment'. Similarly, the nationalist leader Mir Hasil Bizenjo said the province was denied its due, and army actions had to be held in check if achieving peace were the priority. He praised the media for highlighting the conflict and helping shape public opinion in a way that is conducive to peace. An army official, when asked about the situation, although he appreciated the media role in the conflict, warned that the issue was much more complicated, as 'foreigners too' were involved, and any step towards peace must consider such an approach. He added that the army wanted peace, but miscreants had a different agenda, which needed

to be tackled. A TV anchor, Saleem Safi, who has studied the conflict for quite some time, expressed satisfaction with the role of the media and said 'he personally sided with the people' in the conflict and vowed to continue his endeavors for peace. Irfan Siddiqui, a renowned analyst, expressed similar views. This is an excellent example of peace journalism where media actors pursue a path of peace and advocate 'giving people their due' despite pressures from different quarters. Researchers (Galtung, 1998; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005) have long asserted that if media prioritize people and discuss the real causes of conflicts, this will definitely lead to permanent solutions.

Escalation	N (%)	De-Escalation	N (%)
Sensationalism	134 (8)	Responsible	231 (14)
Securitization	274 (16)	Humanization	320 (19)
Otherness	119 (7)	We'ness*	609 (32)

Chi-square = 52.74; df = 5; p < 0.001.

Table 2: We'ness in the conflict coverage

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Similarities among media outlets: The six media outlets emphasized the same theme of 'We'ness' when reporting on this conflict (cf. table 3), despite the fact that Pakistani media follow different editorial policies on key national issues. This similarity was echoed in the viewpoints of reporters who called for reconciliation of the 'estranged Balochi brethren'. This is a good example of the principles of public sphere theory, which though critical of media economic interests, calls for more constructive and democratic media. Many events occur in the province that can be exaggerated and dramatized to attract audiences, but journalists show restraint due to fear of escalation.

Emphasis in conflict reporting	Geo N (%)	Dunya N (%)	Dawn N (%)	Nation N (%)	Express N (%)	Jang N (%)	Chi-square (df = 5)	p
We'ness	72 (32)	59(25)	74(34)	101(33)	160(41)	143(48)	3.30	> 0.05

Table 3: Similarities among media outlets

6.2 What is the impact of media reporting of the Balochistan conflict?

This question is addressed in terms of the impact of the prominence of the conflict, popular (non-)support for the media and the appeal of peace journalism.

Impact of the conflict's prominence: The hypothesis embedded in the question suggests that public opinion in Quetta (Balochistan's provincial capital) will be different when compared to the views of respondents in four other cities who usually turn to media for information on the conflict. As table 4 shows, a significant majority of people in Quetta (mean rank 352.24) considers the army responsible for the conflict, more people in Quetta (mean rank 364.08) believe that ordinary people were the real victims, and finally more people in Quetta (mean rank 288.45) believe that general dissatisfaction with Islamabad's policies is a major cause of concern when compared to the mean ranks in other cities. These observations support the key arguments of the media dependency model that

media effects vary with dependence on media. Different from the people from other provinces the people of that province see the conflict mainly as a humanitarian problem that started with the national government's high-handedness.

Themes	ISD	LAH	QUE	KAR	PESH	Significance	
	Mean rank	Mean rank	Mean rank	Mean rank	Mean rank	Chi-square (df = 4)	p
Is the army responsible?	219.28	305.89	352.24	247.68	212.07	69.967	< 0.001
Is it a security conflict?	228.67	219.16	215.35	251.26	218.64	4.964	> 0.05
People as sufferers	238.62	220.09	364.08	273.62	233.67	47.305	< 0.001
Is deprivation a real cause?	215.40	212.26	288.45	215.48	205.46	26.090	< 0.001

Note: Higher mean scores indicate greater influence. The scale ranges from 5 = 'strongly disagree' to 1 = 'Strongly agree'.

Table 4: Public perception of the Balochistan conflict

Media for Peace: Regarding the Balochistan conflict, greater cumulative agreement was achieved for demanding that media should focus on improving the situation and actively help to resolve this conflict, as shown in table 5. In a very systematic analysis, both Stephanie Thiel and Wilhelm Kempf (2014) analyzed experimental studies by various scholars, including (Bläsi et al. 2005, Schaefer 2006, Stuntebeck 2009, Kempf & Thiel 2012), and found greater audience support for de-escalation oriented texts in media reporting. This must be an eye-opener for journalists who sensationalize events to attract larger audiences. This challenges major criticism of the practicality of peace journalism that for financial reasons (people take an interest in dramatizating conflicts) the concept is a failure (Fawcett, 2002).

Themes	Cumulative agreement	Cumulative disagreement	Chi square (df = 1)	p
Improvement	264 (58.278)	189 (41.721)	128.097	< 0.001
Solution	256 (56.512)	197 (43.487)	102.067	< 0.001

Table 5: Public liking for peace media

Views on conflict reporting: As table 6 indicates, more and more people agree that reporting on the ethnic conflict is irresponsible, less objective, gives less current and timely information and tends to incite violence. The low Pearson values show that the difference is significance. However, the differences are not very strong when evaluated for bias and sensationalism. The hypothesis is partially supported. It can be argued that though media are doing some professional work, people expect more, which can be achieved not through advocacy journalism, but rather through good professional journalism.

Views	Responsibility N (%)	Objectivity N (%)	Timely N (%)	Biased N (%)	Sensationalism N (%)	Instigating N (%)
Agreement	119 (26.26)	119 (31.9)	117 (25.82)	254 (56.07)	246 (54.30)	328 (72.40)
Disagreement	334 (73.73)	254 (68.09)	336 (74.17)	199 (43.92)	207 (45.69)	125 (27.59)
p	< 0.001	0.01	< 0.001	0.067	0.678	< 0.001

Table 6: Public perception of the Balochistan conflict reporting

6.3 What are the key discursive features of Balochistan conflict reporting?

Pakistani media covered the Balochistan conflict mainly from two standpoints; violent incidents and the calls for peace by different stakeholders.

Regarding the first strategy, in this conflict, where security forces and different militias of Balochi nationalists are at loggerheads, the media usually refrain from siding with either group, consider the conflict as 'ours' and sympathize with the people of the province. For example, The daily Jang published a front-page story on April 4, 2012 headlined "4 killed in Sui remote control attack" in which 3 Frontier Constabulary personnel were killed,

including one unidentified man. The story does not refer to the assailants and also avoids labeling them as 'terrorists or miscreants'. Similarly, in other stories the reports do not elaborate on the assailants, usually call them 'unidentified men' and claim that 'the motive was unknown'. An excellent example of how Pakistan media avoid 'otherization' can be found in an example where the Jang reported on a deadly exchange between security forces and 'armed men'. A total of 13 people were killed and a few injured. The story does not tell how many security forces and 'armed men' were killed. This shows that the paper is sympathetic toward both parties; one entrusted to maintain law and order, and the second an aggrieved party that resorted to violence after being denied political rights for decades. The reporters and editors explained to this researcher that they were concerned about the problems of the people in the province, and the 'separatists' only resorted to violence when other options were exhausted. The Balochi leader Mir Hasil Bazenjo told this researcher that 'fair play' and justice toward the province can stem violence, while the army official said 'the new political arrangement is determined for peace' and that they supported political dialogue.

Regarding the second strategy of highlighting calls for peace, the media accord maximum attention to steps for the normalization of the situation in Balochistan, when reporting on the province. Media strongly highlighted the statement of then opposition party Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) chief Nawaz Sharif, saying, "If Balochi people get rights, no one will be a rebel." Mr. Sharif demanded an end to 'abductions of innocent people and mutilated bodies of Balochis'. The Balochistan issue got the most attention when it was debated in the Supreme Court. The judges were quoted as referring to Balochistan as a 'spirit of the country' and expressed concern over lawlessness in the province. Other efforts like the Human Rights Commission report on Balochistan, stating, "Our security lies in focusing on human development, not on making atom bombs" and criticism of media in Pakistan for ignoring the Balochistan issue, where 'innocent people were being killed', also received a prominent position in the media. Similarly, the high-level meeting on Balochistan in which the prime minister, army chief and other senior officials of the government discussed ways and means to improve the situation in the province remained in the major headlines. The army chief was reported as saying, "the problem should be solved politically and there are no military solutions'.

Media framing of this conflict is predominantly constructive. The main features of framing are: "low-level-insurgency, military operation, separatist movement, kidnapping of Balochi youth, mutilated bodies, exploitation of resources, deprivations, Balochistan as the spirit of Pakistan, Pakistan grieves if Balochistan is in turmoil, Balochi as patriotic."

6.4 What are the essential factors that determine media reporting of the Balochistan conflict?

During long interview sessions with reporters, editors, stakeholders in the conflict and media and political analysts, a number of key factors were identified that impact the reporting of this conflict. These range from the personal beliefs of journalists to the security issues, sense of responsibility, salience of popular perspectives and the dominant security aspects of the state apparatuses.

Though usually journalists seldom confess that their personal views influence their professional actions, in the case of this conflict they confessed that their reporting was influenced to a greater extent. A reporter (who requested anonymity) said, "our resources have been exploited, our land is occupied and we are foreigners in our own land." "This is a battle for ownership of the province," another reporter said. The people of the province have been denied their due in national affairs and feel alienated and treated as pariahs, and they (the reporters) considered it their duty to highlight their issues. Explaining such a slant in the Balochistan conflict, an executive editor of Geo TV, Nusrat Ameen, said 'it is a story of neglect, depression and injustices', and we report it in such a way as to press the policymakers to take remedial steps. But, this support is always a tacit one, and in the past many reporters have been killed. All the reporters covering this conflict agreed that security was the major problem, and they feared for their lives and families. According to Abdul Khaliq of the daily Jang, "If we report the views of agencies, the militants say we are state agents, and when we report the views of separatists, the agencies say we work for these groups.". A reporter from the daily Nation said they couldn't verify information about the insurgency, as police are almost non-existent. Security forces and militants fabricate information to tell their side of the story. We often change the non-journalistic expressions to avoid reactions from opponents, even if they force us to report it in their words. He said that in the past year, 26 reporters had been killed. In the past month, one of our colleagues in Huzdar district went underground to save his life, but his two sons were killed.

Despite great odds, a display of responsibility is the hallmark of reporting on this conflict, which, in fact, is the cornerstone of peace journalism (Lynch, 2007; Peleg, 2007). The reporters covering the Balochistan conflict said quite often that they get information that is true and valid, but they don't report it due to fear of the harm it could cause to society. Interestingly, journalists in Balochistan, unlike reporters in other regions, are ready to play the role of conflict-resolver. A reporter from Dunya TV said, "We are also part of that society, so naturally we want peace."

Reporters of the Balochistan conflict agreed that most of the stories were written from the perspective of the Balochi people, because they were the major victims and sufferers. Shah Hussain of the daily Express said, "The

Balochi people have been subjected to discrimination and injustices'. As reporters, they said they considered the problems of the people as theirs and hence were sympathetic towards them. Peace journalism scholars stress that they favor the inclusion of people's voices in reporting but unfortunately, this is not the norm, where elites dominate the media agenda (Herman & Chomsky, 1989; Galtung, 2002). Last but not least, though the Balochistan conflict is framed from a humanitarian perspective, but journalists can't express open support for them due to pressure from the army when it comes to extra-judicial killings, kidnappings and the establishment of military cantonments in vast areas. "We are allowed to speak half the-truth, but not the whole truth," said one editor. Others said there are genuine issues but the media can't discuss them due to fear. The journalists interviewed said that though they don't agree with the modus operandi of separatists, they don't consider them militants or terrorists because, 'if their concerns are addressed they then can be pacified'. A reporter from Dawn said, "...they are Pakistanis and their demands are genuine except for separation."

6.5   What are the prospects and limitations of good journalism in the reporting of the Balochistan conflict?

Though Pakistani journalists are unaware of the theory and practice of peace journalism, the quantitative content analysis, the qualitative discourse analysis and the nationwide survey showed that peace journalism emerged as a dominant theme in the reportage of the Balochistan conflict.

The discourse analysis of Balochistan conflict provides more detailed answers to the question. The media usually refrain from adjectives and name-calling to address the actors in this conflict. By avoiding negative labeling, the media dispels notions of binaries (we versus them) and hence are better placed to intervene for peace. In one of many reports, the daily Jang reported an attack on security forces in which 14 personnel were killed and 15 were injured. The report says 'attackers' fired rockets at security forces in the Turbat area of Balochistan. The story avoids speculation; a common practice that media usually follow, although decried by peace journalists for inflaming conflicts. The report does not elaborate on the 'assailants', and no detailed description of the conflict is reported. By avoiding words like 'insurgency, terrorism', the report downplays the incident, which according to peace journalism is a good way to avoid or at least reduce conflict escalation.

The media does not side with either party; one entrusted to maintain law and order, and the second an aggrieved party that resorted to armed violence after being denied political rights for decades. These notions of peace journalism can be explained, as the reporters covering this conflict had a thorough understanding of the conflict. They know the root causes of the unrest and told this researcher that they often included background information in their reporting to help people to understand the issue in greater detail.

Another aspect of peace journalism exhibited in media discourse on the Balochistan conflict is the prominent coverage of efforts for the resolution of this conflict. Regarding the visit of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, then the opposition leader, the Jang reported him on its front page saying, "If the Balochi people get rights, no one will be a rebel." Obviously the politician is touching the main cause of conflict and the media accorded him due appreciation for that. The underlying message of 'solution' and 'Balochi people are ours' thoroughly resonates in the report. The media gave suitable attention to the outpourings of politicians who were saying, 'The Balochi people are not rebels, they are patriotic Pakistanis'. A reporter from the daily Dawn said, "I don't think we can directly play a role in this conflict to bring peace, but certainly we can facilitate it. By avoiding statements that can endanger peace, the sides can be brought closer." Abdul Khaliq of the daily Jang agreed that journalists should be ready to play a part in achieving peace.

Another aspect of peace journalism that is duly highlighted in the Balochistan conflict by the media are the problems faced by the people and their solution. The daily Jang carried a report entitled "SC rejects government report on peace in Balochistan'. The judges referred to Balochistan as being a 'spirit of the country' and expressed concern over lawlessness in the province. The Express reported 'judges' displeasure over Intelligence Bureau's report on the law and order situation'. The court observed that the situation in Balochistan was grim, people were being killed, abductions were routine events, and the security agencies were barely concerned or even unaware. The daily Dawn reported the Supreme Court of Pakistan reprimanding the government for its apathy towards 'senseless and indiscriminate killings' in Balochistan. By focusing on such stories, the paper asks for the resolution of conflicts and pressured the government to take the necessary steps.

However, specific to this conflict, there are certain issues that circumvent the prospects of peace journalism. First comes the security issue. All the journalists and editors interviewed said that security was a major problem, and hence many issues like the interests of the Pakistani army and separatists, foreign influences, sectarian and militant groups and their activities cannot be properly reported. Two of the journalists recalled how the separatists and military threatened them for writing against their interests. Peace journalism requires that background information about the conflict and the perspectives of the conflicting parties should be reported in a balanced way, which is usually not done, due to pressure from the army. Thirdly, Balochistan is placed in the limelight when something important happens, like the visits of prominent politicians, cases before the Supreme Court or the formation of a new government. It is necessary for the practice of peace journalism that issues like

day-to-day business, security problems, non-availability of civic amenities and the problems of ordinary people are reported. Fourthly, reporters of the Balochistan conflict, though enthused by peace journalism considerations, have to face the adversarial 'editors' sitting at media headquarters in Karachi. These and other factors delimit the scope of peace journalism reporting on the Balochistan conflict.

7.   Conclusions

During the field observations by this researcher, we found people narrating their ordeals of deprivations and a 'stepmother attitude' taken by the center as the main cause of tension. The same concerns echoed in the views of reporters and editors who called for addressing the real causes of the conflict. They sympathized with ordinary people and narrated the events from popular perspectives. The standpoints of separatist leaders and the Pakistani army were encouraging, and they called for peace and harmony. The agency of journalists emerges as a key factor in these findings, which according to researchers like Jake Lynch (2006) and Robert Hackett (2006) is crucial for peace journalism. Jürgen Habermas' public sphere theory offers an explanation for this perspective, where the media play a constructive role by barely discussing the issues with due consideration for the needs of the people. Media take cognizance of the gravity of the situation by sidelining its political and economic interests and focus on the public interests that are supreme and involve larger numbers of people. In the reportage of this conflict, Pakistani media do not capitalize on the violence and tension rather than cautioning and suggesting innovative peace strategies. A number of studies (Lynch & Galtung 2010; Lynch and McGoldrick 2005; Lynch 2006) have shown that when peoples' perspectives are included in media discourse, the chances for peace and harmony increase.

During interviews with journalists and experts, I found them ready to 'work for peace'. Senior journalists like Ihtasham ul Haq, Irfan Siddiqui and Saleem Safi emphasized their determination to highlight the need for resolving this conflict. The nationwide survey showed that people had a thorough understanding of the causes of the conflict and were demanding a solution to this conflict that would encourage politicians to take remedial steps. Media can make a contribution in this positive change and should be duly highlighted. The Balochistan conflict, which was ignored by Pakistanis, is at the top of the list. People are sympathetic to the ordeal of ordinary Balochi people; they are asking politicians about the strategies of resolving it. During recent elections in the country, it was on the electioneering agenda, and voters were asked about this. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has pressed politicians and security agencies to stop the persecution and disappearances of ordinary people. Nationalists run the new provincial government, and one hopes the situation will soon normalize in this insurgency-infested province. The media in this case must be given credit for practicing peace journalism.

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Im Sommer 2012 dokumentierten die Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz Wilhelm Kempfs Abschiedsvorlesung über "Antisemitismus und Israelkritik: Eine methodologische Herausforderung für die Friedensforschung", die wenige Wochen später – in englischer Übersetzung – auch im Journal for the Study of Antisemitism erschienen ist.

Barbara Fritz, Assistant Event Manager des internationalen deutschen Israelkongresses, reagierte darauf (ohne Datum) mit einer Replik, die unter dem Titel "Israelkritik zwischen Peace und War Frame. Über die fragwürdigen Ansichten des Konstanzer Friedensforschers Wilhelm Kempf" von ihrer Website heruntergeladen werden kann.

Darauf aufmerksam geworden, antwortete Wilhelm Kempf am 18.10.2015 mit einem offenen Brief, den wir hier im Wortlaut wiedergeben:

Wilhelm Kempf

Könnte man sich nicht auch mit Reizthemen ein wenig sachlicher auseinandersetzen?

Ein offener Brief an Barbara Fritz, Assistant Event Manager des internationalen deutschen Israelkongresses

18. Oktober 2015

Sehr geehrte Frau Fritz,

vor ein paar Monaten ist mein Buch „Israelkritik zwischen Antisemitismus und Menschenrechtsidee. Eine Spurensuche" erschienen. Als ich gestern das Internet durchsucht habe, ob es bereits irgendwelche Reaktionen darauf gibt, bin ich auf Ihren Text „Israel zwischen Peace und War Frame. Über die fragwürdigen Ansichten des Konstanzer Friedensforscher[s] Wilhelm Kempf" gestoßen, in dem Sie sich mit einem früheren Aufsatz von mir auseinandersetzen.

Beim Lesen Ihres Textes war ich erschüttert darüber, wie sehr Sie doch das, was ich schreibe verdrehen oder zumindest missverstanden haben. Erlauben Sie daher, dass ich einiges richtig stelle:

1. Sie behaupten, dass ich „den Peace Frame in den Mittelpunkt meiner Arbeit stelle".

Tatsächlich unterscheide ich zwischen verschiedenen Interpretationsrahmen (Frames) mittels derer sich Menschen in Deutschland den israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt zu erklären versuchen.

Diese Interpretationsrahmen sind keine Spezifität des israelisch-palästinensischen Konfliktes, sondern *jeder* Konflikt kann entweder in einem Peace Frame oder in einem War Frame (oder irgendwo dazwischen) verstanden werden.

2. Offensichtlich haben Sie schon den Begriff des Frames (bzw. Interpretationsrahmens) nicht richtig verstanden, sonst könnten Sie nicht schreiben, dass „der War Frame von islamistischen Gruppen und Staaten ausgeht". Dieser Satz macht keinen Sinn.

Sollten Sie damit allerdings meinen, dass das Nicht-Aufgreifen israelischer Lösungsinitiativen, das an-den-Pranger-Stellen Israels und die Feindseligkeit der umliegenden arabischen Staaten die Interpretation des Konfliktes in einen pro-israelischen War Frame begünstigen, so haben Sie recht.

Das Ganze ist aber ein Teufelskreis: Die Interpretation des Konfliktes in einem War Frame schärft die Wahrnehmung für die Abscheulichkeit des Gegners und führt darüber auch zu Fehlwahrnehmungen, wie z.B. jener, wonach ein jeder, der um Ausgleich bemüht ist, gleich dem Feind zugerechnet wird. Das ist eine allgemeine sozialpsychologische Gesetzmäßigkeit und so verstehe ich auch den Antisemitismusvorwurf, den sie gegen mich erheben.

3. Z.B. behaupten Sie, dass ich „den War Frame der arabischen islamistischen Nachbarstaaten des demokratischen Staates Israel" nicht zur Kenntnis nehme und „das geringe Interesse bis hin zur Ablehnung einer friedlichen Konfliktlösung durch die Palästinenser" übergehe.

Tatsächlich vertrete ich die (empirisch belegte) Auffassung, dass es sowohl einen pro-israelischen als auch einen pro-palästinensischen War Frame gibt, der an einem Politikwechsel nicht interessiert ist.

4. Weiters behaupten Sie, dass ich eine Israelkritik rechtfertige, „die Israel allein die Verantwortung am Frieden in dieser Region überlässt".

Tatsächlich schreibe ich, dass die Interpretation des Konfliktes in einem Peace Frame stets Kritik an beiden Seiten impliziert - und somit *beide* Seiten für eine Friedenslösung in die Verantwortung nimmt.

5. Sie zitieren meine Worte, wonach „aus einem Peace-Frame resultierende Israelkritik (...) nicht notwendigerweise mangelnde Solidarität mit Israel oder gar Antisemitismus (bedeutet), sondern im Gegenteil auch aus dem Eintreten für die Lebensinteressen der Israelis erwachsen" kann, und leiten daraus ab, dass es nicht in „mein Peace Frame" passen würde, „dass Israel sich gezwungen sehe, aus Überlebenswillen eine der weltweit besten aufgestellten Armeen zu haben und sich auf Angriffe aus umliegenden Ländern verteidigen zu müssen".

Tatsächlich habe ich dies niemals in Frage gestellt. Auch ist es nicht „mein" Peace Frame. Natürlich braucht Israel seine Armee um sich gegen Angriffe verteidigen zu können. Jedoch sind durchaus Zweifel angebracht, wie die Sicherheit Israels langfristig gewährleistet werden kann – das ist es ja, was die Ambivalenz der beiden Frames ausmacht, und selbst, wenn man den israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt in einem Peace Frame interpretiert, bleiben solche Zweifel bestehen und man kann nur – wie der in New York lehrende israelische Philosoph Omri Boehm – darauf hoffen, dass ein Ende der Besatzung Israels Situation im Nahen Osten etwas besser machen würde, weil viele Gründe, Israel anzugreifen, verringert sein würden.

Das ist es u.a., worauf ich mit den von Ihnen zitierten Worten hinweisen wollte.

6. Sie behaupten, dass „die Erkenntnis aus dem Nationalsozialismus" für mich „ – wie für die meisten Deutschen – die Aussage: ‚Nie wieder Krieg' in den Mittelpunkt" stellt und ich nicht so weit dächte, dass nicht „no more war", sondern der jüdische Staat Israel die Antwort auf den Nationalsozialismus sei.

Tatsächlich stelle ich nicht die Aussage „Nie wieder Krieg" in den Mittelpunkt, sondern die *Mehrdeutigkeit der Menschenrechtsfrage* „Nie wieder Faschismus".

Recht haben Sie allerdings damit (so Sie dies sagen wollten), dass sich die Lehren von Auschwitz für Deutsche (so sie sie denn gelernt haben) und Israelis unterschiedlich darstellen. Um es mit den Worten des früheren israelischen Finanzministers Yair Lapid zu sagen:

> „Die Shoah stellt Israel vor eine doppelte Herausforderung: Zum einen lehrt sie uns, dass wir um jeden Preis überleben müssen und in der Lage sein müssen, uns jederzeit zu verteidigen.... Zum anderen lehrt uns die Shoah, dass wir unter allen Umständen moralische Menschen bleiben müssen."

Der Unterschied „Nie wieder Krieg" vs. „um jeden Preis überleben" folgt aus der unterschiedlichen Rolle, die (nichtjüdische) Deutsche und Juden im III. Reich gespielt haben. Das moralische Dilemma, auf das ich abhebe, ist für Deutsche und Israelis jedoch dasselbe, denn – um erneut Yair Lapid zu zitieren:

> „Die menschliche Moral beweist sich nicht, wenn alles in Ordnung ist, sie beweist sich durch unsere Fähigkeit, das Leiden der Anderen zu sehen, auch wenn wir allen Grund haben, nur unser eigenes zu sehen".

7. Völlig rätselhaft ist mir, wie Sie darauf kommen, dass meine "Ablehnung des Krieges (...) (logischerweise) – wie bei vielen Deutschen nach 1945 – die des Krieges gegen das nationalsozialistische Deutschland mit ein(schließt)".

Was für eine verquere Logik unterstellen Sie mir damit? Mag sein, dass das bei vielen Deutschen nach 1945 der Fall ist. Ich habe dazu keine Daten. Haben Sie welche? Ich selbst habe solches niemals gedacht, gesagt oder geschrieben. Erstens wurde der II. Weltkrieg vom Nationalsozialismus vom Zaun gebrochen. Sich dagegen zu verteidigen war unverzichtbar. Zweitens bin ich zwar Friedensforscher – dessen Forschungsgebiet es ist, die Möglichkeit(en) einer friedlichen Konfliktlösung zu eruieren – , doch bin ich kein naiver Pazifist, der Frieden um jeden Preis propagiert und drittens bin ich in diesem Falle der Auffassung, die USA hätten (auch und vor allem zum Schutze der Juden) viel eher in den Krieg eintreten sollen um den NS-Verbrechen ein Ende zu bereiten.

8. Sie fragen sich, ob mein „wahres Gesicht" nicht darin „zum Vorschein kommt", dass ich die Möglichkeit in Erwägung ziehe, dass „selbst Vergleiche zwischen Israel und dem Nationalsozialismus (...) nicht notwendigerweise aus einer antisemitischen Täter-Opfer-Umkehr oder aus Juden verhöhnender neu-deutscher Selbstgefälligkeit resultieren" müssen, und halten dem entgegen, dass „ein Vergleich zwischen Israel und Nationalsozialismus (...) eindeutig als antisemitisch und antizionistisch abzulehnen" ist.

Ich stimme mit Ihnen überein, dass es – außer der Holocaustleugnung – kaum etwas empörenderes gibt, als Israel mit dem nationalsozialistischen Deutschland zu vergleichen. Andererseits gehört es in westlichen Demokratien schon fast zur politischen „Kultur", immer dann, wenn man die gegebenen Verhältnisse dramatisieren und einen Handlungsbedarf zu ihrer Veränderung begründen will, auf NS-Vergleiche zurückzugreifen.

Die Frage, ob neben Antisemitismus bzw. Antizionismus auch anderes im Spiel sein *kann*, wenn Israel mit dem NS-Regime verglichen wird, ist also durchaus legitim und die in meinem Buch veröffentlichten Forschungsergebnisse zeigen, dass die NS-Vergleiche tatsächlich dieses Doppelte sind: Antisemitismus und Dramatisierung, wobei die Dramatisierungsfunktion bei 61% jener Befragten, welche die NS-Vergleiche für eine vertretbare Meinung halten, im Vordergrund steht. Bei 39% ist dies nicht der Fall: Für sie spielt die israelische Politik nur eine untergeordnete Rolle und die antisemitische Konnotation der NS-Vergleiche ist dominant.

9.   Was Sie in diesem Kontext aber ebenfalls missverstanden haben, ist der Begriff der antisemitischen Täter-Opfer-Umkehr, von dem Sie schreiben: „Auch der Täter-Opfer-Vergleich hinkt" und dies damit begründen: „Israel ist der einzige demokratische Staat im Nahen Osten und hat den einheimischen palästinensischen Israelis in vielem gleiche Rechte gegeben. Im Gegensatz zu den arabischen Ländern, wo Palästinenser immer noch – auch aus ideologischen Gründen – als Flüchtlinge gelten".

Tatsächlich besagt der Begriff der antisemitischen Täter-Opfer-Umkehr ja genau dies: dass die Opfer des Holocaust als Täter diffamiert werden, sei es weil man den Juden selbst die Schuld an ihrer Verfolgung gibt, oder sei es in dem man sie mit zweierlei Maß misst und ihnen die alleinige Schuld an den Konflikten im Nahen Osten gibt.

10.   Sie unterstellen mir, nicht zur Kenntnis nehmen, dass „Israelkritik auch legitim sein (kann), solange sie das Existenzrecht Israels als jüdischen Staat nicht in Frage stellt, solange die Situation im Nahen Osten durch die arabisch islamistischen Länder als Gefährdung Israels gesehen wird und die Verteidigung Israels als einzigen Zufluchtsort der Juden vor weltweitem Antisemitismus – gerade auch nach den Erfahrungen durch die Shoah – anerkannt wird".

Wenn Sie damit einen Katalog von Mindestkriterien aufstellen wollen, die erfüllt sein müssen, damit Israelkritik ihre Legitimität nicht verliert, so stimme ich Ihnen voll zu. Wie Sie darauf kommen, ich würde das nicht zur Kenntnis nehmen, müssen Sie mir aber bitte erklären.

11.   Sie behaupten, dass ich „die Verantwortung nach der Shoah für ein demokratisches Israel einzutreten, und das gegen antisemitische Aggressoren weltweit und besonders im Nahen Osten, im Verteidigungsfall auch militärisch, (...) als War Frame – und damit abzulehnen – ab(stemple)".

Auch hier irren Sie sich gewaltig. Erstens stemple ich diese Verantwortung nicht als War Frame ab, sondern bin der Auffassung, dass gerade die Verantwortung für ein demokratisches Israel einzutreten der Grund ist, warum viele israelische Intellektuelle, die den Konflikt in einem Peace Frame interpretieren, nach einer Politikumkehr Israels verlangen. Zweitens stelle ich Israels (auch militärisches) Selbstverteidigungsrecht an keiner Stelle in Frage. Und drittens sage ich auch nicht, dass der War Frame abzulehnen sei, sondern lediglich, dass eine Friedenslösung nicht möglich ist, wenn die Konfliktparteien (Palästinenser ebenso wie Israelis) einem War Frame verhaftet bleiben und ihn nicht durch einen anderen Interpretationsrahmen (einen Peace Frame) ersetzen „der die Berechtigung (zumindest einiger) der Anliegen der Gegenseite zugesteht, die beidseitige Opferrolle anerkennt, die Delegitimierung des Gegners aufhebt und persönliche und nationale Sicherheit durch eine Friedenslösung zu erreichen versucht".

12.   Sie behaupten, dass ich „Antisemitismus und Israelkritik" in der Linken kaum vertreten sehe.

Das stimmt ebenfalls nicht. Tatsächlich referiere ich nicht meine subjektive Meinung sondern empirische Ergebnisse, wonach antisemitische Israelkritik nicht nur typisch für Neonazis, sondern auch in der Mitte der Gesellschaft weit verbreitet ist (ein Befund, der auch mit den Ergebnissen von Schwarz-Friesel & Reinharz übereinstimmt), während sie bei den Grünen und der Linken *etwas seltener* vorkommt. Davon, dass sie dort „kaum vertreten ist" kann angesichts der in der Graphik dargestellten Häufigkeiten keine Rede sein.

13.   Sie behaupten, dass ich „in der Kritik am linken Antisemitismus eine ‚jüdische Weltverschwörung'" vermute.

Tatsächlich schreibe ich, dass es *„wenn man hinreichend naiv ist* (...) allzu leicht fällt", hinter der Verteufelung jeglicher Israelkritik eine jüdische Weltverschwörung zu sehen.

Mit einer solchen Naivität muss man aber leider rechnen, und wenn z.B. Sie im Glauben, damit Israel zu verteidigen und den Antisemitismus zu bekämpfen, vor keiner Diffamierung[1] und vor keiner Denunzierung[2] zurückschrecken, und wenn Sie dies auch noch im Tonfall eines verschwörerischen „wir" tun[3], dann brauchen Sie sich nicht zu wundern, wenn andere darin eine Verschwörung zu sehen vermeinen.

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[1] Zitat: „Damit stellt er sich selbst als Antisemit und Antizionist dar."
[2] Zitat: „Das sollten auch die Herausgeber der JSA Zeitschrift für die Erforschung des Antisemitismus erkennen und die entsprechenden Konsequenzen ziehen."
[3] Zitat: „Sollten wir uns neben Günther Grass, Jakob Augstein, Wolfgang Benz auch den Namen Wilhelm Kempf merken, wenn es um Antisemitismus und Israelkritik in Deutschland geht?"

Tatsächlich zeigen die Ergebnisse unserer Studie, dass der Konspirationsmythos jenes unter den klassischen antisemitischen Stereotypen ist, das sich in Deutschland nach wie vor der größten Plausibilität erfreut, und selbst menschenrechtsorientierte Israelkritiker Gefahr laufen, ihm anheimzufallen. Unter der deutschen Bevölkerung sind dies zwar nur 2%, unter den aktiven Israelkritikern, aber immerhin 22%.

Dafür gibt es keine Entschuldigung, doch die Verantwortung dafür sollten Sie auch bei sich selbst suchen.

Wenn es darum geht, Israel als demokratischen Staat zu verteidigen und seine Existenz langfristig zu sichern, dann bedarf es zu allererst eines offenen Diskurses, in dem von der eigenen abweichende Meinungen nicht schon von vornherein diskreditiert werden. Ohne einen solchen Diskurs ist Demokratie nicht möglich.

Wilhelm Kempf

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