K. P. Moritz’s Case Poetics: Aesthetic Autonomy Reconsidered

Monika Class

Karl Philipp Moritz was born in poverty in Lower Saxony in 1756, his early life marked by his suffering from illness, social inequalities, the emotional neglect of his parents, and, as readers of his autobiographical novel Anton Reiser will know, from sheer hunger.1 Despite these circumstances, Moritz later made a living as a teacher, journalist, and editor of several papers, and in 1789 he received a professorship in fine arts at the Royal Prussian Academy of Arts and Mechanical Sciences in Berlin without ever regarding himself as a fully-fledged member of the establishment.2 Although Moritz tackled many disciplines and professions during his short lifetime (he died of pulmonary consumption in 1793), two main strands in Moritz scholarship exist that rarely intersect.3 Scholars have tended to focus on Moritz in relation either to the history of psychiatry or to aesthetics, working either on his Magazine for Empirical Psychology, arguably the first European psychiatric magazine,4 or on his theory of beauty, crediting Moritz’s On the Creative Imitation of Beauty with the inauguration of aesthetic autonomy in the context of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment.5 It is as if, Janus-like, Moritz’s works looked two ways: unbiased observations and the extensive collection of facts in the pursuit of empirical sciences on the one side and, on the other, intellectual beauty, non-purposiveness, and artistic form. Historians of medicine, for instance, testify to the accuracy of Moritz’s descriptions of neuropsychiatric syndromes. They emphasize that the cases in Moritz’s Magazine for Empirical Psychology are written with such acuity that they permit “reliable diagnoses … e.g. of aphasia and agraphia, … portrayed with clear detail and … usually free of any theoretical speculation.”6 Scholars within this research strand tend to reaffirm Moritz’s empiricism in the Magazine, his anti-theoretical editorial policy, and his prioritization of

Literature and Medicine 32, no. 1 (Spring 2014) 46–73
© 2014 by Johns Hopkins University Press

Konstanzer Online-Publikations-System (KOPS)
URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-0-281854
observation over etiology. In the afterword of their facsimile edition of the Magazine, Anke Bennholdt-Thomsen and Alfredo Guzzoni pay due attention to the fact that Moritz’s Magazine was published for, and written by, physicians and laypersons alike. Moritz had solicited contributions from his readers about the psychic experience of suffering in the so-called “Proposal” (“Vorschlag”), which appeared in the journal German Museum (Deutsches Museum) in 1782. The responses to this call for submissions consisted largely of sober, non-sensationalist third- and first-person narratives written in the form of letters to the editor. It was clerks, teachers, priests, judges, students, military officers, and physicians who authored these contributions; indeed any literate person was invited to contribute. It is also known that Moritz published the Magazine with August Mylius in Berlin and edited it with the help of two subsequent co-editors, Carl Friedrich Pockels and Salomon Maimon, who however both deviated from Moritz’s editorial guidelines. So successful was the scheme that it ran continuously from 1783 until 1793, appearing in ten volumes, each subdivided into three parts, each part between 120 and 150 pages long. Only in 1790 did Moritz discontinue publication for a year. As such, Moritz’s Magazine for Empirical Psychology is known as one of the earliest and perhaps most influential public fora for medical observations in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Western Europe.

By contrast, literary critics like Tzvetan Todorov commend Moritz on the identification of literariness with auto-referentiality, alongside further criteria such as the “intransitive” and “opaque.” On the Creative Imitation of Beauty (1788) is known as the main work of Moritz’s theory of art. His primary principle of aesthetics is commonly understood to be, as Matthew Bell describes it, that “art must be a self-satisfying whole and cannot therefore be the instrument of any external purpose or interest. It also follows from the ‘wholeness’ of the art that it should properly be judged in formal terms, for its constituent parts contribute only to the being of the whole. Art cannot be judged in terms of realism.”

Albeit succinct and adequate, this statement fails to note that Moritz’s understanding of art is, unlike Kant’s “aesthetic ideas” and “genius,” not detached from the “terms of realism” nor exclusively directed at what is wholly new and created from within one’s own inimitable resources. To disregard the “terms of realism” in Moritz’s theory of art would be to throw the baby out with the bathwater. As Meegan Kennedy explains elsewhere in this issue, realism can be said to comprise the following features: accuracy, reliability, transparency,
suspicion of meditation, quotidian rather than extraordinary experience, a dispassionate vantage point, and a skeptical approach conveyed in deflationary language. The present article shows how variations of these criteria (except for reliability and transparency) were at work in the process of Moritz’s conception of his theory of beauty. I contend that the practice of observation was an essential part of Moritz’s notion of artistic autonomy and that his profound concern with psychological and natural observations helped to shape his aesthetic views as manifested in On the Creative Imitation of Beauty. It will become clear that a consideration of the aesthetic dimension in Moritz’s Magazine reveals a passionate and compassionate notion of observership that has little in common with Michel Foucault’s concept of the “medical gaze.”

This is partly because Moritz’s Magazine blurs the lines between visual perception and (childhood) memory. In turn, the approach to Moritz’s theory of beauty through his case collection enhances our understanding of his investment in the plurality and contingency of the real world and allows us to see the conceptual affinity and historical interdependence of aesthetic autonomy and empiricism, of literariness and thinking in cases, and of textual self-referentiality and minute observations of the world outside the text. As such, the present essay explores the nature of the “and” in “literature and medicine” by seeking to recover functional similarities between Moritz’s medical observations and his work on art in the 1780s and early 1790s.

Competing Concerns in the Name of “Experience”; or, the Resilience of Casuistry

Around 1800, Moritz’s Magazine for Empirical Psychology baffled a British reviewer, who speculated in the Monthly Review that “the German Miracle Journal … [would] be found more interesting in the physician’s nursery, than in his library.” Albeit misleading, for Moritz’s cases at times contain images too “disturbing” for most nurseries, the London periodical acknowledged that Moritz’s psychological magazine was unlike any eighteenth-century treatise of nervous disorders. The Magazine introduced a set of innovations and simultaneously continued existing trends. Moritz built on the school of empirical psychology formed mainly by the disciples of Christian Wolff and the “moral doctors” who jointly extended metaphysical inquiry into the nature of the human soul to empirical observation and experimentation.
Moritz published the *Magazine* with the assistance of two temporary co-editors. The magazine title alone, which can also be translated as “Magazine for the Study of the Experience of the Soul,” conveys a philosophical message. It indicates the influence of a group of philosophers, including A. G. Baumgarten (1714–1762), J. G. Krüger (1715–1759), and J. G. Sulzer (1720–1779), who are associated with the name “empirical psychology,” and who reacted against Christian Wolff’s school by prioritizing empirical over rational psychology. Originally Moritz had intended to call his periodical “Magazine for Experimental Psychology” in imitation of Krüger, one of Halle’s influential “reasonable doctors.” Yet his illustrious mentor Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786) advised him to abandon the term in favor of the title “Magazine for Empirical Psychology” on the grounds of ongoing changes in philosophical diction. Moritz, that is, substituted “experiment” with “experience.”

The German word “Experiment” had come to convey too narrow a signification for Moritz’s *Magazine*. In the vogue of Bacon’s *Novum Organum* (1620), the term had acquired a more specific meaning in German language use between 1726 and 1775, namely to designate a mode of experience that “is based on perceiving a thing ‘that is only real through our diligence and effort.’” The differentiation between “experiment” on the one hand and “observation” (“Beobachtung”) or “perception” (“Wahrnehmung”) on the other had become commonly accepted among natural philosophers. Since “experience” comprised both observation and experiment, Moritz’s move to replace “experiment” with “experience” in the magazine title signaled his intention to make room for both observations and experiments. As it turned out, however, experiments played a minor role in the *Magazine*, as observations represented its single most important mode of inquiry.

Another advantage of the term “Erfahrung” consisted in its ambivalence, for it (still) oscillated between its older signification that was bound up with casuistic morality and its more recent association with Lockean empiricism. As recorded in the fourth edition of Johann Georg Walch’s eighteenth-century *Philosophical Dictionary* (*Philosophisches Lexikon*), the fading signification of “Erfahrung” was rooted “in casuistic theory of intelligence,” whereas the recent philosophical use of “Erfahrung” placed particular emphasis on sensibility and the nervous system. In the 1775 definition, that is, “experience” meant, according to Zelle’s translation, “paying attention to a sensation, ... to what one sees, hears, smells, tastes and hears.” According to the early eighteenth-century definition in the *Philosophical Dictionary* (dating from 1733), “experience proper” had (still) been “linked with thorough
meditation, in which we probe the connections between singular cases and examples, in relation to their true causes (wahhaften Gründen) and to their moral purposiveness (in moralischen aber auf die Mittel und die Endzwecke der Verrichtungen)." The casuistic dimension in Walch’s definition of “experience” of 1733 was perceived as obsolete towards the end of the eighteenth century. Following this trend, and in particular the work of Lichtenberg, Herder, Rousseau, and Goethe, Moritz prioritized bodily experiences in his “Proposal” and contributions to the Magazine, while the casuistic dimension of experience (“the connection between singular cases and examples”) remained a latent but pervasive dynamic of this thinking.

Indeed, Moritz appears as a reluctant casuist. His preference for experience in the Lockean sense seems to be a major reason for Moritz’s reservations about the term “case” (“Fall”). It is true that the Magazine for Empirical Psychology was known abroad as the collection of “German cases.” Furthermore, Moritz’s contributors used phrases containing “case,” such as “the case of a young girl in the vicinity,” “cases of suicide,” or a “singular case.” Yet Moritz himself refrained from any systematic use of the term “case,” both in his 1782 “Proposal” and his editorial interventions. The only instance (in the Magazine) of the expression “psychological case” occurs in the tenth and final volume, in a comprehensive overview (“Realübersicht”) authored by Salomon Maimon, one of the two co-editors. Even then we find the term “case” only in the Latin rendition “casus.”

Instead of “cases,” Moritz referred to “observations” in his Magazine as a collective name for the contributions, the most common format of which were letters and, less frequently, excerpts either from diaries or medical publications. By publishing letters, Moritz adopted a common practice since “the format by which even printed observations were first communicated” was, according to Lorraine Daston, “the letter.” Moritz and his contributors, who were diverse in range and included non-experts, amplified the sociability of the observational exchange by communicating in a convivial tone, with letters starting at times with “my friend” or “my dear friend.” Moritz’s consistent omission of the term “case” suggests that he tried to obviate the association of his project with casuistry, which in the broad sense can be described as the process of applying principles of various kinds (theology, law, medicine, etc.) to the activities of daily living and concomitantly of reconsidering these very rules.

Moritz’s classificatory system in the Magazine relied on medical rubrics. Most of his knowledge about medical practice stemmed
from his close friend, the physician-in-chief at the Jewish community hospital in Berlin, Marcus Herz (1747–1803). In the Magazine, Moritz distinguished among four categories, consisting of the study of (1) the nature of the soul, (2) diseases of the soul, (3) cures for the soul, and (4) signs of the soul. These divisions corresponded with the four rubrics in Herz’s Foundation of all Medical Sciences: physiology, pathology, dietetics, and semiotics. Nonetheless, the “Proposal” suggests that medical practice and casuistic morality were inseparable for Moritz. After all, his “Proposal” of 1782 also echoed the casuistic definition of “experience” in Walch’s dictionary (1733), which included “moral purposiveness.” Linking his empiricist inquiry with morality, Moritz explained: “We can always regard the system of morality we possess as a basic outline, to avoid complete dependence on chance; but we have to treat the whole system as tentatively as possible; all we need to do is fix a few points, without drawing any lines, and rather wait for the lines to draw themselves.” For Moritz, it was crucial that any classificatory system remain unstable and rubrics permeable, medical and moral alike.

Moritz’s typology, particularly the rubric “disorders of the soul,” indicates that his objectives included inquiry into the question of the validity and extension of what is “normal,” which is a basic function of the “case” identified in the legal tradition by André Jolles: “in the intellectual preoccupation, which pictures the world as acts of judgment and estimation, we not only assess actions according to norms, but beyond that we evaluate norms with norms, weighing them against each other.” According to Jolles, cases are inherently flexible; indeed, thinking in cases consists of constant measuring of norms against each other. As James Chandler put it, “the case is not only an instantiation of a general scheme or normative system, nor is it just the form in which the instantiation occurs. Rather it is the occurrence of an anomaly for such a system or scheme.” Moritz gave this “style of reasoning” a special name: “Gesichtspunkt,” which literally means vantage point, angle or aspect; however, “shifting horizon” denotes the concept more adequately since it stands for a process of reconsidering one’s limits of knowledge and interests. In his review of the first three volumes of the Magazine, Moritz explained that every representation (“Vorstellung”) could be said to equal the center of a circle since the process of reaching such a specific view of things literally required circumspection. To understand the purpose (“Zweck”) of a matter was just like finding the center of the circle and this usually happened, according to Moritz, by trial and error. Moritz added
that one’s personal comprehension amounted to a kind of arithmetic exercise, which always required a number of possible cases in the first place before any results could be determined.\footnote{43}

The fundamentally unstable dynamic of the “shifting horizon” also underpins the very principle of permeability at work in Moritz’s taxonomy. It is a major factor in Moritz’s avoidance of passing judgments or making diagnoses: he never developed a fixed, normative conception of mental disorder. His understanding of mental states came closest to the idea that “sanity and insanity are extreme points on a spectrum.”\footnote{44} Moritz advocated a form of individualized medicine, in which the boundaries of mental health depended on personal mental equilibrium. In his discussion of the basic outline for the study of the diseases of the soul, Moritz observed that a very strong power of the imagination might have no negative consequences for a person with a strong faculty of memory and judgment whereas, for a person lacking this counterbalance, over-excitement could lead to mental illness.\footnote{45} This instance illustrates Moritz’s appreciation of mutability; indeed, such porosity between rubrics of mental health and disease underpins his entire mode of reasoning. Here, one should note a certain contradiction in Moritz’s attitude: for the sake of sensibility he had excluded casuistry from the title and terminology of the Magazine and at the same time his “shifting horizon” reintroduced casuistry into the periodical as if Moritz had banished casuistry from the front door and let it back in through the back door under a different name. Enthusiastic about observation and weary of seemingly old-fashioned casuistry, Moritz avoided the term “case” and preferred to publish under the latest empiricist banner. But he seems to have cherished one feature of “observations” in particular: their transgressive potential.

The significance of Moritz’s systematic preoccupation with the transgressive dimension of observations, especially his concept of the “shifting horizon,” is evident in the account of Anton’s childhood and apprenticeship in Moritz’s psychological novel Antôn Reiser. For Moritz, the novel was part and parcel of his empirical psychology. He left no doubt that his childhood memories, which he had published in the first person in the Magazine, fed directly into the third-person narrative of his novel, and commented that he regarded Antôn Reiser as the best result of his self-observations.\footnote{46} In the novel, the narrator describes a moment when the protagonist Anton, aged four or five, suddenly realizes the meaning of death. It is his inconsolable mother who triggers this insight because she cannot stop calling out for her deceased baby daughter. Faced with his mother’s grief and pushed to
the limits of his comprehension, the boy confronts profound questions regarding the nature of life and death for the first time.

Elsewhere, Moritz noted that the encounter with death leads humans beyond their horizon and that the effect of this experience is “cheerful” because it entails a distant vantage point from which to view one’s current situation. The narrative in Anton Reiser is driven by a quest for moments of the singular or extraordinary within the common and ordinary, even when such moments consist only of slight variations within the routine. The factual, sober tone of the novel is free from any celebrations of exceptional individuality and simply recounts Anton’s coping mechanisms, especially with the monotony of manual labor as an apprentice hatmaker in Brunswick. While there, Anton keeps searching for unknown paths during his rare Sunday strolls within the city walls as if such unfamiliar lanes allow him to escape from the narrow circle of his deprived existence. The “shifting horizon” concept plays a pivotal role in a sequence in Part I of the novel when the narrator recounts how Anton has to undergo a long series of abusive treatments at the hands of his master, Lobenstein. This sequence of events, which eventually ends with Moritz’s dismissal, reaches a crisis when the master humiliates Anton not in private (as he usually does) but in public: “Nothing was more wounding for Anton than when for the first time in his life he had to carry a burden on his back … having to walk bent double, bowing his neck beneath the yoke like the beast of burden, while his proud master walked ahead of him: this bowed his entire spirit while making his burden a thousand times heavier.” The public subjugation, the experience of being reduced to a mere means of transport, plunges Anton into an even deeper state of despair than usual. Without much narrative intervention, the sequence of events moves on to Anton’s attempted suicide: “At one of these frightful moments … his disgust with life gained the upper hand and he began trembling and swaying … and plunged into the river.” The narrator describes the situation without any detailed causal explanation (and without labeling the act as “suicide”). Instead, the commentary is implicit in the expression “gaining the upper hand” as it addresses not only this particular moment of desperation but also points to the framing of the entire narrative episode about Anton’s abuse as an apprentice: the weighing of norms of obedience against those of self-worth. One of the aspects the narrative emphasizes is the transgressive potential of reconsidering norms, and it does so even at the expense of subversion. As the narrator in Anton Reiser notes: “from that moment [of attempted suicide] on … Anton was regarded as a dangerous person.”
Bodily perception was so important for Moritz that he tried to remove speculation from the magazine. As I will explain, Moritz’s call for “Fakta” should not be misunderstood as a pursuit of pure, emotionally uncontaminated fact. In his “Proposal,” Moritz instructed his readers and contributors to resist the temptation of “weaving” their thoughts into their observations. In the introduction to the first issue (1783), Moritz claimed that the Magazine proffered facts (“Fakta”) alone and no “moral prattle” (“moralisches Geschwätz”). In addition to “Fakta,” he used the term “sad observations (traurige Beobachtungen) … on children, relatives and friends.” The attribute “sad” is highly significant here since it indicates Moritz’s investment in emotion. Contrary to the Enlightenment tradition in science and medicine that Michel Foucault distilled into the notion of the “medical gaze,” Moritz’s call for “Fakta” represents an appeal for unstigmatized fact that takes human sensibility, even passions, into consideration: the observer of human sensibility “will not have to suppress strong passions,” Moritz wrote. Initially he looked at the Magazine as a repository for a potential science model, but Moritz never saw himself as the author of such a theory. Initially Moritz hoped that the publication would engender empirical psychology as an independent science that could provide “knowledge about the human sensibility.” He compared his publication to the storage of materials for a future edifice, the architect of which still had to be commissioned, and “such a person could probably be found.” Ten years later, in an article entitled “The Final Purpose of the Magazine,” he drew attention to the impediments facing a future science model of empirical psychology: “the path of experience is the safest, and it certainly hampers the inauguration of a new edifice of science but also provides a foundation that is all the more solid and allows us to tread safely before we proceed.” It is true that the last print run of the Magazine, published in 1793, contained the co-editor Maimon’s proclamation that it was time to apply the extant collection of cases as a means of establishing empirical psychology as a systematic science. Yet these were not Moritz’s words. Maimon’s article appeared during or after the final stages of the illness which took Moritz’s life on June 26th, 1793. The fact that Moritz had announced two years before that contributors should refrain even from following objectives in their joint pursuit of observation indicates his extreme skepticism towards human abstraction and potential conjecture: “The pursuit of truth does not allow us to determine our own objectives,” Moritz
wrote, “but it requires our readiness to wait and observe where the path of truth leads.”

Naturalized Observations

Beyond the German context, Moritz’s rejection of various forms of conjecture, such as “moral prattle,” resonated with views and practices shared by natural philosophers in Europe in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The notion of “epistemic genre,” introduced by Gianna Pomata, enhances our understanding of a textual agency behind Moritz’s magazine, one that has the potential to partly suspend individual, rational control. According to Pomata, “epistemic genre” designates a textual format handed down by tradition for the transmission of cognitive content. Furthermore, “genres are intrinsically social: contributing to a genre means consciously joining a community.”

Inasmuch as the act of adopting a genre entails entering a virtual community and accepting their rules of writing and reading, this act of conformity also takes away a certain amount of cognitive accountability—or (depending on the viewpoint) of expressive freedom—from the individual writer. I propose that medical observations presented themselves in part, and possibly unwittingly, to Moritz as such an opportunity, namely to relinquish sole responsibility for the daring act of asking his fellow citizens to share their, and their friends’, families’, and protégés’, most private experiences in print, for such a delicate venture required a highly regarded format with established epistemological claims.

According to Lorraine Daston, “observation … had arrived [in Europe] as a key learned practice and as a fundamental form of knowledge … [b]y circa 1750.” But some of the roots of these practices of scientific observation in Western culture lie in antiquity. Observations made a comeback in European medicine during the second half of the sixteenth century under the Latin designation “observatio” during a period that also saw the revival of Hippocratic medicine in Europe. By the 1760s, Andreas Elias Büchner, since 1735 the president of the Leopoldina (the German Academy of Science), had done much to standardize a two-part format of historia morbi (illness narratives) in Prussia. The first part of Büchner’s medical report pertained to observations of the individual patient and the second to the learned commentary about the disease. Moritz encountered this textual practice in the circle around Marcus Herz. In the introduction to the Magazine, Moritz invokes the
act of entering a new community: “what kind of field is it that I am about to enter with uncertain steps?” Without prior experience in medical writing, he admitted that he lacked complete control over his project: “I tremble,” Moritz continued, “as I embark on the execution of a project, the significance and benefit of which appears more vivid before my eyes with every day.” These statements suggest that Moritz felt both anxious whether the plan to solicit observations would gain enough momentum to create a virtual community and hopeful that his chosen format would develop its own dynamic. And it did: although the Magazine contained, among other topics, child abuse, self-harm, and suicides, the language remains fairly sober in contrast to other case collections, such as A. G. Meißner’s criminal ones (Skizzen, 1778–96), in which melodramatic dialogues abound.

In the 1782 volume, Meißner, who also wrote operettas, included the case of Bianca Capello, a sixteenth-century Venetian noble, who had allegedly been poisoned by her Medici in-laws. The noblewoman also features in Thomas Middleton’s early seventeenth-century drama Women Beware Women. Meißner’s story, entitled “Bianca Capello: half dialogue, half narration,” explores, according to his own words, “a middle ground between drama and novel.” Filled with exclamations, Meißner’s inserted dialogues convey great affinity with melodrama. By contrast, direct speech is almost entirely absent from comparable case narratives in the Magazine for Empirical Psychology. It is true that for instance in the contribution “violence of love”—a jealous (male) lover shoots his (female) betrothed at her wedding to another—direct speech features once, that is, in the critical words of the perpetrator, “now you are mine again!” But usually reported speech prevails, as for instance in the case of the desperate foot soldier Friedrich Wilhelm Meyer who, after a failed attempt to starve, tries to murder a fellow mercenary while in the infirmary in order to commit suicide by death sentence. The contribution consists of Meyer’s detailed confession, such as “he confesses that as he was growing impatient he reached the decision to commit murder on his sleeping, innocent comrade.” The contrast between Meißner’s and Moritz’s publications is stark. Whereas Meißner uses the sixteenth-century case of Bianca Capello mainly as a means to demonstrate his poetic skills as a composer of dialogue, the author of F. W. Meyer’s case appears to subdue personal ambitions as a writer in the attempt to create a faithful record.

One of the effects of this narrative restraint points to a basic principle of literary aesthetics, which Moritz helped to establish in theoretical terms, as discussed below: the use of indirect speech draws
attention to mediation of the experience and thus points to the insight that a verbal record cannot capture suffering in its extremity. Besides the claim to objectivity, this practice of narrative restraint in Moritz’s *Magazine* constituted a bold effort to convey suffering effectively in a disinterested manner. The epistemological sophistication of his chosen format helped Moritz to achieve this effect. Accordingly, Moritz tried to distinguish his cases from reading matter intended for entertainment. Yet, what textual expectations did writers and readers have? And how were they at work in Moritz’s magazine?

In his guidelines as editor and solicitor of contributions, Moritz adopted features typical of eighteenth-century observations and actively transformed them. In particular, he assimilated three functional criteria of observation: first, the “deliberate effort to separate observation from conjecture (in contrast to the medieval Scholastic connection of observation with conjectural sciences, such as astrology)” was one of three major “characteristics of the emergent epistemic genre of … observationes” in Europe during the Renaissance. By the late eighteenth century, however, the deliberate segregation of conjecture from observation had partly transformed into “deliberate interaction.” As mentioned, Moritz condemned “moral prattle”; the rejection of this kind of rational interference in the act of recording observations marks his attempt to naturalize the existing textual format of the observation. By “naturalize,” I mean that Moritz tried to invoke visual, auditory, and tactile perceptions unadulterated by human rationality.

The same tendency lies behind two other characteristics of the magazine, which are bound up with further assimilation processes. According to Pomata, the second characteristic of the emergent epistemic genre of observations consisted in “the creation of virtual communities of observers, dispersed over time and space, who communicated and pooled their observations in letters and publications (in contrast to passing them down from father to son or teacher to students as rare and precious treasures).” Moritz solicited contributions from his readers. In a daring move, he asked them to submit their observations of children, relatives, or friends for publication in his journal. Thus he ventured beyond the limit of the common practice of publishing only trained observers such as physicians or natural philosophers. Rather, clergymen, teachers, military officers, civil servants, or any literate person could have their contributions published in the *Magazine* alongside professional medical doctors and academics. This step distinguished Moritz’s periodical from both previous and subsequent psychological journals, such as Johann Friedrich Abel’s collections or Krüger’s scheme.
of gathering cases from medical doctors. At the same time, Moritz’s inclusion of lay observers expanded the social radar of the Magazine significantly. Moritz professed that “we need to focus our perception on the phenomena that have become so ordinary for us that we no longer take notice of them.” The magazine contained observations of ordinary men, women, and children who were often illiterate, such as a deaf-mute female servant, mercenaries, and peasants.

In contrast to Gailus’s hypothesis that Moritz “out-Foucaults Foucault,” I contend that Moritz’s proposal was not intended as the launch of a grand surveillance operation, which would even have surpassed the panoptic one, but rather that he wanted to draw attention to, and de-stigmatize, people suffering from mental illness. The articles on members of the working class in particular did a great deal to make their voices heard and thus increased public awareness for mental problems among the population. The Magazine broke with the eighteenth-century commonplace that the so-called middling classes lacked sufficient sensibility to suffer from nervous diseases. With regard to the mental condition of soldiers, all that Samuel Johnson had to say was: “Employment, Sir, and hardships, prevent melancholy. I suppose in all our army in America there was not one man who went mad.” The Magazine took a different stance and uncovered several cases about soldiers in distress. Moritz brought mental problems of the working class onto the radar of physicians, helping to convince the latter that most people, peasants and princes alike, were awash with passions.

Hence Moritz appears as a Wordsworthian figure in the history of psychiatry, injecting psychiatric writing with the experience of ordinary life expressed in the simple language of non-experts (and doing so prior to the publication of Lyrical Ballads).

Inasmuch as Moritz “naturalized” the virtual community of observers, he put his spin on the authorial standard of observation: “emphasis on singular events, witnessed firsthand (autopsia) by a named author (in contrast to the communication of anonymous data over centuries described by Cicero and Pliny as typical observationes).” For Moritz, it was not enough that observation should be written by eyewitnesses and the authorship be known. Lamenting that hitherto “snail shells” and “spiders” had engendered more interest from observers than humankind had, Moritz aspired towards a new kind of observership. Experienced as an early anthropologist and travel writer in England and Italy, he called his contributors “observers of humans” (“Menschenbeobachter”) or “observers of the human heart” (“Beobachter des menschlichen Herzens”). Moritz specified the requirements for this
demanding task in the “Proposal”: an observer of human sensibility should possess acuity and the ability to process a large number of observations in a short amount of time. In fact, Moritz regarded the ability to make comparisons within a set of observations as an essential requirement for observers. Above all, however, the activity required self-knowledge: “Whoever wants to become a real observer of humans will have to start with themselves.” This appeal in the “Proposal” anticipated the motto under which Moritz published his magazine: “know thyself.” The Greek aphorism of the temple of Apollo at Delphi, “γνῶθι σεαυτόν” or “GNOTHI SAUTON,” formed part of the title of the magazine from the start (in 1783). For Moritz, it was a precondition of observership to examine one’s “heart” from early childhood. Moritz regarded observation as a matter of disinterested, educative formation, and not as a profession nor as an inborn talent. He warned his readers that retrospective exploration of one’s childhood should not be misunderstood as an attempt to recover one’s genius. Instead, he advised observers to describe the history of their reflections and relate recurrent thoughts to their current psychological condition. Simultaneously, he cautioned observers against the solipsistic implications of this activity. For Moritz, the analysis of childhood memories was no means of self-assertion (such as for a physician’s claim to observership), but a form of introspection in the interest of the observer’s mental condition and, concomitantly, of the observed sufferer. For him, observers needed to have mental health, the balance of mental faculties, in order to be able to distance themselves “at least for moments at a time, from the throes of passions as if one were a cold observer.” What Moritz extols here is a moment of self-restraint by an otherwise sensitive and empathetic person. This notion has barely anything to do with the way it has been influentially portrayed in scholarship, as an “excessiveness and cruel quality about the analytical gaze,” nor does it amount to a permanent state of ascetic objectivity. It is true that the phrase “cold observer” points to Daston and Galison’s concept of “mechanical objectivity,” according to which the greatest impediment to scientific pursuit was to contaminate the object of observation with one’s subjective opinion, but it does not define Moritz’s notion of observership in its entirety. Moritz’s observer of human sensibility is driven by the desire to come to terms with the mutability and contingency of the psychic states of self and other; hence the emphasis on childhood memories. Moritz naturalizes the epistemic genre insofar as he stipulated that observers ought to know themselves, warts and all. Ironically, Moritz’s naturalization of
observership, by making memories a requirement, reintroduced a causistic element that he otherwise tried to obviate.95

Moritz’s stipulation of the observer’s self-knowledge points to a central issue in German Enlightenment philosophy, an issue dominated by one philosopher in particular: Immanuel Kant and his critical philosophy inaugurated in 1781. Albeit in contradiction with his earlier work, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason emphatically “condemned the impulses associated with empirical psychology as an obtuse ‘naturalism.’”96 Despite this condemnation, Moritz’s views on observership and his growing skepticism towards empirical psychology as science show that he was not blind to the problems raised by self-exploration. For instance, Kant’s famous arguments in the first critique include the notion that the self cannot know its own consciousness as an empirical object.97 This might suggest that Kant’s and Moritz’s concerns with empiricism were incompatible, but one should note that, like Kant, Moritz never spoke of complete self-knowledge as an empirical fact. Rather, Moritz used the phrase “know thyself” as an appeal. He addressed the difficulties of self-observation in a passage comparing the exploration of one’s childhood to the sensation of drawing an “impenetrable curtain” and acknowledged that the retrospective activity was not merely based on observation but also “allowed the imagination to play” (“das Spiel verstattet”).98 And this is the point at which we find a germ for a key notion of German aesthetics famously disseminated by Immanuel Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment (1791) and Friedrich Schiller’s Letters on Aesthetic Education (1795).

Under Kant’s and Schiller’s hands, the concept of “play” transformed into a method to actualize otherwise non-actualizable pure concepts, such as freedom or self. Yet, for Moritz the driving force behind the mental activity of “play” did not aspire towards such Neo-Platonic ideals but was predominantly concerned with the living body and mind. It is known that Moritz’s aesthetics were an important source of inspiration for Kant and Schiller, especially their theories of beauty, yet this legacy (especially Kant’s contempt for empirical psychology after 1781) has done a great deal to obscure the empirical-psychological roots of Moritz’s theory of beauty. Moritz’s case-aesthetic work was partly driven by a profound skepticism toward (pre-)existing norms, including the Kantian pure concept a priori, Plato’s universal, or Aristotle’s insistence that knowledge be universal and necessary.99

Moritz’s On the Creative Imitation of Beauty (1788) was in part the result of his collaboration with Johann Wolfgang von Goethe while in Rome.100 On Goethe’s return from Italy to Weimar in the company
of Moritz, members of the court complained about Goethe’s latest stubborn insistence on the observation of individual cases. Belittling ancient Greek logic, Goethe composed the aphorism around this time:

What is the universal?  
The individual case.  
What is the particular?  
A million cases.

Such principles surprised and apparently irritated the members of the Weimar Court. The ensuing arguments included Moritz’s *On the Creative Imitation of Beauty*. This éclat involved Ludwig von Knebel who criticized Moritz for having failed to distinguish between the beauty of nature and that of art. Indeed, it is arguably Kant’s *Critique of the Power of Judgment* and not Moritz’s *On the Creative Imitation of Beauty* that separated the beauty of nature from that of art. As Nicholas Halmi comments, “Kant, rejecting the usage of the Leibnizo-Wolffian school, was the first philosopher of the Enlightenment to identify symbolism exclusively as an intuitive, in contradistinction to discursive, mode of representation, ... disallow[ing] the possibility of an inherent relation between the idea itself and an intuitable object.” Since Moritz did not make a clear distinction between the realm of natural phenomena and that of art, it is misleading to speak of the ontological difference between empirical psychology and aesthetics in Moritz’s theory. Instead of a quasi-Kantian ontological shift from epistemology to aesthetics, Moritz appears to have seen observation and literature on a continuous spectrum. As Moritz emphasized in a contribution to the *Magazine for Empirical Psychology*, his novel *Anton Reiser* represented his “strongest” accomplishment as an empirical psychologist and observer of human sensibility.

If Kant disallowed the inherent relation between the idea of beauty and intuitable reality, Moritz cared for the convergence of the two. Whereas Kant in the *third critique* could imagine a handmill as a symbol of beauty, Moritz’s notion of beauty was more dependent on the physical features of the observed. A clock, a knife or another instrument was not beautiful for Moritz, which indicates that, in contrast to the *third critique*, he did not consider beauty to be the result of an intellectual process of the mind. Moritz’s claim that *Anton Reiser* was the strongest achievement of his efforts in empirical psychology contradicts Robert Leventhal’s account of sublimation in Moritz’s aesthetics. Jolles claimed that the case was a simple form
(like riddles or myths), “a kind of principle of human thought as it takes shape in language,” and that simple forms “are to be distinguished from literary forms which are the deliberate and unique construction of individual men.” By contrast, Moritz’s comment ranks the novel (literature) on the same level as the case (simple form), which suggests that, in contrast to Jolles, Moritz had no such literary elevation of human individuality in mind, but rather that case and literature, observation and beauty, operated on equal grounds for him. The focus on ordinary life and simple language in Anton Reiser resembles that in Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, but in contrast to the latter, Anton Reiser does not proffer the celebration of an individual’s achievements. Moritz’s literature and poetics seem driven less by individualist distinction than by the appreciation of observation as an inexhaustible source of artistic and scientific innovation. The resurgence of the interest in observation and facts would, as Moritz anticipated, “put an end to mechanical repetition and plagiarism in spiritual and intellectual works (Werken des Geistes)”; indeed, “poets and novelists will find themselves obliged to consult empirical psychology before they embark on their own compositions.”

Goethe was one of the writers besides Moritz who put these ideas into practice, as Nicolas Pethes discusses in further detail in this issue. Goethe adapted case records for his ground-breaking epistolary novel The Sufferings of Young Werther (1775) and his masterpiece Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship (1795/96). Moritz composed Anton Reiser during the period when he also worked on the Magazine, prefacing the novel with the following lines: “This psychological novel could equally well be called biography, since its observations are, for the most part, taken from real life.”

Some Roots of Moritz’s Aesthetics: The Extraordinary in the Ordinary

In the spirit of the Sturm und Drang movement, Moritz condemned poetic diction. Moritz’s protagonist in the story Almansor (1786), a young poet, is disgusted with the self-important ambitions and dead conventions of the literary world. This antagonism was a driving force behind Moritz’s first published essay on aesthetics and poetry, which appeared in the Berlin Monthly in 1785. Therein Moritz stipulates autonomy for the first time as a trademark of literariness. The fact that Moritz’s text dismisses the generic and simultaneously advocates the principles of genre and generation (in the sense of creation) will
not come as a surprise to those who consider that the Latin “gen” (to be born, to beget, to come into being) is the recognizable root in English of “generate,” “engender,” and “generic.”\textsuperscript{114} Despite this revealing etymology, there has been much discussion about the inherent contradiction and concomitant futility of a concept or “law” of genre, a “principle of contamination, a law of impurity, a parasitical economy.”\textsuperscript{115} In contrast to these views, Todorov wrote in defense of genre: “The fact that a work ‘disobeys’ its genre does not mean that the genre does not exist …; ‘quite the contrary,’ for two reasons. First because, in order to exist as such, the transgression requires a law—precisely the one that is to be violated. We might go even further and observe that the norm becomes visible—comes into existence—owing only to its transgressions.”\textsuperscript{116} The weighing of norms is, as mentioned, encapsulated in Moritz’s concept of the “shifting horizon.” But the parallels between Moritz’s aesthetic and empirical psychology do not stop here. When drawing on Moritz’s said article in the \textit{Berlin Monthly}, Todorov failed to observe that the title aspires not only towards a redefinition of the genre “literature” but also to a mutual common ground of the fine arts and sciences: “Essay on a union of all fine arts and sciences under the concept of that which is complete in itself” (“Versuch einer Vereinigung aller schönen Künste und Wissenschaften unter dem Begriff des in sich selbst vollendeten”).\textsuperscript{117} It is true that Moritz’s hastily written essay does not elaborate on the role of the sciences. Nonetheless, the title points towards the arts and science, literature and medicine, beauty and empiricism. Moritz regarded observation as a source of innovation for both arts and sciences. That Moritz’s experience as an observer of human sensibility and of nature played a systematic role in the conception and formulation of his theory of beauty becomes evident in his principle of that which is “accomplished in itself,” which can be paraphrased as the state of being an end in itself. As such, it is often treated as the epitome of the moral discourse of interiority and disinterestedness in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This standard view overlooks the great cross-disciplinary potential of this very principle. For instance, it is hardly known that the stipulation of beauty as an end in itself in \textit{On the Creative Imitation of Beauty} was part of Moritz and Goethe’s joint observations on plants in Rome.\textsuperscript{118} While there, Goethe sent a proposal to Christoph Martin Wieland, editor of the \textit{German Mercury}, for a serial publication on his Italian journey, which was to include his review of Moritz’s \textit{On the Creative Imitation of Beauty}. In this proposal, Goethe commented that “natural history, art,
morality etc., everything amalgamates with me.” Around the same time, Moritz wrote home in 1787 that his daily meetings with Goethe had taught him to focus his attention even more on external phenomena than he used to. It is true that Moritz’s notion of autonomy was bound up with rationality. Similar to Kant’s famous essay “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” Moritz considered “Enlightenment” as the insight that all human beings, independent of social rank, deserved to think of themselves as ends in themselves. This notion chimes with Anton Reiser’s attempted suicide after his public humiliation. Nonetheless, this insight had less to do with his admiration for pure Reason than with the experience of observing persons and natural phenomena as ends in themselves, as one can tell from Moritz’s stipulation of “uselessness” in On the Creative Imitation of Beauty, which pertains, as I will show, to a characteristic feature of case collections.

Thinking, talking, arguing, and showing in cases entail a double perspective, an act of negotiation between conformity to a norm (a means) and deviation from the norm (an end in itself). I propose that this dynamic lies at the heart of Moritz’s case aesthetics and that it links with Todorov’s dialectic of genre: “the norm becomes visible—comes into existence—owing only to its transgressions.” The notion of an end in itself—of autonomy, of having no immediate gain, and of disinterestedness—is central to On the Creative Imitation of Beauty. Moritz employed various phrases, but above all the term “uselessness,” to transliterate “Nutzlosigkeit” verbatim. The publication of 1788 proposes that the concept of “beauty” (in art and nature) consists of a form of autonomy that we can grasp with our external senses. The immediate convergence of autonomy and sensibility in Moritz’s aesthetics stands in utter contrast to Kant’s concept of beauty as the symbol of morality in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, which rejected the possibility of such a thing. In a kind of epilogue to Moritz’s treatise of 1788, Goethe paraphrased the role of the external senses for the constitution of beauty: “the instruments of our sensibility dictate the degree of beauty.” Moritz emphasized that beauty needed to be recognized as an end in itself and to be freed from the necessity to serve as a means (e.g. for a science model or a moral system): “we can recognize the beautiful in the universal by no other method than by distinguishing it as sharply as possible from the useful and by opposing it to the beautiful. A thing does not become beautiful merely because it is not useful, but only because it does not need to be useful.”
This element of beauty is bound up with Moritz’s experience as an observer and editor of observations. By conceptualizing the inevitable oscillation between conformity and non-conformity, series and isolated phenomenon, means and end in itself, under the designation of “use” and “uselessness,” Moritz assimilated a characteristic feature of cases that scholars have failed to notice. The epistemic relation with observations of this notion of autonomy is apparent in Moritz’s definition of “use” (“Nutzen”), which proclaims the rejection of instantiation. Moreover this characteristic of Moritz’s “uselessness” points to Todorov’s argument that transgression plays a constitutive role for genres. For Moritz, the main detriment to beauty was instantiation:

For we think of the useful as the relation of a thing, seen as a part, to a connection [or series] of things, which we think of as a whole. And the relation must be of such a type that the connection of the whole steadily increases and is maintained; the more of these relations a thing has to the connection wherein it is found, the more useful it will be.

By way of exclusion, namely of that which merely conforms, this definition privileges the case as an end in itself. With regard to the rejection of instantiation in a secular context, Moritz’s notion of autonomy can be said to convey a stronger conceptual affinity with Kant’s distinction between the exemplar (“Exempel”) as a singular case (“besonderer Fall”) and the example (“Beispiel”) as a particular manifestation of a universal, than with the postulation of the purely intellectual activities of reflective judgments and non-purposiveness in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. But Moritz’s stipulation of “uselessness” differs from the “exemplar” just as the former segregates beauty from (moral) instruction. In further contrast, Moritz’s notion of “uselessness” does not prioritize singularity per se, nor the uniqueness of the self, but sheds light on the extraordinary within the ordinary, single personhood within the community, a singular event within a series of actions, in much the same way as any case is simultaneously a single entity and a part of a series.

The Singular and Beyond

The aesthetics of Moritz’s period have come into disrepute partly because critics, focusing on Romanticism’s celebration of the single self, have depicted the movement as the roots of bourgeois individualism.
This body of scholarship sits oddly with recent developments in the medical humanities, committed to elucidating the idea of the too often marginalized individual experience of the ill, drawing inspiration from notions of Romantic expressiveness of the self. Moritz’s work undermines some of the common points of criticism against poetics and aesthetics at the end of the eighteenth century and simultaneously supports the medical humanities with regard to individualized medicine, the practice of empathy, expression, and a refined concept of observership. Moritz did not portray himself as a self-made genius as William Wordsworth did in *The Prelude*. Although Moritz envisioned the *Magazine* as a forum for the open exchange of experiences of illness, hoping that this might de-stigmatize sufferers and alleviate the pain of many who engaged in this virtual community, he did not promote any form of self-help ideology as Samuel Smiles (1812–1904) did in the nineteenth century. Moritz’s appeal to share observation was no attempt to expand panoptic surveillance or to internalize disciplinary power, either. Rather, his works can be said to supplement Foucault’s theory: from Foucault we learn that within the legal and medical system all we have as a testimony of our subjectivity is a case file. But from Moritz’s notion of “uselessness” we learn that each of these case files can still be read as an end in itself. On Moritzean grounds, the boundaries between medicine and literature do not fade. Instead, they did not exist to begin with.

**NOTES**

This research project was conducted with the financial support of the European Union’s Seventh Framework Program (FP7) Marie Curie Actions – People, King’s College London’s Center for the Humanities and Health, and the Zukunftskolleg’s Incoming Fellowship Program (ZIF) at the University of Konstanz.


2. See Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaft, “Life and Works of Karl Philipp Moritz.” The annotated online edition of Moritz’s complete works is currently in preparation and available in parts from the BBAW website, assembled by a team of scholars in Berlin and Glasgow.

3. Moritz was also a hatmaker, actor, and travel writer. Schrimpf observed in 1980 that the reconciliation of Moritz’s political and psychological work with his aesthetic publications was a, if not the, major challenge for Moritz scholars. See Schrimpf, *Moritz*, 2.

4. See Hunter and Macalpine, *Three Hundred Years*, 559; Förstl, et al, “Karl Philipp Moritz’ Journal,” 299. While the literature on Moritz’s empirical psychology is vast, the most important twenty-first century publications on the topic include Bell, *The German Tradition of Psychology*; Dickson, Goldmann, and Wingertszahn, “Fakta, und kein moralisches Geschwätz”; Gailus, “A Case of Individuality”; and Pethes, “Epistemische Schreibweisen.”
5. According to Alessandro Costazza, Moritz’s *On the Creative Imitation of Beauty* (Über die Bildende Nachahmung des Schönen) represents “the inauguration of the autonomy of art” (Schönheit und Nützlichkeit, 49). See also Schrimpf, Moritz, 95; Eckle, “Er ist wie ein jüngerer Bruder von mir,” 97.


8. See Moritz, “Vorschlag zu einem Magazin einer Erfahrungsseelenkunde,” 488, 491. The “Proposal” is an altered version of the essay “Prospect for an Experimental Psychology” (Aussichten zu einer Experimentalseelenlehre), which Moritz had published earlier in the same year (1782). All eighteenth-century literary journals quoted here, including the *Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde*, are available online from the digital archive Journals of the Enlightenment on the Net (Zeitschriften der Aufklärung im Netz) published by the University of Bielefeld.


10. See Bell, *German Tradition*, 94–95; Schrimpf, Moritz, 45; Schrimpf, “Das Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde,” 176.

11. Schrimpf, Moritz, 47.


17. The gist of my argument builds on the studies of literary anthropology, and that of the reciprocity of medicine, aesthetics, psychology, and physiology in German thought in the second half of the eighteenth century, mainly: Barkhoff and Sagarras, *Anthropologie und Literatur*; Richter, *Laocoon’s Body*; Schings, *Der ganze Mensch*; and Zammito, *Birth of Anthropology*.


21. In addition, the title of Moritz’s psychological magazine included the Greek motto “γνῶθι σεαυτόν” (“GNOTHI SAUTON”), discussed below.


28. *Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde* 1 (1798), Part II: 74. Further references to the *Magazin* refer to the facsimile reprint edited by Bennholdt-Thomsen and Guzzoni (1979) and are abbreviated as “MzE.” The abridged title is followed by the volume number, the year, the part and page number. All translations from Moritz’s psychological magazine are mine unless otherwise indicated.
29. MzE 9 (1792), Part II: 1.
32. For instance, Moritz published an excerpt from Marcus Herz’s treatise on convertigo (1786). See MzE 9 (1792), Part I: 97–103.
34. MzE 9 (1792), Part III: 29–33; MzE 1 (1783), Part II: 44–73.
35. See Jolles, Einfache Formen, 179; Slights, The Casuistical Tradition, 3. For historical reasons to disregard casuistry see Jonsen and Toulmin, Abuse of Casuistry.
36. For Moritz’s relation to Marcus Herz see Davies, “Karl Philipp Moritz’s Erfahrungsseelenkunde,” 16–19.
37. See Herz, Grundriß.
41. See Hacking, Historical Ontology, 180–81.
42. See MzE 4 (1786), Part II: 1–24.
43. See Ibid., 16–17.
45. See MzE 1 (1783), Part I: 33.
47. Moritz, Schriften zur Ästhetik und Poetik, 22.
48. See Moritz, Anton Reiser, translated by Robertson, 68.
49. Ibid., 73–74.
50. Ibid., 74.
51. Ibid., 75.
53. MzE 1 (1783), Part I: 2.
55. Ibid., 492. This statement tends to be overlooked in the literature on Moritz’s ideal observer as discussed below.
57. MzE 1 (1783), Part I: 2. My emphasis.
58. MzE 8 (1791), Part I: 2.
60. MzE 8 (1793), Part I: 1.
61. MzE 1 (1783), Part I: 2
62. See Pomata, “Sharing Cases” and “Observation Rising.”
64. Daston, “Empire of Observation,” 81.
67. MzE 1 (1783), Part I: 1.
68. Ibid.
70. For instance, Meißner, The Desert Island (Die wüste Insel).
74. MzE 5 (1789), Part II: 52.
75. MzE 1 (1783), Part I: 19.
76. See Moritz, “Vorschlag,” 497.
78. Ibid., 82.
79. Ibid., 81.
81. Abel’s collection was published under the title Collection and Explanation of Curious Phenomena in Human Life (Sammlung und Erklärung merkwürdiger Erscheinungen aus dem menschlichen Leben). See Zelle, “Experiment,” 101. See also Düwell and Pethes, “Fall, Wissen, Repräsentation,” 17.
82. MzE 8 (1791), Part I: 4.
84. Boswell, Life, 618.
85. See Vickers, ‘Coleridge and ‘Psychological’ Criticism,’ 269.
89. See ibid., 494.
90. Ibid., 490.
91. See ibid., 492.
92. Moritz, “Vorschlag,” 492; see also 495: Moritz’s observership, despite its need for “cold-blooded attention,” is not “unpleasant” or “hard” but brings “comfort” and “refuge.”
94. See Daston and Galison, Objectivity, 186.
95. See Walch’s definition of experience in Philosophisches Lexicon (1733), 792.
96. Zammito, Birth of Anthropology, 256; see Davies, “Moritz’s Erfahrungsseelenkunde,” 33. Kant’s attitude to anthropology and empirical psychology changed drastically over the years. See Cohen, Kant and the Human Sciences.
97. I refer to the passage of the pure or original apperception, the highest point of abstraction in Kant’s epistemology, Critique of Pure Reason, 246 (§ 16, B 131–32).
99. See Forrester, “If p, then what?” 4.
100. Goethe explained that Karl Philipp Moritz’s writings on the imitation of beauty was the most immediate result of their companionship (“das eigentümlichste Resultat unseres Umgangs”). Werke (Weimar Edition), I. 53, 386. See also Schimpf, Moritz, 111; Dörr, Reminiscenzen, 131.
101. Boyle, Goethe, 552–53.
103. Halmi, Genealogy, 63.
104. See Leventhal, “Fallgeschichten,” 79; see also 71, 72.
107. Moritz, Schriften zur Ästhetik und Poetik, 4.
111. See Petes, “Telling Cases,” elsewhere in this issue.
112. Moritz, Anton Reiser. 3. Moritz wrote the three parts of the novel between 1782 and 1790 (Ritchie, introduction to Anton Reiser, xxii).
113. See Moritz, Schriften zur Ästhetik und Poetik, 12.
116. Todorov, Genres in Discourse, 14. Todorov draws repeatedly on Moritz’s writings on autonomy; the significance of Moritz for Todorov still warrants further investigation.
118. See Goethe, *Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft*, 419.
120. Letter to his editor Campe, October 27, 1787. Cited in Eckle, *Er ist wie...*, 111.
121. See Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, 11–22.
130. See Charon, “To Build a Case,” 118, 123.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


