# The Somali crisis and the EU: Moving onshore and committing to Somalia

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## Abstract

About 90 percent of world trade is conducted via sea transport and up to 50 percent of the world's container ships pass by the Horn of Africa (Stone 2012). In result, Somali piracy attacks costs the global economy some USD 7 billion a year (One Earth Future Foundation 2012). The crisis in Somalia has thus become a global problem. In response, the worlds' powers are trying to contain and defuse it. The United States, China, Russia, NATO and the European Union all patrol the Indian Ocean in one of the largest military operations currently ongoing. Thousands of navy officers on war ships are engaged off the Somali coast aiming to protect container and cargo ships. With this costly undertaking not having much effect on preventing piracy, new strategies are needed.

The Global Governance Institute takes a look at the political dynamics in Somalia and recommends to closer integrating shore and offshore-based engagement. It focuses on the European engagement with two running crisis management operations and one launched on 16 July 2012 and to be operational in the autumn. In the medium- to long-term engagement on the ground is needed. Piracy is a symptom of political instability in Somalia, not its cause. The revenue generated by pirates via ransom was about USD 160m in 2011, a fraction of what the international naval operations cost. The new European EUCAP Nestor operation can be a first step in the right direction if it is the first of many steps to much stronger engagement, fostering dialogue and addressing the causes of conflict: poverty and instability within Somalia rather than merely deploying warships to patrol the Somali coast.

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## Introduction

The Horn of Africa is home to the biggest ongoing international military engagement outside of Afghanistan. The US, China, Russia, NATO and the EU maintain naval anti-piracy patrols off the coast of Somalia while primarily the African Union (AU), Kenya and Ethiopia conduct operations on land. The number of international and regional actors raises many challenges, particularly the quest for an integrated strategy and of co-ordination across actors. External engagement is still driven by a simplified counterterrorism and anti-piracy agenda, which does not yield tangible results. Maritime piracy in the Horn of Africa is by far the most visible problem in the region, albeit not one of the most pressing for the Somalis themselves. While the focus of the international engagement is still on re-active measures and containment on the sea, a lasting solution to the problem of piracy needs to consider wider measures on shore as part of a wider-reaching, comprehensive approach.

The EU proclaims such a comprehensive approach as its new *leitmotif* for foreign and security policy since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and exercises it for Somalia. But the International Community is still very cautious of putting its personnel on Somali soil, despite the country being near the top of the international agenda once again. Only the UN maintains a small Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS) with about 60 personnel. But despite considerable aid efforts no European Union member state or the European External Action Service maintains a diplomatic representation in the country. The EU's activities include the launch of a Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) on 8 December 2008 to protect shipping and international trade. On 27 September 2011 the European Union deployed a training mission for Somali soldiers in addition. In November 2011 a strategic framework for the Horn of Africa was agreed by the European member states (Council of the European Union 2011). A third European operation, EUCAP Nestor was launched on 16 July 2012 to enhance the maritime capacities of Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania and the Seychelles (EU 2012a). Our colleague at the Global Governance Institute, Tim René Salomon has recently addressed the widening of the mandate of the EU Naval Force from a legal perspective (Salomon 2012). This paper is adding to his perspective in providing an analysis of the situation in Somalia and evaluating the European engagement.

## 1. State of the conflict and international maritime engagement

Somalia is largely considered the archetype of a failed state and overwhelmingly viewed by external actors through their counter-piracy and counter-terrorism agendas. South-central Somalia looks indeed like the perfect storm to policy makers: an Al-Qaeda affiliated militia is fighting a guerrilla war against Africa Union (AU), Kenyan, Ethiopian troops and against clan-based militias with loyalties to local commanders and warlords. The western-financed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is endemically corrupt, entirely delegitimized and unable to govern even the areas freed from Al-Shabaab militias by AMISOM troops in the capital Mogadishu. An example of this is mentioned in the latest report by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, noting the issuance of a diplomatic passport with the authorization of Somali President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed to pirate leader Mohamed Abdi Hassan "Afweyne" (Reuters 2012; UN 2012:19-20; 204-206). On top of that, the 2011 famine cost 80.000 lives, with 3.2m people still in need of food assistance (FSNAU 2011). With no real breakthrough in the fighting, hundreds of thousand Somalis are internally displaced and spillover effects to neighbouring countries are on the rise.

The mandate of the Transitional Federal Government is running out in August 2012 with uncertainty about its future. On 23 February 2012, the United Kingdom held an international conference in London to come up with a new political framework for governing Somalia. This

conference was complemented by another international conference in Istanbul on 31 May 2012, marking a shift in the British and Turkish policy agenda with Somalia becoming a priority foreign and security policy concern. The London conference seemed to be the first serious international effort to try to overcome challenges that have made Somalia a failed stated for the past 20 years and support the international mantra of establishing a central state in Somalia (International Crisis Group 2012). At the same time the conference rejected any possibility of involving Al-Shabaab in the political dialogue, although many Somalia analysts think the time for a political process with the armed opposition is ripe (Lacher 2011).

*For many Somalis piracy is not a main challenge but a source of income*

Before the backdrop of these lingering internal problems, more than half of the Somali territory is actually controlled by comparably stable authorities, demonstrating the limits of the state failure debate (Höhne and Hagmann 2009). In fact, it is the more stable, permissive environments in the Northeast of the country from where most of the piracy groups operate. Somalis themselves do not view piracy as their main challenge, as it has become a source of profit for those engaged and their families. This poses an additional challenge to international efforts to maintain and combat maritime piracy.

## 1.1 The maritime anti-piracy mission – expensive and inefficient

The international anti-piracy engagement has so far focused on an offshore containment strategy with unsatisfactory outcome. A recent study by the One Earth Future Foundation (2012) estimates that the impact caused by Somali piracy in the Indian Ocean on the global economy to be USD 7 billion a year. International governments spend at least USD 1.3 billion a year to support international anti-piracy maritime missions. The shipping industry spends around USD 5.5 billion a year on maritime shipping in the Indian Ocean, of which USD 2.7 billion are additional costs incurred as a result of increasing the speed of navigation of lone container ships in an effort to reduce the risk of a successful piracy attack. Shippers spend around USD 1 billion on private security guards on ships, a figure that is rising rapidly as rates for a team of security guards are easily over USD 10,000 for a three-day trip. The costs for the Naval operations are not publicly available as they are distributed on a 'cost lie where they fall' basis, but according to a senior military representative, wishing to remain anonymous, the EU NAVFOR operation costs its member states close to EUR 1.5 billion a year[1]. The same official noted that piracy attacks had not been successful on ships that followed the guidelines on how to avoid piracy (ICS and ISF 2011).

Pirates have shown impressive adaption capabilities, adjusting their tactics, techniques and procedures to the presence of the international maritime missions in the Indian Ocean. According to International Maritime Bureau statistics released in January 2012, pirate attacks in the Indian Ocean rose to 237 in 2011 from 219 in 2010. Yet, the number of successful attacks dropped from 49 in 2010 to 28 in 2011. This latter decrease in successful attacks can be attributed to pre-emptive attacks by international naval forces and defensive measures on the part of merchant vessels. However, the revenue generated by the pirates via ransom payments has continued to rise from approx. USD 100m in 2010 to a high of approx. USD 160m in 2011.

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[1] The real costs and the opportunity costs of navies engaged at the Horn of Africa, arguably missing for national defense at home, are difficult to estimate, as no official numbers exist. Such a cost could also need to incorporate the training benefits of a multinational exercise.

*USD 2.7 billion were spent in 2011 by the shipping industry to reduce the risk of a successful piracy attack; but only USD 160m were paid to pirates for ransom*

Furthermore, pirates have gradually expanded their area of operation between 2008 and 2011 with the help of vessels known as "mother ships". Pirates' area of operation has expanded to the east towards the coast of India and to the south towards the coast of Mozambique and Madagascar, an area of approx. 2 million square miles. Currently around 40 ships make up the international anti-piracy flotilla. According to one US Navy analysis, an estimated 1.000 ships equipped with helicopters would be required to provide the same level of coverage in the Indian Ocean that is currently provided in the Gulf of Aden (US Government Accountability Office 2011). Increasing the area of coverage of the international anti-piracy maritime missions would come at significantly greater costs.

Though there has been a decrease in the number of successful attacks on maritime shipments, the geographic expansion of piracy highlights the limitations of the international maritime missions' containment strategy and effectiveness. This raises the question of whether expanding the international anti-piracy missions would be both effective and sustainable. With financially and strategically challenged maritime missions, the international community and the EU should start considering onshore approaches to Somali piracy, strengthening local onshore capacity and ownership of security which have a direct impact on offshore security. In February 2012 General Håkan Syrén, chairman of the EU Military Committee (EUMC), said that 27 defence chiefs and EU ambassadors agreed that anti-piracy campaigns to halt Somali piracy must now move on to land, using "robust" force which means that "strikes would be necessary" (IHS Jane's 2012), subsequently changing the rules of engagement. For a legal perspective on this recent endorsement and implications, see Salomon (2012). This military escalation may undermine the sustainable strengthening of Somali local security forces, and run the risk of exacerbating current problems. In order to understand the impediments and chances to tackle piracy in Somalia it is important to understand its local dynamics.

## 1.2 Local context of the Somali piracy

Piracy is not a new phenomenon in Somalia. While in the early 1990s, foreign navies illegally fishing in Somali territorial waters may have been a prime driver and still a source of local legitimacy for piracy, the dynamic changed over the last years into a professional enterprise. By 2008 piracy off the coast of Somalia reached a critical level and triggered the first international initiatives to contain the problem on sea. Piracy itself is a symptom of political instability, not its cause. A permissive context for the enterprise is a weak political environment: stable enough to operate a base and protect piracy revenues, but also not too stable, since an increased effectiveness by security forces might impede operations. Generally Somali pirates operate in small, locally and along (sub-)clan affiliation recruited groups in a low cost fashion and in a diverse range of political contexts inside Somalia (Hansen 2009).

Historically speaking, piracy was dominated by two principal networks based in the northeastern Somali region of Puntland as well as the Xaradheere and Hobyo districts of Mudug region. Due to sustained pressure by local elders and crackdowns on pirates since early 2011 by the Puntland authorities, many pirates relocated further south to Galmudug region, which is the new hub for pirate operations, albeit the shores of Puntland are still important. Piracy operations in the south of the country are on the increase but are still relatively low when compared to piracy operations in the north. Pirates operating for example near the southern port of Kismaayo are under increased pressure from the ongoing Kenyan military offensive on the one hand and militant groups such as the Al-Shabaab militia from

the other. To date there is no known connection between piracy and the militant Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Shabaab militia, which historically opposed piracy. Local exceptions are based not on ideology but (sub-)clan affiliations. Nevertheless, Al-Shabaab is finding itself under increasing pressure and might change its stance on piracy for pragmatic reasons to gain new revenues in the near future in exchange for allowing pirates operate in areas under their control[2]. So far only Somaliland, the de-facto autonomous region in the northwest of the country and safest part of Somalia, is virtually free of piracy (UN Security Council 2011).

### *The moral economy of piracy: Using local legitimacy and interests*

However, in order to understand the prevalence of piracy in Somalia, one also has to look at what Roland Marchal called the "moral economy of piracy." The permissive environment for piracy is also found in the perception of many local people who see pirates "as genuine nationalists who fight the looting of national assets and fine foreign vessels recurrently accused of depriving Somalis of their national wealth and of dumping toxic waste in Somali territorial waters, if not even onshore" (Marchal 2011). This narrative is reinforced by the fact that pirates can claim to have been connected once to coastal guards.

An even more important factor of support from the local people is the way pirates split their ransom revenues with the local community. A look at the pirate value chain shows that approx. 70% of the revenues go to financiers, sponsors, officers and families, whereas approx. 30% go to the pirates themselves, the support crew, traders, vehicle owners, translators, local businesses and suppliers which benefits also casual labour and pastoralists, particularly in Puntland (Geopolicy 2011). Key beneficiaries invest locally and regionally which in turn leads to a remarkable extension of popular legitimacy. Overall, there is a lack of data about the developmental effects of piracy, with one recent study suggesting – based on satellite images only – that a construction boom in the provincial capitals Garowe and Bosasso might be linked to piracy revenues (Shortland 2012).

Nevertheless, local perceptions of piracy are dynamic and an opposite trend has been observed as well. Local communities experience increasingly the negative consequences of piracy and the huge influx of ransom money stand in harsh contrast to their religion, such as the rise of drug abuse, pre-marital sex, theft and inflation. Therefore effective grassroots efforts to counter piracy are gaining momentum with local elders and religious leaders in coastal villages beginning to build resistance (Ramsey 2011a and 2011b).

Local authorities in Puntland and Galmudug seem to have an ambiguous agenda regarding piracy. The government of Puntland under the President Abdirahman Farole began asserting more control over its territory in 2010 and has since tried to remove pirates from their coastal bases. Nevertheless, parts of the government and/or the security services appear to still "turn a blind eye out of clan loyalty" (International Crisis Group 2009, p. 11). It is still true that "without some form of official protection and collusion, gangs would find it difficult to operate as efficiently as they do, given the complex logistics involved in planning and executing raids and negotiating ransoms" (ibid.).

The UN Security Council Monitoring Group on Somalia reports from 2010, 2011 and 2012 provide convergent analysis, albeit no hard evidence of such collaboration. Puntland president Farole is working on his track record of fighting piracy and has launched several military initiatives against local piracy strongholds. While having less well-developed security forces than Somaliland, Puntland saw the creation of the Puntland Marine Police Force in 2010 now being around 400 men strong. At the same time President Farole is intimately connected to

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[2] For a legal analysis of the implications, see Kolb et al. 2011.

pirates in the region, being not only from the pirate stronghold but also belonging to the same sub-clan – Iise Mahamuud/Muuse Iise – as the two main pirate leaders Abshir Abdullaahi Boyah and Garaad Mahamuud Iise. This led to the allegation that he may have received financial help for his presidential campaign and beyond from these pirate leaders. The increase relocation of pirates to Galmudug, south of Puntland, allows them to penetrate a more permissive environment, as the local government exercises little control over its territory. Only very weak security forces exist in Galmudug and any other forces are clan-based militias unlikely to take on the heavily armed pirates. It remains to be seen if the Sufi militia and largest armed group Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a might be able to effectively project their control also to the coastal areas of Galguduud.

### *Learning from history: local solutions and failures*

While international maritime missions in operating in Somali coastal waters and the Indian Ocean have proven thus far to be financially ineffective and de-facto failed to contain the problem of piracy, there seems to be a strong correlation between onshore and offshore security, as both go hand in hand. Indeed, recent history gives two examples where piracy in Somalia was not only managed, but also overall extinguished in a local context. In a first instance, ports in Somaliland – with the exception of its eastern contested region of Sanaag - have never hosted piracy networks. Despite a negligible coastal security force and relative poverty, Somaliland was able to control its coast trough local ownership, the legitimacy of local law enforcement including local militias and the popularity of the local regime, guaranteeing the cooperation of the effected population (Hansen 2009). In a second instance, a quite different example is the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in Mogadishu. When they took control of the capital in 2006 – described by many Somalis as the most peaceful and stable time since the breakdown of the government in the early 1990s in South-Central Somalia – the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts decided to end piracy and declared them as haraam (against Islam). The UIC even launched attacks against pirate ports and effectively ended piracy in their controlled areas. Obviously, after the invasion of Ethiopia and the withdrawal of the Sharia courts, piracy re-emerged in the area (Holzer and Elliot 2009).

There are, however, also insightful examples of failed Somali counter-piracy attempts in the recent past. In 1999 Puntland contracted the British Hart group to provide coast guard duties and training. Hart's involvement led initially to the curtailing of illegal fishing, some reduction of piracy and legal expertise as well as training to Puntland. Due to an internal war in Puntland between 2001-2002 Hart had to pull out, leaving the former coast guards unemployed (Kinsley 2009). Years later, in April 2008, Puntland stopped paying its police forces after a serious financial crisis in the region. In both cases the newly trained security forces turned to banditry with some of them becoming well-trained pirates themselves (Hansen 2008). With the breakdown of the onshore security the offshore situation followed on food, leading to the dramatic increase of piracy by mid-2008 that finally triggered the international maritime response.

## 2. EU Approach in the Horn of Africa
The European Union as a trading power has a keen interest to stop piracy and Somalia is thus a priority of the EU's security and defence agenda. Given the precarious security situation the EU is engaged in military CSDP operations off the Somali coast, in neighbouring countries or with Commission funding for aid and humanitarian organizations to work within the country.

The EU currently operates two crisis management operations, the small EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Uganda and the naval operation (NAVFOR Atalanta). An operation, EUCAP Nestor, to build up regional coastguards to fight piracy was launched on 16 July 2012 (EU 2012a). In addition, the EU has activated its Operation Centre in Brussels to coordinate

among the three operations and is engaged with the fight against terrorism. Since 1 January 2012 it also appointed a political face to its engagement, namely Alexander Rondos as EU Special Representative and operating out of Kenya. Additional support to Somalia is mostly for humanitarian and development purposes by the European Development Fund and the Humanitarian Office (ECHO). According to the OECD Aid statistics, the EU was the second largest donor with USD 118m after the US in 2010 (OECD 2012).

**European Union engagement in Somalia**

| Financial/ dev. instruments | Political instruments | Crisis management (CSDP) instruments |
|---|---|---|
| Commission Directorates-General include:<br>– European Development Fund<br>– DG Trade<br>– European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) | – EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa Alexander Rondos, since 1 January 2012<br>– Political Dialogue | – EUTM Somalia<br>– EUNAVFOR Atalanta<br>– EUCAP Nestor<br>– Instrument for Stability<br>– 'EU Ops Centre'<br>– Counter-Terrorism |

The largest European engagement is to protect international trade and European shipping vessels. On 8 December 2008 EU member states launched its first naval operation implemented in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Together with the US-led Combined Task Force 151, as well as with the operating vessels of China, Iran, India and Russia they secure critical maritime routes. These naval operations, originally launched to protect food shipping's by the World Food Programme (WFP) have had a significant effect on piracy at first. However, as outlined above, the pirates adapted faster than the military and attacks increased again in 2011. The area to cover is huge and pirates are now moving far off shore. If success is defined solely by focusing on the WFP vessels, the mission is a success. However, if we take the fight against piracy as one of its suggested measures, then the tactical success so far is marginal.

At the same time the operations are vastly expensive exercises, both in terms of opportunity costs as well as financial costs. Deploying vessels to the Somali coast is a huge logistical undertaking and in a time of tight financial budgets limits the ability of particularly European navies to conduct operations elsewhere. Running war ships and crew at permanent readiness and patrolling the long stretch of the Somali coast with speeding to the help of ships under attack makes it a very expensive undertaking.

In addition to the activities at sea, the EU currently conducts an EU Training Mission in Uganda, training about 250 Somalia soldiers in Command and Control. The mission was launched on 7 April 2010 with a mandate of up to 124 EU military troops. The trainings take half a year and four training cycles are planned with the current mandate running until October 2012. By the end of the current mandate in October 2012 the EU will have trained 1.000 Somali soldiers in four half-year training cycles. The impact on the 28.000 strong Somali force is uncertain. EUTM is a step in the right direction and directly supports the capacity of Somali security forces but the operation is more symbolic and rather should be expanded in size, scope and duration. Operating from outside Somalia also shows a lack of commitment and visibility to the Somali population.

Underlining the increased strategic importance of the region, the EU adopted a new Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa on 14 November 2011 (Council of the European Union

2011). In addition, the European Union strengthened its political visibility in appointing Alexander Rondos of the shipping nation Greece a few weeks later as EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa (Taylor 2011). The following week, on 12 December 2011 the EU approved the preparation of another CSDP operation to strengthen regional maritime capacity building. Subsequently and in expectation of three operations at the Horn of Africa, the European Council activated the EU Operations Centre on 23 March 2012 (Council of the European Union 2012). This is the first activation of the EU Operations Centre. Its mandate is to provide support and facilitate coordination between the three operations and the Brussels bureaucracy.

## 2.1 Assessing the EU's new capacity building mission for the Horn of Africa

How does the EUCAP Nestor operation fit into the EU's engagement? It is the next logical step for European engagement without moving on shore in Somalia and preventing piracy in changing its root causes. It aims to contain attacks in supporting the surrounding countries coast guards and navies as the NAVFOR operation is too expensive to run for long periods and piracy cannot be solved in a few years. EUCAP Nestor will therefore aim at strengthening the sea-going maritime capacity of Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, and the Seychelles. It will also aim at strengthening the rule of law sector in the Somali regions of Puntland, Somaliland and Galmudug, notably by supporting the development of a Coastal Police Force as well as by training and protecting judges in the Somali region of Puntland (EU 2012b). Its strength is likely to be similar in size as the EU Training Mission, about 120 personnel.

EUCAP Nestor focuses on the right onshore entities in their respective efforts to curtail pirates' areas of operations, namely Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug. All too often in the recent past such attempts failed, as they focused on the rebuilding of central Somali state institutions of a "virtual" Transitional Federal Government with no relevant control over territory, no local support nor legitimacy instead of supporting the local, albeit weak institutions which are already in place in the areas most relevant to piracy and the best chance to success (Holzer 2011).

Capacity building for local security forces as well as the judicial sector can make a difference, if financed in a sustainable way and adopted as part of a wider engagement in those entities. Clearly, a piracy-centric approach will not yield the expected results. Keeping in mind the dire security, political and humanitarian situation in most parts of Somalia, piracy is a secondary problem at best for Somalis. In addition, piracy seems to have still a strong local support base, as it brings positive developmental effects and labour to neglected and underdeveloped regions in the country. Hence piracy can only be tackled as part of a wider local engagement that addresses local needs in the development, governance and security sector. As Ehrhart and Peretto (2012) put it, a "Somalia first" approach is needed. This demands a comprehensive approach, which brings together coherently and effectively the EU's military, foreign affairs, humanitarian aid and economic development policy standards.

Somaliland has to be supported in order to reward it for its stability and to keep the regional balance when engaging in Puntland. While local governments in Puntland and Galmudug can be pressured to fight piracy, there is a dangerous dynamic lingering on the horizon: if the onshore engagement comes as an anti-piracy engagement only, these entities will indeed fight piracy up to a certain extend in order to gain access to foreign anti-piracy revenues. However, they will at the same time have a vested interest in keeping the piracy problem alive and hence keeping the foreign aid money flowing. From this perspective, an effective ending of piracy would be a disincentive, as it would lead again to international (financial) neglect of the respective region.

Generally speaking, the deployment of 175 personnel for the RMCB mission with its dual mandate and operating outside of Somalia seems not well designed for building up relevant capacities in the respective Somali regions as well as four neighbouring countries. The increase from about 30-40 personnel that were debated in early 2012 to almost 200 despite the constraints of financial austerity, show the strategic importance EU member states attach to the mission. However, if the EU is serious in tackling Somali piracy in a sustainable way, it has to take a broader, long-term and locally owned approach in the respective regions where piracy stems from. So far, the EU has neither implemented the comprehensive approach full-heartedly, nor tried to change its strategy to relevant onshore engagement. In the best case the RMCB mission is a first start for a larger, more comprehensive engagement. Aiming to build up the capacity of five countries to do the job some of the best navies in the world are not able to perform seems ambitious to say the least. Building up capacity takes time. It also takes both advice and training as well as technological and logistical support. Without adequate ships, training the coast guards will not have a lasting effect. And the operation needs to be embedded in a wider strategic framework that requires a political presence of the EU in Somalia and increased work with the Somali government.

## 3. Conclusion

Given the EU's engagement at the Horn of Africa the current focus on the comprehensive approach is the logical solution to bring the EU's fragmented foreign policy instruments together. The increased focus on capacity building and national ownership is also positive. However, the strategy of the EU is not sufficient: In order to allow the withdrawal of the expensive European navies, neighbouring nations shall do the pirate hunting in the future while strengthening the on shore capacity of the Somali regions with the strongest piracy problems. Rather, a shift in strategy is necessary.

The resources spent by the European Union on patrolling the coast off the Horn of Africa are about ten times the amount spent on development and humanitarian aid in Somalia. A long-term and sustainable solution can only be found in ensuring security for Somalis and offering a support for economic development. An EU presence on the ground is needed and money spent on development needs to be closely aligned with the Strategic framework for the Horn of Africa. This can be in the form of a CSDP operation or under the umbrella of the Special Representative's guidance if he is based in Somalia. Given the estimated costs of USD 7 billion from piracy attacks acting sooner rather than later to prevent piracy is essential. Jointly with the United Nations and the African Union, the only actors on the ground, the EU needs to invest heavily in its onshore activities to enable the success of its three security and defence operations.

Based on this analysis, the Global Governance Institute recommends four areas for action. Firstly, the three independent operations need to be joined up and should be led and coordinated by the EU Special Representative (EUSR). The EUSR should not only be able to give local guidance, but strategic direction in close exchange with the relevant Operations Commander. Placed directly under the EU High Representative Lady Ashton his position is suitable. The EUSR should also be chairing a working group with Commission officials in charge of development and humanitarian aid funding. Alternatively, the current institutional fragmentation will persist and the strategies to prevent piracy will not be addressed effectively.

Secondly, a heavy focus on training and training exercises should be launched by member states bilaterally to include not only for the coastguards and navies but also the related institutions, such as ministries, police and navy military structures. This would require not

only experts from the coastguards and navies, but also public administration and management experts to provide support on issues of organisation, finance and institutional learning.

Thirdly, EU development funds should be used to building up national capacities for training. For the first two years a CSDP operation could provide the personnel and support the training academies and co-teaching the new recruits. However, sustainable financing needs to be ensured. These courses could well draw on the expertise of naval officers deployed with NAVFOR Atalanta.

Last, but not least, the EU should support the United Nations in coordinating a political solution for Somalia after August to ensure stability and progress for a future of the Somali people.

Without addressing the political context in Somalia all possible tactical gains in the fight against piracy will not be sustainable. Such strategic failure would continue to jeopardise the livelihood of the Somali people and of the international efforts. Support for the political transition requires the European Union to be present with a delegation, with personnel of the three CSDP operations and with member states' embassies. A commitment to go 'onshore' is needed to prepare the future stability of Somalia.

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