

The Illusion of ‘Peace Through Power-Sharing’: Constitutional Choice in the Shadow of Civil War

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Conflict managers around the world cling to the hope that power-sharing decreases the risk of civil war in post-conflict societies. Distinguishing between territorial and governmental conflicts, we analyse the origin and effectiveness of power-sharing institutions (PSI) and power-sharing arrangements (PSA). Our examination reveals that power-sharing is largely a consequence of the institutional legacy and of the war outcome. While PSI such as proportional representation or federalism cannot prevent a war from recurring, PSA in the form of grand coalitions reduces this risk marginally. However, granting autonomy to a rebellious region increases the danger that the relationship with the government turns violent again. Our results suggest that constitution makers should advocate power-sharing with caution.

INTRODUCTION

Argentina and Sri Lanka experienced violent internal wars pitting an opposition movement against the government, and both adopted similar power-sharing institutions (PSI) in the wake of the civil conflicts. The constitution of both conflict-ridden countries introduced proportional representation as a key electoral reform in the early 1960s (Argentina) and in the late 1980s (Sri Lanka).¹ The decision to opt against the renewed usage of majority rule as a key electoral rule should theoretically have increased the chance of small parties to become part of a ruling coalition, enabling strong minorities to occasionally participate in the domestic power game. However, the fate of the post-conflict societies differed greatly despite their common constitutional choices. While Sri Lanka fell again victim to an internal conflict involving the same actors as before, Argentina maintained a fragile peace until the end of the 1970s.

Such contrasting experiences raise two questions: first, what motivates war-affected countries to embrace PSI such as proportional representation or federalism or to adopt power-sharing arrangements (PSA) and to co-opt former rebels into the federal or a regional government? Second, to what extent does the adoption of power-sharing be it of its formal or informal variant, render governments more encompassing and reduce the risk of recurrent fighting? Drawing on Lijphart’s pioneering work on consociationalism² and related contributions to comparative politics, proponents of the power-sharing approach in civil war studies maintain that the warring parties who act in the shadow of inclusive institutional arrangements

after a conflict should have less to fight about as they face a reasonable chance to obtain access to state resources through the inclusion into government at some point. However, the results in support of this conjecture are mixed. Some scholars have established that political power-sharing between governments and insurgents lowers the risk of war in ethnically, linguistically or religiously deeply divided societies.³ Schneider and Wiesehomeier, for instance, establish that participation of minorities in federal or regional governments pacifies ethnically diverse societies in general.⁴ Lustick et al., however, maintain that the inclusion of minorities not only reduces the threat of secession more effectively than repression, but also encourages larger groups to build 'identitarian movements'.⁵

This article re-examines the controversy over the role of power-sharing by exclusively focusing on their role in post-conflict societies and by differentiating between *de jure* and *de facto* power-sharing, and hence between PSI and PSA. Our study focuses on two key facets of these often inter-related manifestations of power-sharing. While proportional representation (PR) and federalism are considered to be inclusive electoral and constitutional rules, the creation of grand coalitions and the granting of autonomy to regional actors are similar reconciliatory steps that do not need to be based on institutional changes. Although power-sharing enjoys widespread support in policy circles, we contend that it might not be strong enough to counteract the disruptive forces that continue to linger on in a society after the end of a first civil war. This limited effectiveness has, in our view, largely to do with the origin of power-sharing in post-conflict societies. We expect that the choice for inclusive institutions and arrangements depends on the outcome of the internal conflict and the PSI and PSA that characterized the pre-war societies.

The empirical examination of the adaption and effectiveness of PSI in post-conflict societies after World War II supports the double scepticism. First, we find that both PSI and PSA a country opts for after a conflict largely reflect the institutions and political power constellations before a country fell victim to the internal conflict. This means especially that the introduction of constitutional reforms that theoretically enable a society to avoid the embroilment into another internal war is very rare and that most democracies stick to their pre-war institutional setting. Depending on the outcome of the civil conflict, war-torn societies are, conversely, more likely to move towards *de facto* power-sharing. The political clout of the former rebels in the post-war society accordingly increases in the event of a mediated end of the violence. Second, neither federalism nor proportional representation and therefore two key components of consociationalist regimes are seemingly sufficiently strong to overcome the divisive forces within a post-conflict society. Whereas the existence of federalism before a conflict positively affects the occurrence of territorial conflicts, it does, however, not increase the risk that the war recurs in the long term. Third, PSA rather than PSI affect the probability of war recurrence. Finally, we find that ethnically polarized societies and fractionalized states also face a higher risk to become embroiled in territorial conflict, whereas highly fractionalized countries are less likely to experience a governmental conflict. We conclude our evaluation of post-conflict

power-sharing with pointing out that constitution makers should consider the ethnic divisions and also other pertinent cleavages when opting for a more inclusive political system.

THE POWER-SHARING CONTROVERSY

The canonical starting point for studying the causes and effects of power-sharing is Arend Lijphart's influential concept of 'consociational democracy'.⁶ Although his original model did not refer to post-conflict societies *per se*, conflict researchers and policymakers around the world frequently advocate it as a means to pacify post-conflict societies. According to this adage, inclusive institutions should make the former disputants less conflict-prone as even relatively small groups have the prospect to gain access to state resources through peaceful means at some point. This positive effect should result from institutional and political changes along at least one of the four definitional components of consociationalism. Hence, states should (1) establish a grand coalition implying that all rival groups should be included in government, (2) introduce a system of mutual veto power, (3) resort to proportionality in political representation, civil service appointment and allocation of public funds and (4) grant partial autonomy for strong minorities through federalism and similar constitutional provisions.

A growing number of scholars has, based on the Lijphartian framework of analysis and extensions by him and others, examined the role of inclusive constitutional arrangements on the prospects for democracy and peace in war-torn states.⁷ Some studies have established that political power-sharing between governments and insurgents lowers the risk of war in ethnically or religiously diverse societies.⁸ Most of these examinations focus on the risk of conflict in all countries in the world irrespective of whether or not they have recently experienced a civil war.

Advocates of power-sharing portray it as an especially pertinent mechanism in societies that are socially or ethnically highly divided and in which the exclusion of minorities from government is therefore an issue that the post-conflict constitution builders have to reckon with. Reynal-Querol has shown that countries with inclusive political systems face a lower risk of internal war.⁹ Based on theoretical work by Esteban and Ray,¹⁰ Schneider and Wiesehomeier¹¹ demonstrate that this pacifying impact depends on the manifestation of diversity. While proportional representation combined with fractionalization and polarization decreases the risk of conflict, fractionalization in the interaction with federalism similarly pacifies states.

Horowitz, conversely, contends that proportional representation fosters the risk that the party system becomes ethnically more politicized and that vote choice increases along ethnic fault lines within a society.¹² Although Lustick et al. maintain that power-sharing can be more effective in reducing the threat of secession than repression, they also similarly propose that it tends to encourage larger minorities to form 'identitarian movements'.¹³ Huber,¹⁴ however, provides encompassing empirical evidence that one of the key components of consociationalism, proportional representation, decreases the ethnic identification of voters.¹⁵

A growing number of studies uses a more focused research design and assesses the capacity of power-sharing as a post-conflict management tool.¹⁶ Defining it more broadly as rules ensuring that none of the parties has a dominant position over another, these examinations come to mixed results in which particular power-sharing provision included in peace agreements expands the duration of these treaties.¹⁷ Others point out that power-sharing might not necessarily help maintaining post-conflict stability or democracy in the long run or that it even counter-productively sows the seeds of future discord.¹⁸ Various reasons may explain the instability of power-sharing governments, not the least difficulties in holding the coalition together. This is most pronouncedly the case for those developing countries that opted for institutions that are similar to the ones of their former colonial expropriators.¹⁹ However, little is known why some countries adopt new PSI in the post-conflict period and whether this choice results from the circumstances surrounding the end of the war. Mukherjee,²⁰ for example, in analysing why political power-sharing agreements lead to peaceful resolution of civil wars in some cases, but not others, finds that insurgents have incentives to accept a political power-sharing agreement and not revert to fighting after a decisive military victory. Recent studies of the duration of peace agreements²¹ alert us against the danger to treat PSI as an exogenous factor. As not all post-conflict societies adopt or maintain PSI, we should consider that such constitutional choices and their effectiveness are contingent on the war outcome. In other words, post-conflict societies with inclusive political institutions might not be a random sample of all war-affected countries.

We will in the following address this debate about the origin and effectiveness of power-sharing in post-conflict societies. Our article particularly examines how war outcomes and the institutional legacy of conflict-affected countries shape the decision on post-war power-sharing adaptation and how eventual consociationalist choices have the desired double effect of making governments more inclusive and of reducing the risk of war recurrence.

WAR TERMINATION AND POWER-SHARING

The theoretical argument advanced in this study challenges the implicit assumption of the literature that key constitutional and political choices in the aftermath of war are made independently of the war outcome and the institutional setting before the conflict erupted. Furthermore, we contend that the constitutional choice to adopt PSI does not necessarily improve the chance of the former rebel forces to be co-opted into government or to reach more political autonomy for the territory in which they are mainly living. We finally examine in line with the extant literature whether key institutional attributes of power-sharing or increased power of the former rebels influence the risk of war recurrence.

We will develop hypotheses on the different parts of our assessment of power-sharing in turn. The study distinguishes between PSI and PSA or, to put it differently, between *de jure* and *de facto* power-sharing. While the former notion stands for the rules a diverse set of researchers has associated with the potential

inclusiveness of a political system, the latter concept represents the real political inclusion of rebels into the post-conflict power game. Furthermore, this study examines the effects of *horizontal* versus *vertical* power-sharing dimensions: (i) horizontal power-sharing manifests itself through proportional representation (PSI) and the establishment of grand coalitions (PSA), and (ii) vertical power-sharing stands for federalist rules (PSI) and the *de facto* political autonomy granted to former rebel groups (PSA) (Table 1). Note that vertical power-sharing becomes more likely after a territorial conflict, while horizontal power-sharing might be a means to pacify a society following a war over the control of government.

To start our evaluation of post-conflict power-sharing, we will first examine key determinants of both PSI and PSA. These distinctions necessitate that we analyse in a next step how horizontal (vertical) PSI and arrangements influence the risk for renewed conflicts over the control of the central government or a particular territory.

Pre-war Institutions, War Outcomes and the Adoption of Power-Sharing

How does the war outcome affect the choice of power-sharing institution and the real inclusiveness of the political system? The literature on how different termination types influence the choice of post-conflict institutions is very scarce. While some studies focus on the impact of negotiated settlement and victory on the durability of peace²² or the impact of power-sharing provisions in peace agreements,²³ they do not account for the effect of constitutional choices by post-conflict societies.

We believe that decisionmakers only tend to agree to resort to these inclusive institutions if the sharing of power with a contending group allows them to enter government or to extend their stay in office. Such a possibility arises almost naturally if the civil war ended with a negotiated or mediated agreement instead of a victory by one side. Moreover, as many external negotiators tend to consider power-sharing as a good mechanism for keeping countries peaceful or for pacifying societies after the end of a civil war in the long term,²⁴ they push for such provisions in peace agreements.

If a political group, however, emerged victorious from a war, it does not typically have any incentive to share power. The clear winners of a conflict will only make substantial constitutional concessions that possibly benefit the losers of the armed conflict if the ethnic fabric of a country seems sufficiently stable to guarantee their hold on electoral power. Obviously, these expectations might be overly optimistic. Elster and others have maintained that constitution makers often misperceive their own power or the preferences that they might have in the future about a particular

TABLE 1
ANALYSED DIMENSIONS OF POWER-SHARING FOR POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES

	PSI	PSA
Horizontal	PR	<i>De facto</i> grand coalitions
Vertical	Federalism	<i>De facto</i> autonomy

policy issue.²⁵ The Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’ that is surrounding constitutional negotiations consequently leads to the adaptation of rules that have their own life and that might work against the very interests of the constitution makers.

Furthermore, we suspect that, decisionmakers will stick to the rules that existed before the conflict in many post-conflict societies. As the conflict might not have ended the pre-war balance of power, especially the ‘winners’ will not have an incentive to alter the institutional setting. The institutional legacy makes it quite likely that a war-torn country readopts PSI again, although these rules had not prevented the country from embarking on a destructive path in the first place. Obviously, a host of other factors such as colonial heritage or ethnic diversity influenced the pre-conflict constitutional choices.²⁶ However, as we are only interested in the causes of post-conflict adaptation of PSI, this article only examines whether or not a state inherited these rules from the pre-war era.

Hypothesis 1: A war-torn country is more likely to introduce PSI in the first period of reconstruction if the civil conflict had ended with a conclusion of a peace agreement and if it possessed PSI before the civil war.

Is PR a panacea for post-conflict countries? The electoral rule most closely associated with power-sharing is proportional representation.²⁷ Indeed, Lijphart²⁸ lists this institution – specifically, closed-list proportional representation in not overly large districts – among his recommendation for ethnically divided societies emerging from civil war and regime instability. The rationale behind this advice is that PR systems allow a minority group to establish its own party, thereby avoiding the frustration that its interests are not represented.²⁹ Yet, while researchers disagree over whether PR is desirable in divided societies,³⁰ there is a considerable consensus in the footsteps of Duverger that this electoral rule is closely associated with the presence of multiparty systems. This regularity, often dubbed as ‘Duverger’s law’ also suggests by extension that PR improves the chance of a minority group to be represented in the political process.

Although the international community frequently calls for the adaptation of proportional representation, the effectiveness of this electoral power-sharing option for both democracy and peace is nevertheless heavily debated. Combining the evidence of both large-N and case studies, Norris³¹ finds for instance that countries with PR electoral systems are more democratic than majoritarian democracies. Regardless of these merits, the questions remains whether proportional representation is an effective instrument to promote civil peace. To start with, Cammett and Malesky³² find strong support for their argument that closed-list PR systems with their depersonalizing effect on elections have rendered post-conflict societies more peaceful. Reilly³³ conversely argues in line with Horowitz³⁴ that ‘efficient’ institutions are those that can deliver clear parliamentary majorities to disciplined political parties offering distinct policy alternatives as the basis of their claim to government and these are more likely to be associated with majoritarian electoral laws. Similarly, Quade³⁵ favours plurality systems. Although PR systems in theory have the advantage of representing minorities better in parliament, they also

replicate, according to these sceptical voices, social schisms in the legislature, which adds to the difficulties in establishing and sustaining coalition governments. Thus, PR may not only increase the instability of fragile states recovering from war, but it may in this view also deepen the cleavages of an already divided society.

The scepticism of these scholars about the pacifying effects of PR stands in marked contrast to the optimism that the literature attributes to PSA in the form of grand coalitions. A broad range of scholars argues that including parties with a stake in post-war developments may prolong peace.³⁶ According to this adage, oppressed and discriminated groups may find peace after a conflict too costly if they continue to be excluded from government. Gurr and Stedman demonstrated along these lines that politically excluded former combatants return more frequently to violent tactics.³⁷ Note, however, that overly inclusive post-conflict arrangements might backfire. Slater and Simmons³⁸ find in a comparative case study of Bolivia and Indonesia that ‘promiscuous’ power-sharing might even destabilize countries through the unpopular nature of party cartels that the political elites conclude in the aftermath of a war. Be that as it may, this article will test the optimistic expectation of the traditional power-sharing literature that proportional representation and the political inclusiveness of the central executive will make countries more peaceful after a governmental conflict.

Hypothesis 2: Proportional representation and the establishment of a grand coalition after the end of a militarized conflict over the control of government increase the chance of enduring peace.

Federalism as a peace-sustaining structure? Federalism and the *de facto* autonomy granted to a rebellious region are the second key choices that a war-affected society can make after a conflict. Federalism is the ‘most typical and drastic method’ of formal power distribution because it constrains the central government which must give up some decision-making power to the lower-level units.³⁹ Territorial power-sharing between the centre of a country and its regions allows for a better representation of citizens’ interests as citizens can have a better access to the policymakers. The adoption of a federal system may be a solution especially if the internal conflict resulted from the exclusion of the minorities or other territorial issues. Treisman⁴⁰ argues that federalism appeases the demands of those groups that search their own national identity. It seems accordingly to be a viable solution for divided societies. Schneider and Wiesehomeier,⁴¹ for example, find that participation of minorities in federal or regional government might help to pacify ethnically diverse societies in general.

According to the advocates of vertical power-sharing, the federal system may help preserve peace as minorities have a better access to the decision-making process, thus installing a balance of power⁴² and allowing a targeted provision of public goods.⁴³ Stepan suggests that, in divided societies, federalism help the state to ‘hold together’.⁴⁴ He also stresses the importance of regional empowerment as a prerequisite for the consolidations of fragile democracies. Bermeo suggests that the pacifying mechanism

of autonomy only works within democracies, as authoritarian federal structures gave birth to some secessionist civil wars.⁴⁵

Although the choice to commit to a federal structure may be part of the institutional legacy,⁴⁶ it can also be the result of the conviction that granting more autonomy to the territorial subunits might pacify a state after a territorial conflict.⁴⁷ Chapman and Roeder⁴⁸ find that partition emerges as a better solution than other territorial institutional set-ups as it keeps the former enemies really apart from each other. Be that as it may, federalist solutions are much more likely in countries in which strong minorities dominate the populations of some subregions. It is in the light of the endogenous nature of federal arrangements that Christin and Hug⁴⁹ find that a growing number of minority-ruled federal units increases the risk of ethnic civil war onsets. It is therefore doubtful if the empowerment of these minorities after a conflict decreases the chance of civil war recurrence.

Territorial power-sharing can also take the form of a *de facto* or *de jure* autonomy granted to some specific regions only. Devolved powers were for instance given to the Basque country and some other regions in the aftermath of the Spanish democratization process. However, this specific example suggests that territorial power-sharing might not be sufficient in preventing a group from calling for total independence.⁵⁰ On the contrary, territorial concessions in the form of regional autonomy might strengthen group identification and thereby increase the risk of war recurrence. We nevertheless expect in line with the traditional power-sharing literature that federalism and *de facto* autonomy decrease the chance of a recurrence of a territorial conflict.

Hypothesis 3: Federalism and the granting of autonomy to a rebellious region reduce the chance of recurrence of a territorial conflict.

RESEARCH DESIGN

To empirically evaluate the origin and effectiveness of PSI and PSA, we rely on different datasets. As the empirical analysis covers post-conflict societies, we resort to the *Conflict Termination Dataset* (v.2010-1)⁵¹ to select the cases. This source includes information about terminated civil war episodes as identified by the *Uppsala Conflict Data Program* (UCDP).⁵² Our analysis refers to 104 post-conflict countries that had endured a civil conflict terminating between 1946 and 2009 and with at least 25 fatalities. As we want to study the effectiveness of power-sharing between the government and a particular group, our unit of analysis is the post-conflict dyad rather than the post-conflict country. We have identified 601 post-conflict dyads.⁵³

The UCDP *Conflict Termination Dataset* distinguishes seven different types of conflict terminations. We grouped war termination types into four variables: *Peace Agreement* (coded 1 if peace agreement resolved the conflict, 0 otherwise) and *Victory* (1 if one of the sides acknowledges defeat and surrenders, 0 otherwise), *Cease-fire* (1 (0) there is an (no) agreement between all or the main parties on the ending of military operations) and *Inconclusive* (coded as 1 if the conflict ended in another way or low activity, 0 otherwise). Note that about 27 per cent of all

terminations ended with the victory of one of the warring sides and 13 per cent with the conclusion of a negotiated peace agreement, while 9 per cent were cease-fires and 51 per cent of the conflicts wound up inconclusively.

As we distinguish between vertical power-sharing as a solution to conflicts over regional autonomy and horizontal power-sharing as a remedy for a civil war over the control of the central government, we rely on the UCDP to identify the original incompatibility between the rebels and the government. *Territorial (Governmental) Conflict* is coded as 1 if the war was over the control of territory (of government), 0 otherwise. Our study evaluates whether the adoption of PSI and arrangements consolidates peace and prevents a dyad from relapsing into conflict. *Recurrence* measures, based on information in the UCDP *Conflict Termination Dataset*, the risk that a dyadic conflict recurs within five years after the end of the war or not.

We restrict the analysis of the adoption of PSI to democratic countries and thus exclusively to the cases where these rules could have had the desired effect of growing inclusiveness and peace duration. The analysis relies partly on the *Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World (1946–2011)* dataset collected by Bormann and Golder⁵⁴ to identify post-conflict democracies and whether these democracy relied on PSI or not. The dataset uses the minimalist definition of democracy introduced by Przeworski et al.⁵⁵ according to which (i) the chief executive is elected, (ii) the legislature is elected, (iii) there is more than one party competing in elections and (iv) an alternation under identical electoral rules has taken place. We have, based on these categories, found that 39 out of 104 post-conflict countries can be classified as democracies. Relying on the dataset by Bormann and Golder, we also distinguish between *Parliamentary*, *Mixed* (semi-presidential) and *Presidential* democracies. We also used this source to code for the occurrence of elections and the type of *Electoral Systems* used before the start date of the conflict in order to trace whether there were any changes in the electoral systems or in the type of democracy before and after the conflict episodes. Table 2 details the kind of electoral rules for 99 legislative elections (and 53 presidential elections) analysed for a test of Hypotheses 1 and 2. Table A1 in the Appendix additionally specifies election dates and democratic electoral systems in post-conflict democracies.

In order to measure whether a country grants its subunits *de jure* some autonomy, we relied on *Database of Political Institutions (DPI)* compiled by the Development Research Group of the World Bank and the *Institutions and Election Project (IAEP)* dataset.⁵⁶ Of the 12 federal countries, we identified two federal post-conflict democracies, India and Venezuela. We also added, based on the DPI dataset, codes for several former unitary post-conflict democracies that have granted autonomy to some regions: Greece, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, Serbia and the UK.

In our study, we also aim to establish the *de facto* power-sharing. To this end, we need to identify whether the power status of the rebels has improved after the conflict or not. The first step in the construction of the two variables on horizontal and vertical PSA was the identification of the dominant ethnicity of the rebels using the UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia,⁵⁷ datasets and international organizations (Minorities at Risk Project, International Crisis Group, UNHCR Immigration and

TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS USED IN DEMOCRATIC LEGISLATIVE
AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT, 1946–2009

	Freq.	Per cent	Cum.
<i>Legislative electoral system</i>			
Plurality and majoritarian			
Single-member district plurality (SMDP)	26	26.26	26.26
Two-round system (TRS)	2	2.02	28.28
Alternative vote (AV)	0	0.00	28.28
Borda count (BC)	0	0.00	28.28
Block vote (BV)	4	4.04	32.32
Party block vote (PBV)	1	1.01	33.33
Limited vote (LV)	1	1.01	34.34
Single non-transferable vote (SNTV)	0	0.00	34.34
Proportional representation			
List PR (LPR)	54	54.55	88.89
Single transferable vote (STV)	0	0.00	0.00
Mixed			
Mixed dependent	6	6.06	94.95
Mixed independent	5	5.05	100.00
<i>N</i>	99	100.00	
<i>Presidential electoral system</i>			
Plurality (PL)	19	35.85	35.85
Absolute majority (AM)	17	32.08	67.92
Qualified majority (QM)	9	16.98	84.91
Electoral college (EC)	5	9.43	94.34
Alternative vote (AV)	3	5.66	100.00
Single transferable vote (STV)	0	0.00	100.00
<i>N</i>	53	100.00	

Sources: Based on Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946–2011 (Bormann and Golder 2013) and UCDP *Conflict Termination Dataset* v.2010-1, 1946–2009 by Kreutz (2010).

Refugee Board of Canada, Human Rights Watch, OECD, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization) as well as monographs and articles on specific countries. Second, we identified, using data from the EPR-ETH (Ethnic Power Relations) Version 2.0 Group-Level dataset, the status of the ethnic group. The status variables in this source contains the following categories: 1: Regional Autonomy; 2: Dominant; 3: Senior Partner; 4: Junior Partner; 5: Discriminated; 6: Separatist Autonomy; 7: Powerless; 8: State Collapse; 9: Monopoly; 10: Irrelevant. *Rebel Political Inclusion* (coded as Senior Partner or Junior Partner) and *Rebel Political Autonomy* (coded as Regional or Separatist Autonomy), which we coded five years after the conflict and one year before the start date of the conflict, traces the pre- and post-conflict status of the rebel organizations.

The empirical evaluation of *de jure* and *de facto* post-conflict PSI and arrangements will control for the influence of ethnicity. Some scholars suggest that ethnic diversity creates greater security concerns and that, as a consequence, the risk of conflict recurrence looms particularly large in ethnically divided societies.⁵⁸ However, Hartzell et al.⁵⁹ do not find support for this claim. Horowitz⁶⁰ points out that there is less violence in both highly homogeneous and highly heterogeneous

societies, which suggests that ethnic fractionalization may not have a negative effect on the preservation of peace in the post-conflict scenario. This claim motivated scholars to take a closer look at the impact of ethnic polarization on likelihood and intensity of conflict. Elbadawi⁶¹ as well as Montalvo and Reynal-Querol⁶² find that ethnically polarized societies have a higher risk of falling victim to a civil war. As power-sharing is traditionally portrayed as a remedy for highly diverse countries, we control for the ethnic structure of the countries under examination with two variables, *Fractionalization* and *Polarization*. We relied on the Hirschman-Herfindahl⁶³ measure of fractionalization (F) and on the Esteban-Ray⁶⁴ measure of polarization as adopted by Reynal-Querol (RQ):⁶⁵

$$F = \sum_{i=1}^N \pi_i(1 - \pi_i) \quad (1)$$

and

$$RQ = 4 \sum_{i=1}^N \pi_i^2(1 - \pi_i), \quad (2)$$

where π denotes the relative size of the relevant group, be they ethnically, religiously or linguistically defined. We relied on information on the number of groups and their size from the ETH Ethnic Power Relations (1946–2009) dataset (henceforth EPR-ETH).⁶⁶ Specifically, we used the GROUPSIZE variable from the group-level sub-dataset that calculates each ethnic group's population size relative to the host country's entire population. As the ethnic composition rarely changes, we took the most recent year to calculate fractionalization and polarization indices and included all ethnic groups identified in the dataset. The higher the value of either index is, the more polarized or fragmented the country under consideration is. Note that the two measures are not as closely correlated as the ones used in other studies; the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.40.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

This article evaluates post-conflict power-sharing in three steps. We will first evaluate the extent to which democracies have opted for inclusive rules (PSI) in the wake of a civil war. Next, the article assesses the extent to which the *de jure* power-sharing affects the *de facto* inclusiveness of the post-conflict political systems. The final step in our analysis is whether both *de jure* and *de facto* power-sharing reduce the risk of recurring civil conflict.

Determinants of PSI

The first hypothesis states that post-conflict institutional choices largely reflect the institutional setting before the conflict started and the outcome of the conflict. Our expectation that the constitutional choices after the end of a civil war are largely endogenous is at least partly supported. As Table 3 demonstrates, the institutional

TABLE 3
DETERMINANTS OF POST-CONFLICT PSI (MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION) 1946–2009

	Legislative electoral system			Presidential electoral system			Democracy type			Government structure		
	PR	MAJ	MIX	PL	AM	QM	PARL	MIX	PRES	FED	UNI	
<i>War outcome</i>												
Victory	0.048	-0.108	0.093	0.0476	-0.3409**	-0.046	-0.185*	-0.007	0.184*	-0.097**	0.097**	
Kendall's tau-b	0.103	0.097	0.118	0.145	0.101	0.136	0.089	0.101	0.096	0.038	0.038	
ASE												
Rebels victory	-0.134	0.126	0.031	-0.1845	0.4330	0.178	-0.327	0.509**	-0.048	-0.059	0.059	
Kendall's tau-b	0.226	0.233	0.229	0.258	0.206	0.298	0.100	0.166	0.227	0.077	0.077	
ASE												
Peace agreement	0.056	-0.072	0.022	-0.2157	0.4822***	-0.148	-0.207**	0.273***	0.033	-0.004	0.004	
Kendall's tau-b	0.103	0.100	0.109	0.121	0.133	0.113	0.085	0.128	0.102	0.042	0.042	
ASE												
Cease-fire	-0.209**	0.153	0.104	0.1792	0.0376	-0.160	0.098	-0.026	-0.079	0.032	-0.032	
Kendall's tau-b	0.098	0.110	0.130	0.150	0.147	0.044	0.105	0.094	0.101	0.046	0.046	
ASE												
Inconclusive	0.051	0.048	-0.162	0.0359	-0.1401	0.271*	0.248**	-0.191*	-0.123	0.070	-0.070	
Kendall's tau-b	0.104	0.104	0.092	0.143	0.138	0.141	0.099	0.088	0.101	0.042	0.042	
ASE												
<i>Ethnic structure</i>												
Fractionalization	-0.160	0.282***	-0.172**	-0.0923	-0.0925	0.426***	0.408***	-0.136*	-0.314***	0.352***	-0.352***	
Kendall's tau-b	0.085	0.084	0.066	0.117	0.119	0.074	0.071	0.077	0.076	0.085	0.101	
ASE												
Polarization	0.291***	-0.241***	-0.096	-0.1208	-0.1377	0.505***	0.110	-0.114	-0.007	0.007	-0.007	
Kendall's tau-b	0.077	0.076	0.067	0.113	0.116	0.075	0.117	0.089	0.085	0.045	0.101	
ASE												
<i>Some institutions before war</i>												
Kendall's tau-b	0.843***	0.843***	0.5343***	0.897***	0.6022***	0.920***	0.897***	0.602***	0.920***	0.942***	0.942***	
ASE	0.060	0.057	0.167	0.067	0.180	0.076	0.067	0.180	0.076	0.018	0.018	

Notes: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$. ASE = Asymptotic standard error.

legacy of a country strongly determines the rules that it adopts or continues to use after a conflict. In other words, if a war-torn country relied on proportional representation before the war, it is highly probable that it employs such a purportedly inclusive institution after the end of the bloodshed, too, in case it stays democratic. This also implies more generally that the cases where a democracy opted for the institutional *status quo* outnumber the constitutional changes by far, as Table 3 demonstrates.

About 90 per cent of the first post-conflict parliamentary elections relied for instance on the same electoral system as the one that was in place before the conflict. Of the four countries for which we observe a change in the electoral system, two moved from a majoritarian system to proportional representation (Argentina, 1965 and Sri Lanka, 1989), one from a majoritarian to a mixed electoral system (Philippines, 1998) and another from PR to a mixed electoral system (Venezuela, 1993).⁶⁷

Moves between parliamentarism to presidentialism, a majoritarian institution in the absence of some special quorum, are even less frequent. Sierra Leone shifted from the former to the latter system in the mid-1990s, Sri Lanka had made the equivalent transition in the legislative elections of 1989 after the internal conflict with EPRLF and TELO, and Suriname also opted for a Presidential system in the beginning of the 1990s after the conflict with SLA, ending it in pre-conflict parliamentary tradition. Introducing a federalist structure or granting autonomy to some regions is more widespread, but still not overly frequent. Ethiopia (1994), Iraq (2003), Malaysia (1963) and Nepal (2007) moved from a unitary to a federal system, while five countries strengthened the powers of some regions five years after the end of a civil war: Myanmar (2011), Pakistan (1948), the UK (1998), Moldova (1995) and Democratic Republic of Congo (2003).

In the light of the persistence of the institutional *status quo*, it is not surprising that the war outcome does not seem to be a strong correlate of the choice of the electoral system. Cease-fires exert, somehow surprisingly, a negative effect on the chance that a post-conflict society opts for proportional representation; only 37 per cent of all conflicts endings with a cease-fire result in legislative election that rely on this institution. This constitutional choice is more frequent after conflicts that ended inconclusively (49 per cent), and even less frequent after victories (24 per cent) or peace agreements (21 per cent).

The association between conflict termination and the type of democracy are more in line with our theoretical expectation. The chance that the constitution makers opt for a presidential system or a unitary system grows after a victory by either the government or the rebel forces after the conflict. Note, however, that presidential democracies and thus majoritarian systems are far more likely to experience a civil war than parliamentary ones, as Schneider and Wiesehomeier report.⁶⁸ It is also not surprising that the ethnic structure of a country is closely associated with some of the rules that democracies use. Although it is impossible to disentangle any causal relationship in the cross-sectional design used here, note that fractionalization is positively associated with majoritarianism, the usage of qualified majority systems in presidential elections, parliamentarism as well as federalism.

Polarization, conversely, is positively associated with the usage of PR and negatively with majoritarian electoral system.

In sum, the quantitative and qualitative evidence provided on the constitutional choices in the aftermath of civil wars suggest that discussions on the introduction of PSI seem to be largely an academic exercise. In most cases, countries which were democratic before the war relied on the same rules again.

Determinants of PSA and War Recurrence

The usage of the Lijphartian institutional recommendations does not yet guarantee that the political system is sufficiently inclusive to prevent a renewal of the civil conflict. The last part of our empirical inquiry therefore tests whether vertical and horizontal PSI (federalism and PR) increase the power of the rebels after a conflict and whether these rules and the power distribution possibly resulting from them influence the risk of war recurrence.

The results show that rebels were becoming part of the central government after a conflict in several instances: Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Nigeria, Pakistan and South Yemen. Some wars improved their already existent power-sharing status before the conflict (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Chad and Ghana). However, some ethnic groups shifted from being a partner before the conflict to obtaining a dominant position like the Alawites in Syria in the second half of the 1960s. Conflicts also help formerly discriminated or powerless ethnic groups to gain *de facto* autonomy like in Myanmar and Philippines.⁶⁹

In order to examine these changes in rebel groups' real power in the post-conflict period, we use two-stage probit models. The first stage of these regressions examines whether power-sharing rules or arrangements as well as the ethnic diversity of a conflict have influenced the onset of a governmental or a territorial conflict. Based on EPR-ETH Version 2.0 Group-Level dataset and our matching efforts as described in the research design, *Rebels Exclusion* measures the pre-war status of the rebels. It is coded as 1 if ethnic group was 'Discriminated', 'Powerless' or 'Irrelevant'. The second step considers the impact of the conflict type outcomes and the appropriate PSI on the chance that rebels will be included in the federal (Grand Coalitions) or regional post-conflict power game (autonomy). Using EPR-ETH data again, we created two dependent variables: (i) *Grand Coalitions* is coded 1 if rebels' ethnic group changed its status from 'Discriminated', 'Powerless' and 'Irrelevant' to 'Senior Partner' or 'Junior Partner' or if moved from 'Junior Partner' to 'Senior Partner' in the first five years after the conflict in comparison to the pre-war situation; (ii) *Autonomy* is coded as 1 if the rebels gained within the same time frame 'Regional' or 'Separatist Autonomy'. We report the results of the two-stage probit model in [Table 4](#). The standard errors are adjusted for clustering on dyads.

The results reported in [Table 4](#) show that power-sharing rules might be a mixed blessing. While proportional representation is not associated with the risk that a conflict is governmental by nature, it also does not systematically influence the chance that the power status of the rebels improves following a conflict (Model 3). An improved political status is, however, a consequence of the mode in which a war

TABLE 4
DETERMINANTS OF CHANGES IN PSA AFTER CONFLICT AND TWO-STAGE PROBIT REGRESSION, 1946–2009

<i>De facto</i> grand coalitions	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Gov. conflict	Gained inclusion	Gov. conflict	Gained inclusion	Gov. conflict	Gained inclusion
Fractionalization	-1.323*** (0.389)		-1.264*** (0.401)		-0.259 (1.103)	
Polarization	-0.553 (0.385)		-0.634 (0.391)		0.661 (1.271)	
PR before					0.859 (0.678)	
Rebel exclusion	-0.987*** (0.183)	0.332 (0.301)	-0.983*** (0.184)		-2.210*** (0.669)	
Rebel victory						
Peace agreement						
PR				0.472* (0.280)		
Constant	1.542 (0.246)	-1.710 (0.121)	1.572 (0.251)	-1.711 (0.126)	0.368 (0.509)	0.244 (0.820)
<i>N</i>	393		365		52	-1.933 (0.663)
Log-likelihood	-302.701		-283.670		-23.744	
Wald χ^2	48.21		47.01		41.56	
Rho	0.395 (0.1151)		0.437 (0.141)		0.999 (0.004)	
χ^2 (Rho)	5.530		7.244		0.517	
<i>De facto</i> autonomy						
	Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Territorial conflict	Gained autonomy	Territorial conflict	Gained autonomy	Territorial conflict	Gained autonomy
Fractionalization	0.753* (0.440)		0.758* (0.439)		0.749* (0.439)	
Polarization	0.821** (0.400)		0.808** (0.398)		0.820** (0.400)	
Federalism before	0.770*** (0.251)		0.767*** (0.250)		0.772*** (0.251)	
Rebel exclusion	0.917*** (0.189)		0.917*** (0.188)		0.916*** (0.189)	
Rebel victory		0.341 (0.304)				
Peace agreement						
Federalism				0.484* (0.273)		
Constant	-1.533 (0.245)	0.171 (0.274)	-1.529 (0.245)	0.120 (0.268)	-1.531 (0.245)	0.134 (0.267)
<i>N</i>	391	-1.744 (0.140)	391	-1.769 (0.142)	391	-1.686 (0.122)
Log-Likelihood	-293.152		-292.188		-293.759	
Wald χ^2	55.14		54.95		53.64	
Rho	-0.480 (0.119)		-0.519 (0.115)		-0.503 (0.114)	
χ^2 (Rho)	11.436		13.389		13.101	

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$.

ended. *De facto* horizontal power sharing (Grand Coalitions) becomes more likely in the aftermath of a peace agreement (Model 2), but is not systematically linked to the few instance of a rebel victory (Model 1). Note also that a conflict is more likely in ethnically relatively homogenous countries, but that the risk of a territorial conflict by comparison grows in ethnic diversity. Both fractionalization and polarization increase the risk that a country experiences this type of armed violence (Models 4–6). Hence, ethnically powerful minorities will rather try to control a territory than attempting to challenge the central government. The same logic that groups strategically choose the kind of conflict in which they can succeed also become obvious in the negative association of the variables *Rebel Exclusion* in the model on governmental conflict and the reverse sign in the models on territorial conflict. Model 5 also shows that *de facto* PSA (Grand Coalitions) are exogenous to the conflict outcome. This means that governments only tend to accept rebels as junior or senior partners in the government if they were not entirely successful in their attempt to quell the rebellion in the first place.

The last step in our analysis is to test whether PSA and PSI reduce the risk of war recurrence. As Table 5 shows, such a positive influence is only visible for governmental conflicts. Promoting rebels that were marginalized before the conflict to junior or senior positions in the government reduces the risk that a conflict recurs. However, granting political autonomy to some regions – or being forced to accept quasi-autonomy – increases the danger that the government finds itself in a new war with the same rebel groups. This relationship supports the concerns of some recent studies which do not support the early optimism that federal arrangements might be a pacifying force. Note finally that *de jure* power-sharing does not have a systematic effect on the risk of a new war at all.

CONCLUSION

This article has re-examined the hope advanced by many intergovernmental organizations, Western governments and academic experts that power-sharing rules increase the inclusiveness of political decision making and, by extension, help stabilizing fragile societies. Our evaluation has established severe limitations of the peace-through-power-sharing vision dearly held by parts of the international conflict management elite. While not questioning the possibility to pacify divided countries preventively, our quantitative evaluation showed that the establishment of PSI and PSA are endogenous to the war outcome and the rules that governed the society before the armed conflict. More specifically, the analysis has demonstrated that the chance of a society opting for two key components of power-sharing, proportional representation or federalism, crucially hinges on whether or not it used these rules already before the violence erupted. The *de facto* power of the former rebels similarly only improved following a peace agreement and therefore a negotiated settlement of the conflict to which both sides agreed. Second, rules for horizontal power-sharing do neither affect the real inclusiveness of policy-making in the post-conflict societies nor do they reduce the risk that a war recurs. Third, while the co-optation of rebels into the central government reduces the risk of a recurrent conflict,

TABLE 5
DETERMINANTS OF WAR RECURRENCE AFTER CONFLICT (TWO-STAGE PROBIT REGRESSION), 1946–2009.

	Conflict occurrence	Recurrence	Conflict occurrence	Recurrence
<i>Governmental conflict</i>				
Fractionalization	-1.823* (0.988)		-1.811* (1.003)	
Polarization	1.040 (0.812)		1.087 (0.823)	
PR before	0.375 (0.5603)		0.373 (0.558)	
Rebel exclusion	-1.782*** (0.433)		-1.809*** (0.433)	
Rebel victory		-6.360*** (0.268)		-0.199 (0.549)
Peace agreement		-6.280*** (0.276)		-5.911*** (0.401)
<i>De facto grand coalitions</i>				
PR		0.483 (0.526)		0.488 (0.519)
Constant	1.260 (0.493)	-1.679 (0.469)	1.232 (0.499)	-1.674 (0.505)
N		65		65
Log-likelihood		-38.046		-38.335
Wald χ^2		783.20		679.88
<i>Territorial conflict</i>				
Fractionalization	0.546 (0.457)		0.552 (0.457)	
Polarization	1.144 (0.397)		1.132*** (0.398)	
Federalism before	1.113*** (0.253)		1.110*** (0.252)	
Rebel exclusion	0.843*** (0.199)		0.842*** (0.201)	
Rebel victory		-0.586 (0.371)		
Peace agreement		0.734* (0.444)		-0.169 (0.356)
<i>De facto autonomy</i>				
Federalism		0.088 (0.404)		0.603 (0.451)
Constant	-1.651 (0.245)	-1.550 (0.124)	-1.648 (0.245)	0.116 (0.405)
N		357		357
Log likelihood		-280.752		-281.498
Wald χ^2				

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$.

granting autonomy to rebel territories or accepting their *de facto* independence increases the risk of a civil war recurrence.

Obviously, our statistical evidence has to be taken *cum grano salis* as the number of cases examined is relatively small and especially the number of institutional changes made in the aftermath of conflict is limited. The article nevertheless suggests that the international community should avoid recommending the adaptation of power-sharing or of some of its key components without taking stock of the dominant cleavages within a society in the first place. Power-sharing might only be helpful if it softens the identification with a particular group. While this might, according to Huber,⁷⁰ be a consequence of proportional representation, not all forms of power-sharing might have the desired pacifying effect frequently associated with them.

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NOTES

1. According to Bormann and Golder's dataset *Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World*, which we introduce later, Argentina used PR for the first time during the legislative elections of 7 July 1963, Sri Lanka on 15 February 1989.
2. A. Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1977).
3. J. Horowitz, *Power-Sharing in Kenya: Power-Sharing Agreements, Negotiations and Peace Processes* (Oslo: Centre for the Study of Civil War 2008); B. O'Leary, 'Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments' in S. J. R. Noel (ed.) *From Power Sharing to Democracy. Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 2005); T. D. Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*. (Washington, WA: United States Institute of Peace 1996); and A. Wimmer, R. J. Goldstone, D. L. Horowitz, U. Joras, and C. Schetter, *Facing Ethnic Conflicts. Toward a New Realism*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman Littlefield Publishers 2004).
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6. Lijphart (note 2).
7. P. Norris, *Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2008).
8. Horowitz (note 3); O'Leary (note 3); Sisk (note 3); and Wimmer (note 3).
9. M. Reynal-Querol, 'Does Democracy Preempt Civil Wars?' *European Journal of Political Economy* 21/2 (2005) pp.445–65.
10. J. Esteban and D. Ray, 'On the Measurement of Polarization', *Econometrica* 62/4 (1994) pp.819–51.
11. Schneider and Wiesehomeier (note 4).
12. D. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1985) and D. Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1991).

13. Lustick *et al.* (note 5).
14. J. D. Huber, 'Measuring Ethnic Voting: Do Proportional Electoral Laws Politicize Ethnicity?' *American Journal of Political Science* 56/4 (2012) pp.986–1001.
15. This suggests in his view quite ironically that Horowitz (note 12) should have advocated proportional representation rather than vote-pooling institutions in order to depoliticize ethnicity.
16. Hartzell and Hoddie defined power-sharing provisions broadly as 'rules that, in addition to defining how decisions will be made by groups within the polity, allocate decision-making rights, including access to state resources, among collectivities competing for power' C. Hartzell, M. Hoddie, and D. Rothchild, 'Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables', *International Organization* 55/1 (2001) pp.183–208. The main goal of power-sharing provisions included in peace agreements is to ensure that none of the parties has a dominant position over another, which in turn will help minimize the danger of war recurrence.
17. Walter finds that territorial and political power-sharing pacts increase the chance that a peace agreement is both signed and implemented. Jarstad and Nilsson, as well as DeRouen *et al.* demonstrate that military and territorial power-sharing expands the duration of such agreements, while Hartzell and Hoddie stress that multiple power-sharing provisions in settlements play an important role in the durability of peace. B. Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2002); A. K. Jarstad and D. Nilsson, 'From Words to Deeds: The Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25/3 (2008) pp.206–23; K. DeRouen, L. Jenna, and P. Wallensteen. 'The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26/4 (2009) pp.367–87; and C. Hartzell and M. Hoodie, 'Crafting Peace: Power Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Resolution of Civil Wars' (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press 2007).
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20. B. Mukherjee, 'Why Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolutions of Some Civil Wars, But Not on Others?' *International Studies Quarterly* 50/2 (2006) pp.479–504.
21. DeRouen *et al.* (note 17); Hartzell and Hoddie (note 17); Jarstad and Nilsson (note 17); Walter (note 17); Mukherjee (note 20); M. Mattes and B. Savun, 'Fostering Peace After Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design', *International Studies Quarterly* 53/3 (2009) pp.737–59; S. Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes', *International Security* 22/2 (1997) pp.5–53; S. Stedman, S. John, D. Rothchild, and E. Cousins, (eds) *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (New York, NY: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2002); and Walter (note 17).
22. R. H. Wagner, 'The Causes of Peace' in R. Licklider, *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End* (New York: New York University Press 1993) pp.235–68; R. Licklider, 'The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993', *American Political Science Review* 89/3 (1995) pp.681–90; D. Toft, *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2010); and T. D. Mason, *Sustaining the Peace after Civil War* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College 2007).
23. DeRouen *et al.* (note 17); Mukherjee (note 20); Mattes and Savun (note 21); Hartzell and Hoodie (note 17); and I. Svensson. 'Who Brings Which Peace? Neutral Versus Biased Mediation and Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53/3 (2009) pp.449–69.
24. see Schneider and Wiesehomeier (note 4); A. Mehler, 'Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not-So-Obvious Relationship', *African Affairs* 108/432 (2009) pp.453–73.
25. J. Elster 'Constitution Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea', *Public Administration* 71/1–2 (1993) pp.169–217.
26. C. Boix, 'Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies', *American Political Science Review* 93/3 (1999) pp.609–24, for instance advocated the position that ethnic and religious fractionalization promotes the adoption of proportional representation; T. Brambor,

- W. Clark, and M. Golder. 'Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses', *Political Analysis* 14/1 (2006) pp.63–82, challenge this result.
27. Norris (note 7). For more about definitions and classification of different types of electoral systems, see A. Reynolds, B. Reilly, and A. Ellis, *International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System* (Stockholm: International IDEA Design 2005).
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 30. e.g., Horowitz (note 15).
 31. Norris (note 7).
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 36. For a more extensive discussion about the pros and cons of broad inclusion, see A. K. Jarstad, 'Dilemmas of War-to-Democracy Transitions: Theories and Concepts' in A. K. Jarstad and T. Sisk (eds) *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008) pp.17–36.
 37. T. R. Gurr, *People Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press 2000) and Stedman (note 21).
 38. D. Slater and E. Simmons, 'Coping by Colluding: Political Uncertainty and Promiscuous Powersharing in Indonesia and Bolivia', *Comparative Political Studies* 46/11 (2013) pp.1366–93.
 39. A. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press 1999) p.185.
 40. D. Treisman, *The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2007).
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 42. Hartzell and Hoddie (note 17).
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 47. J. Darby and J. Madhav, *Introducing the Peace Accords Matrix: A Database of Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Their Implementation, 1989–2006*, Paper presented at 53rd annual convention of ISA, San Diego, USA, 2012.
 48. T. Chapman and P. G. Roeder, 'Partition as a Solution to Wars of Nationalism: The Importance of Institutions', *American Political Science Review* 101/ 4 (2007) pp.677–91.
 49. T. Christin and S. Hug, 'Federalism, the Geographic Location of Groups, and Conflict', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 29/1 (2012) pp.93–122.
 50. Lake and Rothchild, for example, find that regional autonomy can only serve as an interim solution, unclear are the long-term prospects for peace achieved initially by regional autonomy. D. A. Lake and D. Rothchild, 'Territorial Decentralization and Civil War Settlements' in P. G. Roeder and D. S. Rothchild (eds) *Sustainable Peace: Power And Democracy After Civil Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2005).
 51. J. Kreutz, 'How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset', *Journal of Peace Research* 47/2 (2010) pp. 243–50.
 52. The UCDP definitions are available online at <http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/55/55267_Codebook_UCDP_Conflict_Termination_Dataset_v_1.0.pdf>.

53. Technically, the statistical analysis uses the conflict dyad as a unit of analysis. In other words, each line in our dataset is a separate conflict termination based on the UCDP dataset. As some countries experienced several, often overlapping conflicts with different rebel groups within their borders, only taking into account one conflict with one rebel group would result in the omission of many important conflict ends and the subsequent constitutional choices. An exclusive focus on particularly intensive conflicts would also bias the results as peace accords with one rebel group often overlap with continuing wars a government leads against other insurgent troops. The selection of those conflicts for which peace years do not overlap with war years of other conflicts is not a convincing choice either, as it would exclude several important conflicts from our analysis. We therefore decided to treat each conflict in our sample as equally important.
54. N. Bormann and M. Golder, 'Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946–2011', *Electoral Studies* 32 (2013) pp.360–69. The codebook is available online at <https://files.nyu.edu/mrg217/public/es3_codebook.pdf>.
55. A. Przeworski, M. E. Alvarez, J. A. Cheibub, F. Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy 2000); see also J. A. Cheibub, J. Gandhi, and J. R. Vreeland, 'Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited', *Public Choice* 2010 143/1–2 (2010) pp.67–101.
56. P. Keefer, DPI2010. *Database of Political Institutions: Changes and Variable Definitions* (Development Research Group, World Bank 2010) and T. Beck, G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer and P. Walsh, 'New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions', *World Bank Economic Review* 15 (2001) pp.165–76 describe an earlier version of this resource. The Institutions and Election Project (IAEP), which is described in P. M. Regan, R. W. Frank, and D. H. Clark (eds) 'Political Institutions and Elections: New Datasets', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26/3 (2009) pp.320–37, is available online at <<http://www2.binghamton.edu/political-science/institutions-and-elections-project.html>>. Note that we used common resources like the *CIA World Factbook* to update or complement these sources where necessary.
57. Available online at <www.ucdp.uu.se/database>.
58. T. R. Gurr, 'Ethnic Warfare and the Changing Priorities of Global Security', *Mediterranean Quarterly* 1/1 (1990) pp.82–98; R. Licklider, *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End* (New York, NY: New York University Press 1993); and Chaim C. Kaufmann, 'Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars', *International Security* 20/4 (1996) pp.136–75.
59. Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (note 16).
60. Horowitz (note 12).
61. Ibrahim I. A. Elbadawi, *Civil Wars and Poverty: The Role of External Interventions, Political Rights and Economic Growth*, Paper presented at the World Bank's conference on 'Civil Conflicts, Crime and Violence,' Feb., Washington, DC, 1999.
62. For example, J. G. Montalvo and M. Reynal-Querol, 'Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars', *UPF Economics and Business Working Paper* 770 (2004).
63. A. O. Hirschman, 'The Paternity of an Index', *American Economic Review* 54/5 (1964) p.761.
64. Esteban and Ray (note 10).
65. Reynal-Querol (note 9); J. Esteban and G. Schneider, 'Polarization and Conflict: Theoretical and Empirical Issues', *Journal of Peace Research* 45/2 (2008) pp.131–41, among others, provide a non-technical introduction to these measures.
66. We used the EPR-ETH data (Version 2.0) that are available in research-ready country-year and group-year format from the GROW^{UP} Research Front-End data portal, online at <<http://www.icr.ethz.ch/data/growup/epr-eth>>.
67. The first presidential elections also relied most often on the same rules. Interestingly, however, Argentina changed its electoral system three times after violent internal episodes: from Plurality (PL) to Electoral College (EC) in 1958, from EC to Absolute Majority (AM), and again to EC in 1983. We find one change from Plurality to Absolute Majority (Columbia, 1994) and one from Qualified Majority (QM) to AM (Guatemala, 1999), respectively.
68. See Schneider and Wiesehomeier (note 4).
69. Conflicts with NMSP (1 January 1959–31 December 1963) and SNUF (1 January 1962–31 December 1963) in Myanmar led to separatist autonomy of Mons and Shans, or conflict with MIM in the Philippines to separatist autonomy of the Moro people (Bangsamoro).
70. Huber (note 14).

TABLE A1
ELECTION DATES AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTORAL SYSTEMS FOLLOWING THE END OF CONFLICT, 1946–2009

COUNTRY	REBELS	Conflict Years	Outcome	DEMO Type	LEG EL DATE	ES Type	PRES EL DATE	ES Type	GOV
Argentina	ERP	1974–77	GVC	PRES	10/30/83	LPR	10/30/83	EC	UNI
Argentina	Military faction (Colorados)	1963	GVC	PRES	3/17/65	LPR	7/7/63	EC	UNI
Argentina	Military faction (forces of Eduardo A. Lonardi Doucet)	1955	RVC	PRES	2/23/58	LV	2/23/58	EC	UNI
Argentina	Montoneros	1975–77	GVC	PRES	10/30/83	LPR	10/30/83	EC	UNI
Bangladesh	JSS/SB	1975–92	CF	PAR	2/15/96	SMDP			UNI
Burundi	CNDD-FDD	1998–2003	PA	PRES	7/4/05	LPR			UNI
Burundi	Palipehutu	1991–92	INC	PRES	6/29/93	LPR	6/1/93		UNI
Colombia	ELN	1973	INC	PRES	4/21/74	LPR	4/21/74	PL	UNI
Colombia	EPL	1987–90	PA	PRES	10/27/91	LPR	5/29/94	AM	UNI
Colombia	FARC	2004	INC	PRES	3/12/06	LPR	5/28/06	AM	UNI
Colombia	M-19	1974–2009*	INC	PRES	3/14/10	LPR	4/21/74	PL	UNI
Colombia	M-19	1981–86	INC	PRES	3/9/86	LPR	5/27/90	PL	UNI
Colombia	Serbian Republic of Krajina	1988	PA	PRES	3/11/90	LPR	5/27/90	PL	UNI
Croatia	Serbian Republic of Krajina	1992–93	CF	MIX	10/29/95	MIX	6/15/97	AM	UNI
Croatia	Serbian Republic of Krajina	1995	PA	MIX	1/3/00	LPR	6/15/97	AM	UNI
Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	Katanga	1960–62	GVC	PRES	12/8/63	PBV			UNI
Dominican Republic	Military faction /Constitutionalists	1965	PA	PRES	6/1/66	LPR	6/1/66	PL	UNI
El Salvador	ERP	1979	INC	PRES	3/31/85	LPR	3/25/84	AM	UNI
El Salvador	FPL	1979	INC	PRES	3/31/85	LPR	3/25/84	AM	UNI
France	OAS	1961–62	INC	MIX	11/18/62	TRS	12/5/65	AM	UNI
Greece	DSE	1946–49	GVC	PAR	3/5/50	LPR			AUT
Guatemala	EGP	1975–81	INC	PRES	3/7/82	LPR	3/7/82	QM	UNI
Guatemala	FAR I	1963	INC	PRES	3/6/66	LPR	3/6/66	QM	UNI
Guatemala	FAR I	1965–74	INC	PRES	3/5/78	LPR	3/5/78	QM	UNI
Guatemala	FAR I	1981	INC	PRES	3/7/82	LPR	3/7/82	QM	UNI
Guatemala	FAR II	1970–81	INC	PRES	3/7/82	LPR	3/7/82	QM	UNI
Guatemala	Forces of Carlos Castillo Armas	1954	RVC	PRES	1/19/58	LPR	1/19/58	QM	UNI

TABLE A1 – Continued

COUNTRY	REBELS	Conflict Years	Outcome	DEMO Type	LEG EL DATE	ES Type	PRES EL EC DATE	ES Type	GOV
Guatemala	Military faction	1949	GVC	PRES	12/16/50	LPR	11/12/50	QM	UNI
Guatemala	ORPA	1979–81	INC	PRES	3/7/82	LPR	3/7/82	QM	UNI
Guatemala	URNNG	1982–95	PA	PRES	11/7/99	LPR	11/7/99	AM	UNI
Guinea-Bissau	Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice	1998–99	RVC	MIX	11/28/99	LPR			UNI
India	CPI	1948–51	PA	PAR	10/25/51–2/21/52	SMDP			FED
India	CPI - ML	1969–71	INC	PAR	3/1/73–3/13/71	SMDP			FED
India	NLFT	1995	INC	PAR	4/27/96–5/4/96	SMDP			FED
India	NINC	1956–59	INC	PAR	2/16/62–6/6/62	SMDP			FED
India	PLA	1982–88	INC	PAR	10/22/89–10/26/89	SMDP			FED
India	PLA	1998	INC	PAR	9/5/99–10/3/99	SMDP			FED
India	TNV	1979–88	PA	PAR	10/22–10/26/89	SMDP			FED
India	UNLF	1997	INC	PAR	2/16/98–3/7/98	SMDP			FED
Indonesia	Fretilin	1997–98	PA	PRES	6/7/99	LPR			UNI
Indonesia	GAM	1999–2005	PA	PRES	4/9/09	LPR	7/8/09	AM	AUT
Israel	AMB	2002–04	INC	PAR	3/28/06	LPR			UNI
Israel	Fatah	2005–07	PA	PAR	2/10/09	LPR			UNI
Israel	Non PLO groups	1965–73	INC	PAR	12/31/73	LPR			UNI
Israel	Palestinian insurgents	1949–64	INC	PAR	11/2/65	LPR			UNI
Israel	PFLP	1989	INC	PAR	6/23/92	LPR			UNI
Israel	PFLP–GC	1989	INC	PAR	6/23/92	LPR			UNI
Israel	PNA	1996	INC	PAR	5/17/99	LPR			UNI
Israel	PNA	2000–02	CF	PAR	1/28/03	LPR			UNI
Lebanon	Independent Nasserite Movement / Mourabitoun militia	1958	GVC	PAR	7/2/60	BV			UNI
Liberia	LURD	2000–03	PA	PRES	10/11/05	SMDP	10/11/05	AM	UNI
Liberia	MODEL	2003	PA	PRES	10/11/05	SMDP	10/11/05	AM	UNI
Macedonia	UCK	2001	PA	MIX	9/15/02	LPR	4/14/04	AM	UNI
Mali	FIAA	1994	INC	MIX	4/13/97	TRS	5/11/97	AM	UNI
Myanmar	CPB–RF	1948–50	INC	PAR	10/16/51	BV			UNI
Myanmar	NSH	1959	INC	PAR	2/6/60	BV			UNI

Myanmar	PVO - "White Band" faction	1948-53	INC	PAR	4/27/56	UNI
Niger	CRA	1994	PA	MIX	1/12/95	UNI
Niger	FLAA	1991-92	PA	MIX	2/14/93	UNI
Nigeria	Boko Haram	2009*	CF	PRES	4/9/11	PL
Nigeria	NDPVF	2004	CF	PRES	4/21/07	PL
Pakistan	MQM	1990	INC	PAR	10/6/93	AUT
Pakistan	MQM	1995-96	INC	PAR	2/3/97	AUT
Pakistan	TNSM	2007	INC	PAR	2/18/08	AUT
Papua New Guinea	BRA	1989-90	CF	PAR	6/13/92-6/27/92	UNI
Papua New Guinea	BRA	1992-96	CF	PAR	6/14/97-6/28/97	UNI
Paraguay	Military Faction (forces of Andres Rodriguez)	1989	RVC	PRES	5/1/89	PL
Peru	Sendero Luminoso	1982-99	CF	PRES	4/8/01	UNI
Philippines	ASG	1993-98	INC	PRES	5/14/01	AUT
Philippines	CPP	1997	CF	PRES	5/11/98	AUT
Philippines	CPP	1999-2009*	CF	PRES	5/10/10	AUT
Philippines	HUK	1946-54	INC	PRES	11/12/57	UNI
Philippines	MILF	1994	CF	PRES	5/8/95	PL
Philippines	MILF	1996-2005	INC	PRES	5/14/07	PL
Philippines	MILF	2001-02	GVC	PRES	5/10/04	PL
Philippines	MNLF - NM	1989	RVC	MIX	5/20/90	PL
Romania	NSF	1989	GVC	MIX	9/24/00	AM
Serbia (Yugoslavia)	UCK	1998-99	PA	MIX	5/14/02	AM
Sierra Leone	RUF	1991-2000	PA	PRES	5/14/02	QM
Spain	ETA	1978-82	INC	PAR	6/22/86	UNI
Spain	ETA	1985-87	INC	PAR	10/29/89	UNI
Spain	ETA	1991-92	INC	PAR	6/6/93	UNI
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	EPRLF	1985	INC	PRES	2/15/89	UNI
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	JVP	1989-90	GVC	PRES	8/16/94	UNI
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	LTTE	2003	INC	PRES	4/2/04	AV
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	LTTE	2005-09*	INC	PRES	4/8/10	AV
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	TELO	1984-85	INC	PRES	2/15/89	UNI
Suriname	SLA	1987	CF	PRES	5/25/91	UNI
Thailand	Patani insurgents	2003-09*	CF	PAR	7/3/11	UNI
Trinidad and Tobago	Jamaat al-Muslimineen	1990	GVC	PAR	12/16/91	UNI
Turkey	Devrimci Sol	1991-92	INC	PAR	12/24/95	UNI

TABLE A1 – Continued

COUNTRY	REBELS	Conflict Years	Outcome	DEMO Type	LEG EL DATE	ES Type	PRES DATE	ES Type	GOV
Turkey	MKP	2005	GVC	PAR	7/22/07	LPR			UNI
Turkey	PKK/Kadek/KONGRA-GEL	1984–2009*		PAR	6/12/11	LPR			UNI
Uganda	UNLF	1979	RVC	PRES	12/10/80	SMDP			UNI
United Kingdom	PIRA	1971–91	INC	PAR	4/9/92	SMDP			UNI
United Kingdom	RIRA	1998	CF	PAR	6/7/01	SMDP			AUT
United States of America	al-Qaida (The Base)	2004–09*		PRES	11/2/04	SMDP	11/4/08	EC	FED
Venezuela	Bandera Roja	1982	GVC	PRES	12/4/83	LPR	12/4/83	PL	FED
Venezuela	Military faction (forces of Hugo Chávez)	1992	GVC	PRES	12/5/93	MIX	12/5/93	PL	FED
Venezuela	Military faction (navy)	1962	GVC	PRES	12/1/63	LPR	12/1/63	PL	FED

Sources: UCDDP Conflict Termination dataset v.2010–1, 1946–2009 (Kreutz, note 51); Institutions and Election Project (IAEP) (Regan and Clark, note 56), Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946–2011 (Borrmann and Golder, note 54); Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Kefer, note 56).

* Note on variables: **War Outcomes** (column 4): GVC - Government Victory, RVC - Rebel Victory, PA - Peace Agreement, CF - Ceasefire, INC - Inconclusive; **Democracy Type** (column 5): PRES - Presidential democracy, MIX - Semi-presidential, PAR - Parliamentary; **Legislative Electoral Systems** (column 7): LPR - List PR, BV - Block Vote, LV - Limited Vote, MIX - Mixed dependent and Mixed independent, PBV - Party Block Vote, SMDP - Single-Member District Plurality, TRS - Two-Round System; **Presidential Electoral Systems** (column 9): PL - Plurality, AM - Absolute Majority, QM - Qualified Majority, EC - Electoral College, AV - Alternative Vote; **Governmental Structure (GOV)**: UNI - unitary system, FED - federal, AUT - autonomous regions.

TABLE A2
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AFTER CONFLICT, 1946–2009

Country	Dates	Conflict(s)			Before	After
		Rebels	Outcome			
Changes in Legislative Electoral System						
Argentina	4/2/1963–9/22/1963	Colorados	GVC	Majoritarian (LV) (3/18/1962)	PR (list) legislative (3/17/1965)	
Sri Lanka	5/4–12/31/1985	EPRLF	INC	SMDP (7/21/1977)	PR (List) (2/15/1989)	
Philippines	11/20/ 1984–12/12/ 1985 12/21–12/22/1997	TELO CPP	INC CF	SMDP (5/8/1995)	Mix type (correction) (5/11/1998)	
Venezuela	2/4/92–11/29/92	Military faction (forces of Hugo Chávez)	GVC	PR (list) 12/4/1988	Mixed (mix type: fusion) (12/5/1993)	
Changes in Presidential Electoral System						
Argentina	6/16/55–9/19/55	Military faction (forces of Eduardo A. Lonardi Doucet)	RVC	PL (11/11/1951)	EC (2/23/1958)	
Argentina	8/11/74–12/31/77 10/5/75–12/31/77	ERP Montoneros	GVC GVC	AM (9/23/1973)	EC (10/30/1983)	
Colombia	4/21/87–7/27/90	EPL	PA	PL (5/25/1986)	AM (5/29/1994)	
Guatemala	01/01/1982–12/31/1995	URNG	PA	QM (3/5/1978)	AM (11/7/1999)	
Changes in Governmental Structure						
Ethiopia	1/31/75–5/28/91 1/1/89–5/28/91 5/20/89–5/30/89	EPLF EPRDF Military faction (forces of Amsha Desta and Merid Negusie)	RVC RVC GVC	Unitary	Federalism (1994)	
Iraq	11/1/87–12/31/92 1/1/86–12/31/91 5/30/85–12/31/92 3/12/95–11/30/96 1/1/91–12/31/96 (1/1/58–7/31/60) 7/13/96–11/21/06	OLF KDP PUK PUK SCIRI CPM CPN-M	INC INC INC INC INC GVC PA	Unitary	Federalism (2003)	
Malaysia				Unitary	Federalism (1963)	
Nepal				Unitary	Federalism (2007)	

TABLE A2 – Continued

Country	Conflict(s)			Before	After
	Dates	Rebels	Outcome		
Changes in Democracy Type					
Suriname	1987/10/12–12/31/87	SLA	CF	Parliamentary	Presidential (5/25/1991)
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	5/4/85–12/31/85	EPRLF	INC	Parliamentary	Presidential (2/15/1989)
	11/20/84–12/31/85	TELO	INC		

Source: See description under Table A1.