The theories and histories of nationalism on the one hand and globalization on the other hand are difficult to reconcile. Although ‘nationalism’ remains a contested topic, there is broad agreement about the basic issues facing any theory of nationalism, about a canon of classical authors, texts, and references, and about the possible uses of theory in historical analysis and of history in theoretical arguments. This kind of consensus is lacking for ‘globalization’. The term itself continues to be an instrument of polemics. It is closely bound up with political and cultural diagnoses of the present state of the world. To speak about globalization is likely to evoke the vast problem of modernity. ‘Anti-globalizers’ still deny the usefulness and legitimacy of the word as an analytical concept or warn against its indiscriminate application. Since the nature of globalization is still a matter of fundamental dispute, the tasks of theorizing about the subject are difficult to define. No single body of outstanding theoretical statements has attained the authoritative status enjoyed by the major writers on nationalism from Ernest Renan to Anthony D. Smith. The discourse on globalization is fissiparous, polycentric, and highly susceptible to any new turn in world affairs and any new fashion in the social and cultural sciences. It tends to be descriptive and to avoid explanations about origins.

As far as globalization theory has dealt with theories of nationalism at all, it has limited itself to the question of the expected demise or survival of the nation state. Implicit in this concern is the idea that nationalism and nation state came first and then globalization came second. The first-generation literature on globalization, mainly in the 1990s, tended to emphasize the imminent death of the nation state. At a second
stage, more sceptical and nuanced assessments prevailed, distinguishing between various types and levels—the global, the regional, the national, and the local—and stressing the connections and the interpenetration between these levels. Most observations of this kind care little for the historical evidence and do not assume the form of fully articulated theory. There is thus an obvious asymmetry between the theories of nationalism and of globalization. The two of them are in no position to engage in an even-handed dialogue.

Something similar is true for the respective histories. While debates about the history of nationalism focus on individual cases and particular topics and rarely see a need to doubt the established parameters of time and space, it has never been settled what a history of globalization should be about. Debates are raging, for example, about the temporal shape of globalization: When is it supposed to begin? What should a sensible periodization look like? One group of authors, close to the social sciences, fail to discover any evidence for globalization before the 1950s or even the 1970s. At the other extreme, advocates of ‘big history’ detect traces of globalization as far back as the Iron Age. In between these polar opposites, three schools of thought have attracted a roughly equal share of support. The first school is impressed by the unification of much of Eurasia through the Mongol world empire in the thirteenth century. A second school prefers the maritime unification of the globe in the decades after Christopher Columbus as the threshold to emerging globality. A third school insists on the causative importance of industrialized traffic and electric telecommunication (and sometimes also of the doctrine of free trade), and therefore places the cut-off point between archaic and modern globalization in the 1860s or 1870s, with a transitory phase beginning around 1820. Narratives of globalization and of ‘nationalization’, in other words, the rise of nationalism, are difficult to synchronize. An overarching history of ‘modernity’ might smooth the differences, but it remains to be elaborated. The development of ‘national’ solidarities and the intensification of worldwide connections are certainly elementary processes that characterize the past two centuries. But they do not touch, interact, intermingle, or coincide in an orderly and patterned way. Nor are they logically coterminous. Sometimes ‘nationalism’ is the wider concept: In certain cases, nationalism has historically arisen under circumstances only slightly and indirectly connected to globalization, economic or otherwise. In other respects, ‘globalization’ is more encompassing: The worldwide diffusion of nationalism from its European places of origin can be seen as but one instance and facet of globalization. Nationalism was globalized, whereas only in exceptional cases does it make sense to speak of globalization being ‘nationalized’.

**Levels of Integration and Fragmentation**

Nationalism as a set of beliefs, attitudes, and rhetorical strategies corresponds to ‘globalism’, a somewhat artificial term, rather than to globalization. The proper
counterpart to globalization as a particular type of macro-societal change is the formation and transformation of nation states. Both processes can be conceived of as different kinds of integration, operating at varying spatial scales. They assemble larger entities from a multitude of smaller elements and imbue them with the spirit and practices of homogenization. There is, however, at least one important difference. The nation state, as Saskia Sassen has put it, is ‘the most complex institutional architecture ever invented by mankind.’ Historical globalization, by contrast, has produced a broad range of markets, networks (of migration or cultural exchange), and international organizations rather than a world state, a world society, or a cultural ecumene of planetary extent. Globalization is a process, or a bundle of processes, of integration; yet, the integrative density of its outcome has so far been lower than that of the quintessential nation state. Globalization and the formation of nation states are not necessarily discrete and independent processes. As Sassen points out, globalization works through the nation state and often manifests itself in macro-processes within an individual national state and society. Conversely, elites engaged in building nation states have often attempted to appropriate and employ resources from outside the boundaries of their emerging state: economic resources through trade, imperialist exploitation, or, in the post-colonial era, developmental aid, and also the symbolic resources of an international idiom of sovereignty and recognition. ‘World languages’, to give another example, can be seen as colonial impositions. At the same time they open up spaces of communication that increase the capacities of nationalist movements and of emerging nation states. From its very beginning, Indian nationalism relied on English to overcome parochialism and to counter the communicative advantages of the British Raj.

Other levels of integration intervene between the world and the nation: empires, large regions of multicultural interaction such as Eurasia or the Atlantic, or the international system. The modern (‘Westphalian’, to use a convenient cliché) international system contains in itself contradictory tendencies of stabilization and destabilization, of integration and fragmentation. Nationalism, as Ian Clark observes, has in the past worked both ways, integrative and disintegrative. It has helped to bring about ‘great powers’ with a stake in the proper functioning of international mechanisms, such as alliances and balance-of-power constellations, while at the same time sharpening rivalries and aggressiveness.

Not infrequently, transformations leading to modernity occurred in the core areas of empires. Several of the oldest nationalisms and nation states in Europe developed within contexts of a pre-industrial or ‘archaic’ globalization that was mediated through empire. Earlier ideas about English distinctiveness and superiority were strengthened around 1800 during the simultaneous conflict with France and with Indian princes, a conflict that involved coalitions across continental Europe and into the Americas. Confronting France or India, the English (and also the Scottish and Irish) upper classes persuaded themselves that they belonged to a ‘higher civilization’. The relationship between national and imperial integration does not follow a straightforward tendency or rule. The inaugural phase of revolutionary nation-building in France coincided with the construction of (a very brief) hegemony over vast parts of Europe and a dramatic
contraction of overseas empire: Saint-Domingue (Haiti) was lost, ‘Louisiana’ sold to the United States, and a brief French foothold in Egypt failed to perpetuate itself. In the Spanish case, by contrast, an even more cataclysmic collapse of imperial dominion in the western hemisphere, ultimately triggered by the French invasion of Spain, did not accompany a comparable upsurge of nationalist sentiments and nation-building policies in the metropole.

The period from the 1860s to, at least, the First World War is unique in modern history for the equidirectional advance of integration at various levels. The paths to nation-building were diverse, but the results were similar. The number of independent or semi-independent political entities in the world sank to an all-time low. Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States were transformed into consolidated nation states. By the turn of the century, each of these countries had forcibly acquired its own overseas possessions. Mosaics of colonies in Canada and Australia amalgamated into vast federations. In Africa, thousands of more or less autonomous units were absorbed into fewer than forty European colonies, many of whom had, by 1914, acquired some kind of recognizable statehood. All this happened at a time when markets across the world were becoming interconnected to a degree unprecedented in history. A spectacular increase in ‘factor mobility’, especially of labour and capital, accompanied by diminishing price differentials on markets all over the globe, has prompted economic historians to speak of the first great wave of economic globalization and the rise of global capitalism.\textsuperscript{14} The same period was characterized by the absence of full-scale war between major powers in Europe—in marked contrast to the military turmoil of 1792 to 1815 and 1914 to 1918.

Fragmentation and de-globalization of the world economy during the First World War and after, ending an age of free trade and investment that had easily survived tariff protection since the late 1870s, went hand in hand with the persistence of the West European colonial empires and even with attempts to raise their degree of integration with the metropolitan economies. In spite of the new geopolitical mapping of Eastern and Southeastern Europe and of the post-Ottoman Middle East, achieved at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, empire rather than the nation state seemed to be the appropriate political form to ensure success under conditions of intensified international rivalry, a belief shared by political elites of widely differing ideological persuasions. International anarchy was not effectively restrained by the flimsy agreements and institutions created in the aftermath of the Great War—the Versailles and Washington systems, the League of Nations, or, later, the Briand Kellogg Pact. No comprehensive international order offered solutions to the perceived security problems of nation states and empires, not even the strongest among them. The unspoken moral and ideological assumptions that had underwritten the actions of European political elites from 1815 to 1913 were replaced by conflicts between sharply divergent world views and by a lack of trust in any rules of the game. In the mid 1930s, the growing vacuum in international governance began to be filled by the competitive dynamics of national rearmament. The enlightened motto of ‘national self-determination’, originally intended to help former imperial peripheries on the road to autonomy
or even independence, proved its worth as an instrument of revisionist nationalism. Step by step, Adolf Hitler expanded the German Reich to incorporate adjacent areas with German-speaking majorities who expressed a will to join the mother country. In conditions of weak political globalization, a universalist principle was applied to ultranationalist purposes.

The new imperialisms of Japan, Italy, and Germany abandoned the programme of the civilizing mission that had served as the main justification for European imperialism throughout the long nineteenth century. The fascist imperialist ideologies of the 1930s and early 1940s were built around the three elements of suprematist nationalism, economic autarky, and racial hierarchy. While they were intended to resist and challenge the alleged global hegemony of the liberal-capitalist West, they transcended the limits of pre-1914 nationalism even in its integral forms. The insulated imperial Grossraum or, in Japan’s case, ‘Co-prosperity Sphere’ rather than the classical nation state seemed to offer the best guarantee for the security and prosperity of nations that redefined themselves as master races with a self-appointed historical mission to build ‘new orders’. Less aggressively and without overt racism, the Soviet Union, having resuscitated the Tsarist empire in (almost) its pre-1914 borders, followed a similar model of macro-integration at a level between the nation and the world. The Second World War, more than any other conflict in the past, was a clash of empires. At the same time, it led to a military re-globalization of the international system, generating genuinely global strategies, forms of cooperation, and, on the Allied side, blueprints for the post-war order.

After 1945, empires lost their integrative capacities, being overlaid by the new lines of political solidarity and military allegiance characteristic of a global Cold War. Shorn of their multi-ethnic overseas empires, the countries of Western Europe, for the first time ever, approached the nineteenth-century ideal of the homogeneous nation state free from imperial distractions—only to surrender, voluntarily, part of their national sovereignty to new and historically unprecedented supra-national institutions. The new Europe, founded in the late 1950s and growing ever since, was neither a neo-imperial realm under the control of any one preponderant state nor a mere mediator of globalization or instrument of Pax Americana. The pre-1945 language of strident nationalism and chauvinism disappeared from West European politics and gave way to moderate and peaceful bargaining about national interests. Consensual integration on the basis of continuing though less than absolute national sovereignties took the place of coercive integration as attempted by Napoleon, Hitler, and, more cautiously, Stalin.

It is open to debate whether supra-national integration or global integration, constricted as it mainly is to the economy and communications, has been the more potent force in shaping the development of Europe from the 1950s onwards. In other parts of the world, the nation state became the general norm and was not downsized in importance by overarching integrative structures. An organization like the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is not even remotely comparable to the European Union in its ability to transcend the nation state. Forces of transnational
coordination, let alone integration, are even weaker in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. The disintegration of empires, beginning in 1947 in South Asia and coming to a close with the dissolution both of the Soviet-controlled satellite sphere between Berlin and Ulan Bator and finally of the Soviet Union itself, led to an enormous pluralization of the political map of the world. Since this process unfolded at a time of accelerated economic globalization, Benedict Anderson justly speaks of a ‘paradoxical double movement of integration and disintegration’ in Asia and Africa since the Second World War. An interesting point about this unsurprising paradox is the relative strength of the countervailing tendencies. The shift from imperial to national integration during the process of decolonization created new opportunities for nationalist foreign policies within unstable regional systems of power, for example, in South Asia or Africa. The nineteenth-century European model of the nation state and nationalism advancing hand in hand was, however, seldom repeated. Many of the new states owed their continued existence less to successful ‘national’ integration in terms of institutions and ideologies than to the capacity of the international system to prevent boundary changes being made.

The self-pacification of Europe under the steadying influence of the United States, which ended an epoch of militant nationalism, has as yet found no parallel elsewhere. The lack of intermediate layers of integration between nation and world in much of the globe outside Europe may also render it more difficult to cushion national states and economies from some of the negative effects of economic globalization. Through a common currency, through shared policies on tariffs and trade, and through the redistribution of resources between wealthier and poorer members of the Union, Europe is in a comparatively strong position to influence the terms of globalization without resorting to nationalist defensiveness. The partial surrender of national sovereignty in favour of an augmented supra-national capacity to shape an emerging world society seems to be a good deal for nation states, especially if they are economically well structured and politically stable.

Nineteenth-Century Nation States and the Terms of Globalization

The constant tension between the national and the global should not be misconstrued as a basic antagonism. Early modern dynastic states possessed only blunt instruments for influencing long-distance flows of trade and for profiting from them. They could tax trade (either directly or, more characteristically, through revenue farming), grant monopolies to particular groups of private merchants, or provide legal frameworks for the coercion of subordinate people like slaves, indentured servants, and convicts. Some types of economic activity such as the movement of bullion almost entirely eluded their grasp. Port cities on the coasts of the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean,
and the China Seas were often insulated and only loosely enmeshed in their hinter-
lands. Even after the rise of nation states, these nodal points of vast commercial
networks were difficult to include in national economic systems. It took some time
after the founding of the German Reich in 1871 to integrate Hanseatic cities like
Hamburg and Bremen fully into German economic circuits. During the early modern
period, certain organized private interests, certain regions, and certain enclaves spe-
cializing in the export of commodities and people were active in weaving together the
delicate networks of ‘archaic’ globalization. Governments were not systematically
involved, and larger territorial systems seldom benefited from interactions that were
mostly seaborne and had little impact on the rural societies which almost everywhere
predominated over the maritime fringes.

This relationship between globalization and the state underwent a profound trans-
formation in nineteenth-century Europe. The nation state, as Siegfried Weichlein has
pointed out, was among the great profiteers from globalization. It created legal
frameworks, technological infrastructures, and extended spaces of communication
that matched the functional needs of an intensified circulation of migrants, commod-
ities, capital, and information. Older political forms like city states or multi-ethnic
continental empires found it increasingly hard to keep up with the demands of regular
and frequent mobility. Where nation states did not already exist, far-sighted intellec-
tuals sometimes envisaged a national economy as the best way to adapt to a new age
of growing international trade and mounting industrial competition. Friedrich List
(1789–1846), a German economist and politician with some first-hand experience of
the United States, advocated economic integration among the German states through
modern means of communication; he became famous on every continent for his
championing of moderate protective tariffs as a precondition of industrialization
under the shadow of British economic supremacy. List’s aim was not autarchy, but
market-building on spatial levels below the British-dominated world economy as it had
been taking shape since the 1820s. Similarly, in colonial India half a century later, as
Manu Goswami has suggested, ‘the first sustained articulations of nationalism crystal-
lized around the notion of a territorially delimited economic collective, a national
economy’. In India, such visions had to wait for their fulfilment until the end of
colonial rule. By contrast, national economies became the norm in Europe during the
second half of the nineteenth century. They were congruent with nation states and
ultimately provided a basis for national systems of welfare. When towards the end of
the century the social consequences of industrialization in conjunction with economic
globalization prodded governments to offer basic social security to their most vulner-
able citizens, the nation state proved to be the format best suited to organizing and
financing such novel tasks of public authority. In immigration and frontier societies
like the United States, Australia, and (somewhat less successfully) Argentina, but also
in France and Germany, the nation state created concepts of nationhood and citizen-
ship that turned immigrants and refugees into accepted members of the vast and
somewhat abstract community of the nation. New arrivals from abroad were no longer,
as in early modern times, treated as alien minorities living permanently under special
laws. They were now selected and administered according to new criteria for inclusion and exclusion. Subjects or inhabitants previously otherwise defined (e.g. by estate or locality) were transformed into national citizens.

Governments of nation states that had successfully removed internal tariffs increasingly felt the pressure to shield their national economies from uncontrollable influences originating outside their own borders. Especially in continental Europe after 1879 and in the United States, tariffs were no longer used mainly for revenue purposes but as tools regulating access to markets. When Western imperial power imposed free-trade regimes, as it did in China or the Ottoman Empire, this was a factor inhibiting the development of national political institutions in those countries. European governments were caught between the conflicting expectations of industrialists, agrarian producers, and the labouring masses for whom the cheapness of daily consumption continued to matter. Tariff protection can be, but is not necessarily, an expression of economic nationalism. One does not have to be a ‘nationalist’ when one cares for the viability of a country’s productive basis. Seen in a different light, agricultural protection not only serves the interests of landlords and agrobusiness, but follows logically from advancing democratization: Rural voters enter the political arena. In no major case before 1914 were anti-globalist policies pushed to extremes. Tariffs before 1914 remained moderate when compared to what happened after the First World War, and large-scale expropriation of foreign business in the name of revolutionary nationalism was first practised by the victorious Bolsheviks from November 1917, becoming a feature not of the nineteenth but of the twentieth century.

Globalization in the nineteenth century was not an inexorable juggernaut leaving no choice beyond adaptation or doom. National policies and legislation were in principle able to influence the terms of globalization. To what extent they succeeded depended above all on the position of a particular nation state in the international hierarchy. Thus, for example, any measure by the Westminster Parliament lowering British tariffs reverberated around the world, while a similar decision taken by the government of Greece, Persia, or Uruguay was unlikely to cause a stir outside those countries. However, this was even as the world’s most powerful country, Britain, was not strong enough to prevent the major powers on the European continent from abandoning the doctrine and practice of radical free trade from the late 1870s onwards. British hegemony was of the ‘weak’ variety operating less through overt coercion than through compliance brought about by obeying general rules (of free trade) and submitting to threats (of naval intervention). It provided an international framework by which other states could orient themselves, while it was vulnerable to challenges by rising powers with a more self-centred agenda. The leading nation states of the fin de siècle did not yet possess a post-Keynesian repertoire of tools for managing domestic and international economies. Still, they did not allow global connections to develop untamed. They concluded agreements on common standards from money to railway gauges and world time, collaborated on the unification of international and civil law, and upheld, through the tacit conformity with unwritten rules, such a fragile though effective construction as the gold standard. Nevertheless, far from being under firm political
control and guidance, economic globalization during the six or seven decades before 1914 did not subvert the principal European nation states and the newly arrived USA and Japan. They were, by and large, able to use globalization to their own advantage. The challenge from transnational corporations, those powerful globalizers of the twentieth century, was not yet as threatening as it would become later. Weak countries reacted defensively to globalizing tendencies rather than putting their stamp on them. If their governments were lucky and wise enough, such countries might survive or even prosper on the margins of the international system. Countries like Switzerland and Belgium, minor players in a constellation of Great Power ‘anarchy’, carved niches for themselves where they sponsored world organizations (such as the Red Cross) and offered the services of internationalism.25

As a general rule, only well-organized nation states were able to capitalize on economic globalization. By the 1900s, many political entities had lost their independence and were subject to the political decisions of colonial masters. For the remaining countries outside Europe, it was an important variable whether their incorporation into the world economy occurred simultaneously with the construction of state structures or at some other time. Japan was an exception in that the economic ‘opening’ of the country was, even during the final years of the Tokugawa Shogunate, closely monitored by a political elite with a strong sense of national interest, determined to defend and assert the economic sovereignty of the archipelago. After the onset of the Meiji Restoration in 1868, state-building and the insertion of the country into global structures were two sides of a comprehensive national policy. The situation was different in Latin America, a continent of autonomous post-colonial countries. There the entanglement with global capitalism typically preceded the emergence of coherent and effective political institutions. When nation states consolidated from about the 1880s onwards, they often had little scope to modify the structures that already tied their economies to global networks of trade. They saw their task as deepening and strengthening the existing arrangements for export production.26

**Global Mobility and Defensive Nationalism**

No other aspect of the ubiquitous mobility that globalization is all about is more closely related to nationalism than migration. In the long nineteenth century, more than ever before, new nations owed their existence to large-scale migration: the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, and several others. These societies were ‘global’ before they came ‘national’, and when they began to develop visions of a national bond transcending ethnic and religious differences, this was still a long way from a purposeful nationalism. The most extreme case is Australia: a ‘new’ nation without a defining national moment, apart from the less than heroic arrival of the First Fleet in January 1788, without external enemies and even without evil colonial oppressors.27 Australians never turned violently against the British the way the Irish did. Until the Pacific War,
Australia would not confront a single external foe. In the course of the nineteenth century, Australians slowly developed a kind of patriotic pride, but neither the explicit political programme nor the feeling of superiority then characteristic of European nationalism. Australia never stood at the centre of economic and migratory globalization. Nevertheless, it was a product of long-distance mobility, a ‘global’ nation without a clear demarcation between what was indigenous and what was alien. The discrimination and persecution of the aboriginal population was a weak equivalent to the energetic attempts of the European nations to underline their differences and distances.

Australians lived in colonies, but under a comparatively mild colonial regime. They harboured no expansionist aims of their own. Australia was the terminal point of expansion, not its origin. This was different with the United States, the largest and greatest of all the immigrant nations of modern times. Here, the dynamics of immigration and frontier settlement translated into the hemispheric hegemonism of ‘manifest destiny’, a doctrine directed against weaker neighbours on the American continent, be they Native American tribes or post-colonial Mexicans. Migratory dynamics shaded into military conquest to an extent unknown elsewhere in the areas of ‘white settlement’. Until late in the nineteenth century, the nationalism of ‘manifest destiny’ carried no overt universalist overtones in spite of lingering residues of Jeffersonian rhetoric. A global nation denied itself the task of spreading a global mission. The United States formulated a national vision almost at the same time as this happened in several European countries. The cleavage between the slave-holding South, aspiring to its own brand of national self-definition, and the ‘free labour’ North postponed the implementation of this kind of nationalism until the aftermath of the Civil War. It finally turned global in the late 1890s when the white elites of the United States began to see themselves as unrivalled custodians of liberty, enterprise, and civilization with a duty to spread these virtues abroad.

Whereas the United States nationalized global flows of people by devising institutions and symbols that made it possible for immigrants from many different backgrounds to live together peacefully, the same processes, from a different point of view, could be interpreted as a globalization of the national. For those parts of the world that became major sources of emigration, the national experience had to accommodate the new realities of diaspora. Irish nationalism in an age of the massive transatlantic exodus had a strong anti-colonialist streak and step by step developed a secessionist orientation aiming at an independent nation state. But it was clear from the very beginning that a considerable part of the nation would be living permanently in America and other far-away places and would never belong to the future Irish nation state. Moreover, such states would never be strong enough to protect their overseas expatriates.

Diasporic nationalism assumed many different forms. In the case of Greece, for example, a nation state, however fragile, already existed at the time when the great transatlantic migrations began. Greeks had long been used to living scattered around the Mediterranean. In contrast to Ireland, which formed part of the United Kingdom, the Ottoman province of Lebanon had no militant national movement. Even so, the departure of a great proportion of its population gave rise to the idea of a Lebanese
nation spread over three continents. When the so-called ‘coolie trade’ from China increased after the middle of the nineteenth century, the Qing government assumed the role of protector of the overseas Chinese, especially in South East Asia. Continuing the traditional concept that the Chinese emperor was father to all his subjects, this could just as well be read as the first instance of China making nationality an issue in its foreign relations. The Qing dynasty itself later became a target of anti-Manchu nationalism. It is worth remembering that, a few decades earlier, it had pioneered Chinese nationalism by giving it an ethnic meaning. In all these cases, nationalism assumed the form it did in direct response to processes of globalization. Ideas of citizenship were sometimes difficult to reconcile. Did expatriates or emigrants retain their original status of citizens of their mother country, or was the host country strong enough to demand and enforce unqualified allegiance?

Immigrants are strangers, and therefore they always pose a challenge to nations that invariably, and also in immigrant societies, have a low tolerance for difference and strive to attain homogeneity. Societies and states have developed innumerable ways of insulating or integrating newcomers. The options range from uninhibited assimilation to strict exclusion. Access is typically controlled through law. Since the late nineteenth century, the regulation of immigration has been one of the most important domains for the exercise of sovereignty in ‘new’ nations. A turning point of worldwide consequences occurred in the 1880s, when the neo-European countries of ‘white settlement’, especially the United States, Canada, and Australia, took steps to exclude and deter Asian immigrants. At a time of mounting racism, ‘whites-only’ policies were not just adopted on pragmatic grounds, but called forth all sorts of claims about the inferiority of Asians and their will and capacity to undermine ‘civilized’ and well-ordered ‘white’ societies. Such an exclusionist vision of white purity and yellow peril became the hallmark of North American and antipodean nationalisms during the decades around 1900.29

Whenever the state arrogates to itself decisions about racial and cultural hierarchies, the question of who represents ‘the nation’ moves to the centre of political contestation. A racialization of nationalism has not remained restricted to areas of ‘white’ dominance. Racialized versions of citizenship sometimes developed a long time after the end of political decolonization as a result of complex social processes. Thus, ‘blackness’ can replace, as it did in Jamaica, the idea of victimization by colonialism as a dominant source of national identity.30

The exclusion of Chinese, Japanese, and to some extent, Indians from areas under white hegemony triggered violent reactions on the Asian side. The restriction of immigration was a major issue of diplomatic conflict between the US and Japanese governments in the late nineteenth century. In China the first nationwide popular protests against a foreign country were sparked by the maltreatment of Chinese labourers in the United States.31 Chinese nationalism has a number of roots. One of them was a reaction against discrimination of Chinese abroad during the years after 1900. This was a stronger impulse than a pure anti-colonialist resentment against the West. It was intimately bound up with the question of ‘national honour’ that has been a driving force of Chinese attitudes toward the international community ever since. The
principal weapon of the early Chinese protests was the boycott, an instrument still used today, mainly against individual firms, by anti-globalization activists.

Nationalism contains elements of an ideology of resistance: resistance against imperial rulers and over-mighty neighbours, against economic exploitation or cultural hegemony. Even in a position of objective strength, nationalism is fuelled by anxieties of subversion or, as in the case of Germany after 1904, of military ‘encirclement’. Many or perhaps most of the threats to the national community are seen as approaching from the outside, sometimes from a vast and mysterious outer world that harbours dark forces of destruction. In extreme cases, this can lead to mass hysteria and a paranoid style of politics. Minorities are then treated as ‘fifth columns’ and instruments of hostile powers. Huge numbers of Jews, Armenians, and Chinese (in South East Asia) have fallen victim to this kind of purifying obsession.

Under conditions of globalization, nationalist politicians and voices of public opinion face a dilemma. While it is imperative for the well-being of a nation or the stability of a regime to engage in economic relations with the outside world, that external sphere is perceived as a source of destabilization. Globalized China trying to control the Internet is a current manifestation of this contradiction inherent in modern nationalism. Nationalist resistance against what is seen as global capitalism menacing local ways of life covers a broad spectrum from conspiracy theories and firm rejection of anything ‘alien’ or ‘strange’ to a well-considered defence of national and local preferences. The banning of Coca Cola from India by the Hindu-nationalist Janata Party in 1977 tended to the first extreme; the safeguarding of traditional quality standards in food production against neo-liberal legislation in the European Union exemplifies a position of a more moderate anti-globalism. Today, globalization is often equated with cheap and uniform mass production, with aggressive tourism and ruthless exploitation of the environment. This was not entirely different during the first great wave of globalization before 1914. In both periods, the process can be understood as having stimulated a new attachment to local practices and problems. The result has rarely been a fully developed nationalist programme. At the same time, a mild assertion of cultural difference and specificity has opposed the homogenizing tendencies of globalization, insisting on the need for and the right to identity. One’s own nation, or ‘Europe’, ‘Africa’, and so forth, carries with it particular values and forms of life, different from those of other imagined or socially integrated communities. Globalization does not encourage identification. It offers little in the way of emotional attachment. ‘Cosmopolitanism’, based on a general and abstract idea of freedom and unlimited choice, has historically been a poor substitute for the attractions of community life.

### Nationalism and Normative Universalism

Nationalism has been played out in an ever-expanding arena. During much of the nineteenth century, nationalisms interacted merely within Europe. Apart from
embryonic ideas like the ‘nativism’ of a few thinkers in late Tokugawa Japan, Asian nationalisms emerged slowly from the 1880s onwards. In the early twentieth century, they challenged European colonial rule. In at least one instance, the epochal conflict between Japan and China in the 1930s and early 1940s, they clashed with one another. As late as 1945, the various nationalisms had not met on a world stage, although some of them had formed the non-territorial solidarities of Asian, African, Turkic, and other ‘pan’ movements. From then onward, the United Nations would offer such a stage, especially after decolonization and the ensuing proliferation of the model of the nation state. A ‘global nationalism’ has already been identified for Germany around 1900.

German nationalism at that time imagined Germany’s improving (and threatened) position in the world economy and the global political order. It envisaged Germany as a colonial power and as a Kulturnation of worldwide attractiveness.

A century later, nationalism has become global in a more profound sense. The United Nations and numerous other international organizations and conferences assemble representatives of many nations, each of them operating within a tension between national objectives and the need for international compromise. The rise of international television has turned gigantic sports events like the Olympic Games or the football World Cups into symbolic spaces where national identities come together in peaceful competition. At the same time, nations are reviving their ‘national’ sports, whether genuine or invented. Audiences in the same countries identify just as much with ‘global’ sports as with national peculiarities like Irish ‘hurling’.

Even the smallest nation state nowadays struggles for diplomatic and media attention in a way inconceivable a hundred years ago.

One last manifestation of globalism to be considered in a discussion of globalization and nationalism is the universalism of generally accepted international norms. Before the First World War, such norms existed only in a most rudimentary form, be it as a limited body of international law or as a hazy ‘standard of civilization’ to which non-European states were expected to conform regardless of their own traditions. Normative universalism then grew in the course of the twentieth century. By the final quarter of that century nationalist policies, rhetoric, and attitudes were facing the new and immensely powerful force of ‘world opinion’. Earlier nationalisms, especially if they had a strong political foundation, sometimes attempted to universalize their own principles by casting them in the language of a civilizing mission or, as in the German case after Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, of the natural superiority of a particular race.

Such strategies became difficult to pursue after 1945. The norm of national self-determination, first publicized during the ‘Wilsonian moment’ of 1919, enjoys an unprecedented degree of acceptance. Small states are easily admitted as viable newcomers to the community of nations if they can claim territorial jurisdiction and show some degree of cultural coherence. With self-determination comes the accompanying principle of non-intervention by foreign powers into the domestic affairs of a recognized nation state. This principle, however, stands in stark contrast to a new thinking in terms of human rights. The behaviour of governments towards their own citizens and subjects, in particular as regards minorities, comes under close scrutiny by
international and non-governmental institutions. Around 1900 or 1930, nationalist politicians could do within their own borders whatever they pleased. Towards the end of the twentieth century, the normative power of global standards of political behaviour increased tremendously, more so in the case of smaller states than with large and powerful ones. Sovereignty is no longer as absolute as it used to be, at least in theory. 41 Serious violations of human rights have caused ‘humanitarian’ interventions, although in many other cases regimes were left undisturbed to commit crimes against their own population. Nationalism has not been cancelled or rendered obsolete by this kind of normative universalization. But it has lost its prestige as a form of politics that was ‘natural’ and unaccountable to any higher authority.

Notes

10. Sassen, Territory, 23.
28. See Chapter 20 by Susan Mary Grant.
31. See Chapter 14 by Rana Mitter.
36. See Chapter 34 by Cemil Aydin.
40. See Chapter 28 by Richard Caplan and Chapter 27 by James Mayall.

**Suggested Further Reading**