The Evidential Shift of WANT[*]

Eva-Maria Remberger

Universität Konstanz

## 1.	Introduction

Modal verbs are commonly known to be polyfunctional[1] and their status, which is subject to crosslinguistic variation, is often said to be on a scale between auxiliary and full verbs (cf. e.g. Heine 1993, 1995). However, common criteria for the class of modal verbs[2] often do not apply to the volitionality-encoding modal verb WANT[3]: WANT[4] is syntactically peculiar, since it appears in a greater and more varied range of syntactic constructions than the other modal verbs like CAN or MUST (e.g. in control structures, as ECM verbs, with Small Clause complements etc.), and it is semantically peculiar, since it seems to have its own valency frame, including a volitional theta-role assigned to an animate and intentional external argument (cf. also Gerdts 1988, Fritz 2000). WANT, at least in those languages of the world that have such a verb, is often involved in grammaticalisation processes or shows phenomena of synchronic shift: WANT, which can be assumed to be closely connected to the basic modality of necessity, has a purely deontic, non-volitional reading (modal shift) in several constructions; WANT can also develop into a syntactic future auxiliary, as in Greek, Romanian and English (future shift), or into a deontic passive auxiliary, as in Sardinian and several Italian dialects (passive shift); furthermore, it can have an evidential interpretation in certain contexts, as is the case in some constructions specific to German (evidential shift). The following examples taken from Klein (1994: 174-175) illustrate the evidential shift, which will be the main topic of this paper:

[1]Cf. Kratzer (1977, 1981, 1991), Palmer (2001), Reis (2001), Abraham (2005) etc.
[2]Cf. e.g. those listed in Öhlschläger (1989: 4), Heine (1993: 72), Zifonun et al. (1997: 1253).
[3]This was observed by Calbert (1975: 5-6), Zifonun et al. (1997: 1254f) among others.
[4]WANT, in this paper, stands for the prototypical volitional verb that is instantiated as *want* in English, *volere* in Italian, *wollen* in German, *will* in Old English, *querer* in Spanish etc.

(1)   a. Arnim will   *morgen*   arbeiten.
            A.   WANT-3s   tomorrow work
            'A. wants to work tomorrow.'
        b. Arnim will   *morgen*   gearbeitet haben.
            A.   WANT-3s   tomorrow worked   have
            'A. wants to have worked (by) tomorrow.'

(2)   a. *Arnim will   *gestern*   arbeiten.
            A.   WANT-3s yesterday   work
            'A. wants to work yesterday.'
        b. Arnim   will   *gestern*   gearbeitet haben.
            A.   WANT-3s yesterday   worked   have
            'A. maintains that he worked yesterday.'

The examples in (1) represent control structures with a volitional subject of WANT controlling the subject of the embedded infinitive. Since there is an explicit future reference situation in the embedded infinitive, expressed by the adverb *morgen* (the reference time R is to be situated AFTER the speech time S[5]), there is no ambiguity with respect to the interpretation of *wollen,* since its canonical interpretation is future-oriented (cf. section 3.3). Thus, in (1)a, we get a future interpretation (S_R) for the embedded sentence even if it is a present infinitive (R,E)[6], whereas in (1)b we get a 'past projected into the future' reading (S_R • E_R), since there is an perfect infinitive (E_R). The situation is different in (2): here, the explicit reference situation of the embedded infinitive refers to a past reference situation (hence R BEFORE S) which as such is incompatible with volitional modality and its future-oriented sense: The reference situation cannot lie in the past (R_S), coincide with E (R,E) and be future-oriented at the same time. Thus, (2)a is ungrammatical. However, (2)b is grammatical, but with a different interpretation to (1)b: The volitionality of *wollen* has shifted to an evidential reading, maintaining the time-situational interpretation of the perfect infinitive (E_R) and the explicit time adverbial (R_S), but losing the future-orientation.[7]

The aim of this article is to have a closer look at this evidential shift mainly in the context of the semantics of WANT. It is organised as follows: In the next section, some general observations with respect to evidentiality as a grammatical category are made and the evidential use of German *wollen* is classified. In section 3, the notion of volitionality and the volitional verb WANT are discussed. Section 4 is dedicated to different

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[5]In what follows I refer to the system of temporal relations introduced by Reichenbach (1947) and elaborated by Vikner (1985), Giorgi & Pianesi (1997), with R, the reference situation, S, the speech situation (or, if not directly linked to discourse, the time-relational situation of a matrix clause, cf. Enç 1987), and E, the event situation; the underline shows the temporal ordering (BEFORE or AFTER), and a comma between the temporal relations expresses coincidence or inclusion (i.e. EQUALS); for a similar system representing two temporal-aspectual relations cf. also Demirdache & Uribe-Etchebarria (2000).

[6]There is an ambiguity in infinitival forms which allows "the infinitive to be construed as 'present' or 'future'" (Eide 2003: 129).

[7](2)b could, in principle, have a volitional reading in some very restricted and marked contexts, cf. Remberger (in press) for a more detailed analysis of the relation of volitionality and tense.

subchapters of the evidential shift of WANT, analysing the German data at issue and including an excursion to apparently similar data from Italian (and others). In this section, the question will also be raised of whether German *wollen*, in its evidential use, is simply another illocutionary verb like e.g. *behaupten* 'maintain'. Section 5 summarises and concludes this paper.

2.   Evidentiality

The grammatical notion of evidentiality has recently been subject to lively debate, which has brought forth several definitions and raised several open questions. Evidentiality is usually defined as "a linguistic category whose primary meaning is source of information" (Aikhenvald 2004: 3) and its name stems from the "evidence a person has for making factual claims" (Anderson 1982: 273).

The main open question is whether evidentiality is a category on its own or whether it is just a subcategory belonging to the system of modality. In research literature, there are three approaches to this problem (cf. also Dendale & Tasmowski 2001: 341-242):

(3)   a.   *Evidentiality in a narrow sense* (e.g. Anderson 1982, Willett 1988, Aikhenvald 2004): the focus lies on the expression of the "information or sources of knowledge behind assertions" (Dendale et al. 2001: 340); if evidential marking results in an interpretation that reveals the speakers' (e.g. positive or negative) attitudes towards the evidentially marked proposition, this is purely a consequence of pragmatics and has nothing to do with grammatical epistemic modality.
         b.   *Evidentiality in the broad sense* (cf. Palmer 2001[8]): evidentiality is part of the system of (mainly) epistemic modality (or vice versa), since both characterise the "attitude of the speaker" ("attitudes about the epistemic status of information", Dendale et al. 2001: 340) towards the proposition encoded in an utterance.
         c.   *Overlapping of evidentiality and epistemicity*: this view is adopted especially in the subfield of inferential evidentiality, which might be easily interpreted as a type of epistemic modality (cf. van der Auwera & Pungian 1998: 86, following to Dendale et al. 2001: 242, and Plungian 2001: 354; also Palmer 2001).

Even if WANT is typically a modal verb, in its evidential use as exemplified in (2)b, it clearly encodes evidentiality in a narrow sense. It does not encode an attitude of the speaker towards the proposition encoded in the embedded infinitive (cf. also section 4.1), but it clearly indicates the fact that there is a source of information, in this case, an explicit one, namely the referent of the external argument of *wollen*. Sometimes, of course, the clear indication of a source of information results in an interpretation that

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[8]Palmer (2001) treats evidentiality as a subsystem of modality, but he keeps evidential modal systems clearly distinct from epistemic modal systems.

might include a kind of disbelief or distance on the part of the speaker. However, such an interpretation results from purely pragmatic reasons: If a speaker explicitly encodes the source of information in a language which does not obligatorily need to encode it, this gives rise to the implicature on the part of the hearer that there is something behind it, otherwise the speaker would not have encoded the source of information in such an explicit way.

Although I will adopt the position that evidentiality is a grammatical category standing on its own, *wollen* is not taken to be the typical marker of evidentiality in German. Its main use is still that of a volitional modal verb. Following Aikhenvald (2004), an element whose main use lies in the expression of a lexical or functional meaning other than evidentiality is not a marker of evidentiality proper but one of the "evidential strategies" possible in this language. However, the evidential shift of WANT in German is not only pragmatic inference either, but it has been conventionalised and maybe also grammaticalised to a certain degree. Otherwise the same sentence as (2)b in Italian should be grammatical, which it is not (cf. section 4.6). Aikhenvald (2004) excludes the evidential use of *wollen* from the class of grammaticalised evidential markers since it doesn't satisfy her morpheme-based definition.[9] Others, whose definitions rely more on constructions than on morphemes, assert that German "has grammaticalized evidentiality" without necessarily having an "evidential 'system'" (Narrogs 2005: 385). Aikhenvalds definition of grammaticalisation thus seems to refer to the result of a grammaticalisation process, whereas the evidential use of *wollen* in German is probably at a stage of development between lexical element and fully grammaticalised (= auxiliary) element.

Based on the assumption that evidentiality is a category on its own, Willett (1988:57) has proposed three subtypes of evidentiality, i.e. a) direct evidentiality, based on first-hand sensory evidence, b) indirect evidentiality, based on second- and third-hand evidence (an equivalent of reportative evidence) and c) inferential evidentiality, i.e. evidentiality based on evidence by deduction or inference. In this system, the evidential *wollen*-construction in German clearly belongs to type b) since it encodes an indirect evidentiality, namely the reportative, hence second-hand evidence, but one where the source of information is always explicitly given by virtue of the external argument of the clause. The evidential use of *wollen* often is also called "quotative"[10] (cf. e.g. Diewald 1999).[11]

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[9] Aikhenvald (2004) just mentions the evidential use of *wollen* and *sollen*. However, the interpretation that she gives of the German examples cannot be correct since she pairs the evidential use of *wollen* with the English modal *must*, cf. also the review by Narrog (2005).

[10] Plungian (2001:252), for example, has 'quotative' as a hypernym for "reported speech (presupposing a known author) vs. generalized, second-hand information (presupposing an unknown or non-definite 'anonymous' author) vs. tradition or common knowledge (where no personal author is invoked)." For Anderson (2001: 289) the hypernym is 'reportive' and includes four co-hyponyms, namely "hearsay", "general reputation", "myth and history" and "quotative (marginally an evidential)"; Palmer (2001) also sometimes distinguishes between 'quotative' ("indicates that the speaker regards what he has said to be something that everyone knows") and 'hearsay' ("indicates that the speaker was told the information given in the sentence by someone else, but has no evidence of its truth value") (cf. Palmer 2001: 37), but in general he adopts the labels 'Reported(2)', 'Reported(3)', 'Reported(gen)' (cf. Palmer

3. The Volitional Verb WANT

3.1 Volitional Modality

<u>The modal relation</u>: The basic values of modality following Kratzer (1977, 1981 – among others) are possibility and necessity. There are several reasons to assume that WANT encodes necessity: First, instances of WANT in the languages of the world (the ones that have such a modal verb) often are derived from a verb (or noun) of necessity. This, for example, is clearly the case for English *to want*, which derives from an Old Norse element meaning 'lacking' first, then 'to need', and which also in its today's use keeps this flavour of necessity. Second, there are several examples of the above-mentioned shift phenomena from volitionality to necessity, as the following instances from Italian, German, and Sardinian show:

(4) It.   Ci   vogliono   tre   uova per   fare   questa torta
          there WANT-3p three eggs to   make   this   cake
          'One needs three eggs to make this cake.'
(5) Ger. Dieses Buch will   gelesen   werden.
          this   book WANT-3s read-pprt become-inf
          'This book should be read.'
(6) Sard. Custa macchina cheret   lavata.
          this   car   WANT-3s washed-pprt.f.s
          'This car needs to be washed.'[12]

These examples vary in construction, since (4) is an impersonal WANT + locative construction, (5) probably a raising structure, and (6) a WANT-passive; but they all have in common that they encode a modal meaning of pure necessity whereas volitionality is lost. On this ground, I will assume the basic modal meaning of WANT to be that of necessity (cf. also Calbert 1975: 36, fn. 32).

Some analyses of WANT attest that it carries a meaning of possibility in certain constructions (cf. e.g. Maché 2007); however, these meanings commonly come up in contexts of negation. If we interpret modal necessity as universal quantification over modalised worlds, whereas possibility is concerned with existential quantification, it becomes clear why there could be a kind of 'derived possibility' in the context of

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2001:41), a variation of Willett's (1988) terminological division of reportative evidence in 'second hand', 'third hand', and 'folklore'. Since the evidential interpretation of German *wollen* is clearly connected to the syntactic subject as an explicit source for the reportative evidence, it should be labelled 'Reported(2)' in Palmer's, i.e. 'second hand' evidence in Willett's terms.

[11]For a study of another type of "quotative" or "reportative" evidentiality marker in Romance, cf. Cruschina & Remberger (2008), where some of the general notions concerning evidentiality presented here are also discussed.

[12]Cf. also this parallel example from some American English varieties (cf. Murray & Simon 1999, as well as Remberger 2006):
(i)   This car wants washed.

(especially implicitly dual) negation (cf. also Ehrich 2001: 156): 'It is necessary that p' then corresponds to 'It is not possible that not p' in the same way as '$\forall x P(x)$ ' corresponds to '$\neg \exists x \neg P(x)$' (cf. Lohnstein 1996: 102; 249).[13]

The modal base: Besides the modal relations of necessity or possibility, established between the actual world and the modalised worlds, a further parameter or ingredient of modality (still following Kratzer 1977, 1981) is its modal base or its conversational background, i.e. the model of knowledge, obligations, norms, ideas, desires etc. against which the modal expression is evaluated. It is an open discussion how the modal base for WANT could be described: for some it is a bouletic model ('that what is wanted in w', cf. Kratzer 1981), in other words, a volitional modal base comprising what is desired or preferred in the actual world. For others, the model of a volitional expression is a doxastic[14] one (the 'doxastically accessible worlds for a', cf. von Fintel 1999:117; Heim 1992), or a model of 'the subject's belief' (Hacquard 2006), i.e. simply an epistemic model (Giannakidou 2007) concerning what, based on world knowledge, can be wanted. The second approach would mean somehow that volitional modality could be part of the system of epistemic modality. However, both an epistemic and a bouletic model for WANT have in common that there is a particular feature in WANT which links this modal base to the subject; this will be explained in the next paragraph.

The source of modality: Farkas (1992) introduced the notion of the 'individual anchor', i.e. an utterance-internal or external entity to which the modal base is connected (e.g. the speaker in epistemic interpretations). It is the individual anchor that plays an exceptional role in the case of WANT, since the individual anchor of the model of the actual as well as the future worlds introduced by WANT is the thematic 'subject', i.e. the external argument of WANT. This individual anchor clearly represents the source of

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[13]The interpretation of possibility has been ascribed to WANT in constructions like the following:

(i)   Die   Tür   will   nicht   aufgehen.
        the   door   WANT-3s   not   open
        'The door doesn't open (but it should…).'

(ii)   Diese   Idee   will   mir   nicht   gefallen.
        this   idea   WANT-3s   me   not   please
        'I don't really like this idea (also if I am expected to like it…).'

The first construction obligatorily involves negation, and includes an adversative element (sometimes visible in expressions like *einfach nicht*, *aber nicht* and similar); the second construction does not need to appear in a negative context and always involves psych verbs, i.e. verbs with an experiencer argument that canonically appears in what can be called the subject position, also this experiencer is marked dative or accusative (quirky subjects). I cannot go into an analysis of these constructions here. For a possible interpretation, cf. Gergel & Hartmann (2009) and Maché (2007).

[14]Also following Giorgi & Pianesi (1997: 212) *want* has a doxastic modal base: „A verb such as *want* requires the subject to believe it possible for the embedded proposition to become true." Giorgi & Pianesi (1997: 266, fn. 24): "[...] *want* is similar to belief verbs in having a doxastic modal base [...]. It differs from them in that it has a non-null *bouletic* ordering source." However, I don't believe that *want* needs this belief of its subject as a prerequisite. As Quer (1998: 44, fn. 32) states, *believe* is a weak intensional verb, whereas *want* is a strong intensional verb: there can't be contradictory beliefs, but there can be contradictory intentions.

modality[15] (the first element of a modal relation following Kratzer[16]), which is not always easy to identify in other modal expressions. In the case of WANT, its subject orientation (cf. also Heine 1995) is obvious: WANT has its own volitional theta-role for an external argument, which must be animate and intentional[17]; furthermore, in the eventual case of an embedded infinitive, this argument has control properties.[18]

The goal of modality: The complement over which WANT takes scope (the second argument of a modal relation) is the goal of modality.[19] As Kratzer (1981) puts it, the function g included in WANT maps from possible worlds into sets of propositions constituting what is wanted by the individual referred to by the (logical) subject. Following Farkas (1992) it targets the 'set of bouletic alternatives anchored to the referent of the subjects' or, as Quer (198: 22) says, a 'set of propositions specifying the preferences of a in w' or a 'set of worlds that are compatible with the wishes of the individual'. The goal of the modality of WANT can consist in a proposition (a finite CP or a CP- or IP-infinitive), a predication (i.e. a Small Clause) or an entity (a DP). Shift phenomena can concern all kinds of complements.

3.2   Shift Phenomena

The interplay of the modal parameters introduced in 3.1 with other fields of grammar (tense, aspect, mood, polarity, lexical and syntactic argument structure, semantic selection etc.) leads to the polyfunctionality of modals mentioned above. As far as the shift-phenomena regarding WANT-constructions are concerned, several types of shift (first pragmatic, then conventionalised, until they end up in grammaticalisation and linguistic change) can result from these dynamics to escape incompatibility:

(7)   a.   shift of the <u>modal relation</u>, e.g. from necessity to possibility
       b.   shift of the <u>modal base</u>, e.g. from bouletic/doxastic to evidential

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[15]Cf. the "modal source" according to Calbert (1975); the "Modalfaktor" according to Bech (1949).

[16]I will not discuss the corresponding notion of an "ordering source" (cf. Kratzer 1991) here, since in the case of WANT in its canonical use, the source of modality is quite easy to identify. Nevertheless there might be a need to make a distinction between two modal bases, a bouletic and a doxastix one (cf. Heim 1992), but both of them, as said above, are connected to the subject of WANT.

[17]As far as the theta-role of the subject of WANT is concerned, this has been called an "agentive animate cause" (Calbert 1975: 16, 18, 22), an "agent" (Abraham 2005: 261), an "agent / cognizer" (Gerdts 1988), and the modality of WANT has been related to "agent-oriented modality" (Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994, Heine 1995). But if we observe how WANT behaves under the agentivity test following Cruse (1973), it results that the theta-role of WANT cannot be agentive, cf. (i):
(i)   A: What did John do?
          B: ?? He wanted to drink a beer.
It is more appropriate to call it an "experiencer" (Diewald 2000; Hacquardt 2006: 170), a "senser" (Verplaetse 2003: 159), a "bearer of an intentional attitude" (Doherty 1985: 120), or an "intentional force / force of will" (Copley 2002).

[18]Of course, control is not always given in infinitive constructions with WANT, cf. e.g. the English ECM-constructions with WANT, or the Sardinian personal and inflected infinitives (cf. Remberger 2005 for a phenomenology of WANT-constructions in Romance).

[19]Cf. Calbert (1975); the "Modalfeld" according to Bech (1949).

    c.   shift of the <u>modal source</u>, e.g. from the logical subject to the context

    d.   shift of the <u>goal of modality</u>, e.g. a proposition to an assertion

The evidential WANT-constructions discussed here may be concerned with (7)a, i.e. the shift of the modal relation, insofar as the modal meaning of volitionality is lost in favour of another, maybe not even modal, meaning (depending on the interpretation of evidentiality according to (3)a, b, or c). They also are concerned with the shift of the modal base, which becomes one of reported speech with an explicit indication of the source of information. Thus, there is no shift of the modal source to the context, since the subject orientation of WANT is maintained in the evidential construction. The goal of modality, however, is also shifted in the evidential use of WANT since it no longer refers to alternative worlds, but to a proposition that is asserted. Before moving on to discuss these shifting mechanisms in section 4, something else should be said on the future-orientation of WANT as mentioned above.

3.3   The Future-Orientation of WANT

It has been stated in literature that root modality is future-oriented, since modality involves quantification over a set of future worlds (e.g. Quer 1998: 22-25). Following Giorgi & Pianesi (1997: 212) WANT introduces "a non-realistic domain". Modals have also been called "pretime verbs" (cf. Klein 1994: 174); in their root interpretation, they are always "future projecting" (Eide 2003: 128). This predisposition of WANT has led to the well-known grammaticalisation process of WANT as a future marker, e.g. in Romanian, Greek, and also English (cf. also Heine & Kuteva 2000: 310-311). However, WANT can refer to an actual situation as well[20], cf. (8), even if this is not the usual or unmarked interpretation:[21]

(8)   John wants to work where he works.

Thus, there is a future but possibly also a present reference in WANT. As Quer (1998:50) puts it, WANT does introduce a set of *non-anterior* rather than future alternative worlds. Or, according to Giannakidou, WANT is non-veridical, which means that neither the factivity of the alternative worlds contained in its complement nor the non-factivity is implied.[22]

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[20]Cf. Klein (1994: 174): "After all, one can still want to do what one is doing already."

[21]Eide (2003: 128): "Thus, it is possible to utter *This door must be kept closed* in a situation where the door is already (kept) closed. However, the present situation is irrelevant for a root modal; its complement always refers to a future situation. This is a consequence of their semantics. A root modal denotes e.g. that a rational agent X requires/intends/wants/needs/permits Y to hold, where Y is a situation subsequent to the evaluation time of the root modal. A requirement/intention/will/need or permission cannot possibly influence on things that have already occurred. I.e. although I might have wanted my permitting John to have arrived before S to be able to alter the actual events taking place, this is not possible in reality (except in jocular contexts)."

[22]WANT is not factive but it must not necessarily be non-factive; as a desiderative it belongs to the group of predicates containing a non-veridical operator OP; that means that *OP p* does not imply *p*, cf. Giannakidou (2009) and Quer (1998). Thus, it also does not imply ¬*p*. Therefore, *WANT p* can, but does not have to, have a presuppositional reading of non-factivity ¬*p*.

Indeed, there are always two possible relations in which an embedded clause can be linked to the tense specification of a matrix modal clause (cf. Hornstein 1990, Klein 1994, Quer 1998, Eide 2003) and both can be made explicit[23] by the corresponding temporal adverbial:[24]

(9)   a. E_m, R_e Anna   will/muss/can   *jetzt*   einen   Brief   schreiben.
              A.   WANT/MUST/CAN   now   a   letter   write
              'A wants to/must/can write a letter now.'
     b. $E_m\_R_e$ Anna   will/muss/can   *morgen*   einen   Brief   schreiben.
              A.   WANT/MUST/CAN   tomorrow   a   letter   write
              'A wants to/must/can write a letter tomorrow.'

These two relations could also explain the two conversational backgrounds possibly introduced by WANT (cf. fn. 16): one (the epistemic or doxastic model) concerns what can actually be wanted in w, whereas the second (the bouletic model base) is what might be preferred in a future, irrealis, non-factive world.

3.4   The Characteristics of WANT

Summing up, the modal verb WANT in its canonical, unmarked use, i.e. that which yields a volitional interpretation, can be characterised as follows:

(10)   The modality underlying volitionality is basically *necessity*.
(11)   *Subject Linking*: The modal source of the modal base (the epistemic or bouletic model) introduced by WANT is linked to the external argument of WANT, an animate, intentional entity. A subject-oriented mental necessity results.
(12)   WANT as a root modal is future-oriented, i.e. it introduces *non-anterior* alternative worlds.

If we look at the syntactic properties of the modal verb WANT + infinitive, the construction of interest here, it can be stated that this construction is biclausal with a matrix clause and a modalised embedded infinitive clause encoding a dependent proposition. The subject-linking property of the modality of WANT manifests itself syntactically in the control[25] property, by which the subject of WANT and the subject of the embedded infinitive proposition must be co-referent (but cf. fn. 18).

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[23]*Morgen*, 'tomorrow', and *jetzt*, 'now' are not relative time adverbials, but absolute ones, setting the reference situation in a direct relation to the speech situation; however, since the tense structure of the modal itself is the present tense, the reference situation here can be related to the event situation of the modal.

[24]Subscript *m* = *matrix*; subscript *e* = *embedded*.

[25]In German, however, *wollen* is different from other (subject) control verbs insofar as it does not introduce a *zu*-infinitive, as do other control verbs (coherent or not). Also Italian *volere* 'to want' is different from typical Italian control verbs since, on the one hand, it does not allow a complement clause introduced by *di* or *a*, and, on the other hand, it allows restructuring.

4.   Evidential Shift

The evidential or quotative use of German *wollen* has often been compared to the epistemic interpretation of other modals in order to find a parallel in the behaviour of the class of modals. Doherty (1985), for example, treats the use of WANT exemplified in (2)b as one of the possible epistemic interpretations of modals in general. However, as exposed in section 2, the construction under discussion here clearly falls into the category of evidentiality marking, even if WANT still cannot be called an evidential proper but just an evidential strategy (i.e. the expansion of the use of a lexical or functional element to mark evidentiality in certain constructions). In this section, I will first show that there is no such epistemic shift for WANT (cf. 4.1), then a time-relational approach for the evidential reading of WANT will be proposed (cf. 4.2), the question of whether WANT is indeed a lexical illocutionary verb will be discussed (cf. 4.3), and an excursion into similar evidential, quotative or illocutionary uses of WANT in Italian and French will be offered (cf. 4.4).

4.1   No Epistemic Shift for WANT

That the use of WANT under discussion here is indeed evidential has been stated by several researchers (cf. e.g. Palmer 2001: 9, 15, Fagan 2001, Reis 2001: 289, Schenner 2007); nevertheless, the idea that WANT can be used as an epistemic is quite common (cf. Doherty 1985: 199f, Diewald 1993, 2000, Abraham 2001, Ehrich 2001). The parallel comes mainly from the fact that the shift from a volitional reading to an evidential reading is encountered in expressions with a tense structure quite similar to those that show a shift from other deontic modal readings to an epistemic reading, cf. the following examples:

(13)   a.   Hans muss   *morgen*   arbeiten.
             H.   MUST   tomorrow   work
             'H. must work tomorrow.'
        b.   Hans   muss   *morgen*   gearbeitet   haben.
             H.   MUST   tomorrow   worked   have
             'H. must have worked (by) tomorrow.'

(14)   a.   *Hans   muss   *gestern*   arbeiten.
             H.   MUST   yesterday   work
             'H. must work yesterday.'
        b.   Hans   muss   *gestern*   gearbeitet   haben.
             H.   MUST   yesterday   worked   have
             'H. must have worked yesterday.'

As (13) and (14) show in comparison to (1) and (2), the epistemic shift in German (as in English and other languages) as well as the evidential use of WANT appear mainly when the embedded infinitive is in a compound tense. However, for both the WANT-construction and the constructions with other modals the observation is valid that, as soon

as there is a temporal adverbial that locates the reference situation in the future, a root interpretation is achieved. If there is a perfect infinitive (i.e. one with the second time relation $E_e\_R_e$) in the complement of the modal, a basic ambiguity for the tense interpretation of the construction arises. Examples like the following, where no temporal adverbial is present, are ambiguous:

(15)　Anna　will　　　ihr Ziel　erreicht　haben.
　　　　Anna　WANT-3s　her goal　reached　have
　　　　a.　'Anna wants to have reached her goal.'
　　　　b.　'Anna claims to have reached her goal.'

Another parallel between the epistemic use of modals and the evidential use of WANT is the following:

(16)　*Anna will　　　gestern　gearbeitet　haben　und B.　will　　　es auch.
　　　　Anna　WANT-3s　yesterday　worked　　have　　and B.　WANT-3s　it　too
　　　　'Anna claims to have worked yesterday and B., too.'

(17)　*Anna muss　　gestern　gearbeitet　haben　und B.　muss　　　es auch.
　　　　Anna　MUST-3s　yesterday　worked　　have　　and B.　MUST-3s　it　too
　　　　'Anna must have worked yesterday and B., too.'

The complement embedded by the modal verb cannot be pronominalised by an *es*-form, neither in the evidential use in (16), nor in the epistemic use in (17) (cf. also Gergel & Hartmann 2009). However, this does not mean that both readings are epistemic; it just means that they both are non-root/non-deontic, which is clearly the case. As for the parallel behaviour concerning the tense structure of the constructions at issue, this can be traced back to the future orientation (or non-anteriority, in Quer's 1998 terms) of root modals in general. Thus the feature common to the evidential WANT-constructions as well as the modal constructions with an epistemic meaning is that both of them are not root/deontic, but something else. However, the common ground ends here (cf. also the analysis proposed in Remberger in press). Evidential shift has little to do with the epistemic shift of other modals if we examine the constructions in which they can appear. Several of the examples Diewald (1993: 225, 228) declared ungrammatical for the epistemic use of modals would hold instead for the evidential use of *wollen*. E.g. evidential *wollen* can be substantivised and can take part in word formation (cf. (18)), it can be the infinitive complement to another evidential modal (cf. (19)), it can also appear in the company of an epistemic modal proper (cf. (20)), and it can be used in the past[26] (cf. (21)):

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[26]If *wollen* itself is in a compound tense no evidential interpretation is given, cf. (i); compound tenses in both the matrix and the infinitive clause give a very weird result, cf. (ii), which becomes slightly better if the matrix clause is put in the conditional, cf. (iii); however, no evidential reading results:
(i)　　　A. hat arbeiten wollen.
　　　　　A. has work WANT-inf/part
(ii)　　　???A. hat gearbeitet haben wollen.
　　　　　A. has worked have-inf WANT-inf/part

The Evidential Shift of WANT[*]

Eva-Maria Remberger

Universität Konstanz

1. Introduction

Modal verbs are commonly known to be polyfunctional[1] and their status, which is subject to crosslinguistic variation, is often said to be on a scale between auxiliary and full verbs (cf. e.g. Heine 1993, 1995). However, common criteria for the class of modal verbs[2] often do not apply to the volitionality-encoding modal verb WANT[3]: WANT[4] is syntactically peculiar, since it appears in a greater and more varied range of syntactic constructions than the other modal verbs like CAN or MUST (e.g. in control structures, as ECM verbs, with Small Clause complements etc.), and it is semantically peculiar, since it seems to have its own valency frame, including a volitional theta-role assigned to an animate and intentional external argument (cf. also Gerdts 1988, Fritz 2000). WANT, at least in those languages of the world that have such a verb, is often involved in grammaticalisation processes or shows phenomena of synchronic shift: WANT, which can be assumed to be closely connected to the basic modality of necessity, has a purely deontic, non-volitional reading (modal shift) in several constructions; WANT can also develop into a syntactic future auxiliary, as in Greek, Romanian and English (future shift), or into a deontic passive auxiliary, as in Sardinian and several Italian dialects (passive shift); furthermore, it can have an evidential interpretation in certain contexts, as is the case in some constructions specific to German (evidential shift). The following examples taken from Klein (1994: 174-175) illustrate the evidential shift, which will be the main topic of this paper:

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[1]Cf. Kratzer (1977, 1981, 1991), Palmer (2001), Reis (2001), Abraham (2005) etc.
[2]Cf. e.g. those listed in Öhlschläger (1989: 4), Heine (1993: 72), Zifonun et al. (1997: 1253).
[3]This was observed by Calbert (1975: 5-6), Zifonun et al. (1997: 1254f) among others.
[4]WANT, in this paper, stands for the prototypical volitional verb that is instantiated as *want* in English, *volere* in Italian, *wollen* in German, *will* in Old English, *querer* in Spanish etc.

(1)   a.   Arnim will   *morgen*   arbeiten.
             A.   WANT-3s   tomorrow   work
             'A. wants to work tomorrow.'
        b.   Arnim will   *morgen*   gearbeitet   haben.
             A.   WANT-3s   tomorrow   worked   have
             'A. wants to have worked (by) tomorrow.'

(2)   a.   *Arnim   will   *gestern*   arbeiten.
             A.   WANT-3s yesterday   work
             'A. wants to work yesterday.'
        b.   Arnim   will   *gestern*   gearbeitet   haben.
             A.   WANT-3s yesterday   worked   have
             'A. maintains that he worked yesterday.'

The examples in (1) represent control structures with a volitional subject of WANT controlling the subject of the embedded infinitive. Since there is an explicit future reference situation in the embedded infinitive, expressed by the adverb *morgen* (the reference time R is to be situated AFTER the speech time S[5]), there is no ambiguity with respect to the interpretation of *wollen,* since its canonical interpretation is future-oriented (cf. section 3.3). Thus, in (1)a, we get a future interpretation (S_R) for the embedded sentence even if it is a present infinitive (R,E)[6], whereas in (1)b we get a 'past projected into the future' reading (S_R • E_R), since there is an perfect infinitive (E_R). The situation is different in (2): here, the explicit reference situation of the embedded infinitive refers to a past reference situation (hence R BEFORE S) which as such is incompatible with volitional modality and its future-oriented sense: The reference situation cannot lie in the past (R_S), coincide with E (R,E) and be future-oriented at the same time. Thus, (2)a is ungrammatical. However, (2)b is grammatical, but with a different interpretation to (1)b: The volitionality of *wollen* has shifted to an evidential reading, maintaining the time-situational interpretation of the perfect infinitive (E_R) and the explicit time adverbial (R_S), but losing the future-orientation.[7]

The aim of this article is to have a closer look at this evidential shift mainly in the context of the semantics of WANT. It is organised as follows: In the next section, some general observations with respect to evidentiality as a grammatical category are made and the evidential use of German *wollen* is classified. In section 3, the notion of volitionality and the volitional verb WANT are discussed. Section 4 is dedicated to different

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[5]In what follows I refer to the system of temporal relations introduced by Reichenbach (1947) and elaborated by Vikner (1985), Giorgi & Pianesi (1997), with R, the reference situation, S, the speech situation (or, if not directly linked to discourse, the time-relational situation of a matrix clause, cf. Enç 1987), and E, the event situation; the underline shows the temporal ordering (BEFORE or AFTER), and a comma between the temporal relations expresses coincidence or inclusion (i.e. EQUALS); for a similar system representing two temporal-aspectual relations cf. also Demirdache & Uribe-Etchebarria (2000).

[6]There is an ambiguity in infinitival forms which allows "the infinitive to be construed as 'present' or 'future'" (Eide 2003: 129).

[7](2)b could, in principle, have a volitional reading in some very restricted and marked contexts, cf. Remberger (in press) for a more detailed analysis of the relation of volitionality and tense.

subchapters of the evidential shift of WANT, analysing the German data at issue and including an excursion to apparently similar data from Italian (and others). In this section, the question will also be raised of whether German *wollen*, in its evidential use, is simply another illocutionary verb like e.g. *behaupten* 'maintain'. Section 5 summarises and concludes this paper.

2.   Evidentiality

The grammatical notion of evidentiality has recently been subject to lively debate, which has brought forth several definitions and raised several open questions. Evidentiality is usually defined as "a linguistic category whose primary meaning is source of information" (Aikhenvald 2004: 3) and its name stems from the "evidence a person has for making factual claims" (Anderson 1982: 273).

The main open question is whether evidentiality is a category on its own or whether it is just a subcategory belonging to the system of modality. In research literature, there are three approaches to this problem (cf. also Dendale & Tasmowski 2001: 341-242):

(3)   a.   *Evidentiality in a narrow sense* (e.g. Anderson 1982, Willett 1988, Aikhenvald 2004): the focus lies on the expression of the "information or sources of knowledge behind assertions" (Dendale et al. 2001: 340); if evidential marking results in an interpretation that reveals the speakers' (e.g. positive or negative) attitudes towards the evidentially marked proposition, this is purely a consequence of pragmatics and has nothing to do with grammatical epistemic modality.
   b.   *Evidentiality in the broad sense* (cf. Palmer 2001[8]): evidentiality is part of the system of (mainly) epistemic modality (or vice versa), since both characterise the "attitude of the speaker" ("attitudes about the epistemic status of information", Dendale et al. 2001: 340) towards the proposition encoded in an utterance.
   c.   *Overlapping of evidentiality and epistemicity*: this view is adopted especially in the subfield of inferential evidentiality, which might be easily interpreted as a type of epistemic modality (cf. van der Auwera & Pungian 1998: 86, following to Dendale et al. 2001: 242, and Plungian 2001: 354; also Palmer 2001).

Even if WANT is typically a modal verb, in its evidential use as exemplified in (2)b, it clearly encodes evidentiality in a narrow sense. It does not encode an attitude of the speaker towards the proposition encoded in the embedded infinitive (cf. also section 4.1), but it clearly indicates the fact that there is a source of information, in this case, an explicit one, namely the referent of the external argument of *wollen*. Sometimes, of course, the clear indication of a source of information results in an interpretation that

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[8]Palmer (2001) treats evidentiality as a subsystem of modality, but he keeps evidential modal systems clearly distinct from epistemic modal systems.

might include a kind of disbelief or distance on the part of the speaker. However, such an interpretation results from purely pragmatic reasons: If a speaker explicitly encodes the source of information in a language which does not obligatorily need to encode it, this gives rise to the implicature on the part of the hearer that there is something behind it, otherwise the speaker would not have encoded the source of information in such an explicit way.

Although I will adopt the position that evidentiality is a grammatical category standing on its own, *wollen* is not taken to be the typical marker of evidentiality in German. Its main use is still that of a volitional modal verb. Following Aikhenvald (2004), an element whose main use lies in the expression of a lexical or functional meaning other than evidentiality is not a marker of evidentiality proper but one of the "evidential strategies" possible in this language. However, the evidential shift of WANT in German is not only pragmatic inference either, but it has been conventionalised and maybe also grammaticalised to a certain degree. Otherwise the same sentence as (2)b in Italian should be grammatical, which it is not (cf. section 4.6). Aikhenvald (2004) excludes the evidential use of *wollen* from the class of grammaticalised evidential markers since it doesn't satisfy her morpheme-based definition.[9] Others, whose definitions rely more on constructions than on morphemes, assert that German "has grammaticalized evidentiality" without necessarily having an "evidential 'system'" (Narrogs 2005: 385). Aikhenvalds definition of grammaticalisation thus seems to refer to the result of a grammaticalisation process, whereas the evidential use of *wollen* in German is probably at a stage of development between lexical element and fully grammaticalised (= auxiliary) element.

Based on the assumption that evidentiality is a category on its own, Willett (1988:57) has proposed three subtypes of evidentiality, i.e. a) direct evidentiality, based on first-hand sensory evidence, b) indirect evidentiality, based on second- and third-hand evidence (an equivalent of reportative evidence) and c) inferential evidentiality, i.e. evidentiality based on evidence by deduction or inference. In this system, the evidential *wollen*-construction in German clearly belongs to type b) since it encodes an indirect evidentiality, namely the reportative, hence second-hand evidence, but one where the source of information is always explicitly given by virtue of the external argument of the clause. The evidential use of *wollen* often is also called "quotative"[10] (cf. e.g. Diewald 1999).[11]

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[9]Aikhenvald (2004) just mentions the evidential use of *wollen* and *sollen*. However, the interpretation that she gives of the German examples cannot be correct since she pairs the evidential use of *wollen* with the English modal *must*, cf. also the review by Narrog (2005).

[10]Plungian (2001:252), for example, has 'quotative' as a hypernym for "reported speech (presupposing a known author) vs. generalized, second-hand information (presupposing an unknown or non-definite 'anonymous' author) vs. tradition or common knowledge (where no personal author is invoked)." For Anderson (2001: 289) the hypernym is 'reportive' and includes four co-hyponyms, namely "hearsay", "general reputation", "myth and history" and "quotative (marginally an evidential)"; Palmer (2001) also sometimes distinguishes between 'quotative' ("indicates that the speaker regards what he has said to be something that everyone knows") and 'hearsay' ("indicates that the speaker was told the information given in the sentence by someone else, but has no evidence of its truth value") (cf. Palmer 2001: 37), but in general he adopts the labels 'Reported(2)', 'Reported(3)', 'Reported(gen)' (cf. Palmer

3. The Volitional Verb WANT

3.1 Volitional Modality

<u>The modal relation</u>: The basic values of modality following Kratzer (1977, 1981 – among others) are possibility and necessity. There are several reasons to assume that WANT encodes necessity: First, instances of WANT in the languages of the world (the ones that have such a modal verb) often are derived from a verb (or noun) of necessity. This, for example, is clearly the case for English *to want*, which derives from an Old Norse element meaning 'lacking' first, then 'to need', and which also in its today's use keeps this flavour of necessity. Second, there are several examples of the above-mentioned shift phenomena from volitionality to necessity, as the following instances from Italian, German, and Sardinian show:

(4)   It.   Ci   vogliono   tre   uova per   fare   questa torta
                 there WANT-3p three eggs to   make   this   cake
                 'One needs three eggs to make this cake.'
(5)   Ger.   Dieses Buch will   gelesen   werden.
                 this   book WANT-3s read-pprt   become-inf
                 'This book should be read.'
(6)   Sard.   Custa   macchina   cheret   lavata.
                 this   car   WANT-3s   washed-pprt.f.s
                 'This car needs to be washed.'[12]

These examples vary in construction, since (4) is an impersonal WANT + locative construction, (5) probably a raising structure, and (6) a WANT-passive; but they all have in common that they encode a modal meaning of pure necessity whereas volitionality is lost. On this ground, I will assume the basic modal meaning of WANT to be that of necessity (cf. also Calbert 1975: 36, fn. 32).

Some analyses of WANT attest that it carries a meaning of possibility in certain constructions (cf. e.g. Maché 2007); however, these meanings commonly come up in contexts of negation. If we interpret modal necessity as universal quantification over modalised worlds, whereas possibility is concerned with existential quantification, it becomes clear why there could be a kind of 'derived possibility' in the context of

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2001:41), a variation of Willett's (1988) terminological division of reportative evidence in 'second hand', 'third hand', and 'folklore'. Since the evidential interpretation of German *wollen* is clearly connected to the syntactic subject as an explicit source for the reportative evidence, it should be labelled 'Reported(2)' in Palmer's, i.e. 'second hand' evidence in Willett's terms.

[11]For a study of another type of "quotative" or "reportative" evidentiality marker in Romance, cf. Cruschina & Remberger (2008), where some of the general notions concerning evidentiality presented here are also discussed.

[12]Cf. also this parallel example from some American English varieties (cf. Murray & Simon 1999, as well as Remberger 2006):
(i)   This car wants washed.

(especially implicitly dual) negation (cf. also Ehrich 2001: 156): 'It is necessary that p' then corresponds to 'It is not possible that not p' in the same way as '$\forall x P(x)$' corresponds to '$\neg\exists x\neg P(x)$' (cf. Lohnstein 1996: 102; 249).[13]

The modal base: Besides the modal relations of necessity or possibility, established between the actual world and the modalised worlds, a further parameter or ingredient of modality (still following Kratzer 1977, 1981) is its modal base or its conversational background, i.e. the model of knowledge, obligations, norms, ideas, desires etc. against which the modal expression is evaluated. It is an open discussion how the modal base for WANT could be described: for some it is a bouletic model ('that what is wanted in w', cf. Kratzer 1981), in other words, a volitional modal base comprising what is desired or preferred in the actual world. For others, the model of a volitional expression is a doxastic[14] one (the 'doxastically accessible worlds for a', cf. von Fintel 1999:117; Heim 1992), or a model of 'the subject's belief' (Hacquard 2006), i.e. simply an epistemic model (Giannakidou 2007) concerning what, based on world knowledge, can be wanted. The second approach would mean somehow that volitional modality could be part of the system of epistemic modality. However, both an epistemic and a bouletic model for WANT have in common that there is a particular feature in WANT which links this modal base to the subject; this will be explained in the next paragraph.

The source of modality: Farkas (1992) introduced the notion of the 'individual anchor', i.e. an utterance-internal or external entity to which the modal base is connected (e.g. the speaker in epistemic interpretations). It is the individual anchor that plays an exceptional role in the case of WANT, since the individual anchor of the model of the actual as well as the future worlds introduced by WANT is the thematic 'subject', i.e. the external argument of WANT. This individual anchor clearly represents the source of

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[13]The interpretation of possibility has been ascribed to WANT in constructions like the following:

(i)	Die	Tür	will		nicht	aufgehen.
	the	door	WANT-3s		not	open

'The door doesn't open (but it should…).'

(ii)	Diese	Idee	will		mir	nicht	gefallen.
	this	idea	WANT-3s		me	not	please

'I don't really like this idea (also if I am expected to like it…).'

The first construction obligatorily involves negation, and includes an adversative element (sometimes visible in expressions like *einfach nicht*, *aber nicht* and similar); the second construction does not need to appear in a negative context and always involves psych verbs, i.e. verbs with an experiencer argument that canonically appears in what can be called the subject position, also this experiencer is marked dative or accusative (quirky subjects). I cannot go into an analysis of these constructions here. For a possible interpretation, cf. Gergel & Hartmann (2009) and Maché (2007).

[14]Also following Giorgi & Pianesi (1997: 212) *want* has a doxastic modal base: „A verb such as *want* requires the subject to believe it possible for the embedded proposition to become true." Giorgi & Pianesi (1997: 266, fn. 24): "[...] *want* is similar to belief verbs in having a doxastic modal base [...]. It differs from them in that it has a non-null *bouletic* ordering source." However, I don't believe that *want* needs this belief of its subject as a prerequisite. As Quer (1998: 44, fn. 32) states, *believe* is a weak intensional verb, whereas *want* is a strong intensional verb: there can't be contradictory beliefs, but there can be contradictory intentions.

modality[15] (the first element of a modal relation following Kratzer[16]), which is not always easy to identify in other modal expressions. In the case of WANT, its subject orientation (cf. also Heine 1995) is obvious: WANT has its own volitional theta-role for an external argument, which must be animate and intentional[17]; furthermore, in the eventual case of an embedded infinitive, this argument has control properties.[18]

     <u>The goal of modality</u>: The complement over which WANT takes scope (the second argument of a modal relation) is the goal of modality.[19] As Kratzer (1981) puts it, the function g included in WANT maps from possible worlds into sets of propositions constituting what is wanted by the individual referred to by the (logical) subject. Following Farkas (1992) it targets the 'set of bouletic alternatives anchored to the referent of the subjects' or, as Quer (198: 22) says, a 'set of propositions specifying the preferences of a in w' or a 'set of worlds that are compatible with the wishes of the individual'. The goal of the modality of WANT can consist in a proposition (a finite CP or a CP- or IP-infinitive), a predication (i.e. a Small Clause) or an entity (a DP). Shift phenomena can concern all kinds of complements.

3.2   **Shift Phenomena**

     The interplay of the modal parameters introduced in 3.1 with other fields of grammar (tense, aspect, mood, polarity, lexical and syntactic argument structure, semantic selection etc.) leads to the polyfunctionality of modals mentioned above. As far as the shift-phenomena regarding WANT-constructions are concerned, several types of shift (first pragmatic, then conventionalised, until they end up in grammaticalisation and linguistic change) can result from these dynamics to escape incompatibility:

(7)   a.   shift of the <u>modal relation</u>, e.g. from necessity to possibility
        b.   shift of the <u>modal base</u>, e.g. from bouletic/doxastic to evidential

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[15]Cf. the "modal source" according to Calbert (1975); the "Modalfaktor" according to Bech (1949).

[16]I will not discuss the corresponding notion of an "ordering source" (cf. Kratzer 1991) here, since in the case of WANT in its canonical use, the source of modality is quite easy to identify. Nevertheless there might be a need to make a distinction between two modal bases, a bouletic and a doxastix one (cf. Heim 1992), but both of them, as said above, are connected to the subject of WANT.

[17]As far as the theta-role of the subject of WANT is concerned, this has been called an "agentive animate cause" (Calbert 1975: 16, 18, 22), an "agent" (Abraham 2005: 261), an "agent / cognizer" (Gerdts 1988), and the modality of WANT has been related to "agent-oriented modality" (Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994, Heine 1995). But if we observe how WANT behaves under the agentivity test following Cruse (1973), it results that the theta-role of WANT cannot be agentive, cf. (i):
(i)   A: What did John do?
        B: ?? He wanted to drink a beer.
It is more appropriate to call it an "experiencer" (Diewald 2000; Hacquardt 2006: 170), a "senser" (Verplaetse 2003: 159), a "bearer of an intentional attitude" (Doherty 1985: 120), or an "intentional force / force of will" (Copley 2002).

[18]Of course, control is not always given in infinitive constructions with WANT, cf. e.g. the English ECM-constructions with WANT, or the Sardinian personal and inflected infinitives (cf. Remberger 2005 for a phenomenology of WANT-constructions in Romance).

[19]Cf. Calbert (1975); the "Modalfeld" according to Bech (1949).

    c.   shift of the <u>modal source</u>, e.g. from the logical subject to the context
    d.   shift of the <u>goal of modality</u>, e.g. a proposition to an assertion

The evidential WANT-constructions discussed here may be concerned with (7)a, i.e. the shift of the modal relation, insofar as the modal meaning of volitionality is lost in favour of another, maybe not even modal, meaning (depending on the interpretation of evidentiality according to (3)a, b, or c). They also are concerned with the shift of the modal base, which becomes one of reported speech with an explicit indication of the source of information. Thus, there is no shift of the modal source to the context, since the subject orientation of WANT is maintained in the evidential construction. The goal of modality, however, is also shifted in the evidential use of WANT since it no longer refers to alternative worlds, but to a proposition that is asserted. Before moving on to discuss these shifting mechanisms in section 4, something else should be said on the future-orientation of WANT as mentioned above.

3.3   The Future-Orientation of WANT

It has been stated in literature that root modality is future-oriented, since modality involves quantification over a set of future worlds (e.g. Quer 1998: 22-25). Following Giorgi & Pianesi (1997: 212) WANT introduces "a non-realistic domain". Modals have also been called "pretime verbs" (cf. Klein 1994: 174); in their root interpretation, they are always "future projecting" (Eide 2003: 128). This predisposition of WANT has led to the well-known grammaticalisation process of WANT as a future marker, e.g. in Romanian, Greek, and also English (cf. also Heine & Kuteva 2000: 310-311). However, WANT can refer to an actual situation as well[20], cf. (8), even if this is not the usual or unmarked interpretation:[21]

(8)   John wants to work where he works.

Thus, there is a future but possibly also a present reference in WANT. As Quer (1998:50) puts it, WANT does introduce a set of *non-anterior* rather than future alternative worlds. Or, according to Giannakidou, WANT is non-veridical, which means that neither the factivity of the alternative worlds contained in its complement nor the non-factivity is implied.[22]

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[20]Cf. Klein (1994: 174): "After all, one can still want to do what one is doing already."

[21]Eide (2003: 128): "Thus, it is possible to utter *This door must be kept closed* in a situation where the door is already (kept) closed. However, the present situation is irrelevant for a root modal; its complement always refers to a future situation. This is a consequence of their semantics. A root modal denotes e.g. that a rational agent X requires/intends/wants/needs/permits Y to hold, where Y is a situation subsequent to the evaluation time of the root modal. A requirement/intention/will/need or permission cannot possibly influence on things that have already occurred. I.e. although I might have wanted my permitting John to have arrived before S to be able to alter the actual events taking place, this is not possible in reality (except in jocular contexts)."

[22]WANT is not factive but it must not necessarily be non-factive; as a desiderative it belongs to the group of predicates containing a non-veridical operator OP; that means that *OP p* does not imply *p*, cf. Giannakidou (2009) and Quer (1998). Thus, it also does not imply ¬*p*. Therefore, *WANT p* can, but does not have to, have a presuppositional reading of non-factivity ¬*p*.

Indeed, there are always two possible relations in which an embedded clause can be linked to the tense specification of a matrix modal clause (cf. Hornstein 1990, Klein 1994, Quer 1998, Eide 2003) and both can be made explicit[23] by the corresponding temporal adverbial:[24]

(9) a. E_m, R_e Anna will/muss/can   *jetzt* einen Brief   schreiben.
             A.   WANT/MUST/CAN now a   letter   write
             'A wants to/must/can write a letter now.'
     b. $E_m\_R_e$ Anna will/muss/can   *morgen*   einen   Brief   schreiben.
             A.   WANT/MUST/CAN tomorrow a   letter   write
             'A wants to/must/can write a letter tomorrow.'

These two relations could also explain the two conversational backgrounds possibly introduced by WANT (cf. fn. 16): one (the epistemic or doxastic model) concerns what can actually be wanted in w, whereas the second (the bouletic model base) is what might be preferred in a future, irrealis, non-factive world.

3.4   The Characteristics of WANT

Summing up, the modal verb WANT in its canonical, unmarked use, i.e. that which yields a volitional interpretation, can be characterised as follows:

(10)   The modality underlying volitionality is basically *necessity*.
(11)   *Subject Linking*: The modal source of the modal base (the epistemic or bouletic model) introduced by WANT is linked to the external argument of WANT, an animate, intentional entity. A subject-oriented mental necessity results.
(12)   WANT as a root modal is future-oriented, i.e. it introduces *non-anterior* alternative worlds.

If we look at the syntactic properties of the modal verb WANT + infinitive, the construction of interest here, it can be stated that this construction is biclausal with a matrix clause and a modalised embedded infinitive clause encoding a dependent proposition. The subject-linking property of the modality of WANT manifests itself syntactically in the control[25] property, by which the subject of WANT and the subject of the embedded infinitive proposition must be co-referent (but cf. fn. 18).

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[23]*Morgen*, 'tomorrow', and *jetzt*, 'now' are not relative time adverbials, but absolute ones, setting the reference situation in a direct relation to the speech situation; however, since the tense structure of the modal itself is the present tense, the reference situation here can be related to the event situation of the modal.

[24]Subscript *m = matrix*; subscript *e = embedded*.

[25]In German, however, *wollen* is different from other (subject) control verbs insofar as it does not introduce a *zu*-infinitive, as do other control verbs (coherent or not). Also Italian *volere* 'to want' is different from typical Italian control verbs since, on the one hand, it does not allow a complement clause introduced by *di* or *a*, and, on the other hand, it allows restructuring.

4.   Evidential Shift

The evidential or quotative use of German *wollen* has often been compared to the epistemic interpretation of other modals in order to find a parallel in the behaviour of the class of modals. Doherty (1985), for example, treats the use of WANT exemplified in (2)b as one of the possible epistemic interpretations of modals in general. However, as exposed in section 2, the construction under discussion here clearly falls into the category of evidentiality marking, even if WANT still cannot be called an evidential proper but just an evidential strategy (i.e. the expansion of the use of a lexical or functional element to mark evidentiality in certain constructions). In this section, I will first show that there is no such epistemic shift for WANT (cf. 4.1), then a time-relational approach for the evidential reading of WANT will be proposed (cf. 4.2), the question of whether WANT is indeed a lexical illocutionary verb will be discussed (cf. 4.3), and an excursion into similar evidential, quotative or illocutionary uses of WANT in Italian and French will be offered (cf. 4.4).

4.1   No Epistemic Shift for WANT

That the use of WANT under discussion here is indeed evidential has been stated by several researchers (cf. e.g. Palmer 2001: 9, 15, Fagan 2001, Reis 2001: 289, Schenner 2007); nevertheless, the idea that WANT can be used as an epistemic is quite common (cf. Doherty 1985: 199f, Diewald 1993, 2000, Abraham 2001, Ehrich 2001). The parallel comes mainly from the fact that the shift from a volitional reading to an evidential reading is encountered in expressions with a tense structure quite similar to those that show a shift from other deontic modal readings to an epistemic reading, cf. the following examples:

(13)   a.   Hans muss   *morgen*   arbeiten.
             H.   MUST   tomorrow   work
             'H. must work tomorrow.'
        b.   Hans   muss   *morgen*   gearbeitet   haben.
             H.   MUST   tomorrow   worked   have
             'H. must have worked (by) tomorrow.'

(14)   a.   *Hans   muss   *gestern*   arbeiten.
             H.   MUST   yesterday   work
             'H. must work yesterday.'
        b.   Hans   muss   *gestern*   gearbeitet   haben.
             H.   MUST   yesterday   worked   have
             'H. must have worked yesterday.'

As (13) and (14) show in comparison to (1) and (2), the epistemic shift in German (as in English and other languages) as well as the evidential use of WANT appear mainly when the embedded infinitive is in a compound tense. However, for both the WANT-construction and the constructions with other modals the observation is valid that, as soon

as there is a temporal adverbial that locates the reference situation in the future, a root interpretation is achieved. If there is a perfect infinitive (i.e. one with the second time relation $E_e\_R_e$) in the complement of the modal, a basic ambiguity for the tense interpretation of the construction arises. Examples like the following, where no temporal adverbial is present, are ambiguous:

(15) Anna will ihr Ziel erreicht haben.
       Anna WANT-3s her goal reached have
       a. 'Anna wants to have reached her goal.'
       b. 'Anna claims to have reached her goal.'

Another parallel between the epistemic use of modals and the evidential use of WANT is the following:

(16) *Anna will gestern gearbeitet haben und B. will es auch.
       Anna WANT-3s yesterday worked have and B. WANT-3s it too
       'Anna claims to have worked yesterday and B., too.'

(17) *Anna muss gestern gearbeitet haben und B. muss es auch.
       Anna MUST-3s yesterday worked have and B. MUST-3s it too
       'Anna must have worked yesterday and B., too.'

The complement embedded by the modal verb cannot be pronominalised by an *es*-form, neither in the evidential use in (16), nor in the epistemic use in (17) (cf. also Gergel & Hartmann 2009). However, this does not mean that both readings are epistemic; it just means that they both are non-root/non-deontic, which is clearly the case. As for the parallel behaviour concerning the tense structure of the constructions at issue, this can be traced back to the future orientation (or non-anteriority, in Quer's 1998 terms) of root modals in general. Thus the feature common to the evidential WANT-constructions as well as the modal constructions with an epistemic meaning is that both of them are not root/deontic, but something else. However, the common ground ends here (cf. also the analysis proposed in Remberger in press). Evidential shift has little to do with the epistemic shift of other modals if we examine the constructions in which they can appear. Several of the examples Diewald (1993: 225, 228) declared ungrammatical for the epistemic use of modals would hold instead for the evidential use of *wollen*. E.g. evidential *wollen* can be substantivised and can take part in word formation (cf. (18)), it can be the infinitive complement to another evidential modal (cf. (19)), it can also appear in the company of an epistemic modal proper (cf. (20)), and it can be used in the past[26] (cf. (21)):

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[26]If *wollen* itself is in a compound tense no evidential interpretation is given, cf. (i); compound tenses in both the matrix and the infinitive clause give a very weird result, cf. (ii), which becomes slightly better if the matrix clause is put in the conditional, cf. (iii); however, no evidential reading results:
(i)   A. hat arbeiten wollen.
         A. has work WANT-inf/part
(ii)   ???A. hat gearbeitet haben wollen.
         A. has worked have-inf WANT-inf/part

(18)   Das   Etwas-Gesehen-Haben-Wollen   alleine nützt   nichts.
        the   something-seen-HAVE-WANT-inf alone   serves   nothing
        'The sole claim to have seen something is of no use.'

(19)   Er   soll   die Frau   nie   zuvor gesehen haben wollen.[27]
        he   SHELL-3s the woman   never before seen   have   WANT-inf/part
        'He is claimed to maintain never to have seen this woman before.'

(20)   Er   wird   die Frau   wohl   nie   zuvor gesehen haben wollen.
        he   WILL-3s the woman probably never before seen   have   WANT-inf/part
        'He probably will maintain never to have seen this woman before.'

(21)   Vor   drei Tagen wollte   er die Frau   noch nie   zuvor gesehen haben.
        before three days WANT-3s he the woman still never before seen   have
        'Three days ago he still maintained never to have seen this woman before.'

All these constructions would be inappropriate for an epistemic modal.[28] Therefore the evidential use of *wollen* cannot be epistemic. The subject-linking property of WANT is still maintained in its evidential use since the sentence subject is the source of evidence.[29] Now, if there is an epistemic interpretation of an expression like (2)b, in the sense that the speaker might have doubts on the truth value of p, this is an effect of pragmatics, i.e. an conversational implicature: Since German is a language where declarative sentences are not obligatorily marked for evidentiality (for other languages with this marking, cf. Aikhenwald 2004, Faller 2006), an explicit marking of a situation p as reported gives rise to the implicature that the speaker does not believe that p. However, this implicature can also be neutralised, cf. (22):

(iii)   A. hätte gearbeitet haben wollen.
             A. had-cond worked have-inf WANT-inf/part
             [27]However, (i) is not possible:
(i)   *Er will die Frau nie zuvor gesehen haben sollen.
             he is WANT-3s the woman never before seen have SHELL-inf/part
             'He maintains never to have been claimed to have seen this woman before.'
             [28]Abraham (2001: 11) states that modals cannot be interpreted in their epistemic reading in other than declarative sentences; but cf. (i):
(i)   Will   er   den   Verdächtigen   tatsächlich   gesehen   haben?
             WILL-3 he   the   suspect   indeed   seen   have
             'Does he really maintain that he has seen the suspect?'
However, Abrahams statement must be mistaken since also other modals can keep their epistemic reading
        in interrogatives, cf. (i):
(ii)   Muss   er   denn reich sein, nur   weil   er   teure   Kleidung trägt?
             MUST-3 he   then rich be   only because he   expensive   clothes   wears
             'Does it really mean that he is rich only because he wears expensive clothes?'
             [29]The source of evidence or the new point of view is certainly not the "deictic origo" as claimed by Diewald (1993: 219) and Diewald (1999).

(22)   Er will   noch nie   in Spanien gewesen sein und das glaube ich ihm.
       he WANT-3s yet never in Spain   been   be and this believe I   him
       'He maintains never to have been to Spain and I believe him.'

Besides, the speaker's attitude, of course, can never be interpreted in the sense that he or she has doubts about the fact that the sentence subject claims p. WANT cannot function as a speaker-oriented epistemic marker here, but as a propositional marker of evidentiality, as has been also shown by Faller (2006) and Schenner (2007) for embedded sentences with evidential WANT, where the subject-oriented evidential meaning is maintained, even without direct anchoring to the speech act.

4.2   A Time-Relational Approach

As previously stated, when there is an explicit time adverbial referring to posterior embedded reference time, like *bis zum 18. Juli* in (23), the deontic (volitional) reading of WANT is not changed:

(23)   *Bis zum 18. Juli* will der Landesverband mindestens 20000 Unterschriften
       gesammelt haben.   (COSMAS: bmp)
       until the 18. July WANT-3s the regional-association at-least 20000 signatures
       collected have
       'By July 18th the regional association wants to have collected at least 20000
       signatures.'

But also an evidential reading can be disambiguated by temporal adverbials, either by one encoding anteriority or simultaneity (cf. *jetzt* in (24)) or by evidentiality marking adverbials proper as, for example, *angeblich* 'allegedly' (cf. (25)):

(24)   F. T. (50) von der Universität Viterbo will die Antwort *jetzt* in Geheimarchiven
       des Vatikans entdeckt haben.   (COSMAS: bmp)
       F. T. (50) from the university of Viterbo WANT-3s the answer now in secret-
       archives of-the Vatican discovered have
       'F. T. from the University of Viterbo now claims to have found the answer in
       secret archives of the Vatican.'

(25)   ...P. aus Hellersdorf, der *angeblich* nichts gesehen haben will, … (COSMAS:
       bmp)
         P. from H.   who allegedly nothing seen have   WANTS
       '... P. from H., who claims not to have seen anything, allegedly,...'

However, without a disambiguating adverbial the unmarked reading is the evidential one. A short corpus analysis (COSMAS, *Berliner Morgenpost* 1997-1999) also

shows that of 244 instances of WANT + perfect infinitive, only 40 have a volitional reading.[30]

Taking into account the observations made so far, the evidential shift of WANT can be formalized as follows (with $\square$ as the necessity operator and the colon as a quotative marker):

(26)   Evidential Shift (first version)
        a. *S,R_m º R_m,E_m $\square$ E_m, R_e º E_e R_e (necessity, M(subj), coincidence, perfectivity)
        b. S,R_m º R_m,E_m $\square$ E_m_ R_e º E_e R_e (necessity, M(subj), posteriority, perfectivity)
        c. S,R_m º R_m,E_m : E_m, R_e º E_e R_e (evidential, M(subj), coincidence, perfectivity)

The time relations expressed in (26)a are not compatible with a deontic reading of necessity, since a deontic interpretation of a modal is future-oriented or, at least, non-anterior, and the combination of coincidence with perfectivity inhibits a non-anterior reading (but see the marked contexts given in Remberger in press). Thus the only possible deontic interpretation for a construction with *wollen* + infinitive is the one given in (26)b, where the first time relation of the embedded infinitive has been reinterpreted as future indicating. The result is a past in the future, which is compatible with deontic modality. However, the evidential shift stems from the representation given in (26)a, and it works as follows: The model introduced by *wollen* is not one of future preferred worlds, but one of the actual world. Since the evaluation time of the proposition coincides with the event time of WANT, not the truth of the proposition with respect to future worlds compatible with the subject's desires is evaluated, but the subject's assertion of the proposition itself with respect to the actual world. That is, the temporal relations remain the same, the subject linking is still valid, but what has changed is the nature of the modal base. The world introduced by the proposition encoded in the infinitive clause is not necessary for the subject as far as a doxastic/bouletic model is concerned, but it is necessary for the subject with respect to its truth-value. Thus *wollen* becomes a marker of evidentiality since, by focussing on the truth-value of the embedded proposition, adding it as an actual proposition provided by the subject instead of introducing it as a set of alternative propositions, it explicitly indicates the speaker's source of information.[31]

4.3   *Wollen* **as an Illocutionary Verb?**

The evidential shift of WANT sketched in the previous sections may lead to the conclusion that WANT in German, i.e. *wollen*, has obtained a new lexical entry as a lexical illocutionary verb. However, if we compare the use of evidential *wollen* with

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[30]The evidential reading is not exclusive to embedded perfect infinitives. Constructions with *wollen* + stative or non-perfective predicates might also be interpreted as evidential:
(i)   Dieser Politiker   will   tatsächlich   aufrichtig   sein.
        this   politician   WANT-3s   indeed   sincere   be
        a. 'This politician really wants to be sincere.'
        b. 'This politicians really claims to be sincere.'
However, in this case the unmarked reading would be (i)a, i.e. the volitional one.
        [31]For stative, non perfective predicates this works in a parallel way.

other illocutionary verbs, like *sagen* 'to say'[32] or, in particular, *behaupten* 'to maintain', we see important semantic and syntactic differences. These are summed up as follows:

(27) a. The interpretation of *wollen* as a supposedly illocutionary verb is dependent on the time-relational structure, especially aspect (and *Aktionsart*) of the embedded infinitive. Illocutionary verbs can appear in all tenses, but *wollen* as a supposedly illocutionary verb cannot appear in compound tenses.
 b. The interpretation of *wollen* as a supposedly illocutionary verb depends on subject co-reference with the embedded infinitive. A proposition with any other or no subject cannot be the complement of evidential WANT.
 c. Illocutionary verbs usually can be negated. The supposed illocutionary meaning of *wollen* cannot.
 d. The syntactic context with respect to constructions of *wollen* as a supposedly illocutionary verb is thus very restricted. Illocutionary verbs, in German, can usually also take CP-complements, they select *zu*-infinitives, and they can appear in coherent and non-coherent constructions, they appear in bridge verb constructions etc.

That there is only one negation in an evidential WANT-construction and that the evidential WANT-clause cannot be negated on its own is shown by (28), where in (28)a and (28)c the embedded proposition is negated, whereas in (28)d the illocutionary matrix-verb *behaupten* 'to claim' is negated. However, (28)b is not equivalent to (28)d, since here the negation just can take scope over the adverbial *gestern* – not over the whole embedded clause:

(28) a. A. will   gestern   nicht gearbeitet haben.
  A. WANT-3s yesterday not   worked   have
  'A. claims not to have worked yesterday.'
 b. A. will   nicht gestern   gearbeitet haben.
  A. WANT-3s not   yesterday   worked   have
  'A. claims to have worked not yesterday (but …).'
 c. A. behauptet, gestern   nicht gearbeitet zu   haben.
  A. claims   yesterday not   worked   to   have
  'A. claims not to have worked yesterday.'
 d. A. behauptet nicht, gestern   gearbeitet zu haben.
  A. claims   not   yesterday worked   to   have
  'A doesn't claim to have worked yesterday.'

It is a typical (even if not universal) property of evidentials (cf. Aikhenvald 2004: 96-97) that they cannot be negated. Also the fact that evidential WANT cannot appear in its whole morphological paradigm, cf. (29), leads us to suspect that the propositional domain of the WANT-clause itself is a reduced structure. The first time relation can

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[32]Verbs of saying are a very common source of evidential markers, cf. e.g. Cruschina & Remberger (2008) for some data on Romance evidential adverbials.

encode the EQUALS, AFTER, or BEFORE relation, cf. (29)a, b, and c, but there is no possibility of doing that with a second time relation, cf. (29)d and e:

(29)   a. A. will   gearbeitet haben.   (evidential and volitional)
            A. WANT-pres.3s worked have
       b. A. wird   gearbeitet haben wollen.   (evidential and volitional)
            A. will   worked   have   WANT-inf/part
       c. A. wollte   gearbeitet   haben.   (evidential and volitional)
            A. WANT-past.3s worked   have
       d. A. hat   arbeiten   wollen.   (only volitional)
            A. has   work-inf   WANT-inf/part
       e. A. hatte   arbeiten   wollen.   (only volitional)
            A. had   work-inf   WANT-inf/part

Because of the temporal and propositional structure of evidential WANT I assume that there is only one temporal relation in the matrix clause (cf. also Remberger in press). In this spirit, the time-relational derivation of the evidential shift of WANT given in (26) must be modified as follows, cf. especially (30)d:

(30)   Evidential Shift (second version)
        a. $*S,R_m \circ R_m,E_m \square E_m,R_e \circ E_e\_R_e$ (necessity, M(subj), coincidence, perfectivity)
        b. $S,R_m \circ R_m,E_m \square E_m\_R_e \circ E_e\_R_e$ (necessity, M(subj), posteriority, perfectivity)
        c. $S,R_m \circ R_m,E_m : E_m,R_e \circ E_e\_R_e$ (evidential, M(subj), coincidence, perfectivity)
        d. $S/R_m : R_m,R_e \circ E_e\_R_e$ (reduced clause, evidential, …)[33]

That means that German *wollen* is indeed a grammatical marker insofar as it does not project a fully specifiable temporal structure anymore (with no proper event situation, but still a proper reference situation for which the evidential modal is evaluated) and it appears only in a very restricted syntactic context. *Wollen* is not an illocutionary verb proper, but it can mark evidentiality in certain contexts. It is on a grammaticalisation path, but it is not an evidential marker in the sense of a morpheme, but in the sense of a construction (cf. Narrog 2005 and fn. 9). Thus the difference between an evidential WANT-construction and one with an illocutionary verb is that the first is a constructional evidential whereas the second represents a common lexical means to express evidentiality, i.e. the source of information:

(31)   a. A. will gearbeitet haben.   =>   constructional evidential
       b. A. behauptet, gearbeitet zu haben. =>   lexical evidentiality

In the next section, a further case of encoding evidentiality, which also involves the verb WANT, will be presented.

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[33]'S/Rm' can be instantiated as either as 'S,Rm', or as 'S_Rm', or as 'Rm_S'.

4.4   Excursion on Italian

If we look at other languages and their use of the verb WANT, we can see that the evidential reading of WANT is not common, and thus must be peculiar to German. Italian data, for example, show that there is no such conventionalisation or grammaticalisation of WANT as an evidential marker. Examples like (32) are simply ungrammatical:

(32)   a.   *Gianni   vuole   lavorare   *ieri*.
              G.   WANT-3s   work   yesterday
              (no interpretation)

        b.   *Gianni   vuole   aver   lavorato   *ieri*.
              G.   WANT-3s   have   worked   yesterday
              (no interpretation)

        However there are examples in Italian that might suggest that WANT can have an evidential reading:[34]

(33)   It.   La tradizione   vuole   che   la fiera   sia   iniziata nell'anno   1000.
              the tradition   WANT-3s   that   the fair   be-3s.subj   started   in-the year 1000
              'The tradition says that the fair was started in the year 1000.'

(34)   It.   La leggenda vuole   Positano fondata   da Poseidone.
              the legend   WANT-3s Positano founded   by Poseidon
              'The legend claims that Positano was founded by Poseidon.'

(35)   It.   La storia   vuole   che invece   Todi sia stata costruita dagli Etruschi …
              the history WANT-3s that instead Todi be-3s.subj stay.pprt.f.s built by …
              'History tells us that Todi was instead built by the Etruscans...'

        The same use is observable in French with *vouloir* 'to want': A short survey in FRANTEXT shows us that there are two main groups of subjects with this WANT construction:

(36)   Group A: *la légende, le proverbe, la tradition, le paradoxe, la théorie, la*
                          logique, l'adage, le préjugé, la verité, la nature de choses, le principe
                          etc.
        Group B: *la loi, la constitution, le règlement, l'usage, la coutume, la mode, le*
                          protocol, la convention, la règle etc.

        If WANT is combined with a subject from the first group, the interpretation that results corresponds more or less to 'say', 'tell', 'claim' etc. However, with the second group the meaning yielded is more like 'prescribe', 'dictate' and similar (some of the entries can belong to both groups, depending on the context). This might give us a hint as to the

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[34]All following Italian examples are from the www, 15.7.08.

semantic development of the phenomenon. From the volitional meaning of WANT both can be derived easily: Something is wanted, thus prescribed, and then just proclaimed. However, this use of WANT cannot be considered to be grammaticalised: its subject is restricted to a specific class of non-animate nouns, implying either norms (which inherently prescribe), or folklore (which is transmitted orally). The construction seems to stem from a metaphorical use of the verb WANT with a class of inanimate subjects inherently endowed with certain semantic features, which somehow has become an idiomatic expression. A similar use can also be found in German (*Die Legende will…*) and, perhaps to a lesser degree, in English (*The tradition wants…*).

Of course, there is an evidential meaning insofar as the subject indicates the source of information. It is also a typical example for indirect evidence in the sense of Willett (1988). Indeed, Willett (1988: 96) further subdivides indirect evidentiality (cf. section 2, especially fn. 10) into three types, the second-hand evidence with the indication of the source, the third-hand evidence without, and folklore, when the speaker claims that the situation described is part of established oral history (fairy tales, mythology, oral literature, proverbs and sayings). In the case of the WANT-constructions just discussed, in group A it is indeed the subject itself that lexically encodes what can be called an established oral history; the subjects in group B instead comprise established norms, rules and laws. Both groups encode sources of information[35].

5.   Conclusions

In this article, the evidential use of WANT in German has been discussed. The volitional verb WANT is predisposed towards grammaticalisation, as synchrony and diachrony of its use show. However, it is only in German that the evidential use of WANT has been grammaticalised to a certain degree. In other languages, WANT may have an evidential reading, but only with a certain kind of subject that represents a source of information and thus encodes an evidential meaning themselves. The German construction under discussion has been identified as an evidential construction proper and not just a lexicalized illocutionary verb like e.g. *behaupten*. To sum up, three phenomena concerning evidentiality have been discussed:

(37)   a.   the evidential construction:
              German *wollen* selecting a specific type of infinitive construction
        b.   the lexical evidential:
              lexical illocutionary verbs
        c.   the idiomatic evidential
              a class of evidentiality encoding nouns (norms, folklore) + WANT

The type in (37)a is peculiar to German, lexical entries for illocution like (37)b are common to all languages, whereas the idiomatic evidential use of WANT, type (37)c, seems to depend on language specific noun classes. The question remains of why WANT should be so appropriate for evidential uses, be it as in type (37)a or type (37)c. This

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[35]In the context of modality, one could regard these noun classes as standing for a kind of lexicalised conversational background.

again is probably due to the specific theta-role of WANT, which requires animate intentional subjects: Animate intentional subjects communicate their intentions and say, explicitly or encoded in norms or transmitted by oral history, what they want. This is the evidence for their being intentional.

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Universität Konstanz
Fachbereich Sprachwissenschaft
Fach 189
D-78457 Konstanz
Germany

Eva.Remberger@uni-konstanz.de