Gulf War Revisited

A Comparative Study of the Gulf War Coverage in American and European Media

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Seite 1

1. Introduction

Experiences from the Gulf War and other post Cold War military conflicts have stimulated an ongoing discussion of the role of the media in modern warfare and conflict situations. Media critics - as the Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung (1995) - have taken the view that the way media operate, reporting on war and violence, they not only serve as catalysts to unleash violence, but are violent in and by themselves.

The current discussion among journalists and scholars in media research and peace studies focuses on the question how the media can become vehicles for conflict prevention and constructive, nonviolent, conflict transformation, including the problem of reporting on how to repair war-torn societies - materially, socially and humanly. This proposal of critical peace journalism as an alternative to traditional war reporting is not suggesting that violence should not be reported, or what is reported as facts should not be empirically correct. It stresses the point however, that the form in which they are reported may contribute either to the escalation or to the deescalation of the conflict.

Escalating conflicts entail systematic distortions of how the parties in the conflict view themselves, their opponents and impartial third parties who try to mediate in the conflict, how they evaluate their goals and actions etc. The more a society is involved in a conflict the more will its public and its media be susceptible to such distortions.

Even propaganda does not just invent some sort of propagandistic view of the conflict, but just takes up and improves those natural processes (cf. Kempf, 1996). Therefore, if a piece of jounalism looks like propaganda, this does not necessarily mean that it was systematically constructed for propagandistic purposes. It may look so just because the respective jounalist became victim himself of a heated public atmosphere. Critical peace journalism thus has to take these processes into account in order to break the propaganda trap.

2. Method

The present paper presents the results of an interdisciplinary and multinational content analytical study of the Gulf War coverage in American and European media. Emphasizing that distortions of the conflict perception will be the stronger, the more a society is involved in the conflict itself and the closer it is to the conflict region (on historical,

political, economical or ideological terms), the study aims at a comparison of media from the USA, Germany and Scandinavia. Additionally, some Third World media have been included.

The selection of countries resulted partly from the makeup of researchers involved in the "Journalism in the New World Order" project. It also has a systematic aspect with respect to the impact, however, which the end of the Cold War had on the balance of power within Europe and between Europe and America.

- The US emerged from the cold war as the only global super power.

- At the same time, the ongoing process of European unity has strengthened the European position.

- After the reunion of the FRG and the GDR, Germany has gained more weight within the European Union. Moreover, as the reinterpretation of the constitutional assignment of the German military shows, Germany is willing to take charge of more global responsibility within the framework of the United Nations and the NATO.

Seite 2

- The Scandinavian countries, which are in a process of moving closer towards the EU, started into this process from quite different positions. While Norway and Sweden had been clearly west-oriented during the Cold War already, Finland had been in a position of relative dependence from the Sovjet Union. While Finland and Sweden had stayed politically neutral during the Cold War, Norway had been a member of the NATO. In the referendum of November 28, 1994, on the other hand, Norway decided to stay more distant from the EU than the other two Scandinavian nations, which voted for becoming members.

The content analysis of the European media covered a total of 31 dates pertaining to 10 timespots between August 2, 1990 and January 15, 1993. At these dates the Gulf war coverage in the biggest nationwide prestige paper, in the biggest tabloid paper, in a major regional paper and in one of the most important noncommercial television channels were analysed.

The sample of American media included no regional paper. Moreover, the American TV-material only covered timespots 3-7 for televion channels ABC, CBS and NBC as (partially) distributed by Sky News over Europe.

Table 1: The media sample

type of media / country	TV-news	Prestige paper	Popular press	Provincial paper
Finland (SF)	Tv-uutiset 20.30 YLE TV 1	Helsinki Sanomat	Ilta-Sanomat	Turun Sanomat
Germany (D)	heute 19.00 ZDF	Süddeutsche Zeitung	Bild-Zeitung	Südkurier
Norway (N)	Dagsrevyen 19.30 (19.00)[1]	Aftenposten	Verdens Gang	Bergens Tidende
Sweden (S)	Rapport 19.30 TV 2	Dagens Nyether	Expressen	Nerikes Allehanda
America (USA)	ABC / CBS / NBC	Washington Post	Akron Beacon Journal	-
Iraq	-	Baghdad Observer	-	-
		Addis Zemen /		

Ethiopia		-	Ethiopian Herald>		-		-

The sample of Third World media included two Ethiopian prestige papers (for timespots 1-10) and the Iraqi Baghdad Observer, which ceased publication after the start of the air strikes, however, and therefore could be analysed for timespots 1-3 only.

An overview of the media sample is given in table 1.

In order to make the change of the Gulf War coverage in the course of a longer period of time accessible, the selection of dates included timespots from the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait until after the end of the Gulf War. These dates are:

- Timespot 1: August 2-7, 1990 (Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait).

- Timespot 2: November 28-30, 1990 (UN Security Council's ultimatum to Iraq)

- Timespot 3: January 12-14, 1991 (US-Congress vote for a military intervention)

- Timespot 4: January 17-19, 1991 (Beginning of the air raids against Iraq).

- Timespot 5: February 13-15, 1991 (Bombing of the Amirya bunker: Iraqi civilian victims).

- Timespot 6: February 21-23, 1991 (Last peace proposals befor the start of the ground offensive)

- Timespot 7: February 27-28, 1991 (Military defeat of Iraq).

- Timespot 8: April 26-27, 1991 (Allied measures in protection of Iraqi Kurds).

- Timespot 9: August 25-27, 1992 (Allied measures in protection of Iraqi Shias)

- Timespot 10: January 14-15, 1993. (Bombing of Baghdad in order to force Iraq to fulfill to the conditions of ceasefire).

Included in the content analysis were all news items and reportages dealing with the Gulf conflict at these dates. Since the news items in German print media outnumbered those in the other European countries, however, minor articles with less than two headlines and less than two paragraphs were excluded from the German subsample. Altogether a total of n = 4096 news items was included in the analysis.

Topics of the content analysis were the following themes:

1. The media construction of the conflict, including:

- Explanation of the conflict,

- The Allies' motives for being involved in the conflict,

- The UN role in the conflict,

- Alternative ways to settle the war, and

- Refutation of negotiations, ceasefire or peacetalks; and

2. Propaganda strategies, including:

- New World Order rhetorics,

- Human sufferings and casualties,

- Reports about deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded,

- War crimes, and

- Media strategy

The same coding schedule (cf. Appendix 1) was used for analysing the print media and the television news. The coding schedule covers each of the quoted themes by a number of content analytical variables which will henceforth be referred to as style characteristics of the coverage. Generally, these style characteristics deal with informations on the Gulf conflict which was given or denied by the media and with arguments they corroborated or refuted. The style characteristics do not deal with the aspect of how the information was presented, what means of propagandistic featuring were used, etc., however. The latter is the topic of a qualitative content analysis (cf. Kempf, Reimann & Luostarinen), the results of which will be published in some other place.

Each of the style characteristics was defined both

- in a positive form, as the allegation, conjecture or supposition of a statement (with or without ist factual corroboration, arguments in favour of the statement and/or support of the statement by authoritative sources), and

- in a negative form, as doubt, denial, questioning or relativization (including its labeling as a mere plan or threat) of a stated fact or argument (should the occasion arise, including

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factual corroboration, arguments for the doubt etc. and/or its support by authoritative sources).

Emphasizing Kracauer's (1952) argument, according to which it is not the frequency of style characteristics but their pattern of combination which contributes in determining the direction of the overall text, the statistical data analysis was based on the method of Latent Class Analysis (LCA; Lazarsfeld, 1950).

The analysed media from various countries represent a wide political spectrum. Moreover, the analysed news items stem from different phases of the conflict. Accordingly, it cannot be assumed, that all the news items adhere to the same press coverage style nor that they combine the style characteristics in the same kind of patterns. The over-all distribution of style characteristics, therefore, may rather be a mixture distribution, resulting from the blending of various press coverage styles. Since it also cannot be assumed that all news items pertaining to the same media or to the same timespot make use of the same style of coverage, this problem cannot be coped with by simply producing distinct frequency tables for the various media or time spots, either. The style used in a given news item is only loosely linked to the manifest properties of the source from which the respective item stems. The styles of media coverage, therefore, cannot be constructed from any a priori definition of membership of news items to the various styles of coverage, but they are latent to the probability distribution of the style characteristics. In order to reveal these latent styles, the mixture distribution must be unmixed by use of the LCA-method (Kempf, 1994b).

With respect to Laswell's famous formula "Who says what to whom, how and with which effect?" (Lasswell, Lerner & Pool, 1952), the quantitative content analysis presented here covers the first three of these dimensions:

- the "who?" and "to whom?" dimensions are operationalized by the covariates "type of media" and "country", whereas
- the "what?" dimension is operationalized by the identified latent styles, which constitute patterns of information and/or patterns of argumentation.

In order to analyse, how the image of the Gulf War changed during the conflict, a time series of the over-all style usage was computed for each of the analysed themes. Differences in style usage by the various media, finally, were analysed by means of a proximity analysis (Kempf, 1994b).

3. Media Construction of the Conflict

3.1 Explanation of the Conflict

Explanations of the conflict involving the allegation (+) or query (-) of one or several of the following causes were presented in a total of n=167 (4.1%) of the analysed news items:

1. Iraqi interest in controlling the oil resources and/or strengthening her power and dominance.
2. Alliance (or some of its members) interest in controlling the oil resources and/or strengthening their power and dominance.
3. Iraq's claims of historical right to the territory of Kuwait.
4. Kuwait's refutation to negotiate with Iraq about the border dispute and/or the level of oil export.
5. Allied (or some of its members) diplomacy and/or misleading of Iraq.

According to the AIC-Criterion (Akaike, 1987), the over-all distribution of these variables could be identified to be a mixture distribution of 5 latent classes, patterns of explaining the conflict (cf. Table 2).

Table 2: Explanation of the Conflict: Goodness of fit statistics for the Latent Class Analysis.

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Nclass * LOG-Like. * Npar.* LIK.ratio *   DF.    *   AIC
-------------------------------------------------------------
     1 *  -472.262 *   10 *   236.520 *   1013 *   964.524
     2 *  -434.572 *   21 *   161.141 *   1002 *   911.145
     3 *  -408.466 *   32 *   108.928 *    991 *   880.932
     4 *  -395.048 *   43 *    82.092 *    980 *   876.096
=>   5 *  -374.756 *   54 *    41.507 *    969 *   857.511 <=
     6 *  -371.573 *   65 *    35.142 *    958 *   873.146
-------------------------------------------------------------
 Saturated model :    *      -354.002
```

The over-all distribution of style characteristics is presented in the bottom marginal of Table 3. It shows that Iraqi interests in controlling the oil resources and/or strengthening her power were most often mentioned as causes of the conflict (47.3%), followed by Iraq's historical claims of historical right to the territory of Kuwait (27.5%) and the Alliance's (or some of its members') interest in controlling the oil resources and/or strengthening their power and dominance in the region (26.3%). Kuwait's refutation to negotiate with Iraq (9.6%) and the Allies' misleading diplomacy (6.6%) played a minor role in the explanation of the conflict only.

Table 3: Explanation of the Conflict: Latent styles and over-all distribution of style characteristics.

g	pg	*	1+	1-	2+	2-	3+	3-	4+	4-	5+	5-
1	0.366	*	1.000	0.049	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.049	0.000	0.049	0.000
2	0.263	*	0.294	0.000	0.046	0.000	1.000	0.046	0.045	0.000	0.000	0.000
3	0.246	*	0.073	0.000	1.000	0.024	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
4	0.114	*	0.000	0.053	0.000	0.105	0.000	0.000	0.474	0.000	0.421	0.053
5	0.012	*	1.000	0.000	0.500	0.500	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.500	0.000	0.000
	1.000	*	0.473	0.024	0.263	0.024	0.275	0.024	0.096	0.006	0.066	0.006

An inspection of the identified latent styles shows that the various style characteristics were combined into quite different patterns of explaining the conflict, however.

1. Style 1, as the most frequently used pattern, is characteristic for 36.6% of the explanations given, and attributes the cause of the conflict mainly to the Iraqi interest to control the oil resources and to dominate the region:
- Unequivocally (100.0%) the Iraqi interest in controlling the oil resources and/or strengthening her power and dominance are mentioned as causes of the conflict.

- Only rarely (4.9%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.
- Sometimes (4.9%) Kuwait's refutation to negotiate with Iraq about the border dispute and/or the level of oil export is mentioned as an explanation of the conflict.
- Sometimes (4.9%) The Alliance's (or some of its members') diplomacy and/or misleading of Iraq is mentioned as the explanation of the conflict.

2. Style 2 is characteristic for 26.3% of the explanations and focuses on Iraq's historical claims:
- Unequivocally (100.0%) Iraq's claims of historical right to the territory of Kuwait are mentioned as an explanation of the conflict.
- Only rarely (4.6%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.
- Often (29.4%) Iraqi interest in controlling the oil resources and/or strengthening her power and dominance are mentioned as causes of the conflict.
- Only rarely (4.6%) the Alliance's (or some of its members') interest in controlling the oil resources and/or strengthening their power and dominance are mentioned as causes of the conflict.
- Occasionally (4.5%) Kuwait's refutation to negotiate with Iraq about the border dispute and/or the level of oil export is mentioned as an explanation of the conflict.

3. Style 3 is characteristic for 24.6% and explaines the conflict through the Allied interest to control the oil resources and strengthen their hegemony.

- Unequivocally (100.0%) Alliance (or some of its members) interest in controlling the oil resources and/or strengthening their power and dominance are mentioned as causes of the conflict.
- Only rarely (2.4%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.
- Occasionally (7.3%) Iraqi interest in controlling the oil resources and/or strengthening her power and dominance are mentioned as causes of the conflict.

4. Style 4, which is characteristic for 11.4%, attributes the cause of the conflict to Kuwait's refutation to negotiate with Iraq and/or the Allies' misleading diplomacy:
- Often (47.4%) Kuwait's refutation to negotiate with Iraq about the border dispute and/or the level of oil export is mentioned as an explanation of the conflict.
- Often (42.1%) the Alliance's (or some of its members') diplomacy and/or misleading of Iraq is mentioned as the explanation of the conflict.
- Only rarely (5.3%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.
- The Alliance's (or some of its members') interest in controlling the oil resources and/or strengthening their power and dominance are never stated positively, but sometimes (10.5%) denied, doubted or questioned as causes of the conflict.
- Iraqi interest in controlling the oil resources and/or strengthening her power and dominance are never stated positively, though occasionally (5.3%) denied, doubted or questioned. as causes of the conflict.

5. Only 1.2% follow the pattern of the 5th style, which gives a comprehensive explanation of the conflict, yet presenting Iraq as the aggressor, and not mentioning the Allies' misleading diplomacy.
- Unequivocally (100.0%) Iraqi interest in controlling the oil resources and/or strengthening her power and dominance is mentioned as causes of the conflict.
- This is never denied, doubted or questioned.
- Unequivocally (100.0%) Iraq's claims of historical right to the territory of Kuwait are mentioned as an explanation of the conflict,
- but these are always (100.0%) denied, doubted or questioned.
- Unequivocally (100.0%) Kuwait's refutation to negotiate with Iraq about the border dispute and/or the level of oil export is mentioned as an explanation of the conflict,
- but often (50.0%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.
- Often (50.0%) the Alliance's (or some of its members') interests in controlling the oil resources and/or strengthening their power and dominance are mentioned as causes of the conflict,
- but as often (50.0%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.
- The Allies' diplomacy and/or misleading of Iraq are neither mentioned positively (0.0%) nor negatively (0.0%) as

an explanation of the conflict.

As Table 4 shows, this comprehensive explanation was presented by German media only. As compared to other western countries, the German media left the conflict unexplained (style 0) most seldom and they most often explained the conflict as a "war for oil", either blaming Iraqi (styles 1 and 5) or the Allies' (style 3) interests to control the oil resources or to dominate the region as causes of the conflict.

While the Finnish media made the least efforts to explain the conflict, the Norwegian media are most close to the mean, i.e. they followed the general pattern when explaining the conflict: "Iraq is to blame". The Swedish media, on the contrary, took the position of some relative distance to this explanation. They took up the historical claims on the side of Iraq (style 2) and also the Allies' oil dependency and hegemonial interests (style 3) more often than most of the other countries' media.

While the US media did not make great efforts to explain the conflict, they more than all other countries took up self critical topics like Kuwait's refutation to negotiate with Iraq and the Allies' misleading diplomacy (style 4), however.

Seite 7

Table 4: Explanation of the Conflict: Style usage in western media (Chi-Square = 40.84, df = 20, p < 0.01).

Country	SF	D	N	S	USA	Total[2]
Style 0	0.9712	0.9401	0.9633	0.9512	0.9676	0.9599
Style 1	0.0155	0.0215	0.0152	0.0150	0.0120	0.0156
Style 2	0.0066	0.0107	0.0101	0.0176	0.0084	0.0105
Style 3	0.0022	0.0215	0.0089	0.0149	0.0048	0.0097
Style 4	0.0044	0.0031	0.0025	0.0014	0.0072	0.0038
Style 5	0.0000	0.0031	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0005
Total	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000

Analysing the style usage in different types of media (cf. Table 5) we notice, that the prestige papers left the conflict unexplained (style 0) most seldom. Especially style 4 (Kuwait's refutation to negotiate with Iraq and the Allies' misleading diplomacy) and style 3 (Allies' oil and hegemonial interests) were used much more frequently than in the average. Moreover, prestige papers were the only ones that made use of style 5. (Since this style occured in German media only, it can be concluded that the "Süddeutsche Zeitung" was the only media which contained news items that gave such a comprehensive explanation of the conflict causes).

Table 5: Explanation of the Conflict: Style usage in different types of media (Chi-Square = 34.39, df = 15, p < 0.01)

Media	TV	Prestige	Popular	Provinc.	Total
Style 0	0.9693	0.9458	0.9761	0.9613	0.9592
Style 1	0.0169	0.0153	0.0152	0.0121	0.0149
Style 2	0.0107	0.0130	0.0043	0.0133	0.0107
Style 3	0.0015	0.0175	0.0022	0.0093	0.0100
Style 4	0.0015	0.0073	0.0022	0.0040	0.0046
Style 5	0.0000	0.0011	0.0000	0.0000	0.0005
Total	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000

Though the provincial papers represent roughly the mean distribution of style usage, they less frequently than all other media blamed the Iraqi oil and power interests as causes of the conflict (style 1) and more often than all other media they took up Iraq's historical claims (style 2).

The latter were most strongly neglected by the tabloids, which follow the TV-news in neglecting style 3 (the Allies' oil and hegemonial interests) and style 4 (Kuwait's refutation to negotiate with Iraq and the Allies' misleading diplomacy) nearly completely, and thus presented a one-sided interpretation of the conflict causes, that puts the blame exclusively on Iraq.

The time series of style usage is presented in Figure 1 and shows that the highest effort to explain the conflict was

taken at its very beginning when Iraq invaded Kuwait (timespot 1). During this phase of the conflict the dominance of style 1 (Iraqi oil and power interests) is the most striking. Starting with the US-Congress vote for a military intervention (timespot 3), the Allies' interests (style 3) became emphasized more strongly and were outnumbered by reference to Iraq's historical claims (style 2) only during timespot 5 (bombing of the Amirya bunker) and timespot 7 (military defeat of Iraq). While no explanations of the conflict were presented after the end of the War during timespots 8 and 9, it is again Iraq's historical claims (style 2) which were used to explain the conflict at timespot 10 (bombing of Baghdad in January 1993).

Seite 8

Figure 1: Explanation of the Conflict: Time series of style usage (Chi-Square = 251.66, df = 27, p > 0.001).

[Graphik:] Figure 1

Abbildung. 1.6

3.2 The Allies' Motives for Being Involved in the Conflict

The Alliance's (or some of its members') motives for being involved in the conflict were described in a total of n=412 (10.1%) of the analysed news items by allegation (+) or query (-) of one or more of the following aspects:
1 The liberation of Kuwait.
2 The reduction of Iraqi power.
3 The Allies' peace concern.
4 The reduction of Iraq's nuclear power.
5 The containment of Arab and/or Muslim influence.
6 Secured oil supply and/or stable oil prices.

Latent Class Analysis unveiled the joint distribution of these style characteristics to be a mixture distribution of 5 latent styles (cf. Table 6).

Table 6: The Allies' Motives for Being Involved in the Conflict: Goodness of fit statistics for the Latent Class Analysis.

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Nclass * LOG-Like. * Npar.* LIK.ratio *   DF.    *  AIC
-------------------------------------------------------------
    1 * -1086.668 *   12 *   434.757 *   4083 *  2197.337
    2 * -1000.437 *   25 *   262.295 *   4070 *  2050.875
    3 *  -955.690 *   38 *   172.800 *   4057 *  1987.380
    4 *  -925.392 *   51 *   112.204 *   4044 *  1952.783
=>  5 *  -911.814 *   64 *    85.048 *   4031 *  1951.627 <=
    6 *  -908.786 *   77 *    78.992 *   4018 *  1971.572
-------------------------------------------------------------
 Saturated model :   *     -869.290
```

The over-all distribution of style characteristics (cf. Table 7) shows that the liberation of Kuwait (61.9%), the reduction of Iraqi power (23.5%) and secured oil supply and/or stable oil prices (16.7%) were most often stated as the Allies' motives. All other motives played a minor role only.

Seite 9

Table 7: The Allies' Motives for Being Involved in the Conflict: Latent styles and over-all distribution of style characteristics.

g	pg	1+	1-	2+	2-	3+	3-	4+	4-	5+	5-

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      6+        6-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------
 1   0.527    *   1.000   0.042   0.001   0.009   0.000   0.000   0.023   0.000   0.000
0.000   0.037   0.005
 2   0.227    *   0.307   0.043   1.000   0.021   0.011   0.000   0.053   0.000   0.000
0.000   0.041   0.000
 3   0.125    *   0.001   0.000   0.061   0.019   0.000   0.000   0.019   0.000   0.013
0.000   1.000   0.096
 4   0.070    *   0.000   0.416   0.000   0.035   0.000   0.035   0.210   0.069   0.393
0.035   0.063   0.037
 5   0.051    *   0.428   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000   0.000   0.048   0.000   0.000
0.000   0.190   0.000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------
     1.000    *   0.619   0.061   0.235   0.015   0.053   0.002   0.044   0.005   0.029
0.002   0.167   0.017
```

According to the LCA results, the various motives were combined into the following patterns of argumentation:

1. Style 1 (52.7%) describes the Allies' motive (nearly exclusively) to be the liberation of Kuwait.

- Unequivocally (100.0%) the Alliance's (or some of its members') motive is said to be the liberation of Kuwait,

- only rarely (4.2%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.

2. Style 2 (22.7%) focuses on the reduction of Iraqi power.

- Unequivocally (100.0%) the Alliance's (or some of its members') motive is said to be the reduction of Iraqi power,

- only rarely (2.1%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.

- Often (30.7%) also, the Allied countries' (or some of its members') motive is said to be the liberation of Kuwait,

- only rarely (4.3%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.

3. Style 3 (12.5%) discusses secured oil supply and stable oil prices as the aim of the Allies

- Unequivocally (100.0%) the Alliance's (or some of its members') motive is said to be secured oil supply and/or stable oil prices,

- occasionally (9.6%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.

4. Style 4 (7.0%): describes the Allies' motive to be rather the containment of Arab or Muslim influence and reduction of Iraq's nuclear power than the liberation of Kuwait.

- Often (39.3%) the Alliance's (or some of its members') motive is said to be the containment of Arab and/or Muslim influence,

- only rarely (3.5%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.

- Sometimes (21.0%) the Alliance's (or some of its members') motive is said to be the reduction of Iraq's nuclear power,

- occasionally (6.9%), this is denied, doubted or questioned.

- Only rarely the Alliance's (or some of its members') motive is said to be secured oil supply and/or stable oil prices (6.3%),

- or it is denied, doubted or questioned to be so (3.7%).

- While it is never stated positively to be the liberation of Kuwait, the Alliance's (or some of its members') motive is often (41.6%) denied, doubted ore questioned to be so.

- While it is never stated positively to be their peace concern, the Alliance's (or some of its members') motive is occasionally denied, doubted or questioned to be so.

- While it is never stated positively to be the reduction of Iraqi power, the Alliance's (or some of its members') motive is occasionally denied, doubted or questioned to be so.

5. Style 5 (5.1%) states peace concern as the Allies' main motive, also involving the liberation of Kuwait and the Allies' oil interests

- Unequivocally (100.0%) the Alliance's (or some of its members') motive is said to be their peace concern.

- Often (42.8%) the Alliance's (or some of its members') motive is said to be the liberation of Kuwait.

- Sometimes (19.0%) the Alliance's (or some of its members') motive is said to be secured oil supply and/or stable oil prices.

Table 8 shows that the Scandinavian media were rather silent about the Allies's motives (style 0), including the motive to liberate Kuwait (style 1), the main propaganda motive from the US side. The Swedish media, who were the most silent, obviously were fussy to avoid the impression that the Allies' oil interests could be their motive for being involved in the war: style 3 and style 5 are not present in the Swedish media at all.

Both, the German and the American media put much more emphasis on the explanation of the Allies' motives than the Scandinavian media did. In doing so, they specifically tended to idealize the Allies' intentions by describing them to be the liberation of Kuwait (style 1) and/or the Allies' peace concern (style 5). Both countries' media also tended to demonize the enemies' intentions - though, by different means: while the American media most strongly tended to legitimate the Allies' motives through the need to reduce Iraqi power (style 2), the German media most often saw the Allies' motives in the containment of Arab or Muslim influence (style 4).

Table 8: The Allies' Motives for Being Involved in the Conflict: Style usage in western media (Chi-Square = 107.64, df = 20, p < 0.001).

Country	SF	D	N	S	USA	Total[3]
Style 0	0.9246	0.8433	0.9253	0.9376	0.8403	0.8957
Style 1	0.0366	0.0800	0.0279	0.0394	0.0938	0.0548
Style 2	0.0120	0.0291	0.0246	0.0388	0.0388	0.0239
Style 3	0.0118	0.0228	0.0157	0.0161	0.0161	0.0131
Style 4	0.0083	0.0156	0.0040	0.0025	0.0025	0.0071
Style 5	0.0067	0.0092	0.0025	0.0084	0.0084	0.0054
Total	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000

Though there is little difference with respect to the presentations of the Allies' motives in different types of media (cf. Table 9), this topic was taken up most often by the TV news, however, which also gave more weight to the liberation of Kuwait (style 1), and particularly to the reduction of Iraqi power (style 2), than all other types of media did.

Table 9: The Allies' Motives for Being Involved in the Conflict: Style usage in different types of media (Chi-Square = 28.13, df = 15, p < 0.05)

Media	TV	Prestige	Popular	Provinc.	Total
Style 0	0.8694	0.8928	0.9262	0.9080	0.8994

Style 1	0.0663	0.0576	0.0434	0.0427	0.0531
Style 2	0.0411	0.0211	0.0108	0.0259	0.0228
Style 3	0.0123	0.0132	0.0108	0.0135	0.0125
Style 4	0.0078	0.0080	0.0044	0.0073	0.0070
Style 5	0.0031	0.0073	0.0043	0.0027	0.0051
Total	**1.0000**	**1.0000**	**1.0000**	**1.0000**	**1.0000**

When the conflict started with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (timespot 1) two patterns of motivation were given the same emphasis (cf. Figure 2): the liberation of Kuwait (style 1) and the Allies' oil interests (style 3). In the third place these were followed by the reduction of Iraqi power (style 2).

Of these motivations, the liberation of Kuwait (style 1) was used as the main propaganda motive, with continuously increasing usage until the military defeat of Iraq (timespot 7), after which it is of no account anymore.

The reduction of Iraqi power (style 2) played a minor role only during the pre-war phase. During the phase of military action (timespot 4 until timespot 7) this motive became recognised increasingly, until it diminished again during timespot 8 (Allies' measures in

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protection of Iraqi Kurds). During the last two timespots (August 1992 and January 1993) it is the only motive which was presented in order to explain the Allies' involvement.

The Allies' interest in secured oil supply and stable oil prices (style 3) was mentioned primarily at the start of the conflict (timespot 1), and (even more so) in connection with the US-Congress vote for military invention (timespot 3). During the phase of military action, it started to get out of sight, until it was no more referred to as the Allies' motive for being involved in the war during timespot 7 (military defeat of Iraq) and afterwards.

In the context of the UN-ultimatum (timespot 2), the Allies' oil interests were concealed nearly completely (style 3). If mentioned, they appeared in the context of the Allies' peace concern (style 5), which has its peak of prominence at this point of the conflict.

The containment of Arab or Muslim influence (style 4) was present as a background motivation all through the conflict until the Allies' victory (timespot 7).

Figure 2: The Allies' Motives for Being Involved in the Conflict: Time series of style usage (Chi-Square = 209.17, df = 45, p > 0.001).

[Graphik:] Figure 2

3.3 The UN Role in the Conflict

In a total of n=236 (5.8%) of the analysed news items, the UN role in the conflict was described by allegation (+) or query (-) of one or more of the following dimensions:

1 The United Nations' role as the forum and/or voice of the world community.

2 The United Nations as an instrument for or aiming at peaceful solutions.

3 The United Nations' task as to uphold international laws and/or to punish crimes against the right of national souvereignity.

4 The USA and/or Allies as acting in the name of the United Nations.

5 The United Nations as being influenced and/or dominated by the USA and/or the U.K.

6 The US offer to pay its debts to the UN mentioned in connection with the UN declaration(s).

Latent Class Analysis describes the joint distribution of these style characteristics as the mixture distribution of 5 latent styles (cf. Table 10).

Table 10: The UN Role in the Conflict: Goodness of fit statistics for the Latent Class Analysis.

```
Nclass * LOG-Like. * Npar.* LIK.ratio *   DF.    *  AIC
-------------------------------------------------------------
    1 *  -715.453 *   12 *   312.988 *    4083 *  1454.906
    2 *  -670.579 *   25 *   223.240 *    4070 *  1391.159
    3 *  -648.012 *   38 *   178.105 *    4057 *  1372.024
    4 *  -615.869 *   51 *   113.819 *    4044 *  1333.738
=>  5 *  -598.195 *   64 *    78.470 *    4031 *  1324.389 <=
    6 *  -594.542 *   77 *    71.164 *    4018 *  1343.083
-------------------------------------------------------------
  Saturated model :    *      -558.959
```

While the US offer to pay its debts to the UN was never mentioned nor denied, doubted or questioned in connection with the UN declarations (cf. Table 11), the other style characteristics were combined into 5 latent classes, each of which was clearly dominated by the allegation of one of the remaining 5 dimensions.

Table 11: The UN Role in the Conflict: Latent styles and over-all distribution of style characteristics

```
 g      pg          1+      1-      2+      2-      3+      3-      4+      4-      5+      5-
6+        6-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------
 1   0.387    *   0.078   0.000   0.112   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.972   0.109   0.067
0.000   0.000   0.000
 2   0.185    *   0.000   0.046   0.137   0.046   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000
0.000   0.000   0.000
 3   0.176    *   0.047   0.000   1.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000
0.000   0.000   0.000
 4   0.156    *   0.146   0.000   0.145   0.027   0.920   0.054   0.058   0.000   0.058
0.027   0.000   0.000
 5   0.095    *   1.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.177
0.044   0.000   0.000
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------
     1.000    *   0.157   0.008   0.267   0.013   0.144   0.008   0.386   0.042   0.237
0.008   0.000   0.000
```

1. Style 1 (38.7%) deals with the US and the Allies as acting in the name of the UN.

- As a rule (97.2%), the USA and/or Allies are described as acting in the name of the United Nations,

- sometimes (10.9%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.

- Sometimes (11.2%) the United Nations are described as an instrument for or aiming at peaceful solutions.

- Occasionally (7.8%) the United Nations' role is described as the forum and/or voice of world community.

- Only rarely (6.7%) the United Nations are described as being influenced and/or dominated by the USA and/or the U.K.

2. Style 2 (18.5%) describes the UN as dominated by the USA and/or the U.K.

- Unequivocally (100.0%) the United Nations are described as being influenced and/or dominated by the USA and/or the U.K.

- Sometimes (13.7%) the United Nations are described as an instrument for or aiming at peaceful solutions,

- only rarely this is denied, doubted or questioned.

- Though the United Nations' role is never described as the forum and/or voice of the world community, this is occasionally denied, doubted or questioned.

3. Style 3 (17.6%) describes the UN as an instrument for peace.

- Unequivocally (100.0%) the United Nations are described as an instrument for or aiming at peaceful solutions.

- Occasionally (4.7%) the United Nations' role is described as the forum and/or voice of the world community.

4. Style 4 (15.6%) discusses the UN's role as an instrument to uphold international law.

- As a rule (92.0%), the United Nations task is described as to uphold international laws and/or to punish crimes against the right of national souvereignity,

- this is only rarely (5.4%) denied, doubted or questioned.

- Sometimes (14.6%) the United Nations' role is described as the forum and/or voice of the world community.

- Sometimes (14.5%) the United Nations are described as an instrument for or aiming at peaceful solutions,

- only rarely (2.7%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.

- Occasionally (5.8%) the USA and/or Allies are described as acting in the name of the United Nations.

- Occasionally (5.8%) the United Nations are described as being influenced and/or dominated by the USA and/or the U.K.,

- occasionally (2.7%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.

5. Style 5 (9.5%) describes the UN as a forum of the world community.

- Unequivocally (100.0%) the United Nations' role is described as the forum and/or voice of the world community.

- Sometimes (17.7%) the United Nations are described as being influenced and/or dominated by the USA and/or the U.K.,

- only rarely (4.4%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.

Table 12 shows gross national differences concerning attention paid to the UN role in the conflict. The German media took up this topic more than 5 times as often (11.83% of the German news items) as the American ones (2.28% of the American news items).

The discussion within the German media was quite controversial. While the frequent use of style 1 (USA and Allies in the name of the UN) and style 5 (UN as forum for the world community) points towards using the UN for the legitimation of the Allied involvement, the frequent use of style 2 (UN dominated by the USA and/or the U.K.) and the rare use of style 3 (UN as instrument for peace) point in the opposite direction of critical distance from the Allied involvement.

The UN role was also clearly important in the Swedish media, where the UN was idealized (more often than in all other countries) as an instrument for peace (style 3) and (nearly as often as in Finland) as an instrument for the reinforcement of international law (style 4).

Though the UN role plays a relatively smaller role in the Finnish media, these show a similar tendency as the Swedish do: the UN was idealized (nearly as often as in Sweden) as an instrument for peace (style 3) and (more

often than in any other country) as an instrument for the reinforcement of international law (style 4).

The Norwegian media payed nearly as little attention to the UN role in the conflict as the American media did. Particularly low frequencies of style 1 (discussion of US and Allies as acting in the name of UN) and style 2 (UN dominated by the USA and/or the U.K.) show that (possibly) US-critical arguments were avoided to a large extent.

Table 12: The UN Role in the Conflict: Style usage in western media (Chi-Square = 135.35, df = 20, p < 0.001)

Country	SF	D	N	S	USA	Total[4]
Style 0	0.9468	0.8817	0.9646	0.9281	0.9772	0.9425
Style 1	0.0156	0.0707	0.0089	0.0286	0.0037	0.0233
Style 2	0.0066	0.0229	0.0050	0.0122	0.0024	0.0091
Style 3	0.0131	0.0045	0.0050	0.0187	0.0106	0.0106
Style 4	0.0124	0.0081	0.0090	0.0111	0.0049	0.0092
Style 5	0.0054	0.0120	0.0075	0.0013	0.0012	0.0053
Total	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000

A similar pattern can be found in the popular press (cf. Table 13), which seems to be most inclined to transmit the US view on UN's role in the conflict.

While the TV-news presented an undifferentiated picture of the US and Allies acting in the name of UN (style 1) - which is seen as forum for the world community (style 5) -, it is the regional press who tried to keep some critical distance. Provincial papers particularly often took up the topic of the UN as an instrument for peace (style 3), which however is dominated by the US and/or U.K. (style 2), and particularly seldom they featured the US and Allies as simply acting in the name of the United Nations (Style 1).

Seite 14

The prestige papers put the greatest emphasis on the UN role. They reported on it with less critical distance than the regional press (cf. style 2), however, and more than all other papers they saw the UN as an instrument to uphold international law (style 4).

Table 13: The UN Role in the Conflict: Style usage in different types of media (Chi-Square = 50.46, df = 15, p < 0.001)

```
Media    |   TV   |Prestige|Popular |Provinc.|  Total
---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Style 0  | 0.9416 | 0.9306 | 0.9707 | 0.9373 | 0.9426
Style 1  | 0.0354 | 0.0289 | 0.0055 | 0.0162 | 0.0223
Style 2  | 0.0076 | 0.0112 | 0.0054 | 0.0185 | 0.0107
Style 3  | 0.0030 | 0.0122 | 0.0064 | 0.0158 | 0.0101
Style 4  | 0.0033 | 0.0138 | 0.0045 | 0.0069 | 0.0088
Style 5  | 0.0090 | 0.0033 | 0.0074 | 0.0052 | 0.0055
---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Total    | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000
```

The time series of style usage (cf. Figure 3) shows that the UN being dominated by the USA and/or the U.K. (style 2) was the dominant description of the UN role during timespot 2 (UN ultimatum). During timespot 3 (US Congress vote for a military intervention) the UN was primarily featured as an instrument for peace (style 3).

During the war (timespots 4-7), and even more so during the post-war military actions in 1992 and 1993 (timespots 9 and 10), finally, the USA and Allies acting in the name of the UN (style 1) was the dominant description of the UN role in the conflict.

Figure 3: The UN Role in the Conflict: Time series of style usage (Chi-Square = 230.69, df = 45. p > 0.001).

3.4 Alternative Ways to Settle the War

Alternative ways to setttle the war are among those themes that have been discussed most extensively in the media. A total of n=740 (18.1%) of the analysed news items dealt with this topic by allegation (+) or query (-) of one or several of the following arguments:

1 Force against Iraq is the only possible or most effective way to settle the conflict.

Seite 15

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2 Economic embargo on trade with Iraq should be given or should have been given more time to be effective.

3 Iraqi initiatives for negotiations or peace talks.

4 Alliance's or member state's (excl. UN) initiatives for negotiations or peace talks.

5 UN initiatives for negotiations or peace talks.

6 Third party or neutral initiatives for negotiations or peace talks.

According to Latent Class Analysis these arguments were combined into 9 latent styles (cf. Table 14).

Table 14: Alternative Ways to Settle the War: Goodness of fit statistics for the Latent Class Analysis.

```
Nclass * LOG-Like. * Npar.* LIK.ratio *   DF.    *   AIC
-------------------------------------------------------------
    1 * -2869.618 *  12 *  1292.601 *   4083 *  5763.23
    2 * -2708.930 *  25 *   971.225 *   4070 *  5467.86
    3 * -2657.564 *  38 *   868.492 *   4057 *  5391.12
    4 * -2557.404 *  51 *   668.173 *   4044 *  5216.80
    5 * -2456.286 *  64 *   465.937 *   4031 *  5040.57
    6 * -2427.489 *  77 *   408.343 *   4018 *  5008.97
    7 * -2368.42  *  90 *   290.204 *   4005 *  4916.83
    8 * -2354.04  * 103 *   261.444 *   3992 *  4914.07
=>  9 * -2326.36  * 116 *   206.084 *   3979 *  4884.71 <=
   10 * -2319.25  * 129 *   191.864 *   3966 *  4896.50
-------------------------------------------------------------
 Saturated model :   *    -2223.318
```

The over-all distribution of style characteristics in the bottom marginal of Table 15 shows that force against Iraq was the most intensively and most controversially discussed mode to settle the conflict. In 28.4% of the analysed news items it was presented as the only possible or most effective way to settle the conflict. In 20.0% of the news items this was denied, doubted or questioned. Third party or neutral initiatives for negotiations or peace talks follow in the second place (39.6% allegation; 6.8% query). The Alliance's or member state's initiatives for negotiations played the least role (9.2% allegation; 0.8% query).

Table 15: Alternative Ways to Settle the War: Latent styles and over-all distribution of style characteristics.

g	pg	*	1+	1-	2+	2-	3+	3-	4+	4-	5+	5-	6+	6-
1	0.290	*	0.034	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.067	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.999	0.141
2	0.167	*	0.999	0.099	0.001	0.024	0.001	0.001	0.007	0.009	0.001	0.008	0.040	0.005
3	0.143	*	0.380	0.999	0.058	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.018	0.010	0.001	0.001	0.134	0.001
4	0.114	*	0.134	0.026	0.001	0.001	0.970	0.410	0.064	0.001	0.028	0.001	0.133	0.001
5	0.101	*	0.130	0.202	0.982	0.253	0.013	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.023	0.001	0.001	0.001
6	0.078	*	0.001	0.026	0.041	0.018	0.001	0.001	0.099	0.013	0.982			

```
0.062    0.102    0.001
 7   0.063    *    0.076    0.001    0.001    0.001    0.060    0.001    0.999    0.001    0.001
0.001    0.310    0.001
 8   0.023    *    0.497    0.406    0.001    0.001    0.066    0.001    0.001    0.001    0.001
0.001    0.920    0.990
 9   0.020    *    0.392    0.293    0.001    0.001    0.382    0.084    0.490    0.203    0.999
0.500    0.798    0.135
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------
    1.000    *    0.284    0.200    0.111    0.031    0.145    0.049    0.092    0.008    0.103
0.016    0.396    0.068
```

1. Style 1 (29.0%) as the most frequently used style discusses third party initiatives.

- Nearly without exemption (99.9%) a third party or neutral initiative for negotiations or peace talks with Iraq is mentioned.

- Sometimes (14.1%) this initiative is doubted, denied, questioned or relativised.

2. Style 2 (16.7%) can be described as pure military logic.

- Nearly withhout exemption (99.9%) force against Iraq is described as the only possible or most effective way to settle the conflict.

3. Style 3 (14.3%) is characterized by the discussion and denial of military logic.

- While nearly without exeption (99.9%) force against Iraq is doubted, denied or questioned to be the only possible or most effective way to settle the conflict,

- this statement is corroborated quite often also (38.0%)

4. Style 4 (11.4%) discusses (and often refutates) Iraqi initiatives.

- Though (as a rule: 97.0%) Iraqi initiatives for negotiations or peace talks are mentioned,

- these initiatives are often (41.0%) doubted, denied or questioned, however.

Seite 16

- Sometimes (13.4%) force against Iraq is described to be the only possible or most effective way to settle the conflict, and

- sometimes (13.3%) a third party or neutral initiative for negotiations or peace talks with Iraq is mentioned.

5. Style 5 (10.1%) argues in favor of economic rather than military means.

- Though (as a rule: 98.2%) it is said that the economic embargo on trade with Iraq should be given or should have been given more time to be effective,

- this is often (25.3%) doubted, denied or questioned.

- Sometimes (20.2%) force against Iraq is doubted, denied or questioned to be the only possible or most effective way to settle the conflict,

- sometimes (13.0%) it is said to be so.

6. Style 6 (7.8%) reports about UN and third party initiatives.

- As a rule (98.2%) UN initiatives for negotiations or peace talks with Iraq are mentioned,

- sometimes (10.2%) also third party or neutral initiatives.

7. Style 7 (6.3%) reports about Allied and third party initiatives.

- Nearly without exemption (99.9%) Allied or member state's (excl. UN) initiatives for negotiations or peace talks with Iraq are mentioned,

- often (31.0%) also third party or neutral initiatives.

8. Style 8 (2.3%) deals with third party initiatives, either presenting arguments pro and contra, or two sided messages.

- Though (as a rule: 92.0%) third party or neutral initiatives for negotiations or peace talks with Iraq are mentioned positively,

- these initiatives are doubted, denied or questioned nearly without exemption (99.0%).

- While it is often (40.6%) doubted, denied or questioned whether force is the only possible or most effective way to settle the conflict,

- this is more often (49.7%) stated to be so.

9. Style 9 (2.0%) presents a comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives.

- Nearly without exemption (99.9%) UN initiatives for negotiations or peace talks with Iraq are mentioned,

- often (50.0%) these initiatives are doubted, denied or questioned, however.

- In most cases (79.8%) also third party or neutral initiatives for negotiations or peace talks with Iraq are mentioned,

- sometimes (13.5%) they are doubted, denied or questioned.

- Often (38.2%) Allied or member state's (excl. UN) initiatives for negotiations or peace talks with Iraq are mentioned also,

- sometimes (20.3%) they are doubted, denied or questioned.

- Though often (39.2%) force against Iraq is described as the only possible or most effective way to settle the conflict,

- this is often (29.3%) denied, doubted or questioned also.

- Often (38.2%) Iraqi initiatives for negotiations or peace talks are mentioned, and

- only occasionally (8.4%) they are denied, doubted or questioned.

- The economic embargo does not play any role in this discussion (corroboration: 0.1%; denial etc. 0.1%).

Table 16 unveals gross national differences with respect to style usage.

In the American media, the presentation of alternative ways to settle the war is clearly determined by the strategic interests of the US. UN and third party initiatives (style 1, style 6 and style 8) were paid much less attention than in the European countries. There was little discussion or denial of military logic (style 3) and no comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives at all (style 9).

The most extensive and controversial discussion of alternative ways to settle the war was presented by the German media, who took up the topic more than three times as often as the average

western media. While the picture painted by the German media followed the pattern of military logic (style 2) three times as often as in the average, criticism of military logic (style 3) was pesented even five times as often as in the average of the western countries, and a comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives (style 9) was presented three times as frequent as in the average.

In the Scandinavian countries military logic (style 2) played a smaller role than in the US and Germany.

In the Finnish media, UN and third party initiatives (style 1, style 6 and style 8) were given great attention. A comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives (style 9) was presented more often than in all other western countries except Germany.

In the Swedish media the topic was also taken up more in connection with third parties' and UN initiatives (style 1 and style 6). Moreover, they focused on economic sanctions (style 5) more than all other countries' media did.

The Norwegian media were the least prone to discuss how to settle the conflict. Third party initiatives (style 1 and style 8) and alternative solutions (style 9) were - like in the US - mentioned rather seldom. Again, like in the US, there is a low frequency of style 3 (discussion and denial of military logic) as compared to the mean.

Table 16: Alternative Ways to Settle the War: Style usage in western media (Chi-Square = 544.20, df = 36, p < 0.001).

```
Country |   SF   |   D    |   N    |   S    |  USA   | Total[5]
--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Style 0 | 0.8259 | 0.6114 | 0.8886 | 0.8440 | 0.8691 | 0.8155
Style 1 | 0.0693 | 0.0459 | 0.0421 | 0.0634 | 0.0398 | 0.0525
Style 2 | 0.0178 | 0.0917 | 0.0147 | 0.0169 | 0.0271 | 0.0313
Style 3 | 0.0119 | 0.1319 | 0.0029 | 0.0046 | 0.0027 | 0.0267
Style 4 | 0.0214 | 0.0377 | 0.0158 | 0.0113 | 0.0229 | 0.0214
Style 5 | 0.0176 | 0.0249 | 0.0119 | 0.0257 | 0.0160 | 0.0188
Style 6 | 0.0107 | 0.0171 | 0.0160 | 0.0203 | 0.0068 | 0.0138
Style 7 | 0.0131 | 0.0124 | 0.0065 | 0.0107 | 0.0155 | 0.0117
Style 8 | 0.0068 | 0.0152 | 0.0009 | 0.0008 | 0.0000 | 0.0044
Style 9 | 0.0054 | 0.0118 | 0.0005 | 0.0023 | 0.0000 | 0.0037
--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Total   | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000
```

As regards different types of media (cf. Table 17), the topic was most extensively dealt with in the TV-news, which often followed a pattern of military logic (style 2) and also focused on the discussion and refutation of Iraqi initiatives (style 4) more often than any other type of media did.

The tabloid papers put the least emphasis on different ways to settle the conflict. If they did so, they followed the pattern of military logic (style 2) more often than all other papers did. Iraqi initiatives (style 4) were ignored nearly completely.

Table 17: Alternative Ways to Settle the War: Style usage in different types of media (Chi-Square = 105.08, df = 27, p < 0.001)

```
Media   |   TV   |Prestige|Popular |Provinc.| Total
--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Style 0 | 0.7296 | 0.8335 | 0.8547 | 0.8200 | 0.8193
Style 1 | 0.0665 | 0.0398 | 0.0531 | 0.0691 | 0.0524
Style 2 | 0.0359 | 0.0259 | 0.0351 | 0.0293 | 0.0302
Style 3 | 0.0393 | 0.0234 | 0.0214 | 0.0250 | 0.0258
Style 4 | 0.0538 | 0.0195 | 0.0063 | 0.0126 | 0.0207
Style 5 | 0.0191 | 0.0230 | 0.0087 | 0.0179 | 0.0183
Style 6 | 0.0206 | 0.0151 | 0.0086 | 0.0130 | 0.0141
Style 7 | 0.0168 | 0.0141 | 0.0075 | 0.0053 | 0.0114
Style 8 | 0.0117 | 0.0024 | 0.0023 | 0.0045 | 0.0042
Style 9 | 0.0068 | 0.0033 | 0.0022 | 0.0032 | 0.0036
--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Total   | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000
```

The time series of style usage (cf. Figure 5) demonstrates that style 5 (comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives), which had played a dominant role in the pre-war phase (timespots 2-3), was of no significance any

more as soon as the war had started (timespot 4-10).

Discussion and denial of military logic (style 3) is most frequently found during timespot 3 (US-Congress vote for military intervention) and timespot 4 (begin of the air raids against Iraq) as well as during timespot 9 (Allies' measures in protection of Iraqi Shias) and timespot 10 (Bombing of Baghdad in order to force Iraq to fulfil the conditions of the ceasefire). While style 3 was dominant during timespot 3 and timespot 9 even, the presentation of different ways to settle the conflict switched towards the approval of military logic (style 2) during timespot 4 and timespot 10, however.

Discussion of third party initiatives (style 1) was dominantly used during timespot 5 (bombing of the Amirya bunker) and timespot 6 (last peace proposal before the start of the ground offensive).

Figure 4: Alternative Ways to Settle the War: Time series of style usage (Chi-Square = 1500.04, df = 81, p > 0.001).

> **[Graphik:] Figure 4**

3.5 Refutation of Negotiations, Ceasefire or Peacetalks

Refutation of negotiations, ceasefire or peace talks is covered in a total of n=256 (6.3%) of the analysed news items by allegation (+) or query (-) of one or several of the following statements:

1. The Iraq is described as not being (or not having been) willing to take up negotiations, ceasefire or peace talks.
2. The Allies (or some of their members) are described as not being (or not having been) willing to take up negotiations, ceasefire or peace talks.

Seite 19

Table 18: Refutation of Negotiations, Ceasefire or Peacetalks: Goodness of fit statistics for the Latent Class Analysis.

```
Nclass * LOG-Like. * Npar.* LIK.ratio *   DF.   *  AIC
------------------------------------------------------------
    1 *  -502.174 *   4 *   267.023 *      11 *  1012.349
    2 *  -406.193 *   9 *    75.061 *       6 *   830.386
=>  3 *  -373.451 *  14 *     9.576 *       1 *   774.902 <=
------------------------------------------------------------
```

Saturated model : * -368.663

According to Latent Class Analysis, these style characteristics were combined into 3 latent patterns of argumentation (cf. Table 18).

The over-all distribution of style characteristics (cf. Table 19) shows that both, Iraq (53.1%) and the Allies (43.7%) were quite often accused for not being willing to take up negotiations. Occasionally such a reproach was doubted or denied (Iraq: 12.9%; Allies: 5.1%).

Table 19: Refutation of Negotiations, Ceasefire or Peacetalks: Latent styles and over-all distribution of style characteristics.

```
 g    pg     *    1+      1-      2+      2-
-------------------------------------------------
 1   0.530   *  1.000   0.096   0.071   0.022
 2   0.383   *  0.003   0.001   1.000   0.040
 3   0.087   *  0.001   0.889   0.196   0.274
-------------------------------------------------
     1.000   *  0.531   0.129   0.437   0.051
```

1. Style 1 (53.0%) blames the Iraq for refuting negotiations etc.
   - Without exemption (100%) the Iraq is described as not being (or not having been) willing to take up negotiations, ceasefire or peace talks.

- Only rarely (9.6%) this description is denied, doubted or questioned.
- Occasionally (7.1%) the Allies (or some of their members) are described as not being (or not having been) willing to take up negotiations, ceasefire or peace talks.
2. Style 2 (38.3%) accuses the Allies for refuting negotiations etc.
   - Without exemption (100.0%) the Allies (or some of their members) are described as not being (or not having been) willing to take up negotiations, ceasefire or peace talks.
   - Very rarely (4.0%) this description is denied, doubted or questioned.
3. Style 3 (8.7%) describes readiness for negotiations etc. (particularly on the Iraqi side).
   - In most cases (88.9%) descriptions of the Iraq as not being (or not having been) willing to take up negotiations, ceasefire or peace talks are denied, doubted or questioned.
   - Descriptions of the Allies as not being (or not having been) willing to take up negotiations, ceasefire or peace talks are a bit more often denied (27.4%), doubted or questioned than corroborated (19.6%).

Table 20: Refutation of Negotiations, Ceasefire or Peacetalks: Style usage in western media (Chi-Square = 112.13, df = 12, p < 0.001).

```
Country |   SF   |   D    |   N    |   S    |   USA  | Total[6]
--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Style 0 | 0.9601 | 0.8602 | 0.9557 | 0.9362 | 0.9532 | 0.9366
Style 1 | 0.0188 | 0.0628 | 0.0392 | 0.0285 | 0.0228 | 0.0329
Style 2 | 0.0199 | 0.0553 | 0.0039 | 0.0271 | 0.0240 | 0.0248
Style 3 | 0.0012 | 0.0217 | 0.0013 | 0.0082 | 0.0001 | 0.0057
--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Total   | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000
```

Seite 20

Table 20 demonstrates gross national differences in style usage, once again.

- While the German media covered the topic more than twice as often as the average, the American did not pay much attention to it.
- While (Iraqi) readiness for negotiations (style 3) is reported in the German media even four times as often as in the average, the American media say nothing about it at all.
- Finnish and Norwegian media were also quite silent about the topic.
   - While the Finnish media show a similar picture as the American media do, however,
   - the Norwegian reported on the refutation of negotiations even more one-sided and put the blame exclusively on the Iraq (style 1).

Table 21: Refutation of Negotiations, Ceasefire or Peacetalks: Style usage in different types of media (Chi-Square = 61.27, df = 9, p < 0.001).

```
Media   |   TV    |Prestige|Popular |Provinc.| Total
--------|---------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Style 0 | 0.8833  | 0.9402 | 0.9696 | 0.9387 | 0.9375
Style 1 | 0.0597  | 0.0349 | 0.0205 | 0.0213 | 0.0331
Style 2 | 0.0431  | 0.0203 | 0.0076 | 0.0359 | 0.0239
Style 3 | 0.0140  | 0.0046 | 0.0022 | 0.0042 | 0.0055
--------|---------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Total   | 1.0000  | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000
```

A comparison of different types of media (cf. Table 21) shows that the TV-news payed the most attention to the topic of negotiations etc. and that they also reported on (Iraqi) readiness for negotiations (style 3) more often than the print media did.

The tabloids painted a picture similar to that of the Norwegian media. The Allies' refutation to negotiate (style 2) and (Iraqi) readiness for negotiations (style 3) were rarely reported.

Figure 5: Refutation of Negotiations, Ceasefire or Peacetalks: Time series of style usage (Hi-Square = 255.29, df = 27, p > 0.001).

[Graphik:] Figure 5

In contrast to this, it is again the regional press that tried to develop some critical distance from Allied propaganda. While the Allies' refutation to negotiate (style 2) was reported more often than in in the average of all media types, the provincial papers reported about Iraqi refutation of negotiations (style 1) less frequently than other types of media did.

As regards the time series of style usage (cf. Figure 5), incrimination of the Iraq as not being willing to take up negotiations (style 1) was the dominant style from the start of the conflict (timespot 1) until the end of the war. Only during timespot 2 (UN-ultimatum) and timespot 7 (Military defeat of the Iraq) more attention was given to the Allies' refutation to negotiate (style 2).

(Iraqi) readiness for negotiations (style 3) nearly was not reported at all during the pre-war phase (timespots 1-3), nor at timespot 4 (Begin of the air raids against Iraq). At timespot 5 (Bombing of the Amirya Bunker) and afterwards, relatively more attention was paid to it.

4. Propaganda strategies

4.1 New World Order Rhetorics

New World Order rhetorics, as they were used during the Gulf, war can be described by three factors or dimensions:

1. The "Germany" factor - lessons from the past: It is stated that dictators must not be encouraged by showing signals of weakness and/or it is referred to history (appeasement policy/Hitler) in order to suggest that conclusion.
2. The "right moment" factor - where we are now: It is stated that the moment of a new start must not be missed and/or it is referred to the present historical situation (end of communism/ victory of democracy / reutilization of the UN) in order to suggest that conclusion.
3. The "fair game" factor - where we are going now: It is stated to be the aim of the new policy that justice and ethical principles should rule international relations and/or it is referred to the rights of small nations in order to suggest that fruits of violence must not be accepted, etc.

Allegation (+) or query (-) of one or several of these statements appeared in a total n=136 (3.3%) of the analysed news items. Among these news items all three factors were quite often approved of. Quite seldom they were denied or questioned (cf. Table 23).

Table 22: New World Order Rhetorics: Goodness of fit statistics for the Latent Class Analysis.

```
Nclass * LOG-Like. * Npar.* LIK.ratio *   DF.    *  AIC
------------------------------------------------------------
     1 *  -317.055 *   6 *   151.071 *      57 *   646.110
     2 *  -285.898 *  13 *    88.756 *      50 *   597.795
     3 *  -266.078 *  20 *    49.118 *      43 *   572.156
=>   4 *  -253.103 *  27 *    23.167 *      36 *   560.205 <=
     5 *  -251.302 *  34 *    19.566 *      29 *   570.605
------------------------------------------------------------
 Saturated model :    *       -241.519
```

According to Latent Class Analysis, 4 latent rhetorical patterns could be identified (cf. Table 22). Within these patterns (cf. Table 23) the different dimensions of New World Order rhetorics appear more or less independently of each other, however. Only in style 2, which is dominated by the "right moment" factor, the other dimensions are included to reasonable degree also. Systematic refutation of the New World Order rhetorics was mainly directed against the fair game rhetorics (Style 4), but did not doubt the "Germany" factor nor the "right moment" factor.

Table 23: New World Order Rhetorics: Latent styles and over-all distribution of style characteristics.

```
 g    pg      *    1+      1-      2+      2-      3+      3-
 ---------------------------------------------------------------
 1   0.433    *   0.981   0.051   0.000   0.000   0.086   0.017
 2   0.279    *   0.163   0.000   0.962   0.079   0.206   0.000
 3   0.244    *   0.000   0.000   0.013   0.000   1.000   0.000
 4   0.044    *   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000
 ---------------------------------------------------------------
     1.000    *   0.471   0.022   0.272   0.022   0.338   0.051
```

The latent styles of New World Order rhetorics can be described as follows:

1. Style 1 (43.3%): "Lessons from the past" rhetorics.
   - As a rule (98.1%) the "Germany" factor is used for argumentation: it is stated that dictators must not be encouraged by showing signals of weakness and/or it is referred to history (appeasement policy/Hitler) in order to suggest that conclusion.
   - Only rarely (5.1%) these arguments are denied, doubted or questioned.
   - Occasionally (8.6%) the argumentation is supported by the "fair game" factor (where are we going now).
2. Style 2 (27.9%): "Right moment" rhetorics.
3. As a rule (96.2%) the "right moment" factor is used for argumentation: It is stated that the moment of a new start must not be missed and/or it is referred to the present historical situation in order to suggest that conclusion.
4. Only rarely (7.9%) this argument is denied, doubted or questioned.
5. Sometimes (20.6%) the argumentation is supported by the "fair game" factor (where are we going now).
6. Sometimes (16.3%) it is supported by the "Germany" factor (lessons from the past).
7. Style 3 (24.4%): "Fair game" rhetorics.
   - Without exemption (100.0%) the "fair game" factor is used for argumentation: It is stated to be the aim of the new policy that justice and ethical principles should rule international relations and/or it is referred to the rights of small nations in order to suggest that fruits of violence must not be accepted, etc.
8. Style 4 (4.4%): Refutation of "fair game" rhetorics
   - Without exemption (100.0%) the "fair game" factor is denied, doubted or questioned.

As Table 24 shows, it is again the German media in which New World Order rhetorics were found most frequently, and where the discussion was most controversial. Especially style 1 ("lessons from the past" rhetorics) and style 3 ("fair game" rhetorics) play a prominent role in German media, but also style 4 (refutation of "fair game" rhetorics) was used much more often than in any other western country.

In contrast to Germany, the American media favoured style 2 ("right moment" rhetorics) more than the other countries did and made use of no "fair game" rhetorics at all, neither positively (style 3) nor negatively (style 4).

Among the Scandinavian countries, it is Sweden where New World Order rhetorics were found mosten often. New World Order is mainly regarded as a promise for the future, the fair game perspective (style 3).

Norwegian media, on the contrary, were quite critical about this promise. The Norwegian are the only media besides the German ones, in which style 4 (refutation of "fair game" rhetorics) occured, and Norway also is the country in which the least approval of the New World Order was to be found (styles 1-3).

The Finnish media also were quite silent about the New World Order. Especially the "right moment" rhetorics (style 2) were used less often than anywhere else.

Table 24: New World Order Rhetorics: Style usage in western media (Chi-Quadrat = 137.08, df = 16, p < 0.001).

```
Country |   SF   |   D    |   N    |   S    |  USA   | Total[7]
--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Style 0 | 0.9856 | 0.9017 | 0.9835 | 0.9729 | 0.9712 | 0.9658
Style 1 | 0.0066 | 0.0445 | 0.0063 | 0.0082 | 0.0144 | 0.0148
Style 2 | 0.0045 | 0.0139 | 0.0075 | 0.0081 | 0.0144 | 0.0095
Style 3 | 0.0033 | 0.0323 | 0.0013 | 0.0108 | 0.0001 | 0.0085
Style 4 | 0.0000 | 0.0077 | 0.0013 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0015
--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Total   | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000
```

As regards different types of media, it was the prestige papers which made use of New World Order rhetorics most extensively (cf. Table 25).

While the TV-news differ from all other types of media by putting most emphasis on style 3 ("fair game" rhetorics), it is again the prestige papers and the provincial papers that show some critical distance. They made less use of style 3 than any other media, and they were the only ones in which style 4 (refutation of "fair game" rhetorics) could be found.

Analysis of the time series showed that the style usage of New World Order rhetorics was stable throughout the analysed time spots (Chi-Square = 44.5, df = 36, p > 0.05).

Table 25: New World Order Rhetorics: Style usage in different types of media (Chi-Quadrat = 28.63, df = 12, p < 0.01).

```
Media   |   TV   |Prestige|Popular |Provinc.| Total
--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Style 0 | 0.9724 | 0.9560 | 0.9783 | 0.9733 | 0.9668
Style 1 | 0.0077 | 0.0214 | 0.0098 | 0.0093 | 0.0144
Style 2 | 0.0046 | 0.0141 | 0.0043 | 0.0080 | 0.0093
Style 3 | 0.0153 | 0.0063 | 0.0076 | 0.0067 | 0.0081
Style 4 | 0.0000 | 0.0023 | 0.0000 | 0.0027 | 0.0015
--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Total   | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000
```

4.2 Human Sufferings and Casualties

Human sufferings and casualties were dealt with in a total of n=445 (10.9%) of the analysed news items, involving the allegation (+) or query (-) of at least one of the following:

1. Civilian sufferings and/or casualties due to Iraqi attacks.
2. Civilian sufferings and/or casualties due to Allied attacks.

The over-all distribution of these style characteristics (cf. Table 27) shows that civilian sufferings and/or casualties due to Allied attacks were reported only slightly less often than such due to Iraqi attacks.

Table 26: Human sufferings and casualties: Goodness of fit statistics for the Latent Class Analysis.

```
Nclass * LOG-Like. * Npar.* LIK.ratio *   DF.    *   AIC
-----------------------------------------------------------------
    1 *  -775.908 *    4 *   509.878 *    11 *   1559.816
    2 *  -539.187 *    9 *    36.436 *     6 *   1096.373
=>  3 *  -526.090 *   14 *    10.243 *     1 *   1080.180 <=
-----------------------------------------------------------------
 Saturated model :    *     -520.969
```

According to Latent Class Analysis, these reports were combined into 3 latent styles of coverage (cf. Table 26), two of which report on human sufferings and casualties either coused by Iraqi attacks or by Allied attacks, while the third one, which is used quite rarely, tries to play down the evels of war by the denial or questioning of sufferings and casualties on either side (cf. Table 27).

Table 27: Human sufferings and casualties: Latent styles and over-all distribution of style characteristics.

```
 g    pg            1+      1-      2+      2-
```

```
------------------------------------------------
 1   0.511   *   1.000   0.031   0.033   0.000
 2   0.473   *   0.055   0.000   1.000   0.128
 3   0.016   *   0.000   0.429   0.000   0.571
------------------------------------------------
     1.000   *   0.537   0.022   0.490   0.070
```

1. Style 1 (51.1%): Casualties due to Iraqi attacks.
- Unequivocally (100.0%) civilian sufferings and/or casualties due to Iraqi attacks are mentioned,
- only rarely (3.1%) they are denied, doubted or questioned.
- Only rarely (3.3%) civilian sufferings and/or casualties due to Allied attacks are mentioned.

2. Style 2 (47.3%): Casualties due to Allied attacks.
- Unequivocally (100.0%) civilian sufferings and/or casualties due to Allied attacks are mentioned,
- sometimes (12.8%) they are denied, doubted or questioned.
- Only rarely (5.5%) civilian sufferings and/or casualties due to Iraqi attacks are mentioned.

3. Style 3 (1.6%): Denial of casualties.
- Often (57.1%) civilian sufferings and/or casualties due to Allied attacks are denied, doubted or questioned.
- Often (42.9%) civilian sufferings and/or casualties due to Iraqi attacks are denied, doubted or questioned.

While there is no difference between the western countries with respect to style usage (Chi-Square = 18.85, df = 12, p > 0.05), the various types of media differ quite clearly (cf. Table 28).

While style 3 (denial of casualties) did not appear at all in the prestige papers, this cynical style which tries to produce the picture of a clean war was most often found in the tabloid press and in the TV news, which also put more emphasis on casualties due to Iraqi attacks (style 1) than the prestige and provincial papers did. In contrast to the tabloid papers, however, the TV news also covered Iraqi casualties (style 2) more frequently than the other media did.

Table 28: Human sufferings and casualties: Style usage in different types of media (Chi-Square = 30.19, df = 9, p < 0.001)

```
Media    |   TV    |Prestige|Popular |Provinc.|  Total
---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Style 0  | 0.8510 | 0.9091 | 0.8785 | 0.9000 | 0.8913
Style 1  | 0.0787 | 0.0411 | 0.0730 | 0.0484 | 0.0556
Style 2  | 0.0672 | 0.0498 | 0.0453 | 0.0490 | 0.0514
Style 3  | 0.0031 | 0.0000 | 0.0033 | 0.0027 | 0.0017
---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Total    | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000
```

The time series of style usage (cf Figure 6) shows that casualties due to Allied attacks (style 2) have been reported to a considerable amount only during timespot 5 (Bombing of the Amirya bunker) and timespot 10 (Bombing of Baghdad in January 1993).

Style 1 (casualties due to Iraqi attacks) was dominant throughout all other timespots, especially in reports about Allied measures in protection of Iraqi Kurds (timespot 8) and Shias (timespot 9) during the post-war phase.

Seite 25

Figure 6: Human sufferings and casualties: Time series of style usage (Chi-square = 789.43, df = 27, p > 0.001).

[Graphik:] Figure 6

4.3 Reports about Deaths, Casualties, Missing, Captured or Wounded

Since public support of war involves a delicate balance between feeling threatened by the enemy and confidence in the outcome of the war (cf. Kempf, 1996), it is of strategic imortance for any warfaring nation to have control over the reports of its own and the enemies' casualties. In the present study a total of n=439 (10.7%) of the analysed news items involved the quotation (+) or query (-) of at least one of the following types of reports:

1 Iraqi reports about own deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded.
2 Iraqi reports about other side's deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded.
3 Allied reports about own deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded.
4 Allied reports about other side's deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded.

Table 29: Reports about deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded: Goodness of fit statistics for the Latent Class Analysis.

```
Nclass * LOG-Like. * Npar.* LIK.ratio *   DF.    *  AIC
------------------------------------------------------------
     1 * -1129.714 *    8 *   437.041 *    247 *  2275.428
     2 * -1059.016 *   17 *   295.645 *    238 *  2152.033
     3 *  -994.669 *   26 *   166.951 *    229 *  2041.339
=>   4 *  -939.172 *   35 *    55.955 *    220 *  1948.343 <=
     5 *  -932.921 *   44 *    43.454 *    211 *  1953.842
------------------------------------------------------------
 Saturated model :    *     -911.194
```

The over-all distribution of style characteristics in Table 30, shows, that Allied reports, both about own side's and about other side's casualties were quoted much more often than the respective Iraqi reports. According to Latent Class Analysis, the style characteristics were combined into 4 latent styles (cf. Table 29), the first two of which are almost exclusively based on Allied reports. While these styles (style 1 and style 2) are typical for 73.2% of the news items, and while 14.4% of the news items are similarly biased in the Iraqi direction (style 3), only 12.4% of the news items make use of both sides' reports (style 4).

Seite 26

Table 30: Reports about deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded: Latent styles and over-all distribution of style characteristics.

g	pg		1+	1-	2+	2-	3+	3-	4+	4-
1	0.413	*	0.039	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.006	0.039	0.000
2	0.319	*	0.044	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.354	0.014	1.000	0.032
3	0.144	*	1.000	0.079	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.085	0.023
4	0.124	*	0.304	0.000	0.957	0.221	0.514	0.056	0.286	0.037
	1.000	*	0.212	0.011	0.118	0.027	0.590	0.014	0.383	0.018

1. Style 1 (41.3%): Allied reports about own casualties.
   - Unequivocally (100.0%) Allied reports about own deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded are quoted.
   - Only rarely (3.9%) Iraqi reports about own deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded are quoted.
   - Only rarely (3.9%) Allied reports about other side's deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded are quoted.
2. Style 2 (31.9%): Allied reports about both sides' casualties.
   - Unequivocally (100.0%) Allied reports about other side's deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded are quoted,
   - only rarely (3.2%) these are denied, doubted or questioned.
   - Often (35.4%) Allied reports about own deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded are quoted.
   - Only rarely (4.4%) Iraqi reports about own deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded are quoted.
3. Style 3 (14.4%): Iraqi reports about own casualties.
   - Unequivocally (100.0%) Iraqi reports about own deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded are quoted,
   - occasionally (7.9%) these are denied, doubted or questioned.
   - Occasionally (8.5%) Allied reports about other side's deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded are quoted,
   - only rarely (2.3%) these are denied, doubted or questioned.
4. Style 4 (12.4%): Both sides' reports about both sides' casualties (focusing on Iraqi reports and Allied

casualties).
- As a rule (95.7%) Iraqi reports about other side's deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded are quoted.
- Sometimes (22.1%) these are denied, doubted or questioned.
- Often (51.4%) Allied reports about own deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded are quoted,
- only rarely (5.6%) these are denied, doubted or questioned.
- Often (30.4%) Iraqi reports about own deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded are quoted.
- Often (28.6%) Allied reports about other side's deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded are quoted,
- quite rarely (3.7%) these are denied, doubted or questioned.

While there is no difference in style usage between different types of media (Chi-Square = 7.73, df = 12, p > 0.05), the different western countries followed distinct propaganda or peace-journalism strategies (cf. Table 31).

The American media reported most extensively about casualties and based their reports primarily on Allied reports (style 1 and style 2), thus accepting the Allies' perspective as the only truth and producing an image of the war, which has a clear propaganda bias.

The Swedish media, on the contrary, indicate some tendency towards peace journalism. Making less use of style 1 (Allied reports about own casualties) and more use of style 3 (Iraqi reports about own casualties) than all other countries' media did, they painted the least biased

---

---

image of the war, which also involved both sides' reports about both sides' casualties (style 4) much more often than in the other western countries.

Table 31: Reports about deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded: Style usage in western media (Chi-Square = 67.88, df = 16, p < 0.001)

Country	S	D	N	S	USA	Total
Style 0	0.9102	0.8786	0.9241	0.8928	0.8487	0.8914
Style 1	0.0299	0.0511	0.0303	0.0244	0.0853	0.0443
Style 2	0.0362	0.0376	0.0201	0.0363	0.0426	0.0346
Style 3	0.0101	0.0200	0.0139	0.0245	0.0145	0.0162
Style 4	0.0136	0.0128	0.0116	0.0220	0.0089	0.0136
Total	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000

While the Norwegian media neglected the topic and reported less about casualties than all other countries' media did, the German and Finnish media made use of opposite strategies towards objectivity and distance from both sides: while the German have a relative preference of reports about own sides' casualties (style 1 and style 3), the Finnish media rather tend to avoid them and to put more emphasis on reports about other sides' casualties (style 2 and style 4).

Figure 7: Reports about deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded: Time series of style usage (Chi-Square = 665.28, df = 36, p > 0.001)

[Graphik:] Figure 7

The time series of style usage (cf. Figure 7) shows that Allied reports about own casualties (style 1) were the most favoured style of coverage during the pre-war phase (timespots 1-3) and were increasingly used during the war-phase (timespots 4-7). Only at timespot 5 (bombing of the Amirya bunker) the use of this style was reduced for the benefit of Iraqi reports about own casualties (style 3), which also played the most prominent role at the post-war timespot 10 (Bombing of Baghdad in January 1993). After the end of the war (timespot 8-10) Allied reports about own casualties (style 1) played little or no role at all.

Allied reports about both sides' casualties (style 2) were quoted increasingly during the war phase (timespots 4-7) and reached their peak during timespot 7 (military defeat of Iraq), when

this was the most frequently used style of coverage. Though on a much lower level, this was still the case during timespot 8 (Iraqi measures in protection of Iraqi Kurds). Afterwards they were of no more significance.

Both sides' reports about both sides' casualties (style 4) played the most prominent role during no timespot at all. They had a relative peak during timespot 4 (begin of the air raids against Iraq), however, when they are found in the second place.

4.4 War Crimes

Reproaches of war crimes, as described by the following statements have been alleged (+) or questioned (-) in a total of n=229 (5.6%) of the analysed news items.

1 Iraqi attacks on civilians are described as deliberate.

2 Allied attacks on civilians are described as deliberate.

3 Iraqi forces are accused of breaking the humanitarian rules of war.

4 Allied forces are accused of breaking the humanitarian rules of war.

Table 32: War Crimes: Goodness of fit statistics for the Latent Class Analysis.

```
Nclass * LOG-Like. * Npar.* LIK.ratio *   DF.    *  AIC
-------------------------------------------------------------
     1 *  -636.763 *   8 *   320.207 *    247 *  1289.527
     2 *  -549.586 *  17 *   145.853 *    238 *  1133.173
=>   3 *  -502.211 *  26 *    51.101 *    229 *  1056.421 <=
     4 *  -501.187 *  35 *    49.054 *    220 *  1072.374
-------------------------------------------------------------
 Saturated model :   *     -476.660
```

The over-all distribution of these style characteristics (cf. Table 33) shows that Iraq has been accused for committing war crimes much more often than the Allies. Reproaches against the Allies also were doubted or questioned much more often than reproaches against Iraq.

This unbalance becomes even more visible, if we consider Latent Class Analysis, which resulted in the identification of 3 latent styles (cf. Table 32), two of which deal with Iraqi war crimes (style 1 and style 3) which are taken as matter of fact, while reports on Allied war crimes (style 2) are often denied, doubted or questioned (cf. Table 33).

Table 33: War Crimes: Latent styles and over-all distribution of style characteristics.

```
g    pg            1+      1-      2+      2-      3+      3-      4+      4-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1   0.412    *   1.000   0.011   0.011   0.000   0.024   0.000   0.011   0.000
2   0.354    *   0.000   0.000   0.729   0.423   0.049   0.000   0.250   0.037
3   0.235    *   0.349   0.000   0.000   0.033   1.000   0.056   0.014   0.018
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1.000    *   0.493   0.004   0.262   0.157   0.262   0.013   0.096   0.017
```

1. Style 1 (41.2%): Iraqi war crimes I: attacks on civilians.
- Unequivocally (100.0%) Iraqi attacks on civilians are described as deliberate.

2. Style 2 (35.4%): Discussion of Allied war crimes.
- Often (72.9%) Allied attacks on civilians are described as deliberate,
- often (42.3%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.

- Sometimes (25.0%) Allied forces are accused of breaking the humanitarian rules of war,
- occasionally (3.7%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.
- Sometimes (25.0%) it is denied, doubted or questioned, whether Iraqi are breaking the humanitarian rules of war.

3. Style 3 (23.5%): Iraqi war crimes II: break of the humanitarian rules (including attacks on civilians).
- Unequivocally (100.0%) Iraqi forces are accused of breaking the humanitarian rules of war,

---

- only rarely (5.6%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.
- Often (34.9%) Iraqi attacks on civilians are described as deliberate.

Table 34: War Crimes: Style usage in western media (Chi-Square = 24.48, df = 12, p < 0.05)

```
Country |   SF   |   D    |   N    |   S    |  USA   | Total[8]
--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Style 0 | 0.9279 | 0.9478 | 0.9544 | 0.9335 | 0.9460 | 0.9415
Style 1 | 0.0261 | 0.0201 | 0.0241 | 0.0302 | 0.0196 | 0.0241
Style 2 | 0.0190 | 0.0232 | 0.0171 | 0.0272 | 0.0182 | 0.0207
Style 3 | 0.0270 | 0.0089 | 0.0044 | 0.0091 | 0.0162 | 0.0138
--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Total   | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000
```

Though there is only little variation in the coverage of war crimes among the various countries (cf. Table 34), German media put less emphasis on Iraqi war crimes (style 1 and style 3), however, and took up the topic of Allied war crimes (style 2) more often than most of the other western countries did.

Table 35: War Crimes: Style usage in different types of media (Chi-Square = 25.31, df = 9, p < 0.01)

```
Media   |   TV   |Prestige|Popular |Provinc.|  Total
--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Style 0 | 0.9278 | 0.9498 | 0.9349 | 0.9573 | 0.9443
Style 1 | 0.0314 | 0.0195 | 0.0323 | 0.0125 | 0.0230
Style 2 | 0.0277 | 0.0223 | 0.0110 | 0.0175 | 0.0198
Style 3 | 0.0130 | 0.0084 | 0.0217 | 0.0127 | 0.0129
--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Total   | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000
```

While the prestige papers tended towards the same direction as the German media did, the tabloids followed the opposite strategy. They reported more extensively on Iraqi war crimes and took up the topic of Allied war crimes less often than other types of media did (cf. Table 35).

Figure 8: War Crimes: Time series of style usage (Chi-Square = 537.51, df = 27, p < 0.001)

[Graphik:] Figure 8

The time series of style usage (Figure 8) shows that Allied war crimes (style 2) were the dominant topic only during timespot 5 (bombing of the Amirya bunker). This was the only timespot also, during which criticism against Iraq focused more strongly on the break of humanitaritan rules of warefare (style 3) than on attacks against civilians (style 1), on which reproaches against the Iraq were based most extensively during timespot 7 (military defeat of Iraq), timespot 8 (Allied measures in protection of Iraqi Kurds) and - even more so - during timespot 9 (Allied measures in protection of Iraqi Shias).

4.5 Media Strategy

Although the role which the media play in modern warfare was a prominent topic during the Gulf War, only a

rather small number of the analysed news items (n=171, 4.2%) dealt with this topic, either by allegation (+) or query (-) of one of the following statements:

1. Iraq actively tries to or succeeds in influencing the media coverage of the conflict.
2. The Allies (or some of their members) actively try to or succeed in influencing the media coverage of the conflict.
3. Human rights of information and freedom of the press are important values that must be followed even in times of crisis.
4. Small countries do have the possibility to achieve independent information.
5. Media play an (important) role in modern warfare.
6. Measures like censorship, the activities of PR-agencies and/or other factors of the news production process have an impact on the news coverage.

Though the Allied measures of censorship could not be ignored during the Gulf war, the over-all distribution of style characteristics in Table 37 shows that the media directed reproaches of influencing the media coverage considerably more often against the Iraq than they did against the Allies. While the impact of censorship etc. and the role of the media in modern warfare were touched upon quite frequently also, human rights of information etc. and small countries' access to independent information played (nearly) no role at all in the coverage of the topic.

Table 36: Media strategy: Goodness of fit statistics for the Latent Class Analysis.

```
Nclass * LOG-Like. * Npar.* LIK.ratio *   DF.    *   AIC
-------------------------------------------------------------------
    1 *  -492.602 *   12 *   185.919 *    4083 *  1009.205
    2 *  -475.999 *   25 *   152.711 *    4070 *  1001.997
    3 *  -446.126 *   38 *    92.967 *    4057 *   968.253
=>  4 *  -423.955 *   51 *    48.624 *    4044 *   949.910 <=
    5 *  -417.281 *   64 *    35.277 *    4031 *   962.563
-------------------------------------------------------------------
 Saturated model :    *    -399.643
```

According to Latent Class Analysis, these style characteristics were combined into 4 latent styles of argumentation (cf. Table 36), two of which (style 1 and style 3) focus on reproaches against one of the two parties in the conflict, while the other ones (style 2 and style 4) discuss the media strategies of modern warfare on a more general level (cf. Table 37).

Table 37: Media strategy: Latent styles and over-all distribution of style characteristics.

```
 g      pg      *    1+     1-     2+     2-     3+     3-     4+     4-     5+      5-
6+        6-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------
 1   0.450    *   1.000  0.026  0.286  0.013  0.013  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.065
0.000   0.182   0.000
 2   0.226    *   0.000  0.026  0.114  0.000  0.130  0.026  0.000  0.000  0.057
0.000   0.880   0.026
 3   0.220    *   0.000  0.026  1.000  0.106  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
0.000   0.000   0.000
 4   0.104    *   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.055  0.000  0.000  0.056  1.000
0.000   0.000   0.000
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------
     1.000    *   0.450  0.023  0.374  0.029  0.041  0.006  0.000  0.006  0.146
0.000   0.281   0.006
```

1. Style 1 (45.0%): Iraq influencing the media coverage.
- Unequivocally (100.0%) it is alleged that Iraq actively tries to or succeeds in influencing the media coverage of the conflict.

- Only rarely (2.6%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.
- Sometimes (28.6%) it is alleged that the Allies (or some of their members) actively try to or succeed in influencing the media coverage of the conflict.

- Sometimes (18.2%) it is said that measures like censorship, the activities of PR-agencies and/or other factors of the news production process have an impact on the news coverage.

2. Style 2 (22.6%): Criticism of censorship, PR-agencies etc.
- In most cases (88.0%) it is said that measures like censorship, the activities of PR-agencies and/or other factors of the news production process have an impact on the news coverage.
- Only rarely (2.6%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.
- Sometimes (13.0%) human rights of information and freedom of the press are considered as important values that must be followed even in times of crisis.
- Sometimes (11.4%) it is alleged that the Allies (or some of their members) actively try to or succeed in influencing the media coverage of the conflict.

3. Style 3 (22.0%): The Allies influencing the media coverage.
- Unequivocally (100%) it is alleged that the Allies (or some of their members) actively try to or succeed in influencing the media coverage of the conflict.
- Only sometimes (10.6%) this is denied, doubted or questioned.

4. Style 4 (10.4%): The role of the media in modern warfare - discussed on an abstract level, without any reference to concrete events of censorship etc. brought about by the war parties.
- Unequivocally (100%) it is said that the media play an (important) role in modern warfare.
- Occasionally (5.6%) it is denied, doubted or questioned that small countries have the possibility to achieve independent information.
- Only rarely (5.5%) human rights of information and freedom of the press are considered as important values that must be followed even in times of crisis.
- All other statements do not appear at all - neither stated positively nor negatively

Table 38: Media strategy: Style usage in western media (Chi-Square = 41.91, df = 16, p < 0.001).

```
Country |   SF   |   D    |   N    |   S    |  USA   | Total[9]
--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Style 0 | 0.9634 | 0.9585 | 0.9671 | 0.9579 | 0.9364 | 0.9566
Style 1 | 0.0155 | 0.0138 | 0.0165 | 0.0231 | 0.0288 | 0.0197
Style 2 | 0.0156 | 0.0064 | 0.0052 | 0.0083 | 0.0111 | 0.0096
Style 3 | 0.0044 | 0.0197 | 0.0063 | 0.0094 | 0.0107 | 0.0096
Style 4 | 0.0011 | 0.0015 | 0.0050 | 0.0013 | 0.0130 | 0.0045
--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Total   | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000
```

While there were no differences in style usage between different types of media (Chi-Square = 21.23, df = 12, p > 0.05), Table 38 shows gross differences between the western countries. The American media dealt with the topic much more extensively than the European did. In particular, they put great emphasis on the discussion of the role of the media in modern warfare (style 4).

Among the European media, the Swedish media most strongly tended to blame the Iraq for influencing the media (style 1), while the German ones were most critical about the Allies' media strategy (style 3). Finnish media showed greatest concern for independent journalism (style 2), and the Norwegian media most extensively discussed the role of the media in modern warfare (style 4).

Seite 32

Figure 9: Media strategy: Time series of style usage (Chi-Square = 144.76, df = 36, p < 0.001).<

[Graphik:] Figure 9

The time series of style usage (Figure 9) shows, that criticism of the Iraqi media strategy (style 1) was dominant from timespot 4 (begin of the air raids against Iraq) until timespot 6 (last peace proposals before the start of the

ground offensive) and had its peak during timespot 5 (bombing of the Amirya bunker). Criticism of censorship (style 2) was present from timespot 3 (US-Congress vote for a military intervention) - during which the ground rules of US-censorship had been released also -, until the military defeat of Iraq (timespot 7). While criticism of the Allies' media strategy (style 3) was present all through the war and during most of the post-war phase, the role of the media in modern warfare (style 4) was more or less intensively discussed only during timespot 4 (begin of the air raids) and again during timespot 10 (bombing of Baghdad in January 1993).

5. International Comparison

5.1 News Media

Comparison of different types of media unveils the role which television channels and the popular press played as instruments of war propaganda. Nationwide prestige papers and the provincial press were much more critical about the war and - sometimes - even displayed a tendency towards peace journalism.

Television News

TV-news presented a one-sided interpretation of the conflict causes (cf. Figure 10), that put the blame exclusively on Iraq. The Allies' oil interests (style 3) as well as Kuwait's refutation to negotiate with Iraq and the Allies' misleading diplomacy (style 4) were neglected nearly completely.

Seite 33

Figure 10: Explanation of the Conflict: Style usage in different types of media.

[Graphik:] Figure 10

Figure 11: The Allies' Motives for Being Involved in the Conflict: Style usage in different types of media.

[Graphik:] Figure 11

Seite 34

[Graphik:] Figure 12

Seite 35

[Graphik:] Figures 14 + 15

Seite 36

[Graphik:] Figures 16 + 17

Seite 37

The Allies' motives for being involved in the conflict (cf. Figure 11) were explained by TV-news more often than by the other media and with more emphasis on the liberation of Kuwait (style 1) and particularly on the reduction of Iraqi power (style 2).

Describing the role of the UN in the conflict (cf. Figure 12), the TV-news presented an undifferentiated picture, idealizing the US and Allies as acting in the name of UN (style 1), which was described as forum for the world community (style 5).

Though the topic of different ways to settle the conflict (cf. Figure 13) was most extensively dealt within the TV-news, they often followed a pattern of military logic (style 2), however, and focused on the refutation of Iraqi initiatives for negotiations (style 4) more often than any other type of media did.

On the other hand, the TV-news payed most attention to the topic of negotiations, ceasefire or peacetalks (cf. Figure 14), however, and also reported on (Iraqi) readiness for negotiations (style 3) more often than the print media did.

This is in accordance with a form of New World Order rhetorics (cf. Figure 15) that put special emphasis on the "fair game" promise (style 3), and a way of reporting on human sufferings and casualties (cf. Figure 16) which (similarily as the tabloids) tried to produce the picture of a clean war (Style 3) and put more emphasis on casualties due to Iraqi attacks (style 1) than the prestige and provincial papers did.

In contrast to the tabloid papers, however, the TV-news also covered Iraqi casualties (style 2) more frequently than the other media did. Television channels' voyeurism of showing injuries and pain thus seems to be stronger than their ideological bias.

Tabloid papers

The popular press painted an even more one-sided picture of the conflict than the television channels did. In their explanation of the conflict (cf. Figure 10), they not only neglected the Allies' oil interests (style 3) as well as Kuwait's refutation to negotiate with Iraq and the Allies' misleading diplomacy (style 4), they also told less about Iraq's historical claims (style 2) than all other types of media did and thus presented an interpretation of the conflict causes, that put the blame exclusively on Iraq.

As regards the UN role in the conflict (cf. Figure 12), the tabloids seemed to be most inclined to transmit the US view, which does not give much significance to the United Nations.

Moreover, the tabloid papers put the least emphasis on different ways to settle the conflict (Figure 13). If they did so, they followed the pattern of military logic (style 2) more often than all other papers. Iraqi initiatives (style 4) were ignored nearly completely.

The Allies' refutation to negotiate (style 2) and (Iraqi) readiness for negotiations (style 3) were rarely reported (cf. Figure 14).

Similar as the TV-news, the tabloid papers put more emphasis on casualties due to Iraqi attacks (style 1) and more often denied casualties (style 3) in order to paint the picture of a clean war, than the prestige and provincial papers did (cf. Figure 16).

They reported more extensively on Iraqi war crimes (styles 1 and 3) and took up the topic of Allied war crimes (style 2) less often than other types of media did (cf. Figure 17).

Prestige Papers

The prestige papers put most emphasis on explanations of the conflict (Figure 10). Especially Kuwait's refutation to negotiate with Iraq and the Allies' misleading diplomacy (style 4) as well as the Allies' oil interests (style 3) were taken into account much more frequently than in the average. Moreover, prestige papers are the only ones in which a comprehensive explanation of the conflict (style 5) was to be found. - Since this style occured in German media only, it can be concluded that the "Süddeutsche Zeitung" was the only media which this was the case, however.

The prestige papers also put the greatest emphasis on the UN role in the conflict (Figure 12). They reported on it with less critical distance than the regional press (style 2), however, and more than all other papers they portrayed the UN as an instrument to uphold international law (style 4).

Moreover, the prestige papers made use of New World Order rhetorics most extensively (Figure 15). Like the provincial papers, they showed some critical distance, however. They made less use of "fair game" rhetorics (style 3) than any other media, and they are the only media in which a refutation of "fair game" rhetorics (style 4) could be found.

As regards human sufferings and casualties (Figure 16), the prestige papers are the only ones, which did not play down casualties (style 3) in order to produce the image of a clean war.

With respect to war crimes (Figure 17) they put less emphasis on Iraqi war crimes (style 1 and style 3) and took up the topic of Allied war crimes (style 2) more often than other types of media did.

Provincial Papers

The regional press made remarkable efforts towards distance and objectivity. As regards the explanation of the conflict (Figure 10) the provincial papers blamed the Iraqi oil interests less frequently than all other media to be the cause of the conflict (style 1), and more often than all other media they took up Iraq's historical claims (style 2) as an explanation.

Moreover, the regional press tried to keep some critical distance with respect to the UN role in the conflict (Figure 12). Though provincial papers particularly often took up the topic of the UN as an instrument for peace (style 3), they often portrayed the UN to be dominated by the US and/or U.K. (style 2), and particularly seldom they featured the US and Allies as simply acting in the name of the United Nations (Style 1).

As regards refutation of negotiations, ceasefire or peacetalks (Figure 14), it is again the regional press that tried to develop some critical distance from Allied propaganda. While Allies' refutation to negotiate (style 2) was reported more often than in in the average, the provincial papers accused the Iraq of refuting negotiations (style 1) less frequently than other types of media did.

In the same line as the prestige papers, the regional press also showed some critical distance towards New World Order rhetorics. Making less use of "fair game" rhetorics (style 3) than any other media, they were the only ones in which refutation of "fair game" rhetorics (style 4) could be found.

5.2 Source Countries

Although the Gulf war coverage had been orchestrated to a high degree by measures of censorship, the implementation of a pool system and the impact of CNN, cross national comparison of style usage unveils gross national differences which are due both to historical and political traditions and to the various nations' position within the conflict.

American Media

America, as the leading nation of the Alliance is apt to make its own policy. While there was not so much need for the US media, therefore, to explain the conflict causes (Figure 18), they were also more open to take up self critical topics like Kuwait's refutation to negotiate with Iraq and the Allies' misleading diplomacy (style 4), than were the European media.

On the other hand, they made great efforts to explain the Allies' motives for being involved in the war (Figure 19). In doing so, they strongly tended to idealize the Allies' intentions to be the mere liberation of Kuwait (style 1) and/or the Allies' peace concern (style 5).

Seite 40

Seite 41

Seite 42

Seite 43

More than the Euroean countries, the American media also explained the Allies' motives by the need to reduce Iraqi power (style 2). Thus taking hegemonial interests and the struggle for power as legitimate, the American media paid nearly no attention at all to the UN role in the conflict (Figure 20). Featuring of the US and the Allies as acting in the name of the UN (style 1) played no role at all. US-critical arguments like the UN being dominated by the USA and/or the U.K. (style 2) were avoided to a large extent. Portraying the UN as an instrument for peace (Style 3) is the only style, which was used as frequently as in the European media.

The presentation of alternative ways to settle the war (Figure 21) is clearly determined by the strategic interests of the US. UN and third party initiatives (style 1, style 6 and style 8) were paid much less attention to than in Europe. There was little discussion or denial of military logic (style 3) and no comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives at all (style 9).

Little attention was paid to the topic of negotiations, ceasefire or peacetalks (Figure 22). In particular, the American media told nothing about (Iraqi) readiness for negotiations (style 3).

American New World Order rhetorics (Figure 23) were focused on the "right moment" argument (style 2) and made no use of the "fair game" vision at all, neither positively (style 3) nor negatively (style 4).

Reports about deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded (Figure 24) were given more emphasis than in Europe. Basing their coverage primarily on Allied reports (style 1 and style 2), the American media accepted the Allied perspective as the only truth and produced an image of the war, which has a clear propaganda bias.

Dealing with the topic of media strategies (Figure 26) more extensively than the European did, the American media put great emphasis on the discussion of the role of the media in modern warfare (style 4).

Seite 44

German Media

The German situation is quite different from the American one. While warfare seems to be legitimate to the US, this is not so much the case in Germany, where (at least at the start of the war) there was still a strong peace movement, which thought to have learned its lesson from World War II: no more war, no more fascism. In Germany, which did not take part in the Gulf War Alliance, but yet financed the war to a high degree, the Gulf War coverage was much more controversial than in any other nation, and there was a greater need to explain the conflict to the German public (Figure 18).

While the German media explained the conflict as a "war for oil", either blaming Iraqi (styles 1 and 5) or the Allies' (style 3) interests to control the oil resources as causes of the conflict much more often than other western media, Germany was the only country, in which a comprehensive explanation of the conflict (style 5) was presented as well.

As the American media did, the German media made strong efforts to explain the Allies' motives (Figure 19) and often idealized the Allies' intentions to be the mere liberation of Kuwait (style 1) and/or the Allies' peace concern (style 5). Moreover, the German media tended to see the Allies' motives in the containment of Arab or Muslim influence (style 4) more strongly than any of the other countries did.

In order to legitimate the war, the German media put great emphasis on the UN role in the conflict (Figure 20). In doing so, the discussion within the German media was quite controversial, however. While the frequent use of style 1 (USA and Allies in the name of the UN) and style 5 (UN as forum for the world community) points towards using the UN for the legitimation of the Allied involvement, the frequent use of style 2 (UN dominated by the USA and/or the U.K.) and the seldom use of style 3 (UN as instrument for peace) point in the opposite direction of critical distance from the Allied involvement.

The German media also presented the most extensive and the most controversial discussion of alternative ways to settle the war (Figure 21). While the picture painted by the German media followed the pattern of military logic (style 2) three times as often as in the average, criticism of military logic (style 3) was presented even five times as often as in the average of the western countries and a comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives (style 9) was found three times as frequent in the average.

Similarly, the German media also covered the topic of negotiations, ceasefire or peacetalks (Figure 22) more extensively than all other nations and reported about (Iraqi) readiness for negotiations even four times as frequently as the average.

It is also the German media in which New World Order rhetorics (Figure 23) were found most frequently and where the discussion was most controversial. Especially style 1 ("lessons from the past" rhetorics) and style 3 ("fair game" rhetorics) played a prominent role in German media, but also style 4 (refutation of "fair game" rhetorics) was used much more often than in any other western nation.

In the coverage of deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded (Figure 24), the German media were rather cautious about the propagandistic use of reports on the enemy's casualties and showed a relative preference for reports about own sides' casualties (style 1 and style 3).

The way German media reported about war crimes (Figure 25) unveils some critical distance from Allied propaganda, in particular. German media put less emphasis on Iraqi war crimes (style 1 and style 3) and took up the topic of Allied war crimes (style 2) more often than most of the other western countries did.

This relative distance from Allied propaganda is shown in the coverage of media strategies (Figure 26) also, where the German media were more critical about the Allied media strategy (style 3) than the other European media.

Norwegian Media

Among the Scandinavian countries, Norway as the only NATO member was the most inclined to produce acceptance of the war. In contrast to the German media, the Norwegian ones did not face a strong anti-war opposition, however. Accordingly, the Norwegian Gulf War coverage was much less controversial than the German

one, and the Norwegian media could follow a strategy of being rather silent about many of the critical topics.

In their explanation of the conflict (Figure 18) the Norwegian media are closest to the mean and follow the general pattern: "Iraq is to blame".

Like other Scandinavian media, the Norwegian were rather silent about the Allies' motives (Figure 19), including the motive to liberate Kuwait (style 1), the main propaganda motive from the US side.

The Norwegian media also paid nearly as little attention to the UN role in the conflict (Figure 20) as the American media did. Particularly low frequencies of style 1 (discussion of US and Allies as acting in the name of UN) and style 2 (UN dominated by the USA and/or the U.K.) show that (possibly) US-critical arguments were avoided to a large extent.

The Norwegian media were also the least prone to discuss how to settle the conflict (Figure 21). Third party initiatives (style 1 and style 8) and alternative solutions (style 9) were - like in the US - mentioned rather seldom. Again, like in the US, there was dramatically little discussion and denial of military logic (style 3), as compared to the mean. On the other hand, Norway is that nation, however, whose media supported military logic (style 2) the least often.

Like the American, the Norwegian media were quite silent about the refutation of negotiations, ceasefire or peacetalks (Figure 22). They reported on the refutation of negotiations even more one-sided, however, and put the blame exclusively on the Iraq (style 1).

With respect to New World Order rhetorics (Figure 23), the Norwegian media were quite critical about the "fair game" promise, however. The Norwegian are the only media besides the German ones in which style 4 (refutation of "fair game" rhetorics) occured, and Norway also is that nation in which the least approval of the New World Order was to be found (styles 1-3).

Reports about deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded (Figure 24) were largely neglected. Norway - more than all the other countries - failed to cite the parties' reports on casualties. Only Finland reported less often on Iraqi numbers for own deaths, casualties, etc. (style 3) than Norway.

Similarly as in the US, media strategies (Figure 10) were dealt with primarily from a strategic point of view. Among all European nations, the Norwegian media discussed the role of the media in modern warfare most extensively (style 4).

Swedish media

Sweden has a long tradition of neutrality and peace. Since 1815 Sweden has stayed outsyde military conflicts, and both through World War I and World War II that was a successful foreign and security policy from the Swedish point of view. Sweden also has a clear pro-UN policy as a small and non-Allied country. One of the general secretaries of the UN was Dag Hammarskjöld, a Swede. And Ingvar Carlsson, the present prime minister, has recently chaired a UN commission with the task to reconsider the UN organisation. To this may be connected a long humanitarian tradition - at least in the self-conception of Swedes - connected with the Red Cross aid in the Corean war, and in other conflicts like Biafra. Some of this world view reflected in the Swedish Gulf War coverage as well.

To a certain degree, the Swedish media took the position of relative distance to the usual explanation of the conflict (Figure 18), according to which the blame is to put on Iraq exclusively. They - more than most of the other countries' media - took up the historical claims on the side of Iraq (style 2) and also the Allies' oil dependency (style 3).

Among the Scandinavian media, who were generally rather silent about the Allies' motives for being involved in the conflict (Figure 19), the Swedish media were the most silent. In particular, they obviously were eager to avoid the impression that the Allies' oil interests could be their motive. Both, style 3 and style 5, are not present in the

Swedish media at all.

On the other hand, the UN role in the conflict (Figure 20) was clearly important to the Swedish media. More often than in all other countries, the UN was idealized as an instrument for peace (style 3) and (nearly as often as in Finland) as an instrument for the reinforcement of international law (style 4).

The topic of different ways to settle the conflict (Figure 21) was also taken up more in connection with third parties' and UN initiatives (style 1 and style 6). Moreover, the Swedish media focused on economic sanctions (style 5) more than all other countries' media did. Like in the other Scandinavian countries too, military logic (style 2) was rather absent.

Among the Scandinavian countries, it is Sweden where New World Order rhetorics (Figure 23) were found most often. New World Order was mainly regarded as a promise for the future, the "fair game" perspective (style 3).

In their coverage of deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded (Figure 24) the Swedish media even indicated some tendency towards peace journalism. Making less use of style 1 (Allied reports about own casualties) and more use of style 3 (Iraqi reports about own casualties) than all other countries' media did, they painted the least biased image of the war, which also involved both sides' reports about both sides' casualties (style 4) much more often than in the other western countries.

In their coverage of media strategies (Figure 26), however, the Swedish media had a stronger bias towards the Allied side and tended to blame the Iraq for influencing the media (style 1) more often than other European countries did.

Finnish media

The Finnish media more than other countries' media tended to keep away from the conflict. They made the least efforts to explain the conflict (Figure 18) and - like the other Scandinavian media also - were rather silent about the Allies' motives (Figure 19).

Though the UN role (Figure 20) played a relatively smaller role in the Finnish media, they showed a tendency similar to the Swedish one: the UN was idealized (nearly as often as in Sweden) as an instrument for peace (style 3) and (more often than in any other country) as an instrument for the reinforcement of international law (style 4).

As in the other Scandinavian countries, military logic (style 2) played a smaller role in the coverage of different ways to settle the conflict (Figure 21), than it did in the US and Germany. UN and third party initiatives (style 1, style 6 and style 8) were given great attention, and a comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives (style 9) was presented more often than in all other western countries but Germany.

Although they showed a picture similar to the one produced by the American media, the Finnish media payed the least attention to the refutation of negotiations, ceasefire or peacetalks (Figure 22).

The Finnish media were also quite silent about the New World Order (Figure 23). Especially the "right moment" rhetorics (style 2) were used less often than anywhere else.

With respect to reports about deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded (Figure 24) they followed a similar - though opposite - strategy towards objectivity as the German media did. While the German media had a relative preference of reports about own sides' casualties (style 1 and style 3), the Finnish media rather tended to avoid them and put more emphasis on reports about other sides' casualties (style 2 and style 4).

Among the European countries, it was the Finnish media which showed the greatest concern for independent journalism (style 2).

5.3 Proximity Analysis

Proximity analysis of the various media describes 82.0% of the variance of the style usage frequencies by a four-dimensional factor space (cf. Table 39).

The first dimension of this proximity space (F1) is a unipolar factor (cf. Figure 27) which describes the mainstream of the Gulf War coverage and accounts for 66.2% of the variance.

This mainstream coverage is most clearly represented by the television channels (F1: 0.851) and the regional press (F1: 0.841), and is also typical for the average Swedish media (F1: 0.860) (cf. Figure 29).

Prestige Papers (F1: 0.750) und Popular Press (F1: 0.799) follow the mainstream just minimally less distinctly, varying it in opposite directions as described by the second dimension (F2), which is a bipolar factor accounting for 7.3% of the variance: aggravation versus dissociation.

Table 39: Proximity Analysis: Factor loadings of the single media, average factor loadings within different countries, and average factor loadings within different types of media.

Symbol	country	type of media	F1	F2	F3	F4
1	Finland	o tv	0.906	-0.051	0.162	-0.057
2	Finland	* prestige p.	0.884	0.287	-0.110	-0.127
3	Finland	# popular p.	0.828	0.299	0.167	-0.120
4	Finland	provincial p.	0.911	0.094	0.154	-0.220
5	Germany	o tv	0.704	-0.378	0.235	0.372
6	Germany	* prestige p.	0.810	-0.369	0.146	0.204
7	Germany	# popular p.	0.793	-0.140	0.279	0.232
8	Germany	provincial p.	0.835	-0.256	0.230	-0.150
9	Norway	o tv	0.890	0.230	0.046	0.165
10	Norway	* prestige p.	0.763	-0.120	-0.332	0.249
11	Norway	# popular p.	0.878	0.295	-0.142	0.120
12	Norway	provincial p.	0.796	0.170	-0.107	0.245
13	Sweden	o tv	0.849	-0.075	-0.124	-0.311
14	Sweden	* prestige p.	0.879	-0.154	-0.177	0.071
15	Sweden	# popular p.	0.892	0.277	-0.101	0.089
16	Sweden	provincial p.	0.820	-0.289	-0.225	-0.120
17	USA	o tv	0.903	0.082	0.130	-0.123
18	USA	* prestige p.	0.823	-0.088	0.241	-0.122
19	USA	# popular p.	0.604	0.519	0.222	-0.181
20	Iraq	* prestige p.	0.311	-0.542	-0.436	-0.368
21	Ethiopia	* prestige p.	0.787	0.209	-0.259	0.151
SF	Finland		0.880	0.157	0.093	-0.131
D	Germany		0.786	-0.286	0.223	0.164
N	Norway		0.832	0.144	-0.134	0.195
S	Sweden		0.860	-0.060	-0.157	-0.068
U	USA		0.777	0.171	0.198	-0.142
I	Iraq		0.311	-0.542	-0.436	-0.368
E	Ethiopia		0.787	0.209	-0.259	0.151

```
---------------------------------------------------------------
o                    tv              0.851    0.039    0.090    0.009
*                    prestige  p.    0.750   -0.111   -0.133    0.008
#                    popular  p.     0.799    0.250    0.086    0.028
                     provincial  p.  0.841   -0.070    0.013    0.061
---------------------------------------------------------------
```

In the popular press (F2: 0.25) the normal, provincial black and white painting of the mainstream coverage is even aggravated further. The same tendency is shown by the average American media (F2: 0.171), by the Ethiopian papers (F2: 0.209) and by the other Scandinavian countries: Finland (F2: 0.157) and Norway (F2: 0.144).

The Prestige Papers slightly dissociate themselves from this black and white painting (F2: -0.111). The same tendency differentiates the German media (F2: -0.286) from the other western countries and brings them closer to the Iraqi Gulf War coverage (F2: -0.542).

The third dimension (F3) which accounts for 4.4% of the variance and the fourth dimension (F4) which accounts for 4.0% of the variance describe the relative position of the various countries to each other and to the Iraq (cf. Figure 28).

Different types of media show practically no systematic variation on these dimensions. Small factor loadings (if there are any at all) are due to the blending of types of media and countries included in the analysis (cf. Figure 30).

Seite 48

[Graphik:] Figure 27

Figure 27: Proximity analysis. Factor loadings of the analysed media on dimensions F1 and F2.

Seite 49

[Graphik:] Figure 28

Figure 28: Proximity analysis. Factor loadings of the analysed media on dimensions F3 and F4.

Seite 50

[Graphik:] Figure 29

Figure 29: Proximity analysis. Average factor loadings of countries and types of media on dimensions F1 and F2.

Seite 51

[Graphik:] Figure 30

Figure 30: Proximity analysis. Average factor loadings of countries and types of media on dimensions F3 and F4.

Seite 52

The average factor loadings of the various countries' media on these two dimensions show the Iraq in clear distance

from all other countries which are characterised by relative closeness to each other but show a visible national differentiation also:

The German and Finnish media are closest to the American media. While the German media show the greatest distance from the Iraqi media also, the Finnish and the Swedish media are, at the same time, relatively near to the Iraqi ones.

The Norwegian and Ethiopian media are in a mean distance from the Iraqi ones and, at the same time, they differentiate themselves from the American media most clearly.

6. Conclusions

6.1 Construction of the Conflict

Explanation of the Conflict

Obviously, the media were not prepared for the conflict. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, they started a desperate search for possible explanations of the conflict. The most obvious explanation, Iraq's oil and power interests, was the most frequently used and impressed itself on the perception of the conflict and of Iraq as the party at fault.

Not until the Allied intervention was agreed upon, other conflict causes that might qualify this simple image came to the fore: the Allies' own interests and Iraq's historical claims.

The supposed compulsion to give simple explanations (cf. Mahr, 1995) prevailed particularly in the television news and in the tabloid papers. Throughout the whole course of the conflict, they nearly did not touch upon the topic of the Allies' interests at all, nor on Kuwait's refutation to negotiate with Iraq and the Allies' misleading diplomacy. The tabloid papers went even further and reported less on Iraq's historical claims than all other types of media did. A comprehensive explanation of the conflict was given by one single prestige paper only, the German "Süddeutsche Zeitung".

Among all types of media, the prestige papers made the strongest efforts to explain the conflict and reported both, about the Allies' own interests and about Kuwait's refutation to negotiate with Iraq and the Allies' misleading diplomacy, more often than the average media did.

Among all countries' media, the German media put the greatest emphasis on explanations of the conflict. In doing so, they portrayed the Gulf war mainly as a "war for oil" and thus kept themselves in some distance to the war.

Though the American media made the least efforts to explain the conflict, they gave more precedence to self-critical topics like the Allies' misleading diplomacy than any other of the western media did. As the leading nation of the Alliance, the US could afford to be self-critical. Their adherents were less entitled to criticism of a policy which is clearly dominated by the US.

The Allies' Motives for Being Involved in the Conflict

When the conflict started with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, two main motives for the Allies' involvement were put forward with the same weight: the liberation of Kuwait and the Allies' oil interests. Much less emphasis was put on the reduction of Iraqi power, which was presented as a third motive.

The further course of the conflict is characterised by an opportunistic use of motives:

- The liberation of Kuwait was favoured as a propaganda motive and increasingly used throughout the war until the military defeat of Iraq.

- Not before the enemy image of Iraq had become sufficiently stable, the reduction of Iraqi power started to play a comparable role.

In order to avoid the delegitimation of the war as a mere struggle for power and hegemony, the reduction of Iraqi power was mentioned as an Allied motive quite rarely during the pre-war phase. As soon as the war had started, however, its importance increased continuously until the defeat of Iraq. After it had temporarily diminished immediately afterwards, it was the only pattern of Allied motivation which returned on stage during the Allies' attacks on Iraq in 1992/93.

- While it was functional to hide the Allies' oil interests behind their alleged peace concern in order to drag the UN into the conflict, the Allies' own interests were important for gaining the consent of the US-Congress.

- During the war it was helpful to avoid the impression that people had to die for oil, however. The Allies' oil interests were mentioned less and less until they were no more quoted at all at the time of the Allies' victory and afterwards.

Particularly the German and the American media put great emphasis on the explanation of the Allies' motives and tended to idealize the Allied intentions to be the mere liberation of Kuwait and/or the Allies' peace concern. Both countries' media also tended to demonize the enemies' intentions - though, by different means: while the American media legitimated the Allies' motives by the need to reduce Iraqi power, the German media referred to the containment of Arab or Muslim influence. This motivation, which clearly has a racist aspect, nearly played no role at all in the American media, which took struggle for power as a natural thing for which no (seemingly moralizing, but in the end racist) legitimation was needed.

The UN role in the conflict

While, at the time of the UN-ultimatum the critical discussion of the UN as being dominated by the US and/or the U.K. was still to the fore, it was helpful to portray the UN as an instrument for peace when it came to gain the consent of the US-Congress. Afterwards, during the whole war and even more so during the post-war interventions in 1992/93 the US and the Allies could be seen as acting in the name of the UN.

Such an abuse of the United Nations for the purpose of authorizing the war (cf. Meder, 1994) is particularly characteristic for the European media.

Though the American media obviously had no need to feature the US and the Allies as acting in the name of the UN, they avoided US-critical arguments like the UN being dominated by the US and/or the U.K. to a large extent, however.

Alternative Ways to Settle the War

The media coverage of alternative ways to settle the war demonstrates how armed propaganda (cf. Kempf, 1990) works: as soon as accomplished facts had been created, critical voices turned silent and military logic became dominant. Peaceful alternatives played a significant role only during the pre-war phase, when it was essential to justify the war by depicting it as an ultima ratio. The discussion of third party initiatives was instrumented for the purpose of defense against (possible) criticism of the war (in the context of Iraqi civilian casualties and the forthcoming ground offensive) and thus served the escalation of the conflict as well.

Particularly in the American media, the presentation of alternative ways to settle the war was clearly determined by the strategic interests of the US. UN and third party initiatives were paid much less attention than in the European countries, and there was little discussion or denial of military logic and no comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives at all.

The German coverage, whereas, was determined by the need to legitimate the war against a strong peace movement (cf. Liegl & Kempf, 1994). They presented the most extensive and the most controversial discussion of alternative ways to settle the war. Both, military logic and criticism of military logic were presented significantly more often than in the other western

media, and there was more of a comprehensive discussion of peaceful alternatives than in any other country.

Refutation of Negotiations, Ceasefire or Peacetalks

The significance of the German peace movement is also reflected in the great attention which the German media paid to initiatives for negotiations, ceasefire or peacetalks also. They dealt with this topic more than twice as often as the other western media did and put great emphasis on reports about (Iraqi) readiness for negotiations.

Contrary to the German media, which thus displayed some tendency towards peace journalism, the American media followed a line of strategic propaganda. While the Allies' refutation to negotiate was covered to a normal amount, they did not report about any (mainly Iraqi) readiness for negotiations at all.

The Norwegian media reported on initiatives for negotiations even more one-sided than the American did. Both, the (Iraqi) readiness for negotiations and the Allies' refutation of negotiations were rarely covered.

For the American public it was obviously evident not to negotiate with Saddam. Accordingly, Iraqi readiness for negotiations was no topic for them. To the Norwegian public, however, the Norwegian involvement in the war would not have been plausible if Iraqi readiness for negotiations and the Allies' refusal to search for a peaceful solution of the conflict would have become known.

6.2 Propaganda Strategies

New World Order Rhetorics

New World Order rhetorics played only a minor role in the analysed news items. From an aspired separation between news and commentary point of view, 3.3% of news items containing New World Order rhetorics still is a rather high portion, however. Moreover, it must be expected, that a more extensive and more detailed launching into the vision of a New World Order to be established will be found in the forthcoming analysis of editorials.

The most comprehensive rhetorical pattern which was found in the analysis of news items is represented by a line of reasoning (style 2), which instrumented the present historical situation after the end of the Cold War in order to suggest that the moment for a new start has come and must not be missed. Occasionally this "right moment" factor is supported by a vision of the future when justice and ethical principles will rule international relations and/or by reference to lessons from the past according to which dictators must not be encouraged by showing signals of weakness.

Both, the "Germany" factor (lessons from the past) and the "fair game" factor (where we are going now) were used as rhetorical patterns in their own right also, without any reference to the "right moment" aspect.

Critical distance from the New World Order myth (if there was any) questioned the credibility of the "fair game" argument but doubted neither the lessons to be learned from the past, nor the "right moment" aspect, which both were queried quite seldom and exclusively in the context of their definitive approval. There was no systematic counterposition with respect to these two aspects, which were questioned (if ever) only in order to anticipate possible counterarguments.

While the use of the various rhetorical styles remained stable throughout the whole period covered by the analysis, there were dramatic differences with respect to which style of New World Order rhetorics was preferred in order to make the war plausible to which nation's public. New World Order rhetorics thus did not so much display a consensus within the western world, why it had to intervene in the Gulf conflict, but rather a flexible line of

argumentation that served to convince the public in the different countries on the basis of their specific historical, cultural and political background.

German politicians - right after the reunion of the FRG and the GDR - used the Gulf war as a tool for stirring the discussion on redefining the role of the German military (cf. Kempf, 1994a). Moreover, they had to face a strong anti-war opposition. The hearts and the minds of the peace movement thus became a main target of the propaganda

war. Accordingly, it was the German media in which New World Order rhetorics were found most frequently and where the discussion of a New World Order was most controversial.

The United States on the other hand used the opportunity to establish their hegemonial claims as the only remaining super power after the end of the Cold War. Accordingly, the American media favoured the "right moment" rhetorics more than any other country, and did not at all hit at the "fair game" aspect, which particularly refers to the rights of small nations.

Sweden, which has a long tradition of peace, political neutrality and pro-UN policy, seems to have tapped into the propaganda trap more or less naively. Among the Scandinavian countries, it is the Swedish media in which New World Order rhetorics were found most often. They regarded the New World Order mainly as a promise for the future and did not query its credibility at all.

Norwegian media on the contrary were quite critical about this promise. The Norwegian media displayed the least approval of the New World Order, and they are the only media besides the German ones in which a refutation of "fair game" rhetorics could be found.

The Finnish media which were quite silent about the New World Order, finally, were particularly abstinent with respect to the "right moment" argument.

Human Sufferings and Casualties

Victims of war play a prominent role in propaganda. In their propaganda model, Herman & Chomsky (1988) draw a distinction between "worthy" and "unworthy victims": victims of national or international violence, whose torments, though comparable from an objective point of view, are useful as a weapon against an actual enemy in one case, while they are useless, and hence devoid of interest, in the other. If responsibility for violence lies in one's own sphere of influence, reporting on its victims would be unfavorable to one's national interest.

The results of the present study show, that civilian sufferings and casualties due to Allied attacks were reported only slightly less often as such which were due to Iraqi attacks. Taking into account that the number of casualties on the Iraqi side was a multiple of the Allied casualties, this result does not contradict Herman & Chomsky's hypothesis, however. Moreover, casualties due to Allied attacks have been reported to a considerable amount only in reports on the bombing of the Amirya bunker and in the context of the bombing of Baghdad in January 1993, while reports of casualties due to Iraqi attacks were the dominant style of coverage throughout all other timespots.

While there was no difference in propaganda strategy between the different western countries, the different types of media served as tools for propaganda to a different degree. Particularly television news and tabloid papers paid great attention to the coverage of casualties due to Iraqi attacks, while - at the same time - they were eager to produce the image of a clean war. Television news were less biased than the popular press, however, and put emphasis on Iraqi casualties also.

Reports about Deaths, Casualties, Missing, Captured or Wounded

Since public support of war involves a delicate balance between feeling threatened by the enemy and confidence in the outcome of the war (cf. Kempf, 1996), it is of strategic importance for any warfaring nation to have control over the reports of own and enemies'

casualties. Not surprisingly, therefore, Allied reports, both about own side's and about other side's casualties were quoted much more often than the respective Iraqi reports.

While there was no difference between different types of media with respect to this, the various western countries followed distinct propaganda and - occasionally - peace-journalism strategies.

The American media reported most extensively about casualties and in doing so, they produced an image, which had a clear propaganda bias. Basing their coverage primarily on Allied reports they accepted the Allies' perspective

as the only truth.

The Swedish media, on the contrary, painted the least biased image. They focused their coverage less on Allied reports about own casualties, they paid more attention to Iraqi reports about their casualties, and they referred to both sides' reports about both sides' casualties much more often than any other western country. In doing so, they were the only media which indicated at least some tendency towards peace journalism which admits that the enemy might have reasons to feel threatened as well, and which portrays casualties as victims of the war rather than victims of the enemy.

Norway - more than all other countries - failed to cover both sides' reports on casualties. On the basis of the present results it cannot be decided, however, whether they just supported the propaganda image of the Gulf War as a clean war without human sufferings, or whether they tried to follow a (though insufficient) peace-journalistic strategy of avoiding the transformation of (possible) outrage at the evils of war into outrage at the enemy.

War Crimes

Typical for any war propaganda is the demonization of the enemy and the condemnation of his actions, while the own side's deeds are justified and the own side's rights and intentions are idealized. Particularly the tabloid papers followed this line of propaganda. They more often accused the Iraq of committing war crimes and directed less reproaches against the Allies than any other type of media did.

The prestige papers, on the contrary, tended more strongly towards an unbiased evaluation of Iraqi actions and towards a critical evaluation of the Allies. They put less focus on reproaches against the Iraq and reported more often about Allied war crimes than the other media did. This same tendency towards peace journalism was also displayed by the German media.

Media Strategy

The discussion of media strategies was strongly influenced by the various nations' involvement in the conflict. While both, the American media (which dealt with the topic much more extensively than the European did), and the Norwegian media tended to hide the topic behind an abstract discussion of the role of the media in modern warfare without any reference to concrete events of censorship etc., the Swedish media were most inclined to blame the Iraq for influencing the media. The German media, on the other hand, were most critical about the Allies' media strategy, and the Finnish media showed the greatest concern for independent journalism.

Seite 57

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Seite 58

Appendix 1: Coding Instructions

A. Objective

Reconstruction of latent styles in the news reporting concerning specific themes or topics.

B. Coding units

Articles (in newspaper) and sections referred to in headlines as their equivalent (in television)

C. Identity variables

1. Coder identity: 01-98

2. Country: 0-6

- 0 = Finland
- 1 = Germany
- 2 = Norway
- 3 = Sweden
- 4 = USA
- 5 = Iraq
- 6 = Jordan
- 7 = Ethiopia

3. Item identity: 0001-9999

4. Media identity: 01-98

5. Type of media: 0-3

- 0 = TV
- 1 = Prestige Paper
- 2 = Popular Press
- 3 = Provincial paper

6. Year: 1-4

- 1 = 1990
- 2 = 1991
- 3 = 1992
- 4 = 1993

7. Month: 01-12

8. Day: 01-31

D. Content analytical variables and categories per statement:

1. Allegation and corroboration of the statement: 0-2

- 0 = statement not mentioned at all
- 1 = mere allegation, conjecture or supposition of the statement
- 2 = factual corroboration and/or arguments in favour of the statement

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Seite 59

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2. Support of statement by authoritative sources:[10]

2.1 Iraqi sources (excluding Kurds and Shias): 0-3

- 0 = none
- 1 = yes
- 2 = yes, but oppositional
- 3 = both

2.2 Kurds & Shias (from Iraq, Turkey and Iran): 0-3

- Same categories as in variable 2.1.

2.3 Israeli sources: 0-3

- Same categories as in variable 2.1.

2.4 Allied (with combat troops): 0-3

- Same categories as in variable 2.1.

2.5 Supporting (Allied without combat troops): 0-3

- Same categories as in variable 2.1.

2.6 International sources: 0-3

- 0 = none
- 1 = the United Nations
- 2 = non-governmental peace or human rights organisations
- 3 = both

2.7 Other sources: 0-1

- 0 = none
- 1 = yes

3. Doubt, denial, questioning or relativization (including mere plan or threat) of the statement: 0-2

- 0 = doubt etc. not mentioned at all
- 1 = mere allegation, conjecture or supposition of the doubt etc.
- 2 = factual corroboration and/or arguments in favour of the doubt etc.

4. Support of the doubt etc. by authoritative sources:

4.1 Iraqi sources (excluding Kurds and Shias): 0-3

- Same categories as in variable 2.1.

4.2 Kurds & Shias (from Iraq, Turkey and Iran): 0-3

- Same categories as in variable 2.1.

4.3 Israeli sources: 0-3

- Same categories as in variable 2.1.

4.4 Allied (with combat troops): 0-3

- Same categories as in variable 2.1.

4.5 Supporting (Allied without combat troops): 0-3

- Same categories as in variable 2.1.

4.6 International sources: 0-3

- Same categories as in variable 2.1.

4.7 Other sources: 0-1

- Same categories as in variable 2.1.

E. Themes and statements

1. Refutation of negotiations, ceasefire or peace talks

1.1 The Iraq is described as not being (or not having been) willing to take up negotiations, ceasefire or peace talks.

1.2 The Allied (or some of their members) are described as not being (or not having been) willing to take up negotiations, ceasefire or peace talks.

2. Explanation of the conflict

2.1 Iraqi interest in controlling the oil resources and/or strengthening her power and dominance mentioned as causes of the conflict.

2.2 The Alliance's (or some of its members') interest in controlling the oil resources and/or strengthening their power and dominance mentioned as causes of the conflict.

2.3 Iraq's claims of historical right to the territory of Kuwait mentioned as an explanation of the conflict.

2.4 Kuwait's refutation to negotiate with Iraq about the border dispute and/or the level of oil export mentioned as an explanation of the conflict.

2.5 The Alliance's (or some of its members') diplomacy and/or misleading of Iraq mentioned as the explanation of the conflict.

3. The Allies' motives for being involved in the conflict

3.1 The Alliance's (or some of its members') motives is said to be the liberation of Kuwait.

3.2 The Alliance's (or some of its members') motives is said to be the reduction of Iraqi power.

3.3 The Alliance's (or some of its members') motives is said to be their peace concern.

3.4 The Alliance's (or some of its members') motives is said to be the reduction of Iraq's nuclear power.

3.5 The Alliance's (or some of its members') motives is said to be the containment of Arab and/or Muslim influence.

3.6 The Alliance's (or some of its members') motives is said to be secured oil supply and/or stable oil prices.

4. Human sufferings and casualties

4.1 Civilian sufferings and/or casualties due to Iraqi attacks are mentioned.

4.2 Civilian sufferings and/or casualties due to Allied attacks are mentioned.

5. War Crimes

5.1 Iraqi attacks on civilians are described as deliberate.

5.2 Allied attacks on civilians are described as deliberate.

5.3 Iraqi forces are accused of breaking the humanitarian rules of war.

5.4 Allied forces are accused of breaking the humanitarian rules of war.

Seite 61

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6. Reports about deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded

6.1 Iraqi reports about own deaths, casualties missing, captured or wounded are quoted.

6.2 Iraqi reports about other side's deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded are quoted.

6.3 Allied reports about own deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded are quoted.

6.4 Allied reports about other side's deaths, casualties, missing, captured or wounded are quoted.

7. The UN role in the conflict

7.1 The United Nations' role described as the forum and/or voice of world community.

7.2 The United Nations described as an instrument for or aiming at peaceful solutions.

7.3 The United Nations' task described as to uphold international laws and/or to punish crimes against the right of national souvereignity.

7.4 The USA and/or Allies described as acting in the name of the United Nations.

7.5 The United Nations described as being influenced and/or dominated by the USA and/or the U.K.

7.6 The USA offer to pay its debts to the UN mentioned in connection with the UN declaration(s).

8. Presentation of different ways to settle the conflict

8.1 Force against Iraq is described as the only possible or most effective way to settle the conflict.

8.2 It is said that the economic embargo on trade with Iraq should be given or should have been given more time to be effective.

8.3 Iraqi initiative for negotiations or peace talks is mentioned.[11]

8.4 The Alliance's or member state's (excl. UN) initiative for negotiations or peace talks with Iraq is mentioned.[12]

8.5 UN initiative for negotiations or peace talks with Iraq is mentioned.[13]

8.6 Third party or neutral initiative for negotiations or peace talks with Iraq is mentioned.[14]

9. New World Order rhetorics

9.1 The "Germany" factor - lessons from the past: It is stated that dictators must not be encouraged by showing signals of weakness and/or it is referred to history (appeasement policy/Hitler) in order to suggest that conclusion.

9.2 The "right moment" factor - where we are now: It is stated that the moment of a new start must not be missed and/or it is referred to the present historical situation (end of communism/victory of democracy/reutilization of the UN) in order to suggest that conclusion.

9.3 The "fair game" factor - where we are going now: It is stated to be the aim of the new policy that justice and ethical principles should rule international relations and/or it is referred to the rights of small nations in order to suggest that fruits of violence must not be accepted, etc.

Seite 62

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10. Media strategy

10.1 Allegation that Iraq actively tries to or succeeds in influencing the media coverage of the conflict.

10.2 Allegation that the Allies (or some of their members) actively try to or succeed in influencing the media coverage of the conflict.

10.3 Human rights of information and freedom of the press are considered as important values that must be followed even in times of crisis.

10.4 It is said that small countries do have the possibility to achieve independent information.

10.5 It is said that the media play an (important) role in modern warfare.

10.6 It is said that measures like censorship, the activities of PR-agencies and/or other factors of the news production process have an impact on the news coverage.

Seite 63 **Appendix 2: Coding Sheet**

[Graphik: Seite 63]

Seite 64

[Graphik: Seite 64]

Seite 65

[Graphik: Seite 65]

Seite 66

[Graphik: Seite 66]

Seite 67

Contents

Footnotes

[1] After March 1992

[2] Western media only

[3] Western media only

[4] Western media only

[5] Western media only

[6] Western media only

[7] Western media only

[8] Western media only

[9] Western media only

[10] Authoritative sources = members of the political establishment like politicians, officials (including governmental spokesmen and formulations like "The Pentagon", "The State Department" or "The White House" but excluding general formulations like "Baghdad" or "Washington"), diplomats, experts, intellectuals (e.g. political scientists) but neither merely popular persons (like filmstars or musicians, who do not have a special competence with respect to the topic) nor reporters, journalists and media (like "CNN" or "Radio Baghdad").

Oppositional = authoritative sources which are well known all over the world or identified (as members of certain organisations or individually) as opponents of the present official policy in the conflict but not just demonstrants who are identified by their name.

[11] Only initiatives on governmental level, not just suggestions by the oppositional groups.

[12] Only initiatives on governmental level, not just suggestions by the opposition or the peace movement etc.

[13] Only initiatives on official level, not just suggestions by minorities in the Security Council (like Cuba or Jemen) or by the General Secretary as a single voice.

[14] Only initiatives on governmental level, not just suggestions by the opposition or the peace movement etc.