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Sogdiana Azhiben

Der Zwischenfall von Andijan: Radikaler Islam und Konflikt in Usbekistan

Gegenstand der vorliegenden Studie ist es, anhand einer Analyse des radikal islamistischen Diskurses und der in Zusammenhang mit sozio-ökonomischer und politischer Instabilität stehenden Ereignisse in Andijan am 13. Mai 2005, den Einfluss des radikalen Islams auf die entstehenden Konflikte in Usbekistan zu untersuchen. Zu diesem Zweck wird unter Bezugnahme auf bestehende Theorien des politischen Islams untersucht, mit welchen Narrativen und Diskursen der religiöse Faktor, die usbekische Regierung, die internationale Staatengemeinschaft und die usbekische Bevölkerung in den einheimischen und ausländischen Medien dargestellt werden. Im ersten Abschnitt werden die zentralen Forschungsfragen der Untersuchung formuliert und der Versuch unternommen, das Phänomen des radikalen Islams in einer für das Verständnis des usbekischen Falles angemessenen Weise in Begriffe zu fassen. Die folgenden drei Abschnitte diskutieren den Zwischenfall von Andijan und geben eine detaillierte Analyse seiner Vorbedingungen, seiner Entstehung und seiner Nachwirkungen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen eine Kontinuität der Unterdrückung des Islam, auch in der post-sowjetischen politischen Situation des heutigen Usbekistans. Die radikal islamische Rhetorik, die zum Instrument des Konfliktaustrags geworden ist, beruht stärker darauf, die Entstehung einer Opposition zu verhindern, als auf einem anti-westlichen Widerstand gegen importierte demokratische Werte. Um die usbekische Gesellschaft zu verstehen ist es von Bedeutung dass es den radikal islamischen Ideen deswegen nicht gelungen ist, die Unterstützung der breiten Bevölkerung zu gewinnen, weil der gängige usbekische Islam eher eine Frage der Religiosität denn eine Frage der Religion ist. Erstere, die auf Konzepten der Spiritualität beruht, hat in der heimischen Kultur und Lebensart einen größeren Einfluss und unterstützt Gewalt als Mittel der Einflussnahme nicht. Politisch betrachtet stellt die Überbetonung des religiösen Radikalismus jedoch einen Fehlschlag des politischen Systems dar, der die Korruption begünstigt und notwendige soziale und ökonomische Reformen verhindert. Sie trägt zur Verbreitung von Unzufriedenheit bei, die in Form von Ressentiments gegenüber dem Gewaltmonopol des Staates ihren Ausdruck findet. Darüber hinaus zeigt die Studie, dass die Neuordnung der Sicherheitspolitik gegenüber Russland und China die politische Absicht widerspiegelt, die islamistische Bedrohung mittels einer erneuerten Kooperationsstrategie zu bekämpfen und künftige Unruhen in Usbekistan zu verhindern. Letztlich ermöglicht ein solcher "status quo" jedoch die Übertreibung radikaler religiöser Strenge, welche der zunehmenden Radikalisierung zu öffentlicher Akzeptanz verhilft.

[Volltext \(in Englisch\)](#)

Zur Autorin:

Sogdiana Azhiben erwarb ihren Bachelor in Chinesischer Sprache und Literatur am Tashkent State Institute of Oriental Studies in 2005. In 2003-2004 nahm sie an dem von der US-Regierung geförderten Austauschprogramm in American Studies an der Eastern Connecticut State University teil. In 2006 erhielt sie ihren MA in Politikwissenschaft (Zentralasien) von der OSCE Akademie in Bishkek, Kirgisistan. Sie veröffentlichte einen Aufsatz über Chinesische Tiefenkultur am Austrian Institute for Integrative Conflict Transformation and Peace Building. Ihre bisherige Berufstätigkeit umfasst ein Praktikum im OSCE Sekretariat in Wien, einen Ganztagsjob beim Tashkent Field Office des International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) und Übersetzertätigkeiten für das usbekische Fernsehen.

eMail: bagira_uz@yahoo.com

Sogdiana Azhiben

The Andijan Events: Radical Islam and Conflict in Uzbekistan

The aim of this study is to examine the influence of radical Islam on the emerging conflicts in the Republic of Uzbekistan through the analysis of radical Islamist discourse and the Andijan events that occurred on May 13, 2005 in the context of socio-economic and political instability. The method employed is the analysis of narratives and discourses on the religious factor in the local and foreign media, the Uzbek government, the international community and the Uzbek populace, with reference to existing theories of political Islam. The first section (Introduction) introduces three research questions and attempts to conceptualize the phenomenon of radical Islam by screening for appropriate definitions in an effort to understand the Uzbek cause. The next three sections discuss the realities of the Andijan incident and provide a detailed analysis of its preconditions, development and aftermath. The findings show a continuity in the oppression of Islam, even in the post-Soviet political situation of present-day Uzbekistan. The radical Islamic rhetoric that became an instrument in resolving conflicts is based more on preventing the emergence of opposition than on anti-Western political resistance against imported democratic values. What is relevant to understanding Uzbek society is that Islamic radical ideas have failed to attract support in the general populace because popular Uzbek Islam is more a matter of religiosity than of religion. The former, which relies on concepts of spirituality, is more influential in the local culture and way of life and does not support violence as a means of exerting influence. From a political perspective, however, the over-emphasis on religious radicalism indicates a failure of political institutions that encourages corruption and avoids needed social and economic reforms. It contributes to popular grievances that are formulated and expressed in terms of resentment (the Andijan incident) against the state monopoly of power. Additionally, this study revealed that the dynamics of the security realignment toward Russia and China symbolized a political intent to persist in a renewed cooperation strategy for combating the Islamist threat and preventing future unrest in Uzbekistan. In the end, such a "status quo" allows the overstatement of radical religious strength that complements further radicalization with popular acceptance.

[full text \(in English\)](#)

On the author:

Sogdiana Azhiben received her Bachelor degree in Chinese Language and Literature from Tashkent State Institute of Oriental Studies in 2005. In 2003-2004 she participated in the US-Government sponsored undergraduate exchange program majoring in American Studies at Eastern Connecticut State University. In 2006 she obtained her MA degree in Political Science (Central Asia) from the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. She has published an article on Chinese deep culture at the Austrian Institute for Integrative Conflict Transformation and Peace Building. Her professional experience includes internship at the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, full-time work at Tashkent field office of the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), and English translation at the Uzbek Central Television.

eMail:bagira_uz@yahoo.com

Sogdiana Azhiben

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Abstract: The aim of this study is to examine the influence of radical Islam on the emerging conflicts in the Republic of Uzbekistan through the analysis of radical Islamist discourse and the Andijan events that occurred on May 13, 2005 in the context of socio-economic and political instability. The method employed is the analysis of narratives and discourses on the religious factor in the local and foreign media, the Uzbek government, the international community and the Uzbek populace, with reference to existing theories of political Islam. The first section (Introduction) introduces three research questions and attempts to conceptualize the phenomenon of radical Islam by screening for appropriate definitions in an effort to understand the Uzbek cause. The next three sections discuss the realities of the Andijan incident and provide a detailed analysis of its preconditions, development and aftermath. The findings show a continuity in the oppression of Islam, even in the post-Soviet political situation of present-day Uzbekistan. The radical Islamic rhetoric that became an instrument in resolving conflicts is based more on preventing the emergence of opposition than on anti-Western political resistance against imported democratic values. What is relevant to understanding Uzbek society is that Islamic radical ideas have failed to attract support in the general populace because popular Uzbek Islam is more a matter of religiosity than of religion. The former, which relies on concepts of spirituality, is more influential in the local culture and way of life and does not support violence as a means of exerting influence. From a political perspective, however, the over-emphasis on religious radicalism indicates a failure of political institutions that encourages corruption and avoids needed social and economic reforms. It contributes to popular grievances that are formulated and expressed in terms of resentment (the Andijan incident) against the state monopoly of power. Additionally, this study revealed that the dynamics of the security realignment toward Russia and China symbolized a political intent to persist in a renewed cooperation strategy for combating the Islamist threat and preventing future unrest in Uzbekistan. In the end, such a "status quo" allows the overstatement of radical religious strength that complements further radicalization with popular acceptance.

I Introduction: Conceptualizing Radical Islam: The Search for the Uzbek Cause

That radical Islam exists in Uzbekistan should not be exaggerated, nor should it be minimized. The origins of previous studies of Islam and Islamic radicalism (or 'fundamentalism', the term most researchers use in referring to contemporary radical Islamic currents) can be found in various different background contexts and, consequently, there are different arguments and underpinnings for understanding Islamic revivalism and violence. Among these studies, however, it would be hard to find even one comprehensive work on Islamic radicalism in Central Asia that could help us to understand current events in the region, particularly in Uzbekistan. Most scholars' analyses have so far been reductive to the Islamic cause itself and do not supply us with overall alternative explanations for violence and unrest. Such areas of social activity as the economy, legal system, political participation and the exercise of fundamental freedoms should receive closer scrutiny in order to achieve a more comprehensive interpretation. For that purpose, I point to three main research questions:

1. Why are conflicts and unrest in Uzbekistan framed in the context of radical Islam?
2. Is radical Islam linked to the violent conflicts (analyzing the Andijan events) that are emerging in the Ferghana Valley?
3. How can we understand radical Uzbek Islam and measure its influence on changes in Uzbek foreign and domestic policies?

The pluralism of opinions on the nature of radical Islam leaves these questions unanswered, meaning that previous and perhaps also current scientific efforts have failed to place this social phenomenon into a secure conceptual framework. Speaking of theory, I will not offer a precise definition of radical Islam since it is not my field of expertise; but I will try to offer a general theoretical framework for further use in the discussion, relying on the ideas of three social scientists (Olivier Roy, Gilles Kepel and Bernard Lewis) whose works offer the best informed, most contemporary and reliable analyses of the Muslim world and Islam per se.

In his *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*, Olivier Roy sees the expansion of radical Islam as "a consequence of and [a] reaction to social changes," rather than as evidence of the crystallization and stabilization of values.¹ Discussing radical violence, Roy stresses the cause and the purpose of *Jihad* which, surprisingly, is not the essential feature of radical Islamic movements. The orientation of Islamic discourse on *Jihad* in Uzbekistan varies dramatically depending on whom one talks to. Most media sources, both national and international, warn that Uzbekistan is a venue of struggle between radical (fundamentalist) and 'moderate' (official) opinions over the right to speak for Islam. There are doubts, however, about whether the Republic is a place where the struggle, if at all, is actually taking place. This argument must be supported by data and statistical information on the situation and the facts. Roy could also be misleading in saying that the disappearance of traditional values laid the groundwork for re-Islamization. State policies on returning Uzbekistan to traditional Islamic practices (for example, the administrative establishment of *mahallas*, strict control and censorship of television and radio broadcasts; the promotion of traditionalism in regard to marriage and family life, including the limitation of women's rights in this respect; bringing the religious heritage and the Islamic historical legacy in the face of Amir Temur, which slept under the Soviet rule, back to the surface of Uzbek consciousness; and the 'fight' against modernization in the form of surveillance of and restraints on the private economic sector and the overall economy) have not furthered the disappearance of the traditional values of the Uzbek grassroots population, but rather have tended to crystallize them. Whether the events unfolded in a reversed scenario – crystallization favored Islamic radicalization – is hard to judge, despite the spread of the radical agenda of *Wahhabism*,² *Hizb ut-Tahrir* and *the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)*³ on the territory of the Republic. The President's efforts to impose "defensive" state-controlled re-Islamization on Uzbek society as an aspect of Islamic revivalism provoked resistance at the grassroots level. Was the resistance expressed in terms of *Jihad*? Did it have a movement, an organization, or a leader propagating radical ideas? Did the Andijan events prove the existence of

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1. Mamdani, Mahmud, *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2005. *Whither Political Islam?*, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org>
 2. *Wahhabism*, a fundamentalist movement launched on the Arabian peninsula in the late 18th century by Muhammed Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud. The followers of this movement constitute the largest and most conspicuous category of Islamic revivalists or Islamists. Referred to as 'scripturalists,' 'legalists,' and 'literalists,' they advocate rigid adherence to the fundamentals of Islam, as literally interpreted from the Koran and *Sunna* (the Prophet Mohammed's sayings and deeds). Wahhabis often strive to establish an Islamic state based on the rigorous implementation of the Shari'a and insist that the five *faraidh* (duties) be scrupulously adhered to by all their co-religionists. See further A. Jerichow & J. Baek Simonsen, *Islam in a Changing World: Europe and the Middle East*, Curzon Press, 1997; p. 98
 3. "The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was founded in 1991 in the Ferghana Valley by Juma Namangani and Takhir Yuldashev after their peaceful appeals to President Islam Karimov to take Islamist concerns more seriously ... fell upon deaf ears and provoked a crackdown. A 1999 assassination attempt on Karimov that killed thirteen and injured 128 was blamed on them, and they were sentenced to death in absentia. Supported by outside funding, they retreated to Tajikistan and Afghanistan, from whence they launched a number of incursions into Uzbek and Kyrgyz territory ..." See further Eastvold, Jonathan C., 2003, *Charming the Hyrda: Assessing Islamist Militancy in the Ferghana Valley*, Department of Politics, Princeton University (paper presented at the Central Eurasian Studies Society Fourth Annual Conference in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2-5 October 2003.)

active radical Islamist groups in Uzbekistan? I could go on with such questions, as they indicate that certain elements of Roy's theoretical explanation cannot be applied to the situation in Uzbekistan: He mostly refers to Islam and Islamic history in the Middle East and discusses their relationship with the West, which the other two scholars also discuss in their works.

The state-created ideological division between radical and moderate Islam did not make Uzbek Islam controversial and did not bring it to the development and adaptation stages¹ because of suppression from above. The question is still open of whether the suppression of religiosity can still destine Uzbek Islamism to failure and encourage the spread of radical Islam. Obviously, the blurring of the frontlines between Uzbek Islamism and radical Islam is confusing: If state-promoted pan-Uzbek national ideology with 'moderate' official Islam at the core is the first issue, then a grassroots-level struggle for freedom of religion, economic and political prosperity in the name of fundamentalism must be the second. A comparison with neighboring Afghanistan, however, where the Shari'a was interpreted more radically under the Taliban, who promoted a return to a Islamic Caliphate by targeting traditional local culture and limiting women's rights, helps to distinguish between constructive and destructive ideas. I am not arguing that radical ideas cannot be constructive. Perhaps they were, if we view the Andijan events as an attempt to bring an end to socio-economic frustration and alleviate the oppression of religion and the state's authoritarian policies. But the question is whether the constructive aspects should be understood in terms of religious radicalism, whose role began to be overemphasized especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.

The revolutionary wave in Islam, as Bernard Lewis correctly states in his *The Crisis of Islam*, can be linked to humiliation, frustration and new confidence characterized by the sense of power:

the feeling of a community of people accustomed to regard themselves as the sole custodians of God's truth, commanded by Him to bring it to the infidels, who suddenly find themselves dominated and exploited by those same infidels and, even when no longer dominated, still profoundly affected in ways that change their lives, moving them from the true Islamic to other paths.²

It is still not certain what 'true Islamic' means in contemporary Uzbekistan and what 'other paths' might be. Put simply, for an Uzbek Muslim 'true Islamic' can mean living according to long-accepted Sufi traditions, while for a radical Pashtun it can mean writing the Shari'a into state laws and the criminal code. If it is impossible to distinguish what is true under the conditions of current events in Uzbekistan, how can we identify what is radical? Perhaps political leverage is more easily managed due to the implementation of the latter project; however, it does not facilitate our search for the Uzbek cause.

The aforementioned humiliation and frustration recall the past, when Islam was suppressed in Uzbekistan by Russian imperialism and the Soviet Union, yet instead of disappearing gained new confidence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Did the dynamics of economic and political transformation in Uzbekistan prompt independent religious Uzbek Muslims to try to change the new regime and establish their own based on the Shari'a? Minor efforts were made to agitate for radical anti-government ideas, but were not taken seriously because of their ambiguous and somewhat utopian character. Moreover, the availability of social and economic alternatives helped to avoid a stalemated situation in the Republic, but left no room for political solutions. It is debatable whether social despair in making political choices is one of the key components of radicalization in Muslim countries, and it is also debatable whether it is the key issue when it comes to Uzbekistan specifically. Another debatable point is whether a healing process for Islam (complete separation of religion and politics) is feasible in the long run, not just in Uzbekistan, but for Islam as a whole, since that would require dramatic changes in religious practice, not to mention whether we could predict other consequences.

Methodology: This study has multiple tasks. First, it attempts to distinguish elements of radical Islam within Uzbek Islam through the analysis of Islamic discourse on both the grassroots and governmental levels. It involves a closer study of the reports, as well as the perceptions of Islam among and by international human rights reporting groups, NGOs, and media from the period when the Andijan events occurred up until today, revealing the consequences in both the political and socio-economic spheres. Second, in this study I try to use the more comprehensive approach needed to guide the understanding of radical Islam in Uzbekistan, relying on existing theories of political Islam and supplementing them with additional research and first-hand knowledge of this geographic area. An overview of the preconditions of the Andijan events (radicalization in the late 1980s and the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991) is necessary for further narrative and discourse analysis, as I consider it a reference point in seeking signs of and judging the extent of the influence of radical Islam on popular unrest today. Yet, I will try to analyze in a way going beyond the topic of radicalism and to look for other more cogent and relevant explanations.

1. Here I rely on Gilles Kepel's (*Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*) theory that democratic ideas and equivocal Islamic practices can either destine Islamism to failure or reorient it to more progressive forms. Piscatori, James P. (University Lecturer on Islamic Politics and Fellow at Wadham College, Oxford University, author of *Muslim Politics*), May/June 2002. *Foreign Affairs, The Turmoil Within*, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org>

2. Lewis, Bernard, March 2003. *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*, Random House, p. 18

II On the Path to Andijan

"... the tale of confessions and executions went on, until there was a pile of corpses lying before Napoleon's feet and the air was heavy with the smell of blood, which had been unknown there since the expulsion of Jones."

George Orwell, *Animal Farm* (1945), Ch. VII

In the year after the Andijan events of May 13, 2005, countless versions and opinions were offered by the international community, media, Uzbek Government, victims and refugees regarding what actually happened in Babur Square in the town center and who was responsible for the violence that resulted in the deaths of Uzbek civilians. Most of the reports and articles published since then give us a narrative about the chronology of unfolding events in Andijan, but very few provide truly unbiased and reliable information on the real situation in the Republic. The analysis of this chapter includes both the alleged Islamic cause and socio-economic conditions, taking a look at the historical premises of the past several decades.

Historical victimhood continued through the years of offenses against and suppression of local religious practices by the Soviets, especially during Stalinist rule (massive purges of the late 1920s and 1930s),¹ but Muslims in Uzbekistan cooperated with the Soviet Government in Moscow.² Theoretically, such treatment of Islam and Uzbek religiosity might eventually have cumulated into popular grievances at the lack of religious freedom and mobilized the masses to violent resistance, but this never occurred. Nonetheless, throughout seventy years under Soviet rule, a key issue was the loss of honor and religious privileges suffered by Uzbek Muslims.³ It should not be ruled out, however, that a well-operating albeit deficient system of social welfare and authoritarian yet continuous political stability assuaged sentiments of victimhood, as they coincided in time (the Iron Curtain that isolated Soviet Muslims from the rest of the Muslim world but did not deprive them of collective social and civic privileges). Speaking of contemporary Uzbekistan, where the head of state was a product of Soviet secularism, the implementation of policies on closing borders with neighboring countries, the promotion of a pan-Uzbek national ideological alternative to Islam, incorporation of fundamental Islamic practices into the law, and, finally, the monopolization of control over the national economy in accordance with the private interests of the surrounding elite, have changed the scenario. The foundation of today's religious situation in Uzbekistan was laid when Islam Karimov took control after the elections in 1991 and adopted an "undifferentiated approach to any kind of Islamic belief beyond the officially approved religion," that he expected to be able to manage.⁴ A new era of Muslim victimization by the new regime was something Muslims hoped they would not suffer; it would only be exacerbated by economic impoverishment and other frustrations in the coming years, even though economically citizens were better off in the first few years of independence than those in other Central Asian countries. I recall a brief urbanization boom during which many ethnic Uzbeks were able to afford to move from rural villages to urban areas due to the fears of the majority of the local Slavic population. Many Slavs fled the country in anticipation of unfavorable Uzbek nationalism and policy changes regarding the official language and employment conditions. During the course of a massive "brain drain," more children of *dekhkonlar* (peasants) were able to move away from the cotton fields and obtain secondary and often higher education. However, dynamic urbanization and access to education are not the sole factors worth discussing. The ideological vacuum and political learning allowed the emergence of Islamist movements on the territory of the Republic that met with quick suppression (in the early 1990s⁵), which differed from recent practices in Andijan.

What happened on May 13 has been called a 'massacre' or at least 'violence' by some, while others have referred to it simply as 'events' (in this study, depending on the context, however, the reader will find a variety of terms, none of which reflect my personal views). In all reports consulted⁶ and other sources of information on the events, the beginning is dated to Friday, May 13, 2005. If we look beyond the violent events, the beginnings date back to January/February 2005, when

1. Roy, Olivier, 2000. *The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations*, I.B. Tauris; p. 52
2. See Lewis, Bernard, 2002. *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*, New York, Oxford University Press
3. *Supra*, 7.
4. Goble, Paul, 24 March 2006. *Uzbekistan: Analysis From Washington – Fighting Fundamentalism With Sufism*, http://www.naqshbandi.org/events/us2000/uzbek_pres/rfe_uzbekistan.htm
5. *The Economist*, 24 July 2003. *Allah's Shadow: Is Radical Islam a Threat to Central Asia's Stability?*, <http://www.economist.com>
6. The reports include: two ICG reports, *Uzbekistan: The Andijan Uprising* and *Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul* accessible at <http://www.icg.org>; Human Rights Watch report, *"Bullets Were Falling Like Rain": The Andijan Massacre, May 13, 2005* accessible at <http://www.hrw.org>; OSCE/ODIHR report, *Preliminary Findings on the Events in Andijan, Uzbekistan, 13 May 2005* accessible at <http://www.osce.org>; and Shirin Akiner's report, *Violence in Andijan, 13 May 2005*, print edition.

a trial of 23 local entrepreneurs began on charges of belonging to a religious extremist group, *Akramiya* (allegedly a faction of *Hizb ut-Tahrir*). By the same token, the explosions in Tashkent in February 1999 could also be a reference point that catalyzed the escalation of the government's crackdown on opposition of all sorts, whether secular or religious.¹ The implementation of a massive detention program in summer 1999 and spring 2004² targeted people engaged in any independent activity (uncontrolled by local authorities) that involved pious Muslims. Selective entry to the country, poor international investment in the local economy, and the growing Uzbek population left only the majority of religious-minded Muslims to do business with. The state's hypothesis that independent business networks similar to the one charged with extremism in Andijan are a front for the radical Islamic agenda can be disputed; however, the flourishing system of corruption and state autocracy that eradicates opposition exists at the expense of such networks. On a path leading to self-destruction, Uzbekistan could not refrain from violence in Andijan. For Uzbek Muslims the fact that the authorities are reluctant to seek non-economic solutions is no wonder. The Ferghana Valley (where Andijan is located) has been regarded as a hotbed of instability and religious extremism since the early 20th Century³ and therefore required more commitment in managing problem zones, but instead was handled ineptly by the government from the day Karimov came to power. Perhaps it should have been taken into consideration that the Ferghana Valley is the most populous region of the country (with more than eight million people; nearly 30% of the entire population), troubled by border and inter-ethnic tensions and disputes over the allocation of water resources that make the failure of core political institutions most salient there. The initiative of the 23 religious entrepreneurs to build up their community in Andijan and contribute to the socio-economic development of the town was not fruitful. In this sense, it was a failure to discern an emerging domestic market that had more to do with the development of Islamic middle-class business than with the call for *Jihad*.⁴ The fact of being Islamic did not challenge the country's political order, but rather was a "push for the abolition of state monopoly."⁵ Such incompatibility of official and popular interests contributed to an asymmetric vision of Islam and made the religion and the way it is practiced part of the socio-political dilemma that in the end resulted in the Andijan violence.

III Friday the 13th: Mirroring the Reality

"The great enemy of the truth is very often
not the lie: deliberate, continued, and dishonest;
but the myth: persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic."

John F. Kennedy (1917–1963)⁶

Violent protest in Andijan⁷ could be a strategy to force the President to pay attention to social concerns about living standards, but it could also be a long-planned attempt to overthrow the Government and oust the head of state in the name of Islam. The previous lack of evidence that would support either of these hypotheses also admits of the contrary – that it could be a resentment-driven grassroots response to an authoritarian regime. I will not repeat the chronology and the nature of the events, because that is not the purpose of this study; rather, I will analyze the narrative and the discourse on the day of violence, and then in the next section discuss the consequences.

The laws on criminal liability for extremism, religious fundamentalism, and separatism promulgated in the criminal code of independent Uzbekistan created a legitimate framework for identifying and banning local religious initiatives. The publications of Western press groups and the Western media pictured the Government's actions to quell the unrest as illegitimate and even criminal. According to these publications, which I refer to as reports, the events in Andijan constituted a slaughter of innocent civilians by state military forces in an attempt to divert attention from public calls for socio-economic and political reforms. Two questions arise immediately: If it was intended as a peaceful protest, why would people initiate it at midnight and seize weapons?; and why would troops open fire if the protest did not have anything to do with violence

1. Roy, Olivier, Summer/Fall 2001. *Qibla and the Government House: The Islamist Networks*, JStore online database. SAIS Review Vol. 21, # 2.

2. UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, 2005. *Central Asia Human Development report*, Bratislava, Slovak Republic.

3. Shields, Acacia, September 2000. Human Rights Watch, *International Religious Freedom report*, testimony before the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights.
<http://www.muslimuzbekistan.com>

4. Roy, Olivier, 2004. *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*, New York, Columbia University Press; p. 97

5. *Ibid.*, p. 98

6. <http://www.quoteworld.org/quotes/7643>, (May 2006)

7. Here, I refer to the way the events in Andijan are addressed ("the armed protest") in major reports and additional sources of collected data used for this study.

justified by a radical Islamic or *coup d'état* agenda, as some reports claim? Such inconsistency in the reports compels us to study the reality of the events: The alleged seizure of Kalashnikov machine guns and the occupation of the jail,¹ the unauthorized release of inmates (including the 23 detained entrepreneurs) and participation in a few exchanges of shots are, if true, radical. The reports are similar in denying religious motivation and taking a stance on violations of human rights and international law principles, which responds to a pro-democratic, Western-promoted foreign policy toward Uzbekistan and all of Central Asia. The fact that the headquarters of all major reporting groups are located in Europe (e.g. the OSCE) and the United States (International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, UN) and operate under the auspices of the respective countries could affect the nature of the Andijan-related reports, suggesting the one-sidedness of the findings. What could also make the reports unreliable is the reporters' limited knowledge of the perception and role of Islam in the political and social life of the Republic, as well as of the local Muslim culture per se. The misguided and extreme Western policy toward Iraq, for instance, destabilized the country but so far has not achieved its stated goals, which also had much to do with a somewhat naïve approach to Middle Eastern realities and idiosyncrasies. I am not arguing that Western sources are absolutely unreliable or provide completely unsubstantiated information on the uprising and its causes. They must have relied on at least some theoretical framework to analyze the shortcomings and draw the conclusions that Andijan, and for that matter the entire Ferghana Valley, enjoys few advantages in the development of local business, infrastructure and the system of social services. However, it would still be premature to identify the causative or correlative factors and the extent of their influence on the situation.

Giving broader perspectives on the discourse, a report by Dr. Shirin Akiner² deserves special attention due to its apologetic tone and counterproductive argumentation. Her principal statements – that the episode in Andijan was not a "demonstration mounted by peaceful civilians ... but a carefully prepared attack"³ with hidden religious motives aimed at changing the political order – started people thinking. These are not the statements of a media journalist or a professional belonging to a media group, but rather of a *Western* academic on whose expertise and knowledge of the Central Asian region one could hardly cast any doubt. However, the report provoked skepticism regarding the objectivity of the analysis, perhaps because it was a single Western source that did not conflict with the official Uzbek version in a general sense, or because the research was conducted under rather complicated conditions and therefore could be misleading. I am not familiar with Dr. Akiner's other publications on Uzbekistan, but my guess is that her previous work and field research earned her the confidence of the Uzbek authorities (Dr. Akiner had been visiting and writing about Uzbekistan for more than 25 years⁴) and apparently enabled her to obtain permission to conduct an on-site investigation. Unfortunately, it is hard to say whether Dr. Akiner managed to dig deeper than her competitors or could prove her results, yet she did make valuable comments, although some of them remain quite ambiguous. While Dr. Akiner mentions the fact that the small *Akramiya* movement enjoyed neither popular support nor that of the local *ulama*,⁵ she leaves out the three-month long peaceful demonstration by several hundred supporters in front of the court building.⁶ The explanation offered for such support is the provision of employment to young male residents that is described as a strategy to recruit followers to the movement. It makes Dr. Akiner's argument that the population in Andijan belongs to the middle class self-contradictory in the sense that presumably if there were employment alternatives in the town, the recruitment strategy would be unsuccessful. Due to double standards in the sphere of international development, it is incorrect to assert that the population of Andijan and the poverty symptoms are unrelated. The miserable living standards of a poor African, for instance, residing in a Third-World country who can barely make ends meet, do not necessarily mean that those of a poor Uzbek will be more tolerable. On the other hand, the reality is often relevant to a specific economic milieu that cannot be evaluated just by looking at stores and cafes and talking to merchants in the local bazaars. (It could also be true that lower wages do not always cause poverty for the local population, since the gray and black markets and illegal incomes form a long-established system.)

Apart from economic lag as a factor, the over-politicization of the linkage of events to religious protest is confusing. If the armed protesters had a radical Islamist agenda and plans for its realization, why did it take massive arrests and irregularities in the trial process to provoke a resort to violent tactics, and why did this not happen earlier? If there were generous financial support from outside and the involvement of external forces (allegedly from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) to support and mobilize the protesters, why were a military unit armed with Kalashnikovs targeted as a source of weapons and freed

1. Human Rights Watch report, *"Bullets Were Falling Like Rain": The Andijan Massacre, May 13, 2005* accessible at <http://www.hrw.org> quoting the speech by Islam Karimov on 14 May 2005 on the First Channel of Uzbek Television
2. Dr. Shirin Akiner is a Lecturer on Central Asian Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and an Associate Fellow of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. She has written seven books and many articles, as well as giving frequent BBC commentaries on the region. Dr. Akiner speaks and reads both Uzbek and Russian. See Starr, S. Frederick, Introduction to *Violence in Andijan, 13 May 2005* by Shirin Akiner
3. Akiner, Shirin, June 2005. *Violence in Andijan, 13 May 2005*, print edition, p. 30
4. Akhborot Plus Programme, Uzbek TV, *UK Academic Says Interviews Corroborate Uzbek Official Death Toll*, interview with Haydar Hasanov, 29 May, 2005; http://www.uzbekistan.de/en/2005/e_n0602.htm
5. Islamic clergy.
6. Photoessay, *The Wail of Andijan*, June 2005; <http://muslimuzbekistan.net/en/centralasia/genocide/story.php?ID=514>

prison inmates (as many as 500¹) regarded as potential reinforcements? The state monopoly on the right to speak for Islam precludes a confrontation between different visions of Islam, and this points to the weakness and insignificance of religious radicalism as a factor. However, it is becoming more common to hear statements sympathetic to radical Islamists among the secular Uzbek population, who claim that government by Islamists would eliminate corruption and theft.² Just as the present Government is becoming convinced that any means of eliminating opposition are legitimate, namely 'the fight against religious radicalism and extremism', the rising tide of radicalization could be passing through the Uzbek population, convincing people that any means of changing the regime are justified.³ Such a sentiment is more likely to receive quick acceptance among Muslims in the Ferghana Valley, united as they are by a common socio-economic crisis which is exacerbated by disputes over irrigation and cross-border issues.

The establishment of faithful *nomenklatura* around the President helps to override the personal convictions of the overwhelming majority of government officials, who are conscious of the leader's faux pas. Obedience to implicit orders to fire at the unarmed crowd was the main indicator that political decisions determine a political milieu bypassing pivotal problems and producing such precedents as the Andijan conflict. "You know how it is in Uzbekistan – we do only what we are told to do, and we do nothing unless told to do something,"⁴ precisely describes the state of affairs within the Uzbek Government. It is therefore understandable that even in the President's inner circle people tend to silently "take into consideration the complicated social and economic situation, and as a consequence, the growth of discontent among the population and the increase of religion's role in social life [that] could create a worst-case scenario [in Uzbekistan] in the intermediate future."⁵

IV The Aftermath: The Triumph of the Regime

"A man his worn-out garments laying by
Some different and newer clothes will try
And thus the bodied soul takes other forms
When it discards the worn-out ones that die."

Bhagavad Gita⁶

A sudden shift in Uzbek domestic and foreign Western-oriented policies towards Russia and China occurred immediately after the events. The broad scope of the Andijan aftermath affected media outlets, international NGOs, human rights reporting groups, as well as the US military base in Karshi-Khanabad ("K2") from within the country and extended beyond the state's boundaries, as the Uzbek authorities cooperated with other governments to prosecute and arrest Uzbek citizens abroad. The subdivision of this change into what I call domestic and foreign aspects does not put the two categories into different corners, yet requires their separate overview, entailing the examination of details, exploration of transitions, and the effects of the events on the government, country and populace.

IV.1 Domestic Affairs

The blockage of external information sources and the reiteration of government-supported versions in regard to the internal situation of the Republic has become customary since the explosions in Tashkent in 1999, making rumors one of the main instruments in spreading information at the local level. There were small numbers of satellite television and Internet users in the urban and especially rural areas, while an overwhelming majority of the country's population was left in uncertainty. The policy to ensure that disputes over Andijan realities would prevent the population from arriving at more accurate conclusions through the return of pre-Andijan political conjunctures paid off in due time: A considerable number of US-funded NGOs⁷ stopped their activities, and there was interference with local civil society initiatives and human rights groups.⁸ No-

1. ICG report, 25 May 2005, *Uzbekistan: the Andijan Uprising*, Asia Briefing #38, p. 1
2. Rotar, Igor, 12 August 2004. Jamestown Foundation, *Why Extremism is on the Rise in Uzbekistan*, Vol. 2, Issue #16; <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369711>
3. Ibid
4. I was told this by the Head of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the international organizations in Vienna. For the sake of confidentiality, I have omitted the source's name.
5. Novikov, Evgeniy, 16 November 2004. Jamestown Foundation, Spotlight on Terror, *Islam and Uzbekistan: An Interview with Dr. Rafik Saifulin* (former director of the Uzbek Institute of Strategic and Regional Studies, and, by now probably, former adviser to Islam Karimov), Vol. 2, Issue #12. <http://www.jamestown.org>
6. Runzo, Joseph, 2001. *Global Philosophy of Religion*, Oxford, England. Oneworld Oxford; p. 127
7. See HRW Country Summary on Andijan's aftermath, January 2006; <http://www.hrw.org> and Ferghana.ru reporting *Posle Nas Hot' Potop. Vlasti Uzbekistana Izgonyayut iz Strany Predstavitelstvo Counterpart International*, 5 February 2006; <http://news.ferghana.ru/detail.php?id=4378>
8. *Supra*, 54

tably, the ambiguity of the laws made it difficult for organizations to adapt their community- and human rights-oriented activities to legal requirements before the incident and simplified the employment of harsh tactics against these organizations afterwards. The expulsion of NGOs from whom the local population derived benefits reduced public exposure to the Western-supported promotion of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, freedom of speech and justice. The triumph of autocracy was conditioned by the silencing of outsiders who had pointed out its deficiencies and provided societal information that once tangibly contributed to the clearer formulation of goals at the the Uzbek grassroots level. The state's strategy to suppress the sentiment of social solidarity from within society contradicted its political ideology of national independence – and therefore the pre-eminence of the Uzbek nation – parodying the Soviet attitude that hampered the integration of Muslim societies in its Central Asian satellites.

Post-Andijan consequences for religion and religiosity took the the form of intensified surveillance that increased at the end of March 2006¹ and targeted pious Uzbek Muslims for national victimization. It could be that official measures in the struggle against the autonomy of Islam and its potential to become political led to the creation of a fairly strong opposition.² Yet, it is not the struggle between secularism and Islamism, but secular re-Islamization – the promulgation of an educated vision of Islam by the authorities that is at issue. In this context, the adherents of the opinion that (uneducated) Islam should be left in peace are categorized as Islamists, more often radical, whereby *namaz* (the daily prayer) and *zakat* (charity) appear secondary. Interestingly, however, it is hard to speak about an educated vision of Islam without its five pillars, including these two practices, at the core. Perhaps the establishment of institutionalized Islam will be tolerated under the present regime; but there is skepticism about its full acceptance in the longer run, whereby the politicization of popular Uzbek Islam may become a by-product.

IV.2 Foreign Affairs

The plan for security cooperation realignment, that started ripening within the Uzbek Government before the Andijan violence, broke off friendly diplomatic relations between Tashkent and Washington, and quickly reoriented Uzbek foreign policy towards Russia and China. The closing of US military base "K2" in November 2001 and the refusal to authorize US overflights³ were gestures of dissatisfaction with the US government's failure to live up to its offer of protection against Islamic radicalism in exchange for the President's agreement to cooperate with the global War on Terror. Russian and Chinese support for Uzbekistan presupposed the elimination of the United States as their major competitor for interests in Central Asia. What is interesting, however, is that both Russia and China faced similar dilemmas, the Chechen and Uyghur conflicts respectively, although dissimilar to the Uzbek case in substance. Political flip-flops in relations between the three states brought new advantages in the geopolitical and strategic spheres of cooperation that led to diplomatic exchanges and subsequent *de jure* shifts.⁴ For China, for instance, the interests include not only oil and gas, but also potential markets and opportunities for Chinese investors. In this sense, the state of affairs in the development of post-Andijan relations in the Chinese-Russian-Uzbek coalition rests on the axis of mutual optimality and political caution.

Speaking of the project for strengthening state security, the interest of the Uzbek government in strengthening and retraining its military forces must not be overlooked. Theoretically, the process of militarization may be intensified in response to the coup d'état.⁵ In this case, the government-pursued militarization using the dividends it received from Russia to train the army and security services⁶ is in fact justified by the anticipated continuation of the Andijan plot. Simply compare the increased discrepancy in the number of police and security officers in the streets of Tashkent (Uzbekistan), Almaty (Kazakhstan) and Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), which are more numerous in Tashkent than in other capitals of the region. This factor could be determined by the larger Uzbek population, but became a compulsory feature of the regime over time. As a part of the militarization project, cooperation with Russian security services went so far as to detain and extradite Uzbek residents in Siberia (Russia's Far East) in Andijan's aftermath.⁷ The simplistic principle 'we littered, we must clean up' in the

1. Rotar, Igor, 18 April 2006. F18 News, *Transitions Online: 'Militant Islam': Crackdown in Tashkent*, <http://www.tol.cz/look/TOL/section.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&tpid=16>
2. There are several reasons for this: the exodus of the old intelligentsia that occurred in Uzbekistan after independence significantly decreased the chances of building a politically strong and secular opposition; the ideas of radical Islam that opposed political revivalism after independence met with some acceptance among the younger Uzbek Muslim generation, who tended to reject the rhetoric of the successor Government.
3. ICG report, 16 February 2006. *Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul*, Asia Briefing #45, Bishkek/Brussels, <http://www.icg.org>
4. 'Marriage of convenience', signed on 14 November 2005 between Uzbekistan and Russia, conditional on Russian military support in the case of future attempts to undermine the regime. Spring 2005 was marked by the United States terminating its strategic partnership with Uzbekistan, and China signing the agreement on "The Partnership Relations of Friendship and Cooperation."
5. Chossudovsky, Michel, 10 July 2004. Center for Research on Globalization, *Coup D'état in America?*, <http://www.globalresearch.ca>
6. *Supra*, 65
7. *Supra*, 65

interpretation of Uzbek sovereignty and internal affairs does not reckon with the principles of international law, as it resulted in the decline of Western requests for independent investigations of the Andijan events. In the end, such political leapfrogging by the government has weakened the state over the past few years, leading to the crystallization of political ambitions at the core of the implementation of the military strategy against an abstract enemy.

V Conclusion: Religious Impact: From Radical Islam to Violence in Andijan?

Based on the above analysis, present dynamics in Uzbekistan that incorporate all three vital aspects – socio-cultural, political, and economic – are hard to reconcile with the theory that the Islamic factor has led to a heightened conflict potential. In regard to the three research questions set at the start of this paper, the findings are respectively:

1. Since the time of Soviet rule, as far as the Central Asian region is concerned, the label of religious radicalism, namely *Wahhabism*, has become fashionable among policymakers trying to explain radical forms of Islam in Uzbekistan. Historical records of the relations between government elites, both the Soviet and the post-Soviet Uzbek systems, and those of Islamic movements (as well as Islam as a religion per se) tell us about the image of the Islamist threat with a potential to undermine each regime during the period of its existence. Such negative political experiences have affected present political standards in regard to religion and other independent forms of activity (be it social, economic, or political) that are hard to monitor.

The social aspiration "to enjoy the blessings of freedom and democracy and free enterprise"¹ is framed in the context of radical Islam not because it is described as the promotion of Western values that Uzbekistan has been resistant to so far, but because these values (universal and fundamental) would become a natural precondition of the healthy political (as well as social and economic) competition that Uzbekistan has never enjoyed. What is unclear is whether there is political uncertainty about progress as a part of modernization and globalization or a deliberate attack on internal and external initiatives, targeting the social and economic sectors of the state as a toolbox for reform, or both.

2. The failures of the Soviet and pan-Uzbek identities and secular ideologies, although the destruction of the collective spirit bypassed the individualization of society, did not make Uzbek Muslims espouse radical ideas. Yet the failures of ideology and identity remain on the political periphery, while dire socio-economic conditions and a crisis of political institutions occupy the center of the emerging conflicts. The experience of political and social deprivations that are triggered by confronting the authorities is encouraging Uzbek Muslims to search for an alternative source for the enforcement of justice and law, the importance of which Islam has always stressed. The latter does not provide any link to the radicalization of popular Uzbek Islam, because for ordinary Uzbek people their Islam is not a set of divinely revealed principles, but rather spirituality – a customary historical, cultural, ideological, and exemplary element – that they rely on in times of hardship. Whether this guided the protesters in Andijan on the basis of personal or political impulses remains a matter of opinion, whereas the religious impact was overestimated due to the government's political motives. A higher degree of religiousness in the Ferghana Valley than in other regions of the country² facilitates such political treatment despite the fact that being more religiously inclined does not mean that one will be more prone to violence. It is rather the region's socio-economic problems that deserve a more adequate spectrum of political attention.
3. In trying to understand radical Uzbek Islam, one should bear in mind that the fault-line between the Republic's essential and constructed reality in regard to the radical Islamic threat is unclear. The problem is that radical Uzbek Islam did not fail mainly because it has not yet reached its peak, but has suffered some recent decline. So far, it was understandable in terms of a political discourse that constructed a political mythology around the regime as a defense. Such political 'deculturation'³ among the republics of the former Soviet Union, where Muslim communities were also involved in conflicts with authorities (namely Russia and China), makes religious radicalization a by-product and facilitator.⁴ For the Uzbek government, the failure to differentiate between fundamentalist/radical (hard) and popular/moderate (soft) Islamic orders could be conditioned by the secular education received during Soviet times that did not allow for Islamic learning. This is exacerbated by the absence of holistic Uzbek Islam, that entails not only the fragmentation of the entire vision of Islam in the country, but also incoherence within the fragmented elements.⁵ It makes one wonder who chooses to fight for the ambiguous ideologies of such twofold movements. Accordingly, it shows that in the Republic the linkage between radical Islam and conflict, including the Andijan incident, is rather

1. Roy, Olivier, 2004. *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*, New York, Columbia University Press; p. 333
2. Wearing headscarves (*hijab*) and long traditional dresses is more a value than a tradition for women in the Ferghana Valley that does not have any religious significance.
3. The term that Roy uses to refer to the blurring of borders between cultures in the contemporary Muslim and Christian worlds. Ibid, p. 330-331
4. *Supra*, 40-41

weak. What strengthens it, however, is the political strategy to employ an undifferentiated approach that helps radicals overstate their numbers and appear more legitimate in the long run. Such a conjuncture assumes that the more intense exploitation of the alleged cause has become a complex interconnection of multi-sided rhetoric: official Islam – to win Uzbek Muslim minds from radical Islamic ideologies for the sake of stability; stability – to clamp down on alleged radical Islamists; and a rhetorical crackdown on alleged radicals to preserve the status-quo in the presidential apparatus.

Finally, it is important to stress that in trying to heal the Republic of its crises of identity (socio-cultural) and ideology (socio-political), a cure for economic and political crises should also be concurrently pursued. There should be no state-promoted dividing line between 'us' and 'them' that defines domestic and foreign policies today but leads to a country's stagnation, which in turn promotes an increase in religious activism and subsequent radicalization among the masses.

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5. The ideological split between its two leaders of the IMU, Juma Namangani and Takhir Yuldashev, led the two groups along divergent paths. The fact that the movement ended up divided in its methods of recruitment but remained similar in terms of the original goals should be attributed to the local context of political and socio-economic mutability. Such mutability impedes the process of differentiating and explaining radical Islam vis-à-vis other forms that exist in Uzbekistan.

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About the author: Sogdiana Azhiben received her Bachelor degree in Chinese Language and Literature from Tashkent State Institute of Oriental Studies in 2005. In 2003-2004 she participated in the US-Government sponsored undergraduate exchange program majoring in American Studies at Eastern Connecticut State University. In 2006 she obtained her MA degree in Political Science (Central Asia) from the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. She has published an article on Chinese deep culture at the Austrian Institute for Integrative Conflict Transformation and Peace Building. Her professional experience includes internship at the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, full-time work at Tashkent field office of the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), and English translation at the Uzbek Central Television.

Address: eMail: bagira_uz@yahoo.com

Solveig Steien

"Beinahe im Krieg". Der Mohammed-Karikaturen-Streit in den norwegischen Medien

Im Januar und Februar 2006 erlebten die Norweger die Verbrennung ihrer nationalen Fahne in Palästina und die Verbrennung norwegischer Botschaften und Konsulate in Syrien, dem Libanon und dem Iran aus dem einfachen Grund weil zwölf dänische Mohammed-Karikaturen der Jyllands-Posten in Norwegen nachgedruckt worden waren; die Karikaturen wurden drei Monate nach ihrem ursprünglichen Erscheinen in Dänemark in der unbedeutenden christlichen Wochenzeitung *Magazinet* veröffentlicht. Im Februar 2006 wurden die norwegischen ISAF-Streitkräfte angegriffen. Dieser Konflikt hatte einen überraschenden Einfluss auf die Innen- und Außenpolitik und die norwegische Veröffentlichung der Karikaturen löste eine globale Eskalation des Streits aus; Norwegische Zeitungen schrieben, dass sich das Land "beinahe im Krieg" befinde.

In meiner Studie habe ich untersucht, wie einige führende norwegische Zeitungen (*Aften*, *Aftenposten*, *Dagbladet*, *Dagens Næringsliv*, *Dagsavisen* and *VG*) diese unerwartete Krise dargestellt haben, und basierend auf der Unterscheidung zwischen Kriegs- und Friedensjournalismus die verschiedenen Diskurse analysiert, die zu einem substantiellen Teil der Medienberichterstattung wurden.

Das Konzept des Kriegs- vs. Friedensjournalismus wurde zwar ursprünglich nicht als Analyseinstrument für Medientexte oder Photographien entwickelt, sondern als praktisches Hilfsmittel für Journalisten in Konflikt- und Kriegssituationen. Gleichwohl bietet es eine Grundlage, auf welcher die Ergebnisse journalistischer Arbeit begutachtet und mit den professionellen Normen und ethischen Codes der Medien verglichen werden können. Zugleich zeigen das Aufkommen von Diskursen wie "Kampf der Kulturen", "Meinungsfreiheit", "wir" vs. "sie", z.B. "wir" vs. die Muslime, und die von der Presse verwendeten Quellen eine gute Passung mit dem Konzept.

Der Schwerpunkt der Analyse liegt auf Leitartikeln und Kommentaren ebenso wie auf inländischen Reportagen und Korrespondentenberichten. Mit der Analyse der Artikel verfolgte ich zugleich das Ziel, einige Bereiche zu skizzieren in denen das Konzept des Friedens- vs. Kriegsjournalismus einer Weiterentwicklung bedarf um ein umfassenderes und/oder adäquateres Instrument der Medienanalyse abzugeben.

Im Februar 2008 flammte der Konflikt in Dänemark erneut auf. In Reaktion auf von der dänischen Geheimpolizei so genannte konkrete Attentatspläne gegen Jylland-Postens Karikaturisten Kurt Wesetergaard, haben einige größere dänische Zeitungen die Mohammed-Karikaturen am 13. Februar 2008 nachgedruckt um damit ihrer Solidarität mit dem Karikaturisten Ausdruck zu verleihen und gegen "'terroristische' Bedrohung" zu protestieren, "welche die Unterbindung der Meinungsfreiheit zum Ziel habe" (*jp.dk.*, February 13, 2008).

[Volltext \(in Englisch\)](#)

Zur Autorin:

Solveig Steien (b. 1955) ist eine norwegische Journalistin und Lehrbeauftragte am Oslo University College, Department of Journalism. In ihrer Dissertation "When Norway Was Almost at War, the Mohammed cartoons Controversy in Norwegian Newspapers" (Juni 2007) untersuchte sie, wie sechs überregionale norwegische Zeitungen im Winter 2006 über den Mohammed-Karikaturen-Streit berichteten. Solveig Steien ist Mitglied der internationalen Abteilung des norwegischen Schriftstellerverbandes.

eMail: solveig.steien@gmail.com

Solveig Steien

"Almost at War". The Mohammed Cartoon Crisis in Norwegian Media

In January and February 2006, Norwegians witnessed the burning of their national flag in Palestine, the burning of Norwegian embassies and consulates in Syria, Lebanon and Iran; all simply because twelve Danish Mohammed cartoons from Jyllands-Posten had been reprinted in Norway; the cartoons were published in a marginal Christian conservative weekly newspaper, *Magazinet*, three months after their original appearance in Denmark. In February 2006 the Norwegian ISAF-forces in Afghanistan were attacked. This conflict had a surprising impact on domestic and foreign policy, and the Norwegian publication of the cartoons triggered a global escalation of the controversy; Norwegian newspapers wrote that the country was "almost at war".

I have focused on how some leading Norwegian newspapers (*Aften*, *Aftenposten*, *Dagbladet*, *Dagens Næringsliv*, *Dagsavisen* and *VG*) covered this unexpected crisis and studied the different discourses that became a substantial part of the media coverage. In my analysis I have used an overall approach of War versus Peace journalism.

War and Peace journalism was not created as a concept for analysing media texts or photographs, but to provide practical tools for journalists in the field of conflict and war situations. Nevertheless, this approach gives an opportunity to examine the results of journalistic work and compare them with the press's ideals and ethical codes. At the same time, the occurrence of discourses like "clash of civilisations", freedom of speech, "us" versus "them", i.e., "us" versus the Muslims, and the newspapers' choice of sources for their stories, seem to fit with a model of War and Peace journalism. The focus is on opinion materials like editorials and comments, as well as on domestic reports and reportage by correspondents. By analysing samples of articles I have tried to outline some areas where the concept of Peace versus War journalism still needs to be developed, in order to become a comprehensive or more adequate approach to journalism and media analysis.

In February 2008 the conflict again flared up in Denmark. Due to what the Danish secret police call concrete assassination plans for Jyllands-Posten's cartoonist Kurt Westergaard, major Danish newspapers reprinted the Mohammed cartoons on February 13, 2008; in solidarity with the cartoonist and to protest against what the editors describe as "terrorists' threats meant to inhibit freedom of speech" (*jp.dk.*, February 13, 2008).

[full text \(in English\)](#)

On the author:

Solveig Steien (b. 1955) is a Norwegian journalist and part-time teacher at Oslo University College, Department of Journalism. In her thesis, "When Norway Was Almost at War, the Mohammed cartoons Controversy in Norwegian Newspapers" (June 2007), she scrutinized how six Norwegian national newspapers covered the Mohammed controversy in the early winter of 2006 and used an overall perspective of Peace and War journalism in her approach. Solveig Steien is a member of the International Department of the Norwegian Writers' Association.

eMail: solveig.steien@gmail.com

Solveig Steien

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Kurzfassung: Im Januar und Februar 2006 erlebten die Norweger die Verbrennung ihrer nationalen Fahne in Palästina und die Verbrennung norwegischer Botschaften und Konsulate in Syrien, dem Libanon und dem Iran aus dem einfachen Grund weil zwölf dänische Mohammed-Karikaturen der Jyllands-Posten in Norwegen nachgedruckt worden waren; die Karikaturen wurden drei Monate nach ihrem ursprünglichen Erscheinen in Dänemark in der unbedeutenden christlichen Wochenzeitung *Magazinet* veröffentlicht. Im Februar 2006 wurden die norwegischen ISAF-Streitkräfte angegriffen. Dieser Konflikt hatte einen überraschenden Einfluss auf die Innen- und Außenpolitik und die norwegische Veröffentlichung der Karikaturen löste eine globale Eskalation des Streits aus; Norwegische Zeitungen schrieben, dass sich das Land "beinahe im Krieg" befinde.

In meiner Studie habe ich untersucht, wie einige führende norwegische Zeitungen (*Aften*, *Aftenposten*, *Dagbladet*, *Dagens Næringsliv*, *Dagsavisen* and *VG*) diese unerwartete Krise dargestellt haben, und basierend auf der Unterscheidung zwischen Kriegs- und Friedensjournalismus die verschiedenen Diskurse analysiert, die zu einem substantiellen Teil der Medienberichterstattung wurden.

Das Konzept des Kriegs- vs. Friedensjournalismus wurde zwar ursprünglich nicht als Analyseinstrument für Medientexte oder Photographien entwickelt, sondern als praktisches Hilfsmittel für Journalisten in Konflikt- und Kriegssituationen. Gleichwohl bietet es eine Grundlage, auf welcher die Ergebnisse journalistischer Arbeit begutachtet und mit den professionellen Normen und ethischen Codes der Medien verglichen werden können. Zugleich zeigen das Aufkommen von Diskursen wie "Kampf der Kulturen", "Meinungsfreiheit", "wir" vs. "sie", z.B. "wir" vs. die Muslime, und die von der Presse verwendeten Quellen eine gute Passung mit dem Konzept.

Der Schwerpunkt der Analyse liegt auf Leitartikeln und Kommentaren ebenso wie auf inländischen Reportagen und Korrespondentenberichten. Mit der Analyse der Artikel verfolgte ich zugleich das Ziel, einige Bereiche zu skizzieren in denen das Konzept des Friedens- vs. Kriegsjournalismus einer Weiterentwicklung bedarf um ein umfassenderes und/oder adäquateres Instrument der Medienanalyse abzugeben.

Im Februar 2008 flammte der Konflikt in Dänemark erneut auf. In Reaktion auf von der dänischen Geheimpolizei so genannte konkrete Attentatspläne gegen Jylland-Postens Karikaturisten Kurt Wesetergaard, haben einige größere dänische Zeitungen die Mohammed-Karikaturen am 13. Februar 2008 nachgedruckt um damit ihrer Solidarität mit dem Karikaturisten Ausdruck zu verleihen und gegen "'terroristische' Bedrohung" zu protestieren, "welche die Unterbindung der Meinungsfreiheit zum Ziel habe" (jp.dk., February 13, 2008).

Abstract: In January and February 2006, Norwegians witnessed the burning of their national flag in Palestine, the burning of Norwegian embassies and consulates in Syria, Lebanon and Iran; all simply because twelve Danish Mohammed cartoons from Jyllands-Posten had been reprinted in Norway; the cartoons were published in a marginal Christian conservative weekly newspaper, *Magazinet*, three months after their original appearance in Denmark. In February 2006 the Norwegian ISAF-forces in Afghanistan were attacked. This conflict had a surprising impact on domestic and foreign policy, and the Norwegian publication of the cartoons triggered a global escalation of the controversy; Norwegian newspapers wrote that the country was "almost at war".

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War and Peace journalism was not created as a concept for analysing media texts or photographs, but to provide practical tools for journalists in the field of conflict and war situations. Nevertheless, this approach gives an opportunity to examine the results of journalistic work and compare them with the press's ideals and ethical codes. At the same time, the occurrence of discourses like "clash of civilisations", freedom of speech, "us" versus "them", i.e., "us" versus the Muslims, and the newspapers' choice of sources for their stories, seem to fit with a model of War and Peace journalism. The focus is on opinion materials like editorials and comments, as well as on domestic reports and reportage by correspondents. By analysing samples of articles I have tried to outline some areas where the concept of Peace versus War journalism still needs to be developed, in order to become a comprehensive or more adequate approach to journalism and media analysis.

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1 Introduction

"Those who live in a democracy must be prepared to be humiliated and accept this as a fact. In fact, we are all sometimes humiliated when we read newspapers or watch TV. The difference is, though, that we don't set embassies on fire" (journalisten.no).¹ These thoughts were expressed by Flemming Rose, the editor for cultural issues of the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*, when he visited Norway in June 2007, less than two years after he had initiated and published the twelve Mohammed cartoons that precipitated violent demonstrations in the Muslim world in which about 140 people lost their lives. The subject of this paper is how the Norwegian media covered the conflict.

"A Norway almost at war" is not a headline from April 1940 predicting the German invasion of Norway, but rather the title of an editorial comment in Norway's largest quality national newspaper, *Aftenposten*, some days after the attack on the Norwegian ISAF forces in Afghanistan in February 2006 – one of the dramatic events that accompanied the Mohammed cartoons controversy (*Aftenposten*, 12 February).² A 9 February editorial in *VG*, the largest Norwegian tabloid paper, uses the phrase "Norway at war", a common notion at the time. But when the newspapers announced that Norway was (almost) at war, they seemed to have forgotten that the country had already recently become involved in the war in Iraq and was contributing troops to the NATO forces in Afghanistan.

In this paper I present some of the analysis and conclusions of my thesis, "When Norway was Almost at War: The Mohammed Cartoons Controversy in Norwegian Newspapers" (May/June 2007). I analyse the newspapers' coverage in the context of the War, Peace and Nuanced Journalism approaches.³

For several weeks in late January and early February 2006, the media exposed the Norwegian public to images of home-made Danish and Norwegian flags being burnt in Palestine and the embassy being set on fire in Syria. The same seemed to be happening in Lebanon and Iran, and a major event was the attack in Afghanistan. The cartoons controversy began in Denmark, where on September 29, 2005 *Jyllands-Posten* published twelve cartoon caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed. However, the events in Norway and on Norwegian property are of particular importance, since the reprinting of the Danish cartoons more than three months later triggered an international escalation of the crisis.⁴ The controversy had major consequences, both for Norwegian domestic politics and at the international level.

The cartoons were published in *Magazinet* (10 January 2006), a marginal conservative Christian journal with a weekly circulation of about 4000. After the reprinting the Norwegian Government reacted quickly, apologising for the publication and expressing concern for the sensitivities of Muslim residents (Steien, 2007a:41). At the same time, however, it reaffirmed the right to freedom of speech. Foreign Secretary Jonas Gahr Støre and former PM Kjell Magne Bondevik (a Lutheran pastor in private life) were quoted in several television debates: "We have freedom of speech in Norway, but we don't have any obligation or duty to assert it" (ibid.)!

In Norway many Muslims also reacted strongly to the burning of the Norwegian national symbol (*Standpunkt*, NRK, 8 February) and the attacks on the embassies in Syria, Lebanon and Iran. Businesses in Islamic countries, such as Statoil in Iran and Telenor in Pakistan, were on alert due to threats of boycott actions against Norwegian products (*DN*, 15 February), which also caused concern in the Government, an obvious parallel to the Danish case.

In *Magazinet* the cartoons were accompanied by a critical report on Islam and Norwegian cartoonists' fear of offending Muslims and the consequent avoidance of Mohammed caricatures. *Dagbladet*, Norway's third largest newspaper, published the cartoons in their Internet edition the evening before *Magazinet* was distributed.⁵ *Aftenposten* published a facsimile in their Oslo-based evening edition (*After*) in October 2005, but there was no reaction. The conflict did not begin until January 2006, after *Magazinet* (and several larger regional newspapers) also published the cartoons.⁶

Most of the reactions at the time, and later in Norway, focused on *Magazinet's* initial article and, perhaps by making *Magazinet* a scapegoat, allowed other publishers to dodge questions about freedom of speech. Editor Vebjørn Selbekk and his supporters received death threats via Internet sites, telephone calls, letters and e-mails and had to hire bodyguards (ibid.). Selbekk launched his book, *Threatened by Islamists*, in October 2006, and the debate was revived. Then some representatives of Muslim organisations also reported that their lives had been threatened, although obviously not from the same

1. <http://www.journalisten.no/story/47320> [11.06.2007]

2. The newspaper samples are from 2006.

3. Theoretical definitions on pp. 5, 6, 8, 11.

4. For a further historical overview and presentation of the context, see the international project report, Kunelius et al.: *Reading the Mohammed Cartoons Controversy. An International Analysis of Press Discourses on Free Speech and Political Spin* (2007), and my thesis: *When Norway Was Almost at War. The Mohammed Cartoons Controversy in Norwegian Newspapers* (2007).

5. The story and the cartoons were also published in *Dagbladet.no* at the end of 2006.

6. *Stavanger Aftenblad*, 29 October 2005, in 2006: *Bergens Tidende* 15 January, *Morgenbladet* (three caricatures) 27 January, *Agderposten* 3 February, *Dagbladet* (a facsimile from an Egyptian newspaper), the Egyptian *El Fagr* published one cartoon in November, not to defend the cartoons, but rather to criticise them.

quarters (ibid.).¹ Selbekk became a defender of freedom of speech, although he has asserted that he himself would never publish cartoons critical of Jesus, and at least earlier had suggested reviving the "dormant" Penal Code article on blasphemy. Selbekk was consistently and unreservedly supported by the president of the Norwegian Press Association, who emphasised the constitutional right of freedom of speech/press.² As the conflict developed, this issue was narrowed and framed as a question of "we versus them (Muslims)" (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005:6).

On 10 February, the Minister of Labour and Social Inclusion, Bjarne Håkon Hanssen, arranged a meeting in his office with representatives of Muslim organisations and *Magazinet's* editor. Selbekk apologised for what he described as the unintentional humiliation of Islam. The Government insisted that its intention was never to apologise for freedom of speech, but the reconciliation meeting still appeared politically staged. "Arranging the meeting at the Minister's office might have contributed to some misunderstandings about the Government's role in this matter", Foreign Secretary Raymond Johansen conceded at a meeting in June 2007 (journalisten.no).³

2 Historical and political background

The present Norwegian (majority) government is a coalition of the Labour Party, the Socialist Left and the Centre Party. Some public opinion polls show that the Labour Party drew members from the self-proclaimed liberals, the Progress Party ("Fremskrittspartiet"), to be the largest party. The Progress Party is often characterised as a radical right-wing populist party in academic literature and is a close relative of the Danish People's Party (Steien, 2007a:42). Established in 1973, it is considered to have the most restrictive views on immigration and to be the most xenophobic of all the political parties represented in the Parliament (ibid.). During the cartoons controversy, newspapers questioned whether this party would profit from the conflict.

2.1 The concepts of ethnicity, minority and identity

Over the past 35-40 years, Norway has become an increasingly multicultural country, in which approximately 6 % of the population of 4.65 million comes from non-Western countries (285,300). Approximately 125,000 non-Western immigrants live in or near Oslo. "Statistics Norway" (SSB) has no overview of how many Norwegian residents are Muslims, but registered membership in Islamic congregations was 72,000 in 2006; while in 1990 the number was 19,000⁴; this constitutes about 20 % of members of organised religious groups outside the Church of Norway. Before the 1970s, Norway had a relatively homogenous society, and initially immigrants were referred to as "foreign or guest labourers", which was later changed to "our new fellow citizens", and finally – a concept which is often used today – Norwegians of (for example) Pakistani origin or background with a "hyphenated-identity": Norwegian-Pakistani, Norwegian-Somali, etc., implying a dual or hybrid identity. In the beginning, the "new fellow citizens" were treated with a mixture of curiosity and tolerance; Norway needed them in the labour force (ibid.). In the mid-1980s there was a paradigm change; the focus became more problem- and difference-oriented (Eide, 2003:109). At the same time, the concept of "ethnic Norwegian" became commonplace. This has been very apparent in police crime reports, where during the 1990s the perpetrator's or victim's ethnic background was always mentioned if he was of other than Norwegian ancestry, even if he was second-generation, born and raised in Norway. The same seems to be the case in the media when problems arise. In 1997, a research report initiated by The Norwegian Union of Journalists concluded that, for example, readers of the tabloid newspaper *VG* encountered a criminal foreigner in every third article dealing with immigrants (Lindstad & Fjeldstad, 1997). The same tendencies were apparent in *Dagbladet* and *TV2* (every fourth article, report, etc.). In terms of reporting about minorities: crime was the dominant image, newspapers wrote a lot about racism (and the negative attitudes of political extremists), but almost nothing about discrimination, and Norwegians were described as active, while the minority represented passivity. With some exceptions the report concluded that the media present minorities as groups with a limited repertoire, as if the media had its own minority ghetto (ibid.). There seems to be a tendency for the media to use culture as an explanatory concept when discussing minority groups and crime, and such a model may support racism, if it is used only to describe "them", and not also "us". This is a relevant aspect of the Government's recent concern about the issue of arranged marriages, and its desire to implement age limits for marriages with partners from the countries of origin. As of yet, considerable discussion has not produced agreement on resolving this delicate issue. Concern about this issue, as well as about the wearing of the hijab (veil), female circumcision, and whether to forbid marriage between cousins, tends to dominate media coverage of minorities (ibid.).

When journalists wrote about other cultures in the past, it was often in terms of views shaped by the colonial heritage, and it was hard to check stories. Now the "other" culture is part of the new cultural reality in Norway, and we live in a "global

1. Four other Islam-critical books were published with a similar approach to Islam and (Norwegian) policy on integration in 2006 and 2007, most of them heavily covered in the media.
2. Article 100 of the Norwegian Constitution. This Article was strengthened in 2004.
3. <http://www.journalisten.no/story/47320> [11.06.2007]
4. <http://www.ssb.no/emner/07/02/10/trosamf/tab-2006-12-18-01.html> [17.02.07]

village" where news circulates rapidly through electronic media and via satellites. Elisabeth Eide describes Norwegian residents of non-Western backgrounds as "internal Others" when she analyses contemporary feature stories on minorities in Norway based on the degree of "their" Norwegian identity (Eide, 2002:9, 204). The media's presentation of Europe's "internal Others" has met with criticism from researchers who are open to new ways of thinking and describing society, as well as from minority groups (Steien, 2007b). "The most important contribution for research is to construct an analytical and professional view of culture, ethnicity and identity so it will not be left to private interests and political assurances", Iben Jensen writes (Jensen, 2000:21). She affirms that professional competence and knowledge are weapons in the struggle against hostility towards immigrants. Her view corresponds with the approach of Peace versus War Journalism, which emphasises the importance of conflict analysis skills as an essential tool for journalists covering conflicts, as well as when writing about conflicting interests (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005:34). Gadi Wolfsfeld describes the shift in focus from conflict to peace as something that "leads one down a somewhat different theoretical path" (Wolfsfeld, 2004:2).

At the beginning of the Mohammed cartoons conflict, "everyone" seemed to agree that publishing the cartoons fell within every newspaper's constitutional right to freedom of speech. This right is, of course, a basic prerequisite of all free media, also highlighted as Article 1.1. of the Code of Ethics of the Norwegian Press. Ethical journalistic practice also means "to allow different views to be expressed" (Article 1.2.), and this is also one of the principles of Peace Journalism (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). The Code emphasises the use of "breadth and relevant sources" (Article 3.2.). Newspapers have pledged to obey this code, and many of them have even supplemented it with further ethical in-house rules.

3 Approaches

In analysing Norwegian newspaper coverage of the cartoons conflict, I tried to approach the topic within the context of Peace versus War Journalism (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). Peace Journalism offers a (practical) roadmap for journalists to report in a way that does not support violence, but is not basically a theoretical approach or tool for media (text) analysis. Yet based on this perspective, I have investigated how journalists relate to the complexity of conflict and whether it is possible to identify patterns of "War and Peace Journalism" in news reports and overall coverage. Do articles survey the background and causes of conflict, or are reports "black/white", independently of whether stories are about domestic or international events? Do newspapers contribute to escalating conflict or to reconciliation? Is the main discourse one of a "clash of civilisations, of "us" versus "them", e.g., the Orient versus the West in geography, culture and religion, as well as the Orient *in* the West ("internal Others")? Lynch & McGoldrick assert that most journalism, although regarding itself as neutral and objective, is actually "war journalism", biased in favour of war and conflict as problem solutions (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). By comparing six selected newspapers' parallel reports/reportage on the same events between 15 January and 15 March 2006, I have tried to discover differences and characteristic features in patterns of agendas, traditions and influences. In these two months the newspapers published more than 900 stories and different sorts of opinion pieces and even more pictures on the Mohammed cartoons controversy. The six chosen papers represent the largest national quality daily newspapers (*Aftenposten*, *Dagsavisen*, *Dagens Næringsliv*), the two tabloid newspapers *Dagbladet* and *VG*, and the largest local newspaper, *Aften*.

4 The backdrop of war journalism

Peace versus War Journalism might be regarded as a perspective on the discourse of ideologies (see below), as part of a propaganda discourse and also as part of a political one. I chose this perspective because it highlights a way of thinking that is often lost sight of behind sensationalistic front pages and celebrity journalism. In this connection, Noam Chomsky addresses an important question: "The role of the media in contemporary politics forces us to ask: What kind of world and what kind of society do we want to live in, and in particular, in what sense of democracy do we want to be a democratic society" (Chomsky, 2002:9).

Johan Galtung, the "father" of Peace Journalism, implies that, in general, there are two ways of looking at conflict, the "high road" and the "low road", "depending on whether the focus is on the conflict and its peaceful transformation, or on the meta-conflict that comes after the root conflict, created by violence and war and the question of who wins" (Galtung, 1997, Ch.5:1).¹ The low road, as Galtung implies, is dominant in the media, it "sees a conflict as a battle and the battle as a sports arena and gladiator circus" ... "War journalism has sports journalism and court journalism, as models" (ibid.:1). The high road, however, is the road of Peace Journalism, focusing on violence-free conflict transformation. It should be modelled on health journalism; the focus is not on the disease itself, but on how to overcome it. Galtung reverses a popular saying when he points out that, "... the first victim in a war is not truth, that is only the second victim. The first victim is, of course, peace" (ibid.:1).²

1. <http://www.cnetwork.ca/programs/PeaceJournalism.htm>(Media: (Peace Journalism, ch. 5, p.1) [20.02.07]

2. The next two victims Galtung adds to the first two are *people* and *solutions* (ibid.:3).

Although the vague phrase "Peace Journalism" is understood by many as a way to advocate peace which contrasts with the journalistic ideals of neutrality and objectivity and may also imply that the journalist is not supposed to have her or his own political agenda, Lynch and McGoldrick suggest that the way to interpret it is rather as "giving peace a chance" (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005:xxi).

According to Galtung, Peace Journalism is a "journalism of attachment to all actual and potential victims; War Journalism only attaches to 'our' side" (Galtung, 1997:4). Wilhelm Kempf shows that practising Peace Journalism requires much of the journalist: liberation from the institutional, economic and sociological constraints of news production, and a profound knowledge and understanding of both conflict theory and the particular conflict (Kempf, 2003:10-11). While the news media require immediacy, a successful peace process or conflict solution requires patience. It also requires a minimal understanding of (the needs of) the other party, "but the news media reinforce ethnocentrism and hostility towards adversaries" (Wolfsfeld, 2004:2). Wolfsfeld holds that journalists have an ethical obligation to encourage reconciliation between hostile populations. At the very least, journalists should do no harm (ibid.:5). "The goals for journalism working in conflict-ridden areas should be to provide as much information as possible about the roots of the problem and to encourage a rational public debate concerning the various options for ending it" (ibid.:5).

Furthermore, Peace Journalism demands much in terms of resources, "... the number of specialist correspondents is constantly decreasing, and the trend of parachute journalism is becoming more and more prevalent" (Sjøvaag, 2005:55). At the end of the 1990s the foreign reports are fewer, the number of correspondents is decreasing, while sports reports are part of every broadcasting news report, and the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation's (NRK's) weekly foreign affairs special is broadcast after 11 p.m.

The 2003 research project "Power and Democracy" concluded in the chapter "The New Class Society": "The vast majority of the immigrant population does not participate in the Norwegian political system, and this will after some time constitute a new underclass within low paid jobs or outside the labour market".¹ This group's lack of influence and its over-representation in the media can have negative effects, because it fails to meet the public's need for information and an understanding of the "truth" that reflects the different aspects of a multicultural, multiethnic and multiracial society; something we may call a 'new identity' or modernity. The main problem may be not a lack of minority participation, but rather how minorities are ambivalently portrayed, in terms of contrasts and paradoxes – with regard to the majority (Røgilds, 2003:39). One of the discussants in my sample, Iffit Z. Qureshi, compares participating in TV panels to being the defendant in a trial, as if you were accused of a crime:

Muslims are invited to discussions with well-articulated politicians and leaders of organisations, who profit from enemy images of Muslims. Such programs become a sort of trial where Muslims' loyalty to Norwegian democracy and Norwegian values is being questioned (*Aftenposten*, 3 March 2006).

Her experience may suggest an explanation of why Muslims are underrepresented in the media, even in regard to issues concerning them directly, like the cartoons controversy (Table 2). The prevalence of stereotypical frames in the media also makes many minority representatives reluctant to participate and raises a fundamental question: are the media ethnically and racially biased, and if they are, how is this expressed (Røgilds, 2003:42)?

I view the concept of War versus Peace Journalism as a major *critical* media discourse, a way to encourage critical journalism, and the intention of such a discourse/journalism is to survey and unmask power relations in society and formulate normative perspectives from which the researcher/journalist may criticise these relations and propose new approaches for bringing about social change (Steien, 2007a:43). Two concepts important in the explanations of discourse analysis are "power" and "ideology" and how discourse is related to social power (Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999:11). These two components of the critical discourse approach form the background of my categories of War and Peace Journalism, since both relate to power structures and (political) ideologies, although they are expressed in different ways.

4. 1 The ideological inheritance

Widely shared conceptions of Norwegian identity have been challenged during the last few decades because of immigration. This challenge attracts attention, for example, when a dominant group wants to promote its interests: "... many ideologies develop precisely in order to sustain, legitimate or manage group conflicts, as well as relationships of power and dominance" (van Dijk, 1998:24). The cognitive structures of ideology are important because social practices presuppose a wide range of socio-cultural and group-specific beliefs or social representations. And this again may be directly expressed in discourse. Teun A. van Dijk takes as an example a prejudiced opinion, "women are less competent" than men, to illustrate what he calls a 'male chauvinist ideology' (ibid.:24). "Muslim mass identity is an anti-thesis to kindness" (*Aftenposten*, 16 February) is an example of a claim informed by a racist ideology (using the definitions in the UN Convention).

1. http://odin.dep.no/odinarkiv/english/brundtland_III/ud/032005-990424/dok-bu.html, [11.12.2006]

"Ideologies organise specific group attitudes; these attitudes may be used in the formation of personal opinions as represented in models; and these personal opinions may finally be expressed in text and talk. This is the usual, indirect way of ideological expression in discourse" (van Dijk, 1998:25).

4. 2 The relativism of racism

In discussing the concept of stereotyping ethnic minorities, Ylva Brune explains stereotypes as an aspect of discursive strategies: "They are powerful tools for symbolic power and symbolic violence, and they perform where the distribution of power is unequal" (Brune, 2003:51). She describes how stereotypes work in a bipolar manner, using dichotomies of language or culture to identify or construct inequality between people through simplifications and reductions. The "other" is characterised, for example, by its religion, and thereby the group is reduced to being identical with the religion. In terms of War Journalism, this is "'us-them' journalism ..., voice for 'us'" (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005:6). This also has an impact on the understanding of race: the modern concept of race is deconstructed from biology and skin colour, but constructed into a cultural concept (and then: religious). Throughout history, racism has always been specific and relative to its context. The context and character of the new racism enable it to be recognised.

4. 3 Racism recognised through the "law of commutation"

Three public intellectuals address an important issue regarding the Mohammed cartoons: Was the publication an expression of racism (*Dagbladet*, 22 February)? They refer to the drawing presenting an Oriental man/the Prophet with a turban, sabre and stripe like a criminal, covering his eyes, flanked by two women dressed in burkas concealing everything but their frightened eyes. Like the other motifs, the sabre and the turban "reflect a popular Oriental repertoire of clichés about Arab men as exotic, barbaric and untrustworthy" (ibid.). A revealing test of the cartoons' potential racist or ethnocentric dimension is to use the "law of commutation": replacing the Oriental man in the drawing with, for example, a Jew or a black. Doing so makes any racist content more visible. Another relevant test is to view the issue from the perspective that many of the world's 1.2 billion Muslims regard the cartoons crisis as a Western conspiracy directed at *them*, rather than as a case of the West defending its fundamental democratic right to free speech.

Another example of the discursive struggle for hegemony is provided by Samuel Huntington's theory of the "clash of civilisations", which was often alluded to in editorials and comments during the cartoons controversy and also appeared as an underlying narrative in articles (Huntington, 1993). Huntington believes that future conflicts will not arise from differences in ideologies or economic systems, but instead from cultural differences between civilisations. This follows from his notion that national identities are losing their power to unite people and are being superseded by cultural identities based on history, language, tradition and religion (ibid.).

The opponents of this theory often use questions about power and social conditions and the critique of Western double standards to explain the strong reactions to an issue like the Mohammed cartoons. The clash-of-civilisations approach is also similar to the analyses of War Journalism: "two parties... 'us-them'-journalism... expose 'their' untruths ..." (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005:6). An alternative approach could be that of "clashes of humiliation" (Lindner, 2006).

4. 4 Clashes of humiliation

Evelin Lindner has done a social-psychological study of the role of *humiliation* in human conflict. From the acts of humiliation in Nazi Germany or the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York to intentional humiliations such as those committed at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, she examines how little-understood, often overlooked emotions can spark uprisings, conflict and war. "When respect and recognition fail, those who feel victimised are prone to highlight differences to 'justify' rifts caused by humiliation. *Clashes of civilisations* are not the problem, but *clashes of humiliations* are" (Lindner, 2006:172). With respect to covering Islam, Edward Said describes how knowledge about Islam and Islamic peoples has generally developed not only from dominance and confrontation, but also from cultural antipathy, which might be understood as humiliation (Said, 1997:163). The tendency to legitimate negative approaches towards Islam and to downgrade Islamic peoples has been even more apparent since 9/11, because of an international paradigm shift caused by the "war on terror", and concretised through the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. To "see 'them' as the problem" is war and violence oriented journalism (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005:6). Lindner's critical approach to the "clash of civilisations" approach and her emphasis on the emotional state of humiliation are relevant for the Mohammed cartoons controversy, both in terms of how the cartoons were received and how the media covered the issue. *Dagens Næringsliv* published a feature story on the occurrence of the word "humiliation" (verb: to humiliate) and synonyms like "violation" (to violate) and "insult" (to insult) in the 20 largest newspapers, from 27 January until 9 February for every year since 2000, whereby the frequency was 30-50 in the first six years, but increased to almost 300 in 2006. Use of the word "insult" increased from 40 to 150 (*DN*, 11/12 February). The title of the feature story is "Time for humiliation".

5 Methodology

Barbara Gentikov asserts that to combine quantitative and qualitative approaches to media resources is "a beautiful ideal, but unfortunately, it does not function practically" (Gentikov, 2005:35). Nevertheless, to unmask the power structures or struggles underlying newspapers' choice of viewpoints and sources, I find both approaches useful. It is difficult to establish categories of War, Peace (and nuanced) Journalism within and among my substantial and comprehensive sample without counting the articles, as well as indicating who is speaking. Since the concept of War and Peace Journalism is constructed as a practical tool for journalists in the field and not primarily as a theoretical discourse approach, the categories are based on Galtung's definitions and my judgements and interpretations. There may be a third, middle "way": journalism characterised as "neither-nor": e.g., some journalists may balance their stories or write background articles, or their reports may contain elements of both Peace and War Journalism. Therefore, I have introduced a third category of journalism, Nuanced Journalism, as illustrated, for example, by informative articles about religion.

"Giving a voice to all parties ..." is one of the ideals of Peace Journalism (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005:6). Hence, I have recorded the numbers of sources by gender and minority versus majority background. War Journalism is described by elite-orientation, and I have also classified the sources as expert/politician and grass-root sources.

5.1 Implications of the tables

The quantitative tables show the numbers of articles distributed in different categories of genres (Table 1), the representation of sources (Table 2), the occurrence of War versus Peace or Nuanced Journalism in news reports and reportage, 31 January – 14 February 2006, the period when Norway was "almost" at war (Table 3).¹

	Front page	Editorial	Comment	Opinions, letters	News report	News reportage	Background	Briefs	Inquiries	Number of reports/opinions
<i>Aften</i>	0	1	2	2	5	1	0	19	1	31
<i>Aftenposten</i>	14	7	50	49	65	25	7	49	2	268
<i>Dagbladet</i>	7	7	27	85	46	18	2	21	1	214
<i>Dagens Næringsliv</i>	2	5	11	3	19	6	1	16	0	63
<i>Dagsavisen</i>	12	4	16	18	47	39	2	25	3	166
<i>VG</i>	7	5	26	18	65	22	1	14	0	158
Total	42	29	132	175	247	111	13	144	7	900

Table 1: Overview of the newspapers' distribution of articles and genres

6 Giving voice to the voiceless

The representation of sources is a central aspect of Peace Journalism, and German sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas emphasises the importance of a well-functioning public discourse as an essential foundation of democracy. His perspective presupposes a public that has knowledge of and access to forums for discussion and debate. As an overall perspective, Peace Journalism emphasises a people-orientation, "focusing on the suffering of women, aged, children, giving voices to the voiceless" (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005:6). The relevance of the latter aspect is shown by my sample; the lack of minority voices is apparent in the debate "space", the comments and newspaper sources are elite-oriented, and the lack of female sources is generally apparent (Table 2). The unbalanced representation is not, for example, a basic feminist issue, but rather a question of pluralism and fair representation in a matter that concerns men as well as women, majority as well as minority residents. I find the same aspect to be relevant concerning levels or priorities of sources; in hardcore news, like reports on war and conflict, there is a tradition of privileging male sources (Zilliacus-Tikkanen, 1997:70,147-148).

Of the total number of sources (753) in every genre of stories in the research materials, 80 % are male, 20 % female; *Dagsavisen* has an average of 25 % female sources, *Aftenposten*, with the largest total number of articles (268), has 16

1. The tables are also presented in my thesis (June 2007).

% female sources, *Aften* does not have a single female source. This is obvious due to the (low) number of female sources in the news stories (and in photographs), as well as their low participation in the opinion materials.

Sources	<i>Aften</i>	<i>Aftenposten</i>	<i>Dagbladet</i>	<i>DN</i>	<i>Dagsavisen</i>	<i>VG</i>	Total
Male sources	15	166	97	42	163	122	605
Majority sources	4	120	65	33	93	87	402
Minority sources	11	46	32	13	70	35	207
Expert, politician	14	145	80	39	124	110	512
Grassroot	1	21	17	0	36	12	87
Female sources	0	32	28	11	50	27	148
Majority sources	0	28	21	11	40	24	124
Minority sources	0	4	7	0	10	3	24
Expert/politician	0	20	19	11	38	20	108
Grassroot	0	12	9	0	12	7	40

Table 2: Sources

The people-orientation approach can also be transferred to the grassroots representatives, who, as illustrated above, constitute 17 % of the sources and actually represent many of the interviewees in short inquiries. When conflicts like the Mohammed cartoons controversy cause an international crisis, it is natural to encounter a high representation of politicians and experts in the columns, as well as ones with a minority background; politicians and experts constitute 82 % of the sources. This indicates an elite-orientation in the coverage of the cartoons crisis, which is also characteristic of War Journalism, although I do not mean to imply that all coverage with such a category of sources is war-oriented. Table 2 shows that 34 % of the male and 15 % of the female sources have a minority background. The relatively high representation of male sources with a minority background in the news stories is probably due to the nature of the issue; many were actors and/or experts on the Mohammed cartoons controversy (Steien, 2007a:46).¹ If the newspapers' aim is to contribute to dialogue and finding peaceful solutions to conflicts like this, one way to do this is to present voices, opinions and images that differ from those of the extremists (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005).

6. 1 The voice of an "ideal immigrant"

Shazad Rana comments in *VG* on Islam's own intolerance (*VG*, 15 February) and in *Aftenposten*, 7 February, where he suggests eliminating the Article on obligatory religious stipulations in schools and kindergartens. The comment is accompanied by a picture of the Danish Imam, Abu Laban, raising his right hand in a gesture suggesting the Hitler salute while giving a speech. The image evokes what the German intellectual Hans Magnus Enzensberger describes in an essay as an example of "men of horror" or "radical losers" (Enzensberger, 2006). This is a powerful demonstration of the clash of civilisations; even if the comments are differentiated and moderate, pictures of aggressive, angry demonstrators burning flags, shaking their fists, etc., often accompany them. On 14 February, Rana is interviewed in *Dagbladet*, and the headline is: "The ideal immigrant criticises the government: (They) should never have apologised" (*Dagbladet*, 14 February). He is an example of the new 'fellow citizen' whom "we" approve of; he has assimilated "our" values, is even married to a Norwegian and likes skiing: He stands in contrast to those who wear ethnic clothing, marry within their ethnic group, and react against the cartoons: "The society's premise is that Muslims must 'modernise', i.e. become 'Norwegian'", Anne Sofie Roald writes (Roald, 2005:223). Dutch citizen Ayaan Hirsi Ali launches her book, *The Caged Virgin. Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam* in the Norwegian edition, and this is covered in the different newspapers. She is known as an uncompromising opponent of Islam and was a close friend of filmmaker Theo van Gogh, who was murdered because of his stands on the same issue.² *DN* presents news about Ali three times, as their only female minority representative. As these examples sug-

1. In my thesis I also counted ethnic and gender representation in the opinion samples (editorials, comments, analysis, debate, reader's letters, etc.): 18 % of the participants are women, 12 % of the total number of 216 comments by public intellectuals have a non-Norwegian background (26), and the unsigned editorials are not counted here, although we assume that they are rarely written by women and/or minority representatives, since the editors on most levels are male. In the 915 published photographs men constitute almost 640 of the subjects, women 135 (mixed 15), whether in single images, small groups or crowds. The percentages are 80 % men, 15 % women, with illustrations, caricatures, etc. making up the remainder (Steien 2007b).
2. Karlsen & Winther point out that Theo van Gogh is wrongly described as a "knight of free speech". A regrettable aspect of his campaign was his reference to Muslims as "goat-fuckers" (Karlsen & Winther, 2006:60).

gest, "Conflict is a relationship between two or more parties (individuals or groups) who have, or think they have, incompatible goals, needs and interests" (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005:34).

7 Attitudes in news reports and reportage

VG describes the attacks in the Middle East as a "Mob Amok" (6 February), while *Dagsavisen's* headline of the same day is "Violence Never Acceptable". They deal with the same event, but from different angles or perspectives. The journalist's or the editor's choice of perspective is part of the narrative. "The slant ... the psychological, sociological and ideological ramifications of the narrator's attitudes, may range from neutral to highly charged/slanted" (Chatman, 1990:143). Wilhelm Kempf describes the consequences of such ramifications: "... journalists appoint themselves judges of who is good or evil in the world, and ... they place moral pressure on the international community to take sides" (Kempf, 2002:59). *VG* offers a narrative consistent with a War Journalism approach, while *Dagsavisen* takes a stance against violence, thus aligning with Peace Journalism.

Some 63 % of *VG's* (news) stories (Table 3) (and 57 % of their opinion materials) during the research period fall within the category of War Journalism, recognisable by its conflict implications. In contrast to this approach, "They should ... focus on suffering, expose untruths on all sides, explain the background, highlight peace initiatives and stop demonising one side while glorifying the other" (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005:III). The lower percentage of War Journalism in the other newspapers may be explained by their use of reports by their own correspondents in the Middle East, absent in *VG*.

	<i>Aften</i>	<i>Aftenposten</i>	<i>Dagbladet</i>	<i>DN</i>	<i>Dagsavisen</i>	<i>VG</i>	Total
War Journalism	0	27 % (19)	57 % (24)	23 % (3)	36 % (23)	63 % (24)	39 % (90)
Peace Journalism	33 % (1)	19 % (13)	14 % (6)	8 % (1)	12 % (8)	8 % (3)	15 % (35)
Nuanced Journalism	67 % (2)	54 % (37)	29 % (12)	69 % (9)	52 % (33)	29 % (11)	46 % (104)
Total	100 % (3)	100 % (69)	100 % (42)	100 % (13)	100 % (64)	100 % (38)	100 % (229)

Table 3: War, Peace, Nuanced Journalism, 31/01 – 14/02/2006

7.1 The "point of no return"

"Norwegian flags burnt as a protest" (*Aftenposten*, front page, 31 January). A picture by Damir Sagoli/Reuters is a front-page photograph in *Aftenposten* and *Dagsavisen*, and is used by *VG*, *DN* and *Dagbladet* in connection with their news stories. This provides an example of the presses' use of a particular provocative image acquired from a news agency. The picture shows eight angry men, two of them very clearly raising their fists, crying out or shouting while burning a copy of a Norwegian flag. The flag is a strong national symbol in Norway, which can look back on only 102 years of independence; it is displayed on national holidays, and the colours red, blue and white were chosen to emphasise ties to democracies like France, The Netherlands, the UK and the USA. The demonstrators were not just burning a multicoloured cloth rectangle, but also an image of democracy! This picture, as well as several others subsequently circulated by the press, also functions as a *metonym*: an element (e.g., flag burning) stands for a whole (the "unfair" conflict with and rage against freedom of speech in the West). It also evokes Enzensberger's "men of horror" or "radical losers" and is meant to disturb, shock and probably "move" the viewer. Burning the flag may also arouse a sense of humiliation, which is probably one of the reasons for doing this. A week later, demonstrators removed the Norwegian Coat of Arms, one of the oldest in Europe, from the embassy in Teheran and tried to destroy it. This also had an impact on viewers/readers in Norway. "Don't burn our flag!" is *VG's* headline, referring to Norwegian Muslim politicians (*VG* 31, January). Actually none of the three Muslims is saying this or "condemning [the burning]", as *VG* writes, they were rather commenting on how the acts of a few Norwegians (the editor of *Magazinet*) can harm a whole nation (Norway). Inconsistencies between headlines, titles and an article's content contribute to conflict escalation; if the statements by the interviewees are not strong enough, the newspaper "helps" them by adding emphasis. The same discrepancy is also present in *Dagbladet*: "... [are] threatening terrorism". Correspondent Yngvil Mortensen writes: "Most Palestinians with whom *Dagbladet* has spoken feel that their religion has been dragged down into the mud by the way the Prophet is portrayed, but they do not express any thoughts of revenge ... 'you do not achieve anything by using violence', some women say" (*Dagbladet*, 31 January). Both *VG* and *Dagbladet's* headlines are examples of War Journalism. Words like "terrorism" and "condemnation" connote conflict and evoke negative emotions – pathos. These are words that Lynch & McGoldrick warn against because of the simplification and stereotypes they encourage (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005:30). The message is emphasised by the photograph: "... an event known through photographs certainly becomes more real than it would have been had one never seen the photographs" (Sontag, 2003:94). Using the same Reuters picture on its front page (and inside the newspaper), *Dagsavisen* highlights Western responses to the recent outcomes of the Palestinian elections, which Hamas won: "Threatening to stop aid to Palestine". In this context, "we" (Norway, EU and the West) are still able to act against "them", to strike at their vulnerable economy as a punishment

for voting for the "wrong" political party (Hamas) in their democratic elections two weeks before. This economic boycott became, incidentally, a reality for a year. Norway was the first Western country to repeal the embargo in March 2007.

The particular photograph of the angry, flag-burning men was reproduced seven times during the cartoons controversy and was the first of a series of similar photographs from Palestine via Syria, Lebanon, Iran and Sarajevo (Bosnia). "... after repeated exposure it becomes less real," Susan Sontag writes (Sontag, 2003:94), but perhaps it becomes more natural as it is absorbed into memory? *Dagsavisen's* front-page headline on 1 February is: "Flaming rage". *VG* uses a section of the burning flag-picture as a vignette on the pages dealing with the conflict, as a cursor, "The Mohammed riot". By linking the coverage of the Mohammed cartoons crisis with a vignette focused on fire, *VG* transformed the crisis into a *metaphor*, as though the entire conflict were essentially similar, at least the parts occurring "down there". The dangerous, uncontrolled fire also becomes a symbol of the gap between "them" and "us" as the party of civilisation. It is an example of the underlying message about the clash of civilisations. The image of the dangerous, irrational, wild and unpredictable situation is reinforced by photographs of men with Palestinian scarves or masks concealing everything but their eyes, allegedly threatening further actions, such as bomb attacks (*Aftenposten*, 31 January). Variations on this theme circulated during the following days, accompanied by more serious threats against Norway and Denmark: "The radical, Shiite-Muslim Hizbollah movement in Lebanon indicated yesterday that the cartoons of the Prophet might lead to suicide actions in Norway and Denmark" (*Dagsavisen*, 3 February). Norwegian NGOs withdrew their staffs from the Palestinian territories and Darfur in Sudan.

7. 2 Two different events and how the newspapers covered them

In the study "Our Hero and Their Unworthy Victim", Gro Mette Moen has compared four newspapers' coverage of two events that took place on 5 February 2006 (Moen, 2006).

When the demonstrations against Norway and Denmark took place in Syria on the 4th of February, Even Nord Rydningen, a Norwegian student in Damascus, suddenly found himself in a threatening situation, and saved his life, according to his report, by claiming that he was Swedish not Norwegian. At the same time, a Norwegian resident of Palestinian origin, Anuar Ahmad, was attacked by a mob in Skien, Norway. Stabbed in the neck, he suffered serious injury. These two events were covered very differently in the newspapers. *Dagbladet* did not even mention Anuar Ahmad at all. "Norwegian Even (22) CALMED raging Muslims" was on the front page of *Dagbladet*, 6 February, while on the same day *VG* made this comment: "Said he was Swedish, SAVED HIS LIFE". The front-page pictures in *Dagbladet* gave an overall view of the demonstration from a bird's-eye perspective, while a portrait of Even, partly covering his face, is superimposed on the same picture and presented in a larger format, together with an additional report on pages 6 and 7. The journalist, who was not present at the events in Syria, wrote his story from England. In the front-page picture in *VG*, Even is standing in front of the burning Norwegian embassy, and a subtitle informs the reader: "Boycott of Norwegian salmon and cheese". *VG*, on the same day, devotes nine pages to the events, which *VG's* vignette refers to as the "Mohammed rages". The day before, 5 February, *VG* also focuses on a young Norwegian student, Silje (21), who "had to flee for her life" in Damascus: "FUGITIVE from Muslim revenge". On the 6th, *VG's* reporter (one of the few journalists with a minority background in the Norwegian media) presents an interview (from Oslo) with Even (in Damascus); the photographs used in the report are Even's own pictures of the dramatic events in Damascus. The caption, though, comes from *VG's* newsroom: "RAN AMOK: These are Even Nord's own pictures from where the mob ran amok ...". The journalist asks at the end of the story: "Was it painful to see the Norwegian embassy being burnt?" Even answers: "I did not see Norway burning. What I saw was demonstrations like an oppressed gang that vented a great amount of frustration, all at the same time. What they did was not in their own best interest". There are discrepancies between how *VG* treats the report in its headlines, captions and slant, and what Even actually describes in the interview: "... journalists have little faith in human nature, suspecting the worst and finding it" (Johnsson-Cartee, 2006:286). Even's answer is characterised by an ethos, and he wants to place the events in a different context than the pathos communicated by *VG*. This is also an example of what Oddgeir Tveiten describes as the core of journalism; although we live in a world of globalisation, the essence of journalism will always be the *local* perspective (Tveiten, 2007:33). In response to events of international or global significance, Norwegian newspapers always look for the Norwegian, the person who (hopefully) can be the eyewitness and report (through emotion/pathos) what really happened (to him or her). Although it may not have any implications for Norway's situation, it becomes part of the national and Norwegian narrative, as well as part of an ethnocentric discourse, and frequently an example of War Journalism.

On page 7, *VG* gives only a brief report about what happened in Skien: "Stabbed a Palestinian" is the headline. The introduction is as follows: "The Palestinian (35) was surprised by four Norwegians outside his house. 'Why are you burning Norwegian flags', was the only thing he heard before he was stabbed in the neck". The following (short) text is about the police department, which characterised the incident as an act of drunken rowdies. Ahmad is never mentioned by name, but rather as the "stabbing victim". He remains anonymous and is always referred to only indirectly: "... the minority Other is seldom invited to represent herself, but is often represented by (self-styled) experts or professionals of majority origin who speak about the Other, or on her behalf" (Eide, 2002:208).

Dagsavisen handles Anuar Ahmad's threatening and dangerous experience differently: The report covers the entire page, and Anuar Ahmad tells his story in his own words, describing in detail what happened to him. The criminal act also relates to another story in the newspaper, in which Norwegian Muslims are interviewed about their fear of reprisals after the attack on Anuar Ahmad: "When a man has been stabbed, of course I am afraid that right-wing extremist groups might become violent and not only be threatening to act violently," states Mohammad Hamdan, the leader of the Islamic Council (*Dagsavisen*, 6 February). Nevertheless, Anuar Ahmad's non-Norwegian origin is mentioned in all the reports about him. In *VG*, the two events produce two very different ways of portraying the main characters: Even is a (Norwegian) hero from "up here" in a dangerous environment (Syria) "down there", although he is never physically injured (Eide, 2002). Anuar Ahmad is a refugee and foreigner in Norway, although he is a Norwegian citizen, and although he is seriously injured, he is not that newsworthy for *VG*. *VG* does not consider it important that the attacks on him were directly related to events in the Middle East and thus could have consequences for other refugee and minority populations in Norway, as well as for relations between majority and minority peoples. According to *Dagsavisen*, "the police regard the incident solely as an episode of ordinary drunkenness and a violent episode". This minimises the severity of the criminal act. Using the "law of commutation" and replacing Anuar with a celebrity, a woman or a child as the victim could provide some sense of how the coverage and priority accorded to the story might have differed had the victim not been an immigrant. Would the police have trivialised the criminal act as merely due to "drunkenness" without such a claim being questioned by the press? The coverage uses euphemisms and litotes; the police minimise a serious criminal and probably racist event, and the newspaper refers to it using a *litotes* (the opposite of a hyperbole, e.g., 'it's not that bad'), and the entire story is told using euphemisms. There will always be disagreement about news priorities in newsrooms, and both of these stories deserve thorough coverage. Which of the stories will (probably) have the most serious impact on Norwegian relations/society – Even's courage in Syria, or a racist assault and stabbing in Norway? The first story is an eminent example of War Journalism in *VG*, and the second an example of Peace Journalism in *Dagsavisen* (cf. Galtung, Lynch & McGoldrick).

Noam Chomsky has analysed the coverage of wars and conflicts in the US press and describes a system of propaganda, "portraying people abused in enemy states as *worthy* victims, while those treated with equal or greater severity by their own government of clients will be *unworthy*" (Chomsky, 1988:37). Similarly, except for *Dagsavisen's* report, Anuar is treated as an unworthy victim, nameless, not as newsworthy as Even, who is portrayed as both a worthy victim and a hero.

7.3 Reconciliation meeting

"Peace culture is not a state of eternal harmony. But it is a sort of social contract which enables society members to deal with (internal and external) conflicts within a cooperative environment" (Kempf, 2002:61). Kempf explains that:

"Open communication reduces the danger of misunderstandings. It enables parties to explore the interests behind the issues in a conflict, to elaborate a more adequate definition of what the real problem is that must be resolved and to optimise their contributions to resolving the problem" (ibid.:62).

Exactly one month after *Magazinet* editor Vebjørn Selbekk published the Mohammed cartoons, after four weeks of agony, death threats against Selbekk, two weeks of mob violence, flag and embassy burnings in the Middle East, attacks in Afghanistan and endless national and international debate and discussion, the Norwegian conflict was resolved on 10 February in the office of Bjarne Håkon Hanssen, Norwegian Minister of Labour and Social Inclusion. "Muslims forgive Norway" (*Dagsavisen*, 11 February) and "Kr.F-network solved the problem" (*Aftenposten*, 11 February) were typical headlines on the next day.¹ Both of these newspapers emphasised the contributions of the mediators (high-profile Christian and Muslim men), and in the headline of a sub-article *Aftenposten* describes the meeting as "An historic reconciliation". The editor regrets the impact of the cartoons, but not that he exercised his right to free speech by publishing them. The Muslim representative at the meeting, Mohammad Hamdan (leader of the Islamic Council), explains on the same day on *Al-Jazeera* that Norwegian Muslims accept Selbekk's apology: "In the coming days we will repeat this message through satellite channels in Muslim countries and call our contacts in the Middle East. We will ask Muslims all over the world to reject violence towards Norway" (*Dagsavisen*, 11 February). Except for occasional demonstrations and continued boycotts of Norwegian companies and products, the actions in the Middle East have now ended.

VG and *Dagbladet* covered the meeting differently. Both of the newspapers interviewed the leader of the Progress Party, Siv Jensen, who describes the government's acknowledgement of Selbekk's apology as an "unlucky muddle and cowardly behaviour towards authoritarian powers" and alludes to the realm of theatre when she describes the reconciliation meeting as a "Performance of cowardice" (*Dagbladet*, 11 February). Jensen asserts that the problem was not that Norway humiliated Muslims by permitting the publication of the cartoons, but rather the situation for non-Muslim minorities in the Middle East, who "every day fear for their lives and risk their lives because of their faith" (ibid.). *VG's* headline is: "Chastises the Government" (11 February). Siv Jensen and two other liberal politicians criticise Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg and Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre for heaping all the blame on just one editor (Selbekk). Jensen "demolishes" the Govern-

1. Kr. F. refers to the Christian Democratic Party.

ment's role before the "peace-compromise", which she describes as a collective excuse, although public opinion on the matter is divided. She asserts that, "violent demonstrators around the world don't give a damn about how much Selbekk or *Jyllands-Posten* apologise for their actions" (ibid.). The lack of reactions during the following days shows that Siv Jensen and *VG* were wrong in their predictions. *VG* (and *Dagbladet*) used the opportunity to advocate further conflict and pursued the "low road", presenting the reconciliation meeting as part of a struggle which was not over yet and implying that the conflict, represented as latent violence, was likely to continue rather than progress towards a peaceful solution (Galtung, 1997). "Violence breeds violence" is one of the most reliable predictors we know, and the challenge may be to break this regularity. "In the wake of violence there is not only the desire of the victim for revenge and retribution going back to the conflict, with a totally different outcome, there is also a desire of the victor for more victories: it tasted so sweet that addiction is just around the corner" (Galtung, 2004:186).

8 Conclusions

From the end of January to the middle of February 2006, it became clear that the Mohammed cartoons controversy had ceased to be a conflict between Denmark, Norway (the West) and the "Islamic world". It had instead become an international controversy and debate about some of the core values that the West – particularly Western journalists – claims to live by (Kunelius et al., 2007).

Peace Journalism is not yet a comprehensive tool for text or media analysis, and as an important approach to journalism it needs to be further developed and conceptualised to create suitable models for media analysis. My aim in exploring this perspective is to contribute to a deeper understanding of Peace versus War Journalism and of how these concepts inform daily news production when the media cover conflict.

VG and *Dagbladet* published a majority of the reports recognisable as War Journalism, while *Dagsavisen* and *Aftenposten* covered the event in news stories (and editorials and comments) from within a discourse of Peace or Nuanced, more balanced Journalism. The Progress Party probably gained additional support as a result of the incidents and their coverage. Using opinion polls which analyse changes in voter preferences over a five-year period, researchers conclude that "immigration restriction is the issue that, more than any other, increases the likelihood that a person will vote for the Progress Party", and: "Probably the events occurring during the Mohammed cartoons crisis explain the party's success" (*Dagbladet*, 14 March).¹ In March 2006, the Progress Party, with 30 % on InFact's party barometer, is actually larger than the Labour Party. One may allege that (some of) the newspapers' War Journalism has contributed to the party's current success.

The complexity of a heterogeneous society was highlighted throughout the cartoons crisis. It is easy to live with freedom of speech when everyone has a similar background, but this freedom becomes problematic in a heterogeneous context. The differences in interpretation can be exacerbated in the press by War Journalism, or the media could help harmonise them using Peace Journalism. The media coverage in news reports was characterised by a focus on the dramatic events occurring in the Middle East and Afghanistan, and the media approaches were mainly Nuanced, as well as War Journalism, varying depending on the newspaper. Although hardly any story promotes an escalation of conflict, a comprehensive overview of the news reports and reportage, including the choice and lack of sources/voices, angles, layout and presentation, suggests a high and rising temperature regarding Islam and its implications for multicultural coexistence in Norway, as well as in the rest of the world. The use of sources with a minority background and a lack of women as sources show that the newspapers (with a few exceptions) perpetuate existing attitudes and patterns in society instead of taking the Peace Journalism approach of creatively finding new sources and perspectives and possibly pointing to new solutions. It also seems to be easier to promote war and conflict and exploit stereotypes and present enemy images when newspapers do not have their own correspondents in the field, because newsrooms become more dependent on information and propaganda provided by others. The concept of a "clash of civilisations" became one of the key phrases in the conflict. Thus, despite the many different positions taken regarding its relevance, one can say that it operated as one of the most powerful general discourses of the entire conflict, an example of War Journalism. It was the implicit foundation of much of the coverage of the events in the Middle East, and was often introduced as a self-fulfilling prophecy (Kunelius et al., 2007). "It is possible to predict that if the discourse of 'clash' or 'war' gains more ground as the dominant explanation of the world, this will favour more fundamentalist tendencies" (ibid.). As the Fourth Estate, the press has a duty to contribute to improving the public's political analysis and social ethical consciousness, instead of or in addition to providing 'infotainment'. This is, perhaps, more important in order to further co-existence in a multicultural society, and in order to avoid conflict and support dialogue and mutual respect.

1. The author, Ottar Hellevik, is the head of research at the MMI, (the Institute of Market and Media Surveys).

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On the author: Solveig Steien (b. 1955) is a Norwegian journalist and part-time teacher at Oslo University College, Department of Journalism. In her thesis, "When Norway Was Almost at War, the Mohammed cartoons Controversy in Norwegian Newspapers" (June 2007), she scrutinized how six Norwegian national newspapers covered the Mohammed controversy in the early winter of 2006 and used an overall perspective of Peace and War journalism in her approach. Solveig Steien is a member of the International Department of the Norwegian Writers' Association.

Address: eMail: solveig.steien@gmail.com

Ilhan Kizilhan

Islam, Migration und Integration: Konflikte jugendlicher Migranten mit islamischem Hintergrund

Der Islam mit seinen verschiedenen Verhaltensweisen und Verboten spielt direkt oder indirekt immer noch eine wichtige Rolle im alltäglichen Leben vieler Migranten. Religiöse Vorschriften zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass ihrer Achtung nicht juristisch, sondern durch sozialen Druck Nachdruck verliehen wird (Verwandtschaft, religiöse Lehrer, islamische Gemeinde, religiöse Vereine etc.) und dass ihre Missachtung mit Folgen in Form von Ausgrenzung, Missachtung und Diskriminierung einhergeht. Die kulturellen Vorstellungen der ersten Generation unterscheiden sich auf Grund der unterschiedlichen Biografien von denen der zweiten und dritten durch den Grad der Verwurzelung in der kulturellen Identität und der Verbundenheit mit traditionellen Wertvorstellungen. Fehlende Integrationskonzepte, Ausgrenzung im Migrationsland auf der einen und weltweite staatliche und halbstaatliche Konflikte im Namen des Islams bis hin zum Terrorismus auf der anderen Seite haben einen erheblichen Einfluss auf den Integrationsgrad von jugendlichen Migranten im Aufnahmeland.

[Volltext \(in Deutsch\)](#)

Zum Autor:

Ilhan Kizilhan, Dr. Dipl. Psych., Leit. Dipl. Psychologe, Abteilungsleiter der Michael-Balint-Klinik in Königfeld, Wissenschaftlicher Berater zur Transkulturellen Psychiatrie/Psychologie, psych. Sachverständiger, Psychotherapeut, Supervisor. Mitarbeiter der Forschungsambulanz, Institut für Psychologie, Universität Freiburg.
Arbeitsschwerpunkte: Psychotraumatologie, klinische Psychologie, Biographieforschung, Migrationsforschung.

eMail: kizilhan@psychologie.uni-freiburg.de

Ilhan Kizilhan

Islam, Migration and Integration: Conflicts of youthful migrants with an Islamic background

Directly or indirectly, Islam, with its various behavioral patterns and prescriptions, continues to play an important role in the everyday life of many migrants. Characteristic of religious prescriptions is that they give force to their observance not legally, but through social pressure (kin, religious teachers, Islamic community, religious associations, etc.) and that noncompliance has consequences in the form of ostracism, disrespect and discrimination.

The cultural conceptions of the first generation differ from those of the second and third generation on the basis of different biographies, through the degree of rootedness in a cultural identity and solidarity with traditional value conceptions.

The absence of integration concepts, exclusion in the country of migration, on the one side, and international state and parastatal conflicts in the name of Islam going as far as terrorism, on the other side, have a considerable influence on the degree of integration of youthful migrants in the receiving country.

[full text \(in German\)](#)

On the author:

Ilhan Kizilhan, Dr. Dipl. Psych., Dipl. Psychologist, Head of Department of the Michael Balint Clinic in Königsfeld, Scientific Advisor on Transcultural Psychiatry/Psychology, psych. technical assessor, psychotherapist, supervisor. Employed by the Research Clinic, Institute for Psychology, University of Freiburg.

Primary Interests: Psychotraumatology, clinical psychology, biography research, migration research.

eMail: kizilhan@psychologie.uni-freiburg.de

Ilhan Kizilhan

Islam, Migration und Integration: Konflikte jugendlicher Migranten mit islamischem Hintergrund

Abstract: Directly or indirectly, Islam, with its various behavioral patterns and prescriptions, continues to play an important role in the everyday life of many migrants. Characteristic of religious prescriptions is that they give force to their observance not legally, but through social pressure (kin, religious teachers, Islamic community, religious associations, etc.) and that noncompliance has consequences in the form of ostracism, disrespect and discrimination.

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The absence of integration concepts, exclusion in the country of migration, on the one side, and international state and parastatal conflicts in the name of Islam going as far as terrorism, on the other side, have a considerable influence on the degree of integration of youthful migrants in the receiving country.

Kurzfassung: Der Islam mit seinen verschiedenen Verhaltensweisen und Verboten spielt direkt oder indirekt immer noch eine wichtige Rolle im alltäglichen Leben vieler Migranten. Religiöse Vorschriften zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass ihrer Achtung nicht juristisch, sondern durch sozialen Druck Nachdruck verliehen wird (Verwandtschaft, religiöse Lehrer, islamische Gemeinde, religiöse Vereine etc.) und dass ihre Missachtung mit Folgen in Form von Ausgrenzung, Missachtung und Diskriminierung einhergeht.

Die kulturellen Vorstellungen der ersten Generation unterscheiden sich auf Grund der unterschiedlichen Biografien von denen der zweiten und dritten durch den Grad der Verwurzelung in der kulturellen Identität und der Verbundenheit mit traditionellen Wertvorstellungen.

Fehlende Integrationskonzepte, Ausgrenzung im Migrationsland auf der einen und weltweite staatliche und halbstaatliche Konflikte im Namen des Islams bis hin zum Terrorismus auf der anderen Seite haben einen erheblichen Einfluss auf den Integrationsgrad von jugendlichen Migranten im Aufnahmeland.

1. Einleitung

Als die ersten ausländischen Arbeitskräfte in den 60er-Jahren in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ankamen, wurde davon ausgegangen, dass sie nur für eine begrenzte Zeit in Deutschland bleiben würden. Nach Angaben des statistischen Bundesamtes lebten im Jahre 2005 jedoch 15,3 Millionen Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund in der Bundesrepublik. Das bedeutet, dass jeder fünfte Bürger einen Migrationshintergrund hat (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005).

Die erste Generation von Migranten, die vor etwa 40 Jahren als Arbeitskräfte einreisten, kam mit der Vorstellung, genug Geld für den Aufbau einer Existenz im Heimatland zu verdienen und anschließend zurückzukehren. Dieser Wunsch nach Rückkehr, der über die Jahre konserviert wurde, war mit einer Zukunft in Deutschland nicht zu vereinbaren. Das Leben in Deutschland wurde folglich provisorisch eingerichtet, eine Integration blieb weitgehend aus.

Diese erste Generation verfügte über eine spezifische kulturelle Identität mit Verhaltensmustern, die jedoch unter den neuen Verhältnissen der Residenzgesellschaft weiterentwickelt wurden. Sie musste sich mit ihrer neuen Umwelt auseinandersetzen, um handlungsfähig zu sein. Dazu gehörten der Erwerb der deutschen Sprache und problemlösungsrelevanter Verhaltensstrategien sowie die Einordnung in einen fremden und ungewohnten Produktionsprozess. Auf Grund der emotionalen Bindung an das Heimatland und einer bereits gefestigten Biografie gelang es den Angehörigen der ersten im Vergleich zu denen der zweiten und dritten Generation eher, wahrgenommene und erfahrene Benachteiligungen in Deutschland durch die Idealisierung des Herkunftslandes zu kompensieren. Dies führte wiederum zu einem typischen Diaspora-Konservatismus, innerhalb dessen sie viel stärker an ihren traditionellen, religiösen Werten und Normen festhielten als z. B. ihre Landsleute im Herkunftsland. Der dynamische Prozess der Veränderung einer Kultur durch neue Erfahrungen wird von der Diasporagemeinschaft verdrängt oder abgelehnt, um ihre gefestigte Herkunftsidentität auch im Aufnahmeland stabil halten zu können. Hinzu kommt, dass viele Eltern, Bekannte und Verwandte der Migranten im Herkunftsland nicht mehr leben, und sie selbst sind für ihre Landsleute in der Heimat Fremde geworden.

Die zweite und die dritte Generation gestalten ihre Biografie in Deutschland. Sie sind anders sozialisiert und verfügen folglich über durchaus von denen der Eltern unterschiedene Werte und Verhaltensmuster. Viele Angehörige der ersten Generation, die sich langsam dem Rentenalter nähern, haben die Hoffnung auf eine Rückkehr mit ihren Kindern aufgegeben, da die erwachsenen Kinder ihre Perspektive im Aufnahmeland sehen. Die unterschiedliche Sozialisation der Generationen, das Alter und der Rückzug der Eltern aus dem Arbeitsleben bewirken, dass der Einfluss der Älteren auf die nachfolgenden Generationen schwindet. – Um diesen Machtverlust entgegenzuwirken, greifen Mitglieder der ersten Generation manchmal auf Formen patriarchalischer Ehrvorstellungen mit religiösen Elementen zurück.

Der kulturelle Entfremdungsprozess (vgl. Auernheimer, 1988) prägt jedoch viele Kinder weit stärker als die Elterngeneration, da Erstere zwischen verschiedenen Welten mit unterschiedlichen biografischen Hintergründen aufwachsen. Der Einfluss des Islams wird durch die Eltern, die Migrantengemeinde, durch den Zugriff auf die Medien des Herkunftslands sowie durch den möglicherweise negativen Umgang der Mehrheitsgesellschaft mit ihm und dem immer häufigeren Auftreten terroristischer Gruppen mit islamischer Zuordnung aufrechterhalten (Leiken, 2003). Die islamische Religion wird je nach Interessenlage der Gruppen, der Geistlichen oder der Moscheegemeinschaften in der Diaspora unterschiedlich vermittelt (Gerlach, 2006).

2. Der Einfluss des Islams auf jugendliche Migranten

Historisch gesehen kann festgehalten werden, dass mit der Islamisierung im Mittleren Osten archaisch-patriarchalische Vorstellungen ihre Funktion weiterhin behalten haben. Je nach kulturellem und soziopolitischem Hintergrund der Ethnien wurden die islamischen Vorschriften interpretiert und verändert. So ist es sicherlich nicht falsch, wenn man zwischen einem arabischen, einem türkischen und einem iranischen Islam unterscheidet, unabhängig davon, ob es sich z.B. um Schiiten oder Sunniten handelt. Weitere Aspekte für das Verständnis des Islams und seiner Richtlinien sind der Bildungsgrad und der sozioökonomische Status eines Individuums. Da der Islam fast von Anbeginn an machtpolitisch *und* religiös tätig war, ist eine klare Trennung zwischen beiden Aspekten bis heute schwierig.

Im eigentlichen Sinne bedeutet Islam Unterwerfung unter Gott. Diese Unterwerfung wird umfassend verstanden. Sie betrifft die innere Glaubensüberzeugung ebenso wie die religiöse Praxis, und die Lebensführung ist sowohl auf das Diesseits wie auch auf das Jenseits ausgerichtet. Die Regeln des Islams sind für die gesamte Lebensführung eines Menschen verbindlich und beanspruchen, dass ihr Bestand an Geboten und Verboten die Bereiche Religion und Recht umfasst (vgl. Kizilhan, 2006).

Folglich spielt der Islam direkt oder indirekt auch eine wichtige Rolle im alltäglichen Leben vieler Migranten. Religiöse Vorschriften, Riten und Verhaltensformen werden durch sozialen Druck durchgesetzt. Hierbei spielt die Migrantengemeinde mit ihren Vereinen und Kollektiven (Familie, Verwandtschaft, ehemalige Dorfbewohner etc.) eine wichtige Rolle. Sanktionen für die Nichteinhaltung bestimmter Vorschriften können von Ausgliederung bis zu Gewaltanwendung reichen. Als Stichwort seien nur die "Ehrenmorde" genannt, die in den letzten fünf Jahren in den Medien immer wieder heftig diskutiert wurden.

Das bedeutet allerdings nicht, dass der Islam generell Gewalt begrüßen oder unterstützen würde; aber viele Moslems glauben infolge ihrer z. T. patriarchalisch-religiös geprägten Erziehung, dass z.B. beim Vorliegen einer "Ehrverletzung" nötigenfalls auch Gewalt im Namen der Religion legitimiert ist. Gleichzeitig muss gerechterweise erwähnt werden, dass auch nichtmoslemische Gruppen aus dem Nahen Osten ähnliche Vorstellungen von Ehre und Ehrverletzung haben, auf die ich noch eingehen werde.

Die Zahl der jugendlichen Migranten, die sich radikal-islamischen Gruppen angeschlossen haben, ist in Europa sehr hoch (vgl. Kizilhan, 2004; Gerlach, 2006). Viele von ihnen schließen mit dem Leben in Europa ab und gehen in den Nahen und Mittleren Osten, um für den "Glauben" zu kämpfen. Sie sterben bei den verschiedenen Auseinandersetzungen oder sind sogar bereit, sich und andere durch Attentate zu töten (vgl. Ulfkotte, 2007). Warum sie, die u. U. in Europa geboren, aufgewachsen und zu Schule gegangen sind, sich dennoch entschließen, Mitglieder solcher Gruppen zu werden, ist ein wichtiges Forschungsthema.

3. Die Erziehung der jugendlichen Migranten im Elternhaus

Die Erziehung der jugendlichen Migranten im Elternhaus ist von einer traditionellen und zum Teil patriarchalischen Sichtweise geprägt. Die Mehrheit der Migranten aus der Türkei z. B. kommt aus ländlichen Gebieten, die noch heute stark von traditionell-religiösen Werten geprägt sind. Bei dieser traditionellen Erziehung ist die Einhaltung von Geboten und Verboten von hoher Bedeutung.

Während in internalisierenden Kulturen, wie z. B. in Deutschland, die Verhaltensrichtlinien verinnerlicht werden, was bedeutet, dass hohe Anforderungen an die Moral und das Gewissen des Einzelnen gestellt werden, sorgen externalisierende Kulturen hingegen durch strenge Kontrolle der situativen Faktoren dafür, dass gegen allgemein gültige Verhaltensnormen nur unter größten Schwierigkeiten verstoßen werden kann (vgl. Özsel, 1990).

Die Gesellschaften des Mittleren Ostens zählen zu den externalisierenden Kulturen. Da der Mensch von Natur aus als "schwach" gilt – die menschliche Natur erhält ihren inneren Wert allein durch die unermessliche Güte Gottes, "denn der Mensch ist schwach erschaffen" (Koran, 4/29) –, sorgt z. B. die prinzipielle Geschlechtertrennung im Alltag dafür, dass "moralische Verfehlungen" schlicht durch den Mangel an Gelegenheit verhindert werden können, ohne dass der Aufbau eines rigiden, überstrengen Gewissens erforderlich ist. Hieraus ergibt sich auch eine grundsätzlich andere Einstellung zu dem, was als "Sünde" gilt: "Für den Moslem ist eine Sünde eine Überschreitung eines rituellen Verbots, mehr noch eine Rebellion gegen Allah durch Unglauben: sie ist keine moralische Verfehlung" (Bosquet 1966).

Die starke soziale Kontrolle lässt – nach westlicher Einschätzung – dem Einzelnen nur geringen persönlichen Freiraum. Von den in diesem System Lebenden kann dies jedoch anders empfunden werden, da viele Menschen diese Kontrolle als "sicher" erleben und vor allem kein schlechtes Gewissen haben müssen, da sie "sowieso schwach" sind und somit für ihre Normverstöße nicht verantwortlich gemacht werden können. So ist z. B. für den Fall, dass ein Kind etwas gestohlen hat, die gesamte Familie dafür ebenso verantwortlich wie das Kind selbst. Das ist nur aus der Perspektive logisch, dass es sich dabei eben nicht in erster Linie um eine „Charakterschwäche“ des Kindes handelt, sondern dass die Familie nicht ausreichend für eine Struktur gesorgt hat, in der dieser Verstoß nicht möglich gewesen wäre. Es wird keine innere Stärke des Individuums gefordert, einer Versuchung zu widerstehen. Infolgedessen ist nach einer solchen Verfehlung das Kind durch kein Stigma und keine moralischen Schuldgefühle belastet (vgl. Idema & Phalet, 2007).

Die logische Folge ist ein eher autoritäres Erziehungsprinzip, da es für die Kinder ja nicht darum geht, im Laufe der zunehmenden Charakterbildung Einsichten zu gewinnen, sondern darum, in die gesellschaftlich gesetzten Grenzen ,hineinzuwachsen. Diese Grenzen werden – im Interesse des Kindes – klar und unzweideutig vertreten, also autoritär. Die beiden unterschiedlichen Erziehungsstile, d.h. der zu Hause praktizierte und der der westlichen Mehrheitsgesellschaft, können bei vielen Kindern und Jugendlichen zu Unverständnis und Orientierungslosigkeit führen.

3.1 Herkunftskultur vs. Residenzkultur

Besonders deutlich wird dieser Konflikt zwischen den beiden Kulturen an der Ehrvorstellung sichtbar. Während die erste Generation, meist die Eltern, fordert, dass auch ihre Kinder und Enkelkinder sich an ihrer Herkunftskultur mit ihren Normen und Werten bis hin zur Zwangsheirat orientieren sollen, bevorzugen vor allem die jungen Mädchen – denn sie leiden oft am meisten darunter – entweder eine Mischform aus beiden Kulturen oder die westliche. Im Resultat erleben wir immer wieder, dass viele junge Mädchen und Frauen ihr Elternhaus verlassen und endgültig in der europäischen Gesellschaft untertauchen. Festzuhalten ist an dieser Stelle, dass die Zahl der "Ehrenmorde", die im Kontext solcher Entwicklungen verübt werden, in den letzten Jahren zugenommen hat. Daher wollen wir uns sowohl mit dem Begriff der Ehre etwas genauer beschäftigen als auch damit, wie die jugendlichen Migranten ihn verstehen und mit Ehrvorstellungen umgehen.

3.2 Kollektive Gesellschaften und ihre Ehrvorstellungen

In traditionellen Gesellschaften mit patriarchalischen Werten und Normen sind die Frauen die Verkörperung der Ehre im engeren Sinne. Ausweis der Frauenehre und damit der Familienehre ist die sexuelle Unversehrtheit der Frau, d.h. die Keuschheit *vor* der Ehe und die Treue *in* der Ehe. Die gesamte Rechtseinheit der Familie, vertreten durch den Haushaltsvorstand als Oberhaupt, ist verantwortlich für die Bewahrung der Frauenehre.

Die Positionen in einer Familie resultieren nicht nur aus ökonomischen Bedingungen, sondern auch aus einem System sozialer und politischer Unterordnung, innerhalb dessen die Ehre nach außen und nach innen generell vom Haushaltsvorstand repräsentiert wird. Dieses Referenzsystem löst sich auch bei der Gründung von Abhängigkeiten nur selten – und wenn, dann nur langsam – auf. Die Mikrogemeinschaft ist in einem solchen Netz von Reziprozitätsbeziehungen organisiert, in dem die einzelnen Familien von dem Postulat beherrscht werden, ihre Ehre zu wahren und zu verteidigen und gleichzeitig durch ein innerfamiliäres und transfamiliäres Tauschsystem die ökonomische und politische Stellung der Familie zu stärken. Dies ist auch in den Traditionen und Praktiken vieler Migrantinnen und Migranten zu beobachten, z. B. in Vereinen, bei Festen, Besuchen, der Therapie bei Familienkonflikten, bei einer bevorstehenden Trennung oder bei einer Heirat der Kinder in der zweiten und dritten Generation.

3.3 Ehre und Sexualität

Die Ehre in patriarchalischen Gesellschaften ist sehr eng mit Sexualität verknüpft. Sexualität außerhalb der Ehe bringt die soziale Ordnung in Gefahr, weswegen im Islam klare Vorschriften vorgegeben sind, z. B. wie sich Männer und Frauen innerhalb und außerhalb der Ehe zu verhalten haben (vgl. Özelsel, 1990).

Das oberste Ziel ist immer der Schutz und die Bewahrung der Ehre. Die Bewahrer und Beschützer dieser Ehre sind die Männer. Der Vater als Haushaltsvorstand muss dafür sorgen, dass die Ehre der Familie in der Öffentlichkeit geschützt wird. Die Söhne sehen sich selbst – und werden so erzogen – als Beschützer ihrer Schwestern, die ihre Ehre z. B. durch eine Beziehung zu einem jungen Mann verletzen könnten. Die ständige Angst und Unsicherheit, dass die Ehre der Familie verletzt werden könnte, führt zur Kontrolle und manchmal regelrecht zur Überwachung der jungen Mädchen durch die Brüder – auch und gerade in der Diaspora, was einen erheblichen Einfluss auf die Beziehungen zwischen den Geschwistern und in der gesamten Familie haben kann. In traditionellen Dorfgemeinschaften ist eine solche Kontrolle nicht so dringend notwendig, da das ganze Dorf die gleichen Werte teilt und Regelverletzungen eher selten sind.

3.4 Sexualität im Islam

Der Islam bejaht Sexualität, und um diesem Bedürfnis gerecht werden zu können, sollen junge Frauen und Männer u. a. relativ früh verheiratet werden. Lebenslange Keuschheit wird in den islamischen Ländern kaum praktiziert. Sexualität gewinnt erst im Kontext der sozialen Beziehungen und der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung ihr normatives Gewicht. Trotzdem wird die weibliche Sexualität als destruktiv angesehen, da sie Chaos und Unordnung schaffen kann. Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass die starke weibliche Sexualität dem sozialen Gefüge schaden könne, sobald Männer von ihr dominiert werden. Da der für die gesellschaftliche Ordnung verantwortliche Mann "schwach" ist, muss er also vor der weiblichen Sexualität geschützt werden, z. B. durch eine strikte Geschlechtertrennung. Denn die Zerstörung, die durch "die weibliche Verführungskunst" droht, kann nur verhindert werden, wenn der Kontakt beider Geschlechter auf das Nötigste minimiert wird. Folglich werden auf der Grundlage des Prinzips der Ungleichheit Frauen weitgehend vom öffentlichen Leben ausgeschlossen.

Gesellschaften, die – bedingt durch die verdeckte Angst der Männer vor der sexuellen Aktivität der Frau – Frauen durch Geschlechtertrennung und Verhüllung ausgrenzen, sind von einer tief sitzenden sexuellen Unsicherheit geprägt. Durch eine Mischung patriarchalischer Sitten und Traditionen sowie islamischer Verhaltensregeln wird eine sehr große Unsicherheit in Bezug auf Sexualität geschaffen. Sexualität wird letztlich tabuisiert. Die hohen moralischen Vorstellungen und Einschränkungen führen gerade bei Frauen zu erheblicher Sorge und Angst, da ihre Ehre jeden Augenblick verletzt werden könnte.

3.5 Jugendliche Migrantinnen mit islamischem Hintergrund

Die ständige Angst, dass vor allem junge Mädchen sich nicht an die Moralvorstellungen halten und vor der Heirat sexuelle Erfahrungen machen könnten, führt zu einer omnipräsenten Unsicherheit, zu Kontrolle und Beziehungs- und Kommunikationsstörungen, wenn die jungen Mädchen diese Vorstellungen nicht oder nur teilweise teilen. Gebote wie rechtzeitiges Erscheinen in der Familie, Ausgehen (nur) in Begleitung, Vorschriften für Kleidung, Haartracht oder Schmuck können dann den Alltag dieser Mädchen bestimmen.

Den Koranversen, die die Gleichheit der Geschlechter vor Gott belegen, stehen die skizzierten patriarchalischen Ordnungsvorstellungen gegenüber, die die Basis für die Zuweisung geschlechtsspezifischer Rollen und Funktionen bilden. Auch für die Ehe enthält der Koran unterschiedliche Regelungen für Frauen und Männer. Polygamie ist zwar in vielen islamischen Ländern verboten, was aber nicht immer eingehalten wird.

So verlangt der Koran, dass der Mann zu seiner Frau geht, um mit ihr Geschlechtsverkehr zu haben. Die Frau darf das aber nicht ablehnen, denn eine Zurückweisung berechtigt den Mann dazu, sie zu verstoßen. In der Praxis führt das (nicht zuletzt unter dem Aspekt der Zwangsehen) zu häufigen Vergewaltigungen.

Ayaan Hirsi Ali (2005, S. 9), die selbst Ziel fanatischer Gruppen in den Niederlanden geworden ist, schreibt über die Sexualität im Islam: "Ein wichtiges Element im Islam ist die Sexualmoral, die sich von den Werten arabischer Stämme aus den Zeiten ableitet, als der Prophet von Allah dessen Botschaften empfangen hat; eine Kultur, in der Frauen Besitz waren, Besitz der Väter, Brüder, Onkel, Großväter, des Vormunds. Das Wesen der Frau ist auf ihr Jungfernhütchen reduziert. Ihr Schleier erinnert die Außenwelt permanent an die erstickende Moral, die muslimische Männer zum Besitzer der Frauen macht und die sie verpflichtet, sexuelle Kontakte ihrer Mütter, Schwestern, Tanten, Schwägerinnen, Nichten und Ehefrauen zu verhindern. Und nicht nur den Geschlechtsverkehr, sondern auch die Blicke auf einen Mann, oder seinen Arm zu streicheln, oder ihm die Hand zu geben. Das Ansehen des Mannes und seine Ehre stehen und fallen mit dem anständigen, gehorsamen Verhalten seiner weiblichen Familienmitglieder."

4. Konflikte zwischen den Generationen in der Migration

Die Migranten der ersten Generation unterscheiden sich von denjenigen der zweiten und dritten durch den Grad ihrer Verwurzelung in der kulturellen Identität des Herkunftslandes und der Verbundenheit mit traditionellen Wertvorstellungen. Die zweite und die dritte Generation stehen manchmal im Konflikt mit den Wertvorstellungen und Normen der Eltern.

Ein Nichtbefolgen der elterlichen Norm- und Wertvorstellungen empfinden die Eltern als Entwertung ihrer Lebensziele. Der anhaltende Annäherungs-Vermeidung-Konflikt zwischen den Wertvorstellungen der Eltern und der westlichen Kultur führt zu hohen psychosozialen Belastungen der jüngeren Generation, deren Folgen maßgeblich den Erfolg in der Schulbildung, im Beruf und damit der Integration bestimmen (vgl. Shell Studie, 2006). Auch subjektive und objektive Diskriminierung, soziale Isolierung, unzureichender Wohnraum, eine ungünstige Arbeitssituation, ein verunsichernder Rechtsstatus, unzureichende Kompetenzen in der deutschen Sprache und ein unbefriedigtes Kommunikationsbedürfnis verschlechtern die sozialen Bedingungen.

Sowohl die Herkunfts- als auch die Residenzkultur können in verschiedenen Bereichen (Rolle der Familie; Ehr- und Moralvorstellungen, z.B. hinsichtlich der Jungfräulichkeit) aus der Sicht der Kinder und Jugendlichen als unüberwindliche Barrieren gesehen werden. Die Intention, sich für die eine oder die andere Kultur zu entscheiden, verstärkt die innerpsychischen Konflikte. (vgl. Kizilhan, 2002).

Der Rückgriff auf ihre Biografie ist für viele jugendliche Migrantinnen und Migranten relativ schwierig, da anscheinend nur Scherben oder verstreute Puzzleteile ohne einen Bezugsrahmen vorhanden sind. Das Gerüst der Werte und Normen, durch das das Individuum sein Selbstwertgefühl erhält und an dem es sich in zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen orientiert, kann instabil werden, wenn es gleichzeitig in zwei Gesellschaften lebt. Zusätzlich haben diese Kinder und Jugendlichen ihre eigene "Selbstkultur" aus beiden Kulturen entwickelt, die aber nicht ausreichend verbalisiert und darüber hinaus von beiden Kulturen nicht akzeptiert wird (vgl. Kizilhan, 2005).

In der Herkunftskultur verwurzelte Normen und Werte sind von den jugendlichen Migranten z. T. nur oberflächlich rezipiert worden. Sie beziehen sich darauf im alltäglichen Sprachgebrauch ohne wirkliche Reflexion und obwohl die genauen Hintergründe ihnen kaum bekannt sind. Gerade in diese dritte Selbstkultur versuchen radikale Gruppen einzudringen, um die jugendlichen Migranten, meist männlichen Geschlechts, für ihre Zwecke zu gewinnen.

5. Migrantenorganisationen

Familientraditionen, konservativ-archaisches Denken und strenge Sozialriten, die die Migranten vor vierzig Jahren mitbrachten, bestimmten auch den Aufbau und das Verhalten ihrer Organisationen im Aufnahmeland. Es sind Selbstorganisationen, die die gesamte Bandbreite ihrer kulturellen, religiösen und politischen Interessen repräsentieren. Sie reichen von einigen wenigen völlig unpolitischen Kulturvereinen über Organisationen, die versuchen, Integrationspolitik zu betreiben, bis hin zu herkunftsorientierten politischen und religiösen Organisationen.

Die genaue Zahl der Migrantenvereine auf bundesdeutschem Gebiet ist schwer zu ermitteln, Schätzungen bewegen sich bei mehreren Tausend. Viele von ihnen haben sich regional oder überregional in Dachorganisationen zusammengeschlossen. Ähnlich schwierig ist eine präzise Angabe über den Anteil der in Deutschland lebenden Migranten, der in Vereinen organisiert ist oder von ihnen angesprochen wird. Zum einen sind die Selbstorganisationen eine institutionelle Antwort auf die Bedürfnisse der Migranten im Einwanderungskontext. Zum anderen stellen sie aber auch eine Verpflanzung der sozialen und politischen Beziehungen aus dem Herkunftsland dar. Viele von ihnen haben trotz ihrer Existenz in Deutschland in der Vereinsarbeit kaum auf Integration hingearbeitet und die psychosoziale Versorgung ihrer Landsleute vernachlässigt. Eine konservative Haltung und die Tradition, die vor 40 Jahren mitgebracht und konserviert wurden, gepaart mit den politischen,

sozialen, ökonomischen, ethnischen und religiösen Krisen im Heimatland, verhinderten die Integration und verhindern heute noch, dass jugendliche Migranten dies erfolgreich tun können, ohne ihre Bindung zur Herkunftskultur zu verlieren. Auch den Aufnahmeländern fehlt noch immer ein wirkliches Integrationskonzept, das den Migranten eine reale Chance gibt, sich auf der politischen, gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Ebene behaupten zu können.

Jugendliche Migranten können daher schnell von radikalen Organisationen gewonnen werden, da ihnen plötzlich Beachtung geschenkt wird. Sie werden dort mit anderen Jugendlichen zusammengebracht und politisch geschult. Sie bekommen Aufgaben und erleben einen starken Zusammenhalt, wodurch ihr Selbstwertgefühl gestärkt wird. Sie werden mit einer tief sitzenden archaisch-patriarchalischen Denkweise "überzeugt", um ihr Verhalten und Denken zu lenken. Mit nationalen und religiösen Begriffen werden sie politisch und psychologisch-militärisch motiviert, als Kämpfer in den Krieg zu ziehen (vgl. Öztürk, 2007).

Andere Jugendliche, die sich diesen Gruppen nicht anschließen, gründen u. U. selbst so genannte Cliquen in den Großstädten und fallen durch Gewaltbereitschaft und Kriminalität auf.

Es ist aber wichtig, hervorzuheben, dass die Mehrheit der jugendlichen Migranten sich weder radikalen Gruppen anschließt noch Mitglied krimineller Vereinigungen wird. Dennoch dürfen demokratische Gesellschaften und deren Institutionen nicht zulassen, dass junge Menschen in eine derartige Perspektivlosigkeit geraten und sich von der Gesellschaft abwenden.

Für den Migrationsprozess und damit auch für die Integration der Migranten spielen die verschiedenen Migrationstypen eine wichtige Rolle, die bei den Projekten zur Integration mit berücksichtigt werden sollten: a) Arbeitsmigranten, vorwiegend aus südeuropäischen Ländern, und deren nachgezogene Familien, b) Aussiedler, c) Flüchtlinge (Asylbewerber, Kontingentflüchtlinge, Konventionsflüchtlinge, De-Facto-Flüchtlinge etc.) sowie d) Menschen, die illegal im Aufnahmeland leben.

Die psychosozialen Netzwerke von Migranten benötigten fast zwei Generationen, um sich zu orientieren, und beginnen mit der individuellen und kollektiven Neukonstruktion ihrer Identität. Die Vergangenheit der Migranten sollte als ein Bestandteil der Gegenwart gesehen werden, in der vergangene und gegenwärtige Belastungen überwunden und neue interkulturelle Potentiale geschaffen werden können. D.h., dass Migration nicht nur eine räumliche Bewegung zur Veränderung des Lebensmittelpunktes ist; sie ist vielmehr ein folgenreicher Einschnitt in die Identität der migrierenden Person. Selbstkontinuitätssinn (Bewahrung des Zusammenhangs zwischen Vergangenheit und Gegenwart), Selbstbestätigung (Anerkennung in der Interaktion mit anderen Menschen) sowie Kommunikationsfähigkeit und Handlungskompetenz müssen neu erarbeitet werden. Diese befähigen vor allem die jugendlichen Migranten, aber auch ihre psychosozialen Netzwerke, sich gesund in verschiedenen Welten zu bewegen und eine neue dynamische Synthese zu entwickeln (vgl. Borde, 2005).

6. Vergangenheit in der Gegenwart für eine gemeinsame Zukunft: Identität

Auf die vielfältigen Annahmen und Ansätze, die sich im Rahmen psychologischer und soziologischer Fachdiskurse auf Identität und Identitätsbildung beziehen, kann an dieser Stelle nicht eingegangen werden. Festzuhalten ist aber, dass die Anerkennung der mitgebrachten Werte und Normen als ein grundlegender Schritt zum Aufbau einer neuen Identität im Aufnahmeland kaum diskutiert wird. Identität und ihrer Bildung muss im Kontext kultureller Globalisierung mehr Beachtung zuteil werden.

Unter Identität wird im Allgemeinen etwas dem Wesen des Menschen Eigenes verstanden, das sich im Verlauf der Individuation herausbildet und das - je nachdem - ein sehr starres Konstrukt sein kann oder aber über die gesamte Lebensspanne hinweg in einem stetigen Entwicklungsprozess wandelbar ist. Identität ist für jede Person das Wissen darum, wer sie ist, was sie ausmacht, wohin sie sich entwickeln möchte. Identität entsteht prozesshaft. Sie ist die Quelle von Sinn und Erfahrung, die von der Gegenwart aus der Vergangenheit reproduziert wird. So wird auch aus den Integrationserfahrungen ein Teil der Identität. Dieser Prozess des Aushandelns zwischen dem Selbstbild, das der Einzelne von sich entwirft, und dem Bild, das sich seine sozialen Handlungspartner von ihm machen, hat Einfluss auf das Leben in der neuen Heimat. Dabei ist zu differenzieren zwischen personaler und sozialer Identität. Personale Identität meint, dass der Sinn, den eine Person für sich entwickelt, an Werten und Merkmalen orientiert ist, die sie internalisiert hat und die ihr dazu dienen, ihr Leben zu gestalten und sich damit in Einklang zu bringen, z. B. ihr Leben nach religiösen, ethnischen oder individualistischen Zielsetzungen auszurichten (vgl. Kizilhan, 2004). Soziale Identität meint, dass eine Person ihr Leben auch an Kriterien ausrichtet, die es ermöglichen, dass der Einzelne in einer sozialen Gemeinschaft leben kann. Auch hier kann es sich beispielsweise um religiöse, ethnische oder individualistische Merkmale handeln. Wichtig ist jedoch dabei, dass in einer solchen Gemeinschaft viele Menschen ähnliche Orientierungskriterien haben. Wenn dies der Fall ist, entsteht eine sinnstiftende soziale Identität, die einen wichtigen Beitrag für den Zusammenhalt in einer Gemeinschaft, einer Gesellschaft leistet. Insbesondere infolge der Globalisierung können deren kulturelle Attribute so vielfältig sein, dass es sowohl auf der personalen als auch auf der sozialen Ebene zur Herausbildung pluraler Identitäten kommen kann.

Zur Identität jugendlicher Migrantinnen und Migranten

Viele jugendliche Migrantinnen und Migranten in Deutschland besitzen heutzutage, wie ich glaube, mehrere Identitäten. Die eine – die Herkunftsidentität – ist aufs Engste mit Erinnerung, Familie, dem soziokulturellen Umfeld und persönlichen Erfahrungen verwoben; ohne Nationalismusstrukturen, eher patriarchalisch zu verstehen. Sie kann als historisch gewachsene Identität verstanden werden, die von Generation zu Generation weitergegeben wird. Die andere, die "erzwungene" Identität zentriert sich um eine Nation, einen Staat, eine gedachte Gemeinschaft, die mehr umfasst als die ursprüngliche kulturelle Identität und das Gefühl, zu einer Gemeinschaft zu gehören.

In Deutschland sind viele Migranten im Besitz der deutschen Staatsbürgerschaft, ihre Kinder sehen sich zum Teil als Deutsche plus Herkunftsidentität, z. B. Deutsch-Türkinnen etc. Ihre emotionelle Identität wollen sie beibehalten und sehen keinen Widerspruch zu der neu gewonnenen in Deutschland. Es würde auch der Entwicklung und Erziehung von Menschen widersprechen, wenn man sie zwänge, eine neue, nicht klar definierte Identität ohne Zugang zur Vergangenheit anzunehmen. Identität entwickelt sich aus der Vergangenheit und hat in der Gegenwart einen wichtigen Einfluss auf die Identität in der Zukunft.

Mit der Betonung der tatsächlichen oder auch nur vermeintlichen Stärken ihrer Herkunftsidentität und der Abwertung der Stärken der Residenzidentität kompensieren viele Migranten einen drohenden bzw. bereits erlittenen Identitätsverlust. Diese und andere Formen der Dramatisierung von Selbstwahrnehmungen bzw. der Identität von Gemeinschaften und sozialen Gruppen und die damit verbundene Instrumentalisierung von Kultur gelten als typische Mittel zur Sicherung des kulturellen Überlebens sowie zur Erlangung von Würde und Anerkennung. Gleichzeitig verstärken sich dadurch gegenwärtig Tendenzen der Ab- und Ausgrenzung, z. B. im Festhalten an alten Ritualen oder im Abdriften in radikale islamische Gruppen.

Identität ist das Ergebnis eines komplexen und dynamischen Mosaiks. Sie lässt sich nicht wie ein alter Mantel bei der Einreise ins Aufnahmeland ablegen. Genausowenig kann eine Identität verordnet werden. Wer also Menschen – aus welchem Beweggrund auch immer – die Einreise erlaubt, muss damit rechnen, dass Bürgerinnen und Bürger mit vielschichtigen und zum Teil komplexen Identitäten kommen.

Allein aus diesem Grund muss jede Verleugnung der Differenz und der Vielfalt von Identitäten und Kulturen – ob man nun für oder gegen eine multikulturelle Gesellschaft votiert – sowie jeder Versuch der kulturellen Vereinheitlichung zu einer verfehlten und kontraproduktiven Integration der Kulturen und Identitäten führen. Gerade weil wir es mit kultureller und Identitätsvielfalt zu tun haben, müssen wir uns auf fundamentale, an den Menschenrechten orientierte Werte einigen, die bindende Kraft für alle haben.

7. Schlussbetrachtung

Demokratisches Verhalten und Denken aller Beteiligten sind die Grundvoraussetzungen dafür, dass die Integration der nachfolgenden Migranten-Generation gelingen kann. Ich halte die Demokratie mit ihren universalen Menschenrechten für annehmbar für alle Gruppen, Ethnien und Religionen – sie kann mit der Lebensweise jeder dieser Gruppen in Einklang stehen. Dies gilt auch für islamische Gemeinschaften. Sollte dies nicht möglich sein, dann müssen die Menschen mit islamischer Prägung ihre bisherigen Normen und Werte auf den Prüfstand stellen. Dazu gehören Mut, Ehrlichkeit und der wirkliche Wunsch, die eigene Gesellschaft für das Leben in einer guten und würdigen Zukunft in einer immer kleiner werdenden Welt vorzubereiten.

Deshalb muss den jugendlichen Migranten mit islamischem Hintergrund eine politische, kulturelle oder religiöse Alternative gegeben werden, *bevor* sie sich radikalen Organisationen anschließen. Das kann und muss die Gesellschaft sowohl im Herkunfts- als auch im Migrationsland durch ihre Institutionen leisten. Themen wie häusliche Gewalt, "Ehrenmorde", die Rolle der Frau in der Gesellschaft etc. dürfen nicht länger tabuisiert werden. Besonders die Migranten und ihre Organisationen müssen sie diskutieren und Stellung dazu beziehen.

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Zum Autor: Ilhan Kizilhan, Dr. Dipl. Psych., Leit. Dipl. Psychologe, Abteilungsleiter der Michael-Balint-Klinik in Königsfeld, Wissenschaftlicher Berater zur Transkulturellen Psychiatrie/Psychologie, psych. Sachverständiger, Psychotherapeut, Supervisor. Mitarbeiter der Forschungsambulanz, Institut für Psychologie, Universität Freiburg.

Arbeitsschwerpunkte: Psychotraumatologie, klinische Psychologie, Biographieforschung, Migrationsforschung

Adresse: eMail: kizilhan@psychologie.uni-freiburg.de

Österreichisches Studienzentrum für Frieden und Konfliktlösung (ed.), Gute Medien - Böser Krieg ? Medien am schmalen Grat zwischen Cheerleadern des Militärs und Friedensjournalismus. 2007. Münster: LIT.

Terroristische Anschläge und eskalierende politische Konflikte, deren Lösung mit militärischen Eingriffen zu erzwingen versucht wird, sind in den heutigen Medien allgegenwärtig. Hinzu kommt eine immer schnellere Veränderung unserer Medienlandschaft durch Satellitenübertragung und Internet, in Verbindung mit von den Medien transportierten Falschinformationen wie beispielsweise der "Brutkasten-Story" von 1990 oder dem "Brotschlangen-Massaker" von 1992. Eine sorgfältige Auseinandersetzung damit ist dringend erforderlich, um weitere "Öl-ins-Feuer"-Phänomene zu vermeiden. Dies tun nicht nur Medien- und Politikwissenschaftler auf der ganzen Welt, sondern auch Journalisten, Politiker, Sprachwissenschaftler und ein großer Teil der internationalen Öffentlichkeit. Der vorliegende Sammelband "Gute Medien - Böser Krieg?" entstand im Juli 2006 im Rahmen der 23. Internationalen Sommerakademie des Friedenszentrums Burg Schlaining im südlichen Burgenland, wo sich über 350 Besucher und Forscher in diversen Arbeitsgruppen mit Themen wie Pressefreiheit, Demokratie, Kriegsberichterstattung, Aufgaben und Funktion der Medien, Produktionsbedingungen journalistischer Arbeit, sprachlichen und strategischen Aspekte von Berichterstattung auseinandersetzen.

Das Buch ist in vier Teile gegliedert, die jeweils unterschiedlichen Themenkomplexen zugeordnet sind. Einen Schwerpunkt des Buches stellt die Aufgabe der Medien in ihrer Rolle als 4. Gewalt sowohl unter normativen Aspekten als auch in ihrer konkreten Umsetzung dar. Diesem Thema ist vorwiegend der erste Teil gewidmet. Im zweiten Teil werden darüber hinaus die Produktionsbedingungen journalistischer Arbeit beleuchtet, insbesondere die Situation von Journalisten in Krisengebieten. Ergänzend zu den Analysen westlicher Nachrichtenmedien werden im dritten Teil des Buches auch arabische Sender anschaulich beschrieben. Erweitert werden diese Erkenntnisse im vierten Teil durch medienpolitische Konzepte zu einer konfliktsensitiven Berichterstattung, durch konkrete Beispiele für misslungenen objektiven Journalismus und durch Forderungen, die sich daraus für die Zukunft ergeben.

Zur Einführung stellt Thomas Roithner in seinem Vorwort den Zusammenhang zwischen den Beiträgen und aktuellen Entwicklungen der Medienproduktion und -übertragung her.

Gerald Mader erörtert die Grundkonzeption von Burg Schlaining hinsichtlich der europäischen Friedenspolitik und der geplanten Friedensuniversität. Er diskutiert Begriffe wie Frieden, Friedenspolitik, Friedensforschung, humanitäre Interventionen sowie die Politik der Bush-Regierung und bestärkt die Relevanz der Thematik der Sommerakademie mit Forderungen nach gesellschaftlichem Umdenken und dem entsprechenden Beitrag der Medien.

Freimut Duve, Medienbeauftragter der OSZE, geht auf die zunehmende Kommerzialisierung der Medien zu Lasten der Qualität der Berichterstattung ein und schlägt einen historischen Bogen vom ersten zielgerichteten Einsatz der Medien am Beispiel Adolf Hitlers bis zur Berichterstattung über das Ende der Sowjetunion. Er beschäftigt sich mit der Verantwortung von Journalisten und fordert eine Auseinandersetzung mit Fragen nach der Grenze zwischen Information und Unterhaltung, der Grenze der Unabhängigkeit einer Publikation, der Bedeutung von Kriegsjournalismus für den Rezipienten, mit Mechanismen moderner Kriegsberichterstattung und ihren Folgen für politische Prozesse und

insbesondere damit, welche Funktion Feindbilder für die Beteiligten und Journalisten haben.

Der erste Teil des Buches liefert ein allgemeines Bild über die Entwicklung der Berichterstattung seit dem 19. Jahrhundert, Positionen zur Funktion der Medien in ihrer Rolle als 4. Gewalt und Informationen über die Besonderheiten von Kriegsberichterstattung und den Zusammenhang zwischen Medien und Hegemonie.

Mira Beham erläutert die Funktion der Medien als Informationsquelle für die Bevölkerung und skizziert einen Abriss der Entwicklung und Veränderungen der Berichterstattung seit dem amerikanischen Sezessionskrieg. Dabei beleuchtet sie Aspekte wie Geschwindigkeit der Nachrichtenlieferung, Bedeutung der Fotografie in der Kriegsberichterstattung; Propaganda, die im 2. Weltkrieg ein neues Ausmaß durch die Fernsehübertragung gewann, die "embedded journalists"-Thematik und Einflüsse der aktuellen Internetnachrichtenproduktion. Sie schließt ihren Beitrag mit einem Katalog von Kriterien zur Messung der Qualität einer Berichterstattung.

Heinz Loquai ergänzt seine Darstellung der Funktion der Medien um die Forderung nach ihrer Verantwortung für eine wahrheitsgemäße faire Berichterstattung. Er geht insbesondere auf Manipulationstechniken wie die Verwendung von Metaphern und Euphemismen und die besondere Wirkung von Bildern in der Berichterstattung ein und veranschaulicht diese Mechanismen an vier konkreten Beispielen aus der deutschen Presse.

Der letzte Autor des ersten Teils, Werner Ruf, stellt den Zusammenhang zwischen Hegemonie im Sinne von Dominanz im Bewusstsein und Medien her. Er beschreibt Auswirkungen von Hegemonie wie beispielsweise den Verlust politisch-emanzipatorischer Bestrebungen, welchen Stellenwert der gesunde Menschenverstand dabei hat und wie er solchen Effekten entgegenwirken kann. Anhand der Lasswell-Formel erläutert er die Aufrechterhaltung und Verstärkung der Hegemonie durch die Medien und welchen Einfluss Informationsmonopole auf die Themenpräsenz der Nachrichten ausüben.

Abschließend beschreibt er Ansätze für eine mögliche Gegentendenz zur vorhandenen Hegemonie und nennt reale Beispiele wie Friedensdemonstrationen, den arabischen Sender Al-Jazira oder die Kritik der Medien am Irak-Krieg als bestehende "Gegenöffentlichkeit".

Im zweiten Teil des Buches erhält der Leser detaillierte Informationen über die strategische Manipulation der Medien sowohl durch das US-Militär als auch durch die US-Regierung.

Jürgen Rose erörtert Propagandamethoden wie direkte und indirekte Zensur, Desinformation und Manipulation und stellt anhand der "Joint Doctrine for Public Affairs" des Pentagon und einer "Air Force Doctrine" die Vorschriften für die Handhabung von Informationslieferungen für die Öffentlichkeit vor. Darüber hinaus beschreibt er das "embedding-project" für Journalisten, welche Privilegien die teilnehmenden Berichtersteller erhielten und welchen Auflagen sie sich verpflichten mussten. Er schließt seinen Beitrag mit einem Ausblick auf die regierungs- und militärgesteuerte Informationspolitik, welche bereits für den möglichen Krieg gegen den Iran eingesetzt wurde.

Thomas Seifert beschreibt am Beispiel des "Krieges gegen den Terror" die Vorgehensweise der US-Regierung gegenüber Medien und Journalisten. Sein Beitrag ergänzt das "embedded-project" noch um konkrete Sicherheitsprobleme für Journalisten in Krisengebieten und Grundsätze, welche die Medienunternehmen diesbezüglich beachten sollten.

Der dritte Teil des Buches setzt sich mit der Entwicklung der arabischen Medien auseinander, insbesondere mit dem Sender Al-Jazira und dem Einfluss der Satellitentechnik auf die Berichterstattung.

Aktham Suliman geht auf die Rolle der Medien und insbesondere des Senders Al-Jazira nach dem 11. September ein. Er skizziert die Entwicklung der arabischen Fernsehsender davor und welche Veränderungen sich danach für Al-Jazira ergeben haben. Dabei betrachtet er den Sender aus drei Blickwinkeln: 1. der Sicht der Anderen auf Al-Jazira, 2. des Blicks des Senders auf sich selbst und 3. des Blicks von Al-Jazira auf die Anderen.

Karin Kneissl charakterisiert die Berichterstattung in den arabischen Staaten und deren Veränderung durch technische Einflüsse wie die Verbreitung der Satellitensender und stellt dabei ihre Perspektive auf Al-Jazira dar. Sie liefert ein anschauliches Bild der Inhalte arabischer Sender, vergleicht

verschiedene Länder wie Ägypten, Algerien, Libanon, Saudi Arabien und Tunesien und erläutert die Rolle des Weblog als Medium des Protests gegen das Regime.

Abschließend werden im 4. Teil des Buches zunächst verschiedene normative Anforderungen an einen konfliktsensitiven Journalismus erörtert, ein konkretes Beispiel für die Missachtung einer objektiven Berichterstattung beschrieben und die Rolle der UNO bei der Verbreitung von Informationen beleuchtet.

Nadine Bilke erläutert, inwiefern Massenmedien die Basis für die Meinungs- und Willensbildung darstellen und welche besondere Verantwortung sich daraus für die Trias Journalismus, Medienorganisation und Publikum ergibt. Des Weiteren stellt sie konkrete Forderungen für die praktische Umsetzung eines friedensjournalistischen Konzepts auf, welche v.a. unter Transparenz, Wahrhaftigkeit, allparteilicher Perspektive und dem Vermeiden von Konkurrenzlogik in der Konfliktkonzeptualisierung zusammengefasst werden können.

Andreas Zumach liefert als Fallbeispiel für die Missachtung objektiver Berichterstattung die Darstellung des Irans in der Presse und erläutert anhand der fünf Aspekte Kontext, Fakten, Interpretation von Begriffen und Äußerungen, Personalisierung und Lösungsvorschläge, welches Bild dadurch vom Iran erzeugt wurde. Er belegt seine Ausführungen über die ökonomisch-strategischen Aspekte mit überzeugenden Zahlen und ergänzt sein Kapitel mit dem Beispiel einer gelungenen Darstellung konkreter Lösungsansätze für die Deeskalation des Iran-Konflikts in der Berliner "tageszeitung".

Hans-Christoph Graf Sponeck betrachtet das Wirken der UNO und im Besonderen des Sicherheitsrates und deren Einflüsse auf die Kriegsentwicklung im Irak. Letztlich leitet er aus stattgefundenem Fehlverhalten zehn konkrete Konsequenzen für Politik, Medien und Zivilgesellschaft ab.

In dem hier vorgestellten Band "Gute Medien - Böser Krieg" wird auf eindrückliche Weise ein umfassendes Bild sowohl der westlichen als auch der arabischen Kriegsberichterstattung gezeichnet und anhand realer Beispiele veranschaulicht. Insbesondere der Einfluss des Militärs und politischer Organisationen werden deutlich. Fälle konfliktverschärfender Berichterstattung werden an konkreten Darstellungen aufgezeigt und klare Konsequenzen daraus abgeleitet. Die abgeleiteten Forderungen wenden sich nicht nur an Journalisten und Medienunternehmen, sondern darüber hinaus auch an Politik und Zivilgesellschaft.

Mit dieser Vielschichtigkeit setzt sich das Buch von vielen anderen eher einseitig auf einen speziellen Bereich wie die Medienproduktion oder politische Analysen fokussierten Werken ab und gibt einen facettenreichen Überblick. Die Beiträge werden überwiegend durch hervorragend recherchierte Fakten gestützt.

Alle Autoren präsentieren ihre Thematik spannend und gut verständlich. Einzig das Kapitel von Werner Ruf erfordert zu Beginn ein wenig Durchhaltevermögen, da der Zusammenhang zwischen Hegemonie und Medienproduktion nicht sofort ersichtlich wird. Der Einstieg wirkt zunächst eher ideologisch, jedoch nach den ersten Seiten wird die Medienrelevanz deutlich.

Insgesamt stellen die umfangreichen Informationen aus den verschiedenen Themenbereichen eine interessante Lektüre auch für Spezialisten auf einzelnen Gebieten der Friedensforschung dar und ergänzen sich gegenseitig ausgezeichnet.

Dieses Buch kann das Kontextwissen von Friedenswissenschaftlern jeglicher Disziplinen bereichern.

Monika Spohrs

Über die Autorin: Monika Spohrs, geboren 1965 in Eppstein/ Hessen. 1999 2006 Studium der Psychologie und Medienwissenschaften an der Universität Konstanz. Seit 2002 Mitarbeiterin in der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung. Arbeitsschwerpunkt: Experimentelle Rezeptionsforschung.
Adresse: Fachbereich Psychologie, Universität Konstanz, D 78457 Konstanz.

Adresse: eMail: Monika.Spohrs@uni-konstanz.de

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