

New World Order Rhetorics

A comparative study of American and European media during the Gulf War

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1. Introduction

One of the most permanent and most alluring slogans in the 20th century Western political rhetoric has been the promise for a new start. Winning political parties often get their power by campaigning for a fresh and renewed way of governing, by promising to change - eventually and for ever - the "old" and spoiled ways of politics.

For many reasons, the popularity of "novelty" has been especially typical of the political culture of the United States. First, progress is the central concept in the American political philosophy and popular mythology, and newness has become a synonym of progress. The USA, however, is a state with revolutionary traditions, and in the rhetoric of Samuel Adams, Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin the meaning of "New World" was enlarged from geographical content into an ethical and political characterization. (Jowett & O'Donnell 1986, 51-59)

Secondly, the United States is a two-party democracy in which administrations (if not policies) regularly and completely change according to the outcome of elections. This personified and strict on-and-off system of government has the tendency to sharpen political rhetoric compared with states of multi-party system and coalition governments.

Third, the methods of commercial advertising and promotion - with the leading motive of replacing old products by new ones - have for a long time influenced the American political campaigning. An indicative and stereotypical case was the television campaign of Dwight D. Eisenhower in the 1952 presidential race against the democrat Adlai Stevenson. In one TV-spot an anonymous woman asks: "The Democrats have made mistakes, but aren't their intentions good?". Eisenhower replies: "Well, if the driver of your school bus runs into a truck, hits a lamppost, drives into a ditch, you don't say his intentions are good. You get a new bus driver". (Spero 1980, 36-37)

No wonder that the modern history of the "New World" politics has witnessed a series of administrations with slogans of novelty, the most famous being Roosevelt's "New Deal" and Kennedy's "New Frontier". Such concepts as "New Leadership" and "New Hope" have been used as well.

A logical counterpart in the American political speaking for big hopes and promises has been the rhetorical use of fear and uncertainty by predicting an immediate crisis in future. This tendency reflects

the apocalyptic tradition of American public speaking, a mixture of religious Free-Churchism and populism in political life. The early development of medialization of the American politics must be noticed here as well. Without class-based mass parties and their organizational publicities, the central political publicity of American politics has for long been the media. The commercial and generic demands of the media have shaped the forms of American political speaking and advanced sharp, shocking and black and white political argument.

The demands of the media and the mixture of hope and fear, with its religious referencies, can most clearly be seen in the political appearances of Ronald Reagan.

Throughout his political career Reagan tried to create an atmosphere of crisis (Erickson 1985). The very name of his famous speech A TIME FOR CHOOSING (1964) refers to the hard core of his message: The whole Western civilization is at stake now. The next actions are decisive, time is short:

"Already some of the architects of accomodation have hinted what their decision will be if their plan fails and we are faced with the final ultimatum... 'Better red than dead' If we

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are to believe that nothing is worth the dying, when did this begin? Should Moses have told the children of Israel to live in slavery rather than dare the wilderness? Should Christ have refused the Cross? ... Youand I have a rendezvous with destiny. We can preserve for our children this, the last best hope of man on earth, or we can sentence them to take the first step into a thousand years of darkness."

In 1985 Reagan said in his speech on terrorism that "these terrorist states are now engaged in acts of war against the government and people of the United States". When dealing with tiny Nicaragua, Reagan used the following expressions: "totalitarian communism on the mainland of this hemisphere", "communism on our doorstep", "a dictatorship that threatens this entire hemisphere", "a Russian foothold on the American mainland", "a threat to the open border on our south" etc. (Luostarinen 1986).

When this extremist tradition of political rhetoric is combined with the international missionarism and hegemonical aspirations of the United States, slogans like "The New World Order" used by president Bush in the Gulf War, are created. They are transformations of the culture of American domestic politics into the international context.

The promise for a better future is especially typical of political propaganda in times of war and crisis. War efforts must be legitimized, and the stereotypical ethos is a perspective of a future which is worth the sacrifice: fair, prosperous, free, democratic etc. In its typical form, The Promise is a simple transformation of religious and family values: patience and sacrifices of the present time will get a manifold compensation in the future.

The most famous predecessor of the New World Order slogan was used by American president Woodrow Wilson (in office 1913-1921) who, in the midst of the World War I, promised "to make the world safe for democracy". In his "14 points" programme in January 1918 Wilson promised independence for nationalities of the Austria-Hungary Dual Monarchy. He - as Harold D. Lasswell puts it - "declared war upon autocracies everywhere, and solemnly adhered to his distinction between the German people and the German rulers" (Lasswell 1927, 216). In the popular media discourse, Wilson's ideas got the following

form: This war will be the last war, the war to end all wars. When the despots are dethroned, a purely democratic system will be established. (Taylor 1990, 173-174, Knightley 1982, 97-119)

Wilson has been praised for his skills - Lasswell calls him "the great generalissimo of the propaganda front" - and not without reason. The same principles - expression of altruism, distinction between the people and their rulers and promise for a new, fair and constant world order - have been used since that several times with a great success.

George Bush used the concept "New World Order" in a very similar way. When launching the concept in the US Congress on 11th September 1990 he said:

"We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward a historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times...a New World Order can emerge - a new era, freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony".

Key expressions here are:

- "a unique and extraordinary moment" (urgency to act immediately),
- "The crisis...as grave as it is" (fear of catastrophe),
- "A New World Order can emerge" (promise for bright future).

This is an almost classical formula of war speech, and it was varied by Bush by using different formulations:

"What is at stake [in the war] is more than one small country. It is a big idea. A New World Order where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the

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universal aspirations of mankind - peace and security, freedom and the rule of law". (30th January 1991)

In his speeches, George Bush compared Saddam Hussein with Adolf Hitler. He openly referred to the so-called appeasement policy: as the case of Hitler proves, dictators like Saddam Hussein must be stopped as soon as possible, otherwise they get encouraged and have time for further armament. Originally, appeasement policy was followed by British prime minister Neville Chamberlain from 1937 to 1939 to avoid war by agreeing to transfer the Sudeten German areas of Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany as Hitler demanded. Later on, it has become a synonym for soft, weak and "dovish" politics with good intentions but catastrophic consequences.

Nazi Germany and Adolf Hitler are perhaps the most widely known villains of modern Western history, familiar enough for the American public. Metaphorical use of Hitler as a legitimization of unbending policy

indicates that the consequences of other approaches would be in an apocalyptic scale. This "German factor" is used in this study as one contextual dimension indicating the penetration of the "New World Order" logic and argumentation in the media discourse.

The second contextual dimension in which Bush embedded the concept "New World Order" was the acute and demanding political situation in international life. The Berlin Wall went down in November 1989, and subsequently the communist regimes of the Eastern Block collapsed like dominoes. The Cold War was declared to be over, and the disarmament process progressed with astonishing speed. The Soviet Union, having the public initiative in international relations during the first years of Gorbachev leadership, was retreating in all fronts. Gorbachev's "common European home" was wiped out by the wind of history. It was a splendid moment for the Bush government to rise its visibility, to grasp the initiative and to leave its permanent mark into history. The time was ripe for new slogans like "New Europe" and "New Atlanticism". (Ramsbotham 1994, 512-514).

The chance to grasp a "historical role" surely motivated the US government to emphasize the urgency to act fast and decisively to capture the "right moment" before it was gone. According to the logic of the argumentation, there are crucial moments, turning points in the history of humankind, in which development dramatically changes into worse or into better. When the horrors of the Cold War and ideological division of the world were over, it was the responsibility of this generation to act "now or never".

The third contextual dimension of the concept "New World Order" was its content, revitalization of the idea of international community which protects the rights of smaller nations. Long time before the beginning of the 90s, post-war hopes concerning the role of the United Nations had turned into scepticism and even cynical doubts about the UN's competence to fulfil its great tasks and commitments. Like the League of Nations proved powerless to keep peace during the inter-war period, the authority and respect of the UN had been challenged by the "realpolitik" of the superpower conflicts and intrigues. In the Gulf War the United States promised to "serve together with Arabs, Europeans, Asians and Africans in defence of principle and the dream of a New World Order", as George Bush put it in November 1990. The principle of the "fair game" should guide the international life again, and if the UN should prove to be too bureaucratic and slow in implementing it, it would be surpassed by more decisive forces.

In the following empirical analysis, these three contextual dimensions are used as variables when analysing the impact and influence of the New World Order rhetoric in the media discourse.

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2. Design of the Study

In a comparative study of $n = 4096$ news items from American, European and some Third World media (Kempf, 1996) only $n = 136$ items made use of New World Order rhetorics, as defined by allegation (+) or query (-) of one or several of the following style characteristics:

1. The "Germany" factor - lessons from the past: It is stated that dictators must not be encouraged by showing signals of weakness and/or it is referred to history (appeasement policy/Hitler) in order to suggest that conclusion.
2. The "right moment" factor - where we are now: It is stated that the moment of a new start must not be missed and/or it is referred to the present historical situation (end of communism/ victory of democracy / reutilization of the UN) in order to suggest that conclusion.
3. The "fair game" factor - where we are going now: It is stated to be the aim of the new policy that justice and ethical principles should rule international relations and/or it is referred to the rights of small nations in order to suggest that fruits of violence must not be accepted, etc.

Table 1: The media sample

type of media / country	Prestige paper	Popular press	Provincial paper
Finland (SF)	Helsinki Sanomat	Ilta-Sanomat	Turun Sanomat
Germany (D)	Süddeutsche Zeitung	Bild-Zeitung	Südkurier
Norway (N)	Aftenposten	Verdens Gang	Bergens Tidende
Sweden (S)	Dagens Nyheter	Expressen	Nerikes Allehanda
America (USA)	Washington Post	Akron Beacon Journal	-

From an aspired separation between news and commentary point of view, 3.3% of news items containing New World Order rhetorics still is a rather high portion, which is mostly due to uncommented quotations from political leaders who made use of this kind of rhetorics in their speeches and public statements. On the other hand, it must be expected, that both, a more extensive and more detailed launching into the vision of a New World Order to be established, and a more reserved and critical dealing with this propaganda slogan could be found in the analysis of editorials.

In order to test this conjecture, all editorials which appeared in the American and European print media analysed by Kempf (1996) (cf. Table 1) during the pre-war phase (August 2, 1990 - January 16, 1991),^[1] and all editorials that appeared there during any of the timespots

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- January 17-19, 1991 (Beginning of the air raids against Iraq).
- February 13-15, 1991 (Bombing of the Amirya bunker: Iraqi civilian victims).
- February 21-23, 1991 (Last peace proposals before the start of the ground offensive)
- February 27-28, 1991 (Military defeat of Iraq).
- April 26-27, 1991 (Allied measures in protection of Iraqi Kurds).
- August 25-27, 1992 (Allied measures in protection of Iraqi Shias)
- January 14-15, 1993. (Bombing of Baghdad in order to force Iraq to fulfill to the conditions of ceasefire)

were analysed.

In these media, a total of 187 editorials were found, which contained New World order rhetorics (cf. Table 2).

Although there were no provincial papers included in the American sample, the relatively low number of editorials containing New World Order rhetorics in US-papers suggests that New World Order Rhetorics

formed a propaganda myth which aimed not so much at the American public than at the international public outside the United States.

Especially the Swedish editorials (which had to cope with a long tradition of political neutrality) and the German editorials (which had to cope with a strong anti-war movement) made use of this propaganda myth in order to stimulate support of the Gulf War.

Table 2: National origin of the analysed editorials.

country	n
SF	8
G	59
N	35
S	70
USA	15
	187

3. Analysis of News Items

The analysis of news items (Kempf 1996) had showed, that all style characteristics of New World Order rhetorics were quite often approved of, but quite seldomly denied or questioned (cf. Table 4).

Table 3: Analysis of News Items: Goodness of fit statistics

Nclass	* LOG-Like.	* Npar.	* LIK.ratio	* DF.	* AIC
1	* -317.055	* 6	* 151.071	* 57	* 646.110
2	* -285.898	* 13	* 88.756	* 50	* 597.795
3	* -266.078	* 20	* 49.118	* 43	* 572.156
=> 4	* -253.103	* 27	* 23.167	* 36	* 560.205 <=
5	* -251.302	* 34	* 19.566	* 29	* 570.605

Saturated model :		* -241.519			

According to Latent Class Analysis, four latent rhetorical patterns could be identified (cf. Table 3). These latent styles of New World Order rhetorics can be described as follows:

1. Style 1 (43.3%): "Lessons from the past" rhetorics.
 - As a rule (98.1%) the Germany factor is used for argumentation: it is stated that dictators must not be encouraged by showing signals of weakness and/or it is referred to history (appeasement policy/Hitler) in order to suggest that conclusion.
 - Only rarely (5.1%) these arguments are denied, doubted or questioned.
 - Occasionally (8.6%) the argumentation is supported by the fair game factor (where are we going now).
2. Style 2 (27.9%): "Right moment" rhetorics.
 - As a rule (96.2%) the right moment factor is used for argumentation: It is stated that the moment of a new start must not be missed and/or it is referred to the present historical situation in order to suggest that conclusion.
 - Only rarely (7.9%) this argument is denied, doubted or questioned.
 - Sometimes (20.6%) the argumentation is supported by the fair game factor (where are we going now).
 - Sometimes (16.3%) it is supported by the Germany factor (lessons from the past).
3. Style 3 (24.4%): "Fair game" rhetorics.
 - Without exemption (100.0%) the fair game factor is used for argumentation: It is stated to be the aim of the new policy that justice and ethical principles should rule international relations and/or it is referred to the rights of small nations in order to suggest that fruits of violence must not be accepted, etc.
4. Style 4 (4.4%): "Refutation of fair game rhetorics"
 - Without exemption (100.0%) the fair game factor is denied, doubted or questioned.

Table 4: Analysis of News Items: Latent styles and over-all distribution of style characteristics.

g	pg	*	1+	1-	2+	2-	3+	3-
1	0.433	*	0.981	0.051	0.000	0.000	0.086	0.017
2	0.279	*	0.163	0.000	0.962	0.079	0.206	0.000
3	0.244	*	0.000	0.000	0.013	0.000	1.000	0.000
4	0.044	*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
	1.000	*	0.471	0.022	0.272	0.022	0.338	0.051

Within these patterns (cf. Table 4) the different dimensions of New World Order rhetorics appear more or less independently of each other. Only in style 2, which is dominated by the right moment factor, the other dimensions are included to reasonable degree also. Systematic refutation of the New World Order rhetorics was mainly directed against the fair game rhetorics (Style 4), but did not doubt the Germany factor nor the right moment factor.

4. Analysis of Editorials

The over-all distribution of style characteristics (cf. Table 6) shows that the editorials were more critical about the New World Order than the News Items. Both, doubt/denial of the Germany factor (chi-square = 7.1308, df = 1, $p < 0.01$) and doubt/denial of the fair game factor (chi-square = 9.2157, df = 1, $p < 0.0025$) occur more frequently in the editorials than in the sample of news items.

With respect to all other style characteristics there are no significant differences between editorials and

news items, however. In particular doubt/denial of the right moment factor occurs in the editorials as seldomly as in the news items (chi-square = 2.0119, df = 1, p > 0.01). This points at the fact that the End of the Cold War was indeed the right moment - and America used the historical moment to establish her new hegemony.

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As in the analysis of news items, Latent Class Analysis identified this distribution to be a mixture distribution of four latent styles (cf. Table 5)

Table 5: Analysis of Editorials: Goodness of fit statistics

Nclass	* LOG-Like.	* Npar.	* LIK.ratio	* DF.	* AIC
1	* -549.602	* 6	* 163.708	* 57	* 1111.203
2	* -520.544	* 13	* 105.593	* 50	* 1067.088
3	* -499.357	* 20	* 63.219	* 43	* 1038.714
=> 4	* -485.725	* 27	* 35.956	* 36	* 1025.451 <=
5	* -483.747	* 34	* 31.999	* 29	* 1035.494
6	* -481.688	* 41	* 27.881	* 22	* 1045.376

Saturated model :		* -467.748			

From Table 6 we see, that these latent styles of New World Order rhetorics were quite similar to those, found in the analysis of news items.

Table 6: Analysis of Editorials: Latent styles and over-all distribution of style characteristics.

g	pg	*	1+	1-	2+	2-	3+	3-
1	0.383	*	1.000	0.102	0.208	0.000	0.134	0.001
2	0.176	*	0.000	0.030	1.000	0.121	0.029	0.000
3	0.302	*	0.060	0.020	0.250	0.035	1.000	0.230
4	0.139	*	0.270	0.331	0.000	0.154	0.000	0.652

	1.000	*	0.439	0.096	0.332	0.053	0.358	0.160

- Style 1 puts the Germany factor in the foreground and corresponds to the lessons from the past rhetorics found in the analysis of news items.
 - Typical for 38.3% of the editorials it is used slightly less frequently than in the news items (43.3%), however.
 - Moreover, the argument does not stand as isolated as in the news items, but is
 - sometimes supported by the right moment factor (20.8%) which does not occur at all in the lessons from the past rhetorics as it is presented in the news items (0.0%), and

- sometimes it is supported by the fair game factor (13.4%) which plays less role in the news items (8.6%).
 - The Germany factor, however, is also seen more critical (10.2% doubt) than in the news items (5.1%).
2. Similar as in the analysis of news items, style 2 puts the focus on the right moment factor. This occurs less often (17.6%) than in the news items (27.9%), however.
 - In contrast to the news items, the right moment factor stands quite isolated here. It is not supported by the Germany factor at all (0.0%) and only rarely by the fair game factor (2.9%).
 3. Style 3 puts the fair game factor in the foreground and corresponds to the fair game rhetorics as used in the news items. Typical for 30.2% of the editorials this style is used more frequently than in the news items (24.4%), however.
 - Again, the argument stands less isolated, but is
 - often supported by the right moment factor (25.0%) which occurred only rarely (1.3%) in the news items.

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- Again, the fair game factor is seen more critically (23.0% doubt) than in the news items (0.0%)
- Style 4 "Criticism of New World Order myth" corresponds to the refutation of fair game rhetorics as found in the analysis of news items. As compared with the news items
 - the criticism of the New World Order myth occurs much more frequently (13.9%) in the editorials than in the news items (4.4%), however, and
 - the argumentation against the New World Order is much more complex, also:
 - While the news items based criticism of the New World Order rhetorics solely on doubt and denial of the fair game factor (100.0%), the fair game factor is doubted less frequently (65.2%)
 - quite often (33.1%) the criticism of the New World Order myth questions the Germany factor, and
 - sometimes (15.4%) the right moment factor, also.
 - In contrast to the news items, in their criticism of New World Order rhetorics, the editorials present not only negative arguments, but also concur with the Germany factor, quite often (27.0%).

5. Joint Analysis of Editorials and News Items

In order to test whether the difference in styles within editorials and news items is statistically significant, a joint Latent Class Analysis of editorials and news items was computed, which once again led to the identification of four latent styles (cf. Table 7).

Table 7: Joint Analysis of Editorials and News Items: Goodness of fit statistics

Nclass	* LOG-like.	* Npar.	* LIK.ratio	* DF.	* AIC
1	* -877.709	* 6	* 293.254	* 57	* 1767.418
2	* -820.250	* 13	* 178.336	* 50	* 1666.500
3	* -793.179	* 20	* 124.194	* 43	* 1626.358
=> 4	* -757.143	* 27	* 52.121	* 36	* 1568.285 <=
5	* -753.912	* 34	* 45.661	* 29	* 1575.825

Saturated model : * -731.082

Comparing the joint analysis of editorials and news items with their distinct analyses by means of a likelihood ratio test showed, that the styles of New World Order rhetorics in editorials and in news items do not differ significantly from each other (chi-square = 36.63, df = 27, p > 0.10).

Table 8: Joint Analysis of Editorials and News Items: Latent styles and over-all distribution of style characteristics.

g	pg	*	1+	1-	2+	2-	3+	3-
1.	0.349	*	1.000	0.058	0.067	0.000	0.009	0.000
2.	0.200	*	0.117	0.019	1.000	0.093	0.001	0.000
3.	0.347	*	0.169	0.033	0.240	0.018	1.000	0.125
4.	0.105	*	0.201	0.280	0.000	0.148	0.000	0.680
	1.000	*	0.452	0.065	0.307	0.040	0.350	0.115

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The latent styles identified in the joint analysis (cf. Table 8) thus give the best description of the complete data and are characteristic for the New World order rhetorics in both, editorials and news items. These styles of New World Order rhetorics can be described as follows:

- Style 1 (34.9%) "lessons from the past" puts the Germany factor (100.0%) in the foreground. Thereby, the Germany factor stands similarly isolated as in the news items analysis, and
 - is only rarely supported by the right moment factor (6.7%);
 - in some cases (5.8%) the Germany factor is doubted or denied.
- Style 2 (20.0%) "right moment rhetorics" puts the focus on the right moment factor. Thereby, the right moment argument stands less isolated than in the analysis of editorials, but more isolated than in the analysis of news items.
 - It is sometimes (16.9%) supported by the Germany factor,
 - but nearly never (0.1%) by the fair game factor.
 - Only rarely (9.3%) the right moment factor is doubted or denied.
- Style 3 (34.7%) "fair game rhetorics" puts the fair game factor (100.0%) in the foreground. Thereby, the fair game factor stands less isolated than in the news items analysis.
 - It is often (24.0%) supported by the right moment factor.
 - Sometimes (16.9) it is supported by the Germany factor.
 - Sometimes (12.5%) the fair game factor is doubted or denied.
- Style 4 (10.5%) "Criticism of the New World Order myth" never supports the right moment factor (0%) nor the fair game factor (0%). Similar as in the analysis of editorials, the argumentation against the New World Order is more complex than in the analysis of news items. While the news items based criticism of the New World Order myth solely on doubt and denial of the fair game factor (100.0%),
 - the fair game factor is doubted less frequently (68.0%), while
 - the criticism of the New World Order myth questions the Germany factor quite

- often (28.0%), and
- sometimes (14.8%) the right moment factor, also.
- As in the analysis of editorials and in contrast to the analysis of news items, the criticism of the New World Order myth involves not solely negative arguments, but sometimes concurs with the Germany factor (20.1%).

A chi-square test unveiled that the different types of texts (editorials vs. news items) also did not differ with respect to preference of the various styles (Chi-square = 5.34, df = 3, $p > 0.10$).

Table 9: Joint analysis of editorials and news items: style usage in different countries. (Chi-square = 55.07, df = 12, $p < 0.001$)

g	SF	G	N	S	USA	Total
1	0.3323	0.3990	0.4854	0.1626	0.4539	0.349
2	0.2381	0.1033	0.3009	0.1940	0.3591	0.200
3	0.3776	0.4022	0.0610	0.4967	0.1776	0.347
4	0.0520	0.0955	0.1528	0.1467	0.0094	0.105
	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.000

Similarly as in the news items analysis (Kempf, 1996) there are significant differences in style usage between the various countries, however (cf. Table 9).

- German, Finnish and the Swedish media deviate from the other countries' media by putting more focus on fair game rhetorics (style 3) than on the right moment aspect (style 2).

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- The Norwegian and American media, on the contrary, made only little use of fair game rhetorics (style 3), and put the focus on lessons to be learned from the past (style 1) and on the right moment to do so (style 2).
- While extremely little criticism of the New World Order myth was found in the American media (style 4 nearly did not occur at all), however, Norwegian media were more critical about the New World Order than all other countries but Sweden (style 4).

As regards different types of media (chi-square = 12.88, df = 9, $p > 0.10$) and time series (chi-square = 14.42, df = 9, $p > 0.10$), no significant differences in style usage could be found.

6. Conclusions

In order to understand the use of the slogan "New World Order" in both the American and the European media, it is necessary to make note of the speciality of the American political discourse.

First, the slogan belongs to the type of worn-out, grandiose one-liners which most often have proved to be empty or misleading and which professional journalists tend to handle with certain scepticism. Acceptance of that kind of a slogan is a clear sign of strong commitment from the side of journalists.

As the comparison of new world order rhetorics in editorials and news items from the Gulf War demonstrated, there was neither a qualitative nor a quantitative difference in the rhetorical patterns

of New World Order rhetorics used in the two types of texts, however.

- The same rhetorical patterns that were quoted from political leaders in the news items were repeated by the journalists who wrote the editorials, which
- also did not differ with respect to their relative preference of the various styles of New World Order rhetorics.

Second, the "New World Order" has a taste of American ostentatious style of rhetoric which, more or less, differs from the political culture of Europe, at least in its Northern part. Accordingly, the European media proved to be much more critical about the "New World Order" slogan than the American ones in which nearly no criticism was to be found at all.

Third, although the "New World Order" is a very American political concept, growing from the rhetorical tradition of the "New World", and thus might be expected to have restricted success in the European media discourse only, the results of the present study show, that New World Order rhetorics aimed not so much at the American Public than at the international public outside the United States. Especially in Germany which faced a strong anti-war movement, and in Sweden which had to cope with a long tradition of political neutrality, the editorials jumped at the idea of a "New World Order" much more often than was the case in the U.S.A.

Fourth, the "New World Order" owes for the rhetoric of the United Nations Charter and the CSCE resolutions which makes it more alluring, more difficult to resist and more capable to penetrate the basic cynicism of journalism.

In particular the German, Swedish and Finnish media proved to be highly susceptible to the promise that justice and ethical principles should rule international relations. The Norwegian media, on the other hand, followed the American example by focusing their rhetorics more strongly on lessons to be learned from the past and on the right moment to do so.

Fifth, the "New World Order" is the kind of a superpower slogan that one would not expect to get unreserved support in smaller nations like the Nordic countries. Different kinds of "orders" have been implemented in the recent history of Europe; even Hitler promised a new and better European order.

In accordance with this assumption, the Finnish media were quite reserved towards the "New World Order" slogan. Finnish editorials made little use of New World order rhetorics only. And, though the Norwegian editorials repeated the New World Order myth twice as often, and the Swedish editorials even four times as often as the Finnish did, Norwegian and Swedish media proved to be especially critical about the New World Order promise.

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Footnote

[\[1\]](#) Including the timespots

- August 2-7, 1990 (Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait)
- November 28-30, 1990 (UN Security Council's ultimatum to Iraq)
- January 12-14, 1991 (US-Congress vote for a military intervention)