Germany's Options in Afghanistan

Germany's military mission in Afghanistan has become increasingly politicised in the eight years since it was launched. Political and ideological differences between parties and even between ministries are becoming more pronounced, not less. This trend narrows the room for manoeuvre and limits the strategic debate. Greater instability in Kunduz province, at the heart of Germany's area of regional responsibility in Afghanistan, has two immediate effects: it both increases the need to act decisively and it heightens the risk of political paralysis in Berlin. This article argues that the latter is likely to prevail.


Timo Noetzel and Thomas Rid
For the past eight years, Germany's contribution to the stabilisation of The result of these two contrary but related trends is stalemate. On the one hand, an already sceptical Bundestag is under pressure from the public to scale back Germany's contribution, pressure that is also strongly felt among senior civilian and military leaders in the ministry of defence. On the other hand, the executive branch, particularly the chancellery and the foreign office, is feeling allied pressure to pull more weight, and field commanders in Afghanistan are determined to face up to a bolder enemy just as NATO's other fighting armies are. In the absence of strong and charismatic leadership in the field of security policy, the result is inertia: no matter the outcome of coalition negotiations, Germany's Afghanistan policy is poised to remain on its present track, with only modest adjustments. Berlin wilt by default, react to Washington's strategic lead, though it will not necessarily do what the Obama administration wants it to. This passivity is remarkable given that Germany's stakes in Afghanistan are potentially even higher than those of the United States: continued violence and occupation in Afghanistan will fuel Muslim radicalisation in Europe more than in America. As Afghanistan backfires, Europe will be hit harder.

Germany in Afghanistan
Germany sees itself as tightly connected to Afghanistan. The relationship between the two countries goes back at least tO,the First World War when,    But the conservatives' own position is more complex than meets the eye.
The German right is, at first glance, in favour of the operation and eager to ensure that Afghanistan does not turn into a launching pad for global terrorism. Upon closer inspection, however, the picture is more nuanced. Of all ISAF's five Regional Commands, the northern region was thought to be the most stable. This was mainly because the region's population is largely non-Pashtun and enjoys a relatively consolidated power structure.
The north was the traditional power base of the Northern Alliance, the anti- Some Germans started to believe that the situation in their area was better because the Bundeswehr's approach was less trigger-happy than that of their allies in southern areas. Hans-Ulrich Klose, a senior Social Democrat, reflected the view of many Germans when he suggested that 'America has contributed to a deteriorated situation in the south'23 -implying that Germany had avoided a similar mistake in the north. But the insurgency is slowly creeping northwards and instability is affecting the north as it is the rest of the country. As some allies have occasionally felt compelled to remind their German colleagues, the north was never more secure because the Germans were there, but rather the Germans were in the north because it was more secure. This is no longer the case. In

The insurgency is slowly creeping northwards
Insurgent forces initially relied on suicide attacks, improvised-explosivedevice attacks on convoys and rocket-propelled-grenade attacks on the PRTs. More recently they have staged ambushes and confronted ISAF forces openly. By June 2009, the north was experiencing intense fighting. Kunduz province is at the centre of this confrontation. In parallel, over the last few years the insurgency has been increasingly successful in trying to extend its reach into regions of northern Mghanistan where ISAF's presence is relatively minimal, such as Baghlan and Faryab provinces.
The rate of combat fatalities has increased significantly. ISAF has reacted by readjusting its operational focus and enhancing its combat capabilities. reasoning for doing so is unclear. Generals are also acutely aware that the army lacks funding and adequate personnel for sustaining such an operation in the long run.

Strong tensions, weak leadership
For German policymakers, there are three principal options in Afghanistan: do more, do less, or continue as in the past with minor adjustments.
Doing more, particularly in the military sense, would be very costly politically. This applies not only to changing the number of troops deployed, but also the kinds of missions undertaken, the risk for Bundeswehr soldiers, and the mandated area of operation. Firstly, to do more would cost strategic flexibility. The Bundeswehr might on paper be a 25o,ooo-strong force, but in reality only a fraction of this number is deployable in warfare scenarios, as in Afghanistan. To be sure, Germany's parachute battalions are proficient in irregular warfare, but there are only four of them and all four are undermanned, lacking non-commissioned officers in particular. Germany's Special Operations Forces are among the Western world's specialoperations elite, but 300 deployable commandos overall is not very many.
To tie more of these crucial combat resources to the Afghan operation would deny German authorities the option to provide forces for NATO or BD operations elsewhere. Secondly, to do more would require political vvillingness to order the military to shift its operational focus towards counter-insurgency, and to enable the army to do so by providing the necessary political and legal backing. In particular, the next mandate for ISAF would need to tackle the issue of legal limitations. As a next step, the structures for inter-agency cooperation would need· to be drastically reformed both in the field and in Berlin. Finally, the necessary resources for the Afghan operation would have to be made available. All of this would demand a serious effort, and it is doubtful that Afghanistan will be high enough on the political agenda of the next German administration to bring this about.
Doing less, however, is also politically difficult at least in the international arena. The United States has pledged an additional 21,000 troops for Afghanistan in 2009. Britain is punching far above its weight and has plans to bolster its 8 The slow erosion of patience among the German public is set to continue unless major developments interfere with the trend. There are two possible scenarios, one positive and one negative. The positive scenario is that the 'Afghan surge' works. If the level of violence in the south goes down, including US-and NATO-caused civilian casualties as well as Taliban attacks, then Germany might be in a position to increase its commitment to what would then be se.en as a more realistic effort at reconstruction. In the mid term Germany's contribution would gain in strategic relevance due to the shifting of operational supply routes to the north and Germany's role as guardian of 'Route Pluto' through Kunduz and Baghlan provinces to guarantee supply lines from Uzbekistan to the Salang tunnel.
The negative scenario is a major terrorist attack against German targets, either in Afghanistan or, worse, in Germany. There is no real way to prepare the population for a terrorist incident, and perhaps even politicians would find it difficult to cope: 'The political elite is not prepared for a terrorist attack', fears one senior. official in the chancellery.28 Yet leaders across all parties are worried by the prospect of a terrorist incident in Germany or a successful major military operation by Taliban insurgents in northern Afghanistan. Their fear is that Germany might end up losing its will to fight as a result, of course only after a face-saving salvo of defiant statements in the face of terror.
Germany, in short, is trying to maintain a low profile by hiding politi-