Informationswert bei Stochastisch-quadratischen Entscheidungsproblemen

Abstract

It is widely well known that the introduction of Information Technology (IT)<br />has a hard impact in organizations and markets. This introduces the question<br />about how to design organizations and markets to take the advantages of the<br />IT's and make them valuable. To answer this question we recognize the<br />significance of the coordination. Malone and Crowston (1994) define<br />coordination as the management of interdependence activities. If the<br />coordination is an activity causing costs then we can infer that the IT's<br />can diminish certain costs of coordination. Wich is the value of the<br />information for a decision maker? If different decision makers must<br />coordinate activities, what is the information and communication value? We<br />model the stochastic and quadratic decision problems and have denominated<br />them as (Q1) and (Q2) so as to represent the cases one and two decision<br />makers respectly. (Q1r) and (Q2r) represent the restringed cases.<br /><br />In one side, important theorems of games and decisions theories are deduced.<br />In the other side the following conclusions are got in relation to the<br />information value:<br /><br />1. The information value of the problem (Q1) is non-negative.<br />2. The information value of the problem (Q2) is non-negative, if the<br />interaction is observable.<br />3. In the case of (Q1r), the suffiency conditions for the resources<br />restrictions do not influence on the information value, is that the image of<br />the technology operator be equal to the set of known random variable.<br />4. In the (Q2r) case we have demostrated that the irrelevance of the<br />technology operator on the infomation value is similar to the case (Q1r).