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The termination of international sanctions : explaining target compliance and sender capitulation

The termination of international sanctions : explaining target compliance and sender capitulation

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ATTIA, Hana, Julia GRAUVOGEL, Christian VON SOEST, 2020. The termination of international sanctions : explaining target compliance and sender capitulation. In: European Economic Review. Elsevier. 129, 103565. ISSN 0014-2921. eISSN 1873-572X. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103565

@article{Attia2020-10termi-50626, title={The termination of international sanctions : explaining target compliance and sender capitulation}, year={2020}, doi={10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103565}, volume={129}, issn={0014-2921}, journal={European Economic Review}, author={Attia, Hana and Grauvogel, Julia and von Soest, Christian}, note={Article Number: 103565} }

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