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Ethnic Coalitions and the Logic of Political Survival in Authoritarian Regimes

Ethnic Coalitions and the Logic of Political Survival in Authoritarian Regimes

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BEISER-MCGRATH, Janina, Nils W. METTERNICH, 2020. Ethnic Coalitions and the Logic of Political Survival in Authoritarian Regimes. In: Comparative Political Studies. Sage. ISSN 0010-4140. eISSN 1552-3829. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0010414020920656

@article{BeiserMcGrath2020-06-03Ethni-50399, title={Ethnic Coalitions and the Logic of Political Survival in Authoritarian Regimes}, year={2020}, doi={10.1177/0010414020920656}, issn={0010-4140}, journal={Comparative Political Studies}, author={Beiser-McGrath, Janina and Metternich, Nils W.} }

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