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In the Eye of the Storm : Rebel Taxation of Artisanal Mines and Strategies of Violence

In the Eye of the Storm : Rebel Taxation of Artisanal Mines and Strategies of Violence

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KRAUSER, Mario, 2020. In the Eye of the Storm : Rebel Taxation of Artisanal Mines and Strategies of Violence. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution. Sage. ISSN 0022-0027. eISSN 1552-8766. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0022002720916824

@article{Krauser2020-04-13Storm-49407, title={In the Eye of the Storm : Rebel Taxation of Artisanal Mines and Strategies of Violence}, year={2020}, doi={10.1177/0022002720916824}, issn={0022-0027}, journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution}, author={Krauser, Mario} }

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