What are the equilibria in public-good experiments?

Cite This

Files in this item

Checksum: MD5:4e8276a5db733b48f8794fc9476dbc1e

WOLFF, Irenaeus, 2017. What are the equilibria in public-good experiments?. In: Economics Letters. 150, pp. 83-85. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.015

@article{Wolff2017equil-46604, title={What are the equilibria in public-good experiments?}, year={2017}, doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.015}, volume={150}, issn={0165-1765}, journal={Economics Letters}, pages={83--85}, author={Wolff, Irenaeus} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46604"> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/page/termsofuse"/> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dcterms:title>What are the equilibria in public-good experiments?</dcterms:title> <dc:creator>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:creator> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/46604/3/Wolff_2-3dkgs9vf1ylt5.pdf"/> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/46604/3/Wolff_2-3dkgs9vf1ylt5.pdf"/> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2019-08-05T14:19:39Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:issued>2017</dcterms:issued> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/46604"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Most social-preference models have been tailored to yield only a full-defection equilibrium in one- shot linear public-good situations. This paper determines the Nash-equilibrium sets that result from experiment participants’ elicited preferences. The data show that multiple equilibria are relatively frequent even in a standard three-player setting. In this perspective, the common finding of close-to- omnilateral defection at the end of repeated public-good games is surprising and raises the question of why the dynamics of play seem to select this equilibrium out of the existing equilibria.</dcterms:abstract> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2019-08-05T14:19:39Z</dc:date> <dc:contributor>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:contributor> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

Downloads since Aug 5, 2019 (Information about access statistics)

Wolff_2-3dkgs9vf1ylt5.pdf 26

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Search KOPS


Browse

My Account