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Reconsidering lock-in effects and benefits from delegation : the African Union’s relations with its member states through a principal–agent perspective

Reconsidering lock-in effects and benefits from delegation : the African Union’s relations with its member states through a principal–agent perspective

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WELZ, Martin, 2019. Reconsidering lock-in effects and benefits from delegation : the African Union’s relations with its member states through a principal–agent perspective. In: Cambridge Review of International Affairs. ISSN 0955-7571. eISSN 1474-449X. Available under: doi: 10.1080/09557571.2019.1628707

@article{Welz2019-06-21Recon-46573, title={Reconsidering lock-in effects and benefits from delegation : the African Union’s relations with its member states through a principal–agent perspective}, year={2019}, doi={10.1080/09557571.2019.1628707}, issn={0955-7571}, journal={Cambridge Review of International Affairs}, author={Welz, Martin} }

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