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Skepticism, Metaphors and Vertigo : Wittgenstein and Cavell on the Human Condition

Skepticism, Metaphors and Vertigo : Wittgenstein and Cavell on the Human Condition

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GUTSCHMIDT, Rico, 2016. Skepticism, Metaphors and Vertigo : Wittgenstein and Cavell on the Human Condition. In: Wittgenstein-Studien. 7(1), pp. 131-148. ISSN 1868-7431. eISSN 1868-7458. Available under: doi: 10.1515/witt-2016-0109

@article{Gutschmidt2016-01-01Skept-46533, title={Skepticism, Metaphors and Vertigo : Wittgenstein and Cavell on the Human Condition}, year={2016}, doi={10.1515/witt-2016-0109}, number={1}, volume={7}, issn={1868-7431}, journal={Wittgenstein-Studien}, pages={131--148}, author={Gutschmidt, Rico} }

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