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Pollution claim settlements reconsidered : Hidden information and bounded payments

Pollution claim settlements reconsidered : Hidden information and bounded payments

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GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Patrick W. SCHMITZ, 2018. Pollution claim settlements reconsidered : Hidden information and bounded payments. In: European Economic Review. 110, pp. 211-222. ISSN 0014-2921. eISSN 1873-572X. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.08.005

@article{Goldlucke2018-11Pollu-44175, title={Pollution claim settlements reconsidered : Hidden information and bounded payments}, year={2018}, doi={10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.08.005}, volume={110}, issn={0014-2921}, journal={European Economic Review}, pages={211--222}, author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Schmitz, Patrick W.} }

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Dateiabrufe seit 06.12.2018 (Informationen über die Zugriffsstatistik)

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