Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers

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GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Sebastian KRANZ, 2017. Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers. In: Economic Theory. ISSN 0938-2259. eISSN 1432-0479. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00199-017-1060-1

@article{Goldlucke2017-06-12Disco-39837, title={Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers}, year={2017}, doi={10.1007/s00199-017-1060-1}, issn={0938-2259}, journal={Economic Theory}, author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian} }

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