Auditing, Consulting, and Audit Market Concentration

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BLEIBTREU, Christopher, Ulrike STEFANI, 2011. Auditing, Consulting, and Audit Market Concentration

@techreport{Bleibtreu2011Audit-29963, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={Auditing, Consulting, and Audit Market Concentration}, year={2011}, number={2011-28}, author={Bleibtreu, Christopher and Stefani, Ulrike} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="" xmlns:dc="" xmlns:rdf="" xmlns:bibo="" xmlns:dspace="" xmlns:foaf="" xmlns:void="" xmlns:xsd="" > <rdf:Description rdf:about=""> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource=""/> <dc:contributor>Stefani, Ulrike</dc:contributor> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dc:creator>Bleibtreu, Christopher</dc:creator> <dcterms:issued>2011</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:title>Auditing, Consulting, and Audit Market Concentration</dcterms:title> <dc:date rdf:datatype="">2015-02-23T13:38:30Z</dc:date> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource=""/> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource=""/> <bibo:uri rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="">2015-02-23T13:38:30Z</dcterms:available> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dc:contributor>Bleibtreu, Christopher</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Stefani, Ulrike</dc:creator> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">In its recently published Green Paper, the European Commission 2010 discusses various methods to enhance the reliability of audits and to re-establish trust in the financial market. The Commission primarily focuses on increasing auditor independence and on reducing the high level of audit market concentration. Based on a model in the tradition of the circular market matching models introduced by Salop 1979, we show that prohibiting non-audit services as a measure intended to improve auditor independence can have counter-productive secondary effects on audit market concentration. In fact, our model demonstrates that incentives for independence and the structure of the audit market are simultaneously determined. Because market shares are endogenous in our model, it is not even clear that prohibiting non-audit services indeed increases an auditor’s incentive to remain independent.</dcterms:abstract> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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