Principal-Agent and Peer Relationships in Tournaments

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EISENKOPF, Gerald, Sabrina TEYSSIER, 2013. Principal-Agent and Peer Relationships in Tournaments

@techreport{Eisenkopf2013Princ-29933, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={Principal-Agent and Peer Relationships in Tournaments}, year={2013}, number={2013-07}, author={Eisenkopf, Gerald and Teyssier, Sabrina} }

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