Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact in Times of Crisis

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SENG, Kilian, Jan BIESENBENDER, 2012. Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact in Times of Crisis. In: Journal of Contemporary European Research. 8(4), pp. 451-469. eISSN 1815-347X

@article{Seng2012Refor-21326, title={Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact in Times of Crisis}, year={2012}, number={4}, volume={8}, journal={Journal of Contemporary European Research}, pages={451--469}, author={Seng, Kilian and Biesenbender, Jan} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="" xmlns:dc="" xmlns:rdf="" xmlns:bibo="" xmlns:dspace="" xmlns:foaf="" xmlns:void="" xmlns:xsd="" > <rdf:Description rdf:about=""> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>Journal of Contemporary European Research ; 8 (2012), 4. - S. 451-469</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> <dc:rights>Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International</dc:rights> <dc:date rdf:datatype="">2013-02-08T09:53:04Z</dc:date> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource=""/> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource=""/> <dc:creator>Biesenbender, Jan</dc:creator> <bibo:uri rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="">2013-02-08T09:53:04Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:title>Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact in Times of Crisis</dcterms:title> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource=""/> <dc:contributor>Seng, Kilian</dc:contributor> <dcterms:issued>2012</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">It is a commonplace that the mechanisms established in the stability and growth pact are blunt instruments. They are highly politicised as both the establishment of infringements and possible sanctions are subject to votes in the EU Council. The financial crisis of 2009/10 has dramatically altered the financial situation of many EU member states and has also shown the need for new regulatory instruments to enforce budgetary discipline in the Euro zone. Figures on the EU member states’ budget debts from 1999 to 2010 support this argument empirically. We discuss the current reform proposals and show that the introduction of a reversed qualified majority is likely to strengthen substantially the position of the European Commission to sanction non-complying member states. This becomes possible because decisive players in the EU Council will be closer to the position of the Commission.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:creator>Seng, Kilian</dc:creator> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource=""/> <dc:contributor>Biesenbender, Jan</dc:contributor> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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