Essays on Systems Competition with Human Capital Mobility

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LANGE, Thomas, 2010. Essays on Systems Competition with Human Capital Mobility [Dissertation]. Konstanz: University of Konstanz

@phdthesis{Lange2010Essay-12143, title={Essays on Systems Competition with Human Capital Mobility}, year={2010}, author={Lange, Thomas}, address={Konstanz}, school={Universität Konstanz} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="" xmlns:dc="" xmlns:rdf="" xmlns:bibo="" xmlns:dspace="" xmlns:foaf="" xmlns:void="" xmlns:xsd="" > <rdf:Description rdf:about=""> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource=""/> <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This thesis is a collection of four stand-alone essays on international competition for human capital, together with a general introduction and some concluding remarks. The first essay deals with decentralized public education and human capital mobility. The international mobility of highly-skilled workers may result in an underinvestment in local public higher education when national entities independently decide on educational expenditures to maximize local output. This well-established result due to a positive interregional spillover of national educational policy when some individuals emigrate after graduating can reverse if student mobility is taken into account. When local educational policy attracts foreign students, a negative spillover takes place, and the actual discrepancy between decentralized policy and the global-output-maximizing solution depends on the relative sizes of the two spillovers. The paper also presents a variant of this model in which local governmental objectives rest exclusively upon the native population. The second essay analyzes the effect of increasing human-capital mobility - i.e., student and labor mobility - on net tax revenues when revenue-maximizing governments compete for human capital by means of income tax rates as well as amenities offered to students (positive expenditure) or by tuition fees (negative expenditure). An increase in labor mobility results neither in an intensified tax competition nor an erosion of revenues. In fact, the equilibrium tax rate even increases with labor mobility. Amenities offered to students are non-monotonically related to labor mobility; overall, net revenues increase with labor mobility. An increase in student mobility, however, erodes revenues, mainly due to intensified tax competition. A concurrent cutback in expenditures mitigates this erosion but cannot fully prevent it. The third essay presents a model of student migration in order to determine the optimal level of non-resident tuition fees in a host country of higher education. Students with rational expectations consider a potential return migration in their first-round decision of whether to study abroad, so that demand for the higher-educational system in the host country and optimal non-resident tuition fees depend on the stay rates of foreign-born graduates. A decline in stay rates of foreign students is demonstrated to lead to a cutback in optimal tuition fees if the cost of education per student is not too high. The fact that students take into account the possibility of return migration after graduation in their first-stage location decision, in combination with rational expectations, finally produces this result. The fourth essay presents a model of two countries competing for the international pool of talented students from the rest of the world. To relax tuition-fee competition, countries differentiate their educational systems in equilibrium. While one country offers high educational quality at high rates for students -- the most talented choose to study in this country -- the other provides lower quality and charges lower tuition fees. The regional quality-differentiation increases with the size of the international talent pool, with the stay rate of foreign students in the host countries after graduating, and with the degree of development of the home countries of the foreign students. In comparison to the welfare-maximizing educational policy, the decentralized solution is likely to result in an inefficient allocation of foreign students to the two host countries, as well as an inefficient quality differentiation.</dcterms:abstract> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:issued>2010</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="">2011-03-25T09:42:58Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:alternative>Essays zum Systemwettbewerb bei Humankapitalmobilität</dcterms:alternative> <bibo:uri rdf:resource=""/> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dcterms:title>Essays on Systems Competition with Human Capital Mobility</dcterms:title> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:creator>Lange, Thomas</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Lange, Thomas</dc:contributor> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource=""/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="">2011-03-25T09:42:58Z</dc:date> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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