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Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

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ENGELMANN, Dirk, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2008. Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

@techreport{Engelmann2008Indir-11986, series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut}, title={Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game}, year={2008}, number={34}, author={Engelmann, Dirk and Fischbacher, Urs} }

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