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Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union : An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains

Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union : An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains

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KÖNIG, Thomas, Bjorn LINDBERG, Sandra LECHNER, Winfried POHLMEIER, 2007. Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union : An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains. In: British Journal of Political Science. 37(2), pp. 281-312. Available under: doi: 10.1017/S0007123407000142

@article{Konig2007Bicam-11790, title={Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union : An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains}, year={2007}, doi={10.1017/S0007123407000142}, number={2}, volume={37}, journal={British Journal of Political Science}, pages={281--312}, author={König, Thomas and Lindberg, Bjorn and Lechner, Sandra and Pohlmeier, Winfried} }

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