Two or more different phenomena are equiprimordial (equally original or co-original; gleichursprünglich) if they are mutually interdependent and can only be understood in relation to each other, and if in addition they are not based on a common, more fundamental, phenomenon. They belong to a common phenomenon and highlight different aspects of it, but are not reducible to it. Furthermore, there is no hierarchy between equiprimordial phenomena, no phenomenon is more basic than the other. Instead, they are equally basic. In particular, equiprimordial phenomena are not derivable from or based on each other.

Heidegger uses the term in his early writings and especially in Being and Time, where most of the examples of equiprimordial phenomena can be found. In his later works, the term appears only occasionally. Obviously, Heidegger developed the concept of equiprimordiality as a term referring to Husserl’s phenomenological investigations, in which Husserl analyzes different aspects of one phenomenon. In his lectures on the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (1905–10), for example, Husserl describes the complexity of the experience of time and shows that it has several aspects which cannot be reduced to each other. In particular, Husserl’s concepts of protention and retention in this context mean that our grasping of phenomena in time, like understanding a phrase or listening to music, has to rely equally on past, present, and future. This corresponds quite directly to Heidegger’s claim of the equiprimordiality of past, present, and future as aspects of temporality (SZ 338, 340, 365; cf. also GA 24:377, 406, and GA 42:197).

One of the first examples Heidegger gives is the equiprimordiality of being-with (Miteinandersein) and speaking (Sprechendsein) in his 1924 lecture course on Aristotle (GA 18:62, 64). In the lecture on the concept of time in 1925 he claims that listening and speaking are equiprimordial with understanding (GA 20:368), which resembles the equiprimordiality of listening and speaking in his Hölderlin lecture in 1934/35 (GA 39:71). There, he also claims the equiprimordiality of conversation and silence (GA 39:70). In the Contributions to Philosophy (1936–38), he maintains that language (Sprache) and the human being (Mensch) belong equiprimordially to beyng (Seyn, GA 65:497).

In Being and Time, we find the most important examples of equiprimordiality, which are crucial to Heidegger’s entire philosophical approach. First of all, he explains the concept of equiprimordiality, which is particularly directed against explanations of several phenomena from one single reason (Urgrund, SZ 131, cf. also GA 20:332). Similar to the earlier claim of the equiprimordiality of being-with, speaking, listening, and understanding, he maintains the equiprimordiality of disposedness (Befindlichkeit), understanding (Verstehen), and discourse (Rede, SZ 133, 143, 161). This can be seen as an aspect of the more general claim of the equiprimordiality of disposedness with the disclosedness of the world (Erschlossenheit der Welt), being-with (Mit-sein), and existence (Existenz), which all belong to the phenomenon of being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein, SZ 137).
A predecessor of this assertion can be found in his lecture on the concept of time in 1925, where disposedness is maintained to be equiprimordial with being discovered (Entdecktheit) and disclosedness (GA20:354). In Being and Time, this idea is further spelled out as the equiprimordiality of world (Welt), being-in (In-sein) and self (Selbst) as aspects of being-in-the-world, which are equiprimordially disclosed (SZ 297, 350; cf. also SZ 200, 220, and GA20:350). The equiprimordiality of world and self can also be found in his 1927 lecture course on phenomenology, where Heidegger argues that the subject is equiprimordially constituted by the world and the self (GA24:423). All these different aspects, like disposedness, understanding, discourse, being with others, and disclosedness, belong to the holistic concept of being-in-the-world and can neither be reduced to this concept nor separated from each other.

Another holistic concept in Being and Time is care (Sorge), which contains equiprimordially the phenomena of death (Tod), guilt (Schuld), conscience (Gewissen), freedom (Freiheit), and finitude (Endlichkeit, SZ 306, 372, 385). Furthermore, being is equiprimordial with truth (SZ 230) and truth with certainty (Gewissheit, SZ 256; in the late 1930s, truth is also equiprimordial to art, and truth and art are equiprimordial aspects of reality, GA6.1:220/N1 217). More astonishingly, being-there (Dasein) is equiprimordially in the truth and untruth (Unwahrheit, SZ 223, 229, 299), which can be related to Husserl’s phenomenological claim that the revealing of one aspect of a phenomenon is only possible due to the concealing of another aspect. Consequently, for Heidegger the word (das Wort) is equiprimordial with disclosure (Entbergung) and concealment (Verbergung, e.g., GA54:112–13). This resembles the claim in Was ist Metaphysik?, his Freiburg inaugural lecture from 1929, that being (das Sein) can only be conceived with regard to the nothing (Nichts, GA9:115/91), which leads to the further claim that being and nothingness are equiprimordial (e.g., in Das Ereignis from 1941/42, GA71:133, and, with reference to Was ist Metaphysik?, in Zur Seinsfrage from 1955, GA9:421/318).

Heidegger uses the concept of equiprimordiality also in his characterizations of other philosophers. He claims that sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) and understanding (Verstand) are equiprimordial with knowledge (Erkenntnis) in the philosophy of Kant (GA25:91). Furthermore, the Kantian categories of quantity, quality, relation, and modality are equiprimordial according to Heidegger (GA25:258). Not least, Heidegger argues that the concepts of appetitus and perceptio are equiprimordial designations of the monad in the philosophy of Leibniz (GA9:94/75).

There are far more examples of equiprimordial phenomena and concepts in Heidegger’s philosophy. One famous and awkward example can be found in his Freiburg Rectoral Address (Rektoratsrede) from 1933, where Heidegger declares that work service (Arbeitsdienst), military service (Wehrdienst), and service of knowledge (Wissensdienst) belong equiprimordially to the German essence (zum deutschen Wesen, GA16:114/HR 114). This obviously has no motivation in phenomenology and belongs to Heidegger’s commitment to National Socialism.

Rico Gutschmidt