Promoting National Unity:
The Role of Radio Broadcasting in the Process
of Decolonisation in Namibia and Zambia

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Abstract

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The thesis analyses the role of radio in African decolonisation based on two case studies. It takes broadcasting systems as a whole into account, arguing that the effects of radio broadcasting in African societies can only be evaluated in a close analysis of the interrelations between all actors involved in radio. Colonial administrations began broadcasting to an African audience out of a desire to control information flows; but the medium was also an integral part of colonial efforts to mould African subjects into modern individuals. Post-colonial governments inherited this desire to modernise society, but at the same time distanced themselves from colonial political models. Radio became an instrument in efforts of "nation-building", producing national subjects in fragmented societies to ensure political and social stability. This was again embedded in larger ideas about modernising African societies, which were shared by nationalist politicians and broadcasters alike. Listeners, however, reacted differently to colonial and post-colonial ideological projects, refusing open propaganda and choosing from different sources. Broadcasters had to react to listeners' wishes if they wanted to keep their influence, because even tightly controlled state radios could not establish information monopolies. Therefore, albeit indirectly, the nation was discussed and negotiated between politicians, broadcasters and listeners.

The analysis of African electronic media, the actors involved and the interrelations between different levels of broadcasting institutions, programmes and audiences shows that decolonisation was a complex ideological process, in which efforts at planned cultural and social change did not easily play out. Instead, ideas about post-colonial nations and the production of national, modern individuals were taken up and reinterpreted in social and political conflicts.
Abstract (Deutsch)

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Frantz Fanon, whose work was so central to the anticolonial struggle, in 1959 dedicated an essay to the analysis of the role of radio in Algeria and the subsequent change that occurred in Algerians' relation to the medium after the Front de Libération Nationale began to use it as a tool of counter-propaganda and psychological warfare. According to Fanon, the radio in French colonial society had primarily been directed at French settlers in Algeria to connect them to the cities and to the motherland, to ensure they remained part of the metropolitan culture – "a daily invitation not to 'go native'." Algerians, he wrote, were rather mistrustful of the new medium, which, by bringing the public into the realm of the private (the home) threatened to violate social rules, and allowed "the colonizer's language to filter into the very heart of the house, the last of the supreme bastions of the national spirit." The establishment of radio broadcasts by the FLN, mostly over Radio Cairo, changed everything. From then on, radio was no longer an instrument of oppression that threatened the sanctity of the private space; now that very same private space enabled the listener to hear news of the revolution, to "enter into communication" with it and thereby strengthen the private space as "the last bastion" of nationalism.  

The two different characterisations of the medium in decolonisation – oppressive vs. revolutionary – that Fanon carved out in his essay form important landmarks for


\[2\] all quotes from: Ibid., 92.
the study of the role of the medium in the process of decolonisation on the African continent. His psychoanalysis of the act of listening to the radio provides a unique perspective on the social effects of the introduction of radio in colonial societies. However, radio's role in decolonisation is much more complex than the picture painted in Fanon's revolutionary narrative, and it cannot be confined to the binary oppositions – "European" vs. "native", oppressor vs. oppressed, 'modern' vs. 'traditional' – that structure his essay. Colonial and anticolonial broadcasting are not the two opposing poles of broadcasting in Africa. This becomes clear as soon as the analysis goes beyond the break of decolonisation and includes post-colonial radio stations, which integrated both traditions, and in which the role of broadcasting was again redefined. Now it was supposed to play an important part in building the nation. Colonial as well as nationalist stations, both with specific programming traditions, staff and technical equipment, were integrated into post-colonial state radios. The process was often rife with conflicts, and post-colonial governments soon had to realise that the radio they had inherited was far from being "the nation's spoken words"\(^3\), and that it needed a significant and conscious effort on the part of all involved to make it so.

Fanon's essay is also an example of the mythology that surrounds the radio – as both a technical communicative apparatus and as the most important mass medium in large parts of the world for most of the Twentieth Century. He sees in it a powerful tool of oppression, but – in the right hands – equally of revolution. Its oppressive power is such that Algerians can only escape it by refusing to listen, or even to buy a radio set. In contrast, its revolutionary force cannot be stopped because the sheer existence of the *Voix de l'Algérie Libre* imbues the listeners with the nationalist spirit even when its announcers are barely understandable through the piercing whistle of French jamming transmitters. In this narrative, the broadcasts acquire such power over listeners that they can directly influence them on a psychopathological level.\(^4\) This mythology, to which Fanon was not the first to subscribe, informed public and academic discourse about the radio for a long time, and to a lesser extent still does.\(^5\)

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3 Ibid., 95.
4 According to Fanon, Algerians suffering from hallucinations, before the establishment of the FLN station, reported hearing "highly aggressive and hostile radio voices." After 1956, the voices reported by such patients were more often described as "friendly, protective." Ibid., 89.
5 Debates on the psychological effects on media (usually on the supposedly "weaker" social groups, such as children and women) are not new, and reappear with baffling regularity every time a new medium becomes established in wider society. This ranges from the dangers of "reading addiction" debated in Enlightenment Europe (a debate brought on by changes in printing technology and distribution – and subsequent access to reading culture by women and children
Nevertheless, the possible effects media have on individuals and societies at large continue to be hotly debated in media studies.⁶

There are instances in which radio has had a clearly visible, if not drastic, effect on society. A recent example is the influence ascribed to *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLM), the infamous hate-mongering broadcaster that was a major instigator in the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Numerous studies of its role agree that "RTLM was central to the establishment of the charismatic leaders' authority, without which the akazu's genocidal plan could not have been conducted (in exactly the way it was)."⁷ However, outside of specific events such as the Rwandan genocide, effects of the radio on societies can not so easily be traced. This study argues that it is only through an analysis of all aspects of radio, and the actors involved in them, that media history can show these connections, and answer fundamental questions on the role of mass media in contemporary African history. To trace these connections, it concentrates on the role of radio in mobilising the population for anticolonial nationalism and post-colonial nation-building. In these entangled processes, nationalist movements that turned into ruling parties after independence hold a central place.

1. Decolonisation, the State and Nationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa

"[…] that was the cornerstone of our radio service in propaganda, in psychological warfare. […] This message […] must have all the ingredients: Unifying the people. Inform the people about the importance of unity. […] Tell them how bad is apartheid."

Sackey Namugongo, Interview 11.08.2006

This quote by the ex-Director of the Voice of Namibia, the external propaganda

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station of the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) during the years of the armed struggle against the South African occupation of Namibia, indicates that movements for national liberation during decolonisation could only effectively mobilise significant mass support by conceptualising national unity in an enmity against an oppressive and exploitative alien force. As Eric Hobsbawm writes, national liberation was first and foremost "anti-imperial". Additionally, most followed Kwame Nkrumah's advice to first seek the political kingdom, and all else would be added; "a central maxim of which the truth appeared self-evident: once sovereignty was seized by Africans no matter under what conditions, the road to freedom and development would be theirs to follow." After the transfer of power, however, it became clear that the process of decolonisation encompassed structural, social and cultural issues that went far beyond political change. Nationalism as a mobilising ideology gave way to concepts of 'nation-building' that sought to integrate the population on the respective territory into the nation-state.

This process of nation-building was to be achieved first and foremost by means of ideology: constructing a space of experience, shared values and culture that made people identify as Zambians rather than Bemba or Lozi, as Namibians rather than German or Ovambo. This was a problem they shared with many new nations, including those of nineteenth-century Europe, and that the Italian nationalist Massimo d'Azeglio had expressed in the phrase: "We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians." This is in tune with the constructivist line of nationalism theory, which emphasises the virtuality of the nation, its connection to modern society and technology, and its constructedness. That the idea of 'Italians' or 'Zambians' as a national community was even possible, argues Benedict Anderson, was the result of several confluent processes which he ascribes to the development of capitalism and print technology. "Print-capitalism", for Anderson, is the developing of media, specifically newspapers and the novel, under conditions of a capitalist market. Besides playing a major role in the development of language into "national vernaculars", both helped to make imaginable a community that went beyond their immediate social environment. By separating history from cosmology, these media established new temporalities,

9 Davidson, Basil. 1992. The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, Oxford, 162. The full quote reads: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else shall be added onto you."
10 Hobsbawm 1990, 44.
especially a sense of simultaneity that allowed for connections to be made between the protagonists of a novel or between the different events described in the same edition of a newspaper. While the protagonists of a novel, Anderson argues, need not even meet each other, they are connected through a chain of events. The "imagined community", then is one of people one will never know personally, but are nevertheless connected to oneself. The newspaper, by reporting events under the heading of one specific date, "provides the essential connection – the steady onward clocking of homogeneous, empty time."\[^{11}\]

These arguments, and similar ones made by Ernest Gellner, provide an important perspective on the role of media in the development of the nation-state model and its geographical spread over the globe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Gellner, in "Nations and Nationalism", states quite bluntly that media content "matters precious little", and argues that it is the form of media, "the pervasiveness and importance of abstract, centralised, standardised, one to many communication, which itself automatically engenders the core idea of nationalism, quite irrespective of what in particular is being put into the specific messages transmitted."\[^{12}\] Anderson's work further elaborates this point. For him, the changes in communication technology and its use in capitalist economies form one of the most important factors in enabling individual members of societies to imagine themselves to be part of a national community. While Gellner emphasizes aspects of technological and social change towards modern societies, Anderson, although firmly rooted in the argument that nationalism is a modern phenomenon, focuses on the constructedness of the nation and the role of media, particularly print as the mass medium of the 19^{th} Century, in the process. Nevertheless, his argument is primarily built on the form of a mass medium, not the content.

The constructivist argument has been challenged, most importantly by Anthony Smith. For the purpose of this thesis, one of his arguments is particularly compelling: nationalist elites did not construct the nation out of nowhere, or simply "invent" traditions\[^{13}\], but were "archeologists" in that they resurrected older myths and ethnic symbols that were then transformed into national symbols. His critique of the modernist

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\[^{13}\] this is of course in reaction to the earlier argument about the invention of traditions. Hobsbawm, Eric/Terence Ranger. 1992. The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge.
approach is mainly that it fails "to accord any weight to the pre-existing cultures and ethnic ties of the nations that emerged in the modern epoch, thereby precluding any understanding of the popular roots and widespread appeal of nationalism." While there are instances in which nationalists used similar strategies in decolonising states, another point of Smith’s argument is more important in the context of this thesis: the history of the success of the nation-state in the 19th and 20th Centuries cannot be written without looking at its popular roots, i.e. the way nationalism resonated with 'the masses'. However, Smith argues that "what gives nationalism its power are the myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritages" and their reinterpretation and reappropriation by "nationalist intelligentsias"; but most sub-Saharan African nations could not possibly do that as their borders were too obviously artificial, drawn by the very same oppressors they had just liberated themselves from. Smith has himself stated that in most African and Asian states, "the nation cannot be anything but an imagined, and very recent, community, one that is being quite deliberately engineered in often polyethnic societies." Robert Rotberg called the African nations which developed out of colonial territories "nations of intent." In many accounts, academic or journalistic, the ‘failure’ of African states has often been attributed to this ‘artificiality’. But, as a closer look at the contemporary history of the continent shows, and as many analysts have since pointed out, the nation state in

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15 in Zambia, for example, the nationalist UNIP government promoted rituals like the Makishi dance as "national" in propaganda films and radio broadcasts. The Makishi dance probably originated as a ritual connected to boys' initiation (mukanda) in the Lunda and Luvalue regions in northwestern Zambia, but was described by David Livingstone (who seems to have been horrified at this "heathen ritual") in the mid-19th century as a part of Lozi festivals in Barotseland, where initiation ceremonies for either boys or girls are unknown. Barotseland, with its special status as a Queen's protectorate, is also the source of the second widely promoted example for "Zambian culture", the Kuomboka festival marking the move of the Litunga and his court from the flood plain of the Zambesi to higher ground at the end of the rainy season. Thus, while these rituals had existed for a long time and had crossed regional, language and ethnic boundaries long before the independence or even the colonial conquest of Zambia, both have been reinterpreted in a national framework. The Kuomboka is still broadcast on national television, and both rituals are promoted as tourist events in the country. cf. Herbert, Eugenia W. 2002. Twilight on the Zambezi: Late Colonialism in Central Africa, Houndmills, 58f.
16 Ibid.
17 A notable exception is Ethiopia; the case could also be argued for Lesotho and Swaziland, although their complete economic dependence from the Apartheid state denied them real national autonomy.
18 Smith 1999, 166.
Africa has proven quite stable. This is especially true in the cases presented here, where regional or 'ethnic' conflicts have never threatened the integrity of the nation state as a whole.

Other analysts radicalised the constructivist approach in trying to answer the question of the persistence of the nation as reference for social and political practices as well as identity. Rogers Brubaker argues that even the constructivist approach falls into the trap of treating "nations as real entities", adopting "categories of practice as categories of analysis." Starting with his research of nationalism in and after the Soviet Union, he opts for an analysis of the nation "not as substance but as institutionalised form, not as collectivity but as practical category, not as entity but as contingent event." All three categories will play a role in the following chapters, but it is the third – the nation as contingent event – that is most important in analysing the role of electronic mass media in "performing the nation." In pursuing this task, Michael Billig's notion of "banal nationalism" is helpful. By placing nationalist passion in times of crisis or "exotic" right-wing radicalism in the focus of analysis, he argues, scholars neglect the daily reproduction of nationalist sentiment: "The metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building." In that vein, Chapter 4 looks not just at those programmes that celebrated the nation openly (like live reportage from independence celebrations, or programmes designed for nation-building), but takes into account everyday programming, including music and 'unpolitical' entertainment programmes. Billig's argument that cultural forms such as these play an important role in making nationalism 'common sense' is useful for an analysis of media and the relations between media content and consumption, in that it is the necessary consequence of Anderson's idea of the central role of mass media in nation-
alism. Contrary to Billig's broad criticism, Anderson was not interested in the passions, but in the underlying social processes that made the passions possible in the first place.

The question for a history of nationalism and the nation in Africa remains: what was the driving force that ensured nationalist movements mass support, until well after the independence of the respective country? Basil Davidson has suggested that mass support of anticolonial movements in Africa was driven by social struggles rather than genuinely felt nationalism – in this, Davidson argues, they do not differ much from nationalist movements in 19\textsuperscript{th} century Europe.\textsuperscript{26} Other studies point to the social stratification in play in nationalist movements, arguing that many were driven by a growing urban middle class and an elite that had been educated in European, often missionary, schools.\textsuperscript{27} As Terence Ranger has shown in his influential study, a social foundation for mass nationalism had also been laid by what he calls "primary resistance" movements, early anticolonial movements that often had a charismatic and/or religious character and managed to mobilise significant parts of the rural population. The most important connection for him is one of "types of political organisation or inspiration" that emerged in the "primary" movements and were taken over by the "secondary", nationalist movements. But besides the "direct physical" links Ranger also made out "indirect symbolic" connections.\textsuperscript{28} In the case of Zambia, social unrest organised by labour unions, spiritual rural movements and organisations of a Western-educated elite all laid the foundation for political nationalist organisations such as the African National Congress (ANC), which evolved out of middle class-backed Welfare Societies, but was supported by the Northern Rhodesian African Mine Workers' Union. Both direct and indirect connections are at play.\textsuperscript{29} In Namibia, the history of resistance against German colonisation before the First World War and against the South African mandate and Apartheid after 1923 remained an important

\textsuperscript{26} Davidson 1992, 165f.
\textsuperscript{29} Additionally, in the strikes that preceded the merging of unions into the NRAMWU, Watch Tower preachers had supported the strikers and distributed literature of the sect among them. Another spiritual movement, the Lumpa Church, would later develop into such a threat for the nationalist UNIP that it suppressed it brutally. For a history of nationalism in Northern Rhodesia cf. the classic Rotberg, Robert. 1967. The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: the Case of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964, Cambridge.
source of "symbolic" inspiration for nationalist movements, and SWAPO actively worked on incorporating them into a historical myth of nationalist struggle which not only lent the movement its legitimacy, but was also supposed to form the foundation of national identity for Namibians. SWAPO presented itself as the organisation that brought together the different traditions of resistance into the only "nationally organised and politically representative" nationalist movement in Namibia, denying nationalist parties inside the country their legitimacy. In this, the movement brought together what Frederick Cooper called the "narrative of social mobilization" and the "revolutionary narrative." While they reflect actual connections, the examples show that nationalist movements also referred to their predecessors and to larger traditions of anticolonial resistance in a conscious effort to place themselves in such traditions and use the mobilising power of these narratives. Mass media were important instruments for establishing such narratives.

Radio was the most important of these media, for several reasons: First, it reached the majority of the population. Most African states inherited a working broadcasting infrastructure that encompassed most of the geographical area of the new state, and by the time of independence radio sets were affordable for at least the African middle class. Because it did not need literate consumers, it could reach uneducated rural populations more efficiently and directly than newspapers (that needed a few days to reach more remote regions, and then had to be read out to illiterates). Secondly, it was completely under the control of the state. Where it existed in the form of a parastatal corporation, it was quickly incorporated into the bureaucratic hierarchy. Thirdly, the state held a monopoly over what was, for the larger part of its population, the most important source for entertainment and information. For a long time, there was no fear of private competition, because either the media laws excluded private enterprise in electronic media, or the initial investment, and therefore the economic risk for private ventures, was too high (as, e.g, in the case of Namibia).

This thesis develops its analysis of the role of radio in decolonisation from two case studies, the decolonisation of Zambia and of Namibia. These are two very distinct cases: the independence of Zambia took place in during the first wave of decolo-

nisation that swept the African continent between 1958 and 1964, while Namibia (South Africa not being a "colony" in the strict sense) was the last country in the continent to become independent, in a historic context very different from Zambia's. While in Zambia, the nationalist movement, although banned shortly, could accelerate the process of decolonisation by political means, SWAPO took up arms and fought a guerrilla war that would last more than two decades. And while Zambians, being part of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, had experienced a racially discriminating settler regime, Apartheid rule in Namibia presents a very specific political and social system. Nevertheless, comparisons can be drawn, and despite all these differences, there are similarities in the way colonial regimes used radio to control information flows and to influence the worldviews of listeners. On the other hand, post-colonial governments in Zambia and Namibia also faced similar challenges, and comparing these two very different cases allows to take a broader look at options African post-colonial governments had to take up these challenges, and at the ways governments reacted to them.

2. Radio and National Identity

Anderson's argument concentrates on newspapers and novels, because he develops it from an analysis of the first appearances of the idea of 'the nation' among intellectual elites in Europe, Latin America and (South) East Asia. But it resonates very much with arguments and theories about radio, which can easily be described with Anderson's words as drawing its consumers into "the remarkable confidence of community in anonymity which is the hallmark of modern nations". Electronic broadcasting media seem to embody the principles laid out by Anderson for the production of "homogeneous, empty time" even more than the newspaper. First, radio not just assembles different events under the heading of one specific date (like in news programmes that list the events of the day), but by its very technology it bridges geographical differences with (nearly) no timelapse and can deliver news as they happen

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32 Anderson 2006. 36. cf. also Hilmes, Michele. 1997. Radio Voices: American Broadcasting, 1922-1952, London/Minneapolis, 6. Anderson alludes to the role of radio "in mid-twentieth-century nationalisms", specifically in the Vietnamese and Indonesian revolutions, in a footnote, but only as a medium that could "bypass print and summon into being an aural representation of the imagined community where the printed page scarcely penetrated." (Anderson 2006, 54 (n. 28)). Thus, he seems to see it simply as print's successor in Twentieth Century nationalism.
("This Just In"). This is especially clear in live reportage, where reporters actively emphasise the connection between the listeners and the event, and give the impression that listeners are part of it – even though geographically far away. Secondly, by turning on the radio set, the listener feels connected not just to the announcer, but also to other listeners. More generally, "listeners' tuning in by the tens of thousands to one specific program airing at a specific time created that shared simultaneity of experience crucial to Benedict Anderson's concept of the modern 'imagined community' of nationhood."

Again, announcers and reporters emphasise this when they address their audience as "dear listeners" or even as "the nation", or another community encouraging title. There are also programmes that try to enable two- or three-way communication by reading listener letters or letting listeners call in. These programmes were specifically popular with African audiences, because they functioned effectively as messaging service.

In African contemporary history, it is also important to note that radio was a medium that reached a far bigger and less fragmented audience than newspapers, not just because of largely illiterate populations in African countries prior to and for some time after independence, but also because of its more effective infrastructure. Due to the absence of fast transport routes in often vastly expansive countries with difficult geography and climate, newspapers (that could only be produced in urbanised areas) could simply not be distributed effectively in the whole country. Radio, on the other hand, once a relatively simple, albeit expensive, infrastructure of transmitters had been put up, could easily broadcast news and actuality in time. Therefore, for many African countries one can postulate an argument similar to Michele Hilmes, who puts radio taking over the role of Anderson's newspapers in the USA, because "newspapers remained a primarily local medium." While the reasons for the newspaper's lack of national coverage are different, the effect is the same: radio took over as the medium that made it possible to imagine communities.

More generally, since the establishment of the medium, theorists and analysts of radio ascribed community-building powers to it: "Wireless eliminates not only the boundaries between countries but also between provinces and classes of society. It insists on the unity of national culture and makes for centralisation, collectivism, and

33 Hilmes 1997, 11.
34 Ibid.
standardisation. For liberal commentators, the (theoretically) globe-encompassing characteristics of the airwaves would enable everybody to speak to the whole world, the "Babel of tongues" being the only obstacle towards creating a worldwide community of cosmopolites through radio. Conservatives such as the editor of the German "Funk" (Radio) magazine, Ludwig Kapeller, criticised these tendencies as undermining national unity, and argued for a nationally inclusive radio broadcasting in the national language: "Germanness in Europe suddenly has a focal point, a caring mother: German radio!" The first Director General of the BBC, John Reith, saw the role of the Corporation in bridging class barriers and dreamt of "making the nation one man."

The role of radio in imagining communities has also been acknowledged by scholars of media history. Monika Pater analysed the role of national socialist radio in establishing the "Volksgemeinschaft", the concept central to NS mobilisation of the German population. David Cardiff and Paddy Scannell looked at the BBC's role in constructing "national unity" in Britain. Thomas Hajkowski expanded on their work and, in a thorough analysis of BBC programmes up to 1953, asserted that broadcasting "works in fundamentally the same way" as newspapers do for Anderson. Marissa Moorman, expanding on Anderson's "print-capitalism", proposed the term "sonorous capitalism" to analyse the importance of radio and the recording industry for imagining the nation through music in late colonial Angola.

There is, however, an important argument to be made for the special role of radio in forming national identity. Anderson develops the importance of the novel and the newspaper in enabling the imagination of a community larger than the immediate so-

cial environment through their form. While radio broadcasting radicalizes the formal aspects of "homogeneous, empty time" in one way, it was often also consciously used to fill the form with programme content that embodied the specific national identity. As Hilmes put it: "Radio, more than any other agency, possessed the power not only to assert actively the unifying power of simultaneous experience but to communicate meanings about the nature of that unifying experience."\(^\text{42}\) Especially in those countries where the broadcaster was a monopolist, close to the state if not directly controlled, this was a major task of politicians and broadcasters alike. In the case of the BBC, Cardiff and Scannell have shown that rather than being "limited to a process of diffusion", the monopolist created programmes that "promot[ed] national unity at a symbolic level."\(^\text{43}\) Reith not only saw the potential the technical aspects of radio provided for "making the nation one man", but also actively worked towards it by producing programmes geared towards fostering national unity and a sense of "Britishness" rather than simply diffusing "sacred rituals"\(^\text{44}\), experimenting with the technical possibilities and forming infrastructure and programme schedules after the image of a "listening family" of national subjects.\(^\text{45}\) Therefore, the radio not only lay the ground for imagining communities, but also played an active role in the process of imagining and giving meaning to the specific communities imagined.

Anderson's ideas about the role of media in European and US-American contexts are informed by a specific historical context. It was not the press and the novel alone that made the imagined community possible; instead they worked in confluence with other social and economic processes, in particular the advancement of capitalism. This is very different from the colonial context that lay the ground for the development of media in Africa. Colonial media were not the realm of a Habermasian "Public Sphere" which allowed for rational critical debate and developed in the course of modern mass media.\(^\text{46}\) Rather, they can be understood as "a conscious effort to

\(^{42}\) Ibid., 11.
\(^{43}\) Cardiff/Scannell 1987, 158.
\(^{44}\) e.g. royal occasions or ceremonies of state, but also events that were only brought to prominence by the BBC itself, like the annual live broadcast of the Christmas nativity play from the Church of St. Hilary in Cornwall. cf. Ibid., 160.
\(^{45}\) Ibid. 163ff. The image of the family, according to the authors, was important in that broadcasters imagined listeners as families sitting together and listening, and connected this image to a larger one of "Mother Britain and her children in the empire."
\(^{46}\) Habermas, Jürgen. 1992 [1962]. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Cambridge. The Habermasian notion of the development of bourgeois publics in the 18th century has also been challenged in the European context as too normative and too much separated from the State, cf. for an overview of the critiques Bösch 2011, 83-88.
restructure the social and inner lives of Africans.”\textsuperscript{47} As Karin Barber has argued in a critical reappraisal of Habermas,

"the publics that were convened, first in print and then through the electronic media, need to be understood not as half-way houses to ‘true’, European-style publics; but as specific historical forms which can shed unique light on the nature of sociality in colonial and post-colonial societies."

In nineteenth century Africa, Barber argues, missionaries used print media to re-structure previous social forms that embedded individuals in family, clan or religious relationships by "the imposition of disciplines of time, space and the person which were alien to cultures, but which were, partially and piecemeal, embraced, internalised and hybridised by some sections of the population and not others."\textsuperscript{48} This attitude towards media as an instrument of social change was inherited by colonial and post-colonial governments. Both sought to use the radio to 'develop' the subjects that made up audiences, producing 'modern' individuals, and, in the case of post-colonial governments, "make" Zambians or Namibians.

This thesis draws on the larger argument about radio inherent in Cardiff and Scannell's analysis, arguing that politicians, broadcasters and listeners were actively involved in constructing an imagined community through the medium. These three groups of actors play central roles in the different chapters of the thesis. However, while some of the chapters focus on one group in particular, they emphasise the interactions between them and the resulting negotiated reality in national radio programmes. Also, it holds that the notion of radio constructing an imagined community that transcends social divisions such as race, class and gender is not without contradictions. Michele Hilmes argues that in a society as socially segmented as the US in the early Twentieth Century, radio, while connecting the whole nation and bridging class and race, was also seen as threatening and confronting a naïve and unsuspecting listener with social worlds outside his own.\textsuperscript{49} The threat posed by radio to a segregated society can also be seen in colonial discussions about the introduction of channels for Africans. As Chapter 2 shows, the solution was found by creating institutions that effectively segregated "White" from "Black" broadcasting. Radio in colonial society was not supposed to act as catalyst for national unity; and in the case of Namibia, institutions and programmes were actually designed to effectively circumvent the

\textsuperscript{47} Brennan, James. Communications and Media in African History, unpublished manuscript, 3.
\textsuperscript{48} all quotes from Barber, Karin. 2007. The Anthropology of Texts, Persons and Publics, Cambridge, 144.
\textsuperscript{49} Hilmes 1997, 16.
formation of a national public. Therefore, while radio certainly has a potential for creating a virtual community, it is in the conscious efforts of politicians, broadcasters and listeners that the actual creation takes place – or not. It is the process of negotiating the parameters of the communities imagined in and through radio that this thesis focuses on.

3. Radio in African History

In the context of the contemporary history of sub-Saharan Africa, the negotiated nature of national identity as constructed through and mirrored by radio becomes especially clear. Nevertheless, the issue of how media shaped national identities on the continent has only recently been taken up by scholars. Scholars long interested in the continent analysed the role of radio (as that of other media) in colonial and nationalist propaganda from the perspective of the liberation movements. These analyses were mostly confined to a critique of colonial ideology and the liberation movements’ efforts to counterpropaganda. They largely followed the narrative established by Frantz Fanon – repressive colonial media vs. revolutionary liberation media. On the other hand, political scientists after the first wave of decolonisation were mostly interested in the media policy of independent states. Although they acknowledged the dominant role of radio in relation to other media on the continent, analyses were confined to a normative discussion of policies, evaluating states and governments depending on whether they complied to previously defined notions of democracy, transparency, autonomy of media outlets and journalistic standards (such as protection of sources, separation of news from comment, autonomy of journalists) or whether they influenced or censored the media in any way. Thus, journalism and media were linked to the discussion of the African state, evaluating governments’ performance in terms of democracy rather than looking at the media themselves, the production and reception of content and their effects on society. This led to depressing assessments on postco-


lonial Africa, where many governments heavily restricted media freedom either through legislation or by simply incorporating private newspapers and parastatal radios into the civil service. Many studies were commissioned by NGOs that used them to consult governments or to develop own campaigns on media literacy or journalism training. In this context, the role of media in nation-building was generally acknowledged to be extremely important, but seldom followed up with analyses of the actual social effects of the policies that had been advocated.

Since the early 1980s, media history in general followed a cultural studies approach to media, and focused on their interactions with society rather than politics. Actually, it was the so-called "cultural turn" that sparked historians' renewed interest in communication and helped establish media studies institutionally in many universities. In the wake of the cultural turn, media studies changed their focus as well as their instruments of analysis. On the African continent, this trend was first picked up in South African academia, where Marxist analyses of culture and ideology resonated with scholars' engagement in the social and political struggles of the period. Institutions such as the Centre for Communication, Media and Society (CCMS) at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (established in 1976) or the seminal journal "Critical Arts" quickly became rallying points for liberal and Marxist scholars of media and cultural studies, and remain influential for scholars as well as media practitioners in South Af-


52 A classic example is the edited book that resulted from a cooperation of the Nigerian government, the African Council on Communication Education (ACCE; an NGO that was established in 1975 and today has national chapters in all African countries) and the German Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES; a public trust with close ties to the German Social Democratic Party SPD): Domatob, Jerry/Abubakar Jika and Ikechukwu Nwosu (eds.). 1987. Mass Media and the African Society (Africa Media Monograph Series 4), Nairobi. The authors focus on technological, political and social issues concerning media in Africa and give policy recommendations. The ACCE published more in this vein, e.g. Kasoma, Francis (ed.) 1994. Journalism Ethics in Africa, Nairobi. Not surprisingly, media scholars focusing on Africa were often concerned with pressing issues of contemporary media education and policies, cf. Francis Kasoma's works on Zambian media: Kasoma, Francis. 1990. Communication Policies in Zambia, Tampere; Id. 1992. From Ministries of Information to Ministries of Public Communication: A Synthesis of Four Case Studies and Proposal for Communication Policies in Africa, Tampere. Kasoma also worked out a draft media policy for the Zambian Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. His papers are held in the Francis Kasoma Foundation in Lusaka.

53 It took some time until the cultural turn had arrived in countries with academic traditions different from the Anglo-American. Similar to the analyses of African media politics described above, German and French media history, for example, until the 1990s focused very much on laws, policies and institutions, cf. the standard work on German radio, Bausch, Hans (ed.) Rundfunk in Deutschland (4 vols.), Munich; Duval, René. 1979. Histoire de la radio en France, Paris. For the reception of the cultural turn in German media history cf. Bösch 2011. An early example of German media history taking up the challenges of Cultural Studies is Dahl, Peter. 1983. Radio: Sozialgeschichte des Rundfunks für Sender und Empfänger, Reinbek bei Hamburg.
rica today.\textsuperscript{54} From this context stem the first analyses of the role of media in South African society.\textsuperscript{55} Another impulse came from the realities of the media landscape in 1980s South Africa, where community media sprang up in dozens during the decade. These defied an analysis oriented on government policies and traditional ideas about journalism (such as news values or censorship) and instead called for a new theoretical framework.\textsuperscript{56} It did, however, take some years before these were put to use in analyses of electronic media that were still under government monopoly. Keyan and Ruth Tomasellis and Johan Mullers volume on state broadcasting in South Africa was the first attempt to analyse the interdependent connections between policies, programmes and societal effects of South African broadcasting since its establishment in 1924.\textsuperscript{57} Works on other African countries followed suit.\textsuperscript{58} In contrast to the earlier trends that were dominated by the political sciences, these developed an analysis of African media systems from an historical approach, taking into account the fact that the media systems – not just the infrastructure and institutions, but also their place in the political system and the attitude of politicians towards media – had been taken over from colonial states.\textsuperscript{59}

In the following decade, media studies in Africa were further enriched by new approaches from another scholarly field. Anthropologists started to look at practices surrounding media, usually focused on reception, but also took content and production circumstances into account. While these studies usually draw on the arguments and


theories established by Cultural Studies, they go deeper and undertake detailed analyses of communities and the cultural practices surrounding media, often acknowledging the complex relationships between media production and media reception.\(^{60}\) Another strand of anthropology that is more concerned with analysing the social and political role of music also takes radio into account. Here, rather than acting a simple medium of diffusion, radio is treated as an instrument that through its technical aspect and cultural and social implications plays an important role in the social construction of communities through music.\(^{61}\) The issues taken up by these studies resonate in this thesis; most importantly, anthropological analyses of media, and specifically of broadcasting, are concerned with changes in social interaction and the audience's perception of the world. Many follow and expand on Anderson's arguments in that they argue that radio initiates changes of temporality and spatiality closely linked to notions of modernity, and thus lays the foundation for imagined communities such as the nation, as well as instilling a wider sense of being connected to the world. Kelly Askew, for example, argues that nationalism is not just an elite project, but in the case of Tanzania shows as a "profoundly dialectical process", in which nationalist principles are negotiated between local musicians and state agencies and adopted selectively by both.\(^{62}\)

An important example for this approach in the context of this thesis, and one of the pioneers of this new trend in media anthropology, is Debra Spitulnik's work on radio in Zambia. In her dissertation and several articles, based on fieldwork conducted during the democratic change in Zambia in 1989 and 1990 (in the course of which the Zambian broadcasting system was restructured), Spitulnik analyses issues surrounding the radio that are very similar to what is under scrutiny in this thesis: the specific "temporality" of radio and its connections to the imagined community of the nation, radio's historical connection to modernity, and the question of the construction


\(^{61}\) examples of these are Moorman 2008; Turino, Thomas. 2000. Nationalists, Cosmopolitans, and Popular Music in Zimbabwe, Chicago/London. Askew, Kelly. 2002. Performing the Nation: Swahili Music and Cultural Politics in Tanzania, Chicago/London only mentions the state broadcaster in passing, but her arguments about the role of music in nationalism inform parts of this thesis. All three generally agree to Anderson's central arguments, but correct them in important details.

\(^{62}\) Askew 2002, 270.
of audiences. While this thesis, in the parts that focus on Zambia, is concerned with an earlier historical period, and looks at the very beginnings of this media culture (in production as well as reception), it owes much to Spitulnik's findings in the context of Zambian audiences. Nevertheless, it follows a different approach in that it tries to encompass media systems as a whole, as an entirety of interactions between media politics, infrastructure and structures of hierarchy, ideologies and media content, and reception as well as struggles for hegemony in society.

The anthropological approach to media studies was quickly taken up by other media scholars. Additionally, probably in the wake of the resurgence of the category of ethnicity in political conflicts in many African countries in the 1990s and 2000s, questions of identity and its role in politics and society became central again in African studies. Francis Nyamnjoh calls these the "politics of belonging" and analyses the central role of media in the precarious democratic changes of the decade. He argues that media in Africa often take on "a Jekyll and Hyde personality", propagating "liberal democratic rhetoric in principle while at the same time promoting the struggles for recognition and representation of the various cultural, ethnic or sectarian groups with which they identify." Kimani Njogu and John Middleton assert that the "media, whether global or local, represent ways of living and provide models of how one might appropriately relate to others, as well as how recognition, status, honour, and prestige are given or withheld." However, these studies are concerned with ethnic or religious identities transported through particular media, such as private TV stations and newspapers catering to specific groups. While the larger arguments on the role of media in shaping identities are important, the issue of nation-building through media is very different. Governments directed their efforts towards using media to implement a controlled process of identity formation towards a national community; the construction of ethnic identities and their mobilisation through mass media are a phenomenon of a privatised, fragmented media landscape and fragmented polities in

which parties seek to play the 'ethnic card' to mobilise their constituencies. Not surprisingly, such issues resurfaced in the 1990s, after processes of democratisation in many African countries (the so-called "Second Wave of Democracy") were followed by a significant liberalisation of media laws. The so-called "Windhoek Declaration", a list of demands for guaranteeing free media in African countries, served as a blueprint; however, selective implementation and the reshaping of politics along ethnic lines led to the problems that are discussed in the aforementioned studies. However, the issues are not that new, and have been used in Zambia, e.g., to argue for the implementation of the one-party state in 1973 as well as for the tightening of government control over newspapers and the broadcaster in the preceding years.

4. Radio as an Agent of Modernity

The constructivist approach to nationalism sees mass media as closely connected and interwoven with processes of modernisation. While the idea of modernisation as a linear process with a (relatively) fixed societal endpoint has been scrutinised and subjected to much critique – not least from postcolonial theorists –, Cultural Studies and media anthropology have reintroduced this connection from a different perspective: Radio, they argue, is an agent of modernity in that it is seen and used as such by colonial and post-colonial governments alike. Radio, through its technical setup and its infrastructure, acted as a powerful symbol of modernity and progress, but it was also the medium through which ideas about modernity were spread. Core ideas of modern society, like communication across vast distances and the changes in lived space that it implies, are strongly present in the discourse about radio, be it in government proposals or listeners' letters. Colonial governments, in a period when the main legitimation for colonialism was that it would lead colonised societies into a bright, modern future, used radio, together with other infrastructural projects, to show their willingness to do so. Radio, while being itself one of these projects, and at the same time (because of its presence as a material artefact in the home) an important symbol for the process as a whole, also served to present them accordingly.

"The infrastructural work of radio diffusion was embodied in its antennae and loudspeakers and studios, and also in its programming on infrastructures. One gave publicity to the other. Bridges, roads, health initiatives, and radio sets were combined into concrete, material expressions of the develop-
mentalist work of the colonial regime and its continual aim of progress."\textsuperscript{67}

Modernity and modernisation, however, are problematic concepts. Both modernisation as a (linear) process and modernity (or, in the plural, modernities) as analytic concepts, although much discussed and critiqued, remain relatively vague, at the same time universal and specific, monolithic and pluralistic, and often are used to simply mean all social change that happened in the last two centuries. However, the concept, be it used in the affirmative or criticised, rarely allows for contradictory processes or continuities. As Frederick Cooper states: "the covariance of commercialisation, secularisation, achievement orientation, rationalism, and individuation fit poorly in the history of 'modern' Europe or 'modernizing' Africa or Asia."\textsuperscript{68} Another problem concerns the historicity of the concept: How is it possible to use modernity and modernisation as analytical terms, when the concepts themselves have a such a long, complex and problematic history and have to be historicised themselves?

This, however, leaves the scholar in a dilemma that was accurately identified by Frederick Cooper as the "confusion" whether modernity is a "condition – something written into the exercise of economic and political power at a global level", or a "representation, a way of talking about the world in which one uses a language of temporal transformation while bringing out the simultaneity of global unevenness, in which 'tradition' is produced by telling a story of how some people became 'modern'][.\textsuperscript{69} From the subject of this study follows a tendency to focus on the latter. However, the condition of modernity cannot be separated from its representation – and, as a history of radio that takes the practices surrounding the medium on several levels serious shows, representations have to be written in the plural. While colonial institutions propagated their version of modernity and its benefits in countless leaflets, newspapers, books, films and radio shows, there was enough space for broadcasters, musicians and listeners to deal with the social changes that accompanied what colonial institutions termed "modernisation" on their own terms. The Zambian musician Alick Nkhata became popular in colonial Zambia precisely because he was able to fuse 'traditional' Zambian music with 'modern' pop music, singing about the daily experiences of colonial subjects struggling with processes of social change and up-

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., 114.
heaval. At the same time, he was involved in a large project to record 'traditional' music to save it from extinction. Thus, the representational aspect of modernity is in the focus in this thesis; however, it is not just seen as a colonial ideological project, but takes into account that there was a plurality of representations of modernity that played out in debates around and programmes in radio, albeit from different positions of power.

The analysis can be broken down further. Debra Spitulnik identifies four different areas of modernity, which all play into an analysis of radio as a modern medium:

"ways of talking about modernity (linguistic), experiences of modernity (phenomenological), practices of modernity (social action, which includes communicative practices that are linguistic and representational), and projects of modernity (ideological, and even epochal).”

Clearly, the establishment of radio in African colonies is a project of modernity. But quickly, these areas get muddled and strongly play into each other: radio as an ideological project becomes a medium through which colonial subjects experience modernity, it talks about modernity, and the way people use the radio shows practices of modernity – which, in turn, are informed by the way radio talks about it. It is therefore necessary to analyse these four areas as a set of interwoven aspects of modernity, while taking into account the power relations underlying the project. This can be done by understanding ideas about modernity and modernisation as ideological in the sense that Antonio Gramsci coined: as a kind of "common sense", a "conception of the world which is uncritically absorbed by the various social and and cultural environments in which the the moral individuality of the average man is developed" that is shared by all actors in a given historic situation. This common sense is not a coherent ideology; rather, "even in the brain of one individual, [it] is fragmentary, incoherent, and inconsequential, in conformity with the social and cultural position of those masses whose philosophy it is", and it strongly informs practices which in turn reinforce the original mindset. The set of ideas embodied in the term 'modernity' – commercialisation, secularisation, rationality, and, in the colonial situation most importantly, general improvement of living standards – were seen as entirely desirable by the actors involved in broadcasting, colonial subjects and colonisers alike. They were part of a growing African middle class that shared this attitude towards moder-

70 Spitulnik, Debra. 1998. Mediated Modernities: Encounters with the Electronic in Zambia, in: Visual Anthropology Review 14:2, 63-84,
nity. Nationalist movements after the Second World War did not make claims against modernisation, but demanded it for themselves. And the desire for modernisation was not confined to the middle class either. As James Ferguson has shown, for Zambian mineworkers in the 1950s and 1960s, modernity was an "expectation", a promise that economical and social standards would continually rise to "converge at the level of the most affluent societies."  

"The early years of Zambian Independence seemed on the verge of delivering on that promise. The color bar was indeed dismantled as educated black Zambians rose to unprecedented positions of power and responsibility; a booming economy and strong labor unions meanwhile helped even ordinary workers to enjoy a new level of comfort and prosperity. Zambia, as an 'emerging new nation', appeared poised to enter the world of 'First Class.'"

The language of modernity and, connected with it, progress and development, can also be used tactically, neither embracing nor rejecting modernity, as Steven Robbins argues: "responses to development interventions are often selective appropriations of specific components of development packages rather than an unqualified embrace or rejection of modernization." A Gramscian notion of modernity as "common sense" allows to take these variations and tactical approaches into account while maintaining that the underlying ideas were shared by all actors involved in broadcasting. Many of the persons interviewed for this thesis show ongoing commitment to ideas about the role of media in society (be it in the fields of entertainment or journalism) that can be classified as modern, while not explicitly discussing modernity or modernisation.

There is another important aspect of the argument that modernity and mass media, especially radio, are strongly connected. When taking into account a host of ways to deal with processes of modernisation, the category of 'tradition' inevitably comes into play. Radio, as this thesis shows in a close analysis of broadcasters and programmes, defined 'traditions' and fixed them in time, simply by recording and broadcasting (variants of) songs, stories and rituals and, in a second step, subjecting them to a scholarly analysis that attached values to it. Broadcasters in Northern Rho-

72 Cooper 2005, 131.
desia, having worked with the ethnomusicologist Hugh Tracey, shared his idea that musical traditions were in decline in what was then Southern Rhodesia, as well as the prevailing assumptions among contemporary ethnomusicologists – like Hugh Tracey – that traditions were "dying out" and needed to be preserved.\textsuperscript{76} In South West Africa, the whole infrastructure of the broadcaster was based on the Apartheid principle of "separate development" which stipulated that each ethnic group was to be broadcast content that represented the traditions of this group and this group only.\textsuperscript{77} Radio could therefore, at the same time, come to embody modernity and ascribe traditions to the different cultural groups among its audience. This is less contradictory than it seems, given that 'tradition' itself is a modern category.\textsuperscript{78} Anthony Giddens' argument that tradition cannot think itself as such, and "receives its identity only from the reflexivity of the modern"\textsuperscript{79} implies also that modernity can only think of itself in contrast to tradition. This refers not just to "invented traditions", but to the category as a whole, and an analysis of radio content shows that the medium played an important role in defining tradition in contrast to modernity, as well as identifying specific traditions and fixing them in space and time.

5. Theoretical Framework, Sources and Structure

An important focal point for this thesis has already been outlined: the arguments of Anderson on the connection between mass media and the nation as an imagined community form the background for the study and resonate throughout. But on a more abstract level, the analysis of the role of media in society has much to gain from the analytical tools developed in the Cultural Studies paradigm. Stuart Halls "encoding/decoding" model provides a loose framework for this thesis, as he identifies the different steps in a mass media communication process that is in essence understood as a process of interaction between society and media institutions. Instead of implying, as does the earlier (and more abstract) transmission model, a one-way

\textsuperscript{76} cf. Turino 2000, 99-104.
communication from sender through medium/message to receiver\textsuperscript{80}, Halls model emphasises not just the interdependency of the steps involved in the process, but also their individual agency:

"It is […] possible (and useful) to think of this process [of communication, RH] in terms of a structure produced and sustained through the articulation of linked but distinctive moments – production, circulation, distribution/consumption, reproduction. This would be to think of the process as a 'complex structure in dominance', sustained through the articulation of connected practices, each of which, however, retains its distinctiveness and has its own specific modality."\textsuperscript{81}

Therefore, it is best suited to examine the complex interactions that play out around radio in both colonial and postcolonial societies, since significant agency is attributed to reception without neglecting the power structures that shape the process. This thesis aligns the chapters along the moments Hall identified, looking specifically at how institutions were structured (Chapter 2), how media content was produced and under what circumstances (Chapter 3), what programmes were produced under these circumstances (Chapter 4) and how listeners reacted to them (Chapter 5). Despite this seemingly linear progression, interactions will be taken into account, so that the chapter on broadcasters entails a discussion of how broadcasters have dealt with the infrastructure, and the chapter on audiences also studies how broadcasters have dealt with listeners, and vice versa.

This focus on agency and interaction is especially useful when analysing specific ideological effects of media in societies. To focus on nationalism and nation-building and its effects in (post-)colonial African societies entails the danger of all too easy, linear cause-effect assumptions if one fails to take agency and interaction into account. This is especially important to keep in mind when dealing with relatively homogeneous, hierarchical institutions such as broadcasters controlled by the state. It is all too easy to assume that, because they were under more or less direct control of the state,\textsuperscript{82} broadcasting stations acted as Althusserian ideological state apparatuses, re-


\textsuperscript{82} The immense variations and complexities of the relationship of (post-)colonial states with their broadcasting stations are discussed in Chapter 2.
lating ideology directly to the consumer. While the extent and parameters of control shaped the process and the possibilities of agency, at no point did they shut them off completely. Because radio connects the public realm with the private home quite directly (a source of anguish to Fanon and the Algerian listeners he describes), its effect had often been interpreted as exposing the private realm to state control. But this effect also goes the other way: because radio listening is a private activity – except for public listening stations like the Boma or a local beer hall – it gives the listener significant control and choice over what to hear, when and how to hear it. A Voice of Namibia broadcaster explained his experience in listening to the SWABC in Namibia like this: "When it was music people sat and listened. When the news came they would say 'Ah, stop that Radio Puppet." The argument needs to be made not only for reception, but for all "moments" identified by Hall, and the relations between them. For example, broadcasters in both cases presented here used whatever small spaces left to them in sometimes highly controlled and censored environments to engage in meaningful, subversive communication with listeners. At the same time, the hierarchy in the stations could often be undermined by superiors protecting broadcasters against too much government interference. On the other hand, broadcasters could comply with the ideological tenets underlying work in the station and willfully apply them to the point where they saw their work as following the classic values of independent journalism. Listeners, on their part possessed a not insignificant power in influencing programme content and station policy.

Hall and the Cultural Studies approach as a whole are influenced greatly by Marxist theory. Developed through critical examination of structuralist theory, and specifically Louis Althusser, Cultural Studies reverted to Antonio Gramsci’s theory of ideology and hegemony, reevaluating central aspects of it. In analysing the details of how models such as the nation were negotiated between the state, the agents of the state and society, it is however necessary to go back to Gramsci’s original writings, in order to avoid seeing the categories he develops solely through the lens of Cultural Studies. This is especially important here because the original categories allow for

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83 cf. n. 5.
84 Mosia et al. 1994, 10
85 The image of Gramscian theory is, for all its credit, until today heavily blurred by Raymond Williams' reading of it. Williams, who based his interpretation on a selective and heavily abridged English edition of Gramsci's Prison Notebooks, was mainly interested in developing "a theory of the specificities of material cultural and literary production within historical materialism." (Williams, Raymond. 1977. Marxism and Literature, Oxford). Therefore, he operates with a concept of culture different from the one that informs this thesis. Kate Crehan also criticises that in Williams'
greater flexibility and adaptation to a social and political context that is very different from that of post-war European societies that are in the focus of the works of Hall and Williams.

A return to Gramscian categories can help clear the complex and sometimes contradictory issues analysed here. It is nevertheless important to historicise these categories and not to be content with one fixed, immutable definition of what ideology or hegemony is. In any case, such a definition, as many theorists and researchers have lamented, is not to be had from looking at Gramsci's major theoretical work, not just because of its incomplete and preliminary character or the difficult context in which the Prison Notebooks were written, but "precisely because it does not describe any kind of easily delineated relationship. Rather, it is a way of marking out ever-shifting, highly protean relationships of power which can assume quite different forms in different contexts." Hegemony, for Gramsci, is not a fixed theoretical concept, but rather a term for the problem of power relations and their (re-)production in the capitalist nation-state that he wants to explore. In this context, it designates power relations defined by the poles of realm of the state (political society) vs. private realm (civil society), and consent vs. coercion. In different historical analyses – for example, revolutionary France or Italy during the Risorgimento –, he uses it differently. Therefore, the concept is problem-oriented, highly adaptable and can be changed according to the historical context under analysis. It avoids the strong normative implications other models on the role of media in society have implied, and allows for an analysis of interdependencies, e.g. between society and the state.

Ideology, after Gramsci, is not an openly communicated set of ideas, but rather "a conception of the world that is implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and in all manifestations of individual and collective life." Gramsci determines the

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interpretation, "Gramsci is reduced to a theorist of hegemony" and "that this hegemony is a thin and impoverished version of a much more complex, but also far more interesting, interrogation of power and its mechanisms." (Crehan, Kate. 2002. Gramsci, Culture and Anthropology, London/Sterling, 171). The still influential edition Williams had to refer to was the only translated version of Gramscis writings for nearly two decades. cf. Hoare, Quentin/Geoffrey N. Smith (eds.) 1973. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, London. Joseph Buttigiegs translated edition of the complete notebooks took another fifteen years to be completed, as did the German translation edited by Wolfgang Fritz Haug et al. cf. Gramsci, Antonio. 1992-2007. Prison Notebooks (3 vols.), New York; Gramsci, Antonio. 1991-2002. Gefängnishefte. Kritische Gesamtausgabe (10 vols.), Hamburg. For practical reasons, the German translation is used in this study, and, if necessary, English translations are taken from Hoares and Smiths "Selections".  

87 specifically the Critical Theory models evident in Adorno or Habermas' works discussed above.  
88 Gramsci 1973, 328.
concept by contrasting it with that of hegemony. Raymond Williams, and the Cultural Studies theorists following him, emphasised the cultural aspects of hegemony, and his interpretation proved so attractive to many scholars that it stuck. Gramsci however, though sometimes shifting his focus, always maintained that hegemony "involves 'practical activity', and the social relations that produce inequality, as well as the ideas by which that inequality is justified, explained, normalised, and so on." Thus, in Gramsci’s writings, the problem of hegemony is invariably connected to cultural as well as social and political processes; in hegemony, the three influence each other reciprocally. Power, writes Gramsci, is performed in different ways: as coercive power, involving violent means or structural violence and repression, and in a more consensual way, as "intellectual and moral leadership." Hegemony, then, is "a permanent practice, a notion of the world constantly fought over in struggles for recognition, with which a moral, political and intellectual leadership is established.” The decisive point for this thesis is that Gramsci emphasises the permanent struggles which are fought over hegemony and its function in the production of consent. Its consensual nature is at play not only in democratic societies, but also in more repressive political systems, because any type of power needs consensus, to a greater or lesser degree.

Similar observations can be made for civil society in these examples. Again, this requires the abandoning of conceptions of "civil society" that include political, social or even moral values. The term became widely popular in the wake of the democratic revolutions that accompanied the downfall of Soviet-style communism in Eastern Europe, but was also taken up by political analysts in the context of the African "Second Wave of Democracy”. But these analysts referred to traditions different from the Gramscian, notably a notion of "civil society" that equates it with either democratic ideas of a citizens' public in the "Polis" or the peaceful cooperation of economically equal, bourgeois subjects. Both attach political and moral (positive) values to the concept, both include a binary opposition between the state and civil society, and both have since been criticised, especially in the context of political developments on the

89 Ibid., 174.
African continent. For Gramsci, who represents a "third stream", societá civile, although contrasted with societá politica – the State – is not an opposing force, but rather a field in which all private actors (this includes companies, NGOs, and political organisations; in the context relevant here, political groups defined along ethnic lines, such as the Namibian "Interessengemeinschaft Deutschsprachiger Südwester" (IG), are also included) struggle for hegemony. The state, however, because it takes over functions such as education in modern, capitalist societies, is also an actor in this field. Thus, the state radios analysed here are situated at an intersection of the state and civil society, and are supposed to influence the latter, although they are also strongly influenced by other actors in civil society. This is an important insight, because it enables us to analyse a seemingly monolithic, state-controlled institution such as the radios presented here without falling into the trap of seeing them simply as "ideological state apparatuses" or "Transmissionsriemen" of ruling ideologies. It allows for a thorough analysis of the dynamics at play, showing that radio, despite its technical setup, is not just one-way communication. This will become especially clear in Chapter 5, but informs the analysis as a whole.

It is important to remember that Gramsci developed these categories in empirical studies that were concerned with the history and political processes of his times; and that he developed them to serve a practical political purpose, communist revolution in Western Europe and the fight against fascism. Thus, as Stuart Hall has remarked, "[t]o make more general use of them, they have to be delicately disinterred from their concrete and specific historical embeddedness and transplanted to new soil with considerable care and patience." These categories cannot be simply transferred from a politically motivated analysis of the development of the nation-state in 19th Century Italy to a historical one of media and nation-building in post-1945 colonial and post-colonial states. We can nevertheless heed Hall's advice and look at these categories in the light of the empirical data at hand. Therefore, this thesis operates rather loosely

93 A third field is that of political economy, or, in orthodox Marxist terms, the "basis". The state, for Gramsci, is "the instrument to adapt civil society to the economic structure." Gramsci 1991-2002, 1267 (Book 10 (II), §15), my translation.
with them, using the categories of ideology, hegemony, and civil society to develop a critical understanding of the political, social, and cultural dynamics at play in colonial and postcolonial Zambian and Namibian electronic media.

Sources

The sources for such an undertaking have to be varied. While official sources such as Annual Reports, laws and regulations, official communication, and publications form the framework of the study, they leave many questions unanswered and often tell us more about the image the stations wanted to project to the public rather than the actual processes inside the station. Specifically middle and lower management communication and protocols, as well as monthly reports from the different channels, provide a picture of the internal structure and processes at play. Added to this are newspaper reports, and, more importantly, editorial comment and listeners' letters about the role radio was supposed to play in colonial and postcolonial societies.

Additionally, Chapter 4 in particular relies heavily on programme content. Radio programmes are held in the Sound Archives of the stations. However, it is important to take into account that these Archives have not been established for historical research but to make music and previously recorded items available for broadcasters to use in new programmes. This affects the selection of archival material and the criteria for which items to keep. Most regrettably, it means that live chat shows are not kept in the Sound Archives. While these would be of extraordinary value to historians in general and to this thesis in particular (seeing as many discussed issues of national unity and national reconciliation), they have no further use for broadcasters, because the discussions quickly become outdated. The Zambian station hosts a disproportionate number of 'official' programmes (such as colonial political events or

95 In Namibia, these could be significantly supplemented with internal communication and documentation still held in the Archives of the Information Services in the NBC (hereafter cited as NBC Information Services). In the case of Zambia, the lack of internal documentation at the now Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) and the lack of access to the Federal Papers at the National Archives of Zambia (NAZ) could be compensated by holdings in the BBC Written Archives Centre (BBC WAC), because the Corporation kept close contact with the new broadcaster until well after independence. Some internal communication from the Federal broadcaster can also be found in the "Papers of the Rt. Hon. Sir Roy Welensky, KCMG, 1907-1991" collection in the Rhodes House Library in Oxford (Welensky Papers).

96 In Namibia, this is the Sound Archive of the Information Department in the NBC (NBC Sound Archives); in Zambia, the Sound Archive of the ZNBC (ZNBC Sound Archive).
speeches by Kaunda and other government representatives), but few everyday items, such as music and entertainment programmes (it nevertheless commands an impressive collection of Zambian music recorded since the 1950s). Another restriction involves language. No items produced in languages other than English and German could be closely analysed. This problem is partly made up for by the fact that many of the programmes that were deemed valuable to archive are available in English, and many of the non-English programmes can be reconstructed through descriptions available in other sources, such as programme magazines.

Recorded audio sources such as these programmes possess some attributes that make them different from written sources. It is important to acknowledge these characteristics, as Chapter 4 shows. First of all, audio recordings transmit a host of additional information; radio practitioners very consciously consider how to develop the soundscape of a specific programme, even when a large part of it is speech. This means that when analysing programmes, one can not just rely on the text, but also needs to take into account the subtle messages revealed by sound. The choice of music can convey important messages, as does the choice of speakers. Marisa Moorman relates that Angolan listeners loved Congolese Rumba for the simple fact that "both Congos had attained independence in 1960 and that the Congolese music on the airwaves was being broadcast by newly independent African nations." An example from Chapter 4 of this thesis shows that broadcasters used a change of speakers in the live broadcast from the independence ceremony in Lusaka to convey the change of government. In the exact moment the British flag was exchanged for that of independent Zambia, the native English speaker handed over to a speaker who, to contemporary listeners was distinguishable by voice and accent as a committed nationalist and veteran broadcaster. Similar choices of speakers structure plays. These specific characteristics make it necessary to take the mediality of these sources seriously and not simply see them as text transformed into sound.

A significant part of the sources for this thesis comes from forty interviews with broadcasters conducted during two research visits in 2006 and 2007/08. These were conducted in a simple pattern: on the basis of a fixed set of questions (that differed

97 The simplest example for this is a rule of thumb stating that in a radio feature, two different speakers should be used and every ten to fifteen minutes, the speaking part should be interrupted by music to help listeners concentrate.

according to the station(s) the interviewees had worked in) significant room was given for elaboration and free discussion. While the issue and merits of Oral History in general need not be discussed here, it is important to note the specific nature of these interviews and their role as sources in the thesis.

The most important characteristic of the interviews is the fact that they were conducted with professional journalists or ex-journalists. This means that the interviewees had ample experience in conducting journalistic interviews and were likely more conscious of the implications. Additionally, interviews were strongly informed by contemporary discourse. This pertains specifically to Namibia, where the period under discussion is still much discussed, and the role one played in the Apartheid state still defines one's social (and economic) position. Many interviewees offered clear, precise ideas about their role in the anticolonial struggle and in post-colonial radio, presenting themselves clearly as agents of social change and modernisation and professing deep commitment to national unity. This is probably partly due to the continuing power of that narrative in public discourse in both Namibia and Zambia. Especially in Namibia, it soon became clear that the narratives of journalists differed according to their position in either the clandestine Voice of Namibia or the South African-controlled state broadcaster. As the interviews show, one's own position in Namibia's troubled history very strongly influences personal narratives in the country. Of course, this is in itself an important finding as it tells us much about how journalists imagined their own role in society and in political and social struggles. In Zambia, the distance in time to the events interviewees talked about and the much less conflictual nature of both the transition to independence and to multi-party democracy in 1990 meant that interviewees spoke much more freely about their experiences and could

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99 cf. for a current discussion Abrams, Lynn. 2010. Oral history Theory, London/New York. The interviews were conducted in English and, in three cases, in German. German quotes appear in the text in my translation, with the original German quoted in the footnote.

100 For example, many people who were in positions of influence in Apartheid Namibia continually argue that they were working towards a truly democratic independent Namibia, while Swapo's only goal was political domination. They are highly critical of Swapo's shortcomings before and after independence and stress the violent nature of the anticolonial struggle to the extent of insinuating aterroristic nature of SWAPO in the 1980s. This pertains not only to interviews conducted for this thesis, but also to literature, newspapers and political discourse in Namibia today. On the other hand, the narrative of Swapo insists on the decisive role of the movement in the liberation of Namibia to the extent of diminishing the influence of nationalist and grassroots organisations inside the country and glossing over human rights abuses perpetrated by SWAPO. The arguments in this public discourse strongly inform some of the interviews and sometimes appear verbatim in the answers given by interviewees. For a discussion of this public discourse in Namibia today cf. Pisani, André du/Reinhart Kössler and William A. Lindeke (eds.) 2010. The Long Aftermath of War. Reconciliation and Transition in Namibia. Freiburg.
be surprisingly open, e.g. admitting that they felt freer and more appreciated in the Federal Broadcasting Corporation (FBC) than in the post-colonial stations although the FBC was "objectively" much more repressive and controlled.\textsuperscript{101} Nevertheless, here as in Namibia, journalists saw themselves as agents and mediators of political and social change. These issues are discussed in Chapter 3. Wherever possible, the interviews are contrasted with contemporary written material such as internal communication, which often shows the more contended nature of these self-images in daily work.

Another problem specific to a part of the interviews conducted is that, at the point of writing, very few written documentation exists for the Voice of Namibia (VoN). Therefore, the interviewees were also asked to give detailed information about the infrastructure and hierarchy, as well as their day-to-day work experiences. The problem of relying heavily on interviews for factual accounts is partly made up for by my being able to verify some facts with documents from the Katjavivi Collection held at the University of Namibia and from the Swapo Party Archive Centre (SPARC), as well as information published in other SWAPO media.\textsuperscript{102} Additionally, the standardised nature of those parts of the questionnaire that pertained to facts means that, if corroborated by several interviewees, some information concerning the structure can be taken for correct. For example, all interviewees that had worked at the Voice of Namibia (11 persons) confirmed that every team was supposed to be subdivided into production, translation and announcing and supposed to have one supervisor who reported to the Director in Luanda, but that this ideal was rarely met due to staff shortages this ideal was rarely met.\textsuperscript{103}

Together with the interviews, autobiographical sources are also taken into account. Although there are only a few such publications, they provide original insights into the workings of the stations. Sometimes written shortly after the events described, they are treated to all extents and purposes here like the interviews – as personal narratives that above all provide the personal views of the authors. Neverthe-

\textsuperscript{101} cf. for a discussion of this contradiction Chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{102} the Swapo Party Archive Centre (SPARC) is in the process of making Swapo documents accessible, but so far, only a few documents from the Voice of Namibia are catalogued. The biggest collection of VoN documents is contained in the "SWAPO Documents of Dr. Peter Katjavivi Collection" held by the University of Namibia (hereafter Katjavivi Collection).
less, in both cases a thorough reading also makes them a useful source for the events described and the political, cultural and social dynamics at play therein.

Taking these problems into account, the interviews are a valuable and fascinating source that enables the researcher to dive deep into detailed analysis of the stations, which often leads us to question findings that would have remained unchallenged if based on the stations’ publications and written documentation of the stations alone. Therefore, although the interviews have to be seen against the backdrop of other sources, this process goes both ways.

**Structure**

As already stated, the structure of the thesis loosely follows the steps in the media production circle as identified by Stuart Hall: technical infrastructure/relations of production, production, programmes, reception. However, to emphasise the dynamics at play that go further than this simple circulation model, the different chapters frequently refer to the other respective topics. Additionally, the chapters build on each other, painting an ever more complex picture. This is useful because a discussion of broadcasters’ agency cannot be complete without an understanding of the hierarchy that structured conflicts inside the station. Similarly, a thorough analysis of programmes needs a discussion of the circumstances in which they were produced. Therefore, Chapter 2 is concerned with the political history of broadcasting in colonial and post-colonial Zambia and Namibia. It discusses the historical context in which the stations were established and restructured and asks for the ideas politicians had about the role of radio and the resulting legislation as well as technical and administrative infrastructure. Against this backdrop, Chapter 3 elaborates on the social and cultural position and attitudes of broadcasters specifically concerning ideas of nationalism and nation-building. Moreover, it asks whether these broadcasters are part of an African intellectual elite, if they can be described as “culture brokers” and what this means for their role in social change. Chapter 4 is concerned with questions of ideology, looking at how programmes actually mirror ideas about the nation and what the consequences for an analysis of colonial and post-colonial ideology are. Finally, in Chapter 5, the effects of the radios and their programmes in the societies are discussed, along with the effects of societies on the radios. In a discussion of hegemony and its rela-
tions to civil society in Zambia and Namibia, it shows that even in the most controlled and censored environments, broadcasters and politicians could not completely ignore listener demands, and listeners held a small, but significant influence on programmes.
II. Institutions

1. "This is Lusaka Calling": The Beginnings of Broadcasting in Northern Rhodesia

The development of broadcasting in the British Colonies in Central Africa is exemplary for colonial broadcasting on the whole of the African continent and had a major influence on it through the invention of the first relatively cheap battery-operated radio. For these reasons it will first be elaborated upon in this chapter.

The Colonial Office started to take interest in possible broadcasts to the African population in the late 1930s. A 'Committee on Broadcasting Services in the Colonies' in 1936 recommended to use broadcasting as "an instrument of advanced government' to improve communication between governments and governed and to enlighten and educate the masses as well as to entertain them." But only towards the end of the decade did the officers in charge begin the realisation of the plans. The initial motivation for broadcasting to "natives" had been the growing fear that if it were not done by the colonial administration, African listeners would be susceptible to "propaganda of foreign origin." The BBC helped with research on the local circumstances and possibilities and transferred a liaison officer to the Colonial Office. The decisive elements that seemed to make colonial broadcasting necessary, were the Cold War and resulting ideological competition in Africa as well as the newly awakened African nationalism after the Second World War. An undersecretary in the Colonial Office phrased it thus:

"For some time we, in consultation with the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office, have been planning measures which could be taken to combat the growth of Communist influence, not only by direct counter propaganda but also – and perhaps chiefly – by the positive projection both of the exact appreciation of the democratic point of view and the principles upon which our

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104 The first radio station for white settlers was established in Kenya in 1928.
civilization is based. Among these measures is the development of broadcasting in the Colonies.*107

The origins of the Northern Rhodesian and later the Zambian broadcasting system lie in the Second World War. In the 1930s, radio broadcasting had been limited to an extension of the BBC Overseas Service, targeting mainly settlers and administrators. Although the colonial administration had considered "broadcasting for natives" since 1937, it was only established after the recruitment of African troops made an extensive propaganda effort necessary.108 The first station to address the African as well as the European population was established in Lusaka in 1941 by the likewise only just established Information Department, "primarily to keep the Africans of Northern Rhodesia informed of the progress of the war, to stimulate their war efforts and to convey orders to the native population in the event of grave emergency arising."109 This small station, broadcasting from a rented room at the Lusaka airport with the support of local radio enthusiasts, was "a very Heath Robinson affair"110, "which would have brought tears to the eyes of any B.B.C. visitor, and frequently nearly brought tears to the eyes of those operating it."111 It had to grapple with frequent power failures, patched equipment and a general lack of interest on the part of the administration. The station only broadcast a few hours per day, the reception was unreliable and the actual target audience had scarcely any access to listening facilities. But its mission was clear from the beginning: "[R]adio would bring the government and the people closer together."112 From its inception state broadcasting in the colonies was not committed to an ideal of a critical public:

"What was happening in Northern Rhodesia was that the administration had got to the point of starting an official government broadcasting station not to enlighten, educate, or entertain, but for what was a political and administrative purpose; to broadcast news and refute rumours during a national emergency, in this case, the Second World War."113

The origins of the BBC itself lay in a similar situation; the BBC News Bulletin was

*112 Franklin 1950a, 3.
*114 Ibid., 50.
used during the General Strike of 1926 to refute rumours and pacify the workers.¹¹⁵

One of the most important supporters of broadcasting to the African population, the
director of the Northern Rhodesian Information Department, Harry Franklin, phrased
the problems in the paternalistic jargon of the colonial administration:

"We found that:

(a) Many Africans have a natural gift for broadcasting, and are hardly ever shy of the microphone.

(b) Africans like to listen where listening conditions are suitable and when programmes are interesting. This may appear obvious, but it is still not believed by some Europeans, and it still has to be proved on a larger scale.

(c) Community Receivers, although they may fill a breach, provide the worst kind of listening facilities. In practice it is only rarely that any European or trained African will take the trouble to be present every evening to work the receiver. The receiver is often not properly looked after. Speaker horns get out of alignment, sets get wheezy and so on. Listeners soon lose interest under such conditions.

[...]"¹¹⁶

However, this first experimental phase continued only until 1945. The co-
lonial government was not convinced of the effectiveness of the radio as a mass medium and withdrew its financial support from the station, until proof of its usefulness could be provided. But at this point, around two hundred private receivers existed in the territory, most of them in possession of European settlers. Most Africans listened to radio on the communal sets, public loudspeakers, or at the local Boma if and when the District Officer exhibited his private set for public use. The station had countless technical problems, the transmitters were too weak to cover more than a small part of the territory, and transmissions

¹¹⁶ Franklin 1950a, 3.
often broke down. In this situation, there was little to counter the argument of the settlers and some government representatives that 'the African' did not want nor would ever understand a broadcasting service directed at 'him'.

The further development of broadcasting directed at an African audience was strongly due the two information officers that were responsible for the wireless, Harry Franklin and Kenneth Bradley. From the beginning they were interested in, among other things, the use of radio for education. Already in 1942 they had started the first "enlightenment programme" for educated Africans, and Franklin campaigned further for the access of the African population to the medium. In 1944 and again in 1946 he presented plans for a regional broadcasting service to the Public Relations Committee of the Central African Council. The plan stipulated the constitution of a station for the settlers in Salisbury, and another in Lusaka that was directed at the African population in all three territories – North and South Rhodesia as well as Nyasaland. Eventually, in 1947, the Council agreed to support the project, and the 'African' part of the arrangement was executed in 1948. The Central African Broadcasting Station (CABS) was lodged in a separate building in Lusaka and significantly better equipped than its predecessor.

Because of his untiring commitment to a medium that should bring "education and enlightenment" to an African audience, Harry Franklin became the most important figure in the development of broadcasting in Northern Rhodesia. But his contribution to radio in Africa goes further. Franklin knew that broadcasting to an African audience was possible only when it had access to receivers. The technical possibilities for this had yet to be created; cheap, battery-powered receivers that were affordable at least for the African working and middle class and that had an independent power supply, were a basic prerequisite for the diffusion of radio not only in the urban areas: "We were convinced that before a large audience could be reached, the African must be able to listen in his own home. This meant finding a cheap dry battery receiver

117 The Central African Council had been established in 1945 "to coordinate policy in the three countries." Although it didn't have any executive powers, but nevertheless formed an important institution to connect the three colonies, Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Only the pullout of Southern Rhodesia (whose government wanted to form a federal superstructure), rendered the CAC incapable. Phiri, Bizeck J: A Political History of Zambia. From the Colonial Period to the 3rd Republic, Trenton 2006, 42f.


119 Franklin 1950a, 7.
within the African's means to buy, for use in rural areas."\textsuperscript{120}

Franklin searched for three years for a solution to the problem. Eventually the Ever Ready Company in London (a big battery producer) decided to support Franklin's project. The Managing Director hoped for an access to a huge uninvested market for a "poor man's radio."\textsuperscript{121} The BBC helped with the development of a prototype, and the first twenty radio sets were sold to Africans in Northern Rhodesia for 5£ in the course of just two weeks. It has to be noted that the average income of an African family in the territories was 1£ per week. Seen against this background, Franklin, although again striking a paternalistic note, was correctly asserting the interest Africans showed towards the medium in claiming that this showed "the African's awakening thirst for knowledge."\textsuperscript{122}

This was the birth of the famous "Saucepan Special", a predecessor of the transistor radio that looked like a saucepan with its characteristic cylindric shape.\textsuperscript{123} It was this invention that ensured the distribution of radio receivers throughout all African colonies and made broadcasting to a significant African audience possible in the first place.

The "Saucepan Special" was made up of the mentioned cylindrical shaped aluminium hull and a Bakelite base. It was painted blue, "since research in the various colonies has revealed the fact that one tribe or another had some kind of superstition about almost every other colour."\textsuperscript{124} It was "insect-proof"\textsuperscript{125} and weatherproof for the tropics. Equipped with four tubes, it could receive the shortwave 25 to 90 meter bands; with this, it could receive not only the stations of the three Central African colonies, but also from the Democratic Republic of Congo and the BBC. The idea that listeners would tune in to Radio Moscow was a paranoid fantasy of colonial administrators.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{121} Franklin, Harry. 1950. Report on "The Saucepan Special", Lusaka, 1.
\textsuperscript{122} ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{123} Franklin remembered in an interview that the shell actually was purchased from a nearby company that produced pans. The name "was a good joke that turned out to be a very brilliant idea". Franklin, cit. in Sichalwe 1988, 57.
\textsuperscript{124} Franklin 1950b, 17. Debra Spitulnik remarks on the issue: "A rudimentary form of market research had thus already been undertaken to insure the success of the radio sets." Spitulnik 1996, 95.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid. The tube holes at the back of the apparatus were covered with gauze.
\textsuperscript{126} Years later, the Federal intelligence service FISB, in a climate that was much more paranoid, admitted that "there are no regular listeners to Moscow radio in the territory." Subversive Radio Propaganda, January 1960. Welensky Papers 238/8: Reports and memoranda by FISB and others.
While developing the receiver, an important decision was the question whether the radio should be delivered with a preset frequency or if the listeners should have the liberty to tune in to whatever station they wanted to hear. Peter Fraenkel, one of the first staff members of the Central African Broadcasting Station, remembered that Franklin’s superiors were not very enthusiastic about Franklin's idea not to preset the receivers: "They knew the African, they grumbled, and the African would never want such a set or understand what was broadcast, or if he did he would listen to Moscow. If there had to be wireless sets for Africans they should be pre-set to one station only."127 Franklin countered:

"It is hardly practicable to pre-set receivers, since people with a little knowledge would soon learn to un-pre-set them. In any event it would be psychologically wrong. Many educated Africans wish to listen to Daventry and if they thought they were prevented from listening to anywhere but Lusaka, a prejudice would be created which would defeat the ends of broadcasting."128

Other propagandists had been confronted with this problem before: the respective government can easily establish a radio station under its control, but theoretically, every receiver129 can provide alternative information to the listener.

Soon the station received enthusiastic letters from listeners. The government of Southern Rhodesia was still afraid that a radio directed at African listeners could politicise them – particularly as the CABS in Lusaka were under control of the Colonial Office, that was for too liberal in the minds of the Southern Rhodesian settler politicians. They continually tried to put spoke in the wheel of African broadcasting. But nevertheless the period from 1948 to 1952 can be described as "The golden years of African Broadcasting in Northern Rhodesia."130 Franklin allowed for much experimentation and assembled around him a group of highly committed broadcasters, African and European alike. In these years programmes and techniques were advanced farther than in any other colony in Africa. According to Peter Fraenkel, the son of Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany who worked as a programme assistant in CABS from 1952, a BBC executive had called the station "the most fascinating broadcasting station in the world."131 At CABS, African programme managers, an-

on the monitoring of subversive radio propaganda.
127 Fraenkel 1959, 18.
128 Franklin 1950a, 11.
129 provided that the range is wide enough, other transmitters strong enough, potential jamming transmitters not effective enough.
130 Sichalwe, 59.
131 Fraenkel 1959, 16.
nouncers, journalists and technicians were educated and trained. Until the establish-
ment of the Central African Federation, CABS was viewed virtually as an anti-racist El
Dorado – even though the paternalism of European journalists is reflected in their re-
ports. Phrases such as the following are not rare, but practically standard:

"[W]e considered that the appeal of broadcasting might well eventually be greater to Africans than
to Europeans, since Africans are mostly illiterate and speaking and listening forms the basis of their
intellectual life, of their customary teaching, their folk lore, their riddles, plays and simple sciences. [...] We believed that formal educational methods – taking perhaps two or three generations to produce a
comparatively civilized African people capable of working reasonably well in the development of the
territory – were too slow in the face of the obvious possibilities of rapid advance in Central Africa. We
believed that if broadcasting could reach the masses, it could play a great part in the sensible en-
lightenment of the masses and help to avoid the tragic consequences produced in some colonies,
where the native population consists of a handful of formally educated 'intelligentsia' and a completely
ignorant mass, easily misled by discontented agitators of the 'intelligentsia' class."

Such a declaration of intent shows the purpose of establishing a broadcasting ser-
vice for the "native population": above all, it was there to pacify the colonial subjects
and to prevent the "discontented masses" from resorting to other ideologies that
could lead to unrest in the colony. The station was controlled by the colonial govern-
ment; its intended means of control until then had been the Public Relations Commit-
tee of the Central African Council. In 1949, an African Broadcasting Advisory Board
was drafted to exert greater and more direct control, and at the same time integrate
interested parties from all three territories. The committee consisted of Secretaries for
Native Affairs from Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Members of Parliament from
both colonies, two representatives of the employers, the chairman of the Central Af-
rican Council, the director of the Northern Rhodesian Department of Information and
the Public Relations Officer of Nyasaland. This composition suggests whose in-
terests were represented by this body: the interests of colonial government and
(European) employers. The committee worked as a sort of Broadcasting Board and
decided on general guidelines. The actual constellation, however, was to be dis-

132 Franklin 1950a, 7. Peter Fraenkel, who worked as programme assistant under Franklin, defends
him in his autobiography, published in 2005: "Today his words sound embarrassingly paternalistic.
Indeed, Harry Franklin was a paternalist, but in the 1940s this is what the best colonial officers
were." He then in a strange continuation of Franklins paternalistic tone argues that nevertheless
the audience expected CABS to "educate" them: "The vast majority of Africans were illiterate and
even those with some education agreed that they needed and wanted 'enlightenment' and
expected their white rulers to provide it." Fraenkel, Peter: No Fixed Abode. A Jewish Odyssey to
guised: "The activities of the new Committee, suitably publicised, should help to allay whatever fears may exist that our African broadcasting will spread 'Colonial Office Propaganda.'"  

Franklin, however, did not deceive himself that the target audience would just listen to open colonial propaganda. If the CABS wanted to reach the audience, it needed to be responsive to its wishes and give something to them. It had to orientate itself along the tastes and cultural as well as informational needs of the target audience if anyone at all was supposed to listen – a general problem in propagandistic broadcasting. In the colonial context another problem was added: African languages had to be integrated to reach not only a "formally educated intelligentsia", but also "the masses" in general. But that was not the only problem that necessitated the education of African announcers. In addition, and as the responsible institutions soon realised, the new station could only attain a certain legitimacy in the eyes of the audience when it put on an 'African' face or, in this case, voice. From the time the station started to broadcast in local languages it had employed Africans as announcers; from 1948 onwards they were also trained in advanced techniques: handling studio equipment, writing broadcasting typescripts and organising broadcasts.

Soon the Central African Broadcasting Station was extremely popular with the African listeners. The situation changed, however, when the station was forced to propagate the official politics of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland that had been formed in 1953. Many Africans in the territories were afraid – with good reason – that the Federation would first of all ensure that the northern copper mines supported the Southern Rhodesian economy, and secondly, that Federation would primarily be an instrument of the Southern Rhodesian settlers' hegemony. The political hegemony of settlers, they feared, would mean that the North – where most of the land was as "Native Trust Land" still in African hands – would be subjected to the same land redistribution measures as the south had been – where settlers had taken over vast stretches of land. The British colonial administration, however, was deaf to African protest and dismissed it as the machinations of a few extremists. Federation was implemented against the protest, but the rift between the official rhetoric of "racial partnership" and the social and political reality was too big. The CABS, who had to communicate the official ideology, lost the trust of its listenership because of its

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134 Franklin 1950a, 13.
uncritical support of Federation. This loss of trust even went so far that journalists and producers – especially the African ones – were suspected of having been bitten by vampires. This belief was directed against all Africans who supported Federation:

"[...] The victims lost their will power and were made to support the Federation. [...] African announcers at CABS received threatening letters. People in the rural areas where the CABS recording van had always been a welcome sight, fled in terror at the sight of the familiar grey Land-Rover."\(^{135}\)

The Federal Broadcasting Corporation

In the process of restructuring the broadcasting system in the Central African Fe-
deration the interest groups that determined broadcasting policies in Northern Rhodesia as well as the other colonies become visible. Harry Franklin, director of CABS until 1951, wanted to build upon the good reputation the station had earned with programmes that appealed to African listenership and the employment of Africans as broadcasters. His plan was to transform the station, over time, into an independent corporation: "But Lord Malvern saw it as an 'excellent propaganda instrument' with which to hammer the virtues of the federation into African ears, a process which would only have made them more deliberately deaf." The government of Northern Rhodesia would have let Lord Malvern, alias Sir Geoffrey Huggins, take control of African broadcasting as he was entitled to by the Constitution; however, Franklin, who had just been appointed as representative of African interests in the Legislative Council, intervened and pointed out that the station would lose listeners' trust completely, if it was directly and openly subordinate to the government. Using public pressure, he managed to force Huggins to appoint a commission headed by BBC experts. In 1955, the Broadcasting Commission of Inquiry, headed by Hugh Carleton-Greene (who was at the time a member of the BBC External Service), recommended the centralisation the three stations of the Central African territories in one overarching institution. But it also recommended the organisation of this institution as an independent corporation. This was done in 1958, and the headquarters transferred to Salisbury. The new broadcasting institution, the Federal Broadcasting Corporation (FBC), united broadcasting for "Africans" and "Europeans" under one roof. The FBC was, following the recommendations of the commission, established as a nominally independent corporation led by a broadcasting board; however, among the members of the Board there was no representation of African interests, although broadcasting to Africans was one of the declared goals of the FBC. The Southern Rhodesian line eventually won out, and in 1958, with the incorporation of the CABS as "African Service", the FBC was established. The same year, a small contribution studio for programming in African languages in Southern Rhodesia was established in Harare, a township near Salisbury.


especially CABS in Northern Rhodesia, which was directed to Africans in all three colonies, and the SRBC in Salisbury, that broadcast for the White population. In Nyasaland, there existed only a small station under direction of the colonial administration.

Ibid., S. 175.
The structure of the FBC largely followed the recommendations of the Broadcasting Commission. It was nominally independent, but a series of procedures and regulations severely limited its autonomy. The Board of Governors was appointed by the Governor-General. The commission had suggested that the members be appointed "without regard to race" and "not [...] as representatives of any particular territory or racial group." This rejection of quotas led an all-white Board consisting mainly of representatives from Southern Rhodesia. The Board answered to the Federal Minister of Home Affairs. It appointed the Director General and (in consultation with him) the Heads of the different Services, laid down programming and employment policies, set the salaries of top management posts and supervised the finances. Therefore, the Board, the members of which were appointed by the highest ranking official without any consideration for representing the diverse population of the Federation, held considerable power over the station. Additionally, the government could "require that an announcement should be made or that a particular broadcast should not take place," and in the case of an emergency it reserved the right to completely take over the station. However, the government, after declaring the state of emergency in Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in early 1959, does not seem to have deemed it necessary, as the Corporation had complied to "vital measures of secrecy", and handled the situation "with high responsibility."

While the African Services continued to be based in Lusaka, former FBS broadcaster Cyril Sapseid replaced Donald Lightfoot as Head of the African Service, who, except for a year managing the studio in Kitwe, stayed in Lusaka. Additionally, an Advisory Committee on African programming was established. Although the Report had recommended a "preponderance of unofficials", listener representatives were in the minority. This, as other bodies, was dominated by representatives of the colonial governments (here, the three Secretaries of Native Affairs).

Broadcasting to Africans in the colonies had been introduced after governments felt the pressure of other media; and its main role was to establish an information monopoly. At the same time, it was also part of a more general modernisation project undertaken in the colonies after the Second World War. Information Departments, es-

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140 Ibid., 14.
tablished during the War for precisely the purpose of controlling information flows, now undertook the effort to educate colonial audiences and guide them to the path of modernity and development. The Saucepan Special itself was depicted as a distinctly modern apparatus, one that enabled the listener to overcome spatial boundaries and to connect with the world outside his or her direct surroundings, his "hut". While the FBC tightened censorship and control, it retained the policy of employing African broadcasters, who themselves embodied the new, rising African middle class. Nevertheless, the desire of colonial governments for information control – not letting Africans come under the spell of "Moscow" – determined the structure of colonial broadcasting systems.

2. **Takeover and Restructuring: From Corporation to Services**

After the dissolution of the Central African Federation in 1963, broadcasting had to be reorganised. The Northern Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation (NRBC), planned since October 1963, was established in January 1964 to accompany Northern Rhodesia/Zambia on its way to Independence. This time African representatives were included from the beginning: the chairman of the committee that had been established by government was the local Chief Mapanza. First, however, the committee had to acquire the old equipment that was released after the dissolution of the FBC. As the budget was small, the committee struggled to gain access to the equipment and money from the FBC assets: 

"[...] a great deal of hard bargaining took place to ensure that Northern Rhodesia received a fair share of the assets of the existing organisation, since the bulk of development during its six years of life had taken place in the South."

The settler regime did not easily let go of the assets for the benefit of a government that was already working towards the independence of the territory.

The NRBC was nominally – following the BBC model – an independent corporation financed through licence fees, advertising fees and financial support from the state. Although state support was a necessity, it effectively opened up the corporation to government influence. It was directed by a Board of Governors that was assigned

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142 Northern Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation: Interim Report, 01.01.-30.06. 1964, 3. NAZ 20/134.
the definition of guidelines for broadcasting. The Director General of the NRBC, Donald Lightfoot, was a member of the Board, together with another civil servant. Four members of the Board were representatives of African interests.\textsuperscript{143} Chief Mapanza remained chairman. Local elites were deliberately incorporated into the broadcasting

\textsuperscript{143} This strong presence of representatives of the administration in the Board of a nominally autonomous Corporation was excused by the minister as reflecting the financial responsibility that was largely borne by the government. Wina, Sikota: The NRBC: To Build or to Destroy?, Central African Mail, 15.05.1964. NAZ Newspaper Collection.
structure, pursuant to the plan to prepare the country for Independence.

This structure at first glance was geared to the example of the BBC, and the colonial government stated that it had decided for an "independent statutory corporation." But there were important differences to the archetype. The Board was not independent, as it was answerable to the Minister of Information and Postal Services, and he could even prevent programmes from being broadcast, "should he consider the broadcast not in the public interest." This was an instrument of significant government control, albeit much less than in the FBC. The management subordinate to the Director General was divided into Administration, Engineering, News and Programme Departments. A Religious Advisory Board exerted an advisory function.

Although broadcasting fees were collected, the corporation was financially backed by the state. This was a necessity, given the fact that the largest part of the population wouldn't have been able to afford a receiver set if the collected fees were too high. But it also ensured government control over the station. The BBC and the Colonial Office remained in permanent contact with the station and supervised it; periodic reports and a close contact with the responsible persons ensured this. As with its predecessors, the NRBC was incorporated into the BBC training program for the colonies. Contact was facilitated by Michael Kittermaster, the former director of the CABS, who then sat in the Central Office of Information in London. Between him, the NRBC Director General Donald Lightfoot and the Chief of the BBC African Service and former liaison officer in the Colonial Office, S. Eliot Watrous, a lively correspondence unfolded. Watrous again sent reports about the contact to the governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir Evelyn Hone. Through this network, information about programmes, personalities and political developments were exchanged, and the BBC exerted a significant, although indirect influence on broadcasting in Northern Rhodesia.

The General Service of the FBC, which had broadcast from Salisbury to the settlers in the territories, was replaced by a National Service that broadcast in English. The African Service was renamed "Vernacular Service" and broadcast in ChiBemba.

144 Ibid.
145 ebd.
146 fees were lowered to 1£ per year in 1964. Persons with an income of less than 300£ per year paid a "Concessionary License" of 10s. Ibid., 10.
147 cf. BBC Written Archives, E44/32/1.
ChiNyanja, ChiTonga, SiLozi, Lunda, Luvale and Kaonde (the seven biggest lan-
guage groups in Zambia). But the NRBC still followed the policy of ‘educating the Af-
ricans’ in the sense of western civilisation. The NRBC served as a transmitter for the 
modernisation ideology that formed the late colonial system. Nevertheless the policy 
of the Northern Rhodesian government was liberal to a certain extent: the NRBC, as 
its predecessors had, trained Africans in different professions and enabled a large 
part of the population to access information about the world in general, the politics of 
the colony and their own situation in Northern Rhodesia. It carried information about 
the African nationalist parties and provided them with programming slots for election 
campaigning. Unlike its predecessors, its purpose was, above all, to enable a smooth 
takeover after independence, for which the date was already set.

The change of structure from completely separate "European" or "General" and 
"African Service" in the FBC to a "National" and "Vernacular Service" under one 
administrative roof was the most important improvement in the NRBC. It had consi-
derable symbolical significance, but also far-reaching consequences for the day-to-
day programming and the relation of the station to its listeners. African announcers 
and journalists were now also employed in the National Service – an important act, 
as this channel produced and broadcast the news and most actuality programmes. 
The National Service catered for the election broadcasts in January 1964, and nation-
alist parties were allocated slots in the run-up to the election. It also reported exten-
sively from the Northern Rhodesian Constitutional Conference that was taking place 
in London, where Zambian nationalist politicians negotiated with the British govern-
ment on the future of the territory. BBC courses for Zambian announcers and jour-
nalists aimed at the mastery of perfect English. Thus, English was established as na-
tional language for Zambia, British English was supposed to serve as model and per-
fected pronunciation was presented as goal for every educated African. While the Na-
tional Service was supposed to cater to the national population, it effectively excluded 
those who did not understand English well enough – above all, the rural population. 
In addition, many listeners complained about a dominance of ChiBemba and Chi-
Nyanja, as these two languages (the most common in Zambia, spoken in the urban 
areas) dominated the Home Service and were ultimately integrated into the National 
Service.

Following the independence of October 1964, Zambian Radio was not immediate-
ly reorganised. The NRBC had been established as an institution that was to survive in the independent Zambia and remain an autonomous corporation – an institution the British colonial administration considered as essential prerequisite for a democratic state. For this reason, it was simply renamed in Zambian Broadcasting Corporation. However, as shown, the corporation was open to government influence on several levels. In 1965, the Zambian government started a restructuring process that was to convert the corporation into an administrative service, and, as a result, subject it to direct government control. At the same time, the Zambianisation of administrative services and parastatals influenced the newly named Zambian Broadcasting Services (ZBS). In the process, broadcasters were again employed as civil servants, a practice the FBC had abandoned. The media scholar Kenny Makungu summarises the process as follows:

"After the country became a Republic in October 1964, the new African Government simply put itself in the status of the colonialist Government and continued to see and use the mass media as a tool for the mobilisation of the people to achieve whatever goals it thought were good for it and the country.

So in Zambia, like many other African countries, the mass media has functioned as a tool of the ruling class, to help it mobilise people, purportedly for the economic and social development of the country, but in reality, to help it remain in power."\(^\text{148}\)

To understand this damning analysis, it must be placed in historical context. The increasing tendency to control broadcasting institutions coincided with the development of Zambia towards an authoritarian one-party state. Recent studies show that since 1964, the UNIP government steered more and more towards the authoritarian option.\(^\text{149}\) UNIP Nationalists took it for granted that they should be the ones to lead the independent country. Zambia after 1964 was surrounded by hostile colonial governments to the west and south and faced political, economic and military pressure. To the south, the White minority regime in Rhodesia, after its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 and the subsequent guerrilla war posed a major security threat.


threat to its northern neighbour. Its economy was severely strained by Kaunda's boycott of the white settler regime, as the most important export routes lay to the South. Zambia's support for the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), South Africa and Namibia also took its political and financial toll. But the road to the one-party state was not only paved with external economic and political pressure. As Giacomo Macola has shown, only shortly after its foundation, UNIP had already

"embarked on a dangerous intellectual trajectory, the endpoint of which would be the vindication of intolerance not only for open political opposition, but for independent expressions of the civil society as well. [...] The ideological seeds of the one-party state and its natural corollaries, a much-heralded belief in the leader's infallibility and a totalitarian ambition to quash and/or encapsulate autonomous social movements, were already firmly embedded in the Zambian political soil well before the formal declaration of independence in October 1964."[^150]

The "populist" ideology of UNIP

"was based on the idea that the black person had suffered enough at the hands of white people and that the only way to redress this situation was to secure the removal of white people from the realm of political power and to replace them with black people. 'Populist' ideology particularly opposed liberal ideology with its commitment to multiracial politics as an alternative process for transferring political power from the white ruling elite to a multiracial ruling elite."[^151]

From its inception, UNIP assumed that it represented the majority of the African voters, and that, as it was the true representative of African interests, democratic decision making processes inside the party were not necessary: "Seventy Years of colonial rule had not demonstrated the power of political debate."[^152] UNIP's leaders were not set to negotiate with the more moderate ANC if not absolutely necessary. UNIP's victory in the elections in January 1964, for the party's leaders, showed a clear rejection from the electorate of the British favoured "multi-racial politics" in favour of an African nationalism.

After independence it became increasingly difficult for UNIP to uphold its image as the only true representative of the interests of the Zambian majority. UNIP considered itself both the symbol and the main proponent of national unity. In the first years after independence UNIP was able to retain its dominance in Zambian national politics, but

[^150]: Macola 2008, 23.
[^151]: Phiri 2006.
[^152]: Ibid., 117.
it was challenged by intra-party conflict as well as an ANC opposition that, albeit on a small scale, had a stable electorate base. Conflicts inside the party as well as with the ANC opposition were soon perceived and described in an ethnic dimension. The ANC’s electorate base was especially strong in specific regions of Zambia (e.g. the South), and when too many representatives of specific regions or ethnic groups were assembled in UNIP bodies or in the parliament, political conflicts were expressed in ethnic terms.

The incorporation of the Broadcasting system in the bureaucratic structure was a consequence of these ideas, and part of the development towards the authoritarian one-party state. At the same time, the government, which in 1964 had already bought one of the two major daily newspapers of the country, stepped up repression against the private owned print media (mainly the Times of Zambia and its weekly The Sunday Times), influenced appointments of top editorial staff and in at least two instances even deported journalists. At the height of these developments, in 1972 (one year before the official implementation of the one-party State), President Kaunda held a two-day "national mass media seminar", which "was attended by nearly all the country's journalists from print and electronic media, information officers and public relations personnel." In a "lengthy and 'brutally frank'" address, he sharply criticised them for failing to fulfil their duty to help in building a "Humanist society". According to the President, "the mass media were to be an instrument of nation-building", but instead the journalists "still lived in the colonial past" and were "caught up in the cobwebs of the so-called ethics of journalism, a lot of which were no more than colonial myths designed to mislead young Zambians in order that they could work against Zambian interests in furtherance of foreign interests." This paranoid worldview, in which not just criticism of government, but all negative reporting was deemed counterproductive and a threat to nation-building, stood behind the government's repressive measures against the media. By 1972, the described policies had already effected the media to such an extent that the assembled journalists "unanimously endorsed the President's remarks." For Zambian politicians,

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153 Both were citizens of other countries, but had worked for Zambian newspapers. Makungu 2004, 16; Pitch, Anthony. 1967. Inside Zambia... and out, London.
154 Kasoma 1986, 104.
155 Kenneth Kaunda, cit. in: Ibid.
156 Ibid., 105.
"[t]he press was to foster national unity in all that it published. Any article that could possibly cause disunity in the nation was anathema to the party."\textsuperscript{157} This view, in which every piece that criticised the party was seen as a direct attack on national unity, informed Zambian politicians' relation to the media. In the state-controlled monopoly broadcaster, it dominated the journalists' work from the establishment of ZBS in 1966.

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 134.
Faced with the external threat of UDI Rhodesia, with the ANC challenging the leading role of UNIP in defining the characteristics of the Zambian nation and UNIP cadres' growing paranoia toward any possible power centres outside of the government, the nationalisation process was an opportunity to ensure the party's hold over this defining role by taking control of the "ideological state apparatus". The decision to bureaucratise the electronic media and subject it to direct government control needs to be viewed against this background.

The Zambian Broadcasting Services

In 1966, the restructuring process was completed. The Board of Governors was abolished; the Zambian Broadcasting Services were subjected directly to the Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism; they were to be an "agency department for all Government Ministries and Departments", and their function was described as follows: "In this sense the Services are a mirror of Government to people and, by the use of public participation in their national programmes, of people to Government." 158

The new Deputy Director was now directly answerable to the Minister. He supervised four departments: Administration, Engineering, Sound Broadcasting (Radio Zambia) and Television (Zambia TV). In 1969, a report criticised the structure as too top-heavy, as some posts were redundant, especially the posts of Controller: Sound and Head of Programmes, which shared many duties. 159 The development towards bureaucratisation culminated in the employment of broadcasters as civil servants, thus falling even behind the FBC practice – the last time broadcasters had been employed as civil servants was during the time of CABS, when the colonial government had used the station as its mouthpiece.

The Zambian Broadcasting Corporation had taken over the programming structure of the NRBC; after the restructuring process, the Vernacular Service was transformed into a "Home Service" that specialised in features on local and regional culture(s) in the different vernaculars. The National Service was renamed in General Service and mainly broadcast news and current affairs programmes, covering events of national and international importance. It retained, however, the ChiBemba/Chi-

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158 "Zambia Broadcasting Services", (brochure, no author or date given), BBC Written Archives, E 44/32/1; S. 2.
Nyanja slot from 8 to 10 a.m.\textsuperscript{160} The General Service in particular served as a mouthpiece of the government and attached greatest importance to the figure of President Kenneth Kaunda, who increasingly was pictured as living symbol of Zambia's national unity.

The production of news was centralised in a special department that was contained in the General Service; news programmes were then translated into the respective languages. The advantage of this was that news production was more effectively organised and cheaper, as well as easily controlled; however, it produced unintended side effects: broadcasters in and listeners to the Vernacular Service channels got the impression that more importance was placed on the General Service than to the vernacular channels, because translated news was not up to date by the time it reached the Home Service. An inquiry into the structure of ZBS in 1968 concluded: "By playing down the importance of the Home Service, Government is unwittingly defeating its own policy of maintaining and advancing Zambian culture."\textsuperscript{161}

At the same time, the inquiry found that listeners constantly complained that their respective languages were not or too seldom heard on the Home Service. The biggest languages ChiBemba and ChiNyanja, they claimed, were favoured unfairly.

This ambivalent situation, the contradictions of a language policy that on the one hand wanted to use radio as an instrument of nation building, but on the other had to take the interests and wishes of the listeners into account – that the programmes reflected local cultures, and provided them with intelligible information, continued to be a problem. This view was shared by the inquiry: "Local pride should be enhanced positively to promote economic development, but it should not be allowed to grow to an extent where it could have negative results, such as promoting parochialism."\textsuperscript{162}

By the end of the First Republic, the ZBS were fully restructured as a government department. UNIP had taken the authoritarian option and created a broadcasting structure that was ultimately closer to the colonial FBC than the Corporation that had been intended at the time of independence. The development of the ZBS was part of a general development in UNIP, which was rooted in the nationalist movement's anti-colonial past. The party saw itself as the only legitimate representative of the Zam-

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{160} Interview Matteo Phiri, 12.09.2006.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}

56
bian nation, and started to see the opposition ANC, which had a less radical past, but also other groups, e.g. ethnic or religious interest groups\textsuperscript{163}, as a threat not only to its own power, but above all to national unity. As the political culture in post-colonial Zambia, the character of the broadcasting system and the attitude of politicians towards it resulted at least partly from the colonial past. But the decisive factor in the UNIP government's desire to bring the station under its full control was the precarious nature of the post-colonial nation, which was felt to be under permanent attack by enemies from the inside (ANC, Lumpa Church) and outside (UDI Rhodesia, Apartheid South Africa, and the portuguese colonies) of Zambia. As the colonial government, UNIP looked towards broadcasting as an instrument of information control, but also one of nation-building, that could positively contribute much to promote the development of a truly Zambian identity.

3. "Unifying the People" and "Separate Development": Broadcasting in and to Occupied Namibia

The South African occupation of Namibia was fundamentally different from the system of late colonialism in Northern Rhodesia. Since 1966 the occupation was illegal, because the UN had withdrawn its mandate from South Africa. Three years after the withdrawal the occupation regime began to expand "Radio Bantu" to Namibia. "Radio Bantu", a station which had grown out of a cable broadcast service for the townships of South Africa, was supposed to support Apartheid ideologically. The "Radio Bantu"-Services in South Africa were detached from the rest of the SABC and had a separate Board of Governors; the only connection was through Dr. Piet Meyer, who was chairman of both Boards.\textsuperscript{164} This complete separation was not retained by the SWABC, but below the highest Level of management (and above the level of the Technical and Security Departments), the African Language Services were also separated from the other Departments. The Director General of the SWABC, Piet Venter, was a member of the Broederbond, like Meyer and Dr. Albert Hertzog, the "notorious-
ly hard-line Minister of Posts and Telegraphs\textsuperscript{165} in South Africa. The Broederbond, a network of apartheid hardliners in the ruling South African National Party, held the broadcasting services under tight control and ensured their commitment to Apartheid ideology.

The Apartheid State separated the different 'tribes' according to a racist system, in which language, as an integral part of culture, was a factor. The basis of the system in terms of power was the principle of "divide and rule"; Radio Bantu was organised along these lines to support this principle – a separate channel for each language. It was an autonomous department, and, although theoretically a part of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), only connected to it through the person of Piet Meyer, who sat in the Broadcasting Boards of both institutions. The ideological alignment of the Radio Bantu Service was officially described thus: "Radio Bantu was introduced to serve the seven Bantu peoples of the country, according to the nature, needs and character of each, and, by encouraging language consciousness among each of the Bantu peoples, to strengthen national consciousness."\textsuperscript{166} An internal report found much clearer words: "[...] the purpose to introduce Radio Bantu was 'to counteract the warped and dangerous political, social and economic doctrines being propagated assiduously by agitators among the Natives, throughout the country' and from abroad."\textsuperscript{167} In this vein, the first three channels that were established in Namibia as part of the "Radio Bantu" scheme – Radio Herero, Radio Damara/Nama and Radio Ovambo (Radio Lozi and Radio Tswana were added later) – were to support the 'homelands'-policy of the Apartheid state by emphasising the specific cultural characteristics of the respective ethnic group. The (after the chairman of the commission charged with the draft) so-called "Odendaal Plan" had expanded the homeland-system to Namibia by establishing ten "homelands" and relocating the respective population groups according to the previously established ethnic and geographic categories. The expansion of "Radio Bantu" channels was part of this process.\textsuperscript{168}

While Hayman and Tomaselli in their analysis of the ideological foundations of South African broadcasting conclude that the SABC under the National Party became

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{165} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{166} Fuchs, D.: Die Radio en die gesproke Woord, Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe 9 (1969), S. 241, cit. in Tomaselli/Tomaselli/Muller 2001, 95.
\item \textsuperscript{167} cit. in Amupala, J.N. 1998. Development of Broadcasting in Namibia, Paper presented at the Press Centenary Celebration, Windhoek, no page numbers given. BAB Archive 13855: 5.
\item \textsuperscript{168} Du Pisani, André. 1986. SWA/Namibia: The Politics of Continuity and Change, Johannesburg, 160-72.
\end{itemize}
just another government institution, only one that specialised on broadcasting\textsuperscript{169}, Amupala sharpens the argument in regard to Namibia: "In Namibia one may say that radio broadcasting became another battalion in South Africa's ideological and war machine."\textsuperscript{170} It was introduced in Namibia at a time when SWAPO was drawing more and more attention to the liberation struggle in Namibia. Because of the withdrawal of the UN mandate South Africa had to find legitimacy for its continued presence in Namibia. From 1971 on, when the International Court of Justice declared the occupation illegal, South Africa's ideological war became difficult. During the 1970's SWAPO grew stronger in military, political and propagandistic terms. More and more newly independent countries provided SWAPO with broadcasting facilities; since 1966 SWAPO had been broadcasting from Tanzania, but from 1975 on, the station that was now named "Voice of Namibia" received more and more support from Angola, Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe.

In 1979, after South Africa had, on paper, accepted UN Resolution 435, which envisaged the independence of Namibia in the foreseeable future, the South West African Broadcasting Corporation (SWABC) was established in Windhoek. The establishment of the SWABC was part of a larger effort of the South African government to start a process which, in theory, would ultimately implement the UN demands. However, the process was implemented only superficially, creating institutions that were ultimately powerless. Control over all political and legislative matters rested with the Administrator General (AG), who had been appointed by the South African government. One of the more infamous directives of the AG, proclamation AG 8, effectively continued the homeland policy of the Odendaal Plan and established semi-autonomous "second-tier governments" in those areas.\textsuperscript{171}

The Turnhalle Constitutional Conference, held from 1975-77 in Windhoek, had laid out plans for the transition to democracy in Namibia. But the elections that followed were accepted neither by SWAPO nor the UN and OAU. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) won the elections in 1978, but the Ministerial Council that was

\textsuperscript{170} Amupala 1998.
established in 1980, and in which the DTA held a majority, collapsed three years later, when the party opted out because it could not sustain the contradictions it worked under. Its successor, the Multi-Party Conference (MPC), suffered the same fate. The Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU), established as a third effort for upholding a however superficial democratic process in 1985, only survived until 1989 because of massive financial and political support from South Africa.
The SWABC was one of these institutions, created to uphold the image of a transition process. It was nominally independent, but in reality, more or less directly answerable to the AG. It did have a Broadcasting Board, but this was comprised of representatives of the White population – only in the middle of the 80s did Black politicians manage to be admitted to the Board – and the Board answered to the AG. De facto the SWABC was an extension of the Apartheid government in Namibia – a South African propaganda radio. The ideology it communicated was one of "separate development" – a euphemistic term for Apartheid, meaning that each of the different "races" should be enabled to develop itself, taking its own special way, without interference from the other groups. One of the first Black members of the Broadcasting Board, Zedekia Ngavirue explains this "philosophy":

"[There was] a sort of philosophy that underlay their propaganda through the media, that if you brought people of different races and different ethnic groups together, each protecting its own interests, you’d have better security for the whole. [...] It’s just like saying: the body corporate, the human being, is there to serve its parts, its limbs [...] rather than the other way round."

From these quotes, it is possible to assess that the propaganda transmitted by the SWABC, subjected, in terms of cultural programming, all language groups (including the English, Afrikaans and German language) to such an idea; but it has, however, to be added that Afrikaans remained the dominant language (as well as culture). Also, the Apartheid division between Black and White overarched this system – for example, below the second management level, the SWABC was divided into the "AEG"-Services (Afrikaans, English, German) and the other "Language Services." Since Resolution 435 it also had to uphold the impression that Namibia was treated as a nation in its own right without making any real concessions.

The SWABC was established by the Proclamation AG 16, which was laid down in 1979. The background of the proclamation was the South African "Broadcasting Act" from 1976, with which the SABC had been reorganised. Added to this were regulations about the composition of the Board and the rights of the station in matters of granting TV and radio licences. The AG retained far reaching control over the corporation: he appointed the members of the Broadcasting Board and he could discharge

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172 Interview Zedekia Ngavirue, 18.08.2006.
173 Ibid.
them "if in his opinion there are sound reasons for doing so."\textsuperscript{175} He also decided the yearly budget and appointed an auditor. The Broadcasting Board itself was charged with providing overall policies, the administration and control of corporation matters. This created an appearance of public control. But the Director General was the chairman of the Board, and as the case of the "policy code" shows, the guidelines could easily be bypassed by the SWABC management. The Director General also chaired the management of the station, which consisted of the Heads of the Administration, Technical, Programme and News Services.

The Services were strictly separated from each other. The Programme department was subdivided in European (Afrikaans, German, English) and several African Language Services (again subdivided in Northern and Southern Namibian Languages). The "Indigenous Language Services" were split in two separate departments, Herero/Damara/Nama/Tswana Services and Ovambo/Kavango/Caprivi Services in 1986. News production was centralised. News were produced (in Afrikaans) by a separate department and then given to the Language Services for translation. The Services, however, had separate actuality segments, with the English and German Service also broadcasting overseas items. The important characteristic of the Language Services was a technical limitation: except for the Afrikaans Service, which operated on a national scale, the Language Services did not cover the whole country. Especially the "Vernacular Services" only covered major settlement areas of the respective language group (not necessarily just the "homeland").\textsuperscript{176} This structure, as can be seen when compared to the other broadcasting institutions, was decidedly top-heavy, creating redundancies and red tape. Most importantly, it meant that information and communication was heavily filtered:

"The structure at that stage consisted of a support dominated environment where technical, financial, administrative and human resources heads of department reported through a deputy director general support services to the chief executive. Programmes and news consisted of one department also reporting to the director general through a deputy director general."\textsuperscript{177}

\textsuperscript{175} Broadcasting Act, in: Government Gazette, 26.05. 1976. (Changes after AG 16/1979 included in handwriting), 5. NBC Archives, no call number.
Since 1987, three (later four) Board members were representatives of the nationalist parties that were acknowledged by the Apartheid administration in the system of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU). Only in 1986, Black staff members were promoted to middle management level. After the restructuring of the station (when the Vernacular Services were splitted in two), for the first time the two departments were headed by staff that actually came from one of the target language groups. Before that, the Vernacular Services had been headed by a White manager.\textsuperscript{178} While Black staff members were appointed as announcers, translators and technicians, the decisive positions of journalists and editors in the News Services and contribution centres were occupied only by the most reliable White – Afrikaans – staff. Black staff members were permanently subjected to rigid controls.

The Corporation itself had far reaching formal rights. It could decide on the erection of transmitters and attached infrastructure, take over programmes from other stations, organise programming, decide on advertisement tariffs and decide on the rate of annual licence fees. Following consultation with the AG, it could purchase land – and even, if necessary, expropriate it. The Board had to compose an annual report to the AG that comprised not only a report on financial and administrative matters, but also "[t]he name of every member of a political party by whom any political speech was broadcast, the name of the party of which he was the representative, the time allowed for the broadcast of the speech and the hour at which the broadcast took place"\textsuperscript{179} The AG decided what additional information the report should contain, and only he could also dissolve the Corporation. Although the SWABC seemed to be a formally independent "Corporation" (as opposed to government-controlled "Services") from the outside, it was actually under rigid control of the Administrator General, the representative of the South African state in "South West Africa". And although the SWABC was theoretically autonomous in its day-to-day business, sources show how strongly everyday programming fell in line with South African propaganda. An internal "policy code", signed by the Director General, Piet Venter, which was published by the independent newspaper "The Namibian" in 1987, showed the extent of censorship and propaganda that broadcasters in the SWABC were subjected to. It stipulated:

\begin{quote}
"The Corporation will make itself thoroughly conversant with the official foreign policy of the Go-
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., 25.
vernment of the day, and programmes and news initiated by the Corporation will take this into account. Biased reports, and out of context reports that can damage South West Africa’s image overseas, may not be broadcast.”

Commentaries, the document continues, "in the form of statements or explanations may be broadcast only when they emanate from an authoritative person, a recognised expert." In effect, this meant that only those who occupied appropriate positions and worked for the regime were "recognised experts" and would therefore dominate feature programmes and commentaries. In reference to political reporting the censorship was even more open:

"Political Reports will be regarded as controversial and will be broadcast only:

(1) if they are of a factual and/or authoritative nature;

(2) if they are policy statements by a political party in connection with any events or disputes and if the statements, as broadcast, do not contain comparisons with, or commentary on, the declared policies or actions of other South West African political parties. For these purposes a political party is defined as a party represented in a Legislative authority;

(3) if they contain remarks or an opinion by a recognised leader of a political party that will give the public an indication of his party's attitude towards an event or dispute;

(4) if the Corporation is not used to promote political argumentation"

As the policy code shows, the already limited formal autonomy was accompanied by a rigid content policy that was kept secret. Censorship in a narrow sense was not even necessary, because the policy code made it clear to every employee what he or she could do and what was out of the question. The Director General had been selected according to his political attitude and secured the policy of the South African occupiers inside the corporation. Nahum Gorelick, the first Director General after independence and co-author of an NGO report on the onesided reporting of the SWABC during the 1989 elections, suggested far-reaching control: "Being a state broadcasting instrument during a war situation, all information relating to the local environment would have to be cleared by the security police and the military, thus not giving the journalists and programme makers the freedom to move about as they would

181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
183 Piet Venter saw himself as "verligter", as an enlightened, "liberal" Afrikaner. Interview Zedekia Ngavirue, 18.08.2006.
have liked."\textsuperscript{184}

How much the station was kept in line with the ruling ideology was exemplified in 1984, when two years after the establishment of a separate German programme department, and nearly a year after it had been given a separate frequency (before that it had shared a channel with the English department) the chief editor and six other broadcasters – basically the German Service department as a whole – left the station due to "political differences with the South African-influenced management of the SWABC."\textsuperscript{185} The centralised News production that reflected the official positions of the Apartheid state, which were cited nearly literally, clashed with the claim of the German editors "to inform and not indoctrinate."\textsuperscript{186}

Part of the strategy of the South African administration was a division of the political landscape along ethnic lines. In the SWABC Black politicians – contrary to White politicians – only had access to the 'ethnic' channels that were allocated to them according to their 'ethnicity' – Herero-speaking politicians were only invited to Radio Herero and so on. Namibian politicians and their parties did not have much influence in the political system of Namibia. Their function was mainly to lend an appearance of democratic legitimacy to a system in which the consecutive governments composed of Namibian parties actually could not make any decisions without prior approval of the Administrator General. Two politicians of the Namibia National Front (a coalition of several nationalist parties), Zedekia Ngavirue and Fanuel Tjingaete, in 1980 eventually managed to convince the AG of the necessity to let Black politicians be represented in the National (at the time the Afrikaans) Service, and not only in the respective "Bantu Services" He joined the Board in 1982 as the only Black representative, and was joined only in 1987 by Tjingaete.

Despite rigid control by the AG, it seems that politics in the territory was not completely monolithic. Above all, the station had to react to listeners' protests (although it reacted more to the complaints of White interest groups), and Namibian parties had – although very limited – the possibility to influence policies. Zedekia Ngavirue comments: "We were trying to influence things, but within their parameters."\textsuperscript{187} Of course,

\textsuperscript{184} Gorelick 1995, 2.
\textsuperscript{185} "Wegen politischer Differenzen mit dem südafrikanisch beeinflussten Management des SWAR." Namibia Nachrichten, 11.10.1984.
\textsuperscript{186} "Anspruch, zu informieren und nicht zu indoktrinieren." Ibid.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid.
the possibility ultimately depended on the decisions of the respective AG – and the conditions of the information and propaganda battle that was an integral part of the liberation war in Namibia. The inclusion of nationalist politicians in the Broadcasting Board could be used as an argument against critics of the station – first of all the independent newspaper "The Namibian" that put considerable pressure on the station.

The Voice of Namibia

On the other side of the propaganda war was the SWAPO station "Voice of Namibia" (VoN). In 1964 SWAPO had already started to broadcast a short programme called "Namibian Hour" from the facilities of the Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation (TBC) in Dar-es-Salaam. In 1976, at the Enlarged Central Committee Meeting in Nampundwe, Zambia, the station was renamed "Voice of Namibia".\textsuperscript{188} At the same time, broadcasting times were significantly extended, as more and more newly independent countries allocated air time to the station on the External Services of their

stations. Eventually, it broadcast from Addis Abeba, Brazzaville, Luanda, Lusaka, Dar-es-Salaam and Harare at different times and on different wavelengths to Namibia, under the centralised control of the SWAPO Information and Publicity Department. The largest part of the station’s funds came from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It was “aimed at sensitizing the Namibian people on the liberation struggle, informing them about the progress of both diplomatic, political and military activities conducted by Swapo, as well as keeping the people informed on a variety of news and events happening around the world.”\textsuperscript{189} This paraphrase shows the actual function of the station: the "Voice of Namibia" was a propaganda radio, the only goal of which was the propagandistic support of SWAPO’s liberation struggle. However, it targeted not only a Namibian, but also an international audience.\textsuperscript{190}

The station’s central department with its director, Sackey Namugongo, was placed at the headquarters in Luanda, and reported to the Politbureau. The stations in the different cities consisted of 3-5 broadcasters under direction of a supervisor. In theory, production was autonomous in every station, but in practice, programmes were often exchanged. In particular the station near headquarters in Luanda sent recordings and programmes to the other stations, as it had the greatest capacities for recording. As the stations were situated far from each other, control was not easy to achieve.

But the broadcasters that were selected for VoN jobs were those who displayed special "commitment".\textsuperscript{191} Other than that, proficiency in languages was an important ability for candidates, as they had to translate from the English scripts into the vernaculars and vice versa. The teams were divided into the fields of "production, translation, announcing"\textsuperscript{192}. Accordingly, the VoN broadcast in many Namibian languages (Otjiherero, Damara/Nama, Oshiwambo, SiLozi, Rukwangari, Afrikaans), but also in English – for the Namibian audience as well as the "international community", that was to be informed about the liberation struggle of the Namibian people and to be won for SWAPO’s cause.

As a party propaganda organ, the VoN had two priorities: "[...] the station’s role

\textsuperscript{189} Shivute, Mocks: A Synopsis on the Revolutionary Media (Underground Media) operated by the Liberation movement – Swapo, speech held at the Namibian Press Centenary Conference, 12 & 13 October 1998, Windhoek, no page numbers.
\textsuperscript{190} Interview Charles Mubita 18.08.2006.
\textsuperscript{191} Interview Sackey Namugongo, 11.08.2006. Charles Mubita, indicated a "level of understanding of the political situation in Namibia" and "proficiency in languages" as necessary abilities. Interview Charles Mubita, 18.08.2006.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.
was to counter enemy propaganda against the SWAPO and to educate our people on what they were expected to do, namely to support the struggle."\textsuperscript{193} But in targeting an international audience, it could rely on the support of the United Nations in the international public arena.

The decision of the International Court of Justice in The Hague of 1971, which declared South Africa's occupation of Namibia as illegal,\textsuperscript{194} and the UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, which declared all measures unilaterally taken by the South African administration concerning the election procedure as void and explicitly welcomed SWAPO's willingness to cooperate, took away any rest of legitimacy the administration had.\textsuperscript{195} In addition to that, the UN had already in 1973 recognised SWAPO as the "authentic representative of the Namibian people."\textsuperscript{196} Inside Namibia, it attained moral legitimation through the messages of solidarity from the two biggest churches in Namibia, which condemned the presence of South Africa in Namibia after the ICJ ruling in an open letter.

A significant part of the station's assets came from UN sources. It was financed mainly through the UN Development Programme. The UN Council for Namibia, which worked closely together with SWAPO and provided training facilities for VoN broadcasters through the "Swapo Broadcasters' Training Project". But the SWAPO Politbureau through its Information Department retained its rigid control over the station and its programmes.

The station was embedded in a general propaganda offensive. As a part of the Information Department, it was closely coordinated with the print publications of the respective country departments and UN negotiations. The successes of SWAPO in international propaganda can be seen as a decisive part of the Namibian liberation struggle: "[...] the information conflict was by far the most dominant and significant contributor to the eventual outcome."\textsuperscript{197}

\textsuperscript{194} Dobell 1998, 40.
\textsuperscript{195} UN Security Council, Resolution 435, 29.9. 1978.
\textsuperscript{196} UN General Assembly, Resolution 3111 (XXVIII), Question of Namibia, 12.12.1978.
that were directed at a Namibian audience. The content varied significantly:

"For example, if I'm talking in Oshiwambo, I add certain things which are not meant for the international community. [...] I'm saying that, ah, 'your sons and daughters are passing there tomorrow. Give them water' and so on. I can not tell somebody in Britain about that, you know? So, there are certain things which I overemphasised in local languages and understated in English. In English, we are putting our case straight. We're appealing for action on this particular issue. But when it comes to our people we'll say 'yes, we got the said news. We know what happened there. Now this is what we have to do."198

The propaganda also entailed an element of national unity, but it was subjected to the general purpose of the struggle against Apartheid and the illegal occupation:

"that was the cornerstone of our radio service in propaganda, in psychological warfare. [...] This message [...] must have all the ingredients: unifying the people. inform the people about the importance of unity. [...] Tell them how bad is apartheid [sic]."199

The motive for establishing the SWABC, more than even in colonial Zambia, was information control. The South African government had been forced to establish institutions in Namibia that, at least on the surface, could bring the country on the path to autonomous administration. The radio station was established to embody in principle the development towards an independent, democratic Namibia as an institution while being itself an instrument in the process, lending legitimacy to the South African model for the future of the country as well as promoting it. Rather than educating its listeners to bring them on the path to modernity, however, it separated the different groups and assigned them specific cultures, trying to fix 'traditional' societies at an imagined point in time.

Radio in occupied Namibia was part of the war that was fought out over the country. While the SWABC was to legitimise South African rule and promote phony political institutions, the Voice of Namibia challenged the South African version of events, inside the country as well as internationally. This information conflict became more and more important, as SWAPO was inferior on the military field, but could effectively mobilise international diplomatic support. It also countered South African efforts to uphold an artificial ethnic division, countering the SWABC's emphasis on distinctive 'traditional' cultures with calls for unity, achieved in decades of struggle against Apartheid.

198 Interview Sackey Namugongo 11.08.2006.
199 Ibid.

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Because of this emphasis on propaganda, both stations had to be controlled heavily. Therefore, information control and (counter-)propaganda played a bigger role than in the colonial setting in 1950s Zambia. This put an even heavier burden on the post-colonial broadcasting station, which had to reconcile both strands of Namibian radio culture.

4. Reuniting and Reconciling: the NBC in Independent Namibia

In 1991, after extensive debates, the Namibian Broadcasting Act established the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC). Although the Act drew upon the SABC and SWABC laws, and although elements of the SWABC structure were retained, decisive changes were made to the structure of the Corporation.

The NBC is headed by a Broadcasting Board that consists of 11 persons at most who are appointed by the Minister of Information and Broadcasting – according to the restrictions provided by the act (e.g. no members of the National Assembly). This for-
mally independent Board exerts more control over the station than it had before independence – besides appointing the Board members, the Minister exerts no control over the station, as the Act stipulates. The Director General of the NBC is appointed by the Board; he (to date, the DG has always been male) is then an additional member, but with no voting rights. He is the executive organ of the station, the different departments are subordinated to him. Top management posts were reduced in 1992 reduced to 3: Radio & TV Programmes (heading the different Language Services and the National Service), News & Current Affairs (including the still centralised news production) and Human Resources. This was an important change, as the first DG of the station, Nahum Gorelick, remarked, because the "top-heavy structure" of the SWABC had enabled "filtering of information" because of a "support dominated environment." This reduction of top management posts by half "improved substantially the communication channels and information flow from bottom to top and top to bottom." The issue of the limitation of the different channels' "footprint" to the respective "ethnic" areas was not resolved for a while, however. While it had been identified as an important issue to tackle, there were simply not the resources available to enlarge the transmitter network in a way that could ensure the coverage of the whole of Namibia by all the channels. Broadcasters were however encouraged to "introduce cross-information from all other Namibian language and cultural groups."

Following the Namibian Broadcasting Act, the government still exerts control over the Corporation: it not only appoints the members of the supervisory institution, but also funds the assets of the station – in 1990 76.8 per cent of the NBC's revenue came from state subsidies. Additionally, the Minister of Information and Broadcasting is mentioned in the Act as the registrar of companies, and in that function is legally responsible: "In the case of the NBC, this translates into 100 percent ownership by the state." The Minister also had a final say over appointments and programme content, although he scarcely used it in the first five years.

The government has tried to exert influence over programming on several occa-
After the Broadcasting Board’s first term of office phased out in 1995, only Swapo party members were appointed to the second Board. Although the Swapo government was in 1991 commended both in the country and internationally for its commitment to a public broadcaster, individual members of the government exhibited a more and more authoritarian approach to the station. They expected especially high-ranking politicians to feature prominently in the news. Government representatives often complained about lack of or the way of reporting. Especially the President’s and Prime Minister’s offices expected every public appearance of Sam Nujoma or Hage Geingob to be covered. In letters often addressed to the Director General himself (who continued to stress the editorial autonomy of the newsroom), they sometimes struck a note that led one broadcaster in 1996 to remark that the letters "make frightening reading, seen against the background of the work of a journalist."

As in post-independence Zambia, the background for this attitude was a general feeling among Swapo cadres that they were the liberators and true representatives of the Namibian nation. Many of them had spent ten to twenty and more years in exile, fighting a guerrilla war, and through this sacrifice felt entitled to hold key positions in the newly independent state. On the other hand, Swapo in government was under enormous pressure to deliver on its commitment to greater equity and social justice, while at the same time it needed to integrate the (predominantly white) upper class into the new society. Lauren Dobell has described this dilemma as the twin pressure of "the politics of power" and "the politics of support". The Deputy Minister of Information, Danny Tjongarero, likened the situation to "walking a tightrope" and to the challenges facing Robert Mugabe after the independence of Zimbabwe. Swapo’s answer to this dilemma was the policy of "national reconciliation", with its triple processes of ethnic or racial (overcoming the legacy of apartheid), social (healing the wounds of war) and economic reconciliation (which, in effect, meant retaining the economic status quo). Under considerable public pressure and scrutiny from the

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205 The movement, after becoming a party, was restructured and renamed "Swapo of Namibia" after independence.
206 Cont.: News and Current Affairs to DG, Internal Memorandum, 26.11.1996, NBC Information Services House 19, Box 1. Hage Geingob had accused a journalist of having "literally doctored" an interview with him, because parts of the interview he (Geingob) considered important had been edited. Prime Minister to DG NBC, 25.11.1996, Ibid.
208 Ibid., 107.
209 Ibid., 111.
press, and unsure about the outcome of these processes, it is no wonder that politicians saw the public broadcaster as a danger and reacted nervously to any criticism coming from the media.

As UNIP, Swapo politicians saw the role of the public broadcaster as assisting in nation-building, which for them meant supporting the government in its efforts to foster national reconciliation (as a prerequisite for nation-building). This was reflected in the new policy code the station adopted in June 1990, which, before emphasising the NBC’s commitment to investigative journalism, debate and critical analysis, stipulated that "[t]he corporation's programmes and news services will act in the best interests of the country and its people, with particular emphasis on nation-building and development."\(^{210}\)

The first Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Hidipo Hamutenya, at a workshop organised by the NGO Namibia Peace Plan 435 (NPP 435) to discuss the future of the electronic media in Namibia, stated that "we do have a well-developed radio network today in this country, and we hope that these facilities will become instruments of nation-building, of development, i.e. of education, information and indeed entertainment."\(^{211}\) However, the idea of nation-building envisioned by leading political figures was putting the cart before the horse: "There is a need for our broadcasting services, while recognising the diversity in Namibia of trying to ferment a unity, a national unity that would ultimately lead to the creation of some national identity, and I think once you have a national identity, the question of culture becomes something which flows automatically."\(^{212}\) This attitude was reflected in the first Annual Report of the newly established station:

"The various Language Services will augment the action of the National Service in future in playing a vital role in the development of a Namibian culture. The services can contribute by drawing on the rich and diverse culture associated with each Namibian language to eventually establish a single homogeneous culture which is acceptable to all Namibians."\(^{213}\)

If culture was not an instrument of nation-building, but an outcome, how was the "creation of a national identity" supposed to be established? And what was a "single

\(^{210}\) Gorelick 1995, 5.
\(^{212}\) Ibid., 25. Dan Tjongarero, who put forward this view, was at the time the Deputy Minister for Information and Broadcasting.
homogeneous culture" supposed to look like?

SWAPO's nationalist ideology was shaped by over three decades of armed liberation struggle. Central to it was the view that what constituted Namibian nationhood, what united all Namibians regardless of their ethnic affiliation was the experience of centuries of colonial oppression and the struggle against it. The movement's account of the liberation struggle, conspicuously titled "To Be Born A Nation", traces the history of Namibia from the earliest encounter between locals and Europeans near Walvis Bay in 1670 through the early conquests and the consolidation of colonial rule in the 19th century to the South African occupation. It places SWAPO in a 300-years long tradition of anticolonial struggle and it argues that the Namibian nation was formed by a dialectic of colonial oppression and popular resistance, placing Nama and Herero leaders of anticolonial resistance in a tradition of nationalist liberation struggle. And it states in the introduction the necessary result of this history:

"90 years of brutal subjection to a system of colonial exploitation has irrevocably welded a new social order amongst the oppressed people of Namibia, has given them a common experience of national oppression. It is on the rock of this new social and political reality that SWAPO has forged a united and nationally representative movement for national liberation [...]"

The party retained this concept after Independence. However, it was connected to SWAPO as the agent and catalyst of this process, being "cast in the role of both liberator and 'unifier'." André Du Pisani analyses the implications of this mindset: "Logically speaking, if Namibia is identical with liberation and the freedom struggle with SWAPO, it is in principle impossible to be a Namibian nationalist, i.e. to for the liberation of the entire country, without being a supporter or sympathiser of SWAPO." SWAPO politicians consequently thought that the NBC, although technically a public broadcasting institution, was not supposed to criticise the party or its prominent members, because it was committed to promote national unity and reconciliation. Thus, the ideological prerequisites effectively prevented NBC programmes from discussing controversial issues like the detainee question and, more generally, human rights.
abuses by SWAPO during the liberation war. 'National reconciliation' in Namibia did not result in society facing its violent past from all sides, as South African society was to do after 1994. There was no Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Namibia.\textsuperscript{217} On the other hand, Namibian nationalists who had chosen to stay in the country during the 1980s and had taken part in the various 'internal solutions' were integrated into NBC programmes and not excluded from public discussion, as some had feared from SWAPOs fiery rhetoric against them before 1990.

Thus, like UNIP and other liberation movements before, Swapo equated the interests of the 'nation' with the interests of the ruling party. Independence and democracy notwithstanding, they saw Swapo still as the "sole and authentic representative" of the Namibian people. NBC News reflected this attitude. Ellen Dyvi describes the dilemma the NBC found itself in:

"Journalists report the actions and statements of those claiming to represent the nation, thus constantly reminding the listener of the reality and power of these constructs. Journalists do so, however, not only to serve interested sources whose legitimacy is enhanced by representing the nation, but also to inform an audience which lives in micro-societies that are often far removed from the agencies which act and speak for the nation."\textsuperscript{218}

Thus, although Sam Nujoma was by far not the unifying figure for Namibia that Kaunda had been for Zambia, the problem of nation-building that posed itself in 1990s Namibia was very similar to that in Zambia thirty years earlier. Nujoma, for personal, social and historical reasons, could not fit in this role.\textsuperscript{219} He was not an 'outsider' to Namibian ethnic groups, like Kaunda had been. Nujoma and SWAPO had always been under attack for alleged particularity, commentators claiming that it was essentially an organisation representing Ovambo interests. Secondly, Namibian Whites formed a politically, socially and culturally still significant group that claimed that Swapo was not speaking for them. In addition, a one-party system was not an

\textsuperscript{217} Representatives of the so-called "ex-detainees" had demanded to establish such a commission formed on the South African model. cf. Kornes 2008, 53f.


option after the end of the Cold War and the Second Wave of Democracy in Africa, and certainly not in a country that was under close observation by the United Nations. Although the NBC was not as fixated on Nujoma as ZBS had been on Kaunda, national news was dominated by reports on government representatives.

The NBC retained the division in different Language Services, but established a National Service as central Information Channel, which initially broadcast only four hours a day, by cutting in to all the Language Services in certain slots, especially from 21.00 to 01.00 on weekends. Eventually, it developed into a full-fledged 24 hour Service. The National Service was broadcast in English, but directed to the Namibian population as a whole; consequently, Namibian music and topics of a national interest were introduced to the National Service. Phone-in shows were supposed to incorporate listeners, so that they were able to participate in discussions on nationwide topics. These shows were often mentioned as proof that the NBC was a democratic broadcaster, open to the public and integrating the whole nation that provided listeners with participation in the process of forming public opinion. However, a significant part of the listenership could not take part in the National Chat Show, as the use of English as conversation language excluded many from the discussion – at the time, only a small part of the Namibian population (English-speaking descendants of South African settlers, formerly exiled Swapo members and the upper and middle classes) spoke English. This became more effective over the years, as the younger generations learned English in school.

The problems of using English as the dominant language in the National Service also became clear in the "Namlish" debate that unfolded in the "letters to the editor" and other sections of the independent and opposition press during the year 1991. The English of NBC announcers (especially the Black staff) was criticised as being inadequate in orthography, intonation and general articulation. The debate was mainly led by White élites that spoke Afrikaans and English. They felt that the National Service should reflect the cultural hegemony of the upper classes by exhibiting an orientation towards British English. These debates showed the essential problem of the introduction of English as national language: while it had the advantage over Afrikaans of not being the cultural

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221 Ibid.
expression of the ex-occupier, it was only spoken by a minor part of the population. Afrikaans was to remain the lingua franca of the majority of the Namibian people for some time after independence.

In addition, how the Corporation could distance itself from the Apartheid practice of dividing the population according to cultural and language partitions through the separate Language Services remained a problem. The solution was programme exchange – in addition to recurring to the National Service, the different Services started to produce a host of programmes that featured aspects of social and cultural life of other language groups.

As UNIP, the Swapo government after independence was confronted with the problem of nation-building. But the Namibian nation was contested even more; the conflicts of the previous decades had produced an essentially divided society. Swapo reacted in a way similar to UNIP's 25 years before: politicians wanted to control the medium and saw any criticism of government members as jeopardising national unity. The pressure on the Swapo government to ensure democratic proceedings and the sensibilities of a population that had continually worked against a highly censored medium, however, excluded the authoritarian option of incorporating radio into the bureaucracy. Swapo politicians therefore tried to control the station by putting pressure on managers and editors and bullying them into compliance. As in post-colonial Zambia, their desire to control and censor information was rooted not just in their attitude to power, but in deep insecurities about how to establish a unified nation, all the more so as reconciliation between the former adversaries was the most pressing issue. As UNIP, Swapo saw itself as "sole and authentic representative" of the Namibian nation, and saw national unity as connected to the party's rule.

5. Government Control, Public Service Broadcasting and Issues of Censorship

As shown, none of the stations was completely free from government control. The role of broadcasters was not perceived as informing the public or keeping politics in check; rather they were supposed to act as mouthpieces of government, informing the public on government decisions instead of analysing or challenging policies of go-
vernment and opposition. Journalists' role in general was rather seen to help 'building the nation'. Although especially the state broadcasters were nominally independent, they fostered censorship in the interest of the government in many indirect ways. It is, however, difficult to assess the amount of censorship, as it was not executed openly most of the time.

Censorship is a complex mixture of real external control mechanisms in a given media institution (or, for that matter, company) and preconceived ideas of journalists about what they can and cannot (or should and should not) publicise and the consequences of trying to do so despite the possibility of conflict. Censorship and selfcensorship open a central field of agency for journalists, as they have an impact on journalistic ethos and influence the everyday workings of media institutions.

Censorship is an everyday practice in many media institutions. Academic research usually focuses on politically motivated censorship carried out by party or state agencies. Other categories are military censorship, religious censorship and the censoring of "obscenities". That censorship is not a thing of the past, even in democratic Western countries that pride themselves in their free media, is shown by the heated debates on censorship of (child) pornography and politically or religiously "extremist" contents on websites. These debates evolve around socially, historically and culturally established norms of decency and acceptability. At the same time, governments refuse to publish sensitive documents for reasons of national security. Only recently have media, journalism and communication scholars started to analyse censorship against the background of economic developments by looking at the complex linkages of media conglomerates. There are many examples where media companies such as publishing houses censor magazines, journals or books for reasons of economic interest to either of the publishing house itself or companies that belong to the group that owns the media institution. In the context of this study, politically motivated and military censorship are of primary interest.

Censorship in most of the stations analysed here was seldom an open procedure.

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222 Recent events, for example the scandals involving the Abu Ghraib prison, or the publication of secret communication of the US Army in Iraq and US diplomats around the world, show the general interest of political and military institutions to control information.


In general, laws that stipulate censorship exhibit only vague definitions, which gives the censors significant leverage vis-à-vis the journalists.

The most outspoken case of censorship was the SWABC's policy code. Additionally, the system of SWABC was structured to ensure that only persons who could be trusted to present the political situation in the correct way were admitted to responsible positions. This went so far that only broadcasters with Afrikaner background were admitted to ideologically important positions in the direction of contribution centres and in the core of the News Desk in Pettenkofer Street. These journalists can now claim there was no censorship in SWABC: "I compiled my news stories throughout the day, and sent them through to Windhoek, but I can't remember one instance where they told me 'we are not including that story because of politics'. I was never instructed to keep it back."\(^{225}\)

Censorship and selfcensorship are not necessarily disguised. In a war situation, such as the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, propaganda becomes a necessary weapon in the fight. While the UNIP and SWAPO propaganda stations were openly controlled by the liberation movements, they both relied – as did the SWABC – on politically trustworthy staff. As the stations were broadcasting from exile, there was no possibility to uphold an infrastructure of control; the only way to ensure the propagandistic effectivity was to employ broadcasters that displayed the necessary "commitment."\(^{226}\) There was however no need to disguise that fact – both had openly been established to support the struggle, and both could draw on significant legitimation as they were supported by organisation such as the OAU and the UN. Consequently ex-Voice of Namibia broadcasters don't hide the fact that they were working as propagandists: "That was in exile, it was war. There was no play in anything, it's a serious mission. People need to know what is happening, people are fighting, people are dying. We had to focus on what we're doing."\(^{227}\) Voice of Namibia broadcasters considered themselves not neutral journalists, but fighters for a common cause: "Although I did not fight with a gun, I'm still fighting by mobilizing people through the radio and informing them and educating them as well. So it was almost the same, but another front."\(^{228}\) The same goes for UNIP staff in Tanzania.\(^{229}\) Selfcensorship in this case was

\(^{225}\) Ibid.  
\(^{226}\) Interview Sackey Namugongo, 11.08.2006.  
\(^{227}\) Interview Johanna Mwatara, 17.11.2007.  
\(^{228}\) Interview Theofilus Ekandjo, 10.11.2007.  
\(^{229}\) cf. Andrey Sylvester Masiye's account of his time at the Voice of UNIP. Masiye Andrey S.: Sing-
an open and to a certain degree conscious practice, not a "scissors in the head". It was legitimised by the common goal of all involved, the struggle for liberation in Southern Africa.

In the colonial stations, selfcensorship and censorship were enmeshed in complex ways. The FBC, for example, kept a tight control over political news and current affairs. The Lusaka station could basically only translate what was sent from Salisbury, or programmes were censored by the Ministry of Information – politically, the former CABS was reduced to a mouthpiece of the Federal government. Politics was thoroughly kept out of programmes:

"We were reasonably free to produce what we wanted, but censorship was there, if the subject was hinging on political development, then some boss form the Ministry would have to listen before it went on the air. You could not just interview somebody who is going to talk about either political advancement or the lack of it without special permission. [...] The government didn't mind, but you could not go to the studio and talk politics in CABS. It was never allowed, because not even the colonial masters spoke about the manner of colonizing as it were. It didn't arise. The objective was totally different. 'This is not the media for politics', that's what they'd tell you." ²³⁰

In an autobiographical account, ex-broadcaster Andreya Sylvester Masiye described in detail censorship practices in the FBC:

"In Lusaka, an expatriate with no journalistic training or experience was put in charge of our news nerve-centre. His duty was to monitor the Salisbury newscast. He would record the English bulletin and transcribe or rewrite it in accordance with telegraphed instructions from the federal headquarters. These instructions invariably led to the blue-pencilling of certain items which the federal authorities deemed unsuitable for the majority of African listeners. In some cases, whole news items were replaced by new versions. In others, paragraphs were completely rewritten." ²³¹

Both the Northern Rhodesian Information Department and the FBC also maintained a monitoring system, employing missionaries to listen in to African language programmes and letting African translators read translated items back to their superiors in English. ²³²

As the examples show, censorship practices varied according to the form of government, ideological tenets and general attitude of politicians towards the media. Colonial governments used the radio as an instrument of propagating government

²³⁰ Interview Cosmo Mlongoti, 10.10.2006.
²³¹ Masiye 1977, 35.
²³² Northern Rhodesia Information Department: Annual Report for the Year 1956, 12. NAZ 15/87.
policies and information control. Post-colonial politicians saw the electronic media as instruments of nation-building, but this was, in their mind, connected to the government of the day. For them, criticising government actions or even individual members of government amounted to compromising the nation-building process. In post-colonial Zambia, UNIP in power became more and more authoritarian, connected to the party's attitude towards nation-building and an increasing tendency to see political conflict as a risk to national unity. As shown, this was reflected in the government's policy towards the media in general and the broadcaster in particular. Broadcasters in ZBS were employed as civil servants and as such, had a duty towards the government of the day: "Once you joined the institution, you were being oriented for three months. During this period, you were told the function of the particular institution you were joining." Some, who joined broadcasting after this change, joined as civil servants and were trained in that vein. The situation was clear to everybody: "So we were being controlled by the state. And you also knew what to do, because you can't just go on air and say something which'll not please the Government. You'll be in trouble." The attitudes of politicians towards "their" broadcasters could border on the absurd:

"In the TV in Kitwe, the producer and his cameraman were covering a group of politicians. They took a little longer to pack up equipment and travel back to point B, to cover another political group of the ruling party. So when they got there, they explained and apologised, but the guy said 'You should have given me priority, because I am the minister.' And it didn't end there. This chap complained to the Minister of Information [...] Those chaps ended up being suspended from service, they remained on suspension for about two, three years. Ultimately, there was a court case. Meanwhile, the government built up such a big case out of it and they were seen out of service. This was a protracted case. It involved one of my best TV cameramen, Moses Phiri. Up to now, I'm not sure even if the Supreme Court ruled in their favor. They should have been reinstated or be paid, but nothing like that has happened." A similar attitude toward the media was exhibited by the Namibian government. In 1996, an NBC editor had to defend herself and her colleague against a complaint made to the Board of Governors: "our absence [...] had nothing to do with disrespect or disregard for nation building." A subordinate journalist had failed to report from

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235 Interview Cosmo Mlongoti, 10.10.2006.
236 Internal Memorandum, Ass. Editor TV News Input to Cont.: News and Current Affairs, 22.11.1996, ebd. The complaint mentioned that a report had been promised, but the editor explained that such promises were generally not made.
an event in which the Prime Minister personally handed over a donation to a school in the North of Namibia.  

From 1964 on, the Zambian government exerted more and more control over the broadcaster, as well as over other media. Although theoretically, the constitution guaranteed the freedom of the press, it managed to exert more and more influence on editorial decisions through other means – for example, by banning expatriate journalists from the country. The question here is not only what the attitude of the government was towards the media, but also what possibilities the government had of interfering in editorial decisions. In Namibia after 1990, the new Swapo government was under internal as well as external pressure to form a political order in Namibia oriented towards democracy and a free market economy. Although the SWAPO movement in exile had, as shown, developed a tendency towards an authoritarian style of politics, the Swapo party after independence committed itself to democratic rule. This was reflected in the constitution of the NBC, which had considerable editorial freedom, as well as in the general media legislation. The Swapo government was internationally acclaimed for its commitment to a liberal media environment – the legislation provided for private as well as community broadcasting. Possibilities for government influence, although still existing, were limited significantly. Nevertheless, government representatives, as in Zambia, tried to interfere with editorial decisions. At the same time, many ex-VoN journalists and ex-SWAPO cadres felt loyal to the party. NBC broadcaster Norah Appolus described the balancing act between the different loyalties: "I would always protect Swapo, but I would do it in a way that didn't compromise the work of the NBC." In several occasions, broadcasters were compromised by their proximity to Swapo. However, in a media environment that allow-

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237 Regional Manager: Oshiwambo Service to Controller: News and Current Affairs, 27.11.1996.
238 In the course of the years between 1964 and 1973, conflicts between parts of the Zambian press and the UNIP party and government intensified. The government interfered more and more in editorial decisions, and even banned expatriate editors and journalists from the country. It had taken over the weekly Central African Mail in 1965 out of fear that the major newspapers in the country would all belong to the same expatriate company, Lonrho. Eventually, after the formation of the one-party state, UNIP took control over the major daily newspaper, the Times of Zambia, in 1975. After that, all mass media were in the hand of either the government or the party, up to the end of UNIP rule in 1991. cf. Kasoma 1986; Makungu 2004, 13-20.
240 Interview Norah Appolus, 24.11.2007.
241 News editor Sackey Namugongo was attacked in the press in 1990 for addressing a Swapo rally he originally attended as a reporter. The incident led to a policy decision by the Broadcasting Board that although reporters could be members of a party, they should refrain from being actively involved in politics. cf. "Active politics out!", Times of Namibia, 28.06.1990; "NBC reporter in the soup for for addressing Swapo rally", Windhoek Observer 30.06.1990.
ed for an oppositional and independent press, the government's position towards the NBC was critically scrutinised by other media. In such an environment, instances of government interference were constantly checked by a free press that had a watchful eye on the NBC. During the term of office of the first Broadcasting Board and the first DG, however, the Ministry of Information increasingly put pressure on the NBC management to comply with Swapo's demands. The first DG of the station, Nahum Gorelick, summarises:

"I think it was more a human capacity problem than it was at the beginning a financial problem in really changing this process. A lot of us had gone through education with communication and broadcasting and worked in, not direct, but very close to the political realm and were very aware of how the ideas of the day were developing. But generally, people on the ground, the programme makers and the programme developers were still the old school. [...] But I think as that started moving, there was also a realisation, not only on NBC, [...] a certain political view of maybe partly paranoia, but also partly of control, and I think the stronger that view became, the more they felt that, the way that broadcasting was going, they needed to turn down the screws." 242

Censorship, as becomes clear from these examples, is the result of a complex mixture of political intentions, legislation, infrastructural possibilities and necessities, and a general attitude of politicians as well as managers, editors and broadcasters themselves. While politicians in general tend to try to influence media coverage, legislative and infrastructural premises are decisive in guaranteeing autonomous and critical media. The examples cited here offer a wide spectrum of gradations of censorship and selfcensorship; however, in all instances, broadcasters retained possibilities of agency. All these conditions determined the attitude of broadcasters in the stations, and were reflected in the programmes.

242 Interview Nahum Gorelick, 29.08.2006.
III. Broadcasters

Broadcasters are not just journalists. The term "broadcasters" comprises a host of diverse occupations such as editors, journalists, newscasters, presenters, radio drama producers and speakers, discjockeys, and technicians. This is not to say that these occupations are specialised and can only be executed by those with the right training. In many broadcasting stations, people swap functions, stand in for a sick colleague or regularly work in areas they were not specifically trained for. This pertains even more to the stations analysed here, as they often lacked important resources, including technical, financial and personal. This working environment generally facilitated contacts between staff, especially in the colonial situation and so the station had to be structured in a way to uphold a division between black and white. The Federal Broadcasting Corporation (FBC) and the South West African Broadcasting Corporation (SWABC) are examples of this artificial division: in the case of the FBC, the division was actually geographical, with the English/General Service situated in Salisbury, the African Service in Lusaka. The organizational structure of the SWABC was strictly divided; black staff would only work in the African Services. In the end, this division could not be upheld in either station. The fundamental problem was that on the one hand, a division had to be made not only in terms of output but also on the structural level between "African" and "European Services". On the other hand, the South African regime, when starting with broadcasting to Africans in "South West Africa" through the "Radio Bantu"-scheme in 1966, had already learned that without white broadcasters who had enough knowledge of the respective languages controlling the output of the so-called "Radio Bantu"-Services, African broadcasters could use the radio to spread dissident political messages.

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243 Technicians are not only those workers who maintain the technical facilities, but they work closely together with presenters and producers, in producing programmes as well as in controlling sound levels, music, callers and so on during live broadcasts. Only in recent times and only in studios with the appropriate equipment the host of a live programme is in charge of technical aspects, as many of the procedures are computerised. But technicians used to be the one highly specialised function other broadcasters couldn't always take over. cf. Interview Eden Phiri, 12.09.2006.

244 There was also a small production studio for African programmes in Harare, at the time a township near Salisbury.

1. **CABS and the "European" and "African" Service in the FBC**

The Federal Broadcasting Corporation (FBC), founded in 1958, was an essential part of the political entity called the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. It incorporated the small Federal Broadcasting Services (FBS) in Salisbury, which catered for European listeners, and the Central African Broadcasting Station (CABS) in Lusaka, as the European and African Services respectively. The Division of Broadcasting in Northern and Southern Rhodesia had been implemented right from its start in 1947. The FBS, however, had only been introduced in 1950, two years after the start of the project "Broadcasting for Africans".

Since 1953, the CABS was supposed to promote Federation.

"At that time, the concept slightly changed. It was the colonial settler that wanted to make Propaganda to the locals, to ensure the African got just what he wanted [him] to hear in a limited sort of scope. So, again there was very little room for that kind of expansion of these various talents amongst the African broadcasters."

Peter Fraenkel and Michael Kittermaster left the station as their aversion to Federation grew and their efforts to establish an autonomous Radio Service were frustrated. Harry Franklin had already resigned in 1951. He later stated he left because of "the end of the policy of paramountcy of African interests.", which for him was "the only policy under which I could work." He entered Federal politics as a representative for African interests in the Legislative Council, a postion from which, as shown, he tried to influence the establishment and form of the FBC.

At the time of his departure from Northern Rhodesia, Kittermaster could already boast of an impressive career in international broadcasting. He had started in 1937 as a studio assistant in the BBC, served as signals officer and in army intelligence in India and the Far East during the War, then joined the South African Broadcasting Corporation where he was in charge of music programmes. He had come to Zambia in 1948 as an information officer, where he had played as central a role as Harry Franklin in the establishment and organisation of the CABS. According to Peter Fraenkel, Kittermaster had "created around him a team among whom colour-discrimination was completely unknown", and invited Africans to his house, "oblivious of the

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246 Interview Cosmo Mlongoti, 10.10.2006.
reactions of white passers-by and neighbours." Andreya Masiye corroborates this, describing Kittermaster as "a man full of ideas very fond of the African community, devoted to the welfare of African [...] civilians and soldiers."  

He was passionate about broadcasting to Africans, which he saw as a major tool of development. According to Peter Fraenkel, Kittermaster believed that "broadcasting could do for the African languages what Luther's Bible had done for the German."  

In one of his last broadcasts in 1953, Kittermaster read an announcement of the Government of Northern Rhodesia informing African workers of the consequences of their planned general strike during the two-day national prayer the ANC had organised "as a climax to [its] campaign against Federation." In the recording, Kittermaster, in reading the announcement that says no worker will be protected by trade union law if he goes on strike for reasons "other than industrial disputes", emphasises that this is a Government announcement that is read purely for information, "so that Africans can be quite clear what the law says." He left in 1954 to take up broadcasting in Cyprus and, later, organised a UN-commissioned TV and radio programme series on "Africa's Economic Emergence". Peter Fraenkel hints at his motives for resigning by citing a novel written by Kittermaster himself, in which the protagonist, a district officer, "leaves his district frustrated by racial tensions that destroy his life's work and by time-serving officials who are too weak-kneed to resist settler politicians." Andrea Masiye explains that "because of his pro-African attitude, [Kittermaster] had to leave the station." He would return to Zambia in 1966 to fill the post as Director of the newly established ZBS.  

Fraenkel continued for three more years, trying to "[fight] the increasing illiberalism [...] from the inside", but gave up in 1957. He later explained that he had felt his position resembled the Innere Emigration, "the justification German non-Nazis made..."  

for carrying on the administration for a régime repugnant to them. [...] It was a comfort-
ing lie, but a lie." 257

In 1953, when its listeners had lost trust in it, the station "had reached rock-bottom [...] Our announcers were threatened. Our recording vans had their tyres punctured in remote villages. People refused to record for us. If they could be persuaded to do so, many of their songs had the refrain, 'We don't want Federation.'" 258

By the time the FBC was established, the political tension in the Federation had in no way eased. Its first Annual Report stated that during the crisis in 1959 that ultimately led to Nyasaland's break-off from the Federation, "there can be no doubt of the high responsibility with which the Corporation handled the whole matter," 259 – i.e., it had complied with the demands that Federal government had put on it. It seems that the Ministry of Home Affairs had not even deemed it necessary to exact its right to take over the station completely in a case of emergency. It had succumbed completely to the rationale of the federal and territorial governments. On March 12, 1959, the then Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir Arthur Benson, defended the government's banning of the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) and subsequent arrest of its leaders (including Kaunda) in a broadcast in which he referred "to a joint plan for violent revolution in Central Africa, which he alleged had been prepared by the Federation's nationalist leaders at the Accra Conference of 1958." 260 Accusing the more radical ZANC and Nyasaland's leaders of acting out on the alleged scheme, "Benson then made his well-known comparison between Z.A.N.C. and Chicago's 'organization of killers' of the 1930's, 'Murder Incorporated.'" 261

Broadcasts like this certainly added to the bad image of the Lusaka station among listeners. Only by 1962, after the political tension had eased significantly, African broadcasters felt safer in their own communities: "it had improved. We were living in the same residential areas, so people

257 Fraenkel 1959., 221. Fraenkel, who was of German-Jewish origin and grew up in Breslau (today's Wrocław), had fled from the Nazis together with his family, cf. Fraenkel 2005. The term Innere Emigration (inner emigration) is normally used for German artists, musicians and writers who stayed in the country but stopped publishing, writing only "for the drawer".
258 Ibid., 207. Andreya S. Masiye quotes the same song, according to him a modified "traditional community song": "We do not want Federation/We want a black government." Masiye 1977, 23.
260 Mulford 1967, 95.
261 Ibid., 96. The full text of the speech was also published in the Information Department's radio magazine for Africans, "Nshila", although the reference to "Murder Inc." is absent from the transcript. There are, however, references to "gangster rule" and allegations that the ZANC had used "witchcraft and unmentionable cursings" to intimidate voters in the run-up to the elections. Nshila 30, 17.03.1959, 20-22. NAZ Newspaper Collection.
realised that we were just employed.\footnote{262}

By 1959, FBC staff totalled 198, of which only 39 were African. The Corporation grew in 1960 to 239 (48 African). The African Services in Lusaka, however, hosted most of the African staff – 40 – and 15 Europeans.\footnote{263} While African broadcasters mostly worked in Lusaka, the African Service also trained broadcasters from Southern Rhodesia, and soon a small studio for African broadcasting in ChiShona and IsiNdebele was established in the township of Harare, near Salisbury.\footnote{264}

In Northern Rhodesia as in South West Africa, broadcasters were comparable to bureaucrats and teachers in terms of education, remuneration and social standing. Most of the broadcasters in the FBC, except for the technicians, had attended a higher (secondary) school, and some had worked as clerks and teachers before going into broadcasting.\footnote{265}

Some of the African staff, but only very few, enjoyed pensionable service. European broadcasters had around six per cent higher salaries than most of the Africans; and the latter were often employed on a casual basis. As the BBC’s Tom Chalmers, by that time working as a UN Technical Advisor in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, reported in 1963: "There appears in the past to have been little sustained effort towards fitting Africans for higher responsibilities."\footnote{266} He recommended that ":[i]n future, such training should be a key subject in the [future] NRBC's and NRTV's staff policy."\footnote{267}

Chalmers was invited to help with the establishment of a new Broadcasting Service after the break-up of the Federation. He was a BBC presenter and engineer who had previously established Broadcasting Corporations in Nigeria and Tanganyika. Before that, he had famously organised the BBC Empire Service broadcasts during the London Blitz and announced the death of Hitler "to the rest of the world."\footnote{268} After the

\footnote{262} Interview Kenneth Chibesakunda, 28.07.2007.
\footnote{264} FBC Annual Report 1958-1959, 7f.; BBC WAC E1-1,422-2 (FBC 1959-).
\footnote{265} Interviews Joseph Chileshe, Cosmo Mongoli, Andrea S. Masiye.
\footnote{266} T.W: Chalmers: Report on a Broadcasting Service (Sound and Television) for Northern Rhodesia, in Succession to the Federal Broadcasting Service, 1963. BBC WAC E14-77-1 (Staff Secondments Northern Rhodesia).
\footnote{267} Ibid.
\footnote{268} "Tom Chalmers" (obituary), in: The Independent, 4.9.1995. Organising the broadcasts in a way that met US-American and Commonwealth broadcaster’s demands for timing in order to relay these broadcasts is seen as his major feat in that time.
independence of Tanganyika he left the Corporation in Tanganyikan hands. He stayed for a while as an advisor, then joined the UN Technical Assistance Board and travelled to Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to help establish new radio stations.

What Chalmers found in Lusaka was not to his satisfaction. In a letter to the Director of External Broadcasting at the BBC he remarked: "It is a great pity that the FBC allow the Lusaka station as a whole to run down so badly." The interim report of the NRBC explained that while all 142 employees of the FBC in Northern Rhodesia had been offered to be taken over, only 109 accepted. Except for one, all of the those rejecting the offer were European. The NRBC adapted the salaries to the level of the European and the higher paid African staff and started negotiations to introduce a pension scheme. The whole salary structure was to be revised later in 1964 "in the light of the recommendations accepted by Government dealing with conditions in the Public Service." At the same time, "[t]he need for greater opportunities for local staff was recognised [...] and many of those already in employment were transfered [sic] to different duties carrying greater responsibility." New recruits with experience in broadcasting also joined or re-joined the NRBC in "positions of responsibility."

Together with these material improvements, the NRBC introduced training courses for broadcasting staff, with the help of attached experts from the BBC African Service. The courses usually lasted for four weeks and "covered all aspects of broadcasting production." Two "Announcer/Producers" were sent to London to attend the BBC Special Course for Overseas Broadcasters, after which they were attached to the BBC African Service, the whole period lasting six months. Clearly, the NRBC wanted to establish a Corporation that would be able to stand on its own legs after Independence.

However, there was much work to do to reach that goal. Most African staff in the FBC had not had any formal training, and those who did had arranged it for themselves. For example, Joseph Chileshe had been attached to the BBC during a stay in London to teach Bemba at the School of Oriental and African Studies in 1958. The veteran broadcaster and famous Zambian musician Alick Nkhata joined the Voice of

271 Ibid.
272 Ibid., 12.

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America in January 1963 (he had left the FBC a year earlier to help the UNIP election campaign) and only returned after Independence. Several others had attended courses for "intensive journalism" at the African American Institute in Dar-es-Salaam sponsored by UNIP in 1961 and 1963.\(^\text{274}\)

Only smaller courses were organised in Lusaka, the first one as late as 1962:

"The course, the first of its kind in the Federation, opened at 9 a.m. this morning. There are eight students, all trainee African broadcasting staff with less than a year's service at the Lusaka studios. Among the lecturers will be John Parry, the general service controller from Salisbury, Mervyn Hamilton, Alick Nkhata, Peter Robins and John Appleby. If this first course is successful, others are likely to follow, Mr. Donald Lightfoot, the Lusaka studio's manager, said. 'So often has a new man come without experience and had to be rushed into full operation on the African service quicker than he should be that this type of course has become necessary.' Among the outside lecturers will be the headmaster of the Prince Philip school, Mr. E.G.W.Stevens, and an English mistress at the school, Mrs. G. Bourne de Lange.\(^\text{275}\)

Will Everingham, who held the first course organised by the BBC in April 1964, noted that "[n]one of the students, whose experience ranged from six years to a few days, had any previous training except for a short course organised locally by Mr. Lightfoot at the beginning of the year, which dealt mainly with broadcasting administration."\(^\text{276}\) The Lusaka College of Further Education provided English language courses, as the NRBC now had to create its own English Service.

Everingham's courses were comprehensive: writing for Radio, preparation for Talks and Discussions, training for National Service producers and announcers, newsreading, preparing and recording interviews, record presentation, microphone use, the use of specific recorders, tape editing and use, outside broadcasts, production of features, the use of the Radio Archives and Children's programmes were all part of the course; it was a tight schedule. The NRBC managed not only to prepare the broadcasters for the time after independence, but also improve the material situation of the African broadcasters significantly, as well as giving them much more responsibility.

\(^{275}\) "A Special Course for African Broadcasters", Northern News (NN), 10.04.1962.
\(^{276}\) W.E. Everingham: Report on the Training Course held at Lusaka from 20\textsuperscript{th} April to 16\textsuperscript{th} May 1964, 1. BBC WAC E14-77-1 (Staff Secondments NR).
Experiences and Attitudes

The "English Service" of the FBC, called "General Service" from 1959 and situated in Salisbury was completely separate from the Lusaka African Service. There was a small studio for African broadcasting in Harare, from which contributions were sent to Lusaka. But the most important difference between the General and African Services, as in occupied Namibia, lay in the attitudes of broadcasters.

Broadcasters in the European Service saw themselves as representatives of the white settler population. John Parry, Head of the European Services, continually complained to BBC producers about their reporting on matters of the Federation; for him, the stance of the BBC was too liberal, too critical of Federation and of the doctrine of minority rule that was the core of settler ideology. In instances, the Director General of the FBC, James McClurg, himself forwarded letters from irate listeners accusing the BBC of being "at pains to paint as bad a picture of Federation as [they] could." McClurg, when forwarding this specific letter, remarked:

"Why I think it worth while to let you see Canon Mason's letter is that (a) I believe that on the whole his comments are justified; and (b) it illustrates the fact that distrust of the BBC [...] is no longer confined to the reactionary or even the narrow-minded but is shared by a very large proportion of the European population, including many people of liberal views."

The BBC had no sympathy for the views of the FBC settler broadcasters and insisted on designing their programmes along the lines of broadcasting values such as newsworthiness, non-interference and the refusal to let any censorship affect programme contents. Increasingly irritated, Bernard Moore, the Head of Colonial Services, had to defend himself before his superiors against Parry's charges and dismissed them if they didn't concern actual pronunciation mistakes. One example should be cited here, as it shows the attitudes of the FBC European Service management towards the newsworthiness of events and their role as broadcasters. Parry had complained about a short news item broadcast in the BBC News Bulletin, which was relayed by the FBC. It reported a campaign by the National Democratic Party against racial segregation, in the course of which several African activists had been arrested. Parry complained that the matter was so unimportant that it shouldn't be "head-

277 C.P. Mason to FBC, 21.08.1960, BBC WAC E1/1,422/3 (FBC 1960-61).
278 J.McClurg to J.B.Clark, 05.09.1960, BBC WAC E1/1,422/3 (FBC 1960-61). Sir Beresford Clark was the Director of External Broadcasting at the BBC.
lined\(^{279}\) (according to the BBC, it hadn’t been) and indirectly accused the BBC of bias. Moore, in an internal letter to the Head of the External Services News Department titled “Nonsense from Parry”, explained:

"The arrests and the intentions were considered by the local correspondents of Reuter and the Associated Press to be important enough to report to London, and I should have thought that the F.B.C. was failing in its duty if in its news it did not report that the National Democratic Party had proclaimed its intention to invade churches on that day."\(^{280}\)

In their complaints about the BBC coverage of matters concerning the Federation, the FBC General Service broadcasters were not alone: Southern Rhodesian newspapers, in particular, picked up all kinds of negative or perceived negative BBC reporting, sometimes going so far as to demand censorship of relayed BBC broadcasts: "in critical times the FBC should consider recording the BBC news bulletins, vetting them for offensive material like this, and transmitting only an approved version – with official answers on contentious points."\(^{281}\) Prime Minister Roy Welensky himself communicated with politicians in the UK and the Director General of the BBC, complaining about the BBC's "slant", and considered suing for libel several times.\(^{282}\) The difference in attitude is quite clear: politicians and at least some of the managers in the FBC considered their primary task to be keeping "peace" in the territories, which boiled down to maintaining the status quo of settler domination. Therefore, decisions on which items were reported in the news were based on political agenda. The BBC, on the other hand, claimed to judge items according to news values such as unexpectedness, conflict, relevance for the audience or how the event fit into a bigger context or an already established narrative.\(^{283}\) In this case, these (and more) applied: the spe-

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\(^{279}\) J. Parry to I. Thomas (Overseas Liaison Officer, BBC), 07.06.1961, BBC WAC E1/1,422/2 (FBC 1959-).

\(^{280}\) B. Moore to Head External Serv. News Department, 14.06.1961, BBC WAC E1/1,422/2 (FBC 1959-). The entering into churches that didn't admit Africans – especially the Dutch Reformed Churches – was also announced as a protest against segregation by the NDP. The NDP was banned shortly thereafter.

\(^{281}\) "At a time of tension BBC is found wanting", The Chronicle Weekend Magazine, 6.3.1959.


\(^{283}\) Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge, in an analysis of foreign news in Norwegian media, first analysed what was reported (and, more importantly, what was not reported), in order to establish a new system of "news values". Although the idea of – more or less unspoken – news criteria was thus brought up by social scientists as a critique of how media shape the worldview of their audiences, such criteria are until today also taught in journalism schools and newsrooms. Since then these informal criteria for what makes it into the news and what doesn't have often been used to critically analyse media output, especially that journalists use them to account for lack of or biased reporting on minorities or Third World countries. cf. Galtung, Johan/Mari Holmboe Ruge. 1965. The Structure of Foreign News: the Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in...
cific action was conflictual and unexpected, but nevertheless fit the context of the growing tide of nationalism and political unrest (or even further decolonisation) that had previously been covered by the BBC. The Empire was part of British politics and society and therefore relevant to British listeners because of cultural proximity. The overall newsworthiness, as Moore noted, was also corroborated by two of the biggest news agencies. The FBC, however, adhered to their political agenda, at one point even reporting a journalist of the US-American NBC to the authorities for giving "anti-Federation" reports, and banning him from the FBC facilities, which he had been allowed to use to despatch his reports.284

John Parry went on to become Director General of the Southern Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation (SRBC; formed after the dissolution of the Federation) and the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation (RBC; formed in 1965 after the Smith government's Unilateral Declaration of Independence). By that time, the conflict had escalated, and the RBC was accusing the British Government of broadcasting anti-Government propaganda from transmitters in Botswana and Zambia. In April 1966, the Rhodesian Government declared the BBC "persona non grata" in Rhodesia and stepped up the anti-BBC propaganda.285

Europeans in the African Service studio in Lusaka had a very different attitude. Even in the days of the FBC, they were likely to behave like Peter Fraenkel and Harry Franklin: paternalistic, but with a liberal attitude, sympathetic to the grievances of Africans in Northern Rhodesia. The general atmosphere in the Lusaka station remained one of equality. Instances of censorship and control, as shown, increased; but the relations between African staff and European superiors were good. Kitte...
successor, Cyril "Sapper" Sapseid, also belonged to the team of veteran White broadcasters in CABS. He had taken up broadcasting in 1949, and become second-in-command to Kittermaster. After the latter's resignation, he headed the station, and was taken over as manager of the African Service in the FBC. As his European colleagues, Sapseid was on equal terms with African colleagues and together with Alick Nkhata established the "Lusaka Radio Band", the stations' own music group, which with some reshuffles lasted from 1950 well into the Seventies (renamed in Big Gold Six Band).

This is not to say that European broadcasters understood either what social changes they were witnessing or that CABS itself was an agent of that social change. A quote from an Annual Report well into the Fifties shows what colonial information officers thought of modern African music:

"The majority of listeners appear to want to listen to modern African town songs rather than to their own tribal music and the trend of musical taste seems to have deteriorated over the past year very much faster than was thought possible. It is, of course, understandable, but none the less deplorable. Attempts have been made to keep alive the music of the people with specially recorded programmes, and although some rural Africans still like to hear the music of their forefathers, the majority of our listeners have little time for it."

Nevertheless, they were on friendly terms with African staff, who might even have shared such views. In the interviews conducted, Joseph Chileshe, Andrea Sylvester Masiye, Kenneth Chibesakunda and Cosmo Mlongoti remember their European superiors as good colleagues and friends; all felt they would be protected by them. The tension that had gripped the CABS in 1953 had eased by the early 60s, the ban-yama rumours subsided gradually. Still, the FBC was no free space. Politics was not to be talked about in the African Service, and especially in programmes.

The African broadcasters at CABS had not been inclined to join the new body, especially those who were active in the ANC or ZANC (later UNIP). But as the station needed trained broadcasters, they were attracted with bonuses:

"Some of us, who had connections with political bodies like UNIP, didn't want to go to the FBC, because we didn't like the Federation. But they came up with the suggestion that if we agreed to go to

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287 Northern Rhodesia Information Department: Annual Report, 1956, 11. NAZ 15/87: Information Department Reports. Emphasis mine.
the FBC, they would give us pension for the number of years we had worked with the Northern Rhodesia government, firstly in the Information Department and then in CABS.\textsuperscript{289}

Involvement in the African nationalist parties doesn't seem to have been a drawback to working in Broadcasting at the time of Federation, or even joining. Joseph Chileshe had just lost his job as a clerk in the Information Department because he had taken part in the 2-day national prayer and stayaway in protest against Federation organised by the ANC 1953.\textsuperscript{290} Donald Lightfoot, an ex-colleague who had just gone into broadcasting, invited Chileshe, saying that "he didn't believe in the action that was taken against us by the colonial government."\textsuperscript{291} Two other broadcasters, Andrea Sylvester Masiye and Alick Nkhata, left the FBC in a spectacular move in 1962, the first to join the newly established UNIP radio service in Tanzania, from where election broadcasts were directed towards Northern Rhodesia, and the latter to support UNIP as a musician on campaign rallies. Joseph Chileshe also agreed to work for UNIP, but was unable to join Masiye in Dar es Salaam.

All three by then were widely known broadcasters and popular voices in the programmes broadcast from Lusaka. Masiye was a veteran broadcaster who, after working as a teacher, had been introduced to the radio during the Second World War. As a soldier and language educator in the Northern Rhodesia Regiment of the Kings' African Rifles, he had joined the very first station geared towards an African audience, transmitting messages from African soldiers in Nairobi to their families and vice versa. After some years of teaching, he came to the CABS in 1954 to fill the late Edwin Mlongoti's post. In the FBC, he was for a period seconded to the studio in Nyasaland. Masiye had developed some of the most popular programmes in the Lusaka station, including the ChiNyanja Kabvulumvulu ("The Whirlwind"), a an entertainment and discussion programme. He had shown his anticolonial leanings earlier when he pro-

\textsuperscript{289} Interview Joseph Chileshe, 19.01.2008. The actual reason for this pension was the fact that senior broadcasters at CABS (a government body), who had had seniority status in civil service, would lose this status as a result of the change to FBC, as the FBC was a parastatal organization. The pension was given as a compensation. After independence this resulted in the problem that ex-FBC broadcasters who stayed on in ZBS (again a government body) would start again as civil servants with junior status. The broadcasters vindicated their compliance, stating that "resistance to the Federal concept by civil servants was usually met with either demotion or dismissal." Nkhata, Alick: Written Submission to the Administrative Commission of Inquiry into Effectiveness of Zambia Information and Broadcasting Services, 30.11.1967, p. 8 Institute of Commonwealth Studies (ICS), 115/3/1.

\textsuperscript{290} Africans working for the civil service, the mines and other big employers had been warned that they would be dismissed if they participated. Ultimately, the plan failed, as the trade unions didn't support Nkumbula and the ANC. "Only in Lusaka did Congress achieve as much as fifty per cent support." Hall, Richard: Zambia, London 1965, 158. See also Mulford 1967, 26f.

\textsuperscript{291} Ibid.
duced a play that indirectly criticised the colonial conquest of Central Africa, which in 1958 even led to a raid of the premises in Lusaka and the destruction of the scripts. Asked personally by Kaunda (with whom he was acquainted) upon his return from Nyasaland, he resigned and moved to Dar es Salaam, to organise election broadcasts from the studios of the Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation. Chileshe, who had also agreed to work for UNIP, was unable to accompany him.

Nkhata, originally also a teacher and KAR soldier, had, with an ex-servicemen’s grant, studied music in South Africa and worked with the ethnomusicologist Hugh Tracey, recording all kinds of African music in Southern Africa. After joining the CABS in 1950, he rose to stardom in Northern Rhodesia as a broadcaster and musician. He developed a distinct style, drawing on the different Zambian musical traditions, regional forms of popular music such as Guitar Music (a style developed in mining areas in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Copperbelt, made popular by musicians such as the Zimbabwean George Sibanda, whom Hugh Tracey had recorded) as well as Jazz, Calypso and other globalised forms. He played solo with his guitar or, together with Sapseid on the piano and other CABS broadcasters and technicians, in a quartet called the "Lusaka Radio Band". The band, urged by Kittermaster to provide a new tune every week for a Saturday Variety Show, reinterpreted and "hotted up" village songs they had found in the vast recording library that had been amassed over time.

Especially the move of Alick Nkhata, who by that time was already a music star throughout the territories and one of the most famous African broadcasters in Northern Rhodesia, was widely publicised. The Northern News added, somewhat smugly, that he had given up his "£1000-a-year job" to work for UNIP at a monthly allowance of £5." Masiye as well as Chileshe were also widely known in Zambia. Several other interviewees were also involved in politics in one or the other way. Both Masiye and Nkhata were discussed as potential Directors of the post-colonial station.

Peter Fraenkel, in his autobiographical account of the CABS, spoke of his fellow

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292 An annual income of £1000 was the average income of Europeans in the Federation; the average income of Africans amounted to £70. Alick Nkhata presumably was one of six Africans in the African Service of the FBC who were employed on the same terms as their European colleagues. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Survey of Developments since 1953, Salisbury 1959; Rhodes House (Oxford): Papers of the Rt. Hon. Sir Roy Welensky, KCMG, 1907-1991, 203/7.
broadcasters as "Men Between", implicating they were men between two cultures, between (African) "tradition" and (European) "modernity", "hovering in the balance between the loin cloth and the LSE-Blazer". Fraenkel, although reproducing a dualism that has long since been proven inadequate to analyse the situation of Africans in late colonialism – which was much more complex –, nevertheless has a point. The broadcasters at CABS adapted a medium built to work in a Western social and cultural context to an African one. African broadcasters were much more skilled in "translating" European concepts and adapting them for an African audience. Fraenkel does not hide his astonishment at and admiration for the skills of people like Edward Kateka or Edwin Mlongoti, who were among the first broadcasters to adapt Zambian tales and stories to the new medium. Both were older and had followed career paths in the colonial information system. Mlongoti had worked for Mutende, the first colonial newspaper for Africans as translator, rising in the ranks to become assistant editor. Franklin had introduced him to radio, where he soon adapted folk stories and produced plays. He died of Diabetes in 1954.

Broadcasters in Exile

The FBC, as the SWABC, was a monopolist; but its ideological hold over the colonial population came to be challenged. UNIP secured a spot in the External Services of the Tanganyikan Broadcasting Corporation in 1962 and beamed election programmes to Northern Rhodesia. The station was headed by Andrea Sylvester Masiye; after he left for America "for further training" in September 1963, the post was taken over by Lucas Kamungu, who had joined the FBC in 1960 only to leave it two years later. They were assisted by Elias Kaenga. The station was small, but could look to UNIP correspondents who visited and recorded Party events for assistance. Kaenga took recording tours through all the Provinces to record speeches by Chiefs and Party officials as well as traditional and political songs.

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295 Fraenkel, Wayaleshi, 134.
296 It has to be pointed out, however, that he was actually able to describe his friends and colleagues in a way that constantly proves this dualism wrong, cf. Frankel: Wayaleshi, 117f.
297 cf. Fraenkel 1959, 44f.
299 "ZBC Appointments", in: Background No. 32, 1965, ICS 115/3/1.
While there is no information about the financial situation of the broadcasters other than the smug remark in the Northern News about "a monthly allowance of £5" mentioned above, it is clear from frequent letters to the Party Headquarters that the general financial situation of the station was not an easy one. Many important assets had to be requested from the Party treasury. Salaries were catered for by a scholarship programme. But the staff in Tanganyika were very few anyway: all in all, three persons ran the station from the TBC External Services. Material was sent by UNIP and by freelance correspondents or collected during recording tours.

Broadcasters and correspondents were selected not only looking at their journalistic experience and training, but also their "political colours." Given the low salaries and difficult circumstances of broadcasting from abroad, they had to be dedicated to the nationalist cause. Masiye describes his short stint in Tanganyika as "a breath of fresh air", as he experienced an independent African country for the first time. The three broadcasters at the TBC had all given up their jobs in the FBC because they felt that it unfairly allocated airtime to the different parties that were taking part in the election. The United Freedom Party, dominated by White settlers, had more airtime than the two nationalist African parties. From Tanganyika, hour-long broadcasts could balance this discrimination at least to an extent.

The interviewed broadcasters remember their time at the FBC in positive terms. As did other African civil servants, they accepted the rule that politics, nationalist politics in particular, was not to be mentioned. Those employed as newsreaders felt the gap between what they were reporting and what they knew through alternative sources of information, for example family members.

### Notes

301 see n. 55.
302 see for example A.S. Masiye to National Secretary, 21.05.1963; P. Sozigwa (Admin. TBC) to S. Kapwepwe (UNIP treasurer), 19.08.1963.
303 A.S. Masiye to N. Mundia (Dir. of Elections, UNIP), 25.11.1962.
305 According to Patrick Keatley, Welensky pressured the Congolese secessionist Moise Tshombe to grant the ANC a spot on Radio Katanga and refuse the same to UNIP. (cit. in: Zaffiro 2002, 48.) This coincided with massive financial and material support the Katangese government granted to the ANC, cf. Macola 2008, 33f. However, in the sources analysed for this thesis (specifically in the ANC documents that are also held in the UNIP Archive), no information was found whether the ANC made use of the offer, or who was involved in the effort.
306 Interview Kenneth Chibesakunda, 28.12.2007. Chibesakundas brother had to flee the country because of his involvement in the ChaCha campaign; his father, who was a chief in the Northern Province was also sympathetic to the nationalist cause and Kaunda. Later, when the crisis
other hand, were already quite elaborated by that time. Edward Kateka and Edwin Mlongoti had set standards for broadcasting folk storytelling and plays that would influence African broadcasting for years to come. Dennis Liwewe in the first half of the Sixties developed a distinct style of live reporting from the soccer stadiums on the Copperbelt. The broadcasters are not the only members of the African intellectual elite who exhibit some nostalgia for the Federation. Hugh Macmillan, in his analysis of the pictures of the popular Zambian painter Stephen Kappata, remarks that "like many of his generation he now looks back on the Federal period with some nostalgia, as the time when 'development' got started and when the cost of living seemed to be relatively low."308

Joseph Chileshe's account of how Lightfoot introduced him to CABS supports this argument. European and African broadcasters in the successive Northern Rhodesian African Services certainly did share liberal values about a multi-racial future for the territory. For European broadcasters this usually meant they would lean towards one of the liberal organisations associated with Capricornist ideas on non-racialism.309 But as political tension grew, African broadcasters were inclined to join the more radical nationalist camp; as with the ongoing denial of African political demands most nationalists did not see the Capricorn Society or its political offshoots as potential partners.310 Thus, many African broadcasters found themselves between different political worlds. But despite having no illusions about the propagandistic nature of the programmes they produced for FBC, and despite the fact that they were looked upon with hostility by listeners as well as neighbours (especially in the years of growing political tension), broadcasters still describe the atmosphere at the African services as one of mutual friendship and nonracialism. The interviewees attribute this fact strongly to the personalities of Kittermaster and Lightfoot. Also, broadcasters managed to negotiate the conflicts between FBC regulations towards nationalism and their own political leanings. Masiye explains that African broadcasters had obtained permission to attend nationalist gatherings, arguing that they "would find it difficult to get artists

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307 Interview Dennis Liwewe, 11.01.2008.
309 Harry Franklin, for example, was one of the founders of the Constitution Party. See Phiri 2006, 71.
310 For a description of liberal organisations and their role in pre-Independence politics, especially the Capricorn Society, see Phiri 2006.
and performers for our programmes." He also gives many examples of broadcasters conspiring with listeners in request programmes to play nationalist songs. As it usually took some time for FBC monitors to discover nationalist messages, which were often hidden, by the time one song was banned, another had already risen to the top of the playlist.  

Some of the interviewees, in comparing it to post-colonial broadcasting, even describe the FBC as a "better" employer:

"If you were good, they would tell you that you were good, and they would organize for better conditions of service for you in the colonial days. You really were respected for what you did. It wasn't so after Independence. It was a question of what is your relationship with the government, or what is your political affiliation."  

The same interviewee claims that after Independence "there was much less freedom than before." Such statements on the "freedom" at FBC stand beside descriptions of censorship, propaganda and control. The point here is that while broadcasters explain they could do nothing about "propagandistic" Federation statements in the news, they felt a freedom for personal development (including the opportunity to attend broadcasting courses in Britain, or even join the BBC African Service), relative personal wealth as well as a certain amount of freedom in shaping cultural programming for African audiences. Despite strong political opposition to Federation, they enjoyed the benefits of a cultural liberalization grounded in the very same discourse of "racial partnership" that nationalists had opposed from its beginnings as insincere. This discourse of "racial partnership" was at the same time a bone of contention for African listeners, who protested the gap between Federal propaganda and reality, and it had been one of the reasons for the integration of Africans in programming in the first place.

3 "Zambianisation" in the ZBS: Africanizing Radio?

Independence in many African countries posed one major problem for the state:

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312 Ibid. 35ff.
313 Interview Cosmo Mlongoti, 10.10.2006.
314 Ibid. Mlongoti was offered a permanent position in the African Service, but was called back by Lightfoot to help establish a TV studio in Kitwe.
How could the standard of administration be upheld, so that Africans could take their fate in their own hands? Where could states get the skilled bureaucrats they needed without having to rely on colonial staff and thus ensure its continuing presence and influence? The Africanisation of mainly, but not only, the administrative services was seen as a foremost goal should the newborn nations achieve not only political, but also social and economic independence. "[...] Africanisation and decolonisation are essentially one and occur at the same time." 315

Actually, the colonial administration itself had already seen the need for Africanisation before independence; however, most African civil servants could not rise above a certain level. Moreover, the very basis for an Africanisation not only of the administrative services was lacking, but also in important sectors of the economy, as there were too few Africans with the educational background needed to fulfil the necessary tasks:

"Zambia entered its Independence in 1964 with a pathetically and dangerously small stock of educated manpower. At that time, there were 100 Zambian graduates, a bare 1500 Zambians with a school certificate, and only 6000 who had as much as two years of secondary education, a meagre return, in all conscience, from an education system which had started more than three quarters of a century earlier." 316

A swift and effective change of personnel, especially in managing positions, was nevertheless necessary.

It took some time, however, to bring the process to a close. Although some Ministries could report successes in Zambianisation rates, as late as 1969, the government was still reorganising the whole process. Education Minister John Mwanakatwe was appointed to a newly formed Committee charged with a review of the Zambianisation and training process in order to accelerate it. 317 Also, the rates say nothing about the problems zambianised institutions were faced with, like inexperienced and not sufficiently trained staff.

Especially in the ZBC and its successor body, the ZBS, higher positions remained occupied by Europeans for years. It is nevertheless a proof of their liberal and pro-Af-

316 Snelson, Peter: Educational Development in Northern Rhodesia, 1883-1945, Lusaka 1974, v.
317 Zambianisation, 10.05.1969, BBC SWB, ME/W519/A2/2.
rican attitude during their years at CABS and the FBC in the eyes of the Zambian politicians that Donald Lightfoot and later Michael Kittermaster were selected for the post of Director General for respectively the ZBC and the ZBS. After the change to ZBS, there had been a first "shadow" appointment of an African, Alick Nkhata, as Director, leaving Lightfoot as de facto "consultant." BBC consultants claimed Nkhata was not up to the task, albeit more for personal reasons than a lack of education. Tom Chalmers, who had earlier helped in building up the NRBC, assessed Alick Nkhata in a memo to his BBC colleagues thus:

"[...] he dislikes administration and has no aptitude for it. Though I have yet to meet an African who is not to some degree politically minded, Alick is more interested in music than in politics. He will, therefore, be likely to accept direction from his former rival, Sylvester Masiye, now Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Information. [...] His appointment means that, if he runs true to form, ZBC will lack effective and competent leadership and ZBC itself will be dominated by stronger personalities outside or inside." 319

However, it is doubtful that by the time the new legislation came into force there would have been much space for a Director in ZBS to depart from the course defined by the Ministry of Information, even if he had been a "politically-minded" talented administrator. Nkhata was clearly the only available African with enough knowledge of the broadcasting field to be able to fulfil such a task (Andreya Masiye, who had a comparable experience and knowledge in broadcasting, was working for the Ministry). Kittermaster, who in the meantime had worked for the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) and visited Zambia and the ZBC several times, took over as Director in 1967, while Nkhata remained Deputy Director. There were other "shadow" appointments at the management level, meaning that Zambians were trained for the jobs by the "expatriates" from whom they were supposed to take over. The program, which started in 1965, was not finalised by 1967.

Nkhata was faced with a host of problems in the implementation of the Zambianisation program. As shown, in 1964, when the NRBC had been established with the prospect of providing the Broadcasting Corporation for an independent Zambia, many European staff had left the station. This resulted above all in a shortage in professional technicians, as these had been predominantly European. Zambian professional

318 Donald Lightfoot to Tom Chalmers, 06.09.1965, BBC WAC BBC WAC E1/1,525/1 (Africa - Zambia Broadcasting Corporation, 24.10.1964-65).
technicians in the ZBS building faced another problem:

"Due to the haphazard way the present building programme is carried out, it is not possible to keep a single chart of the wiring and its connections to the various electronic equipment at the Transmitters and in the studios. All modern broadcasting organisations have centres within the main buildings where such charts are kept for ease of reference when carrying out repairs. As things are at present not one engineer knows how to repair faults in equipment that has been installed by his colleague."320

Nkhata urged for standardisation of technical equipment, as this could, at least to an extent, balance the notorious shortage of manpower:

"I would sooner like to see technicians changing hands without their having to be faced with the problem of dealing with different equipment. In this department, as with the National Assembly, the Police, Zambia Information Services and other organisations, technicians could, if necessary, move from one studio to another and finding work easy to undertake. It has been proved that a country with standard equipment could work with fewer technicians than with a conglomerate (sic; he probably means conglomerate, RH) of different electronic equipment."321

He argued for a pragmatic policy to overcome the problems posed by insufficient education and inadequate professionalisation of technicians:

"[...] in the field of engineering, prospective applicants should not be disqualified from becoming professional men in their own right. There are for example a number of men with less educational qualifications but who are otherwise capable men in the technical field through their own hard work, who could become present chief engineers."322

This was an important argument, as there was clearly a lack of formally educated staff, not only in the technical field. But Nkhatas experience as a broadcaster, who himself had had no formal training when he started gives credence to his standpoint that "what our organisation requires at the moment are men who are willing to work hard, who are able to service our transmitters, who are able to repair faults, and generally able to look after equipment and order the right spares."323

Thus, while one problem of Zambianisation in broadcasting was that there was a general lack of formally educated staff, as the education facilities that had only recently been established could not service the demand, there was no lack of person-

321 Ibid., p. 7.
322 Ibid., p. 13.
323 Ibid.
nel with adequate abilities – only that those were effectively barred from rising in the ranks because they could not show the necessary certificates.

Concerning broadcasters’ qualifications, Nkhata took an original standpoint that is worth extensive quotation. Firstly, he argued again that formal education should not necessarily be the criterion for hiring broadcasters:

"While we are dedicated to further educational qualification of our young people in Zambia, we are still of the opinion that the lesser qualified people should receive consideration on merit. This means that in Broadcasting, ability to translate from English to a Zambian language should be the most important factor in considering applicants for employment."324

But he went further, arguing even that the Zambian higher education system did actually not qualify people for broadcasting under the special circumstances of broadcasting for a largely rural African audience, as it was too much oriented on European models and European content:

"Our young people may have G.C.E. qualifications, but these are in foreign ideals, languages and customs. Let us take say a Bemba Form Four boy, who was born, brought up and educated in Kitwe or Chililabombwe. This boy may be very intelligent, but would he speak Bemba correctly? It may be argued that he would speak Bemba acceptable to people on the Copperbelt, but is this really what we are looking for? We firmly believe that a Bemba announcer or Lozi announcer should be able to understand the idiomatic and proverbial aspect of his language, to make broadcasting more interesting. We also believe that he should be able to have some idea of how people live in his tribal area, etc. etc. These qualities are abundant in persons who have had education up to standard six in the rural areas, during the period 1940-1956. We do not see any reason why people of this educational standard with extensive experience either in the teaching or clerical field, should be barred from joining broadcasting as broadcasters."325

Nkhata here develops the original idea that there actually were possibilities to develop independent African broadcasting forms and that European education standards were not the necessary criterion for this. Seen against the background of the African broadcasters’ experience in developing such forms in practice, this is not surprising. Nkhata argued that the needs of an African rural audience and its cultural expressions needed to be taken seriously, "to make broadcasting more interesting." Thomas Turino describes Nkhata as "cultural broker" who "may have [had] a deep understanding of the different cultural and aesthetic positions involved."326

324 Ibid. p. 12.
325 Ibid., p.12f.
programming. This could be the position Nkhata tried to occupy in Zambian broadcasting, but his argument that people educated in rural areas in the Forties and early Fifties were best equipped for the task suggests that what he actually had in mind was the broadcasting tradition of CABS. This was not the sort of argument that would have been easily agreed upon by Nkhata’s superiors; rather, they felt a need to distance themselves from the colonial past – at least on the surface.

Taken from another angle, Nkhata’s argument is also one for a different approach to qualification – it is not necessary or even desirable that the education of broadcasters is a standardised one that is formed along ideas and standards of media professionalism. Inherent here is the view that professionalisation does not lead to better output quality, but rather that criteria for employing broadcasters should be open to taking media outsiders into account to ensure originality in programming – Nkhata emphasised that broadcasters should be "creative personalities."  

Nkhata also argued for a commercialisation of the Service, so that it would ultimately be able to run self-sufficiently, and for an abolition of the broadcasting licenses, as he believed "that many more people would be encouraged to buy sets if they knew they wouldn't have to pay Musonko [i.e. fees, RH] for the radio." Also, especially in the more remote provinces where high outside aerials were necessary for a good reception, many radio owners did not use these aerials for fear of being reprimanded for not paying license fees; Nkhata argued that with an abolition of fees, those people would be able to have better access to a medium that he described as "a necessity" for a largely illiterate population, for which it was "the only means of hearing what [was] going on in the country as whole and in the world in general." This proposal was taken up three years later by a provincial Minister of State, who, in a speech to the Zambian parliament, suggested "that people living in remote areas should be exempted from radio licence fees so they would be encouraged to put up aerials to get better reception." 

The Zambian government, however, did not respond to Nkhata’s proposals for a thorough liberalisation of broadcasting on several levels. The increasing tendency to centralise and bureaucratise more and more parastatal institutions did not spare the

328 Ibid., p. 15.
329 Ibid.
330 BBC SWB, ME/W554/B/3, 07.01.1970 (BBC WAC).
Broadcasting Services. The parastatal that had been envisaged (in theory) by the colonial administration was transformed into a department of the state, its hierarchy incorporated into the bureaucracy. Broadcasters were committed to the person of Kaunda as the embodiment of national unity. A BBC broadcaster seconded to Zambia in 1965 reported on programming courses:

"Great stress was laid in these courses on the broadcasters' responsibilities to the country and to the part they could play in its further development. Early in 1965 a rather formal 'hand-out' about a speech of President Kaunda's urging Zambians to form co-operatives had been broadcast. Each course discussed at some length how, as broadcasters, they could help to keep people interested in this idea by using different radio forms."331

In 1969, this development culminated in the employment of broadcasters as civil servants, thus falling even behind the FBC practice – the last time broadcasters had been employed as civil servants had been the time of CABS, when the colonial government had used the station as its mouthpiece. With this incorporation into the bureaucracy came a significant cut in salaries. Many broadcasters were not happy with this development:

"They looked at broadcasters and tried to fit them into civil service slots or job descriptions. So you became a clerical officer or senior clerical officer. [...] But, you see, that was not the only problem. [...] There were even more serious structural things, where people expected you to be in the office at the same time as the civil servants, oblivious of the fact that at 5 p.m. the typical civil servant goes home. You as a broadcaster are continuing with the work."333

Nkhata protested:

"A broadcaster is not a Clerical Officer in the sense that he types drafted material. A broadcaster is creative. He makes up his own stories, produces them and these are later broadcast. Now if we take into consideration the fact that stories or talks which find their way into programmes must be informative, educational and entertaining, then we must admit that a broadcaster must be a creative personality if he is to provide material required of his profession. [...] We shall never attract good men to the broadcasting profession if they are going to do a more difficult and exacting job to be paid the same salary as a man who merely types letters day in and day out."334

But remuneration was not the only problem. Staff were not oriented anymore towards a lifelong career as a broadcaster. Rather, they looked to graduations in the administrative service. Charles Muyamwa, one of the broadcasters who left the sta-

332 According to Eddie Mupeso 30%. Interview Eddie Mupeso, 08.01.2008.
tion partly because of this tendency, explains today:

"To advance in your work, you have to graduate out of broadcasting into administration. Which, in my opinion, is not the right thing. You want people to spend, if possible, their entire lives as broadcasters, but they must also grow in stature; they must receive more money. So, you should be able to receive as much money reading news and being a broadcaster as you would if you were, like, programme manager or even the head of the organisation. But this practice where if you are to graduate and become senior in the organisation you must graduate out of the profession, I've never agreed with that. [...] And that explains why, in my opinion, the quality of the service is mediocre. Because you're not allowing people to grow in their profession; you're encouraging them to grow out of it."

Muyamwa's grievances were shared by many of his colleagues, as a report of a review conducted by the Staff Inspection Unit of the ministry confirmed in 1969. The "long serving officers" of Radio Zambia, it noted, unanimously complained that "salary and some conditions of service were reduced or worsened when Government took full control of the radio." Many "able and ambitious men", they said, had left for the private sector because of this, and those that remained were frustrated. Nearly all of those interviewed for this thesis who had worked in the FBC and NRBC left the station before the introduction of the one-party state in 1973, usually for PR and production jobs in the private sector. To these problems were added a general mistrust in the Administration Department of ZBS as well as the Ministry (backed by allegations of maladministration such as partiality in the allocation of housing, delaying appointments for months or even years, abuse of facilities, indiscipline and irresponsible behaviour), staff shortages, significant deterioration of technical equipment, lack of transport for reporting and recording tours, insufficient recording time and studios, and lack of training.

The nationalisation process in ZBS redefined the role of the medium as well as that of the broadcasters. Their self-definition differed significantly from the expectations the new government put on them. Of the interviewed broadcasters, those who had started working in Zambian broadcasting before the restructuring to ZBS, complained massively about the censorship, control, and administrative barriers put in place by the UNIP government. Significantly, those who joined later accepted this as

335 Interview Charles Muyamwa, 26.09.2006.
337 Interviews Cosmo Mlongoti, 10.10.2006; Dennis Liwewe, 11.01.2008; Errol Hickey, 10.01.2008; Charles Muyamwa, 26.09.2006.
338 Ministry of Information 1969, 3f.
part of their job: "So we were being controlled by the state. And you also knew what to do, because you can't just go on air and say something which will not please the Government. You'll be in trouble." The responsibilities were laid out to the aspirant journalists: "Once you joined the institution, you were being oriented for three months. During this period, you were told the function of the particular institution you were joining." This function was quite clear:

"With the Government Services at that time, I think there were no problems, because we were inclined to fulfil the requirements of the government. Our duties were specifically to promote the activities of the government. We were an agent or the mouthpiece of the government."  

Some of the journalists navigated censorship successfully, and managed to negotiate priorities between journalistic values and administrative exigencies. The TV announcer Charles Muyamwa in August 1971 interviewed Simon Kapwepwe, a long time companion of Kenneth Kaunda and co-founder of UNIP, in the popular news and talk programme Review of the Week. The reason for the interview was that Kapwepwe had just split from UNIP and publicly announced the formation of a new opposition party, the United Progressive Party (UPP). The UNIP regime considered such an action as near treason and polemically accused the UPP of being an instrument of the White minority regime in Rhodesia. Consequently, Kapwewe was not to be given the airtime to voice his critical views. Muyamwa however managed to convince his superiors that the event could not be ignored by a programme that claimed to cover the most important events of the past week.

"As a BBC trained broadcaster, it was clear to me that I had to face this particular issue. There was no way I could see myself going on the air that Sunday and pretend that I was presenting 'Review of the week' and didn't talk about that event. But on the other hand, it was clear to me also that there was no way I would make an independent decision on whether to interview this man or not. It was clear that things were not run like that. So, as it was, I spoke to the Director of ZBS, and I said, look, my programme is coming up, I have to do this interview with this man. There is no way I can go on television and talk about 'Review of the Week' and not talk about it. No one's going to have faith in us. [...]"

The interview was allowed; however, for the first time, the show was not broadcast live, but recorded. Ironically, Kaunda actually profited from the broadcast, as Kapwepwe, who did not hold back with criticism of the UNIP government, could not present a detailed political programme as a viable alternative.

"So he came off very poorly in that he was criticizing people but he didn’t seem to have an alternative program. [...] And I remember Dr. Kaunda making mileage of that programme and saying, you see, were being accused of being undemocratic and this and that, but here we are, we have allowed this man to come on the radio, but you can see that when he was asked to tell you what he intends to do for the country, he isn’t able of anything to say."³⁴²

The main reason for the broadcasters leaving ZBS was frustration with the work environment. Tom Chalmers, who had returned to Zambia as an observer sent by the BBC in 1970, came to the conclusion:

"I found that ZBS is suffering from low morale, inadequate leadership, lack of professional managerial experience, shortage of maintenance staff, and the effects of the haphazard growth and planning of the whole organisation. It is symptomatic that all three of the BBC-trained television producers have either left or are considering doing so."³⁴³

The reason for this was not necessarily that the broadcasters couldn’t accept too much censorship. Rather, the fact that the Broadcasting Services had been incorporated in the governmental administration led to a more general feeling of being shackled in day-to-day work:

"The Civil Service, they have all this what they call procedure, you know, general orders. And you cannot operate a media organization with such restrictions. Because the news has to be covered. [...] All those procedures – [for example] transport, first you have to write a requisition for transport, but the news was not waiting for you! The news were happening, and you must be on the spot to get that news. It was very difficult, and I couldn’t attain with those experiences."³⁴⁴

Government members felt that government activities should have priority over other news and through administrative hierarchy, had the possibilities to enforce these priorities. In TV as in Radio Zambia, the new priorities heavily affected day-to-day work, which was already restricted by the lack of equipment:

"They didn’t even appreciate the constraints of having only one camera to undertake services of government operations and other, civic operations. To them, what was most important was government operations. We experienced times when there was a camera assigned for State House operations. And even if there was something very important that was taking place elsewhere, that camera should never leave the station, it should stay. [I] had served during colonial times, and I had colonial bosses, and we were free to move equipment to whatever case or priority. We did it freely. We came into a time when you could not do that freely. I don’t know who would ever give you permission. You’d probably

³⁴² Ibid.
have to ask the minister for permission to use the camera elsewhere, to avoid any conflict between State House your organization. The Director himself would never allow you, because if he did, he'd lose his job. And as I said, quite a number of guys lost their job because of that kind of thing.\textsuperscript{345}

Cosmo Mlongoti describes how the broadcasters experienced the difference in employment conditions between Federal broadcasting and the ZBS:

"We enjoyed respect. If you were good, they would tell you that you were good, and they would organize for better conditions of service for you in the colonial days. You really were respected for what you did. It wasn't so after Independence. It was a question of what is your relationship with the government, or what is your political affiliation."\textsuperscript{346}

Given these and other statements, it becomes clear that censorship was not necessarily the reason why broadcasters felt increasingly frustrated in the post-colonial broadcasting system. Rather, their very idea of what a broadcaster should do and in what working conditions he should do it was challenged by the incorporation of the broadcasting institution in the bureaucracy. Programme content, especially in the news section, was not controlled by an editorial hierarchy governed by factors such as news values, but by a bureaucratic hierarchy that was effectually answerable to the ministers and the head of state. While there had been clear limits to programme content in the FBC, broadcasters had been relatively free to operate within the parameters defined by the colonial state – as long as politics were kept out of the programmes. Ironically, the main problem of broadcasters in the ZBS was that politics were not kept out of the programmes anymore.

Zambian broadcasters were part of an African middle class and intellectual elite that greatly influenced the development of post-colonial African societies. In many aspects, they can be compared to other such intellectuals, like civil servants. They discussed models for the future of the country, and with their discussions and ideas influenced programmes that were to transmit these ideas to their compatriots. As shown, Zambian broadcasters had developed these ideas in a colonial context. Together with their European colleagues, they had developed a self-image that contrasted with what the post-colonial government asked from them. However, in some decisive aspects of their worldview, they differed not much from UNIP politicians and their bureaucrat superiors. All shared similar ideas about Zambias path towards national unity and a modern society, e.g. about the necessity to develop a national culture that

\textsuperscript{345} Interview Cosmo Mlongoti, 10.10.2006.  
\textsuperscript{346} Ibid.
could unite particular ethnic cultures under one roof. Although broadcasters did not share UNIP cadres’ identification of the party with the nation, many looked up to Kaunda as the uniting figure for Zambia and as a national leader. Their ideas about their role in society, however, differed greatly from that of the Zambian government, the party, and their bureaucrat superiors. There is a marked difference between broadcasters taken over from the colonial station, who had developed a critical understanding of journalism ethics and constantly negotiated between these and the exigencies of a controlled media environment, and the new generation that joined the ZBS fresh from school or the Evelyn Hone College, who accepted their role as civil servants communicating government policies to the people. Despite the controlled environment in the FBC, broadcasters had felt appreciated in their role and self-image. As civil servants, these were strongly questioned, and the problems of submitting electronic media to administrative processes added to this. Their problem of ZBS was not censorship, but the way control was exerted in the station and how it conflicted with their self-image.

3. Separate Worlds: Black and White Broadcasters in South West Africa

As in the Federal Broadcasting Corporation, the A/E/G (i.e., the "White") Services in the SWABC were institutionally as well as geographically segregated from the "Black" Services. In addition, the requirements for the broadcasters were quite different, as were the career opportunities, salaries and freedom in day-to-day work. Also, both stations exerted significant control over political reporting and gave Black broadcasters access only to the production of cultural programmes – in news programmes, their role was limited to do research for (White) superiors, translate and read. Despite these similarities, the historical context to working in the two stations was quite different. Although the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, contrary to its rhetoric of "racial partnership", continued to discriminate against Africans, especially in Northern Rhodesia there was no set of policies in force comparable to Apartheid. More importantly, media in the Federation did not operate in a war situation, nor was the state under similar international pressure. Both factors contributed significantly to the way the SWABC was structured, as well as the working conditions in the station. Additionally, post-colonial broadcasters in Namibia came not from one, but two very different
stations that had stood on opposing sides in a propaganda war that accompanied and, to a certain extent, mirrored the military campaign. To understand post-colonial developments in the NBC, these conflicting traditions need to be taken into account.

**SWABC Staff: Education and Remuneration**

As in the other examples discussed, the education of staff in the Services was mainly achieved by training on the spot. The main qualification for working in the radio was the ability to talk in a way suitable to be able to present programmes – proficiency in the respective language, being able to speak clearly and, ideally, having a 'radio voice'. Only some of the White journalists in the SWABC had a University degree, and many had no journalistic background whatsoever. Most of the broadcasters had worked as teachers or clerks before or were still students. One of the German Service broadcasters, Almute Möller, claims she can "safely say that nobody in the German Service had been a journalist before."\(^{347}\) While studying Languages at Cape Town University, she was told during a visit to the SWABC by Werner Talkenberg, then Head of the German Service, that she could start as soon as she had finished University: "I actually wanted to do something completely different."\(^{348}\) When she passed the necessary language (speaking) tests in 1982, she stayed nevertheless. "It was quite a young team. Nobody had any idea of how to do it."\(^{349}\) Those who had actually studied relevant topics for broadcasting, like Robin Tyson (who had graduated with a thesis on televised music at the University of Cape Town), had done so at South African Universities and didn't see the the tight control and censorship in the SWABC as unusual:

"It was my first job, straight out of University, and [...] there was very little to relate it to, because South Africa was the same. If you were working in South African radio, you'd also be in a propaganda machine, basically. If anything, we were more liberal than South Africa in the 1980s."\(^{350}\)

Announcers were employed as Cadets for 3 years (two if they had any degree), and worked an additional 3 years in the status of Junior Announcer. Announcers were

\(^{347}\) "Ich glaube, ich kann fast meine Hand dafür ins Feuer legen, dass vom Deutschen Hörfunkprogramm keiner vorher Journalist war." Interview Almute Möller, 20.11.2007.; my translation. The first Heads of the Service, Jürgen Hecker and Werner Talkenberg, had been teachers.

\(^{348}\) "Ich wollte eigentlich was ganz anderes machen." Ibid.


\(^{350}\) Interview Robin Tyson, 06.11.2007.
paid a smaller salary during these first six years, but this didn't correlate with their actual work. In 1986, a Junior Announcer of the English Service complained that they actually worked as full-fledged announcers from early on:

"[I]t is a fact that ALL the announcers on the English Service have been carrying a full work load of air time, research time and compiling since the third or fourth week, and in some cases the first week. This is in addition to one hour of training at a time to suit the Superintendent's work schedule."\(^{351}\)

Junior Announcers and Cadets were paid a salary between 600 and 700 Rand per month, an amount that, as the same Junior Announcer claimed, was not enough to meet basic needs: "It cannot be, if more than half of the work force, and ALL of Cadets and Juniors, are struggling to make it through the second half of each month."\(^{352}\) The management reacted by starting a process of "fixing salaries."\(^{353}\) There was a bonus for "specialists working in traditional black areas", i.e. the "homelands"\(^{354}\), and, in 1984, an extra risk bonus for personnel working in the Kavango and Ovambo contribution centres (both situated in the northern war zone).\(^{355}\)

The SWABC Annual Report for the year 1986 acknowledged that "Training and qualified broadcasting personnel remain in critical short supply,"\(^ {356}\) but the Corporation continued with its policy to train personnel rather than recruiting non-Namibian staff: "although this is certainly a longer process, it will in the long term prove to be a more durable system in that there will be greater understanding and loyalty"\(^{357}\). Nevertheless, because of continuing staff shortages throughout the 80s, trained personnel still had to be recruited, mainly from South Africa. A Training Section was not established until 1988, and in its first year only 43 of 668 employees attended internal courses. At the same time, 149 employees enrolled for seminars by specialists in Management Sciences. Also, scholarships were granted to employees who went to universities and technikons in South Africa.

Most of these provisions pertained only to White (Afrikaans-, English-, German-speaking) broadcasters. The following ruling of the middle management in Oktober 1986 illustrates this:

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\(^{351}\) R. MacDonald to Dir. A/E/G Services, 10.02.1986. SWABC Hoofdevergaderings 1985-87, NBC Information Services, House 19.

\(^{352}\) Ibid.


\(^{354}\) "Gebiedstolaag aan spesialiste in tradisionele swaart Gebiede", Middelbestuursvergadering 03.10.1984, SWABC Middelbestuur, NBC Information Services, House 19.

\(^{355}\) Ibid.


\(^{357}\) Ibid.
1984 shows how the hierarchy in terms of salaries and positions was upheld: salaries would be upgraded depending on the individual merits, on academic qualifications and skill.\textsuperscript{358} Academic qualifications in particular were an area where none of the Black broadcasters could possibly compete with their White colleagues, as many were unable to attend a University. Black personnel were notoriously underrepresented in the management of the station. In 1985, after Zedekia Ngavirue and Fanuel Tjinga-ete, in their role as representatives of nationalist political parties (in this case, the NNF, a coalition of several internal Black Namibian parties) had become members of the so-called "Independent Board", the first Black staff were admitted to leading posts, such as Supervisor and Organiser, while the actual higher management still remained White. Only in April 1986, when the whole Management section was completely reorganised, were two Black administrators admitted to the posts of Head of the two African Service Sections ("Herero/Damara-Nama/Tswana Services" and "Ovambo/Kavango/Caprivi Services"), and the respective Language Services were also headed by Black managers (Herero Service by an Otjiherero-speaking Manager etc.).\textsuperscript{359} Black staff were generally seen as not being educated enough to be paid salaries equal to those of White staff. Of course, taking into account the Apartheid social reality, most of the Black personnel didn't have access to institutions of higher learning. However, as most of the training was on the spot, and taking into account that most of the White broadcasters had not actually studied Communications or anything that would directly relate to their work in broadcasting, one can assume that educational background did not play as big a role in the day-to-day workings at the station as the middle management believed. In this way, none of the protocols, memos, or Annual Reports mention of Black staff working in the same jobs, but earning considerably less money than White staff; but the reality in the SWABC was that for a long time, there was a "glass ceiling" for Black broadcasters. It has to be added that at the same time, women with families were paid less than men with families, as it was argued that the women were not wholly dependent on their own salary: "there is of course also a man who is earning money."\textsuperscript{360}

Nevertheless, jobs for Black staff at the SWABC – as announcers, journalists,

\textsuperscript{358} Middelbestuursvergadering 03.10.1984, SWABC Middelbestuur, NBC Information Services, House 19.
\textsuperscript{359} SWABC Annual Report 1987, S. 64, NBC Information Services.
\textsuperscript{360} "Da ist ja schließlich auch noch ein Mann, der Geld verdient." Interview Almute Möller, 20.11.2007. The unequal payment for men and women, as well as those broadcasters with a family and singles, continued after Independence. Ibid.
technicians – had considerable advantages over other job opportunities in "South West Africa" under South African rule. After 1985, the SWABC ran a housing scheme for its staff, in terms of which people could "borrow 95% of the purchase price of a property at a slightly reduced interest rate"\textsuperscript{361} As the Annual Report admitted, even the deposit of 5% that was left for the applicant to pay was "a limiting factor"\textsuperscript{362} to the scheme. The Corporation also had some houses to hire for staff, even though the housing was notoriously short. Other benefits included medical aid. The SWABC gave African staff qualification, a good salary compared to other companies\textsuperscript{363} and the opportunity for bettering their standard of living. All in all, compared to the strains of the contract labour system or work on the farms, SWABC jobs for Africans offered good opportunities.

Most of the African announcers had been educated in secondary schools and had been working in intellectual jobs, many as teachers, before joining the Corporation. Some had worked for government services, e.g. as translators, or as clerks.\textsuperscript{364} They were well educated, having obtained "Junior" and "Senior Certificates" – a secondary school education. Most of the African staff were trained on the spot or by the Training Section, but some were also sent to Technikons in South Africa.\textsuperscript{365}

The Herero programme organiser Alex Kaputu had a model career in this sense: he was born in Windhoek but grew up in the Omaheke region (he had left Windhoek together with his grandmother, who had resisted the forced removal of the Old Location to Katutura). After working on a farm, he went to Otjinene to work as a clerk and court interpreter and later as a teacher. It was there, in 1979, that his knowledge of Herero history and lore was 'discovered' by a recording team from the Herero station of the "Radio Bantu" Services. "They saw me while I was teaching the schoolchildren about Otjiherero and History. [...] After I finished the period, they came in the class and asked: 'Do you not want to go and be a presenter of the Radio?.'"\textsuperscript{366} He was invited to Windhoek, "for cultural programmes, because they didn't want political programmes.\"\textsuperscript{367} Joining "Radio Bantu" shortly before the establishment of SWABC, Ka-

\textsuperscript{361} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{362} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{363} Interview Alex Kaputu, 07.11.2007.
\textsuperscript{364} "Nuwe Aanstellings", Uitsaaiier/Broadcaster 2:2 (8/1987), 5.
\textsuperscript{365} short biographies can be traced in the "Ons stel vor" and "Nuwe Aanstellings" sections of the irregularly published internal SWABC-newsletter "Uitsaaiier/Broadcaster". NBC Information Services, Newsletter.
\textsuperscript{366} Interview Alex Kaputu, 07.11.2007.
\textsuperscript{367} Ibid.
putu became a widely known broadcaster and an authority on Herero oral history and culture.

**Broadcaster's Experiences**

Clearly, there was a line between White and Black broadcasters, artificially upheld by the system of Apartheid and a 'glass ceiling' inside the station. One of the institutionalisations of this line was the strict division of "AEG-Services" (Afrikaans, English and German Services, meaning those catering for the White communities) from the African language Services, which was only slightly reduced in 1985. They were separated from each other – organisationally and physically. Even in interviews today, one can see this line in the way Interviewees talk about their past under South African rule. Many of the broadcasters who worked in the German, English or Afrikaans Service are nearly completely ignorant about the situation of their colleagues in the Black Language Services and talk about their own work in the SWABC as if it had been a normal broadcasting job, only differing from working in a European broadcasting station in the lack of decent technical equipment and lower degree of professionalisation. In their day-to-day work, they didn't have to deal with the struggles of their Black colleagues. 368

Most of the broadcasters in the English, Afrikaans and German Services produced cultural programmes and seldom collided with their superiors over political programming. However, even in cultural programming they experienced some censorship and conflicts. A female broadcaster from the German Service was "nearly fired" after having taken part in the talks of White Namibian groups with SWAPO in Lusaka and Harare, as a representative of the *Interessengemeinschaft Deutschsprachiger Südwesten* (IG). 369

Broadcasters from the English Service who had recorded a SWAPO demonstration at the end of the 1980s returned to the studio only to be told not to broadcast their material. 370 Jürgen Hecker, then Head of the German Service, and a whole group of broadcasters left the SWABC in 1984, only one year after the

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368 cf. Interviews Freddy Frewer, 03.08.2006; Almôte Möller, 20.11.2007 & 22.11.2007; Robin Tyson, 07.11.2007. Tyson and Möller openly admit their ignorance – at the time – of the amount of control and censorship. Both cite specific instances of conflict, after which they changed their views.


370 Interview Robin Tyson, 06.11.2007.
establishment of a separate German Service, because of "political differences with the South African-influenced Management of the SWABC."  

Hecker left for Germany, but returned to Namibia in 1989 to take over as chief editor of the German language weekly Namibia Nachrichten. On the other end of the political spectrum, the announcer Werner Talkenberg was "given the boot", because he had been broadcasting German marching songs of the Nazi era. However, his dismissal in late 1988 came at a time when Independence was already looming. His superiors gave as the reason that "the vague ties that he still maintained with that era were not appropriate to the new conditions applicable in this country", so that the episode can be seen a move to rid the station of a representative who would make it an easy target for external criticism. Irate German-speaking listeners complained of this censoring by "left-leaning circles" of what they saw as "part of german [sic] culture."  

Despite these sporadic examples of open conflicts over censorship, most of the SWABC broadcasters avoided confrontation with their superiors and, ultimately, the South African-controlled authorities. One reason was certainly a good amount of self-censorship, but this was not only because, as Almute Oehl argued, "as a journalist, one always knows who pays the cheque at the end of the month", but also because – unsurprisingly, given their education and socio-political background – a majority of the White broadcasters were actually quite agreed on the legitimacy of political and social realities in 'SWA/Namibia'. Some interviewees with an Afrikaans or German background still characterise their work in the SWABC as having been true to journalistic ideals like objectivity, accurate research of all positions involved in a specific issue and protection of sources, and see nothing wrong in their reporting.  

Black broadcasters found themselves in a much more uncomfortable position:

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372 "Radio man given the boot", Windhoek Observer, 05.11.1988.

373 Ibid.


376 Ibid.

377 cf. Interview Freddy Frewer, 03.08.2006, Interview Christo Retief, 28.11.2007.
"We were regarded as 'boers' dolls' or 'puppets'. We were working for the South African government, for the boers, so no SWAPO cadre wanted us, they saw us as sellouts. On the other hand, the boers also were hesitant, they didn't know if we were really 'good citizens' or not, if we are not for SWAPO. So they followed us where we were going, to basars [sic], to dancing halls. Everywhere there were people watching you."  

In 1987, the Ovambo Service received threatening letters. Several announcers thereupon left the station, explaining they lacked the motivation to be able to ignore such letters. White broadcasters in the North were to experience a similar situation, when shortly before the time of the first free elections in 1989 they were attacked from both sides: "I was labelled by the Koevoets as a 'kafferboetie', I was labelled by SWAPO as an agent of the South African regime."  

Their position was contradictory: while most of the Black broadcasters were opposed to the South African occupation of Namibia, they nevertheless worked in an Institution whose role was to legitimise that very occupation, by supporting South African unilateral plans for a "democratisation" and an at best slow independence process. Also, they felt the precariousness of their jobs:

"You came to work everyday with the thought of losing the job today. [...] You must say things which you know are wrong, and if you query things, you loose your job. And the only way to get money was the [SWABC] who paid people well, other than the other firms or companies."  

Many, however, had reasons to stay – in the country as well as in their jobs:

"I thought about leaving the country and join SWAPO sometimes, because of this pressure. But the person who held me here was my Grandmother. [...] I couldn't leave her here and go outside the country. She was already very old, I couldn't leave her alone. For me, it was taboo. But on the inside, I was longing to go out."  

There is only one known example of an African broadcaster who, while working at the SWABC, was a member of SWAPO. Immanuel Mwatara was discovered in 1988 as being a member of SWAPOs "Namibian Police" and fired. Four other Black announcers had to go at the same time "because of what was seen as pro-SWAPO

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378 Interview Alex Kaputu, 07.11.2007.
380 A derogatory term, roughly translated "the buddy of kaffirs".
381 Interview Jan Poolman, 22.11.2007.
382 Ibid.
383 Ibid.
384 The Namibian Police, a part of the "internal" SWAPO party, had been established to maintain order at SWAPO public rallies inside Namibia.
sentiments."

Centre of Propaganda: The News

More than any other part of the broadcasting system, the news services were tightly controlled. Highly ideologised, those broadcasters in responsible positions had been carefully selected and were ideal proponents of the system. The important parts of the Broadcasting Services were insured against any unwanted interference of any one staff.

The production of news was centralised in the newsroom in Windhoek. This newsroom produced the output of news broadcasts that was then sent to the different services – Afrikaans, English, German, Oshiwambo, Herero, Damara/Nama and the Caprivi Service. Newsgathering took place the other way round: local studios, so-called "contribution centres" in several cities, gathered the news items of the day. The most important and, consequently, best equipped were the contribution centres in Oshakati, Rundu and Katima Mulilo in the North, which was not only a more densely settled area, but also the main arena of the fights between SWAPO's "People's Liberation Army of Namibia" (PLAN) and the South African-controlled "South West Africa Territorial Force" (SWATF) and Koevoet units These reports were sent to the newsroom in Windhoek for editing.

The newsroom itself was under the control of a separate department in the station, the News Services. In a reorganisation in 1986, this department was subsumed under the Programme Service. However, as the Manager of the News Service, J.W. Lordan, remained editor-in-chief and was still listed with the management of the Station, and also as the department was renamed "Programme and News Services" in 1986, it is fair to assume that the News Services still had considerable administrative autonomy towards the other Programme Services. The most important change for the News Department was that from 1986, the SWABC gradually stopped relaying

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386 Studios had by 1985 been established in Oshakati, Rundu, Khorixas, Okakarara, and Keetmanshoop. Oshakati and Rundu were bigger, with 3 studios each, while the other three had one studio each. Khorixas and Okakarara were dissolved in 1986, and a new contribution centre was established in Otjiwarongo. SWABC Annual Report for the year 1985, NBC Information Services: Annual Reports, p. 49; Interview Christo Retief, 28.11.2007.
news from the SABC and increased the amount of local newsgathering, while at the same time starting to subscribe to international news agencies (having relied completely on the SABC for international news before). This was a relatively important change, considered by the independent press as "loosening the apron strings" to its mother organisation in South Africa, appearing more to be an independent national 'South West African' institution rather than a mere appendix relaying South African propaganda. In effect, however, there was no real change of content, and most of the non-local news content was still drawn from South African – even SABC – sources.

The News Services were well equipped. They received news copy from the South African Press Agency (Sapa) – a special news service for Southern Africa hosted by the SABC –, United Press International (UPI) and the Deutsche Presseagentur (dpa, through UPI). The bulk of this, however, was received from Sapa; the only comparable amount of news copy came from the SWABC's 90 local correspondents, who sent reports via Telex from the different regions of the country. The reports were then edited and news bulletins created (in Afrikaans) for both Radio and Television. Those were translated into the different languages to be read in the Services. In 1988, the department itself was reorganised and separate desks were created, the most important of which was the political desk. It was created specifically to cover the independence process, and was comprised of "reporters with experience in the political, economic, financial fields."

Staff for the newsroom in general were carefully selected. The editor of the political desk, Cyril Lowe, was a member of the army, along with several of his colleagues, some of whom had worked as controllers in the contribution centres before. These were reliable broadcasters who had experience in reporting from the northern war zone. The involvement of staff with the South African administration went so far that, after independence, several prominent editors who had occupied leading positions in

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388 "Loosening the apron strings", The Namibian, 27.06.1986.
389 SWABC TV was boycotted by TV producers all over the world and therefore had few possibilities to acquire foreign-produced content. cf. SWABC: The First Ten Years; SWABC Annual Reports, NBC Information Services, von Nahmen 1998, 151.
390 The numbers for the year 1986, for example, are: 29 394 reports from Sapa, 19 537 from own sources, 10 806 from SABC, 4 388 from UPI, and 800 from dpa. While the numbers changed from year to year, the relation of Sapa and own sources towards the other did not change significantly. In 1987, the dpa subscription was canceled, allegedly because it was too expensive. cf. SWABC Annual Report 1986, NBC Information Services, p. 51; SWABC Annual Reports, NBC Information Services, von Nahmen 1998, 151.
391 Interview Christo Retief, 28.11.2007.
the newsroom were suspected of having actually been members of the South African secret service. Some were fired by the NBC shortly after Independence.

The ties between police forces and the SWABC were close. At the upper level, there were frequent meetings and exchange of information; the department of psychological warfare also could place certain issues in the news. As the SWABC was subordinated to the Administrator General, it was clear that it would always fall in line with the policies of the South African administration. In addition to this, the policy code mentioned in chapter 2 strictly regulated political reporting. Political broadcasts, especially speeches or statements by political parties other than in news and actuality programmes had to be reported to and confirmed by the Administrator General, as stipulated by Section 27(1) (g) of the Broadcasting Act.

The position of Afrikaner broadcasters assigned to the so-called "contribution centres" to supervise African staff differed significantly from those of people working in the Windhoek studios. 90 correspondents were distributed across the country. The contribution centres had been set up mainly by white staff who then also managed them. Those managers had to speak local languages, at least rudimentarily, in order to gather news themselves and to be able to control the output of their subordinates. Their main function was local newsgathering, which in the North often meant reporting from scenes of assaults or conflict.

In a small contribution centre, there were only a few newscasters. In Otjiwarongo, for example, the Afrikaans-speaking broadcaster Christo Retief, who had been sent there in 1986 to establish the contribution centre, and his local counterpart. 6 persons were ran the Caprivi Service from the centre at Katima Mulilo. The main regional centres were Oshakati and Rundu, each being equipped with 3 studios and hosting the services for, respectively, Ovamboland and Caprivi. The news was "20

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393 Interview Norah Appolus, 24.11.2007; Interview Penny Ukunde, 28.11.2007.
394 The majority of the personnel of the political desk today work for the opposition (DTA) newspaper "Republikein". Interview Christo Retief, 28.11.2007; Interview Jan Poolman, 22.11.2007.
395 Interview Siegfried Eimbeck, 20.08.2006.
397 Jan Poolman explains that there was no control of the translation of news in the Oshakati studios; however, he adds, there was a tight censorship after the item was broadcast, as the programmes were monitored: "If they [the announcers] would say something wrong, it was immediately reported to the station." Interview Jan Poolman, 22.11.2007.
398 plus some announcers and administrative staff. Interview Christo Retief, 28.11.2007.
399 Oggendvergadering Caprivi, NBC Information Services, House 19.
per cent of our total output\textsuperscript{400}, the rest was comprised of music, children's and actuality programmes or programmes of interest that were produced in the Otjiwarongo studio and sent to the respective Services (in this case, Damara/Nama or Herero, for the most part) via telephone line. News reports were sent from these centres and studios via Telex to the newsroom in Windhoek for editing. The centralised news production pertained also to the English and the German Services. The news was always produced in the News Services and then sent to the respective Language Services for translation.

The news gathering from the contribution centres was especially important in the North, the actual battle zone. When gathering information, Retief and his local counterpart would always go out as a pair. Nevertheless, Retief insists that in general, the local population was not particularly aggressive towards them. Only specific groups did not cooperate: "Bishops Auala and Dumeni kept a distance from the SWABC, because they were affiliated to SWAPO, and they regarded us as a mouthpiece of the colonial regime. So there were a lot of negative reactions."\textsuperscript{401} There was also a ban on any information from the Executive Council of the Ovambo Legislative Assembly, one of the so-called 'second tier governments' which was headed by the Rev. Peter Kalangula, the ex-President of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) who had broken away from the DTA to form a new party, the Christian Democratic Action, and distanced himself from the Transitional Government of National Unity headed by the DTA.\textsuperscript{402}

A general mistrust was the problem of journalists when dealing with agencies of the state, such as the armed forces who were operating in the area: "The people that were aggressive when you started with newsgathering were the police and the milita-

\textsuperscript{400} Interview Christo Retief, 28.11.2007.
\textsuperscript{401} Ibid. The Evangelical-Lutheran Ovambo-Kavango Church (ELOC), founded in 1954 and renamed Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia (Elcin) after independence, played a significant role in the struggle against Apartheid. ELOC was often accused of being a "SWAPO-Church". Most Lutheran churches (except the German Evangelical-Lutheran Church) maintained that while the churches should not be bound to any political party, there was no question of taking a "neutral standpoint." Bishop Leonard Nangolo Vilho Auala was its first bishop, succeeded by Kleophas Dumeni. Both were outspoken critics of the occupation regime. see Groth, Siegfried. 1995. Namibische Passion, Wuppertal.
\textsuperscript{402} Ibid. Retief says he tried to research into claims of corruption against the Ovambo administration, but was denied any information. Kalangula was one of the internal opponents of the South African occupation. He called for the abolition of the notorious Proclamation AG8, replaced White civil servants in the Ovambo administration with locals and spoke out against SWATF and SADF actions in the northern war zone. Pütz, Joachim/Heidi von Egidy and Perri Caplan: Namibia Handbook and Political Who's Who, Windhoek 1989, 103f.
ry, because you were looking for information about what they regarded as military in-
telligence." But there was a difference in behaviour towards journalists, depending
on what organisation they worked for:

"I had very good relationships with the police and military commanders. I could go to the military
commander with an enquiry, and he would immediately refer me to people that would be able to assist
me, just to get background information on an issue or an event. But I was present when other news-
papers approached them, especially the Windhoek Observer, at that stage the Windhoek Advertiser,
when [Gwen] Lister was still working for them. And that's when they refused blank point to give any in-
formation, while I sat there with a typed document 'for your information.'"

Retief, knowing some of the commanders personally from his own time in the mili-
tary, seemingly had more possibilities for accessing military information than those
who – like the staff of the opposition Windhoek Observer – were known for their criti-
cal stance towards the regime. The relationship towards intelligence services could
also be one of exchange:

"They gave me information, I gave them information. If I broke a story about something that had
happened, I guarantee you they would be in my office in half an hour and ask: 'where did you get that
information.' But I was never forced to provide information."

As it was, the behaviour of state agencies such as the army or the police towards
the journalists seems to have depended very much on individual relations. It is not
possible to reconstruct unofficial connections of – Black or White – journalists with
people in the lower ranks of these institutions, but they surely existed, as such rela-
tions are an intricate part of journalistic work. Additionally, Christo Retief, who came
under fire after Independence because of allegations that he had worked for the intel-
ligence service, claims to have had a very close relationship with military and intelli-
gence services.

Control was tight, in all the Services; news were always recorded, never presen-
ted live – in Radio as well as in Television. Sometimes, broadcasters who crossed
the boundaries of what they were supposed to cover would be summoned to their su-
periors:

403 Ibid.
404 Ibid. Gwen Lister, today one of the most famous namibian journalists, left the Advertiser in 1985
to found The Namibian, a daily that became the most outspoken critic of the South African
occupation in the media landscape of the 80s.
405 Ibid.
406 Interview Robin Tyson, 06.11.2007.
"There was a SWAPO Demonstration in front of the Gustav Voigt Centre, we came here to record it, and we took the tapes back, we were going to broadcast it. And we were all called into a meeting from Gerhard Roux [then Head of the Programme Section], who said: 'No, you're not going to broadcast it.' We tried to have an argument, look, this is a SWAPO demonstration, this is important, but we were refused."  

Thus, the production and dissemination of news – especially political news – was the most tightly controlled part of programming in the SWABC. Centrally produced, no other department could have any influence on the news, either by producing it themselves nor by changing the bulletins received by the News Services. The careful selection of staff who had proven themselves to be reliable and in line with the policies of the South African administration ensured until the very end of the independence process, that no unwanted commentary or facts would be broadcast. In controlling the translations it was also ensured that announcers did not deflect from what was given to them.

The SWABC, as the FBC, seems to have offered few incentives or possibilities especially, but not only for Black broadcasters to develop journalistically. But, as in the case of the FBC, it would be premature to conclude this from a look at the many systemic instances of control. First, as the restructuring effort in 1986 shows, the increasing pressure forced the institution to open up top level management to Black staff and the Board for Black nationalist politicians. Secondly, as the FBC, the South West African broadcaster gave broadcasters in the different services significant creative freedom in developing cultural programmes. The well equipped studios and up-to-date technical equipment for outside broadcasts and recordings, the very large programme space resulting from each language having a 24/7 channel, and the training and possibilities given to broadcasters who cared deeply about culture, history and language of the respective ethnic group were all incentives and provided some space for individual development of broadcasters. The clear separation of news production from other departments, and tight control over contribution, selection, and production processes enabled a relatively loose control in the other departments. Broadcasters in the different Language Services, therefore, could separate their own work from the open propaganda, all the more so because they were closely connected to the communities they broadcast to. Listeners to the Black Language Services did not dismiss them completely as propaganda, but also discriminated between

407 ibid.
news and entertainment programmes. Despite working for the propagandistic "mouthpiece" of the Apartheid government, broadcasters could see themselves as primarily loyal to their respective communities. This ambivalent position, however, was not shared by their colleagues in the station on the other side of the propaganda war.


Voice of Namibia (VoN) broadcasters were committed to the common cause: the liberation of Namibia and Southern Africa in general from Apartheid rule. By the time the station was established on the basis of the earlier "Namibian Hour", it could draw on a large reservoir of Namibian exiles, most of whom had left the Country in one of the waves from 1974 to 1979; many of them students. Although the central task of the VoN was to provide counterpropaganda for listeners inside the country as well as the international community, it (among other SWAPO projects) was also supposed to serve as an institution that would provide qualified personnel for taking over necessary functions in independent Namibia.

VoN broadcasters were chosen out of the camps in which exiles fromNamibia poured since the late 70s. SWAPO Commissars who were stationed in the camps would, when asked by the Information Department, send people with the needed abilities: Potential broadcasters were selected after their "proficiency in languages" and their "commitment" to SWAPO. Teams were subdivided into "production, translation, announcing", but basically every broadcaster had to be able to fulfil all of these assignments, as the stations were notoriously understaffed.

The lack of broadcasting skills was a constant problem. Vinnia Ndadi, the first Director of the Voice of Namibia, complained that the applicants sent to him were "not trained, or with very low education; such comrades found it very difficult to perform their duties at the broadcasting [sic] satisfactorily. You will find them not even able to

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408 Interview Kauku Hengari, 15.11.2007.
409 Interview Charles Mubita, 18.08.2006.
410 Interview Sackey Namugongo, 11.08.2006.
411 Interview Charles Mubita, 18.08.2006.
412 Interview Johanna Mwatara, 17.11.2007; Interview Kaomo Tjombe, 27.11.2007; Petrus Schmidt to John Ya Otto, 29.07.1980; SPARC No. 02001348.
translate a script from [the] English version into Vernacular languages." The Voice of Namibia was not the only project that suffered from inadequately trained personnel.

The United Nations Institute for Namibia (UNIN), an Institution created by the UN General Assembly in 1974, took to improve this lack of educated personnel; however, it did so not just to provide skilled staff for the VoN, but with the explicit aim "to enable Namibians to acquire the necessary skills to man the public service of an independent Namibia." It was based in Lusaka, where workshops and seminars were organised "to train Namibians in specific skills." But more important for the actual broadcasting training was an Information project which was part of the UN Nationhood Programme for Namibia and worked under the Office of the UN Commissioner for Namibia. In 1979 it started the project "to provide training in radio broadcast programming, programme production and utilisation; technical radio operations and studio equipment maintenance; and broadcast transmitter operation and maintenance." The project also provided studio and transmitting equipment for the training, using the same VHF equipment that was "used by the South Africans in Namibia." Although the full programme was not established before 1983, all Voice of Namibia announcers and producers underwent a course with the Nationhood Programme, although often only after they had worked some time for the station.

The radio production training courses were organised by Robin Makayi, a Zambian journalist who had been an editor for the Zambian government controlled newspaper "Times of Zambia" and a correspondent of the BBC. Because of his too critical reporting on Kaunda's role in the Angolan civil war, he had been the only journalist in the Second Republic to be detained because of his work. He was acquitted in 1976

413 V. Helao la Ndadi: The Department of Information and Publicity (Radio Section) Supplementary Report or Recommendation, undated, UNAM Archives Special Collections, SWAPO Documents of Dr. Peter Katjavivi, 14/1.


415 Ibid.

416 Nationhood Programme for Namibia: Progress Report of the UN Commissioner for Namibia, December 1980; UNAM Archives Special Collections, Katjavivi Collection Series E.

417 Meeting held at UNESCO headquarters on 14 March 1979, UNAM Archives Special Collections, Katjavivi Collection Series E. The VHF equipment could not be used for the actual broadcasting, as VHF waves don't have a wide coverage and are easily deflected by mountains or other geographical obstacles. The VoN usually broadcast Short- or Mediumwave. Ibid.

418 Interview Robin Makayi, 29.12.2007. Makayi had reported on the trafficking of South African arms for UNITA through Zambia, "with the full knowledge of the Zambian government." After Kaunda's "watershed speech", in which the President took an anti-marxist turn, Makayi was marked as
and reinstated in his job as an editor of the "Times of Zambia". In 1982, with the recommendation of the prominent SWAPO cadre and VoN broadcaster Mvula ya Nangolo (who had established its predecessor, the Namibian Hour), Makayi started working as a consultant journalist with the Office of the UN Commissioner for Namibia, educating Namibian trainee broadcasters. Makayi eventually became a Media Advisor to SWAPO in Luanda and helped build up the Namibian Press Agency (Nampa).

At the beginning, Makayi had to improvise. Courses were held at the Office of the Commissioner in Lusaka, later in Luanda or in the field, at the SWAPO offices and particular host radio stations. Makayi also visited host governments and tried to negotiate for more airtime. In Lusaka or Luanda, "there would be a rotation that those who finished in Luanda would be assigned to the stations and others would come in." Makayi had to develop his own structure for the courses, teaching scriptwriting, production and presentation in particular. "In the first half of the year, we would go through all this, starting with the theory of mass communication to understand the medium that they were in. Then [they had to learn] writing for the ear as opposed to writing for the eye." But the special circumstances had to be accounted for, for example the fact that they had to bear the particular circumstances of their listeners in mind. Broadcasting from exile, they had to avoid talking about things that were irrelevant to their listeners in Namibia. Makayi also taught Namibian history, so that broadcasters would "understand the reasons and development of the liberation struggle."

Makayi encountered several specific problems in training the VoN broadcasters. The priorities were dictated by the exigencies of the exile situation and the guerrilla war; therefore, little could be done to prepare broadcasters for the work in a planned public broadcaster in a democratic Namibia. Most of the trainees were not proficient enough in English to do the scriptwriting. Many had fled the country as young people and therefore had not been in school long enough.

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419 Ibid., p. 83. See also Interview Robin Makayi, 29.12.2007. The UNESCO actually had looked for a Zambian as a consultant; cf. "Meeting held at UNESCO headquarters on 14 March 1979", UNAM Archives Special Collections, Katjavivi Collection Series E.


421 Ibid.

422 Ibid.
"And because of the circumstances we were in, we didn't have the luxury of them going out to develop stories, to interview people and whatnot. Sometimes, we could interview the President or the Secretary for whatever, or the people in the refugee camps. But the ordinary type of story was not there; we could not have our sources in society."  

Because of these circumstances, there were also qualitative limitations: "Basically, it was propaganda journalism. At that time, our priorities were on the liberation struggle itself."

Many broadcasters were additionally sent to Universities, Schools and Polytechnics in Moscow, Sofia, the GDR, or Tanzania. In Harare, the broadcasters could take evening classes at Harare Polytechnic for the Master in Mass Communication. The broadcasters were also financed through the Office of the Commissioner for Namibia, which paid Inservice Training subsistence allowances. However, they often had to work for months without any payment, supplied with the basic necessities of life by the SWAPO offices.

Experiences and Attitudes

The broadcasters at the Voice of Namibia were dedicated SWAPO cadres – dedication to the cause had been one of the criteria for selecting them in the first place. Many had been politically active inside the country, taking part in workers' or students' strikes, boycotts, etc. or even organizing them. Fleeing the country across the border to Angola or Botswana, they were sent to the SWAPO camps in Angola, Zambia and Tanzania, where they received military training. After they had been selected by their commissars, they would be sent to Lusaka, or, later, to Luanda:

"The way things were, you were just told that you'd be going on a mission. You wouldn't know where to. And the first briefing was only in Luanda. So, in Luanda they told me you have been chosen to work in the Voice of Namibia. And the way we were working that was part of your duties and immediately you'd just say ok and see how it goes."

Sometimes thrown in the job without any preparation, the broadcasters underwent several courses, changing back and forth between the different stations: "[In 1981] I

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423 Ibid.
424 Ibid.
425 P. Schmidt (Dep. Secretary for Information and Publicity) to UN Commissioner, 09.05.1980, SWAPO Party Archives and Research Center (SPARC), No. 02001355.
426 Interviews Kauku Hengari, 15.11.2007; Kaomo Tjombe, 27.11.2007; Theofilus Ekandjo, 10.11.2007.
427 Interview Kaomo Tjombe, 27.11.2007.
had some short crash course there and was put on air. Then, I was sent to Zambia, did a short course in English and Media. 1982, around February I was sent to Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{428} Some had only had the course in Zambia, with Robin Makayi, and were further trained on the spot.\textsuperscript{429}

The work was different from 'normal' journalistic work in that the broadcasters could do very little research on their own in most stations, but had to rely on what they received from the news agencies, other media and the SWAPO Headquarters in Luanda. "[We got our information] mainly through monitoring broadcasting systems around the world, secondly newspapers from home, and then, of course, interviewing various leaders."\textsuperscript{430} Only in Luanda would broadcasters go to the camps and record interviews with PLAN fighters, as well as traditional songs, "freedom songs" composed by soldiers and cultural activities. Those stationed in Addis Ababa had to cater for all events connected with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU):

"around February, there used to be the ministerial meetings, and in June/July also ministerial and then the summits. So that time used to be really very hectic. If you are alone, you have to see how to divide your time, run there, get an interview, run back, record, and then to Luanda, they are waiting for you also."\textsuperscript{431}

The daily routine was pretty much the same at all the stations:

"We would come in around 8 o'clock, then we would look at the wires, what has come in. We'd see if Nujoma or any other leader maybe was in London, and had been recorded. Then we'd use that for our bulletins, we could also use it as the basis for our commentary. And while preparing this, we'd also get Telexes from Luanda on the latest military reports from PLAN, we'd also get the latest Publications – The Combatant, Namibia Today – and would also make use of those. But basically we would compile a news bulletin, looking more on the Namibian angle, stories related to Namibia and Southern Africa, or of course to the sister liberation movements which were there. And then we'd write a commentary on a particular issue. After that we would translate that and then you go and record."\textsuperscript{432}

Monitoring was one of the constant occupations. While they would mostly listen to the BBC World Service – a not so unusual thing in most African countries – the broadcasters also monitored the External Service of the SABC, Radio RSA:

*From their commentaries we would write countercommentaries. And the Namibian newspapers,
we had a special programme on VoN in Addis Ababa, where we would just quote verbatim what they say and then we'd counter it with our commentary. That used to be a weekly programme.

The workload, however, was heavy, even if the stations only broadcast for one hour a day. At many stations, the designated number of broadcasters was not met: "Generally, it was supposed to be five in every station. But sometimes you were reduced to three only." Kaomo Tjombe worked alone in Addis Ababa for one year, shuttling back and forth between the studios and the OAU conferences.

From the establishment of the Voice of Namibia the exigencies of the propaganda war overshadowed the original intention of the UN project to train broadcasters for taking over a public broadcaster in independent Namibia. In day-to-day work, there was simply no (air-)time and no space for anything else than propagandistic output. The selection process, in which SWAPO commissars would look for "committed" fighters in the camps, already introduced political criteria. The scarcity or bad quality of material, personnel, equipment and airtime resulted in a concentration on refuting allegations made by South African stations and propagating SWAPO's goals for a future Namibia. As shown in the numerous quotes from interviews, broadcasters developed a self-image not as independent journalists, but propagandists for SWAPO's cause, fighting a propaganda war to support the guerrilla war for the independence of the country. This self-image strongly informed how they saw their role in the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation.

4 "It was not so easy, you know": the NBC as laboratory of national reconciliation

The restructuring of the Namibian broadcasting system was an essential part of a painful process in a country which was coming to peace after 23 years of armed struggle. The army – the newly named Namibian Defence Force (NDF) – and the national broadcaster NBC were the two institutions that underwent the most difficult restructuring processes, as these were the institutions that were considered essential agents as well as public mirrors of post-independence reconciliation in Namibia. In 433 Ibid. 434 Interview Kauku Hengari, 15.11.2007.
both, two formerly inimical institutions that had stood on the two sides of the war were merged, bringing the former enemies together to build up a new society; also, both were institutions that were central to policing this new society. On a more pragmatical level, "national reconciliation" was also a way to retain badly needed skills and economic power in the administration and private sector: "To many observers, the key to Namibia's fortunes would be a policy of national reconciliation which would seek both to 'heal the wounds of war', and to encourage white Namibians to keep their skills in Namibia."\textsuperscript{435}

But while promoting national reconciliation in their productions, the NBC broadcasters had to come to terms with their own situation as working closely together with their respective enemies from the Voice of Namibia or the SWABC. The former VoN-broadcasters saw themselves entering a hostile environment full of people that let them constantly feel that they were not welcome. Many could not understand why SWABC broadcasters, even the most notorious Apartheid propagandists, were not only still working in the Corporation, but sometimes even remained in high ranks.\textsuperscript{436} Ex-SWABC employees, on the other hand, felt confronted by new colleagues who were in their view partisan and had "a clear cut political agenda and political instructions."\textsuperscript{437} They suspected that party politics would dominate programmes produced by SWAPO veterans. The conflicts were most openly played out on the management level, where ex-SWABC managers felt they would soon be replaced by party cadres that were not qualified for the positions they were being put in. The conflicts were exacerbated by the reduction of the top level management from 26 posts to 11, as the new administration had to get rid of the extremely top-heavy structure of its predecessor.\textsuperscript{438} At the same time, as Director General Nahum Gorelick explained in 1995, "the NBC was faced with the challenge of changing the attitude of all the staff from being 'civil service' orientated through the state broadcasting environment to professional producers and journalists in order for the true essence of public broadcasting to develop."\textsuperscript{439} Neither SWABC nor Voice of Namibia broadcasters had worked in an environment that fostered independent journalism, and so neither were used to the new

\textsuperscript{435} Dobell 2000, 82.
\textsuperscript{436} Interview Charles Mubita, 18.08.2006.
\textsuperscript{437} Interview Christo Retief, 28.11.2007.
responsibilities in a democratic, multi-cultural state.\textsuperscript{440}

Most ex-Voice of Namibia broadcasters who returned to Namibia in 1989 and 1990 had lived through ten or more years of exile. Many did not speak much Afrikaans anymore, but English. They had devoted a significant part of their lives to the struggle against an easily identifiable suppressor, but now on returning had to take people at face value that had been representatives of that very suppressor. Returning as victors, they had to take up a new struggle they were not used to. Democratic culture had not been one of the outstanding characteristics of an organisation that had developed a more and more autocratic style of politics, partly due to the necessities of armed struggle. But after the transition, the new administration dedicated itself to a democratic order in a new multi-cultural Namibia – which meant that former enemies had to be integrated into the political system. A socialist Namibia, which had been a conceivable goal for many cadres while in exile, was now abandoned for good, as “a neo-colonial outcome seemed inevitable, but, under the circumstances, not altogether undesirable. […] Successful reconstruction would depend largely on the ability of Namibia’s new government to attract foreign aid and investment, for which political stability would be critical.”\textsuperscript{441}

Voice of Namibia broadcasters felt unwelcome in the new institution. On the management level, they were still a minority. As the Voice of Namibia hierarchy had not sported a large management structure, there were few broadcasters with experience in the field.\textsuperscript{442} Only two ex-VoN men (who had occupied higher positions in the VoN hierarchy)\textsuperscript{443} entered the new institution at middle management level. Most were treated like trainees, having to enter the new institution at a junior level, with corresponding financial consequences. Johanna Mwatara had an annual salary of 24 000 N$.\textsuperscript{444} In 1992, the Swapo-owned weekly “Namibia Today” cited sources from inside the corporation that claimed that black news editors were paid significantly less than

\textsuperscript{440} Interview Nahum Gorelick, 29.08.2006.
\textsuperscript{441} Dobell 2000, 82.
\textsuperscript{442} see Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{443} One, Sackey Namugongo, had been the last Director of the Voice of Namibia from 1981 on, the other, Charles Mubita, who was to take over Television news, had worked as a supervisor in many VoN stations and just before Independence had completed a Diploma in Mass Communication at the University of Harare. On the top management level, Obed Tulinane Emvula was until 1992 the only SWAPO member. He had filled the post of SWAPO Deputy Secretary for Political Mobilisation and Orientation in Luanda and been Swapo’s chief representative in the GDR before 1989. Interviews Sackey Namugongo, 11.08.2006 and Charles Mubita, 18.08.2006; “New heads at NBC”, Windhoek Advertiser 4.5.1990; “Appointments and Promotions at NBC”, Windhoek Observer 17.08.1990.
white editors. The disparities were there, but if you address[ed] it, nobody would listen to you." The result was that, on returning as victors, ex-VoN staff felt dominated by the very "Apartheid propagandists" or "South African puppets" they were supposed to have vanquished:

"There were two black faces. But most of the time, if you're in planning meetings and so on, all the senior journalists and so on were white. So I happened to be the only black man, you know, sitting in their meetings, most of the time. [...] It was not so easy, you know. [...] Yesterday you were calling each other names and today you have to sit and plan together. [...] Everything was done in Afrikaans, you know. All the files were in Afrikaans. You see, it was tough. In a meeting, these guys will come in and start speaking in Afrikaans. You had to constantly remind them that, look, gentlemen, the official language now is English."

Language problems were only one aspect of conflicts in the NBC between the former enemies, albeit a central one. The use of English as national language instead of Afrikaans was prescribed by the new SWAPO government as a symbol of independence from colonial South African rule. Actually, this was "the first time in history that a nation has decided to change both its official language and its lingua franca." The change to English was difficult, as only a minor percentage of the population spoke the language. Afrikaans, however, still remains a lingua franca in Namibia, especially of the older generations and in the rural areas. After independence, "only a very few ha[d] it [English, RH] as their vernacular or first language. [...] Those who take a guess would say that between 10 and 15% of the population understand and speak the English language." Following the analysis of Ellen Dyvi, one can say that the symbolic aspects of English as a national language – "as a marker of a new identity which is, inter alia, projected as being supra-ethnic, nationalistic and anti-colonial" – overrode the communicative disadvantages. In 1981, even the UN had recommended a planned change from Afrikaans to English as national language in an independent Namibia. For SWAPO, the use of English as national language was a powerful symbol of cultural and spiritual liberation from colonial rule – "decolonising

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445 "Sources say a white news editor gets R52,668 while a black news editor gets R39,735", "Who is Winning the NBC Battle?", Namibia Today, 21-27.02.1992.
446 Interview Johanna Mwatara, 17.11.2007.
447 Interview Sackey Namugongo, 11.08.2006.
449 Dyvi 1993, 53.
450 Ibid.
451 Ibid., 54.
452 Harlech-Jones 1989, 5.
the mind”. But underlying the change from Afrikaans to English as the national language was a conflict between the returning SWAPO cadres – who in Exile had adopted English as lingua franca – and Afrikaans-speaking Namibians who had remained in the country, especially the Afrikaner elite who claimed the Afrikaans language and culture as hegemonic in Namibia. Opposition politicians tried to denounce the use of English as national language as an instrument of power of the new SWAPO (or, in the more ethnicised version, "Ovambo") elite.

As a national broadcaster, the NBC was on the forefront of the language change – but struggled itself with it. While in the programmes, English was used as national language, in day-to-day communication inside the station, Afrikaans remained the lingua franca. In 1991, presumably in reaction to constant complaints from the press and general public about the bad English – "Namlish" – in NBC programmes, management complained about the "poor English" in in-house communication. It was necessary, explained the Secretary of the Management Board, to improve the use of English in the NBC, and he "asked the Controllers to urge their personnel to make use of the Language Bureau", as this "would help to improve the standard of English in the NBC." Conflicts between ex-SWABC and ex-VoN staff also played themselves out on the level of language:

"At our meetings with the Director General then, Nahum Gorelick, I informed him that, one, I wanted to change the language to English within a week, and, within a month, I needed black people to be visible on the screen, and also to have local content. We had a meeting at Television News, I called the staff, and all of them were saying no, we cannot speak English, so we will not be able to do reporting in English. Until at the end I said fine – it was a Wednesday, I remember – I said, fine, whoever is not able to do news in English by next Monday, they should not report for work. We can get other people, we can do that. I don’t know what happened between Wednesday and Monday since all of them now knew how to speak English."

The returning ex-VoN broadcasters had – as had most of the exiled SWAPO cadres – not spoken Afrikaans for more than a decade; all had used English and sometimes other Namibian languages in communication between SWAPO departments. Those broadcasters who kept speaking Afrikaans delayed, in the view of the

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453 Ngugi wa Thiong’o. 1986. Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature, Oxford/Nairobi/Portsmouth. In other African countries, English was the language of the oppressor. The language situation in Namibia is only comparable to that in South Africa. The language policy of SWAPO was derived from comparable ideas in the exiled ANC. cf. Dyvi 1992.
455 Interview Charles Mubita 18.08.2006
returned exiles, the liberation of Namibia(ns).

But language was only one form inside the NBC in which the deeper lying conflicts between SWAPO returnees and especially the Afrikaans speaking ex-SWABC managers were expressed. In the newsroom, everybody mistrusted everyone else, to the extent of accusing others of obstructing daily work: "At that time, when we started, we didn't know about computers. We only knew typewriters. So what they used to do sometimes: they would delete everything in the computer, and you'd have to start the newswriting again." In the newsroom, where prominent ex-VoN broadcasters had to work closely together with ex-SWABC men who had filled the most important positions in the Apartheid propaganda apparatus, much depended on personal relations. In the interviews, broadcasters name specific persons with whom relations were good or bad.

General tensions remained. In February 1992, a group of black broadcasters presented a petition to the NBC Broadcasting Board in which they demanded "the dismissal of several top executives, including Director-General of the corporation Nahum Gorelick himself." The petitioners' grievances included key issues such as discrepancy in salary, the selection of culturally biased and (in the Namibian context) irrelevant programmes, overrepresentation of White staff in management, failure to purchase African produced programmes on TV, neglect of the Regional and Language Services at NBC, "systematic denial of qualified black applicants of employment opportunities at the corporation" and that too many jobs were given to non-Namibians although enough Namibians would qualify. The petition was backed by detailed documentation.

The biggest complaint was that management was still lopsided. In the 10 top grades there were 119 White staff and only 52 Black staff; in the top 7 grades there were 5 Black and 8 White. To prove that the issue was not about race, but rather about attitudes, the protesters explained that

"As communicators in control of the most influential and powerful medium in the country, they seem to have no idea, contact and experience concerning the majority of the population who seem to be the silent recipients of the NBC messages. […] Why are white NBC reporters not send to rural Namibia to report on events there and in the process familiarise themselves with the needs of a changing and de-

456 Interview Johanna Mwatara, 17.11.2007.
At the same time, they alleged, "qualified blacks were being denied employment and those who were already there were not being promoted." In television and radio, blacks were still underrepresented as announcers. Management countered that the problem was one of language, claiming that rejected Black announcers spoke English badly or with a heavy accent – a rationale that was too similar to that of Apartheid times as well as to that of the conservative opposition press.

These policies, a source told the Namibian, resulted in a continuation of white hegemony in programming. Announcers and compères "play[ed] a vital role in setting the national agenda," as they "were often the people who decided what issues of national concern should be highlighted and what issues should be left out or ignored." The source claimed that the host of the National Chat Show, Robin Tyson, "was clearly in a position to steer discussion towards issues that mainly concern whites." The protesters could detail the allegations on programming on TV: US soap operas like "Falcon Crest" were preferred over African produced movies like Ousmane Sembène "Xala"; TV played even less Namibian music than before independence, when the SWABC had produced a Music Makers' competition. Allegedly, the African Nations' football cup had only been broadcast after an intervention by Nujoma himself. The authors of the note claimed that the policies of the NBC management concerning employments and promotions continued an unpleasant SWABC tradition. They felt that "the whole orientation of the NBC [was] towards the interests of the white community, while completely disregarding the views and tastes of the black majority," proof of which they saw in programme changes such as the institution of a new channel for classical music while at the same time cutting the programmes of local language stations. Also, they claimed that the Afrikaans and German Services disposed of much better and up-to-date equipment, their budget was bigger and the salary of the manager and staff of the Afrikaans Service higher than others. While these problems were probably leftovers from the SWABC (the manager of the Afrikaans Service was also one of the longest serving employees), there were more serious allegations.

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460 cf. the 'Namlish' debate, Chapter 4, also Dyvi 1993, 58-61.
For example, there were no Baster announcers on the Afrikaans Service, although Afrikaans is the mother tongue of this group, and therefore the Afrikaans Service should represent them as it did other Afrikaans-speaking communities.463

Not all of the allegations were completely justified, but the grievances behind them were real. 180 black staff initially supported the petition, their numbers growing as the crisis continued. The Management committee was irritated by the fact that the petition had been presented to the Board in by-passing of the committee, which would have been the designated address for such grievances. The presentation of the petition to the Board led to the publication of details before management could deal with the problem.464 It was a clear sign that two years after Independence, reconciliation and the overcoming of the racial boundaries constructed by 40 years of Apartheid were still a long way down the road. The Swapo-owned "New Era" reported about "deteriorating work relations particularly between white and black employees" and reported on clashes between (White) superiors and (Black) employees.465 At the same time, the fact that the petition was presented first to the Board suggests that the relationship between NBC staff and the top management was severely strained. The strike was averted, but only through intervention of the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Hidipo Hamutenya – an intervention the Board in turn resented as undue government interference.

In this conflict several issues overlapped. One was the already described conflict between former enemies, VoN and SWABC propagandists, which expressed itself in racial terms (as most Black staff at SWABC had only been employed in junior posts and cultural programming). The second was the conflict around the cultural and political hegemony of different groups in the new Namibia – protesters claimed that important posts in the NBC were still occupied by White staff and that this reinforced a cultural hegemony of the White minority in Namibia. Although the protesters were eager to point out that "most of us don't see it as an issue between black and white"466, much of their demands concerned the disproportionately high number of White ex-

463 Ibid., 3. The Rehobother Baster
SWABC staff in senior positions. But underlying these conflicts was still another – the described tensions were exacerbated by a streamlining process that was introduced to make the corporation more financially efficient and enable it to expand the network, but included severe cuts in the NBC workforce. This process had been planned since 1991, but began only in June 1992. By March 1993, total staff numbers had been reduced from 675 to 511. The Black Language Services were downsized to only 10 broadcasters in each department – not much, given the fact that especially those Services had to maintain regional branches.

The strike threat was deferred when the Board agreed to deal with the grievances. In March 1992, the management sacked a prominent member of top management, Stuart Super, who had been a freelance sports journalist and presenter for the SWABC since its foundation. Super was known to listeners for his "extensive commentaries" during the independence celebrations and had been appointed Deputy Director General: Programmes and News in 1990. He was replaced with Yussuf Hassan, a Kenyan journalist in the BBC World Service who had been posted to Namibia. This left the protesters (who had actually demanded his dismissal as Head of the News Department) dissatisfied and enraged the English language opposition press: "Mr. Super, in all his political innocence, has become the first – and by no means will he be the last – victim of a process of political bloodletting within the NBC which has only just begun", a commentator in the English language Windhoek Advertiser suspected. Several commentators in the press also suspected that the whole affair had been a welcome opportunity for the Swapo government to tighten its grip on the nominally independent corporation. The top management level was restructured, the posts of Deputy DG were now renamed "Senior Controller" and a new post "Senior Controller: Radio and TV Programmes" was added to the Human Resources and News posts. With Ewald Katjivena filling the new post, two of the four top management posts were now occupied by former high-ranking Swapo cadres. Stuart Super had been the last representative of the (White) ex-SWABC staff in the corporation at a higher level.

Bigger social and political conflicts played into the crisis at the NBC. The intervention of the Minister raised fears of undue government interference, and the whole af-

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468 "Stuart Super's sacrifice will not quench the cabal's bloodthirst", Windhoek Advertiser, 02.03.1992.
fair soon got to be seen in terms of a struggle over hegemony by the White opposition press as well as the Swapo party organs – each one accusing the other side of trying to influence the NBC’s programming policies in their favour. The protesters as well as the SWABC management, while trying to downplay these issues in communication with the press, nevertheless used them in their argument. Although labour issues were at the heart of the conflict, they soon got to be expressed in more general terms of cultural, political and social hegemony. The Swapo newspaper New Era concluded: "The power struggle within NBC according to the February unrest was between whites and blacks; liberal and conservative whites and between blacks divided into factions of returnees and those who worked with the corporation before independence.”

Reconciliation, the conflict showed, was still a long way down the road – inside the corporation as well as on a social and political level in Namibia.

The labour issues behind the conflict were, however, not resolved. In July 1992 and again in January 1993, smaller attempts to strike were made by small groups of staff, partly organised by the same steering committee that had materialised during the February protest. This time, the strikes turned directly against the retrenchment process as a whole. However, NBC workers still were not united, and the attempts remained too small to really shut down broadcasting in the corporation. The retrenchment process went on, with the already mentioned results.

The rift of "old" SWABC representatives vs. "new" staff in the NBC went through the whole Namibian society. Listeners complained in letters to different newspapers about lopsided staff, depending on what political side they saw themselves on. A good example is a letter from listeners in Okakarara who

"just do not understand why this section [the Otjiherero Service] is still staffed with the very old faces who were employed by the colonisers for the sole purpose of dis-informing (sic) us about SWAPO. We are making this appeal after realizing that, a lot of what is heard in Otjiherero programmes [...] are only contributions by the very people against the people of this country and SWAPO."

On the other hand, the NBC was attacked by the opposition press for being too Swapo-friendly. Personnel matters like the replacement of known personalities from the old SWABC by Swapo members particularly enraged the press and were even criticised by the independent newspapers, for example, the appointment of Charles

Mubita, another prominent Swapo member (and ex-VoN broadcaster), as Acting Controller: News when Yussuf Hassan left the station in August 1992. The Namibian reported sources in the NBC as suggesting "that Mubita's appointment [was] a ploy to place someone 'politically reliable' in the Controller's seat in the run-up to the forthcoming regional and local elections." With Mubita, top management now consisted (at least for three months) of three prominent Swapo cadres besides the Director-General.

The streamlining process took its toll on operations in the corporation. In March 1993, the News and Current Affairs Department noted that the "reduction of staff complements" in three regional contribution centres in the North "had a significant effect on production." The Current Affairs Desk, in particular, struggled with the retrenchments, as the senior editor Mubita had already constantly urged for more personnel in 1992. The Radio Output Desk in the News and Current Affairs Department had been severely understaffed since 1990, with seven instead of the ten experienced journalists required. The lack of even the most basic equipment added to the stressful situation and had "a depressing influence on our staff." As the News Desk staff had to work shifts, they were "under considerable pressure, especially during weekends." Although the News Desk was assigned two additional permanent staff members during the restructuring process, this and other Desks remained understaffed. News and Current Affairs was the most important programming department, as all other departments were supplied by it – a centralised structure the NBC inherited (and retained) mostly for reasons of effectiveness. During the years 1992 and 93, the situation at the Radio News Desk slowly stabilised, although at a low level. What was important for the News Room was that teamwork among the broadcasters improved significantly after the strike threat and the most controversial personalities had left the NBC.

The question of continuity between the colonial and post-colonial phases in Nami-

473 Departmental Report on News and Current Affairs for the Board Meeting to be held on 14th April 1993, 4. NBC Monthly Reports, NBC Information Services, House 19.
474 Departmental Report on News and Current Affairs for the Board Meeting to be held on 22nd January 1992, 3f. NBC Monthly Reports, NBC Information Services, House 19.
475 Manager: News Operations to Managing Editor, Monthly Report for March 1992, 1. NBC Information Services, House 19 Batteries, Umbrellas, microphones and -stands were on the list with most urgently needed equipment.
bia must be asked differently than in the case of Zambia, which is a more classic example of decolonisation. One the one hand, the exigencies of Apartheid rule and the decades-long war against it made a clear break necessary, much more so than in countries where the path to independence had entailed less violence. One the other, as many societies and political systems in transition, Namibian society after independence depended upon the skills and cooperation of large parts of the old bureaucratic apparatus, all UN efforts to train skilled SWAPO personnel in exile notwithstanding. Also, the international community looked to Namibia and expected what SWAPO had promised: a peaceful transition which would integrate all communities living in Namibia into the new society. Therefore, the process of national reconciliation entailed that the break was not total, but rather a smooth transition, engendering a compromise that would ensure the continued presence of old staff in new positions. Conflicts at the NBC were rooted in this underlying contradiction. SWAPO returnees, who had expected to reap the fruits of their dedication to the party and the struggle by being able to occupy positions of power, were disappointed by the power-sharing that was entailed in national reconciliation. On the other side stood those who felt that SWAPO had forced itself into Namibian politics by violent means, and saw themselves now in the role of a democratic opposition, watching closely for power abuses by the ruling party. While SWAPO, unchallenged, held significant political power, economic power remained firmly in White hands. Beyond this issue, there was also the question of influence in society and, especially important in the NBC, of cultural hegemony. In the old institutions taken over by the independent state, where, as shown, these larger social conflicts played out amongst staff and between staff and management. What is clearly visible in these conflicts is how the issues were connected: the issue of cultural hegemony did not stand for itself, but the protesters indicated that the question of how much African produced content would feature in NBC programmes was determined by how sensitive editors were towards the issue.

The break with the Apartheid past in the NBC was difficult, because two conflicting lines of continuity met in the institution. For Nahum Gorelick, at the time Director-General, both were equally problematic, because none had imbued the broadcasters with the values he considered necessary for journalism in a public broadcaster that was crucial in building a democratic society:

"The NBC is still hampered by bureaucratic and political thinking and acting, a tendency evident
throughout the country [...]. Amongst staff that came over from the SWABC, a tendency to resistance to change has been noted, while some new staff members are often criticised for serving their political party rather than their people."477

6. "Men Between": Broadcasters as Cultural Brokers

Peter Fraenkel, in his 1959 account of his time at CABS, describes his African colleagues as members of an African intellectual class that had developed under colonialism, which he dubs "Men Between". According to Fraenkel, they stood between African tradition and the modern education and culture colonialism had brought to the territory, between town and country, between their African peers and European colleagues. Fraenkels analysis is problematic because it falls for the very categories the people he describes defied, but it hints at the very real situation of broadcasters in colonial radio. Broadcasters were "men between" in more than one sense, and this pertains not only to their class position. They all too often found themselves between different cultures, between different styles of broadcasting and between colonial politics and their listeners.

An analytical expression for the issue Fraenkel identified is the concept of cultural brokers. It is often used in the social sciences to describe 'indigenous' actors in societies with a cultural background different from the Western, whose role is, often uncritically, seen as that of mediators in areas such as education, health services and development aid. Historians and ethnographers, however, have for some time called for a different concept of cultural brokerage and the persons involved, one that avoids the essentialism and the dichotomies that inform not only Fraenkel's account, but also much of the literature on cultural brokers. Andreas Eckert, writing about African clerks, describes them as "Cultural Brokers" situated in a "space between",

"jenseits der binären kolonialen Muster, die säuberlich zwischen 'Alt' und 'Neu', zwischen 'Indigen' und 'Westlich' oder zwischen 'Tradition' und 'Moderne' unterscheiden. Der Zwischenraum, in dem sie sich befanden, offenbarte aber immer auch die Grenzen der hierarchischen kolonialen Ordnung."478

David Coplan sees South African musicians as cultural brokers engaged not only in vertical, but also horizontal mediation, because they "occupy linkage roles between

sectors of society and mediate between cultures in contact in ways that affect the perception and action of their listeners." Alick Nkhata, who "may well have [had, RH] a deep understanding of the different cultural and aesthetic positions involved" in his work as a musician, ethnomusicologist and broadcaster can serve as an example of both types of cultural brokers.

Thomas Turino cautions scholars to not assume such a role for African intellectuals "based on essentialist ideas of race or regional heritage". This essentialist assumption may have been an important motive for employing people like Kateka or Nkhata in the first place – as 'indigenous' experts on African culture –, and for the European broadcasters to rely on their judgment in matters concerning African issues. But as Turino, referring to the CABS broadcasters' statement on the "poverty" of Zimbabwean music, has shown, "being black is not a sufficient condition to make indigenous music their music; socialization and habitus are the operatives here." Turino uses the term "cosmopolitans" for the CABS broadcasters and argues that they had internalised "foreign" – European and North American – ideas and practices to the extent that this internalization allowed "for internally generated cultural creativity, practices, and identities." At this stage of internalization, people are not just imitating initially 'foreign' or 'European' cultural features: "Rather they are acting and thinking from their own cultural position – this is part of who they are." But Turino's definition of cosmopolitanism encompasses the whole CABS team and includes European broadcasters such as Franklin, Kittermaster, Fraenkel, and Lightfoot.

"The fact that these people found each other is no mere accident. Like the members of any socio-cultural group, cosmopolitans are often more attracted to and more likely to hire other cosmopolitans because of shared assumptions and social style, as well as values about types of credentials and backgrounds."

The role of cultural brokers that these men and women assumed was not just that of mediators between cultures. It had important political and social consequences. This bears special significance in the cases presented here, where they acted as communicators and interpreters of colonial policies. Broadcasters in both colonial sta-

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481 Ibid.
482 Ibid. Emphasis in original.
484 Ibid., 102 Emphasis in original.
tions found themselves not just between two cultural worlds, but also between political camps. This is true for both Black and White broadcasters, although the former were significantly more affected, because their social position corresponded to their professional. While White broadcasters in both the Northern Rhodesian and the South West African broadcasting corporations were unequivocally part of the colonial elite, whatever their political leanings, Black broadcasters, as part of an African middle class, were in an ambivalent, at times almost schizophrenic, position. Their role resembled that of "African agents who used their own words to support the colonial policies they administered"\textsuperscript{485}, but at the same time, many were sympathetic to the nationalist cause, some even politically active – to the point of risking their employment. It is important to note this ambivalence, because it led to an attitude that a large part of the African elite under colonialism shared and that would greatly influence post-colonial politics in African states. While Nationalists fought colonial rule and the political, social and economic discrimination of Africans, they rarely challenged the method of rule, namely the modern state and its bureaucratic centralism. Rather, nationalist politicians and African civil servants were convinced that the centralist state was a necessary prerequisite for nation-building. The Namibian case bears many similarities to the 'classic' decolonisation processes between 1957 and 1975, although it is set apart by time as well as the specific context and dynamics at play. The nationalist idea of the post-colonial state was taken over by SWAPO and reinforced by the OAU's and UN's support of the movement as the "sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people."\textsuperscript{486} While it is difficult to establish exactly how widespread sympathies for the nationalist movement were amongst Black (and White) staff at the SWABC, the few examples mentioned show that they were there.

**Cultural Brokers in the Post-Colonial Nation**

In Namibia as in Zambia 25 years earlier, the state-controlled broadcaster was in the focus of post-colonial state- and nation-building, for two reasons. First, it was, as other parastatals, a target of politicians' efforts to restructure and "nationalise" the state and its institutions. Secondly, it was also seen as a major tool to enable the re-

\textsuperscript{485} Feierman, Steven: Peasant Intellectuals. Anthropology and History in Tanzania, Madison 1990, 120.

\textsuperscript{486} UN General Assembly, Resolution 31/146, 20.12.1976.
structuring process as a whole. Therefore, broadcasters were doubly affected by po-
licies such as nation-building or national reconciliation. Again, broadcasters found
themselves in an ambivalent position: politically, most supported the new govern-
ments – sometimes to the extent of actually being members of the ruling party. But
supporting their government through reports conflicted with their self-perception as
reporters. Interestingly enough, Zambian broadcasters who had started their careers
in colonial radio claim that it provided more freedom and autonomy than the post-
colonial station. This is probably due to several factors. First, CABS and FBC had
given them considerable freedom in producing cultural programmes, while reducing
their role in news and actuality to that of translators and announcers. As African
broadcasters advanced into these fields, already equipped with an idea of standards
of independent, autonomous journalism, they began to feel the control and censor-
ship much stronger, and it came from a government that they had hoped would im-
prove their working conditions. Secondly, their incorporation into the bureaucracy
made them personally more vulnerable to control and offered no incentives, as the
salaries actually dropped. In stark contrast, broadcasters that started their career af-
ter 1964 saw no problems with the rules laid out by the new government.

Namibian broadcasters, in their reaction to post-independence developments,
were as divided as in most other aspects of their work. Most found themselves in loy-
alty conflicts. While many of the ex-VoN staff continued to be members of the now
ruling Swapo, a sensitive public pressurised the NBC by scandalising incidents like
Sackey Namugongo, the ex-Director of the VoN, speaking at a Swapo rally from
which he also reported for the station. Their dilemma is aptly described by Nora Ap-
polus: "I would always protect Swapo, but I would do it in a way that didn't
compromise the work of the NBC."487 On the other hand, journalists who had occu-
pied important positions in the SWABC, specifically in the newsroom, were suspected
to undermine the autonomy of the NBC just as well. They saw their respective roles
in the new Namibia rather differently. The first group wanted to continue their work –
the liberation of Namibia and Namibians –, only now from a position of power in the
country. The other saw itself as an oppositional safeguard of democracy, who dis-
trusted Swapo's affirmations to ensuring democratic processes. Both, however, were
partisan: where some saw Swapo as the only party able and willing to advance na-

487 Interview Norah Appolus, 24.11.2007.
tion-building and democracy in Namibia, others saw it as a threat to the stability of the nation, interested only in advancing ethnic interests. These contradictory viewpoints were not just rooted in different views of Swapo, but also in fundamentally differing ideas of the nation and the place of the different ethnic groups in it, which had both developed during the Apartheid era and the struggle against it.

The different positions and attitudes of broadcasters described in the preceding chapters again warn us to assume certain characteristics of cultural brokers just because of their race or their position in society. Cultural brokerage is something that they do, not who they are. And it can be done in different ways. But what was the role of these cultural brokers in post-colonial societies? Radio was the main channel through which governmental policies could be communicated, and broadcasters, however restricted, interpreted and discussed these policies for – and, on occasion, with – the audience. Although broadcasters were critical of government action, specifically when it affected their own working conditions, they still saw their role as helping and enabling governmental policies such as national reconciliation. Turinos notion that broadcasters formed a specific group that, in colonial society, had more in common amongst themselves (be they European or African) than with the respective ethnic group they belonged to, helps also to understand how they influenced post-colonial radio. Similar to what Andreas Eckert found for Tanzanian bureaucrats, there are strong continuities between colonial and post-colonial broadcasting, not least because the staff remained the same, and strongly influenced radio culture in the independent African nations. Zambian broadcasters shared ideas about African society in general (e.g., that it was dominated by tribalism) and Zambian society in particular with colonial officials and African politicians alike, as well as ideas about how this society should change. The case of Namibia, however, is more complex. The Namibian decolonisation process took place much later than others on the continent, and it happened in an altogether different context. Most importantly, Apartheid policies structured Namibian society in a way that differed significantly from late colonial societies. Together with the war in Namibia's North and the involvement of international actors in it, Namibia's independence had been an international issue for some time. While SWAPO sometimes indicated socialist leanings in its programmes and public statements, these were usually part of its tactics to ensure support from both the USA and socialist countries. The strongest influence on the ideas and worldview (the
common sense) of SWAPO cadres came not from one of the Cold War ideological camps, but from the UN. Institutions like the UNIN trained SWAPO cadres with the explicit task to provide an intellectual elite that would be able to fill the necessary positions in a future independent Namibia. These were still infused with ideas such as the desirability of a stable nation state, a strong bureaucracy and parliamentary democracy. SWAPO's authoritarianism, forged through years of military struggle, and its acceptance as "sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people" by the UN, led the movement-turned-ruling-party Swapo, much like UNIP a quarter of a century earlier, to see itself as the natural leading political force of the independent country. Both parties therefore, albeit for different reasons and in different historical circumstances, came to identify themselves with the Zambian or Namibian nation, and its well-being and stability with their staying in power. Broadcasters, although critical of the repercussions of this authoritarianism on their own work and sometimes critical of the ruling parties, tended to share these ideas, and in instances sacrificed what they saw as journalist ethics for the greater good of nation-building.

Therefore, while taking into account that their position was that of cultural brokers, it is important to see these broadcasters not as brokers between two cultural worlds defined by binary distinctions. Rather, they acted as intermediaries between intellectual elites and the broader population (their audience), while being part of the former. As broadcasters, they were inclined to take into account the wishes of their audience. At the same time, they saw themselves as educators who would teach the audience what was important in the new, independent country. Nation-building, in this regard, was a top-down process. Thomas Turinos characterization of FBC broadcasters as cosmopolitans seems to apply to broadcasters in both cases. Although, as shown, some SWABC broadcasters viewed the transition process and Swapo in power critically, the dominant majority of NBC staff shared a commitment towards "building the nation" – from Black ex-VoN propagandists to White ex-SWABC contributors. The most outspoken opponents of the new order either left the station or were driven out soon after the transition. Especially the Swapo broadcasters and journalists had enjoyed an international education, in European and American universities or in the UNIN in Lusaka.

Cosmopolitanism, understood as a type of "cultural formation[.]" that is "simulta-
neously local and translocal\(^{488}\), has long been associated with elites and privilege. Turino’s research shows that this applies to a certain extent to CABS and FBC broadcasters, although one should be wary of neglecting the differences in racial privilege between Black and White broadcasters in colonial society. Also, it is important to note that these cultural formations mirror global hierarchies. They are "more heavily influenced by certain particularly powerful sites\(^{489}\) – enforced through colonial or neocolonial structures, be they economic, political or cultural. Zambian broadcasters took over journalistic ethics and broadcasting techniques from the BBC and its educators, then adapted them to local purposes and cultural formations. Both the Voice of Namibia and South African-controlled media such as the SWABC or Radio RSA were steeped in Cold War discourse; but the VoN also knew the language of human rights and international law. In both cases, they shared distinctly modernist ideas and took part in the creation of local modernist ideologies. Broadcasters were part of globally dominant cultural formations, but interpreted them creatively and adapted them locally.

It should again be emphasised that this is not an issue of imitation, but internalisation and creative adaptation – broadcasters acted and thought "from their own cultural position"\(^{490}\). However, the concepts of cultural brokerage and cosmopolitanism are not mutually exclusive, especially if the idea of cultural brokers is taken to reference a multiplicity of cultures instead of binary "Western" and "African" culture. While fulfilling the role of cultural brokers, broadcasters were part of a cosmopolitan elite, which influenced this role heavily. Cosmopolitan broadcasters infused their ideas into greater society, thus decisively influencing cultural and political discourses and establishing their own as 'mainstream'. And while being critical of government policies and struggling to keep the autonomy of the stations and their own positions, broadcasters shared many ideas about the societies they lived in and analysed, as well as the desired goals of social change, with civil servants and politicians. Chapter 5 will look at how these attitudes influenced the programme output of radio stations in both countries.

\(^{488}\) Turino 2000, 7.
\(^{489}\) Ibid., 8.
\(^{490}\) Ibid., 9.
IV. Programmes

The previous chapters were concerned with the conditions of programme production. These set the terms for actual programme content, which then was consumed by the audiences. Programme content is at the heart of media analysis, and rightfully so. While there were many direct interactions between audiences and producers, these always revolved around the programmes. But these need to be evaluated in context, taking into account the many practices, interpretations, and discourses surrounding them. Therefore, while this chapter forms a core around which the rest of this thesis revolves, programme content should not be the sole focus of analysis. Rather, it is in connecting programme content to the conditions in which it was produced, and its change to the interactions between the involved actors, that the analysis enables us to isolate the ideological underpinnings of programme content.

In analysing these, it is important to remember that these were by no means monolithic, clearly structured ideologies; nor could they be simply applied to all content, as there were many actors involved. Rather than treating programme content as result of fixed, immutable and clearly identifiable "ideologies", this chapter seeks to trace ideological fragments in programmes that unfold their power not by open propaganda, but through creating an environment in which certain ideas and assumptions about (post-)colonial society and its development seem only natural. In fact, "development" is one of the more powerful of these ideas and, together with ideas about "modernity", "modernisation" and the "modern" in contrast to the "traditional" individual and society, permeates nearly all programmes under analysis here, from information and actuality to entertainment formats and music. However, this happened even before Walt W. Rostow and others had published the works that would encapsulate these ideas in a coherent theoretical framework.\footnote{Although the idea of a transition from tradition to modernity was largely taken from Talcott Parsons earlier concept of "pattern variables", the works that came to embody "modernisation theory" were only published from the end of the 1950s. Rostows "The Stages of Economic Growth" was first published in 1960, other "classics" of modernisation theory between 1958 and 1961. cf. Lerner, David. 1958. The Passing of a Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, New York; Lipset, Seymour M. 1960. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Garden City, NY; Rostow, Walt W. 1960. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge; Smelser, Neil. 1959. Social Change in Industrial Revolution, Chicago. An influential application to modernisation theory in the field of communication studies is Wilbur L. Schramm. 1964. Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the Developing Countries, Stanford University Press.} Another example in the
context of this chapter is Apartheid ideology, which, although much more coherent and fixed, also permeated SWABC programmes in much subtler ways, informing them more on a structural level instead of being clearly identifiable in programme content. The two are also linked together, as the strict division of "traditional" and "modern" formed the basis of Apartheid ideology, which then went on to claim that the two could not coexist and promoted the model of "separate development." As with other ideas that can be derived from programme analysis, the connections are manifold; the idea of "nation-building", e.g., was strongly informed by a sense of feasibility and controllability of social change that was at the core of the modernisation project.

The ideological tenets of radio programmes were established early on. In fact, the very introduction of radio targeting colonial subjects in Africa was due to the governments' desire to control information flows and secure a media monopoly. While their reaction came too late to control newspapers, radio as a (relatively) new medium that was (relatively) expensive and complex to set up, but would be faster and more effective in reaching its audience was an attractive alternative. As shown, in Northern Rhodesia and South West Africa radio stations were established at a time when the respective colonial government was under pressure to legitimise its rule and mobilise the population to its cause. Government communication and information control are at the core of colonial radio projects. But programme content was more complex, and cannot be reduced to simple open propaganda. Listeners had to be attracted to programmes, and addressed in a way that was not too direct.

The post-colonial broadcasting stations inherited this desire for information control and communication of government to the people. Although programme content changed, there are ideological continuities. Most importantly, ideas about development and its goal, "modernity", remained unchanged, with only the subject (not the object) replaced: instead of the colonial masters, it would be Africans themselves that would find the way to modernity. Zambia was one of the early aspirants and paragons of development, as it was already fairly industrialised and, with copper prices relatively high, seemed to dispose of a strong basis for taking the route to modern society. The persistent influence of modernisation ideas in post-colonial society is one of the stronger connections to the colonial past, and, taken together with the fact that actors seemed completely unaware of it, suggests that the term "ideology" should be applied very carefully here to avoid indicating that it was a clearly modeled, consciously
propagated and fixed set of ideas. Rather, "ideology" should be taken in the Gramsci-an vein as "common sense", as an idea or set of ideas that is shared by all actors involved. The question if a process of modernisation was desirable, and if yes, which modernisation exactly, did simply not come up. All actors involved shared the idea that radio was an agent of modernisation (in the sense of a development towards the bureaucratic, capitalist, nation-state) and that this was a good thing, just as everyone agreed to the elements necessary in that development – a certain work ethic, overcoming "tribalism" and building a national community, bringing farmers into the capitalist economy, creating (or enlarge) a Black middle class, and more. This can also be seen in Namibia, although the heyday of modernisation theory was already over at the time of the country's independence. Affirmative action, national reconciliation and nation-building were still ideas that were supposed to form Namibia after the model of the European nation-state. And in both cases, radio was supposed to act as an agent of these processes. Programme content, as this chapter will show, mirrored these projects.

1. The Development of Programmes for Africans in the Colonies

When broadcasting was introduced in the African colonies, only shortly after having been established as a mass medium in Europe, it targeted an audience of European settlers and administrators, for whom it was a connection to the civilisation of the motherland – the link to the cities, to the metropolis and to the "world of the civilized."\(^{492}\) As Frantz Fanon has described, broadcasts provided a soothing reminder of colonial power and its ability to ensure the safety of its subjects, as well as a link to metropolitan culture, "a daily invitation not to 'go native'."\(^{493}\) Accordingly, programmes for Europeans consisted mainly of BBC relays – predominantly news and current affairs –, classical music and theatre.

Media in the colonies served above all the aim of controlling information flows and gaining an information monopoly over African consumers. The first newspaper for Africans in Northern Rhodesia, Mutende, was introduced as what Thomas Kirsch calls

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\(^{492}\) Fanon, Frantz. 1965. This Is the Voice of Algeria, in: id.: A Dying Colonialism, New York, 69-98, 71

a "counterforce in writing" after the widespread circulation of Watchtower literature in the territory made missionaries and officials fear to lose African readers to religious ideas that had proven their potential for fostering social unrest.\textsuperscript{494} The mobilisation of colonial subjects for the war effort made a similar media strategy necessary. Consequently, the first programmes geared towards an African audience from the Lusaka station were news talks and messages from the Northern Rhodesia Regiment that supported the Kings' African Rifles fighting in Africa and Asia.\textsuperscript{495} The talks were a mixture of news about the military progress of the war in Europe and propaganda to support the British troops. The broadcasters tried to explain the events by comparing them to conditions familiar to the listeners – a technique which would later also be employed by CABS. In 1940, a news programme reported the events in France:

"The Germans have for five days now been attacking in a battle which stretches from the sea to the German border – which is the same distance as from Lusaka to Ndola. Although Hitler has sent twice as many soldiers into this battle as there are people in Northern Rhodesia, he has not beaten the French and the British."\textsuperscript{496}

Together with such reports of Allied successes, around half of the broadcast was taken up by appeals to send money and warnings that rumourmongering would be persecuted: "Lies about the war do a great deal of harm because they frighten people. We are always telling you not to believe any words you hear except from these talks on the wireless, and the true words which you read in Mutende. As you see, people who tell these lies are quickly punished."\textsuperscript{497} This policy of "refuting rumours"\textsuperscript{498} was geared first of all at controlling the population, preventing civil unrest and gaining normative power over information not only from the theatres of war but also from inside the country.


\textsuperscript{495} The Northern Rhodesia Regiment served in India, Burma, Palestine as well as in East Africa and Madagascar. Roberts, Andrew: A History of Zambia, New York 1979, 210.

\textsuperscript{496} News Broadcast to Africans No.42 (up to 1.30 p.m. 10.06.1940), cont. in: District Commissioner Luanshya to Secretary for Native Affairs, Lusaka. NAZ SEC2/425: Broadcasting for Natives including schools Broadcasting (1937-1949), Vol. I. The broadcast had been relayed by a small station in Luanshya in the local vernacular. This particular part of the broadcast was actually not read in Luanshya as it arrived ten days too late, so that the news was out of date.

\textsuperscript{497} Ibid. Mutende was a Newspaper printed in several vernaculars by the Information Department. For a history of Mutende, cf. Kasoma 1986, 47-52.

\textsuperscript{498} cf. Franklin 1950a.
Besides news and current affairs programmes, the station provided a connection between African soldiers appointed to East Africa or India and their families in Zambia. Andrea Masiye started his broadcasting career in Nairobi where he had been seconded as army liaison to the Lusaka station. He read soldiers' letters that were then broadcast. The station also communicated families' greetings over the radio service for soldiers and it organised two-way broadcasts for which soldiers and families were invited in the respective studios to exchange messages. Civilians' contributions had to be written out beforehand.\textsuperscript{499} The message programmes in particular proved to be a success, as they provided an important connection between families in the country and soldiers fighting in foreign countries in a war that many did not perceive as theirs, and in an army that appointed them to do the most dire jobs.\textsuperscript{500} The rest of the programme was embedded in a general propaganda effort by the High Command to describe the war as a legitimate fight against tyranny, and to promote the idea that "Britain could and should win the war."\textsuperscript{501} A Christmas message by the Governor to African troops "was greatly appreciated and [Harry] Franklin frequently heard the comment that 'this was the first time we really felt that Northern Rhodesia was remembering us'\textsuperscript{502}.

\textbf{Colonial Power and Information Control}

Media policy shortly before and during the war was part of a general effort of colonial governments to control the flow of information. With the beginning of the war, British colonies had introduced the post of Information Officer, who had far reaching decision-making power in the respective colony. Theoretically answering to the Ministry, Information Officers usually coordinated with the respective Governors. After the war, the post remained and its function changed from war propaganda to a more complex task, which Kate Morris calls "Public Relations".\textsuperscript{503} Harry Franklin, who was at the forefront of this change, described this "public relations" project as an effort to "popularise the Government by informing the people about what it was doing and

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{501} Morris 2000, 434.
\textsuperscript{502} Ibid., 363.
\textsuperscript{503} Ibid., 311.
\end{footnotes}
how and why it was doing it.\textsuperscript{504} After the establishment of the Central African Broadcasting Station (CABS), programmes focused on producing a generally positive image of 'modernisation', of a continuous development towards a modern society, mainly through education. This can be viewed as being consistent with the ideological project of late colonialism, namely to promote an idea of advancement towards modernity in which the colonial state would 'assist' its African subjects. But if the station was to reach a significant audience and to implement broadcasting to Africans on a long-term scale (as opposed to the earlier attempts that followed the necessities of war propaganda), it could not just rely on openly propagandistic programmes. Once the possibility of reaching a large audience was achieved through technical developments – most importantly, the Saucepan Special, it also needed broadcasting content that was attractive to listeners. For that reason, entertainment programmes took up a significant part of air time. It has to be noted that the orientation of the station towards the wishes and needs of an African audience was strongly promoted by Harry Franklin against sceptics in the colonial administration as well as the Central African Council (CAC) and against strong resistance from settler politicians.\textsuperscript{505} Because of Franklin's (and his successors') emphasis on factual information and entertainment, the station retained an ambivalence towards its African audience – driving the ideological point home while at the same time providing information and possibilities for education, especially for an audience living in rural areas.

Franklin's approach was "to keep politics […] out of broadcasting as much as possible, and out of all other aspects of our work."\textsuperscript{506} The quote says a lot about the attitude of British Information Officers in Zambia at the time. Keeping politics out did not lead to a neutral or objectively 'apolitical' programme, but rather resulted in a policy that was geared towards conserving the political status quo. While the station broadcast government announcements, African nationalist politicians were excluded from access to the programmes. Also, educational and cultural programmes were modelled after the ideas of the colonial government and expatriate broadcasters about how 'Africa' should be modernised.

British propaganda since the Second World War relied on factual accuracy. Julian Hale has remarked that while the BBC's objectivity "may or may not be a carefully

\textsuperscript{504} Franklin 1974, 165.  
\textsuperscript{506} Franklin 1974, 193.
cultivated myth", its "reputation for telling the truth" is not. Colonial Information officers cite the BBC as a model for their work in the colonial stations:

"Always we told the truth, according to the gospel of the B.B.C., in so far (sic) as we knew it. If we had not, and had tried to gloss over set-backs and disasters, we could not have lived with ourselves and we should also have floundered from lie to lie into ever worse confusion. Honesty was not only the best, but the only possible policy."  

This approach was retained after the war as it had proven its effectiveness. CABS managers followed the same principle: "The long-term advantages of a reputation for honesty far outweighed the short-term disadvantages in telling the whole truth to primitive listeners. This became an article of faith with me, as it was with Kittermaster." However, even for the BBC, the "telling the truth"-policy

"does not mean that the BBC's goal, to influence foreigners' minds in favour of the political principles it represents, differs fundamentally from that of any other External Service. It so happens that those principles are the minimally offensive ones of liberalism, moderation, and parliamentary democracy; and that the best way to promote them is through liberal, moderate means. The notion of ideological persuasion is not absent, it is merely tacit."

Also, colonial stations differed fundamentally from the BBC in their setup and mission. As shown, they were set up as instruments of communication and information control for colonial governments, and their purpose was "political and administrative". Although individual broadcasters looked upon the BBC as a model, they were well aware that the exigencies of the colonial state called for a controlled output of information, as far as possible. This did not necessarily mean simple censorship, which, because of private actors in the news market, would not be viable. Kittermaster argued against censoring the news: if CABS did not report about, for example, the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, Africans would read about it in English newspapers. Although these were aimed at a European readership, Africans read them too, and pass on the information, which could easily lead to rumours: "God only knows what distorted versions filter down to the illiterates." Wouldn't it be much better to give them "clear and accurate news" in the vernaculars through CABS? This was the same line of argument that Harry Franklin had used when promoting a full-fledged government broadcasting station for an African audience: by censoring the news, the

507 Hale 1975, 48.
509 Fraenkel 1959, 31f.
510 Hale 1975, xv.
511 Sichalwe 1988, 49. cf. Ch. 2.1.
government would relinquish the possibility to communicate directly its own version of events, opening the door for "discontented agitators of the 'intelligentsia class'" to "mislead" the African masses. Fraenkel concluded: "The long-term advantages of a reputation for honesty far outweighed the short-term disadvantages in telling the whole truth to primitive listeners.

**Modernising the African Listener**

In the first years, the station broadcast two, sometimes three hours per day, alternating between the main vernaculars of the three territories – ChiBemba, ChiNyanja, ChiTonga, SiLozi, IsiNdebele, ChiShona – and English. Talk programmes focused more or less on the direct promotion of administration policies, spanning topics such as "Land and Native Development" or "Rabies." Talks were given either by Department officials in "simple English" or, translated into the respective vernaculars, by African staff. Occasionally, Chiefs were invited to give a talk. The policy for the talks followed a scheme of "mass education among adult Africans", divided into nine different subjects such as economy or work. These educational broadcasts were to promote disciplinary values; under the subject "work", Franklin listed "Responsibility and service; honesty; dignity of labour" in an early annual report. In 1950, the Information Department started a 5-year "propaganda campaign" for "improved methods of agriculture" and cattle breeding aimed at increasing the production and improving the quality of agricultural products. Again, "hard work" was one of the subjects.

The news was strongly affected by the ideas of colonial officials and CABS broadcasters about modernisation and the ways Africans should take to achieve it. News selection was modeled after these ideas. It often focused on events in Britain and the Western World and items were presented in a simple manner broadcasters believed would appeal to their audience. News items "had to be followed by explanatory talks." The way the news was presented was often perceived as talking down to

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512 Franklin 1950b, 7.
514 Northern Rhodesia Information Department: Annual Report, 1948, 9f. NAZ 15/87: Information Department Reports.
515 Ibid., 5.
517 Northern Rhodesia Information Department: Annual Report, 1950, 6. NAZ 15/87: Information Department Reports.
listeners, not surprisingly, considering quotes such as this one, announcing mile-runner Roger Bannister's famous world record:

"In England the other day, a British athlete ran a mile in under four minutes. His name is Roger Bannister, a 25-year old London medical student, and the actual time taken for the 1,760 yards was 3 minutes 59 and 2/5th seconds. The mentioning of time in minutes and seconds may be a little confusing to our listeners, and perhaps you will get a clearer picture of just how fast this man was running if I say that his speed was greater than you travelling at 15 miles per hour on your bicycle."\(^{519}\)

Nevertheless, behind this paternalistic tone there was a genuine effort to translate world news to an audience that started to include more and more rural listeners without formal education. Broadcasters felt in a dilemma: "On the one hand we had to keep in step with the sophisticated listeners; on the other hand we had to become even simpler for that new mass audience."\(^{520}\) To tackle the problem, broadcasters experimented with formats such as the very successful "Question Time", in which questions sent in by listeners were answered by broadcasters. As shown European and African broadcasters saw themselves as culture brokers, but they also realised that they had to balance the urban-rural divide among listeners, which was more of a class issue.

CABS broadcasters did not like to see themselves as propagandists. A quote from Peter Fraenkel shows the ambivalent attitude the broadcasters had towards their role:

"We thought of propaganda and of social engineering with some feelings of guilt. Our background did not equip us for the job of high-pressure salesmen of ways of life. Our attitude was somewhat confused; certainly we wanted to sell ideas, but we hoped to limit our influence to health and agriculture and such fields. Yet, since a change in agricultural technique may shake the whole traditional structure of a society, the limitations we imposed upon ourselves were not strictly logical. We were aware of this, but, on the other hand, we did not have the heart to sit down and plan coldly to tamper with the souls of men."\(^{521}\)

The issue is a complex one, especially as CABS broadcasters did not want to resort to open propaganda. The role of the station in controlling information flows and preserving the political status quo coincided with its other function in lending legitimacy to the colonial project by transforming African listeners into modern subjects. While

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519 Donald Lighfoot: The four minute Mile, CABS 1954, ZNBC Sound Archives 2317. Bannister went into history books as the first man to run the mile in under four minutes, only to have broken his world record six weeks later.
520 Fraenkel 2005, 181.
521 Fraenkel 1959, 62f.
this was an offer to colonial subjects that they would benefit from the modernisation project and part of the general role in preventing social and political unrest through information control, it also supported social change and enabled listeners to educate themselves and eventually start to demand that the promises were fulfilled.

But the programmes were nevertheless saturated with colonial ideology, from news, informational and educational programmes to cultural and entertainment slots. For example, a talk on livestock and the treatment of its diseases could be useful information for a farmer while at the same time promoting the colonial administration’s agricultural and environmental policies, as in the case of a programme series called "Cattle Talk." The announcer, Richard Buckland, talked about the dangers of "overstocking" of cattle, especially the problem of overgrazing; but the issue of overgrazing for many African farmers stemmed from the fact that they had been resettled by the colonial government to areas that could not sustain their herds. In general, agricultural programmes supported the policies of the colonial government, which aimed at a modernisation of agriculture by replacing 'traditional' subsistence with a 'modern' capitalist market economy. Much room was given to government officials to present the provisions of the colonial administration through elaborate reporting on issues like the opening of a new cement factory. Great stress was laid on the positive effects such modernising measures would bring to Northern Rhodesia, while the actual negative effects of the resettlement schemes, the exploitation of mining resources and problems of game preservation were whitewashed over. In talks programmes prominent chiefs were interviewed on the effectiveness of colonial policies and District Officers about the history of their respective districts. In one talk programme, Aaron Mwenya, an African civil servant, was interviewed by Peter Fraenkel about his secondment to Britain. He had visited the metropole "to study the English judicial procedure," attended courses at the London School of Economics (LSE) and travelled parts of Europe. Although Mwenya mainly gave a factual account of his journey, the interview was clearly intended to paint a positive picture of the relations between Britain and its colonial subjects by emphasising the possibilities of educational and social


523 Peter Fraenkel/Aaron Mwenya "My work in England", CABS 1952, ZNBC Sound Archives No. 2314.
advancement that came with an employment as civil servant for the colonial regime.\textsuperscript{524} During the 1950s, these programmes were perfected, involving extensive listener research in the process. The takeover of CABS by the FBC in 1958 did not entail a significant break in programme policy, as CABS had been forced to adhere to Federal regulations since 1953. Rather, existing trends were continued and reinforced. Talks were now also concerned with customs and traditions, and aimed at reconciling social change with indigenous 'traditions'. In a ChiShona programme, for example, participants discussed traditional Shona customs, such as the practice of lobola (the traditional bride price paid in cattle): "The purpose of this programme is to remind people that some of the old customs were good ones, and that even today they play an important part in your daily lives."\textsuperscript{525} Talks on topics such as health stopped letting only European experts drone on, without discussion nor regard for possible problems of understanding. Broadcasters had learned that such disregard for the listeners could lead to misunderstandings and subsequent rumourmongering, which could be devastating to the implementation of colonial policies.\textsuperscript{526} In 1959, the new "Consulting Room" programme presented a doctor who spoke about health issues such as Malaria, and was then questioned by a "panel of laymen": "From a sociological viewpoint, this is one of the most important feature programmes yet broadcast on the African Service."\textsuperscript{527}

**Propaganda in the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland**

As opposition against the Federation grew, the FBC saw its duty in promoting government policies and guarding the peace. Again, information control was the main aim of programming. In the years between 1958 and 1962, when civil unrest sprang up on the Copperbelt and in Nyasaland, the FBC acted as a communication channel during the emergencies: ":[...] it kept people abreast of the situation and at the same

\textsuperscript{524} Ibid. For an analysis of the situation and self-image of African civil servants under British colonial rule, cf. Eckert 2007.

\textsuperscript{525} "Notes on your Programmes", Radio Post 4:4 (1959), 27.


\textsuperscript{527} Ibid., 28.
time assured them that their way of life, their families and their property would be protected at any cost." In general, FBC programmes radiated the same modernisation ideology as its predecessor's. An overview of features in the African Service in 1959 read as follows:

"the annual Eisteddfod in Bulawayo; multi-racial sporting events; [...] visits by Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Macleod; the Central African Trade Fair at Bulawayo; [...] the Blackpool football matches; animal rescue at Kariba; the opening of the Federal Parliament; the Inyati celebrations; the Broken Hill Mine Indaba; the Federal athletic championships; a special programme on Kariba; Commonwealth Youth Sunday; the installation of Chief Samuriwo; training in hospital work [...]

This summary is fairly representative of much of the feature and talk programmes in Federal broadcasting for Africans. It was clearly designed to show African listeners elements of a modern society – modeled after the British ideal – as well as how Africans could reach that goal (however, what a Zambian listener was supposed to gain from listening to a report from the annual Eisteddfod in Bulawayo – a Welsh festival of literature, music and performance – remains a secret of FBC programme producers). Federal politics was presented as leading Africans toward this goal. More critical issues were ignored – for example, the above list sports a programme on animal rescue in Kariba, where the Zambezi valley was evacuated to build one of the biggest dams of the time, but there was no similar programme on the resettlement schemes for the project that uprooted a whole ethnic group (the Gwembe Tonga), destroyed sites central to their culture and moved them to areas they did not know how to cultivate. In all this, the FBC did not differ significantly from CABS either before or after the establishment of Federation.

The propagation of colonial policies was also integrated in entertainment programmes. Already in the beginnings of the CABS, a skilled team of actors, dramatists and musicians had been formed, with figures such as Edwin Mlongoti, Edward Kateka, and Alick Nkhata in its centre. Radio dramas in particular were used to pro-

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528 FBC Annual Report 1 February 1958 – 30 June 1959, 20. BBC Written Archive E1/1,422/2: FBC 1959-.
529 FBC Annual Report 1959-60, 18. BBC Written Archive E1/23: Africa - FBC 1954, 1960. Hugh Macmillan, the British Prime Minister, on this tour through the colonies held his famous "Wind of Change" speech (in Accra and, a month later and more widely publicised, in Cape Town), in which he acknowledged imminent decolonisation in large parts of the continent. Iain Macleod at the time had just assumed the office of Secretary of State for the Colonies. cf. Hyam, Roger. 2006. Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968, Cambridge.
531 cf. Chapter 3.
mote a code of conduct modeled after colonial policies. As mentioned, African broadcasters – in CABS mainly Kateka and Mlongoti – successfully managed to merge the form of radio drama with the storytelling traditions many Zambian cultures maintained. The station became a breeding ground for skilled actors and improvisers, male and female.\footnote{Fraenkel cites the example of a female actress in the context of his recount of the development of the serial "Shimwansa Kopolo." Fraenkel 1959, 155.} "This pool of actors quickly developed skills at understanding each other's artistic creativity which allowed them to improvise within the framework of a clearly understood formula."\footnote{Kerr, David. 1998. Dance, Media Entertainment & Popular Theatre in South East Africa, Bayreuth, 127.}

Many stories dealt with problems that the broadcasters saw as endemic in the African advancement towards modernity, such as alcoholism, adultery, prostitution or criminal activities. The stories usually had a moral. Fraenkel cites an example from the late 1940s, "Mumba and his Bicycle": Mumba brags to all his friends about his new and flashy bicycle, but when they go to the beer-hall to drink, it is stolen, and only the frame reappears. The thief is never caught. The moral of the story: "Mumba should not have been so proud of his bicycle." The story of Mumba is an example of how African broadcasters, in an early stage of broadcasting in Zambia, used the medium to tell stories that dealt with the challenges of modernisation and social change: "\[T\]he old moral code asserts itself [...]\footnote{Fraenkel 1959, 37f.}

Thus, the ideological aim of the colonial broadcaster could easily be integrated with the traditional form of the stories – usually culminating in a message on social values. However, the stories can also be interpreted as dealing with the challenges of modernisation in Zambia. Zambian listeners usually understood the stories as a guide through the pitfalls of social change. A family serial in Bemba for the listeners on the Copperbelt was "designed to let our audience identify itself with the hero who suffers the common experiences of town life and solves his problems in an intelligent, modern way." In this soap opera, a multifaceted cast of figures appears: Shimwansa Kopolo, the hero and eponym of the serial, works as a foreman in a mining company's foodstore near Kitwe. He represents the 'modern African', working in capitalist conditions of wage labour: "He's got to have troubles, like how to get on with an uneducated wife, and whether to send his little daughter to school or back to the village, and what to do about the unsuitable suitors that hang around his other daughter." His wife
Namwansa is "a totally illiterate woman, but well-versed in proverbs and folk-lore." As a member of a royal Bemba clan, she can "take more liberties" vis-à-vis her husband "than an average woman would"; as such, the main representatives of African 'modernity' and 'tradition' act out the resulting conflicts on equal levels. Completing the family are a son and two daughters, one of which has a boyfriend called "Smart Jim", who dresses in the newest 'cowboy' fashion, is involved in shady business and is not at all to the liking of Kopolo. Later, a Ngoni neighbour was introduced to add some good-natured 'ethnic' banter to the plot, and an uncle from the village increased the juxtaposition between village and town from which the series drew most of its dynamics.

Other serials worked with similar motives, usually culminating in a moral about modern life in the colony. Many stories included topics of 'modern' everyday life such as hygiene, usually with a simple message ("people [...] should use warm water and not hot water for washing woollen things.") But many added commentaries on changing social relations. In a story that revolves around the dangers of flies on your food (passing on diarrhoea and other diseases), the son, who has been taught in school that he was not to eat food on which the flies had settled, goes home. His father believes him only after he himself has come down with diarrhoea. The story not only implied a message on hygiene, but also a reversal of the traditional roles of father and son, the former admitting that he learned an important lesson from his son: "The idea that the old should learn from the young seemed to be accepted by the listeners and represented a revolutionary change in attitude." As listeners looked to the radio "to provide explanations, give advice and act as an arbiter of social morality", it was a perfect medium to communicate the modernisation ideology that was such a crucial part of late British colonialism. However, the ideological message was seldom straightforward, and in most of the stories, aspects of entertainment, colonial ideology, messages about social change and 'traditional' African values were interwoven in a complex ideological mesh. Fraenkel often didn't even get the point of the stories. The producer of "Mumba and his Bicycle", for example, "laughed at my ignorance. [...] I had known that these plays always have a simple moral, but to me only two possible ones had emerged; 'Don't drink' or 'Crime does not pay.' The one that

535 Ibid., 154.
537 Ibid., 250.

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Resistance against Federal Propaganda

In analysing this ideological mixture one has to remember, however, that there was not an intentionally devised ideology that all broadcasters at CABS subscribed to – contrary to rumours, there was of course no Capricornist conspiracy. Therefore, while broadcasting at CABS surely was not free from government interference, and while there had to be certain (more or less unspoken) ideological guidelines, broadcasters did not necessarily subscribe to them – and they managed to include very different messages in programmes, especially in radio plays. A famous example is Andreya Sylvester Masiye's 2-hour-long English language radio play, "Journey to the Lands of Kazembe". Masiye, the war veteran among the CABS broadcasters, regularly produced a popular Nyanja programme called Kabvulumvulu (The Whirlwind) in which he presented oral traditions and discussed issues of the day, held together by a background story about "a simulated public gathering' where people told stories and discussed their traditions." To be able to write English language radio plays, he had gone "through a rigorous, self-training exercise of listening to BBC tapes and reading scripts." However, Masiye's efforts were not welcomed in the increasingly hostile atmosphere of Federal broadcasting. Before Donald Lightfoot, true to his liberal leanings, directed and produced it as "Kazembe and the Portuguese" in 1957, Masiye had encountered severe opposition from white broadcasters, even to the extent of being threatened with losing any chance of promotion: "The whole notion of an African writing a play in English about colonialism seemed threatening to some colonialists, particularly the idea of black and white actors performing together on the radio." After Independence, the play was performed on stage; but although there were deliberations to rename it "The Invaders of Zambia", the publisher settled for the less obvious title "Journey to the Lands of Kazembe".

The play is brilliant in that it avoids direct criticism of colonialism while at the same time subtly shifting the perspective from the white protagonist to African agents and drawing parallels between the fate of the expedition it follows and that of contemporary colonialism. Masiye stuck closely to his – colonial – source, the Portuguese travel-
ler Francisco de Lacerda e Almeida's diary of his journey into Central Africa and his party's meeting with the king of Kazembe (a Luba-Lunda kingdom in Eastern Zambia) in 1798-99. However, the author fills the play with a cast of multifaceted characters, which are by no means one-dimensional: "If the modern reader is expecting a play which shows the triumph of indigenous culture over the cruel colonial invaders she/he will be disappointed." Several interest groups are represented in the play, and they are not just divided along the lines of European/colonialist vs. African/indigenous. Francisco de Lacerda often comes into conflict with either the Portuguese settlers in Tete (Mozambique), where the party starts, and the priest of the expedition, Father Pinto. The settlers refuse to provide slaves to the expedition, because they think it will be unsuccessful. The ensuing conflict is not only about the question of slavery; more importantly, it is a conflict about power relations in the colony. For a Zambian listener in 1957, when Federation flourished, it would be hard not to understand the following dialogue as a commentary on the political situation of the time:

"Fr. Pinto: Good Evening, my name is Pinto. I am Chaplain of the expedition and I have come to collect 40 carriers for the governor.

Pereira (a settler): Carriers? What are you talking about, man?
- Didn't you get the order?
- My dear Reverend Father, I receive no orders from anyone. Here on my farm, I give the orders.
- Hey, look here, haven't you any respect for government officials? Dr. Lacerda is the governor of Sena.
- (laughs) Alright, he governs Rio de Sena(?), but I'm governor here. You can't frighten me. If your governor wants to get lost in the bush, let him. I shan't help him."

This confrontation may just have been personalised enough (the discussants being two of the main characters and providing the central dynamic of this part of the play) that the implications of such a dialogue could slip through Federal censorship. On the other hand, the play also emphasises African agency, in that it mentions the Kazembe's own interest in dealing with the Europeans to strengthen his own position in the Central African political landscape. He sells ivory and slaves and buys guns to be able to defend himself from the "Malawi", who often attack his caravans but are only equipped with bows and arrows.

In the end, the expedition fails and Lacerda dies. The Governor General gives a gloomy outlook on the fate of colonialism: "Ah poor Lacerda! Still, no doubt there will be others who will follow in the years to come. I wonder what the future holds?"

542 Ibid., 122.
543 Masiye, Andrea S./Donald Lightfoot: Journey to the Lands of Kazembe, undated recording, ZNBC Sound Archives, Kat. No. 734.
544 Ibid.
This conclusion can at the same time be understood as a comment on what for the listeners was the past – what followed was the era of colonialism, from an African point of view one of oppression and injustice – and an invitation for the listeners to ask themselves what the future of colonialism will be. In 1957, the year of Ghana’s independence and a rising nationalist tide in Zambia, the answer for many African listeners could well point to colonialism’s ultimate downfall. This answer also “emerges from the epic structure of the play; Masiye’s portrayal of the Portuguese expedition slowly getting bogged down in the intractable African wilderness provides a metaphor for the power of Africa in its physical/natural rather than human forms.”

Thus, Masiye’s masterful radio play was able to slip criticisms of colonialism and Federation under the radar of censorship in FBC/CABS; but only for a short time. In a raid of CABS in 1958, the Federal Police confiscated and destroyed the scripts of all Masiye’s plays. As mentioned earlier, Masiye soon took his support of African nationalism a big step further, when he left the country at Kaunda’s personal request in 1962 to organise the “Voice of UNIP” broadcasts from Dar-es-Salaam.

Listeners and nationalist broadcasters used music as a similar transmitter for ideological messages, and, like the radio plays, presented an ambiguous mixture of commentaries on social change, entertainment, and African conservative and nationalist as well as colonial elements. Kittermaster “had the good sense to let an African expert singer, guitarist and composer, Alick Nkhata, handle most of the musical auditions and recordings.” Turino sees the connection between Kittermaster, once a producer responsible for indigenous music in the SABC, and Nkhata, who had worked with another SABC expert, the ethnomusicologist Hugh Tracey, as one of shared “cosmopolitan ideas about indigenous arts.” The cosmopolitan environment at CABS brought with it a variety of assumptions about the characteristics of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ African music. For example, CABS broadcasters were convinced of the “poverty” of Zimbabwean music. The connections between Nkhata and Tracey as well as the CABS team “provide an important glimpse of how early ethnomusicological ideas, such as the need for preserving ‘the Traditional’, might have been popularly diffused and influential beyond scholarly circles.”

Broadcasters looked for a

545 Kerr 1998, 123
546 Turino 2000, 99
547 ibid.
548 Fraenkel 1959, 57
549 Turino 2000, 101. Charles Muyamwa, who worked for ZBS in the late 60s and early 70s, today still adheres to this idea of needing to preserve Zambian traditional musical forms. A musician
specific set of characteristics to identify 'indigenous' music; however, more often than not, it was defined by the absence of 'modern' characteristics, such as European rhythms or instruments. Consequently, an Annual Report of the station stated that "indigenous music" was even in the rural areas "becoming adulterated by rhythm and melodies adapted from European tunes." Such an idea of "adulteration", however, was only possible if there was a concept of "unadulterated" music that was fixed in time and space; long histories of musical change and exchange of forms and instruments were ignored. Cultural change was seen as problematic, and the report worried that it seems "almost inevitable that the indigenous music is gradually dying out." Nevertheless, the broadcasters could not resist fast-changing listener tastes and subsequent demands for contemporary music in programmes – "hilly-billy" and "tsaba-tsaba" music were played more and more in the course of the decade.550

The idea that indigenous music was dying out led CABS to undertake a grand archiving project. Through this, it played a major part in defining 'traditional' music, fixing it in space and time. At the same time, listener's tastes demanded the production of contemporary popular music.551 From the very beginnings of the station, recording vans were regularly sent all around the territories to record dances, rituals and songs. A considerable effort was undertaken for these recording tours. From modest beginnings, the mobile recording unit was enlarged in only a few years' time: while in 1948 the station complained about old and bad equipment and had to rely on "Bantu music" obtained from the SABC, in 1949 new recording equipment was purchased and the quality of recordings grew. Specially equipped vans toured the territories, returning up to 3000 recordings per year. In 1951, the Information Department could boast of 6000 self-produced recordings of African music in the library, "many of them of

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550 all quotes from Northern Rhodesia Information Department: Annual Report for the Year 1950, NAZ 15/87, 6.
551 Letters to the Editor in the Radio Post continually demanded "better" contemporary music (such as Jazz) to be played on Saturday evenings. The editors defended the choice of what writers called "poor Jazz" and "village music" by demands from rural listeners; however, FBC policy seems to have been as much a reason for the continued dominance of the latter in all programmes. cf. "Your Letters Answered", in: Radio Post, 5:2 (1960), 7 and Radio Post 5:3 (1960), 7. NAZ Newspaper Collection.
great historical value." Technical advance enabled the station to use less staff with better equipment for a higher recording quality, and some of the songs were published in cooperation with South African commercial record labels.

The CABS vans were widely popular. Many chiefs and villages saw the possibilities of recording their songs and dances for broadcasting in the territories. Listeners wrote to the station to complain that their town or village had not yet been visited by the vans. Many recordings were done by Alick Nkhata himself, who grew more and more popular with the listeners as a broadcaster and musician, and in CABS as an expert on indigenous music. He arranged studio recordings of church and school choirs; musicians from the rural areas came to see Nkhata in Lusaka as well as young men from the towns in search of a breakthrough with modern Guitar Music. Nkhata also used the gathered material to draw on for his own songs. Because of these duties, Nkhata not only played a crucial role in the preservation of 'indigenous' music, but also in the development of modern Zambian music, especially the style called 'Guitar Music'. Although the guitar as a European instrument had been introduced to the region by Portuguese sailors as early as the 16th Century, and had been used in what David Coplan calls "neo-traditional" music played in South African mining compounds around the turn of the 20th, the different styles brought together under the label of 'Guitar Music' in Zambia were developed around the end of the Second World War in the urbanised copper mining areas of Katanga, in the south of what was then the Belgian Congo and the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt. Following Coplan's terminology, Zambian Guitar Music can be defined as syncretic or modern rather than neo-traditional, as it blends "performance materials and practices from two or more cultural traditions, producing qualitatively new forms."

Nkhata rose to stardom in the 1950s. He played solo or with his quartet, later with the 'Lusaka Radio Band'. His songs often tackled problems of social change and its consequences for Africans: "He sang of town 'wives' who painted their lips, of the

552 Northern Rhodesia Information Department: Annual Report for the Year 1951, NAZ 15/87, 7.
554 cf. Fraenkel 1959, 56.
556 cf. the liners to the CD "Origins of Guitar Music in Southern Congo and Northern Zambia", Utrecht: SWP Records 2001. Katangese Guitar Music differs much from that played in the Copperbelt, a fact that Hugh Tracey accounts for by indicating the hugely different colonial history of the regions. cf. Ibid. Andrea Masiye explains that guitars were introduced "in large numbers" to Zambia by returning World War II veterans. Masiye 1977, 11.
557 Coplan 2008, xii.
awkwardness of wives from the rural areas, of the loneliness of men away from home, of the fear of dying away from relatives, of the joys of town life, of drinking, of 'jiving', of sex."\textsuperscript{558} One of his songs warned about the dangers of flashy young men from the town who bragged about their wealth:

"Some young men of today have no sense.
When they see a girl with painted lips
They lose their heads.
Then they speak in English:
\textit{Yesh, good},
\textit{alas my beauty},
come live with me in the yards.
\textit{You're gonna get bread an' butter}
I have everything.
\textit{New look in plenty}.
You'll have so many dresses
You'll be changing clothes all day.
And every morning you'll be taking
\textit{Morning coffee, toshta an' butter}
If you live with me."\textsuperscript{559}

According to Fraenkel, listeners clearly understood the message: "'It is a very educative song,' said one of our listeners, 'it teaches us to look after our wives properly and to beware of domestic servants. They are morally weak.'"\textsuperscript{560}

However, songs in Zambian languages were difficult to decode for Federal informants monitoring the service. As mentioned, most informants were missionaries or colonial administrators who didn't speak local languages sufficiently enough to understand the subtle nuances used by newscasters. Even more difficult to decode for an outsider were the metaphorics used in popular songs that, on the surface, dealt with all kinds of topics except politics. Masiye, in his book "Singing for Freedom", cites an abundance of songs that could be understood as political commentary by African listeners. A few examples shall be noted here.

"For instance, there was a sweet religious melody by a group of Watchtower adherents. It spoke about the wickedness of man who had exalted himself to a high position in this mundane world. Man was trampling on the rights of others, bringing untold misery and suffering. There was no peace. God Almighty would one day descend on them and punish such people. He would take away their brief authority. The exalted would be vanquished forever. And those who were suffering under the usurpers would live on to celebrate their victory.

This tune was for a long time at the top of the weekly request programme hit parade. Christians, Mus-

\textsuperscript{558} Powdermaker 1962, 233f.
\textsuperscript{559} cit. after Fraenkel 1959, 51f. The italics (in the original) signify words that are English in the original song. The phrase "girl with painted lips" refers to the expression "Kapenta" for "good-time girls" in the towns. cf. Powdermaker 1962, 239.
\textsuperscript{560} Ibid., 52.
lims and heathens alike asked for it. The reason was obvious to both African broadcasters and listeners, but not to our European colleagues and supervisors. To the Africans, the hymn was not referring to an imaginary people in a fictitious situation. It was pointing to the Africans of Central Africa, particularly those of Northern Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{561}

The Watchtower Movement or "Kitawala" was an African millenarian movement that, although rooted in religious ideas purported by Jehovah's Witnesses, had soon taken an independent path. For decades it had been a catalyst for African political discontent and a source of disquiet for the colonial administration. As such, Kitawala theology from its beginnings after the end of World War I had been understood as a "religious means of political expression." For Africans, a lot of its attractiveness came from its millenarian idea that "the last [i.e. the oppressed Africans, RH] would be first."\textsuperscript{562} Although Kitawala preachers presumably had been implicated in the stimulation of the Copperbelt riots in 1935, and although in reaction the colonial government had severely restricted the movement of preachers and banned Watchtower literature in Northern Rhodesia until after the war, Kitawala never presented an actual political threat. Its adherents projected their hopes for political freedom in a spiritual future after the Apocalypse. For this reason, colonial administrators watched the movement with suspicion, but did not see it as playing a major role in the politicization of Africans. However, songs such as the cited could subvert FBC policies of censorship, as they could easily be interpreted by those listeners they were addressed to but avoid direct political statements. Only after African broadcasters started to accompany the songs with more explicit statements, "the British officials awoke to what was happening" and "ruled that the song be banned from broadcasting."\textsuperscript{563}

Such songs could easily find their way into the programme through "Zimene Mwatifunsa" (Nyanja: "Yours for the Asking"\textsuperscript{564}) or other request programmes. Those were hugely popular, as they not only gave the opportunity for listeners to hear the music they requested, but also provided a useful medium for the exchange of news and messages over longer distances: births and deaths, engagements and marriages, the new address of a man changing his place of work, etc.\textsuperscript{565} As shown, European infor-

\textsuperscript{561} Masiye 1977, 24f.
\textsuperscript{562} Rotberg 1966, 139 [comment in the original]
\textsuperscript{563} Masiye 1977, 25
\textsuperscript{565} Powdermaker, 224. The NR Information Department reported in 1954 that the programme was so
mation officers were distrustful of modern African music and looked down on it. However, the enormous popularity of request programmes made a cancellation practically impossible. Even FBC, taking over in 1958, only reduced the air time of these programmes, but did not cancel them completely.

At the beginning of the 1960s, another political song followed the banned Kitawala tune on the top of the hit parade. It was more outspoken but still managed to slip through censorship for a while. Masiye cites parts of the song:

"Lidzafika liti dzuwa lopulumuka
Kwa anthu amu Africa wosauka
Africa, mazunzo ndi ambiri
Komabe tidzawagonjetsa"

"When will Freedom day come
For the poor African people
Africa, persecution is too much
But we shall overcome"

"Koma kale-kale mu Africa
Timali kugulitsidwa ukapolo
Africa, mazunzo ndi ambiri
Komabe tidzawagonjetsa"

"Long ago in Africa
We were sold as slaves
Africa, persecution is too much
But we shall overcome"

The text seemed to be about either religious deliverance or freedom from slavery, but the refrain in the present tense alluded to ongoing struggles about political freedom. Given the repressive nature of FBC broadcasting, it is astonishing that such a song could be played day and night. This was partly due to broadcasters' cunning.

"Broadcasters were very aware that once British officials knew about the subversive nature of the song they would ban it. To assure listeners that so far there was no danger, another song came in handy. It was a release by a white group calling themselves The Tokens. Their innocuous sounding number was called 'The Lion Sleeps Tonight'. It was an assurance from one listener to others, or from the announcer to his listeners, that the British were not aware of what was happening."

In the end, the song was banned after an African announcer, who Masiye claims
was an informant planted in the station by the Federal government, divulged its implications to the officials.

The cited examples show the ambiguity of FBC programmes. While there was significant tension between the governments' desire to propagate colonial and Federal policies and the subversion tactics employed by nationalist broadcasters, a diffuse set of Modernisation ideas or ideological fragments that were shared by all actors involved dominated the programme. Overall, however, the ideological message of FBC programmes was clear: the Central African territories were undergoing significant social change, but with the help of colonial and Federal governments, a transition into a bright, modern future would be possible. No timeline was given, while colonial as well as settler politicians debated heatedly about what the timeline should be to release Africans into an independent future. Nobody debated about how that future should appear – a developed, industrialised, urbanized capitalist democracy after the model of the metropole. Programmes reflected that ideology, an ideology that was even shared by nationalist African politicians, as can be seen in the development of broadcasting programmes in the run-up to and after the independence of Zambia.

2. "Tiyende Pamodzi": Zambian Programmes after Independence

Tiyende Pamodzi ndi mtima umodzi
Tiyende Pamodzi ndi mtima umodzi
Kaunda tiye
Limba moyo
Ee, tiye
Limba moyo
Tiyende Pamodzi ndi mtima umodzi

Let's march together in one spirit
Let's march together in one spirit
Kaunda, let's go
Strengthen your heart
Let's go!
Strengthen your heart
Let's march together in one spirit

Tiyende Pamodzi (UNIP anthem), cit. in: Masiye 1977, 118.

After the demise of the Federation in 1963, the colonial government restructured the broadcasting system to fit the needs of the soon-to-be independent nation-state.
It is in this period that concepts of nation building started to be discussed in the colonial administration and nationalist parties. The colonial government tried to restructure the broadcasting system to enable it to play its role in an independent Zambia. The Northern Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation, established in January 1964, was supposed to be retained after independence, for which the date was already set. An important restructuring process thus took place: While the FBC had been subdivided into a European service (broadcasting from Salisbury) and an African service (from Lusaka), the NRBC, taking over the assets of the Lusaka station, now sported a National and a Vernacular Service. This was an important change: while the services before had divided the population of the Central African Federation into 'European' and 'African', this division was now abolished for a classification of channels into their function – (theoretically) incorporating all Zambians in the National Service while catering to the needs of regional language and culture groupings in the Vernacular Service. African announcers and journalists were now also employed in the National Service. The National Service broadcast the election programmes in January 1964 and organised discussion panels with the representatives of the three major parties (The nationalist parties UNIP and ANC as well as the settler United Federal Party, UFP). It also reported extensively from the Northern Rhodesian Constitutional Conference that took place in London; for the Independence Celebrations on the 24th of October, listening arenas were organised in Copperbelt towns where a live broadcast combined with a reenactment of the change of flags was to provide "a minute-by-minute picture of the independence celebrations." 80 000 people were expected in the town of Chingola, where a special floodlight arena was prepared for the "hook-up."568 Thus, radio was supposed to play a crucial role in the symbolic construction of the Zambian nation, connecting the different regions by live transmission from Lusaka. Through radio, even the remotest Zambian village was part of the Independence celebration, and, where possible, the live broadcast was enhanced by a reenactment of the most important symbolic acts. But programmes were not confined to mere descriptions of the celebrations.

The recording of the live broadcast from the celebration shows how national symbolism was not just evoked in audiovisual media such as these stagings and reenactments, but also in a purely aural medium. The live report applied sound and recording techniques to emphasize decisive moments and imbue them with meaning a symbol-

ism of its own. The importance of this aural symbolism should not be dismissed lightly; most Zambians experienced the celebrations through radio.

Creating the Virtual Nation

The celebrations began on the evening of the 23rd October, the climax being the exchange of the British for the Zambian flag on midnight, October 24th. The live broadcast from the Independence Stadium started at 10.45 p.m., slowly building up to the decisive moment. The recording only covers the last minutes before the change of flags, but nevertheless, it provides a good example of how radio established a national symbolism. In it, a speaker first sets the scene by referring to the passing of time ("the clock ticks away") and the protagonists, the governor Sir Evelyn Hone and the President designate Kenneth Kaunda ("These two men, who have done so much, and given so much, to the creation of the new nation which is about to be born").

Background noises can be heard, but are stifled. When the two arrive at the center of the stadium, clapping sounds are faded in, then cheering, so that the presenter has to raise his voice. Then the British national anthem is played. While the presenter remarks that "for the last time, the British National Anthem has been played as the anthem of Northern Rhodesia", the cheers grow louder. Another scene-setting follows, with the presenter describing the change of flags; the moment the Zambian flag reaches the top of the flagpole, the cheers, deliberately emphasized by the technician fading them in, grow so loud as to nearly overwhelm the speaker, who closes: "the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia (...) is NO more." At this moment the speakers change. While the first, speaking clear British English, is not identifiable, the second, speaking with an accent, very probably is Andreya Sylvester Masiye. He had returned from Dar after the dissolution of the Federation to join the NRBC. His past as broadcaster in the FBC made him recognizable and popular enough, but as the voice of Radio UNIP he also had strong nationalist credentials. A change of speakers from European to African (and one recognizable as a committed nationalist at that) in the exact moment the Zambian flag reached the top and the "new nation" was "born" clearly was deliberately staged to symbolize the take over of national and state institutions by Africans. Masiye then announced the national anthem of Zambia ("Stand and Sing of Zambia, Proud and Free"). The anthem is set to the melody of Nkosi Sikelel'i Afrika, a hymn composed and written by Enoch Sontonga in 1897, and the offi
cial anthem of the African National Congress in South Africa. 569

Three elements of an aural symbolism are at play in this recording. First, through fading in and out of specific background noises (drumming, clapping, or cheers from the crowd), decisive moments are underscored – the noise is loudest when the Zambian flag reaches the top. Secondly, the change of speakers symbolizes the handing over of responsibilities from colonial (British) officers to Zambians. And thirdly, the music itself is highly symbolic, not only as national anthems. The melody of the Zambian national anthem is laden with meaning. Composed at the start of the Twentieth Century by a South African who drew on traditions of Methodist hymns as well as African praise singing, and played at the first meeting of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC, which later became the ANC), it is a song that is deeply connected to the nationalist struggle in Southern Africa (it forms the basis for the national anthems in Tanzania and Zambia, the first verse of the South African anthem, and used to be the anthem of Zimbabwe and Namibia). 570 Thus, it symbolizes not just the history of Zambian nationalism, but also its commitment to nationalist struggles all over the region. Thus, the NRBC in its last broadcast before it became the ZBC established a national symbolic soundscape for its listeners.

The ZBS went on to develop more such ideas and symbols, but employed them differently. In ZBS programmes, the Zambian nation was connected to the UNIP government, even symbolically. As shown, the newly established Zambia Broadcasting Services concentrated on communicating UNIP’s policies in general and Kaunda’s speeches in particular. UNIP increasingly came to see itself as the embodiment as well as the guarantor of national unity. The news, for example, was shaped around a simple principle: reporting the actions first of the President Kaunda, then the Vice President, the ministers and so on was prioritised. 571 Thus, the ZBS were, above all, an instrument of propagating government policies, but it was this function that for UNIP leaders was congruent with its mission of fostering national unity. As Debra Spi-

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571 “Usually, the structure of the news was: first the head of state, […] what Kaunda did, what the Vice President did, what the ministers did. It was propaganda for the government.” Interview Emelda Yumbe, 27.12.2007. cf. Interview Kenneth Chibesakunda, 28.12.2007, Interview Frank Mutubila, 09.01.2008.
tulnik has shown, the constant repetition of the national motto "One Zambia, One Nation" at the beginning of the newscasts formed a powerful invocation of national unity, but it was connected to two assumptions. First, as the motto was never uttered in a Zambian language, but always in English, it transported the additional unspoken message that English was the national language. Second, as listeners knew very well, the motto, when shouted at UNIP rallies, acquired an additional quality: in a call-and-response pattern, the invocation went "One Zambia – One Nation – One Nation – One Leader – That Leader – Kaunda Uwayaya" (or Wamuyaya). While invoking the unity of Zambia as a nation, the motto connected it to Kaunda as the guarantor of national unity. The invocation of this motto at the start of the news was taken very seriously. Eddie Mupeso, an announcer in the Tonga Service, recalls that leaving it out could lead to one's dismissal.

Nevertheless, programmes were not reduced to this rather open form of government propaganda. In educational, cultural and entertainment programmes, the Zambian nation was constructed in more complex ways. Programming was organised so that Lozi, Tonga or Bemba cultural programmes were interwoven with formats like "Zambian Jazz" or "Zambian Musicians" that featured a nationally produced music, drawing on characteristics of several musical traditions (Jazz, Guitar Music, and urban Zambian music). This coincided with listeners' tastes, as an audience survey established in 1971: nearly half of all interviewees wanted more Zambian music on the radio. In 1973, the government introduced a 90% quota for Zambian music in ZBS. Listener's request programmes, either in English or in all languages, which read out listener's letters from all regions, also helped in creating a national space. It also reintroduced "Zimene Mwatifunsa", the most popular of these programmes and for decades the second most popular programme in the service. The FBC had abandoned the programme for another, Lucky Dip, which was broadcast in each language separately. ZBS returned to the original format that spanned the whole nation, broadcast through the General Service on Wednesday evenings and also took the old name to draw on the programme's popularity. There was an effort to revive a programme called "Inter-Town Quiz" (as well as an "Inter-School Quiz") that connected

575 Interview Eddie Mupeso, 08.01.2008.
several towns of the country in a competition to answer questions about the nation.\textsuperscript{577}

\textbf{Who Belongs to the Nation? Conflicts around Language Division}

In a second process of restructuring, the two channels were again changed. The National Service, now renamed in General Service, broadcast not only in English, but also in Bemba and Nyanja, the two major Zambian languages spoken in the urban areas along the line of rail. The Home Service was continued as a channel for all vernacular languages. However, the creation of a national space that was envisaged with this change in structure and the programmes that were developed accordingly did not work out easily. Above all, the division of the different language channels remained a huge problem. The labels "Vernacular" and "Home" for this service carried with them "connotations of being specific, local, and even narrow." For Zambian audiences, the label "Home Service" also "signalled that the 'vernacular' broadcasts were for rural and ethnic-based audiences, and tapped into their essential identities."\textsuperscript{578} Through broadcasting in English and (to a lesser extent) ChiBemba and ChiNyanja, the "General Service" on the other hand was associated with the urban population – all three languages were colloquially used by the urban population. The problem remained, however, that listeners connected the two languages to certain ethnicities, and complained that preferential treatment of these was tantamount to undermining national unity.\textsuperscript{579} This problem of how to organise the two channels remained with the station until, after another restructuring process in 1990, more radio channels were introduced.

But the division between the two channels went beyond the symbolic of labeling. As, for example, the news was produced centrally, they reached the Home Service only after having gone through a translation process. Thus, news in the vernacular languages was stale, having been broadcast on the General Service a few hours before. Listeners as well as broadcasters got the impression that the Home Service was

\textsuperscript{577} Zambia Mail, TV and Radio Supplement, 16.09.1966, NAZ Newspaper Collection. Ironically, the original programme had been featured in the FBC as an attempt to connect listeners from Lusaka and Zomba to Salisbury, Bulawayo and other Southern Rhodesian cities. The FBC with this programme had tried to "make the Federal Service really 'Federal'." Annual Report of Controller: European Broadcasting for the year ending 31st December 1954, 4. BBC WAC, E1/1,422/1: FBC 1955-58. cf. also Radio Post 4.9 (1959).


\textsuperscript{579} Ibid., 344.
inferior to the General Service. The so-called Siyomunji Report in 1968 recommend-
ed that

"[N]ews broadcasts on the Home Service should be as up to date as those on the General Ser-
vice, if Government is to discontinue giving the impression that those who do not understand English
do not deserve to be as well informed as those who do."\textsuperscript{580}

The ZBS was caught in a dilemma that would accompany it for the whole 25 years of its existence: giving priority to the nationwide General Service met with sharp pro-
tests from listeners who felt discriminated against. Shifting the weight more to the
Home Service meant turning away from the policy of nation-building. In the words of
the Siyomunji Report: "Local pride should be enhanced positively to promote econo-
mic development, but it should not be allowed to grow to an extent where it could
have negative results, such as promoting parochialism."\textsuperscript{581} The solution the report
proposed was to distribute experienced broadcasters equally among all language
sections and to send recording teams to all regions to record traditional music and
interviews and then broadcast them in the General Service. An audience survey in
1971 confirmed this diagnosis: the preference for programmes and assessments
from the Service did not vary along regional lines, but rather social groups, and pre-
dominantly depended on the education of interviewees. For example, younger and
better educated listeners favoured foreign music on the radio, while the majority de-
manded more Zambian music.\textsuperscript{582} However, there were simply not enough resources
to return to the extensive recording project of the CABS.

While the problems were known and often discussed in management meetings,\textsuperscript{583}
little was done to solve them. The major reason was that the infrastructure continued
to be found wanting. Listeners in rural areas, especially to the south, often tuned in to
foreign stations as ZBS reception was bad. At times, the station only had one
recording van, not even enough to be able to cover all news events of the day.\textsuperscript{584} But
even without these difficulties, the UNIP government still preferred programmes that
propagated its policies over those that would have been better suited to incorporate
different social, religious or language groups. The "Nation and Humanism" discussion
programme, for example, where representatives of religious and political institutions

\textsuperscript{580} Report of the Inquiry into the Information and Broadcasting Services 1968 (Repr. 1981), NAZ
20/170: ZBC, S. 36.
\textsuperscript{581} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{582} Institute of African Studies (Univ. of Zambia): Mass Media Audience Survey, 1971. NAZ 20/170.
\textsuperscript{583} cf. Graham Mytton Papers, GB 101 Institute of Commonwealth Studies, ICS 115/3/1.
\textsuperscript{584} Interview Cosmo Mlongoti, 10.10.2006.
were supposed to discuss topics of national interest, was perceived as dull, as participants did not really discuss, but basically agreed to and elaborated on government policies.\textsuperscript{585} A considerable amount of recording time was blocked for another such programme, "Tiyende Pamodzi" (after a popular nationalist song performed frequently by the Lusaka Radio Band and connected to UNIP), which lead to bitter conflicts among Programme Department staff.\textsuperscript{586} The news in vernaculars were reportedly viewed by listeners as talking down to them. Two years after the Siyomunji report, listeners continued to complain about "stale" news in the Home Service.\textsuperscript{587}

Ernest Gellner remarks in his "Nations and Nationalism" that

"the media do not transmit an idea that has been fed into them. It matters precious little what has been fed into them: it is the media themselves, the pervasiveness and importance of abstract, centralized, standardized, one to many communication, which itself automatically engenders the core idea of nationalism, quite irrespective of what in particular is being put into the specific messages transmitted."\textsuperscript{588}

A similar, albeit less radical, view of media, especially print media, can be found in Andersons "Imagined Communities". In much of the literature about media and nationalism, this thesis is still taken for granted, with more or less reservations. But this virtual construction of a nation is not just a process that plays itself out quasi-automatically through the characteristics of the medium – and neither is it just a construction on the reception side. The process of nation-building through Zambian radio was not without contradictions. People received programmes in different ways – they could simultaneously recognise a programme as national and ask how their cultural identity was encompassed in this national programme. Producers knew about the pitfalls of broadcasting structures and programming and tried to devise formats that consciously constructed the nation. It is in this interplay of many different factors, one could say, of different levels of agency, that the "building a nation" takes place. But it remains a precarious process.

In addition, seen against the background of UNIPs identification of the party with the nation, these efforts were made within tightly drawn limits. As national interest equalled UNIPs interest, the priority of uniting the nation could be used as an argu-

\textsuperscript{585} Minutes of Management Committee Meeting, 30.06.1971. ICS 115/3/1.
\textsuperscript{586} Minutes of Programme Organisers' Meeting, 03.05.1972 and 09.05.1972. ICS 115/3/1.
\textsuperscript{587} Interview Cosmo Mlongoti, 10.10.2006.
ment for the control and censorship of the daily programme. Elaborate programmes to build the nation, in the way producers imagined, could not be realized in the context of the development of political culture towards the One-Party State. In addition, the infrastructural and financial means to enforce them were lacking. The introduction of the One-Party State in Zambia in the 1970s was as much a reaction of the UNIP government to the growing regional conflicts inside the party and in the political realm as it was a consequence of UNIP’s increased identification of the nationalist party with the Zambian nation.

Nationalism and conscious nation-building was the biggest difference that separated post-Independence broadcasting from colonial and Federal radio. But while Radio Zambia (as the radio branch of ZBS was now called) went great lengths to emphasize the break with the colonial past, modernisation ideology remained a dominant aspect of Zambian radio programmes. The idea that a development towards a modern, industrialised society was an inevitable process that should be embraced and actively promoted was nearly seamlessly adopted by postcolonial governments:

"Colonial development, in the end, produced more conflict than resolved, but the development idea had immense appeal to many Africans. Colonial and nationalist versions of development shared a belief that government planning and government investment [...] would help African economies emerge from backwardness. [...] The 1960s African state sought to take over the interventionist aspect of the colonial state, and indeed to intensify it, in the name of national interest and (for a time) to demonstrate to voters that the state was improving their lives"589

The Continuation of Modernisation Programmes

Development programmes remained an important part of Radio Zambia’s broadcasts. The idea that Zambia was "underdeveloped" and had to be "developed" was shared by the Zambian government and international Organisations and donors. In cooperation with the United Nations, Radio Zambia from 1967 on produced "Radio Farm Forum", a radio programme that explained sowing and harvesting certain crops, how to deal with cattle diseases, and other farming techniques, sometimes through little dramatised scenes. It was part of a bigger UN programme that involved discussions with local villagers, the distribution of seeds as well as Q&A booklets that repeated and elaborated on the radio programmes. The entire programme had been

developed in rural India and was now adapted to other "developing countries" by the UN.

"The main objective of the Radio Farm Forum was to give farmers an opportunity to assemble, listen to a particular problem introduced to them on radio, talk it over, decide what to do about it and make the decision known to the local extension officer and the producers of the programme in Lusaka." "

However, the Forum was mainly supposed to play a decisive role in national planning, enabling the Zambian Ministry of Agriculture to communicate its policies to the farmers.

"The original rationale of the programme was to serve as the main mode of communication of agricultural news and technical information by the technical experts based at the Ministry of Agriculture to the peasant farmers in remote rural areas. Some of the specific educational needs the programme was meant to address were: information on new farming methods, new varieties of seed, types and application of fertiliser, types and spacing of seeds, types and application of pesticides and types and treatment of some of the crop diseases as well as information on specific questions raised by the farmers. The audience for the programme was clearly defined as the rural non-white farming community involved in subsistence agriculture with potential for increased productivity."^590

National development in this programme coincided with the change from subsistence farming to "increased productivity", i.e. capitalist production with a surplus that could be sold at local markets. An extract from a Radio Farm Forum booklet on tomatoes shows this goal very clearly:

"Question 72. - What are the most important points to bear in mind when dealing with tomatoes for marketing?

Answer. - (1) Grade tomatoes according to size and ripeness.
(2) Clean the fruits to remove all dirt.
(3) Pack the fruits firmly in standard boxes measuring eighteen inches by nine inches by $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches or in clean baskets if the market is near.
(4) Do not expose tomatoes to high temperatures when sending them to the market.

Question 73. - Where can farmers sell their tomatoes?

Answer. - (1) On the line of rail tomatoes can be sold to the National Agricultural Marketing Board.
(2) In towns and bomas, they can be sold to the public from town and boma markets.
(3) In rural areas they can be sold to schools and hospitals where special arrangements can be made."^591

While the Radio Farm Forum Programme differed in significant details from the talks that had been broadcast by colonial radio, the two shared an idea of what the goal of the programme was; namely, to motivate subsistence farmers to convert their cultivation techniques to a capitalist mode of production, selling their surplus at local markets or – one of the main differences – to the Planning Board of the Ministry of Agriculture.

The continuing emphasis on development in Zambian programmes after independence shows how engrained modernisation as a concept and a (not necessarily coherent) set of ideological fragments was in an intellectual elite that had spent the bigger part of their careers in colonial institutions. Modernity and modernisation as a goal for independent Zambia was common sense, to an extent that it was rarely consciously discussed as a coherent concept.592

A similar commonality can be found in cultural programmes. Many African broadcasters continued to work at the station, and, through the Zambianisation process, rose in the ranks. This personal continuity resulted in significant similarities of programming below the level of open nationalism in news and current affairs broadcasts. Although modern African and Zambian music played a much bigger role in music programmes by that time, this was due to the fact that listeners' tastes had developed over the latest period of colonial broadcasting. A growing urban audience wanted to hear modern dance music, which it also listened to in bars and dance clubs in the cities, and it did not hold back on those wishes. As request programmes continued to be highly popular, broadcasters complied with the tastes of their audience. A younger generation of broadcasters that had grown up with American and African Jazz and other pop music produced programmes such as Matthew Phiri's highly popular "Zambian Jazz." They also introduced a different style of announcing, oriented more towards popular US-American radio DJ's.593 At the same time, recording tours became more difficult, because the equipment was much too old and used, and ZBS grappled with budgetary problems. Alick Nkhata and the Lusaka Radio Band now played nationalist songs using electric guitars and melting sounds taken from Congolese Rumba, Nigerian Highlife, and the Zambian Guitar Music of which Nkhata was such a famous proponent. But as shown in Chapter 3, Nkhata retained essentialist ideas in his

592 cf. for a wider discussion of similar continuities in Tanzania Eckert 2007.
stance towards Zambian culture – cf. his ideas about a better, more 'pure' ChiBemba that was spoken by people coming from the rural areas. In a programme called "Composers' Corner", Radio Zambia tried to encourage the use of traditional instruments by calling upon readers of Nshila magazine: "composers who make use of traditional instruments are invited to contact Isaiah Mapoma at the Broadcasting studios in Kitwe, when it may be found possible to broadcast their work."\footnote{594} In a later issue of the same magazine, a reviewer stated that Mapoma's "African Music Feature" reminded him of his childhood, when "traditional" dances were the predominant entertainment, and concluded in quite the same vein as his forerunners: "In actual fact, Isaiah Mapoma seem (sic) to be reviving the pure African music and I think the talent will be fully restored."\footnote{595} As the examples show, the idea of a "traditional", "pure", i.e. authentic, Zambian culture retained a powerful influence. While before independence, it had been formulated in essentialist terms of a static 'African' culture that had to be preserved and protected from the pitfalls of social change, it was now connected to a national cultural identity distinctly Zambian. This musical identity was brought forth by announcers such as Mapoma, who selected 'traditional' music from all over the country and explained the significance of rhythms, melodies and texts to those listeners who knew little about it. At the same time, ZBS as a whole developed a policy of highlighting certain cultural hallmarks that belonged to specific regional traditions, but were now taken to stand for the richness of 'Zambian culture' as a whole. The most famous example is the Kuomboka of Barotseland, a big ceremony held when the Zambezi overflows the fertile Barotse plain in Eastern Zambia during the rainy season. When the water rises, the Litunga (king) of Barotseland leads his people away from the Zambezi flood plain to higher ground. ZBS radio and television reported live from the event, claiming the importance of the festivity for the Zambian nation. Today the Kuomboka is well established as a Zambian (in addition to a Lozi) ceremony, symbolizing an elaborated tradition that goes back to precolonial times. Another is the Makishi dance.\footnote{596} Both events are heavily marketed as tourist events today.

Postcolonial radio in Zambia was thus characterised by two main features. First, a

\footnote{594} "What's In the Air?", Nshila, January 14, 1966, 35. NAZ Newspaper Collection.  
\footnote{595} "Listening In with Fred Chella", Nshila, March 10, 1967, 3. My emphasis.  
\footnote{596} cf. n. 16.
significant break was symbolically and actually made with colonial radio. The Zambian Broadcasting Services now claimed to be the one vital institution able to construct a Zambian nation out of the vastly different ethnic groups that had been jumbled together in the colony. The ambivalence of these efforts, in talk programmes, music and cultural programming could not and has yet to be overcome. The connection between politicians' ideas of the Zambian nation and the United National Independence Party as its embodiment, symbol, and promotor failed to produce significant programmes; instead, the news repeatedly announced what members of the government were doing or saying, irrespective of its actual newsworthiness, i.e. significance for listeners. News production was still centralized and controlled – as mentioned, nothing in the translation process had been changed. Talk programmes on "Nation and Humanism" basically elaborated on specific political problems without actually tackling the nation-building process beyond mere rhetoric.

Other programmes tried to turn the Zambian nation into a reality that could be experienced by listeners on a daily basis. Request programmes were not only used to request music, but also as a useful means of communication over long distances in a country that for the most part lacked any other means of telecommunication. The multiplicity of requests, messages and opinions expressed in listener's letters to the station presented a much more vivid picture of what the Zambian nation was about than stale news or dull speeches of politicians droning on about how UNIP would guarantee the unity of Zambia as a nation.

The second major aspect of Zambian post-colonial broadcasting was not so widely publicised, and interviews and other autobiographical sources indicate that the fact was not even consciously contemplated by ZBS management and staff. Everybody, from UNIP politicians to civil servants to broadcasters seems to have agreed on the necessities of Zambia's modernisation. It was, in the sense of Antonio Gramsci's idea of ideology, "common sense": a shared set of ideas and values that permeated the self-image of broadcasters and, in consequence, programming in the station. As James Ferguson has shown, for Zambia the 1960s was a decade of more or less unabashed confidence that, although there was still a long road of 'development', ultimately Zambia would be a trailblazer of industrialisation for the whole continent. 597

The relatively elaborated mining system and advanced urbanisation made Zambia a

laboratory for modernisation theorists who saw most of their theories confirmed. ZBS itself, as well as the history of the Saucepan Special and subsequent distribution of radio sets in the country, was a symbol of modernity, down to the actual radio sets, the possession of which lent its owner the appearance of a "modern", "progressive" person. But modernist and cosmopolitan ideas of Zambian culture continued to be present in programmes. Although ZBS tried to break with its colonial past, below the level of nationalist politics, ideas and ideologies of the late colonial state were far from being abandoned.

3. Afrikaner Culture and Nationalist mobilisation: Programming for and against Apartheid

The South African administration in 1980s Namibia was faced with a legitimacy crisis that was barely possible to ward off. Since 1966, the occupation was declared illegal by the UN, and in several resolutions throughout the 1970s, the UN Security Council reaffirmed its "legal responsibility" over Namibia. In its famous Resolution 435 of 1978, the Council had demanded free elections under UN supervision and declared "that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, [...] are null and void." The UN throughout the 1980s held on to this resolution and never accepted any of the 'transitional governments' the South African administration tried to impose on the occupied country. In 1976, the General Assembly followed the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) decision, taken in 1964, to regard SWAPO as "the 'sole and authentic' representative of the Namibian people." None of the Administration's efforts to bring forth a "peaceful solution" for "democratic transition" were accepted by either the international community or the majority of Namibians.

The continued presence of the South African Administrator General and his notorious Proclamation AG 8 were rightly seen as a continuation of South African domination and Apartheid policies. The guerrilla war in the North of the country, several

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600 UN Security Council: Resolution 435 (1978), §§ 3, 6
601 Dobell, 1998, 35
scandals involving secret killings of opposition politicians and church members and continued allegations of systematic torture, especially against the infamous "Koevoet" (Afrikaans for crowbar) forces, contributed to the legitimacy crisis of the South African occupational forces.

**Legitimising South African Occupation**

Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that the SWABC was established in 1978, the year of Resolution 435 and the described constitutional changes in Namibia. The Corporation itself made the connection between these events: ten years later, an anniversary publication noted that "[w]ith independence looming in 1978, serious attention was given to the establishment of an independent broadcasting corporation for South West Africa/Namibia." The ignorance of the publishers to the sound of a claim like that of "looming independence", ten years after the fact had indeed not occurred, shows something of the ideological output that lay at the core of SWABC media content. For the SWABC (and, as shown in chapter 3, for a significant part of its staff), independence had been looming and was still doing so, because all of the measures taken by the South African government and its Administrator General in Namibia were seen as actual steps towards a democratic, peaceful transition rather than a way to ensure Apartheid's hold over South Africa's "Fifth Province". Excluding "SWAPO terrorists" was, in their worldview, necessary to ensure this transition. Notwithstanding this, as the quote shows, timetables did not seem to spring to the mind of those who defended the TGNU model.

As shown, the SWABC structure very much resembled the SABC and its Board. Apartheid ideology was already active in the structure of the station: to each group as defined by the Odendaal Plan its own language channel. The Language Services were situated in the SWABC building in Windhoek, although the African Services received large parts of their programmes from the contribution centres as many events were recorded locally. The central department, partly taking over the function of 'National Service' for 'South West Africa', was the Afrikaans Service: "As Afrikaans, although the home language of only 8 per cent of the country's inhabitants, was understood by 88 per cent of the population, priority was given at the outset to the estab-

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602 "SWABC: The first ten years", NBC Information Services, 2
603 with the notable exception of San groups.
lishment of a full-fledged own Afrikaans Service."  

604 In the 1985 annual report, the function of the Service was described in the same vein: "This service is meant for all Afrikaans speaking people and for that reason the service continually tries to improve good relations between Black, Brown and White."  

605 The formulation of this sentence explains a lot about the ideological background of SWABC programme policy: the Service was supposed to actually improve *already good* relations "between Black, Brown and White." The daily suppression of an African majority in the country, the manifold smaller instances and bigger events of protest against it and political and social problems connected with Apartheid, and even the situation in the North, where conflict had escalated into full blown war, simply did not appear in most programmes, especially in the so-called "A/E/G" (Afrikaans/English/German) Services. Robin Tyson, programme manager in the English Service, describes SWABC programmes as a "fantasy world" in which TV news could open with images of children playing in water as the Summer holidays began.

"And the contrary to that was the black population fighting for the independence of the country. SWAPO and Sam Nujoma were portrayed as monsters. These were terrorists, these were evil people, these were people who were abducting school kids, who were blowing up buildings etc. And therefore you could use words like 'eliminated'."  

606 Actuality programmes in the A/E/G Services focused on positive developments in the territory. "Controversial affairs", one report said, "were treated in a balanced, responsible way and in national interest"  

607 — meaning the corporation had fully subscribed to the version of events the government was proclaiming. A commentary section produced commentaries for all Services (apparently, considerably more for the A/E/G than for the "Black" Services), with the explicit goal to promote "a peaceful, democratic system. Emphasis was thus continually laid on the advantages for the whole country of negotiation and reconciliation and the futility and needlessness of violence."  

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604 Ibid., 10.  
606 Interview Robin Tyson, 06.11. 2007.  
607 SWABC Annual Report 1985, 6. NBC Information Services. The SWABC in this regard mirrored its big sister company, the SABC. Between 1985 and 1989, during successive declarations of States of Emergency, all recording of unrest was banned. The short film "Don't Shoot" about Riaan Cruywagen, who is the SABC’s TV news presenter since the establishment of SABC TV in 1976 (the year of the Soweto uprising), gives a vivid impression of Apartheid TV news, and critically examines Cruywagens role in reading the news. Bosch, Lederle/Lucilla Blankenberg. 2007. Don't Shoot, Johannesburg.  
News and actuality programmes, especially those produced centrally and in the Afrikaans Service, featured items showing the improvement of infrastructure or presenting the proceedings of the TGNU or MPC in Parliament as part of a democratic process. Much of the news and actuality programme content was dubbed from the SABC, and consequently the bulk of news dealt with events in South Africa. International news for the most part, relied on material gathered from South African sources, either the South African Press Agency (SAPA) or the SABC.

Given these sources and the way they were produced, it is no surprise that news and actuality programmes exhibited a heavy slant towards the views of the South African administration. An example in point is the reporting of Andimba Toivo ya Toivo's release from Robben Island in 1984. Ya Toivo, a veteran of the struggle and co-founder of the Ovamboland People's Organisation (OPO; a predecessor to SWAPO), had been detained for 16 years following his arrest and conviction for "terrorist activities" after he had endorsed SWAPO's decision to take up arms against the South African occupation. In the news and actuality programmes, ya Toivo's release was presented as an initiative of the South African government to strengthen a "nationalist faction" in SWAPO against a "communist faction". The station predicted that Sam Nujoma's influence in SWAPO as alleged head of the "communist faction" would be strongly reduced, and a more moderate SWAPO under the guidance of ya Toivo would be acceptable to negotiate with (Ya Toivo and Nujoma had actually never met in person). In several interviews, Erich Leistner, a South African social scientist, presented this analysis prominently.609

The idea that there was a "nationalist" faction as opposed to a "communist" one is a good example of how ideologically biased the reporting of the SWABC was. As Lauren Dobell has shown, even the political programme that SWAPO had adopted in 1976, saturated as it was with "Soviet-style phraseology", did not reflect any real commitment to communism: "The Political Programme must be seen primarily as the final touch to this diplomatic manoeuvring [i.e. using newly independent Angola as military base and party headquarters, RH], and not a statement of political beliefs."610 By the mid-eighties, most observers, including the western powers and the UN, saw SWAPO as a nationalist rather than a communist movement – SWAPO preferred the

609 "Leon Kok talks to Dr. Erich Leistner about Andimba Toivo ya Toivo's position in SWAPO after his release from prison." NBC Sound Archives, K85/738..
610 Dobell 1998, 57.
term "national liberation movement" to distance itself from nationalist parties inside the country. The Apartheid government, however, stuck to its claim that South Africa was faced with a "total onslaught" of communism (in the guise of the Angolan and Mozambican socialist governments, but also SWAPO, the ANC and ZANU/PF) to legitimise its "total strategy" \(^{611}\), which included the use of paramilitary troops such as the notorious Koevoet. Toivo was presented as a veteran who had been sentenced to jail before "communists really developed an influence in SWAPO." \(^{612}\) His release came at a time when the Apartheid government tried to pressurise SWAPO into joining the so-called "internal solution" – the transition to independence under South African terms and conditions. Erich Leistner connected Toivo's release to the efforts of the government to work together with Angola in a "Joint Monitoring Commission", which was supposed to monitor the withdrawal of foreign troops from southern Angola \(^{613}\).

"Militarily one can see that the arrangement which South Africa is working out now with Angola will cut off insurgents from their bases in Angola and make it far more difficult to wage terror war in South Africa, and politically this new initiative which already started with the Multi-Party Conference creates conditions where there's a good chance that radicals who believe in the gun will be left out in the cold. There is a chance that the radicals in SWAPO could split from those who are prepared to work along constitutional lines for an internal settlement, so that you would have a division between genuine nationalists who seek the welfare of their people and those who could be called puppets of Soviet striving for domination." \(^{614}\)

Andimba Toivo ya Toivo's own statement upon his release, however, couldn't be more articulate:

"This is not my freedom yet. I have people whom I left behind, whom I am leading. And I'm not happy out of jail, leaving them behind. I have a big responsibility and I didn't want to be released. [...] I went to jail for the freedom of this country, for the freedom of my people. They're not free yet." \(^{615}\)


\(^{612}\) "Leon Kok talks to Dr. Erich Leistner about Andimba Toivo ya Toivo's position in SWAPO after his release from prison." NBC Sound Archives, K85/738.

\(^{613}\) The work of the Joint Monitoring Commission, in which SWAPO was not represented, was futile from the onset: "In fact, South Africa had no intention of shifting UNITA out of south-eastern Angola, nor did Angola intend to stop PLAN from moving through the area south of the 16th Parallel." Susan Brown. 1995. Diplomacy by other means – SWAPO's Liberation War, in: Leys, Colin/John S. Saul (Hg.) 1995. Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword, London/Athens, 19-39. The ill-fated JMC was disbanded in February 1985.

\(^{614}\) Leistner, "Leon Kok talks to Dr. Erich Leistner about Andimba Toivo ya Toivo's position in SWAPO after his release from prison." NBC Sound Archives, K85/738.

\(^{615}\) "An interview with Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, who was released from prison and transferred from Robben Island to Windhoek", Rep.: Chris Jacobie, NBC Sound Archives K86/053.
The statement, recorded just outside the prison, was not broadcast.\cite{616}

Things did not turn out as predicted by Leistner. Although Andreas Shipanga, acting for the Multi-Party Conference, tried to convince Toivo ya Toivo to join an internal settlement, the latter left Namibia for a tour of Southern African countries, where he met with Nujoma for the first time, as well as with several heads of state. He was subsequently appointed to the post of SWAPO's Secretary General. The movement was far from being divided by Toivo's arrival, and he again made his positions very clear in a press conference after his return from the tour.\cite{617}

The episode fits in a grand narrative that many of the SWABC's newscasts and actuality programmes adhered to. It can be described by the following core elements:

1. The South African government (and, consequently, its administration in what was always called "South West Africa/Namibia") pursues a peaceful and democratic solution to the problem of Namibia's transition to independence. This is shown by its repeated efforts for an "internal solution."

2. In contrast, SWAPO are the ones who have made the decision for violence. What the liberation movement is fighting for is not the independence of Namibia, but its own position in power.

3. Therefore, it is not a liberation movement, but a terrorist organisation. The guerrilla war, which involved sabotage and bombs, was for the SWABC, proof of the terrorist nature of SWAPO. South African atrocities weren't mentioned or they were glossed over as 'necessary' measures.

4. SWAPO is not only a terrorist organisation, but also a communist (in the sense of Soviet) party that aspires to turn Namibia into a communist state and another outpost of the Soviet Union in an already predominantly communist Africa. This was part of the theory of "total onslaught".

5. The true nationalists are those parties who have accepted an "internal solution." They are working for a democratic independent Namibia. Despite the all too obvious powerlessness of the DTA, the MPC or the TGNU, and despite the frequent failure of such political models, the SWABC continued to present these as viable political...
alternatives to the implementation of Resolution 435.

**Afrikaner Hegemony and Censorship**

While this grand narrative was adhered to in a relatively concrete way in the news and actuality items, other SWABC programmes had a more generalized hegemonic outlook, and gave priority to Afrikaner culture in 'South West Africa'. In the structure of the station, the Afrikaans Service was dominant and acted as "National Service" until 1988. An important part of this hegemonic project was the promotion of Christianity. This was reflected in repeated statements by the management staff. Antonie van der Smit, Director of Programmes and News, in an interview with the opposition newspaper *The Namibian*, insisted that "the Corporation had made an ideological choice and that was to promote a Christian, democratic order, and not Marxism or Leninism."\(^6\)\(^\text{18}\) The unofficial SWABC policy code\(^6\)\(^\text{19}\) regulated contents in the same vein, stating that the corporation would "promote the Christian faith and the Western way of life."\(^6\)\(^\text{20}\) The contradictory nature of this bias is reflected in a quote from the 1987 Annual Report: "The programme services continued to broadcast in a politically unattached, impartial and balanced manner within the limits of programme policy, which is unambiguously in favour of a Christian and democratic ideology."\(^6\)\(^\text{21}\) In 1989 a report on SWABC news and actuality programmes compiled by the NGO Namibia Peace Plan 435 (NPP 435) concluded that broadcasters were "purely passing on pre-selected information without verifying, examining or criticising what was being broadcast" and that "no alternative [was] offered by the SWABC to the current status quo."\(^6\)\(^\text{22}\)

The Religious Department of the Station, established in 1984, had "as its aim to reach those estranged from church, to help believers prepare themselves for service and to spread the Word according to accepted Biblical interpretation by means of a variety of broadcasts."\(^6\)\(^\text{23}\) Although the programmes provided by the Religious Department took up a relatively small part of broadcast time (around 3.2%), it also produced

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618 The Namibian, 05.09.1986.
619 cf. Ch. 2.
623 SWABC: The first ten years, 24. NBC Information Services.
interviews, talks and discussions that could be included in children's, youth and women's programmes. In addition, the Services produced religious programmes independently; for example, the English Service broadcast 14 religious programmes per week, ranging from short "epilogues" to Sunday services. The SWABC regularly met with churchmen, trying to convince those who were "negatively inclined towards or not involved at all with the activities of the SWABC" (predominantly churches like ELOC/ELCIN who supported the struggle against Apartheid, but also individual priests) to contribute. The collaboration of Namibian churches was extremely important for the SWABC, given the influence they could exert over the population. Religious programmes could be presented as being above petty politics, while at the same time boosting the image of the station as well as the South African administration in occupied Namibia.

Christian morality, especially in its rigid Afrikaner Calvinist version, was fundamental to SWABC programming as a whole, not only positively in religious programmes but also negatively in prohibiting content that was considered a violation of Christian values and morality. Because SWABC programming procedures were heavily controlled and pre-censorship (not to mention self-censorship) did not leave traces in the archived scripts, there are few evidences of actual censorship in the written sources. Music, however, is an exception. A special Music Department was established in 1980, which evolved into the central censoring department for all music broadcast in the SWABC channels. It regularly issued detailed lists of prohibited songs to all departments.

Sometimes, whole LPs were banned, but when just one or more songs were censored, they were actually scratched out on the surface of LPs so only the specific song could not be played. Prohibited songs included those with political content, such as Anti-Apartheid songs (like Peter Tosh's "Fight Apartheid" or Harry Belafonte's Anti-Apartheid-LP "Paradise in Gazankulu"), but also those referring to the American Civil Rights Movement (and, in a rather generalising move, much of Reggae music), or African nationalist songs. Besides these obvious choices stood a host of other ban-

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625 "Die Taak van die Musiekafdeling [is] te waak oor die gehalte van musiekuitsendings van die SWAUK." A.J. Polgieter, Head: Radio Production Services to Head: Herero/Damara/Nama & Tswana Services: Funksie van die Musiekafdeling, 01.05.1986, in: Musiekkeuring en afgekeurde Plate [Music Selection and rejected LPs, RH]. NBC Information Service, Documents House 19. Some lists, dating from 1985-89 and quoted in the following, are collected in: ibid.
626 Interviews Almoute Möller, 20.11.2007; Robin Tyson, 06.11.2007.
ned songs, some probably chosen just because they were performed by musicians who took a public stand against Apartheid, others because they spoke out against re-armament in the context of the Cold War (like Udo Lindenberg’s "Sonderzug nach Pankow"). Many songs were presumably banned because they didn’t fit the Christian morality that SWABC saw as its mission to propagate. This pertained mostly to overtly sexual titles (classic examples include "Touch Me" by Samantha Fox or Serge Gainsbourg’s "Je t’aime (Moi non plus)", as well as many songs by Madonna) but also those that mocked Christianity, contained "blasphemous" texts (Many Heavy Metal titles were put on the index) or just vaguely referred to some kind of rebellion (like "Revolution" by The Cult, with a text that is completely devoid of actual political statement). In this practice, the SWABC followed the example of its bigger sister station, the SABC. It had serious consequences for South African musicians, as the record companies looked to the SABC, their most important medium for promotion of their products, when instructing the musicians to self-censor. Johnny Clegg, one of the most famous South African musicians, whose works were often mentioned in the SWABC’s "Musiekkeuring" documents, explains the repercussions for the development of music in South Africa:

“Textually, censors forced us to develop a symbolic language which the audience would quickly understand […] but if censorship in that way stimulated linguistic development, it smothered us musically […] I remember endless discussions when we were mixing the music. If I wanted more powerful drums or guitar it was always quieted down. Music was meant to ‘heal’ [and] became more toothless.”

From "ethnic music" to "South West African local flavour"

The Music Department as a whole is a good example of hegemonial culture in SWABC programmes. Its tasks included "discover[ing] new talent" and collecting indigenous ("ethnic") music by organising studio and outside recordings in Windhoek as well as the contribution centres. It also provided and recommended convenient music for topical programmes in the African Services, such as Christmas programmes. The bulk of the recordings were made up of "ethnic music". Similar to
the CABS and FBC policies, the SWABC (as the SABC) promoted an idea of musical " Traditions" that were the "authentic" expression of the respective ethnie, and sought to fix them in space and time. Additionally, the Department produced LP recordings of local musical talent specifically for the respective Services in a SWABC studio with the help of the station's studio band. The Department organised live competitions for pop music, but these were done mostly for "White" music groups. In 1983, the "Windhoek Advertiser" announced a "Feast of Local Talent" presented by the SWABC Music Department in the Windhoek Theatre. However, only contestants for the Afrikaans, English and German Services were invited; in each language group, contestants were awarded in three categories respectively. This segregated approach to discovering musical talent however changed only a year later when the Department announced its first Music Makers Competition. This grand event, sponsored by the Namibian Swabank, was held biannually – three times between 1984 and 1989. Its task was "in line with the Music department's efforts to promote music with a local flavour in South West Africa." Through the staging of this competition, the relatively small Music Department was able to discover local talent and produce as well as promote original and genuinely "South West African" recordings that could be used in SWABC entertainment and music programmes after the show. The final concert and award ceremony were broadcast live on several Radio Services and, from 1986, also on Television.

Music in the SWABC, as this change shows, was now supposed to serve positively in the unification of a Namibian community. The Music Department's task was re-defined in 1986 "to advance a common South West music idiom", or more precisely, "to arrange music, stimulate the composition of music, promote the country's musical character and give publicity to local music." However, here as in other programmes, this was usually done under the umbrella of Afrikaner culture, despite providing a space for what was defined as 'traditional' music. The first jury of the Music Makers Competition consisted of music experts from the SABC and a former Head of


635 SWABC: The First Ten Years, 24. NBC Information Services. emphasis mine.
the Music Department in the Free State Department of Education, a South African regional body. SABC music experts were notorious in South Africa for their ill treatment of Black musicians, especially those that played music that was not ‘traditional’ enough, such as Jazz or Marabi.636

"National Unity" in South West Africa

The shift from an exclusively White event to one that, in theory, encompassed the "South West African" population as a whole, is symptomatic for a general shift in SWABC programme policy. In the course of the decade, while the South African state and its administration in Namibia came under increasing pressure from the international community as well as various liberation movements to find an inclusive political model for the future of the country, the SWABC discovered national unity and national reconciliation as concepts to promote. However, the inclusive model propagated by the institutions of the South African state was flawed from the beginning, as they were not prepared to give up South African political control.637

Zedekia Ngavirue describes the fallacies the nationalist politicians had to face. Ngavirue is an interesting case in general for Namibian history – he is a veteran as well as a historian of the Black nationalist struggle in Namibia –, but also of the specific media-centered research presented here. As a politician who tried to "influence things, but within their parameters,"638 he was asked to join the Board of the SWABC as its first Black member. While trying to use the media to campaign for the nationalist cause and the NNF inside the country, he complained about SWABC Radio’s news policy of to the then Administrator General. He describes the specific ambivalence the Apartheid governments showed vis à vis nationalist politicians and community activists in the run-up to the internal elections:

"[T]hey were then pushing for internal elections. And I was saying to them that look, here we are members of the NNF, whose president then was Justus Garoeb, who was educated in the Afrikaans tradition, spoke Afrikaans almost like an Afrikaner. […] So I said to the Administrator General Gerrit Viljoen that: here you say now, you want to have an internal government, you want to have fair and democratic elections. But since my return from exile, I've been interviewed only by Radio Herero. And that applied to everybody.

636 cf. the statements of South African musicians on their experiences with the SABC in Ansell 2005.
638 cf. Ch. 2.
RH: They were only interviewed by the respective ethnic channel?

ZN: Yes. And here you have the President of the Namibia National Front, who speaks Afrikaans A. High-grade Afrikaans. Have you ever heard him on the Afrikaans radio? And if people here in Pioneerspark, where we are sitting, vote for the Republican Party, you’ll say it’s because of ethnic interests et cetera et cetera. And that’s a self-fulfilling prophecy, you know. They haven’t got a broad view of what is happening and what other people are saying or thinking. How can you have a democratic system based on that? And really, he sat back! He said is that really- you mean you haven’t been interviewed by other radios? - No, I have not. Because this is the system you have created. A German politician is interviewed by the German radio and his views are hardly heard. And you are saying you are building a nation and you are going to have fair elections, how is that going to happen? [639]

Ngavirue also contextualises this behaviour. Underlying it, he says, was

"a sort of Apartheid nationalised to the point of actually suggesting that if you are a Nama or Herero, Ovambo, San, Damara, Coloured, White, and you stick to your identity and you come together as a collective, that’s the best form of granting security to the different groups, and therefore a nation composed on that basis is a better whole than having the interests of the whole starting as your premise. [...] It’s just like saying, the body, the human being, is there to serve its parts, its limbs. In other words, your body exists in order to serve the teeth and the arms and [so on], rather than the other way round." [640]

When looking at the content of SWABC actuality programming, one has to keep in mind that concepts like "reconciliation" or "national unity" that were to become so central to Namibian political discourse in the 1990s were used by the South African administration in this twisted way, changing their definition to the extent that they could mean the opposite of what nationalists presented as their model for the transition of Namibian society.

The SWABC Annual Report for the year 1985/6 stated that "Opportunities were also utilised by every programme service to emphasise, and promote, national reconciliation insofar as this credo was articulated or demonstrated either by the Government or any other body or organisation." [641] In reality, "any other body or organisation" did not of course refer to SWAPO, who at the time actively promoted its inclusion of all parts of the Namibian population. SWAPO held several talks with representatives of White groups such as the "Interessengemeinschaft deutschsprachiger Südwester" (IG). Leaders of the movement repeatedly stressed that SWAPOs aim was to create a racially inclusive society in an independent, democratic Namibia, and this

639 Interview Zedekia Ngavirue, 18.08.2006.
640 Ibid.
message was also strongly emphasised in its propagandistic outputs, e.g. in Voice of Namibia broadcasts. SWABC programmes, however, continued to present SWAPO as a terrorist threat to the Namibian nation as a whole and to White groups in particular.

**Changes in Apartheid Discourse**

Taking these ideological defaults into account, SWABC actuality and feature programmes present a complex picture. While there was no question of integrating SWAPO in discussions on the future of what was often called "South West Africa/Namibia" by announcers, the fact that this future lay in an independent, democratic state was discussed in detail if not actively promoted. These programmes, however, have to be seen in the context of major shifts in Apartheid ideology in general and South African policy towards Namibia during the 1980s in particular. The discussions took place in the "A/E/G" (Afrikaans, English and German) Services targeted mainly at Namibias White population. In 1982, the English Service broadcast a discussion in which political scientists and economists as well as nationalist politicians reacted to economic arguments against Namibias independence. One oft-repeated argument was that, upon Independence, skilled Whites would leave the country, leaving a mainly unskilled Black population. Andreas Shipanga, a SWAPO dissident who had returned to Namibia to join the "internal" efforts for transition, characterised this point explicitly: "There will be some problems, obviously, and nobody wishes that will happen, but I don't think that the whites should use their skills as a kind of blackmail in their struggle against self-domination and independence of Namibia." Other participants stressed the need for the government of an independent Namibia to create favourable investment conditions for multinational companies, while Douglas Hoff, Resident Director of Consolidated Diamond Mines Ltd., pointed out that the company was committed to help educate Namibian professionals:

"I would say that a transnational should have a very high degree of social responsibility, that it should have as a great preoccupation the advancement of local citizens into middle and senior management of its company, that it should have training opportunities – I think naturally it would be an equal opportunity company, I think all of the transnationals already are – and that it should have programs for the advancement of the people, so that the government of the country can feel that the profits that are being made are legitimate and that the company has a good sense of responsibility for the
Discussions such as these fit into a shift in Apartheid politics and ideology that Aletta Norval characterised as *rapprochement* between Afrikaner nationalist and English business leaders in South Africa during the Botha administration.\(^{643}\) There, as well as in Namibia, business representatives began to exert pressure on radical Apartheid politicians, trying to convince them to loosen some of the more economically damaging policies. This development took place against the background of neoliberal shifts in global economy as well as the connection protesters made between Apartheid and South African capitalism. As a consequence of these protests, grassroots organisations and intellectuals argued that social equality could only be attained through Marxist political and economic models. South African capitalists reacted by urging politicians to do away with racial discrimination while promoting a free market economic system. At the same time, initiatives were launched to promote 'entrepreneurship' in 'disadvantaged communities' as a part of a bigger "strategy to deracialise the economy so as to create a black middle-class 'buffer' against revolution [...]"\(^{644}\) In Namibia, this ideological change was also felt, but it was overtaken by political developments after the acceptance (at least in principle) of Resolution 435 by South Africa. Although the South African government and its administration in Namibia did everything to stall the process, the fact that it took place and that Independence would one way or another be attained in the future was clear to most. Discussions and talk programmes gave publicity to experts from the local and sometimes even international scientific community as well as nationalist politicians who prepared the listening public for the fact that Namibia would attain Independence in the near future and discussed about the political and economic implications. As these programmes were broadcast in the "White" services, primarily in the English and German Service, one can safely assume that the target audience was White. Taking this into account, the programmes become part of a shift in Apartheid ideology, as the social model presented is one of White groups being prepared to give up political domination while retaining economic domination and, with it, social hegemony.

Discussions and talks prepared a largely critical White listenership for independence and promoted an inclusive political model, however flawed, for the future inde-

\(^{642}\) all quotes from "Namibia – pawn – or king: a discussion programme", bc. 22.01.1982, NBC Sound Archives K84/464.
\(^{644}\) Ibid., 226.
pendent Namibia. Neville Alexander, who at the time was Director of the South African Committee for Higher Education (SACHED), spoke extensively on the German Service about national unity. Prior to his appointment as Director of SACHED, Alexander had suffered a 10 year imprisonment on Robben Island for his involvement in radical student politics in South Africa. On the German Service, he was interviewed on the role of non-governmental organisations and education in nation building. Alexander confronted listeners with the social realities in Namibia:

"I think the important point in nation-building is the following: we can't wait until after Independence or liberation. Actually, if we like to see it or not, a nation is continually built on all levels, whether we acknowledge it or not. And therefore it is much more important to consciously influence this process."645

He found harsh words for the administration in Namibia: "I think the present government's purpose is to prevent the coming into being of a single nation."646

The whole series "Südwest – Land und Leute", of which this feature was a part, presented different viewpoints on the country, ranging from Alex Kaputu explaining Herero history to comparisons of SWAPO and MPC policy goals. The series is interesting for the issue of nation-building in the SWABC, as it paints an ambivalent picture of the situation in Namibia and its future. In a commentary on the aims of SWAPO and the Multi-Party Conference (MPC), shortly after SWANU had declared its resignation, Christine von Garnier challenged the official view of SWAPO as a "communist" movement and explained: "We don't know to what extent the hands of the leadership are tied by Moscow. But I would say that the majority of SWAPO sympathisers in this country are African nationalists."647 On the other hand, she criticised the MPC as being corrupt and fraught with ethnic tensions. "They say they are Democrat[s]. But who do they actually represent? [...] If they really are Democrat[s], they have to submit their proposal for Independence to the population in a referendum."648

646 Ibid.
648 "Die Mitglieder der MPC sagen, daß sie Demokrat[en] sind. Wen vertreten sie eigentlich? [...] Wenn sie wirklich Demokrat[en] sind, dann müssen sie ihrem Vorschlag der Unabhängigkeit in
Programmes such as these that contained critical statements on the Administrations’ plan for Independence certainly did not comprise a large part of overall broadcasts, and, as mentioned, they were only broadcast over the A/E/G Services. In the overall picture of SWABC actuality programmes, they nevertheless present a striking countercurrent and point to the fact that by the mid-1980s, the inevitability of an independent future for Namibia, and the fact that SWAPO had to play a role in it, was clear even to producers in the mouthpiece of the South African state in Namibia. While SWABC tried to use concepts like "national unity" and "national reconciliation" in a way that would ensure ideological dominance of conservative political forces, once they became accepted terms to use in public debate, intellectuals such as Alexander could use them to challenge the interpretation that representatives of the Administration tried to establish.

Challenging Apartheid: VoN and SWAPO ideology

The Voice of Namibia (VoN), the radio that didn't tire of challenging the South African view of the political process towards Independence, was kept out of the public view, and only mentioned as a source in news items that dealt with SWAPO announcements or interviews with SWAPO cadres. There are several probable reasons for this. As the SWABC only broadcast in Namibia and had no External Services, it made no sense to counter those VoN broadcasts that were geared toward an international audience. Concerning the Namibians that tuned in to Luanda, Lusaka or Addis, doing so was illegal and perpetrators could be detained – a measure that, in the North, always included the danger of being severely tortured at the hands of Police or Koevoet members. Although some SWABC journalists, especially in the North, regularly listened to the Voice of Namibia, they did not refer to it in news items. For SWABC, it was better to ignore the challenge from a station that probably had a relatively small listenership in Namibia; quoting from and referring to the station would


651 cf. Ch. 3. SEITENZAHLEN
have given it a wider coverage than it actually had.

The propaganda war on the international airwaves was fought out between the Voice of Namibia and Radio RSA, the South African external propaganda station. Radio RSA had been established in 1966 and broadcast to countries in Africa, Europe, the Middle East and the Americas in eleven languages. Its objective was to paint a favourable picture of the Apartheid system and of life in South Africa in general, or in the words of the Station, to present "balanced and objective information that enabled its audiences to make a more accurate assessment of South African affairs against a background of what it described as inaccurate and often one-sided coverage given events in South Africa by foreign media." Philo Wasburn, with the help of students, compiled an overview of the items broadcast over Radio RSA in 1988 and isolated recurring themes in Radio RSA broadcasts: they tried to present South Africa as a 'normal', democratic state committed to 'western' values that may have a few problems with "Race relations", but which is actively working to improve them through measures in the areas of education, democratisation, or cooptation of Black South Africans in the economy. The Voice of Namibia countered this by presenting counterfactuals on the actual economic, political and social situation of Black Namibians and interpreting South Africa's and its Administrations' efforts in the light of SWAPO's perspective. The main weapons in this propaganda war were the classic journalistic genres of news and commentary. Both stations reported events in the guerrilla war differently – in some incidents, e.g. several bombings, the perpetrators are still unknown, and both the Voice of Namibia and Radio RSA in commentaries accused the other side of being responsible for them, often in a highly moralistic tone. In one famous case, the bombing of a Barclays Bank branch in Oshakati, each side accused the other, and it is unclear until today who planted the bomb that killed 27 civilians, including the daughter of Bishop Kleopas Dumeni.

A classic example for this struggle over is the coverage of the Cassinga massacre. On the day of the event, "Johannesburg in English for Abroad", as the BBC

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653 Ibid.
654 cf. the summaries in BBC SWB ME/6005/B/3 (bc. from 29.-30.12.78), ME/7624/B/7 (bc. from 18.04.84) and ME/7458/B/6 (bc. 05.10.83).
655 A few months after the event, Leonard Sheehama was arrested for the bombing. Later, it was found that he was responsible for other bombings in Walvis Bay and a school in Ovamboland. His case, however, dragged on until after independence, and was discontinued after it became evident that his confession was acquired under torture.
Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) called Radio RSA's English Service, reported that "South African forces have crossed into Angola in a limited military operation against SWAPO terrorists" and that "strict precautions had been taken to ensure that the local population [...] had not become involved."  Soon, the Angolan radio and the Voice of Namibia broadcast the information that Cassinga had been a refugee camp and that South African paratroops had been dropped there after a prolonged air raid. They cited the Angolan Defence Minister, who described it as a "hateful attack on Angola and on a few thousand women, old men and children." In the following days, Radio RSA broadcast commentaries on the "inevitability" of the operation in the context of the already established South African narrative of its commitment to democratic change in Namibia and SWAPO's power-hungry terroristic war against the "peaceful" road towards Independence. The Voice of Namibia and other stations supporting SWAPO had the propagandistic advantage of being able to quote African politicians and international organisations condemning the campaign and calling for sanctions against South Africa.

An issue Radio RSA (as the SWABC) tried to capitalise on in return were allegations that SWAPO held dissidents in jail or even, as the SWAPO dissident Andreas Shipanga was quoted, in "concentration camps." The station attacked Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Commissioner for Namibia, citing accusations that he had not investigated the matter, even after having been presented with a list of names of detainees in 1977. Ahtisaari denied this. This is one of the few instances to be found in the sources where the reports of Radio RSA forced SWAPO to react fiercely and directly through the Voice of Namibia:

"On the instigation of his South African racist masters traitor Shipanga and his fellow gang-members have been making constant booming noise about the so-called Namibian prisoners held by SWAPO in Zambia...Shipanga, his masters [words indistinct] of South African colonialism in Namibia would find it as impossible to produce proof of the so-called SWAPO prisoners in Zambia as trying to get water from [word indistinct] rock in the middle of the Namib desert. Such prisoners exist only in

656 BBC SWB ME/5806/ii (bc. 04.-05.05.78).
657 The SWB do not always differentiate between the respective State Radios and the Voice of Namibia programmes that were broadcast over the same transmitters and on the same frequencies. Often, the Voice of Namibia is labeled as "Luanda in English" or similar.
658 BBC SWB ME/5806/ii.
659 BBC SWB ME/5808/B/4 (bc. 07-08.08.78).
660 BBC SWB ME/6036/ii (bc. 06.-07.02.79).
The detainee issue, however, was picked up by Radio RSA in several instances in later years. The topic was crucial as backing for South African allegations on the terrorist nature of SWAPO, as were the bombs, and just as the massacre in Cassinga was proof for SWAPO of the criminal nature of the South African forces' campaigns in the border area.

A particular scoop for SWAPO was the publication of a hit list with the names of prominent religious and political leaders of Ovamboland as well as teachers and businessmen in 1980. It had been found on the body of an Ovambo administration official. Sam Nujoma broadcast the accusations over the Voice of Namibia after the list had been brought to Luanda by the editor of a church newspaper that had first publicised the news. This was the first appearance of Koevoet, the notorious "death squad" that would terrorise Namibia's North in the 1980s.

As the SWABC was part of the South African ideological and propaganda machinery, its versions of events followed those of Radio RSA. By more or less directly countering Radio RSA reports, the Voice of Namibia also provided Namibian listeners with a different view from that presented by SWABC news. Radio RSA had the better infrastructure and was able to broadcast continually, worldwide and in good quality, while the Voice of Namibia only had short slots on the External Services of other African countries and was therefore only able to broadcast around one hour per day, alternating between 3 to 5 languages according to the weekday. A typical programme plan of a Voice of Namibia station would list news bulletins and commentaries for most days, interrupted by features on Wednesday and news magazines, discussions and interviews on the weekend. Because the same bulletin or feature had to be presented again and again in the respective languages, a usual programme would not last longer than 20 minutes. Such a tight schedule didn't leave much time for cultural programming, except for "freedom songs".

Most of the news was comprised of military reports, commentaries on the political situation in Namibia and South Africa and statements by SWAPO leaders or sympathetic African nationalist politicians. Besides reporting on specific events, the Voice of Namibia also propagated SWAPO's political models for the future and denounced the

661 BBC SWB ME/6040/B/5 (bc. 09.02.79).
different models the South African government presented. Its most important argument was that SWAPO envisioned a unified, inclusive democratic Namibia for the future, while the South African administration's proposals for transitional governments were nothing but desperate measures to stall the independence process. This was usually formulated in strong language. In 1983, Nujoma denounced the Multi-Party Conference as yet another "manoeuvre" by "the racist Pretoria regime" that would be to no avail, and that its "participants were puppets in the service of Pretoria who, instead of fighting against colonial domination, live in luxury at the expense of the precious blood of the Namibian people."^663

In stark contrast to these denunciatory attacks against more moderate political activists and the South African regime in general stood SWAPO's proposals for the future of the country. The Voice of Namibia contradicted allegations that SWAPO was a communist organisation who envisioned a socialist, one-party state for Namibia and declared its commitment for democracy and majority rule. It especially emphasised that White Namibians were part of that future and that SWAPO was "a revolutionary liberation movement which has as its aim the liberation of Namibia for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of their colour."^664 In 1979, reacting to rumours about White Namibians leaving the country, the Voice stated that "The policy of SWAPO has nothing to do with the colour of skin of somebody. A persone [sic] can be black, white, yellow, or brown. [Passage indistinct] Those whites who want to live in a democratic society of an independent state of Namibia are welcome."^665 SWAPO leaders continually asserted their readiness to cooperate with White Namibians in the building up of a multiracial society. In 1985, Sam Nujoma called

"upon the white section of our population which over the years has constantly fallen victim of the racist false propaganda and deliberate insinuations aimed at frightening them not to join or support SWAPO, to courageously and heroically stand up and openly reject South Africa's manipulations [sic] and intrigues. […] Namibia is for all of us. I have time and again stated that our struggle is not against individual whites or aiming at depriving them of their property. Our struggle is aimed at smashing colonial domination, apartheid and colonial oppression."^666

In addition to Namibian indigenous languages, the Voice also broadcast in English and Afrikaans to reach White listeners. Its message was clear:

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^663 BBC SWB ME/7498/B/10 (bc. 22.11.83).
^664 BBC SWB ME/7583/B/3f. (bc. 29.02.84).
^665 BBC SWB ME/6026/B/6 (bc. 23.01.79).
^666 Sam Nujoma: New Year's Message, BBC SWB ME/7839/B/9ff. (bc. 01.01.85).
"[...] that was the cornerstone of our radio service in propaganda, in psychological warfare. [...] This message [...] must have all the ingredients: Unifying the people. Inform the people about the importance of unity. [...] Tell them how bad is apartheid."\textsuperscript{667}

In this, the Voice of Namibia was an integral part of SWAPO's media network. The different stations and print publications produced by the movement shared content such as interviews. In addition, they shared the overall ideological message that is exemplified by the examples cited here. However, there was one area in which the Voice differed from other publications – that of specific cultural forms, especially music. While the print publications – posters and magazines – were important for SWAPO's visual culture, the station had – albeit small – spots for aural culture.

\textbf{A Culture of Resistance}

That the bitter propaganda pill had to be coated in the sugar of entertainment was a truism established since the days of World War II. However, as mentioned, broadcasting time was scarce, and direct propaganda the priority. Elaborate entertainment programmes were out of the question. Nevertheless, in between items the Voice played music that had been recorded in the PLAN camps, by SWAPO music groups such as the "Ndilimani [=Dynamite, RH] Cultural Troupe" or by musicians sympathetic to SWAPO, like Jackson Kaujeua.

For SWAPO, culture was vital in the liberation struggle. A booklet on the role of culture in the Namibian liberation struggle acknowledged that "the politico-military confrontation between the Namibian people and the racist South African occupationalist regime is exerting tremendous influence upon the material and spiritual phenomenon known as culture."\textsuperscript{668} It was of great importance, stated the text citing Sam Nujoma, that the children who grew up in exile be taught the languages, culture and traditional values of Namibia. Also, a century of oppression and apartheid had had a strong influence on the different communities. As they had all been subjected to these political and social processes, their cultures had been influenced in the same way. As such, they had enough in common to form a Namibian culture that united them through a common experience while leaving the specifics of different cultures intact. For example, all musical traditions had been strongly influenced by Christian music

\textsuperscript{667} Interview Sackey Namugongo, 11.08.2006.
\textsuperscript{668} "Namibia: Culture and the Liberation Struggle", BAB Registratur AA.3: SWAPO Collection, 86fSLuPb1, 3.
through missionaries. The role of groups such as Ndlimani was to modernize traditional forms and fill them with revolutionary texts:

"Their songs mirror reality. They reflect clearly and realistically the soul of the people in bondage: speak about its history full of glory and heroism. The revolutionary content of their lyrics has given their songs effectiveness, influence and great motivation. The NCG gears itself at creating consciousness, helping our people to understand their difficulties and those responsible for them. […] Enlarging the group will make it possible for the NCG not only to add to its music traditional dancing and singing, but also to use their modern instruments to compose good music with Namibian roots and tastes. […] That is the essence of maintaining originality in culture or say, developing and perfecting our culture without depriving it of its Namibian colour."669

Ndlimani also took up songs that came from the camps. The songs had to have a simple structure, so that people who heard them on the radio could easily remember and sing them. "If less artistic in the rhythmic arrangement of their tones, these songs are truly evocative in their expression of feelings, ideas and call to action."670 The songs were supposed to be a documentation and reminder of the struggle, an instrument of identification with the community of "the Namibian people." The message of Ndlimani songs was clear:

*Alert Namibia to win Freedom  
in Unity and Solidarity  
You will be born a new Namibia  
Free from Oppression  
Free from Exploitation

Sons and daughters of Namibia  
Far too long a time we were oppressed  
Solid we must stand in unity  
Fighting for Freedom  
Freedom and Justice

(Ref.;) We shall liberate (Namibia)  
We shall liberate (Namibia)  
Our country, Namibia  
Our motherland  
Namibia we love thee  
[…]*671

This song ("Alert Namibia") was sung to the melody of "Nkosi Sikelel'i Afrika", a tune that had long been famous as the expression of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa and is the basis for several national anthems in the region today. Most Namibians, just as any African nationalist in the region, knew the theme by heart. Other

669 Ibid., 6.  
670 Ibid., 17.  
671 Ndlimani Cultural Troupe: Let Us Unite vol. 2, recorded at NBC Studio 7, Windhoek.
songs also had either well-known or simple, catchy, repetitive melodies.

Voice of Namibia-produced songs were also used for other purposes. The Ndilimani Cultural Troupe and Jackson Kaujeua toured Europe and the USA and worked as cultural promoters for the Namibian liberation struggle. While Ndilimani’s repertoire was mostly made up of songs that had been composed and written in the camps, Kaujeua did so himself. His music was a mixture of traditional Namibian forms with Blues and Reggae. He had written and sung a kind of unofficial anthem of the liberation struggle, "The Wind of Change", in which he quoted the famous speech of then British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in Cape Town 1960: "The Wind of Change, sweeping across the African continent." Macmillan had warned South African (as, in an earlier speech, colonial) politicians not to refuse self-rule to Africans. Sixteen years later, Kaujeua, adding a few slogans like "Amandla Awethu" and "A Lucha Continua" over a rhythmic acoustic guitar, turned it into the positive assertion for his fellow nationalists that no matter what Pretoria would come up with to stall the independence process, SWAPO and the other liberation movements had history on their side. For Kaujeua, the Namibian musician of the struggle, this song was "the one that actually made me what I am today."

Music communicated the voices of PLAN soldiers from the camps – be it their actual voices or conveyed through Ndilimani’s interpretations – and was the audible creative expression of the freedom fight and an emotional connection between the guerrilla fighters and their families. As Moorman and others have shown, music had significant mobilising power, catching emotions and providing important communication between guerrilla camps and listeners at home.

Besides this direct cultural output, the Voice of Namibia also tried to foster a national culture by celebrating national holidays. Because SWAPO saw the Namibian nation as a product of a shared experience of colonial oppression and the struggle against it, to build a national culture it was crucial to establish a shared memory of the struggle. This was done in all SWAPO media by commemorating holidays such as Namibia Day, Heroes Day or the anniversary of the Cassinga massacre. The Voice of

672 Kaujeua, Jackson: The Wind of Change, Audio CD provided to the author by Jackson Kaujeua. The original phrase Macmillan used is "the wind of change is blowing through Africa." cf. for the significance of the speech Hyam 2006, 257ff.
673 Interview Jackson Kaujeua, 08.11.2007.
Namibia released statements by SWAPO leaders that encouraged people not to give up the fight for which "scores of Namibians had died," as well as solidarity addresses by African statesmen and OAU representatives.

"We used to have special programmes on those days, like Cassinga, 4th of May, and the 4th of May would really be devoted to Cassinga, and we would write a commentary. But then, if there were leaders around, we'd also interview them. And that would focus on Cassinga, and on the formation of SWAPO, or on Namibia Women's Day, according to the days. But also, if it's the day of the formation of the ANC, for example, there was this arrangement between us and the ANC comrades that that day our programme will also focus on the struggle in South Africa. And they would do the same, likewise."  

Voice of Namibia programming concentrated on more or less direct (counter-)propaganda, be it information on specific events or, more generally, about the movement's political and social aims and ideological prerequisites. Nevertheless, this entailed also efforts to develop an inclusive national outlook for a future independent Namibia. The VoN, in general, must be viewed against the background of a wider network of SWAPO media – leaflets, magazines, posters – that shared this mission, and often exchanged content. This network advertised SWAPO's model for the future of a united, independent Namibia: the Namibian nation was united through a shared experience of a common struggle against colonialism. The paradox that this entailed – namely that this would entail that the former colonisers were not foreign forces, but would have to be included in a national community defined by this struggle – was ignored. After independence, faced with the economic and social problems of the new country, Swapo adopted the model of "national reconciliation", all the while retaining the original concept. That the Namibian national identity was defined by this shared experience of the common struggle also entailed, as shown, that SWAPO, like UNIP, was inevitably connected to the nation, as it had unified and led the anti-colonial movement in Namibia. This would significantly influence the party's relations towards the national broadcaster.

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675 BBC SWB ME/6423/ii (bc. 18.03.80).
676 Interview Kaomo Tjombe, 27.11.2007.
677 cf. SWAPO of Namibia, Department of Publicity and Information. 1981.

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4. "Building the Nation": The NBC as Promoter of National Reconciliation

The Namibian Broadcasting Corporation was supposed to be one prime mover in the building of the Namibian nation. After Independence, the station was to take the problematic heritage of the SWABC and turn it upside down, so that a divisive radio network would become a unifying one. This was no easy task. The country that emerged from the political upheavals of 1989 was riddled with conflicts. First of all came the political change. Lauren Dobell stated that

"Namibia provides a particularly fascinating case study of the gradual dismantling of a century of colonial rule, and its ultimate replacement – through democratic means, and monitored by external powers – by a movement which, some would argue, had in certain respects come to resemble the forces against which it had originally struggled." 678

However, while SWAPO – now a political party – had taken political control, "in so doing [it] found itself inevitably engaged in compromise in that, although it formally acceded to power, it did so without securing adequate control over wide swathes of society and the economy. Instead, the structural legacy of settler colonialism remained alive." 679 The bulk of economic power, and with it most private-owned media, remained in the hands of White Namibians. Thus, SWAPO now controlled the state institutions in a country in which the group that just had given up political power still firmly retained social and cultural hegemony. The NBC, as a public broadcaster, was not completely under SWAPOs control, although the government, through channels such as the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, could put more pressure on it than other political groupings. As shown in the previous chapters, the NBC became a battle ground en miniature for the conflicts that threatened Namibian society as a whole. At the same time, its main function had been defined as that of regulating and negotiating those same conflicts through its programming output.

The situation was not made easier by the fact that news items received from external agencies had a heavy slant towards news from Europe and North America, and despite the establishment of the Namibian Press Agency (NAMPA), the NBC was still very much dependent on the South African Press Agency (SAPA) during its first years. With most news items coming from the dominating Western agencies (even if vetted through SAPA), the NBC struggled with fulfilling its own guidelines, which stat-

678 Dobell 1998, 23.
ed that emphasis should be on national news, followed by regional news from Southern Africa, Africa, and then the rest of the world, in that order. Only about one-third of news covered national issues. These were often just accounts of government statements; the most quoted political actors in news were by far the Ministers, followed by the President. A typical news item would be structured by clauses like "the Prime Minister said...", "the Prime Minister added that..." and so on, followed by verbatim reports. In other actuality programmes, government officials were often invited to talk extensively about government policies and measures related to the topic at hand.

In addition to that, the internal conflicts, infrastructural and personnel problems that shaped the NBC in its initial stage made it difficult to implement its mission to foster 'national unity' and 'reconciliation'. The Annual Report for the year 1991 stated that "Some ongoing problems within the NBC have created an atmosphere which is not conducive to this goal. An important manifestation of the dilemma within the department is the difficulty in bringing about the necessary diversification to enable the broadcasting of more relevant programmes."

"Building the Nation"

What followed from these political and infrastructural problems were anaemic programmes that stayed diffuse and lacked a coherent concept of how national unity was to be achieved. An example in point and central part of the "informal education programs" was the series "Building the Nation", broadcast in 1992. It was a series of 30-minute interviews, in which personalities from politics, economics and the media talked about different aspects of national unity and national reconciliation. The interviewees, however, didn't talk about economic realities or political programmes, and the talks remained vague and abstract. The interviewees had much room to present their view, and the presenters, after a short opening statement, asked very few questions. Most of the speeches, as an analyst at the time stated, gave "very simple answers and solutions [...] to very complex and fundamental problems in Namibian society." In one broadcast, Moses Katjiuongo, president of the Namibian Patriotic Front, declared:

681 In countries in the Global North, the ratio of national topics is usually around 50%.
682 Dyvi 1993, 93.
684 Dyvi 1993, 100.
"Reconciliation should mean peace between people who were in a conflict, or at war, or some kind of situation of enmity. So therefore, it means that now some people say „Can you forget the past?“ My own feeling is that not even God can change the past, the past happened, and nobody can undo it. My approach is simply that there should be peaceful coexistence, we should not fight over differences, but we should have dialogue over our differences. We should accept one another that we are all fellow Namibians. It is our country, nobody has more right in this country than any other person. And in a democracy, all of us are entitled to opinions. So I rather associate the word reconciliation with a concept of peaceful coexistence between people with different backgrounds and different views, political and otherwise."  

In this as in other programmes, Ellen Dyvi states, "the 'national personalities' who were invited to speak on those programmes spoke very positively about the government's policy in all fields." The actual social and political problems of the process of nation-building were not discussed, and the programmes painted a very positive picture. The personalities invited to speak were hardly representative of the population. Instead of displaying unity in diversity in their choice of guests, and inviting representatives of the different ethnic groups and with different social and political backgrounds to discuss the social, political and cultural problems of the different groups on a national level, the talks were staffed with politicians and high-ranking personalities from the print media and business. Thus, the broadcasts, which the NBC termed "informal education programs", could hardly speak to all listeners; rather, they gave the impression of rehearsed speeches held from the lofty heights of national politics. NBC programmes on national reconciliation in the first half of the 1990s failed to tackle the most pressing issues – especially allegations of human rights abuses against Swapo.  

While these direct, official attempts at implementing a policy of nation-building seem rather blatant, there were other programmes in NBC that took the challenge in a less direct way. First of all, the cultural programmes on the African Language Services changed their focus. In SWABC, the African channels had concentrated on the respective 'ethnic traditions' of the Language group they were directed at. NBC changed this programme policy: cultural programmes now reported on historical or cultural events of other groups as well and produced and translated features on the

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687 The first feature programme in my sources to tackle the controversial issue of the so-called "detainees question" was broadcast as one of four parts of a series on national reconciliation on 30th January 1997, cf. NBC Sound Archives CA97/001 [A 02]. However, the topic remained underrepresented in NBC actuality programmes.
different traditions. This may seem a small change, but it was significant in that while the "Ethnic Channels" in SWABC had been supposed to cultivate separate 'ethnic' identities, their function was now to cater not only for the cultural and social needs of the respective community, but to also foster an understanding between the groups in order to let them see *unity in diversity*. This also pertained to the area of music. Alex Kaputu explains that while cultural programmes in the SWABC had put the emphasis on 'traditional' music of the specific ethnic group, including old war songs with texts that mocked other groups or insulted the 'enemy', the NBC explicitly tried to be more inclusive. All Services introduced programmes on the history and traditions of those ethnic groups that were not their respective target; song lyrics that were seen as 'divisive' were banned.\(^688\) The Music Makers Competition was continued, and the National Service put more emphasis on broadcasting African Music. Programme content was exchanged between the Language Services: the National Service took over cultural content and returned programmes for teaching English.

**Calling the Nation: NBC Chat Shows**

The most popular and, for the NBC, most controversial programmes to breach the issue of national unity were the so-called "phone-in shows" or "chat shows". Although all channels produced these highly popular programmes, the one that regularly broached the issue of national unity and reconciliation was the "National Chat Show", which aired weekdays from 8 to 10 pm. The first hour was devoted to music and announcements, either of events or of messages sent in by listeners; in the second, listeners could phone the studio and speak their mind. No parameters were given, and the presenter asked no specific questions to let callers discuss on. The topics callers wanted to talk about were usually the news of the day. Ellen Dyvi, who listened in to the programme, assessed that over 60 per cent of the discussions revolved around political issues: "Whether agreeing or not, it is obvious that the government actions is what people phoning in are mostly concerned with, and that the government decisions, actions and statements are setting the agenda not only for the news, but also for the 'Chat Show'." While the Chat Show did not explicitly make national unity or national reconciliation its priority, the discussions often touched on sensitive issues. Cal-

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\(^{688}\) Interview Alex Kaputu, 07.11.2007. In the SWABC, only the 'A/E/G'-Services had produced such programmes.
lers could go too far in expressing their discontent with the government or they could attack other ethnicities. In those cases, the presenter would intervene. However, as Dyvi pointed out, "[t]he programme presenters are very eager to emphasise the importance of national reconciliation and are very quick to defend or explain the government's policy if a caller expresses disapp[rovel] of what people from other ethnic groups are doing or disagreement with the government." This also pertained to chat shows on other Services.

The biggest problem of live phone-in shows was how to control their content. What callers said, especially when it came to emotionally charged issues such as reconciliation, could easily trespass the border of what was legally defined as hate speech, and the NBC was responsible for what went over the air. In 1994, the phone-in programmes on the Otjiherero Service were suspended because of "consistent misuse by callers." When it came back on the air, the Minister of Information and Broadcasting addressed the audience on this and the Oshiwambo Service "on the importance of a civil approach during call-in programmes." One solution was to broadcast the shows not exactly live, but time-delayed, usually by a few minutes. Through this measure, callers could be cut off when they started to stir up hatred against other ethnic groups or sexual minorities before the statements went on the air. However, as national reconciliation and unity were equated with the stability of the government, the standards for cutting a caller off who went too far were not always clear. The fact that the host of a chat show could be made responsible for statements of callers made it especially difficult to let callers speak freely about the issues at hand, to challenge hate speech and not just cut it off. There were more complex ways to navigate the pitfalls of live chat shows. The host of a chat show broadcast from 1995 on the National Service, "Open Line", negotiated the different demands between freedom of speech and the ideological exigencies of the policy of national reconciliation. Muchila invited callers to "share whatever is on your mind," but called upon them not to "step on someone's freedom." Wendi Haugh, in

689 all quotes from Dyvi 1993, 108f.
690 NBC Annual Report 1994/1995, 5. NBC Information Service. In more recent years, there were repeated efforts by the Swapo government to ban the National Chat Show, which have often been met with strong protests by listeners. In 2009, shortly before the parliamentary elections, the government justified its call for more control by claiming that the National Chat Show was used "to attack Swapos leadership." "Misa slams National Chat Show Ban, The Namibian, 05.06.2009.
an analysis of Muchila's show, explained that "[he] attempts to create a space in which all Namibians can feel comfortable, regardless of race, ethnicity, or even geographical location." He challenged callers that expressed divisive views, but tried to argue with them respectfully. To a caller who asked why Germans, a "foreign population", were "favor[ed]" with a German Service, Muchila answered "You must remember that [...] German service it has to be there. I mean we have Germans in this country, we have Tswanas in this country, just like we have Hereros [...]" Haugh concludes that "Muchila refuses the classification of certain ethnic groups as foreign to Namibia, arguing that the nation is comprised of people who live in various geographic areas."

The phone-in programmes opened NBC output for the more uncomfortable discussions on political topics, such as the new democracy, the behaviour of government members, or what the sovereign nation of Namibia was supposed to be. Ultimately, the content and topics of discussion could not be censored, and once established, the shows became so popular that efforts to dispose of them were met with severe protests. Thus, chat shows formed the space in NBC in which the issue of Namibian nationhood could be openly negotiated.

5. Mediating Ideologies in Radio Programmes

While accusations of ideological slant were – and, to a certain extent, still are – thrown around in international broadcasting more than in any other media context, the actors naturally thought and still think of themselves as 'objective'. But as media theorists and analysts since Stuart Hall have determined, no media outlet is completely without ideological prerequisites. The case studies presented here are no exception. However, the extent and nature of ideological prerequisites varies greatly. In addition, although it is often assumed that stations on the African continent, at least before the significant liberalisation of the airwaves in many countries in the wake of

692 Ibid., 9.
693 Ibid., 5.
695 Hale 1975.
the "Second Wave of Democracy", were heavily government-controlled and therefore ideologically fixed, a closer look on the details of day-to-day programming paints a more complex picture.

In African media studies, the 1990s are usually hailed as the decade of liberalisation. The famous Windhoek Declaration on press freedom in 1991 set the standard for a free and independent press on the continent, and many countries opened the airwaves for community and private broadcasting, with Namibia and South Africa taking the lead. However, the periodisation of African media history in eras of colonial, post-colonial autocratic and post-1990 democratising media is mainly informed by political and legislative processes. By taking actors and their interactions, political culture and actual programme content into account, continuities between the periods and ambiguities in the process become much clearer.

**Breaks and Continuities in Post-Colonial Ideology**

In neither of the two case studies did the break with radio's colonial past entail a complete change of personnel – understandable, in the context of a lack of trained staff this was just not possible. Partly for this reason, one can also make out significant continuities in programming. First of all, formats were taken over from the old stations. Secondly, old recordings were still used. But the most important continuities are visible on a more abstract ideological level. In Zambia, ideas regarding which form the future of society was supposed to take and how it was to reach this goal persisted after Independence, and were even enhanced by assumptions that Zambians themselves would clear the path towards modern, industrialized society and that the country would be a model and motor for the modernisation of Africa as a whole. Information programmes in post-colonial Zambian radio mirrored the same belief in modernisation as a linear and controllable process of social change like those before Independence. While they had originally been propagated by the colonial government, now it was UNIP, sometimes embedded in a larger context of UN development policies, that pushed those ideas. Entertainment programmes designed to moderate social change and help listeners accommodate were also continued. In addition, ideas on the character of 'traditional' vs. 'modern' music prevailed in ZBS music shows.
No such strong continuity can be found in post-Apartheid Namibian radio. This is largely due to the fact that the Independence process was much more violent and the social model of Apartheid possessed even less legitimacy than colonialism; therefore, the need to break with the past was stronger. However, cultural and entertainment programming in NBC was also not far away from the programmes produced before the political change; the most important difference was the shift of focus from separation to inclusion of social and ethnic groups. In particular, the Services aimed at White audiences continued cultural and entertainment programmes as before, on the one hand due to the fact that those programmes in the A/E/G-Services had been under less tight control, on the other because the interests and tastes of large parts of their listenership hadn't changed.

However, both countries also made a conscious and significant break with their colonial past. The most important project for post-Independence broadcasting was to 'build a nation', to foster national unity in countries divided not only by ethnic and language differences, but also social conflict. For the nationalist movements, nation-building was also an important source of political legitimacy. As shown, this could result in official sounding, blatantly propagandistic efforts at hammering the point home that were too obviously connected to the governments' interests in holding on to power to be very efficient. However, the prerequisites of nation-building in programmes also opened up possibilities to develop more creative formats. Indirect attempts that tried to construct a national space in the programme rather than to just talk about the nation were to prove more successful in the long run. The best way was to open the airwaves for public discussion and argue with those that expressed divisive opinions. Other programmes were part of larger efforts to create a national culture, be it through commemorating events that were decisive for the desired image of the nation, be it through popularising cultural events and making them part of a national culture.

Radio as a Virtual National Space

Ideology, after Antonio Gramsci, is not an openly communicated set of ideas, but rather "a conception of the world that is implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and in all manifestations of individual and collective life." Following this,

ideology in Zambian and Namibian radio before and after Independence was not only present in blatant propaganda, but, more importantly, permeated all programmes, and was probably more effective in those where it formed an unspoken part of the format. While Black Namibian listeners were very well aware that SWABC news was not to be trusted, they nevertheless appreciated it as a communication tool and enjoyed cultural and music programmes: "When someone died in a rural area the easiest thing the bereaved family could do was to broadcast it. [...] When it was music people sat and listened. When the news came they would say 'Ah, stop that Radio Puppet.' The same can be said of its opponent, the Voice if Namibia. Using radio as a mouthpiece proved not very effective; of greater ideological importance were those formats that were applicable to influence "manifestations of individual and collective life." Thus, the fact that programmes in the A/E/G-Services painted over the realities of the war in the North, and presented a "fantasy world" of children playing in the summer holidays supported the claims of the Apartheid government more effectively than all the assertions of government officials. South African controlled media could actively construct a virtual world where the ideological assumptions and the reasoning of Apartheid politicians were shown to be true. In Northern Rhodesia, while the Federal institutions failed to gain ideological hold over the African population, CABS and FBC in combination with social factors such as the establishment of an African middle class and educational institutions nevertheless set the ground for a general acceptance of modernisation theory in African nationalist circles and important social strata.

The point of radio programming was therefore not to use it as a simple communicator for ideologies, but rather to make it a part of the "ideological terrain" that determined how people moved and "acquire[d] a consciousness of their position" in society. SWABC cultural programmes, in separately emphasising the cultural traditions of the different Black groups, tried to do exactly that: defining the social and cultural environment in which people moved, in a way that supported the twisted idea of national unity they purported. The NBC, on the other hand, countered by changing the terrain in all programmes to a national one that encompassed all the different Namibian cultures in all Services. A similar development can be seen in colonial and post-colonial Zambia. Both colonial broadcasters tried to obtain the power of defini-

697 Mosia et al. 1994, 10.
tion over what the nation should be; both, however, were destined to fail, as in the realm of nationalism, they were challenged by political actors that possessed much more legitimacy to speak for the nation. Thus, although radio was an important means to influence the ideological framework of listeners, the process was not without contradictions.

This became even more clear after Independence. Postcolonial governments in Zambia and Namibia both struggled to construct a national identity in a population that had only partly been united by the anticolonial struggle, and which could easily lose its unity when, in a democratic society, particularist interests were no longer suppressed for the sake of the greater goal. Nation-building programmes, however, suffered from the post-colonial governments' equation of national interests with those of the respective party in power. Both parties, as they had developed out of nationalist movements, saw themselves as sole promoters and guarantors of national unity. The connection between the greater goal of national unity and the short-term political interests of the party in power resulted in dull, blatantly propagandist programmes. Again, the creation of a national space in discussion and cultural broadcasts was a much more important and durable ideological project than those 'educational programmes'. The 'ideological terrain' was not set by SWAPO or UNIP politicians droning on for a half hour about vague concepts of 'Humanism' and 'national reconciliation', or about how successful the government was in building the nation, but it was negotiated when Felix Muchila tried to convince an irate listener that the Germans he wanted to leave Namibia were as much a part of the nation as he was. The nation was constructed in a virtual space when Zambian listeners called in to ask for 'their' music and exchange greetings to relatives in distant parts of the country.
V. Audiences

Government officials and politicians both in the British colonies and in Apartheid South Africa were not happy with a mass medium that ultimately eluded their direct control. Many saw the introduction of the Saucepan Special, the first set that an emerging African working and middle class could afford, as a problem. Conservatives feared that Africans, who they thought could easily be influenced, would come under the spell of "Moscow". The South African Minister of Post and Telegraphs, Albert Herzog, in a speech to parliament, did not hide his true concerns: "If they [the Soviets, RH] know those natives have all those shortwave sets there is nothing to prevent Moscow from giving them all types of information that we do not want the native to hear about." Officials had for a long time assumed that Africans would not 'understand' modern media, claiming "that [they] could not interpret photographs, and that they often looked at them upside down." or that they thought of voice recordings as "witchcraft."

Why, then, did colonial governments introduce mass media in the first place? If, as Chapter 4 argues, media policies had above all the goal to control information, why not deny colonial subjects the access to mass media altogether or only allow media produced by the government?

The answer to that can be found by looking at mass media from the perspective of colonial subjects, and take their agency into account. The problem of colonial administrations was that not using mass media would amount to lose control altogether. They reacted – and this holds for both case studies presented here – to a confluence of two processes: first, Africans already had – however limited – access to mass media, and officials felt that if the government didn't provide content, they would be all the more exposed to unwanted propaganda; and secondly, the governments needed to mobilise the African population to their own cause:

"Government officials and missionaries who were believed to be experts on African affairs, offered their advice generously, and because they were aware that the black people loved music, rhetoric and argument, they advised the use of these on the radio, in order to urge Africans to appreciate the dan-

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699 Fraenkel 1959, 18, cf. Ch. 2.
700 cit. in Mosia/Riddle/Zaffiro, 5.
701 Franklin 1974, 172f.
gers which were threatening the British way of life.\textsuperscript{702}

In the case of Northern Rhodesia, the war effort made it necessary to mobilise potential recruits, and to inform colonial subjects about events that concerned their relatives, who had been sent as soldiers to mainly South Asian war theatres; later, African political organisation and labour unrest showed the need to establish a medium of communication that was able to reach the majority of the population. In South West Africa, the administration needed to propose its own political model for the future of the country, to provide an ideological alternative to SWAPO's demands. Therefore, the introduction of mass media for an African audience was a reaction by the government to pressure from outside and, most importantly, from the audience itself. Colonial officials realised that if they did not act and present attractive media content that took its readers and listeners seriously, they would lose the audience to other, alternative media.

Thus, while government officials had only the most crude and paternalistic views about the African audience, the latter, by choosing from the available media output (be it Watchtower literature, the Voice of Namibia, BBC or, most unlikely, the dreaded 'Moscow') and appropriating it in their own terms (e.g., using religious language to express political aspirations) had already forced the government to react. The inconsistencies of their reasoning were not consciously reflected by government representatives; for them, the danger did not lie in African audiences being active recipients, but in 'Radio Moscow' (which, basically, was a chiffre for all unwanted ideological content) enticing 'naive' African listeners and 'misleading' them. The fact was, however, that it never reached a significant number of listeners, as even the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau acknowledged.\textsuperscript{703} Of the transnational propaganda stations, only Radio Cairo would later reach significant audiences, and it did so mainly in East Africa.

Both incentives for directing mass media towards an African audience were not new. Governments had always tried to control broadcasting output; a now famous case is the conflict between the British Government and the then still privately-owned BBC over its reporting on the 1926 General Strike. Although the BBC had more or

\textsuperscript{702} Masiye 1977.
less openly taken the side of the Government, then Managing Director John Reith insisted on taking in both sides when it "made no difference to the situation."However, the BBC effectively cooperated with the government in that it aimed at "dispel[ling] rumours" and "spread[ing] intelligence and good cheer." By the beginning of 1927, the BBC was established as a public broadcaster. In Germany, radio was from its inception a state-owned enterprise, and in France and Spain, the government used every possibility to ensure its hold over Radio Clubs and privately owned stations. The important role of the BBC in the General Strike in helping the government to bring the situation under control by establishing a monopoly over information was acknowledged by politicians and was probably what colonial officials, to a certain degree, envisaged for CABS as well. As already stated, the establishment of the SWABC in 1979 was a reaction by the South African administration to external pressure to commit to a democratic process towards Namibian independence, but the role SWAPO media played in this should not be underestimated.

But how did listeners react to the content that was presented to them and what influence did they have on what was broadcast? In the previous chapters, ideological content was analysed as being complex and a result of negotiation between different interest groups and individuals with influence on programming content rather than controlled only by specific institutions. While it is important to analyse media content and the ideological factors influencing it, it cannot be just assumed, as at least some colonial politicians seem to have done, that listeners take in any content that they happen to overhear. Instead, besides the broadcasting studio there is a second space of negotiation in front of the speaker. Listeners decided themselves what they wanted to heart and what not; they chose between stations and programmes and checked what they heard against alternative sources of information and alternative ideological inputs. Groups of listeners, whether in front of the wireless or when meeting after listening to it, discussed the programme and, for example, could enjoy the music and entertainment while regarding the station as a "radio puppet" and

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705 Ibid., 20.
707 This is derived from Stuart Hall's communication-model, which emphasizes these negotiating spaces as the "encoding" and "decoding" moments of a certain message. cf. Introduction and Hall 1977.
708 Mosia et al. 1994, 10. cf. Ch. 4.
relying on other sources for news. They also voiced their demands in other media or in letters to the station; as shown, nationalist broadcasters, often part of the same communities, complied with listener's wishes for nationalist songs.

Listeners also influenced programme content significantly, albeit indirectly. For every journalist, his or her audience or readership is important, and he thinks about what it expects from him. Even without sophisticated statistical and technical tools to determine audience ratings at their hands, broadcasters tried to pick up on which programmes were most popular and which were not. From 1950 on, the CABS sent out questionnaires to African listeners, and broadcasters were positively surprised at the high turnout, and Information officers soon realised that "any medium of mass education, and especially broadcasting, can only be effective if it is also successful as a medium of entertainment." Without offering content which listeners wanted, the propagandistic problem of colonial radio was ineffective.

1. "The African Listener"\textsuperscript{710}: Audiences and Reception in Colonial Broadcasting

Although Zambians had had opportunities to listen to radio before – usually by rallying around the District Officers' receiver at the local Boma or the public speakers at a bar or a welfare centre in the mining compounds –, it was the Saucepan Special that effectively created an African mass audience. For the first time, it enabled middle- and working-class Africans to buy a receiver, although it was still too expensive for large parts of the population. A Saucepan Special in Northern Rhodesia (where it was cheaper than in other colonies) cost 5£ plus 1£ 5s. for the Battery; at a time when African families had an average income of 1£ per week, this was for most a purchase to carefully consider.\textsuperscript{711} Nevertheless, the first 2000 sets were quickly sold out.\textsuperscript{712} Many Africans saved up for it, and the Colonial Government put a loan scheme in place for the purchase of a Saucepan Special.\textsuperscript{713} In any case, as group listening

\textsuperscript{709} Northern Rhodesia Information Department Annual Report for the Year 1950, 6. NAZ 15/87: Information Department Reports.
\textsuperscript{710} Before 1958, the magazine Nshila had been titled "The African Listener". cf. NAZ Newspaper Collection.
\textsuperscript{713} Franklin 1950b, 2.
was common, in the 50s the CABS reached a large part of the population, and not only urban workers or civil servants. In 1952, the Information Department estimated a "nightly listening public in the region of 90,000" from questionnaire turnout and Saucepan sales. In a country with a total population of three million, this was no small number – given that a "nightly listening public" was not a constant set of people who tuned in regularly, but a shifting part of a larger, more irregular audience. A small (although probably not representative) survey in 1956 found that 89 per cent of interviewees had access to a radio set.

As CABS managers were aware of the novelty of the medium to African listeners, and unsure about what approach to programmes would be most "effective", they backed quantitative with qualitative research. From 1950 on, questionnaires were sent out to listeners who owned a Saucepan set, asking them to give detailed information on listening time and context, programme and music preferences. Additionally, the messages written to request programmes such as "Zimene Mwatifunsaa" were analysed, and to include illiterate listeners, an "African Listeners' Club" was established, which encouraged "the most enthusiastic" of those who had returned the forms to start listening groups in their hometowns and report the reactions in similar forms.

Around the same time, Hortense Powdermaker carried out her research on social change in the Copperbelt. Powdermaker's book, by adding anthropological fieldwork to the quantitative CABS data, highlights the reasons why certain programmes were more popular than others. News, she acknowledged, "gave the listeners some sense of reassurance, of predictability, of control." Interviewees explained that they liked to be up-to-date on the government's policies and laws, so as to adapt and not come into conflict with the authorities. Listeners in the Copperbelt liked news from their respective home districts just as much as those from the urbanised areas of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, because "[a]lthough the adults on the Copperbelt were now part of a larger society, many still had close ties to their rural districts. They were eager to hear of progress there and of local events, trivial and important."

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716 NR Information Department Annual Report for the Year 1950, 6. NAZ 15/87. cf. also the detailed results in: Central African Broadcasting Station (Lusaka) Listener Research Summary, BBC WAC E1-37. The listeners' club did not last long, because results were seen as "unreliable" and too much time and effort had to be devoted to the organisation. cf. Fraenkel 1959, 137.
717 It seems the part of it that was concerned with radio was coordinated with the stations' listener research. cf. Powdermaker 1962, 231-253.
Additionally, illiterate listeners could "reduce[.] the social distance between them and those who could read"\(^718\) by listening to the news. Although the news was sometimes not remembered correctly, Powdermaker concludes that listeners "felt more in control of their movements, through knowing what was going on in villages and towns, hearing about new regulations and getting other information which they considered important."\(^719\)

**Listeners' Reactions and Motives**

Despite all the data at hand, it was soon discovered that more detailed research was necessary to evaluate the "effectiveness" of programmes. In a sample survey in 1953, six actuality programme series (four in English and one in either SiLozi or Chi-Bemba) were tested on how popular they were and if the audience would pick up on the message as intended. The results were devastating: "[m]ost of them [the respondents, RH] had some grasp of the subject, but many of the points which had been hammered two or three times in the talk had been missed." It was found out that subjects more familiar to the listener were received better than background talks on international events. African announcers were more popular, and listeners remembered their names; also, their English was understood much better. Albeit reluctantly, the station reacted by employing more African announcers, and using them for news-reading.\(^720\) This is an example of the dilemma the CABS found themselves in: their claim was to educate the African listener, which included making British English the model African English speakers were to aspire to; however, if the station wanted to reach the listeners, it had to use a language that was easily understood by the majority of the population.

Misunderstandings also happened when programme planners made assumptions about African culture. An experimental programme in 1954 combined music with short educational "slogans" based on traditional proverbs. The programme failed to catch on with the audience and listeners "were depressingly adept at missing the point."

The station's management concluded that proverbs were seemingly not "the potent

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\(^718\) Powdermaker 1962, 242f.
\(^719\) Ibid., 246.
\(^720\) Kittermaster, Michael. 1954. Northern Rhodesia Listener Research, 1953, in: Community Development Bulletin 5:2, 42-46, 43. However, as mentioned in Chapter 3, more educated listeners differed from these demands: they favoured British newsreaders, because they wanted to better their English. Powdermaker 1962, 364.
force in African life”\textsuperscript{721} they had expected. However, as Peter Fraenkel recounts, it was the assumptions broadcasters had about how African proverbs worked that were behind the misunderstanding. For example, a slogan comparing a disease-spreading fly – small, yet dangerous – to bundles of corpses traditionally tied for funerals – small, but a heavy load – led to bewilderment among recipients, or could even be dangerously misinterpreted: "[T]hough it's small, it's a heavy load. One man can spoil the happiness of an entire village; if he's a witch he will bring fear and suspicion. 'Kill that fly? That means – well – nowadays Europeans interfere.'\textsuperscript{722} An additional problem was that (mostly urban) listeners who had learned Bemba or Nyanja only as a second language missed the subtle connotations that proverbs had for native speakers. The "slogans" were discontinued.

These examples give an overview of how broadcasters assessed and responded to early problems of reception. It soon became clear that music programmes which met the contemporary African tastes were the most popular and far surpassed actuality programmes. But by changing the style and content of news, features and talks to suit the demands of the audience, their ratings were significantly increased. In the end, however, reception can not be controlled from the producing end of radio communication and the reactions of the audience went far beyond mere misunderstandings.

Listeners were well aware of the political leanings of the station and by no means took the messages and views communicated through it for granted. Broadcasters found that "educated Africans" in particular listened to the BBC, either directly to the shortwave broadcasts from London or to the relays from Salisbury. They held the CABS by the standard of BBC news, and soon demanded "controversial broadcasts on political and social subjects." Listener research revealed that "the more elementary programmes" did not have as big a following as "adult" discussion programmes, and suspected that was "because the listener instinctively felt that he was being 'spoken down to'."\textsuperscript{723} This was probably due to the fact that in 1951 educated members of the African middle class formed the biggest part of the audience. But it is not to say that they were the only ones complaining. As early as the 1940s, Africans in rural areas resisted government propaganda and actively tried to influence pro-

\textsuperscript{722} Fraenkel 2005, 183.
\textsuperscript{723} all quotes from NR Inf. Dep. Annual Report 1951, 7f.
gramme content. When asked to sing motivational songs for the war effort to be broadcast, school choirs inserted contradictory verses: "You chiefs/Don't send your people/To this war/It's an aerial war." Teachers, upon the command "Number!", let their pupils sing "Number 1, 2, 3, 4, 5/The country is crying." The slogan described above also evoked expressly political, anti-Federation interpretations: "Though it's small, it's a heavy load. Though the Europeans are few, they are powerful. They'll get the better of us in that planned federation."

Other reactions to programmes were more varied. As Hortense Powdermaker found in 1953, the talks on farming and agriculture mentioned in Chapter 4 generated mixed reactions. Although one listener welcomed them "because they help the well-being of the people, so that they will not be hungry and will have more clothing and more wealth; and trade, too, is increased", others were not so appreciative. They put the talks into context:

"These Europeans have come here and introduced the new methods of farming, but they have pushed the Africans to rocky places. Now they force Africans to use the European methods of farming in these rocky places. How can they expect us to grow food on rocks? If they know better, then why didn't they occupy these rocky places and improve them? The Europeans are unfair."

Another listener explained the difficulties for African farmers to implement the recommended techniques:

"I remember hearing a talk about agriculture. I heard that ridges would be introduced so as to keep the fertility of the soil unharmed by running water or wind. I also heard that people were refusing to make these contour lines or ridges because it was such hard work. I feel that people were right to refuse, because we have no special machines to work with. Europeans have tractors, ploughs, and other special farm equipment to make the contour lines. But we Africans don't have them. How can we make contour lines with hoes only? This is very hard work."

Listeners had their own motivations for listening to the radio. When asked about their reasons for listening to the news, some of Powdermaker's interviewees stated that they wanted "to find out if a war was going on." Many adults had experienced the Second World War, some in the Asian war theatres, and older people still remembered World War I. Through radio, listeners had heard of the Korean War and of the atomic bomb. "Any news connected with war was heard in the context of suspicions..."

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724 Masiye 1977, 16f.
725 Fraenkel 1959, 152.
726 all quotes from Powdermaker 1962, 250f.
that Europeans had malevolent intentions of sending Africans to war."\(^{727}\) Masiye cites an example of the impact the radio had on villagers' lives. A CABS recording van from one of its tours brought back the following "traditional" song:

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{Kanzi mwamywa?} & \text{Have you heard?} \\
\text{Wayalesi yanena} & \text{The radio has been talking} \\
\text{Ikuti kuli mtendere} & \text{It says there is peace} \\
\text{Ku Lusaka} & \text{In Lusaka} \\
\end{array}
\]

"On hearing a musical message like this one, the crowd would grunt satisfaction. Their affairs were safe. The wireless would have informed them if anything was the matter."\(^{728}\)

Other political news items from the colony were not at all interesting to African listeners, although newscasters would consider them as newsworthy and important. Upon news of a new Governor being installed, an interviewee stated: "It did not make any difference to me, since they are only Europeans who favor their fellow Europeans. Had they said that Harry Nkumbula, president of African [National] Congress, was going somewhere, I would be sorry, since he is trying to fight for my sake and my children."\(^{729}\)

As these examples show, African listeners balanced information they got from CABS with other sources and with their own experiences. While broadcasters thought about how best to communicate messages so that they would not be 'misunderstood', people on the receiving end of the Saucepan could sometimes understand the news only too well, and interpreted it according to what they saw as their own interest. This pertains especially to everything connected to the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland.

**Listener Resistance to Propaganda**

The shift of political and economic power towards the settler-dominated south that accompanied the introduction of the Federation in 1953 could not be glossed over by CABS. It soon became all too clear that the station's propagandistic power was limited. Broadcasters in CABS found themselves caught between Federal demands for promoting a political entity they themselves did not support, as well as accusations of

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\(^{727}\) Ibid., 245.  
\(^{728}\) Masiye 1977, 22. [italics in the original] Masiye here seems to use the term "traditional" to denote the musical form of the song.  
\(^{729}\) Powdermaker 1962, 244.
betrayal from African listeners. The strong resistance of Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to any kind of political connection with the South went back to before the Second World War, when European settlers had started to voice ideas of amalgamation. Africans knew very well, as nationalists did not tire pointing out, that outright amalgamation would help European settlers in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to significantly improve their political hold over the territories, otherwise checked by colonial authorities and regulations on land use, protectorate status for parts of the territory and other policies. What happened in a colony in which settlers dominated the political realm was visible in Southern Rhodesia, where the African majority lived under far more repressive conditions than in the northern colonies. While many Africans, although not uncritically, acknowledged that the project of the British colonial government was an advance of the population towards modernity and progress, they abhorred settler politics, the intention of which, they felt, was to hold them in subservience. While settler politicians, after meeting with considerable resistance from African political groupings and colonial authorities, continued to present less radical alternatives to amalgamation (the Federal model being the last in a line), Africans saw all of these as mere camouflage of the intention to secure minority rule. The institutionalisation of Apartheid in South Africa in 1948 only added to the apprehensions. Although the ANC failed to impede the introduction of Federation, it would ultimately strengthen the nationalist movements in both territories and accelerate the development towards the independence of Zambia and Malawi. CABS and its broadcasters became one of the focal points for African outrage.

The extent to which African listeners felt betrayed by the station when it began to broadcast pro-Federation programmes is very visible in attacks against recording vans throughout the colony and "banyama" (Vampire) rumours that were circulating in Lusaka. Rumours had long been a part of life for the broadcasters, and Peter Fraenkel recalls the problems CABS had with news items leading to uncontrollable rumours. However, while broadcasters had previously tried to avoid 'misunderstandings' and laugh off the occasional misinterpretation, the "banyama scare" presented a real danger. Banyama rumours had circulated in the colony (and other regions) since the 1930s. Luise White has argued that the rumours linked "ideas about the

731 There were several terms for the rumour, differing from one province to another. Banyama is the term used by scholars to refer to the rumours in Northern Rhodesia. cf. Musambachime 1988, 201-15.
alienation of labour power with those about the circulation of money and commodities and the commoditisation of blood."\textsuperscript{732} The rumours did not involve Dracula-style undead vampires, but rather living men killing Africans to collect blood and/or (parts of) the brain to give it to Europeans for use in pharmaceutical products. Other variations included cannibalism, men being abducted for slave labour in the Belgian Congo or a serum that turned men into pigs that were then slaughtered and sold in butcheries. The Information Office tried to use "Mutende" as a forum to discredit the rumour, via reader's letters and editorial comments, calling on "educated Africans to help 'kill' the rumour."\textsuperscript{733}

With the advent of the Federation, a political twist was added to the rumours. They were now connected to the Capricorn Africa Society, a liberal, multi-racial pressure group that was Southern Rhodesian in origin but Central African in outlook. It had not only dedicated itself to promoting a "just Race Relations policy\textsuperscript{734} and racial partnership but also supported the attempts to unite the three colonies. Although more liberal than the settlers, it drew some hostility from Africans because it campaigned for Federation, and probably because Africans saw its form and methods as conspiratorial. Consequently, Africans who appeared to be opposed to the ANC, or too moderate, were considered pro-European and called out as "Capricorns." They were "seen as being 'political informers for the colonial government' and being against the aspirations of their own people who were struggling for self-determination."\textsuperscript{735} Soon, the allegations against "Capricorns" included being banyama. Because the station and, by extension, its broadcasters were seen and heard promoting the Federation, especially the more prominent African announcers were accused of being banyama, having been brought under the control of Capricorn Africa Society. Alick Nkhata and Edward Kateka were the most prominent accused. Peter Fraenkel saw a rationale behind the rumour: "How could the announcers broadcast 'bad news', news which displeased Africans, unless they had lost all their will-power? How else could they be made to read pro-Federation propaganda on the air?"\textsuperscript{736} The story acquired a very real power when a mob assembled at Edward Kateka's house, whom they

\textsuperscript{733} Musambachime 1988, 209.
\textsuperscript{734} quoted in Phiri 2006, 34. cf. ibid. for an analysis and reevaluation of the Society's influence on politics in Northern Rhodesia.
\textsuperscript{735} Musambachime 1988, 212.
\textsuperscript{736} Fraenkel 1959, 202.
accused of having abducted a child, and chased him until he found refuge in a police station. Luise White speculates that the specific banyama rumours about African broadcasters were connected to their work as, essentially, storytellers: "What did cause these accusations? Was it the general panic, the men themselves, the stories newscasters told on the air or the way they told those stories?" She suggests that "it was the work that was suspicious, not the man." Alick Nkhata's concerts were still very popular, and the audience laughed at a new song that joked about banyama. "But during the interval when he went to get some fresh air, members of the audience strolling around outside shrieked when they noticed him among them and fled in terror."

In any case, the banyama accusations were a drastic – and potentially harmful – way for listeners to voice their discontent with the CABS station's "pro-Federation propaganda." In addition, recording vans "had their tyres punctured in remote villages" and Africans returned to the practices from the 1940s: "If they could be persuaded to [record songs], many of their songs had the refrain, 'We don't want Federation.'" Masiye quotes from the song:

*Ife sitifuna Federeshoni*  
*Tifuna boma la anthu akuda*  
We do not want Federation  
We want a black government

Although voiced in the paternalistic tone he would later apologize for, Fraenkel acknowledged what this reaction meant: "The African masses expressed themselves in primitive and irrational ways, but their fears were real and rational and, in my view, to a large extent justified."

**The Role of Music in Anti-Colonial Resistance**

Reactions to and resistance against Federation did not only show itself in demonstrations, attacks and rumours, but permeated everyday culture in Northern Rhodesia, especially, as the above cited example shows, through songs. Listeners reinter-

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737 White 2000, 304.  
738 Fraenkel 1959, 205.  
739 Ibid., 207.  
740 Masiye 1977, 23. Italics in the original.  
741 Frankel 1959, 207. In his 2005 memoir, Fraenkel states that while Rhodesian whites looked down upon the rumours as 'primitive', he remembered the antisemitic stories of Jews sacrificing Christian children for Passover matzos, which were being published "in a country with one of the highest standards of education in the world [...] as fact" by the Nazi newspaper *Der Stürmer* during his childhood in Breslau, implying that rumourmongering has nothing to do with how 'developed' a society is. Fraenkel 2005, 221.
preted songs produced by CABS to give them a nationalist twist. An old song, produced during a campaign for villagers to send their children into school instead of herding cattle was thus given a different twist: "For 'school' [the singers] substituted the name of the party like this:

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\begin{align*}
\text{Nobyzyali} & \quad \text{Parents} \\
\text{Kamubaleka bana} & \quad \text{Leave your children alone} \\
\text{Kamubaleka bana banjile UNIP} & \quad \text{Let them join UNIP} \\
\text{Bakakale kabotu} & \quad \text{So they will have a better life}
\end{align*}
\]

Masiye cites an abundance of other examples. Some songs went so far as to promote violence against those who didn't carry UNIP or ANC cards, or against the members of the respective other nationalist party.\footnote{Masiye 1977, 31ff. Violence between members of the two parties grew in the run-up to the elections in 1962. In some areas, people joined both parties just to be able to show the "right" membership card when approached by violent supporters. cf. Rotberg 1965.} The more subtle songs, however, found their way in CABS programmes. While they were sometimes played deliberately by African broadcasters, they were also often requested by listeners in Zimene Mwatifunsa and similar shows. Although some were banned, colonial officials consistently lagged behind the production and dissemination of new nationalist songs. They could only be banned after officials had been made aware of the content, and even many of the broadcasters simply did not do that. After having been informed, officials would have needed to translate and judge the item in question, which by that time was probably easily replaced by the next song. Through the recording process, "songs in praise of African leaders" found their way into the CABS music library. African listeners and broadcasters also shared alternative interpretations of seemingly harmless Western pop songs, mocking, for example, the practice of European shopkeepers refusing to serve Africans inside the shop, but only from a hatch in the side wall: "The song 'How Much is the Dog [sic] in the Window?' was made to refer to the white shopkeeper, butcher or bakery owner, who attended African customers through the hatch. In this way, we laughed at our indignities."\footnote{all quotes from Masiye 1977, 29f. The original title of the song is "How Much Is That Doggie In The Window."}

To acknowledge the role music played in anti-colonial resistance, it is important to note that it can promote a sense of community, provide information, emotion and a narrative that makes sense of complex political and social processes.\footnote{cf. Pedelty, Mark. 2010. Musical News: Popular Music in Political Movements, in: Bird, S. Elizabeth (ed.): The Anthropology of News & Journalism: Global Perspectives, Bloomington/Indianapolis, 215-37.} As noted earlier, Alick Nkhata and other musicians tried to help their audience to come to terms...
with their place in a rapidly changing social environment. He and other artists also wrote political songs and performed at UNIP rallies. Songs were not only easy to produce, disseminate and consume, but the fact that music held a central place in Zambian popular culture meant that there was already an established set of musical and performance practices to build upon. The emotional power of music to mobilise people for political action was recognised by liberation movements all over the region. Sylvester Masiye mentions the central role Bartolomeo Bwalya, "the doyen of UNIP singers", played at party rallies:

"Bwalya always knew when [Kaunda] and the crowd appreciated a musical interruption. His specialty was the guitar and his gravelly, Satchmo-like voice. [H]e was the best political chronicler of current affairs. Bwalya changed the words of many Kalela songs [a popular type of music originating from Luapula Province in the North, RH] and politicized them. As he slung his guitar about and faced the crowd, more applause greeted him."745

The Voice of UNIP radio team (until 1963 led by Masiye) in Dar es Salaam attached great importance to music as a medium to get its message across to the listeners, and repeatedly urged party officials in Lusaka to provide them with suitable recordings, preferably by popular singers who supported UNIP, like Bwalya and Nkhata.746 Masiye introduced and closed his election commentaries with recordings or sang himself, like Bwalya reinterpreting traditional tunes by adding political texts. In dire need of recordings, he also formed a UNIP choir in Dar es Salaam, let exiled members of other nationalist parties in Central Africa record, and got hold of banned political songs held in their audio library in the Blantyre studio through his contacts.747 The circulation of alternative ideological messages in the form of songs throughout the colony played no small part in political mobilisation for the nationalist parties. Thus, the CABS and the FBC were inadvertently integrated into what one could call a culture of resistance. On the one hand, music produced by the station was reinterpreted and reappropriated. On the other hand, it was used consciously, though most of the time not openly, by listeners and at least some broadcasters to disseminate anti-Federation content. Besides the open contempt towards the Federation and the CABS/FBC as its mouthpiece, which subsided after the initial reactions and the banyama scare, listeners reacted in more complex ways to undermine the propagandistic char-

745 Masiye 1977, 83.
747 Masiye 1977, 110.
acter of Federal programme content.

Radio as Symbol and Agent of Social Change

Debra Spitulnik has argued that Zambian colonial radio was connected to modernity in four different ways: It belonged to an overall ideological project of modernity; listeners developed practices of modernity around it; and, in that context, there was an experience of modernity and a way of talking about modernity.\(^748\)

Radio use spread through the colony simultaneous to processes of 'modernisation'. "It coincided with the increasing industrialisation of Central Africa and rapid increases in African incomes. Radio was becoming a 'must', a coveted symbol of status among a wide range of people."\(^749\) In Zambia as in other colonies, the medium was seen as an embodiment as well as a promoter of 'development': "[b]ridges, roads, health initiatives, and radio sets were combined into concrete, material expressions of the developmentalist work of the colonial regime and its continual aim of progress." Radio was one of many infrastructural projects of late colonialism, but it also gave publicity to the others.\(^750\) It acted as a "doubly articulated technology," as a material object as well as a communication modality. "[R]adio was construed as a new and high status technology, which carried messages about what was high status and new."\(^751\) It lent ideological coherence to the overall developmentalist project and moderated the problems that came with social change. For contemporary anthropologists, radio was "a reinforcing and contributing agent functioning with other social and economic agents of change." It "gave meanings and clues to many problems in the new world and some sense of control over it."\(^752\) Again, music played a central role in this:

"A major problem for the tribal peoples becoming modern is that for the first time they are faced with many choices. Traditional-minded elders who disapproved of the new town customs could not give guidance. The songs offered advice to urban young men faced with alternatives and gave them the comfort of knowing that their temptations and problems were not unique."\(^753\)

Letters to the Lusaka station published in 1950 reveal that many listeners made the connection between radio and modernity or "progress" themselves. "Let everyone

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748 cf. Chapter 1.
749 Fraenkel 1959, 137.
750 Larkin 2008, 61.
751 Spitulnik 1998, 68.
752 Powdermaker 1962, 252f.
753 Ibid., 241.
listen, because it is by listening that he will encourage himself and his daughter to follow the way of progress" or "Time has come for Africans to wake up by means of the help Government renders", they read. The communications were published in a government report put together by Harry Franklin to demonstrate the success of the Saucepan Special. It is unclear what criteria he used to select the excerpts (all of the letters are positively euphoric about the set). Thus, no conclusions can be made as to how representative they are of the whole body of listeners’ letters and of the reactions of consumers in general. Franklin gives a total number of 312 letters received in the first four months after the first shipment of Saucepan sets (i.e., since September 1949), the period under review. The report quotes from 54 of these. Only 2 come from Europeans, and only some of the writers identify their occupations, including several chiefs and teachers. More than half of the letters were sent in from provincial capitals, so it is probably safe to assume they originated in rural areas.

As Debra Spitulnik has pointed out, despite the mentioned limitations, the letters can be used to analyse listeners' experience of modernity, as mediated through radio. First, radio was "experienced as affecting the relations of time and space." Many writers expressed joy at having "the WHOLE WORLD [sic] in my house." People could "talk to each other as of same village [sic]" or enjoy a Remembrance Day Service "as if they were in the chapel from which the service was conducted." Such statements, argues Spitulnik, display predications about time as well as space, an "understanding that two distinct places are linked via a shared activity in synchronous time." While many media analysts describe this experience as a broadening of space, Spitulnik adds rightly that it is also about a contraction of space. Through the machine, listeners were connected to the administrative and political centre – "from Lusaka there can come words as if the one speaking is just with me in my house" –, to each other, and to the world – "I hear news from all over the districts in Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Nyasaland." Powdernaker's contemporary analysis supports this point. She described the effect of radio as bridging the distance between town and country: "In the space of an hour or two, [radio] took the listener from one to the other, without giving him a sense of disparity." Or, as one

754 Franklin 1950b, 11. [Letters by Steven F.M. Leith, Kasama and Henry Bruce Kumwenda, Lusaka].
755 Ibid., 6.
757 all quotes from Franklin 1950b. emphasis in the original.
758 Spitulnik 1998, 68.
759 Franklin 1950b.
of her interviewees put it: "When [Kunda music] is on the program, I forget I am in Luanshya and think I am in the rural." 760

Thus, even without the government consciously developing programmes to 'build the nation', radio had a unifying effect. However, this is not to say that the argument made in Chapter 4 – that radio became a unifying factor through deliberately constructing a virtual national space rather than through inherent aspects of the medium – is invalid. Although the technical setup surely encouraged such a use, the infrastructure had to be constructed to fit this. With the studio in Lusaka and transmitters dispersed over the territory, radio infrastructure mirrored administrative structure. Federal politicians expanded infrastructure – from roads to radio coverage – to connect the three territories together. Zimbabwean announcers and technicians were sent to Lusaka, and contribution centres were established all over Central Africa – in Kitwe, Umtali, Bulawayo, Blantyre, and Zomba. 761 The infrastructural setup in both cases presented here played a role in how the virtual space was constructed – centred around a national outline, or on specific communities, or on a larger, federal, scale.

Thus, listeners' reactions present themselves as complex and varied. While they dismissed the pro-Federation propaganda and developed an aggressive contempt of its representatives at CABS, the medium itself continued its rise towards the most important mass medium in the colony. Despite its political function, it still symbolized modernity and progress to the listeners. The struggle for Zambia's independence was not fought about what the country should develop into, but how it was supposed to get there. Nationalist politicians did not criticise the idea that Zambia should be a 'modern' society, but that colonialism or minority rule was the right path toward that goal. The banyama rumours about broadcasters didn't stop the audience from using the radio and listening to the programmes. Rather, one could speculate, the fact that broadcasters became the main target of the rumours supports the notion that listeners attached great importance to the medium.

760 Powdermaker 1962, 236.
2. A Unified Nation? Language, Hegemony and Nation-Building in Zambia

By the time the country became independent, listening to the radio was an everyday experience in Zambia. Eighty two per cent of respondents to a survey conducted in the major urban areas in the summer of 1965 had at least once listened, while 77 per cent tuned in regularly to the ZBC Home Service. Half of all respondents (mostly the younger and more affluent) owned a radio. As the figures were nearly the same for men and women, it is probably safe to assume that the average radio-owning household was that of a younger middle class couple or family. For the first time, peak listening times were identified. The highest ratings (on weekdays) were detected between 6.45 and 7 a.m. (22 per cent); another main listening period started in the afternoon (16 per cent on 6 p.m.) and peaked around 7.45 to 8 p.m. (23 per cent), after which ratings gradually went down. A majority of listeners tuned in to programmes in ChiBemba (40 per cent), followed by ChiNyanja (26 per cent) as their first choice. Both languages also featured prominently as second choices. Neither findings are surprising, given that the survey was only conducted in the main urban areas where the majority of Africans worked in the industrial or service sector, so that leisure times would fit into those time slots, and that in those areas ChiBemba or ChiNyanja are linguae francae that even listeners with other first languages speak and understand. Despite these figures, listeners were highly critical of the claim that "[t]he seven (7) main vernacular languages on [sic] the Media represent all seventy three (73) tribes found in Zambia."763

The Language Question...

Language diversity as a main issue for listeners in post-colonial Zambia was already established months before the country became independent. The NRBC, created on the 1st of January 1964 with the intention of preparing the ground for a future public broadcaster, received demands to include the respective languages of the complainants in programming. A letter to the editor of the Central African Mail summarised and criticised this tendency:

"It has almost become a habit with some people to complain about the languages broadcast on the


NRBC, and it seems the Corporation is yielding [sic] little by little to these pressures. Every tribe seems to think that it ought to be represented on the NRBC since the country has achieved self-rule. Will these people be reminded that there are 60 tribes, and therefore 60 languages in Northern Rhodesia? And that there are only seven days in a week in which all these languages are supposed to be broadcast? Such complaints stem from an inferiority complex, and no sensible person can follow them.\textsuperscript{764}

Another letter shows the complexity of the problem the then ZBC was facing: "The Tonga, Lenje and Ila are known as the 'Bantu Botatwe' (which means 'The Three Peoples'), and I understand that they are represented on the ZBC by the Tonga. But Tonga is such a difficult language with lots of phrases which a Lenje-Speaking person cannot understand."\textsuperscript{765} Here lay the problem: even those languages considered related enough that they could be represented by the one with the biggest group of speakers were difficult for the respective minority groups to understand. Although these problems had existed before, and although a significant majority of listeners in urban areas (77 per cent)\textsuperscript{766} listened to other languages than their own, the problem had been ignored by politicians and broadcasters, if not even enforced by thinking about 'standardising' the diverse languages. Now, the rural population in particular started to demand full representation of their respective languages, in compliance with the national doctrine that declared all ethnic groups in Zambia as "equally different."

Debra Spitulnik has described the intricacies of this policy:

"National discourse thus attempts to diffuse the political dimensions of ethnicity at the same time that it promotes an image of the state as tolerant of diversity. References to the more volatile differences between ethnic groups, particularly their inequalities in population, political positions, and economic resources, are avoided at all costs. Furthermore, there is no direct discussion of ethnic favouritism or conflict at the national level (except to denounce them), although both significantly structure social relations and politics, and are frequent topics of everyday conversation."

Although Spitulnik refers to the situation in Zambia at the end of the 1980s, the discourse was formed early in the independent country's history. Kaunda from 1964 on condemned 'tribalism' as a discriminatory practice, and balanced political appointments so that representatives of all ethnic groups would be integrated into the political system. After the introduction of the one-party state, fears of a tribalist revival and

\textsuperscript{764} Is NRBC Yielding to Pressures? [letter by Mrs. A.J. Phiri, Mufulira], in: Central African Mail, 10.06.1964, 9.
\textsuperscript{765} Tonga [letter by Landros C. Laishi, Mumbwa], Central African Mail, 8.1.1964, 7.
\textsuperscript{766} This quota may be a bit disproportionate. Graham Mytton asserted in a study five years later that respondents tended to overstate their knowledge of broadcast languages. Institute for African Studies/Zambia Broadcasting Services Research Project. 1970. National Mass Media Audience Survey: the Major Towns, 41. NAZ 20/170
ethnic conflict were also raised to argue against multi-party democracy: "The national claim to build unity, fend off tribalism, and also encourage unique ethnic cultures, creates a cautious pluralism within bounds, where diversity always verges on divisiveness, and where attention to difference itself borders on subversion." This national discourse was dominated by UNIP, who after Independence struggled to keep its dominant position in the political system. "[T]he drive for political supremacy was entwined with UNIP's search for national unity, seen as the prerequisite for nation-building." These issues played out in a very concrete and direct way in Zambia's state broadcaster. But it also had an effect on Zambian society and the spaces different ethnic groups occupied in it. The choice of the seven languages broadcast was taken over from colonial times, and it left a strong legacy on which languages were "associated with different prestige values and domains of use in the national context, primarily through the 'uneven development' of the ethnic groups speaking them and their concurrent unequal valuation in broadcasting." Thus, after the change to ZBS, the selection of "the big two" as linguae francae broadcast on the "General Service", although rooted in social realities, continued to be contested by listeners: "Some languages have more hours [and] only two of the seven languages are on the General Service. [This is] unfair as far as the motto 'One Zambia, One Nation' is concerned." Thus the invocation of the national motto could backfire when listeners refused to accept the glossing over inequalities and silent preferences given to the "big two" practised in Zambian language policy.

The hierarchy of languages was not only apparent in the allocation of time and spots in the programme schedule, but also in terms of staff, infrastructural resources and, consequently, programme content. The issue of "stale" news on the Home Service that the Siyomunji report brought up in 1968 pertained to all these areas: broadcasters were convinced that the General Service was valued higher and tried to move there; the news on the Home Service came late because there were not enough translators for the respective languages, and listeners complained that they had to put up with yesterday's news. The same report gave some prominence to the issue of language and explained that listeners, when asked, continued to complain

767 all quotes from Spitulnik 1992, 339.
768 Phiri 2006, 132.
769 Spitulnik 1992, 341.
771 cf. Chapter 4.
772 cf. Chapter 4.
that 'their' respective language was either not broadcast at all or allocated too little time, and that Bemba and Nyanja were allocated "what they claimed to be excessive-ly long hours of broadcasting [...]." The answer of the Commission shows that the is-sue of language hierarchy was intertwined with larger issues of cultural and political hegemony of ethnic groups in Zambia. While they acknowledged that the problem could not be solved by further restructuring the channels, the authors of the report re-*commended that "recording teams should be sent to all parts of Zambia to record tradi-tional music and interviews which would be broadcast on Radio Zambia", so that the different ethnicities were at least represented in radio through their cultural pro-ducts. However, in the end the report only relocated a real solution to the future: "It may be the education of the people of Zambia which will in the long run solve the problem."773 With this, the authors showed themselves remarkably close in attitude to Harry Franklin, who like Kittermaster had envisioned radio as the modernising agent that could dissolve the African "babel of tongues" and support an "eventual development of one African tongue."774 Language division, as Debra Spitulnik's research shows, would remain a major problem in broadcasting for decades to come.

...and the Larger Issues Behind it

For the management of the ZBS as well as the listeners, the problem of language allocation was only part of much larger issues. As a government department, the ZBS now placed an emphasis on the five-year economic National Development Plan that the government implemented from 1966, and issues of national unity and identity with it. Multilingual listeners interpreted the existence or non-existence of their respective language in programmes as a marker of which ethnic group was hegemonic in Zam-bian society, politics and culture. To include more languages in programmes was not just an issue of reaching more listeners, it was above all a question of which cultures and ethnic groups were a significant part of the Zambian nation and which were not. Listeners voiced complaints not because they didn't understand the languages, but because they felt their specific culture was underrepresented in the respective pro-grammes. Lamba-speaking listeners who neither expressed nor showed problems in understanding ChiBemba (a related language), nevertheless demanded to be in-

774 Franklin 1950a, 16.
cluded in cultural programming: "The addition of Lamba or Lala in radio broadcasting would enable us to have our traditional music. The young ones are forgetting their ancestral life." Graham Mytton, the author of a study that collected such statements, acknowledged the grievances that stood behind this:

"The desire to preserve the language, and with it the culture and traditions of the Lamba people, was prompted by the desire to guard against domination by a larger group. There was little doubt that the Lamba people understood Bemba language broadcasts; the objection was not connected to the problem of comprehension. There were those who would accept the use of Bemba language on the radio realising that with the large number of languages and dialects in Zambia it would be unrealistic to expect the ZBS to use all of them. Nevertheless, such people said, this should not lead to the almost total exclusion of the music and culture of those other language groups which are supposed to be catered for by the Bemba language broadcasts."

Similar views were expressed by other ethnic groups whose languages were supposed to be covered by the ChiBemba programmes, as well as minority languages in relation to other broadcast languages. In some cases, speakers of a minority language who had problems understanding (e.g., Nkoya speakers without formal education, who didn't understand SiLozi) refrained from listening to ZBS altogether. Also, interviewees voiced "a certain resentment of perceived Bemba dominance of ZBS broadcasts in that language", claiming that Bemba broadcasters "tend[ed] to select their own music." Lenje speakers, although accepting Tonga broadcasts, felt that those were dominated by the Plateau Tonga. There were no similar complaints against the ChiNyanja broadcasts; according to Mytton this was because "[t]he Nyanja language is less attached in peoples' minds to any particular tribal group." Nevertheless, "[m]any listeners genuinely felt that the broadcasts were not for them but for people of another culture or another tribe."

All these findings show that the language issue was not about understanding, it was about which ethnic, language or cultural groups were an important part of the Zambian nation and which were 'negligible'. The Home Service failed to include all ethnic groups, and programmes were dominated by the respective culture of hegemonic languages. Given that the pronounced policy of the Zambian government and, consequently, of ZBS, was to treat all ethnic groups equally and individually, the broadcaster failed to deliver. Additionally, when asked if they favoured more or less

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Zambian music on the radio, many listeners added that they would actually prefer "their own" music, i.e. 'traditional' music of their respective ethnic group. CABS had set a high standard with their regular and frequent recording tours, a standard its successor, because of lack of infrastructure, failed to meet.\(^{776}\) "Many times the survey interviewers were asked: 'When is the ZBS going to come and record our music?' The question was [...] related closely in listeners' minds to the language questions." Mytton as well as the Siyomunji Report strongly recommended stepping up the recording van scheme, as, both reports argued,

"[t]hat way [listeners] would feel they were participating in broadcasting. It would also give them a sense of 'belonging' to a national community of cultures in which their own played a visible (or audible) part. This attitude tended to be regarded by some in authority as parochial or 'tribal' attitude. In effect though it may be the exact opposite. The national identity the ZBS was supposed to promote might well have been assisted by a greater attention to particular local cultures and local traditions."\(^{777}\)

Despite the recommendations, ZBS, mainly because of drastic budget cuts, could not return to the CABS practice of recording. The whole issue went unresolved. Added to that was the fact that younger listeners in particular wanted to hear more modern African music (for example, Congolese rhumba music), and the lack of transmitters that failed to ensure nation-wide coverage. All these factors led listeners to tune in to foreign radio stations.

**Ensuring Listener Loyalty**

Tuning in to other radio stations is the simplest and most obvious way listeners express their dissatisfaction with radio (or TV) stations or programmes. For ZBS, it was an existential problem if listeners turned to foreign radio stations, as Zambia was surrounded by hostile governments – such as the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, where African struggle for independence would soon escalate into full-blown civil war; Rhodesia, whose white minority government was boycotted by Zambia (putting a significant economic strain on a country that was depended on trade routes to South African ports); and the Apartheid regime to the south. Foreign stations other than the Tanzanian and Congolese were regarded as hostile. South African or Rhodesian radio stations sported a significantly better infrastructure and therefore of-
ferred much better reception; therefore (and because the music was more up to date), a significant minority in the Souther Provinces listened to them. Radio RSA deliberately used modern African and international pop music to get listeners to tune in. A Chinese donation of two 50 kW short-wave and one 200 kW medium-wave transmitters improved the situation for the ZBS, but the underlying problem remained. Around half of the listeners continued to tune in to other radio stations, especially the Mozambican station Lourenço Marques and Radio RSA. The reasons given include bad reception and choice of programmes (people tuned in to other stations to listen to music when ZBS broadcast talks). However, interviewees did not always give the correct information; Mytton found that the figures for listening to Radio RSA were much higher than actually given by his respondents and assumed this was because "the fact that such broadcasts had been criticised by leading political figures within Zambia had made listeners wary about admitting to any stranger that they still listened." Interviewees showed themselves generally mistrustful of their government, and their reaction to the interviewers coming from the University of Zambia tells something about their attitude towards ZBS as a government institution:

"It is very difficult to get many people to express views, and I am not sure whether this means that many people do not have opinions, or that they are afraid or reluctant to express them. I believe the latter is the case and so also do the Zambian research assistants who have been carrying out the interviews. In spite of the fact that these research assistants are experienced in interviewing, they often reported having encountered hostility and suspicion. Sometimes this would be for political reasons – they would be suspected of being the agents of UNIP or ANC. At other times hostility arose out of a general suspicion of Government and the belief that the research team was 'from Government.'"

This proved difficult especially when asking for listeners' opinion on languages:

"Many people found the interview situation strange, and even sometimes a little frightening. Why should a complete stranger come many hundreds of miles to ask a long list of questions which included some seeking views on controversial issues? Many people thought at first there was some hidden reason behind our visit. It also became clear to us that some were answering the questions on language policy in the way they thought we wanted the questions to be answered. There was an understandable tendency among such people to favour the status quo." 

Music programmes remained the most popular for Zambian listeners. News and

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780 Mytton 1974, 91.
782 Mytton 1974, 64.
actuality programmes, on the other hand, were listened to much less often, and only a few interviewees could remember exact information on either international or domestic news. "Major items of news were not recalled even by regular listeners." Mytton concluded that this was due to the way the news was presented – not only were translations late, they were often inadequate, too. Also, the Home Service broadcast too few news slots over the day – only three news programmes informed listeners in Zambian languages, and they were not broadcast during the peak listening times. Many items were not repeated, so that in order to hear all the news, listeners had to tune several times during the day.  

The issues described in this chapter were not new to listeners in Zambia; however, only after Independence could such a grievance as that of language representation be voiced. The FBC had never had a space for this issue, and it only became important when the task of nation-building became primary for Zambian state broadcasting. The problem could however not be solved; lack of infrastructure, inexperienced staff and political issues prohibited any development. The more authoritarian Zambian politics grew, the less listeners would complain, which made listener research, as shown, tricky. How were researchers supposed to find out what Zambians thought about the language issue when interviewees suspected ulterior motives for asking?

In the years immediately after independence, the complaints were openly raised in listeners' letters to the station or in newspapers. However, given that the state brought the station more and more under control, little could be done by broadcasters and managers, who were hampered by political decisions and short budgets. The government didn't bow to pressures, which were in any way much less strong than before independence. While pressure on the colonial radio had been exerted in the context of wider political mobilisation and drive to change the political system, the UNIP government possessed much greater legitimacy precisely because of the nationalist struggle, at least during the time under analysis here. Listeners did not protest openly or in the form of such aggressive rumours as the banyama scare; rather, discontent with Radio Zambia took silent forms where listeners simply chose other stations, including the dreaded Radio RSA. Nevertheless, as in colonial times, listeners in the first years after Independence held the UNIP government to its own

783 Ibid., 104.
standards. The language question was largely debated in terms of national unity, precisely because UNIP had made it an issue of national unity. As with colonial goals to foster progress towards modernity, listeners did not question the goal, but rather the way to it. They formulated particular interests such as the promotion of specific ethnic cultures and traditions in the terminology of national unity that UNIP had established, thus subverting government discourse while at the same time reinforcing it.

3. Contested Hegemony: Afrikaner Dominance and Language Division in the SWABC

Prior to the establishment of the SWABC, radio in 'South West Africa' was a mere extension of the South African broadcasting system. This meant that Namibia, as the 'Fifth Province', was covered by the SABC. Three stations broadcast in the Oshiwambo, Otjiherero and Damara/Nama languages to the respective 'homelands', but other listeners had to settle with programmes that were focused on South African content. First of all, this was a problem for the two non-Afrikaner White groups in Namibia, who protested against the dominance of Afrikaans on the SABC. English speakers in particular complained about the dominance of Afrikaans in South African broadcasting, which had been an issue since the state had taken over radio in the country. The SABC English programmes were seen as inadequate, full of "boring discussions and 'pile-driving' music." Thus, the establishment of the SWABC, while partly motivated by a South African desire to show compliance with international pressure, was also meant as a sign for Namibians – White and Black – that "South West Africa/Namibia" was more than a "Fifth Province" of South Africa. The SWABC was as much a result of internal as external pressure.

By the end of the 1980s, radio ownership had spread so far that on average every household with a radio license in Namibia commanded more than one set; in households that listened predominantly to the A/E/G-Services, on average more than two persons possessed a set; even in the other, 'Black', Language Services, the average household had more than one. As the numbers researched in this particular inquiry only referred to households with a radio license, and by far the biggest part of return-
ed questionnaires came from Whites, the real numbers were probably lower; nevertheless, taken together with the fact that group listening was common, they point to the fact that access to radio had become a matter of course. More than half of the respondents declared that they listened to radio for at least 4 hours per day, and more than a third even for at least 6 hours. This shows that radio was still the most important mass medium, especially in Namibia, where national TV was introduced only during the Eighties, and special technical equipment was needed to receive South African or foreign stations. SWABC Radio was also the main news source, with 75 per cent of respondents stating they received their most recent news from it.

In 1980s Namibia, peak listening times were significantly different for the A/E/G Services compared to the O/K/C and H/D/N/T Services. While the first were listened to predominantly in the mornings, the 'Black' Language Services had their peak in the evenings. This, however, was probably due to the fact that White listeners more often had access to a TV and would spend the evening in front of it instead of the radio.

The Failure of a National Service

Comparing the numbers of listeners to the different Language Services with the first languages of respondents, it becomes clear that the Afrikaans Service was not the most important Service, even for the White population. 92 per cent of listeners to the Afrikaans Service had Afrikaans as a first language; the rest was made up predominantly of English- and German-speakers, and a few Otjiherero- and Damara/Nama-speakers. The SWABC's goal, to make the Afrikaans Service the one that catered for the national population was clearly not met. Nevertheless, throughout the decade, the SWABC maintained the idea of the Afrikaans Service as the national one, an idea that was, for example, expressed through its priority in news programming. The management, when confronted with complaints about the dominance of the Service, continued to argue that it catered to all Namibians. As SWABC research showed, listeners did not share this opinion – nearly all respondents only listened to

786 The triple division in SWABC infrastructure is analysed in Chapter 2.
788 It has to be added that this included Non-White groups, such as the Rehobother Basters (a community of mixed Afrikaner and Nama heritage that have Afrikaans as a first language) and parts of the population that saw themselves as ethnic Damara or Nama, but had Afrikaans as first language.
their respective Language Service. Even the Damara/Nama Service had a higher percentage of non-first language speakers than the Afrikaans Service, and it was the English Service that showed a quota of 52 per cent listeners with other mother tongues. Again, nearly all of these listeners came from the other two White groups, so it too, could not boast of reaching a national audience. Thus, while the Afrikaans and English Services reached a majority of the White listenership in Namibia, the Black audience was de facto segregated, with only the Kavango and the Damara/Nama Services reaching a few listeners outside their target communities. Of course, this was also related to the administration's decision to only broadcast the Black Services in their respective 'homelands'. Although Afrikaans was effectively the lingua franca of the country, and therefore the Afrikaans Service the logical candidate for a national channel, listeners refused to tune in to it. Clearly, this was not just a language issue. The Afrikaans Service could not become a substitute for a national channel, because its programme content was dominated by Afrikaner culture.

As these numbers show, especially when compared to the hegemony of Afrikaner-domin in programmes, language segregation in broadcasting was a fact in pre-Independence Namibia that, despite SWABC claims to the contrary, was deeply rooted in programme policy. Listeners turned their backs on the Afrikaans Service, because its alleged double task of catering for the Afrikaans-speaking community and the national public alike was never followed through in earnest; instead, the SWABC just assumed Afrikaner culture to be so hegemonial in Namibia that a channel geared towards a national public would not need to account for the variety of cultures of the majority of the audience. Afrikaner culture was simply conflated with national culture, but the SWABC management failed to take into account the fact that listeners, if nothing else, had a choice in not listening. Thus, the SWABC undermined its proclaimed policy of nation-building, simply because it was impossible to reconcile it with the original task of segregating the population, giving "to each its own". As Zedekia Ngavirue stated, this contradictory policy was absurd to the core: "It's just like saying: the body corporate, the human being, is there to serve its parts, its limbs [...] rather

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789 Many of these, however, gave Afrikaans as their first language. These were probably groups like the "Rehobother Baster".
790 Ibid., 61f.
792 although the cited enquiry was done at a time when an English-language National Channel had been introduced, its high ratings were due to the fact that it overrode all other channels during peak listening times (6.30 a.m. and 9.30 p.m.), cf. SWAUK Radio Prosopname 1989.
The Struggle for Cultural Hegemony

Despite the ignorance of SWABC management and its restrictive programme policy, the struggle over cultural hegemony also manifested itself in radio. After the establishment of the SWABC, English and German speakers started to demand adequate representation. Because the new station sported only one channel for German- and English-speakers alike, the English community started to protest against what they saw as "discrimination." The protest was founded in a struggle over cultural hegemony between Afrikaans- and English-speakers in South Africa that went far back to the founding days of radio. When broadcasting was introduced in the country, it was through private ventures that were controlled by and which initially targeted an "urban English elite." It broadcast exclusively in English and "revealed their assumptions about what activities were appropriate for their leisure hours and the hierarchies of 'quality' in which they ranked various forms of culture. The news was supplied by Reuters, and thus reflected the news agenda of the English press which controlled it." The SABC, which was established in 1936, in taking "a position of apparent neutrality" found itself confronted with demands from either of the two groups, experiencing contradictions of "urban vs. rural; regional vs. national; Afrikaans vs. English." With the political ascent of Afrikaner Nationalism, one group resolved the conflict in its favour when the NP government and the Broederbond brought the corporation under their control and tried to use it to forge "an ethnic unity across class lines which divided Afrikanerdom." However, English listeners were soon given a channel on the SABC, and the introduction of the commercial (though still state-owned) Radio Springbok, which broadcast mainly in English due to companies' preferences for an urban, and in their eyes more affluent audience, provided another outlet for English demands.

The conflict reemerged in 1980s Namibia, when English-speakers again came to feel Afrikaner dominance in state broadcasting. It was exacerbated by the presence

793 Interview Zedekia Ngavirue, 18.08.2006. cf. Ch. 2.
796 Teer-Tomaselli/Tomaselli/Muller 2001, 28.
797 Ibid., 34.
798 Ibid., 46.
of the third White group, German listeners, with whom the English were supposed to share a channel. English language newspapers scandalised reports that English would only take up 30 per cent of air time, and while peak listening times would be reserved for German. English-speaking Namibians frequently referred to Radio Springbok, which had been relayed from the South West African studio of the SABC, and coordinated a "Save English Radio" campaign, arguing that they wanted to keep a full English channel. The campaign collected signatures and tried to mobilise public pressure on the SWABC through pamphlets and advertisements. Interestingly, the campaigners claimed to have mobilised Black Namibians "virtually covering the entire political spectrum", who they argued had "at some time or other stated that English should be at least one of the official languages of an independent Namibia." With this, the campaigners connected the issue to the political struggle for liberation. In 1981, SWAPO had, in a position paper on language policy in an independent Namibia, declared its object to introduce English (instead of Afrikaans) as official language after political change.\textsuperscript{799} While the argument partly drew on the liberal leanings of the English community, a not insignificant part of which supported an independent future for Namibia, it was also a move to instrumentalise Black political struggles inside Namibia, stating that a 30 per cent share of one channel "ignores the wishes of the vast majority of the Territory's population."\textsuperscript{800} According to the campaigners, 35 per cent of the signatures came from Black Namibians. Additionally, German- and Afrikaans-speakers supported the campaign, as did the Republican Party, in the context of its "policy of complete equality for English, Afrikaans and German."\textsuperscript{801} Nevertheless, due to limitations in budget and infrastructure, the SWABC at first did not comply with the demands of English speaking listeners. Despite the pressure, the German and English programmes had to share a channel for the next three and a half years and were only separated in 1983. English listeners, however, continued to complain about the poor quality especially of entertainment programmes on the Service. Compared to Radio Springbok, they found it wanting.

While the issue of the position and space for English on the newly established South West African radio was deeply connected to cultural and political struggles in South Africa, German "Südwesters", who saw themselves as a very distinct group,

\textsuperscript{799} cf. also SWAPO Dep. of Inf. and Pub. 1983.
\textsuperscript{800} "Campaign to Save English Radio Service", Windhoek Advertiser, 05.10.1979.
\textsuperscript{801} "Radio Campaign Spreading", Windhoek Advertiser, 19.10.1979.
were more concerned with having their own cultural niche. From the beginnings, the German community showed great loyalty towards the Service, at one point even going so far as to collect money to ensure the continuation of the Service in its entirety when it came under threat of shortages. Although individual listeners as well as German interest groups did complain, they only did so when they saw their minority rights being compromised, and only spoke for the needs of "Südwesters." What Germans in Namibia wanted from ‘their’ station was a connection to German culture as they saw it, which meant the more conservative aspects of it. They expected to hear classical and military music, "Hörspiele" and features taken over from German radio stations, although the productions of the German public broadcaster were sometimes perceived as too left wing. Compared to German-speakers, English Namibians felt deprived of a Service they felt they were entitled to, especially since the South African radio had provided them with several good channels in the past. And they continually voiced their complaints in the name of not only Namibians of English heritage, but all those who wanted the language to play a larger part in Namibian culture, including Black groups. Even the argument that English could (and should) be the lingua franca of an independent Namibia in the future was voiced, thereby riski
ging politicising the campaign beyond its original goal and connecting it to SWAPO's language policy. Thus, English speakers confronted the cultural hegemony of Afrikanerdome with calls for a more dominant position of English language and culture in Namibia as a whole. As several English language newspapers supported the campaign, the English community had sufficient means at their disposal to mount public pressure against the SWABC.

The Struggle for a Black Audience

Black groups in occupied Namibia commanded over much fewer possibilities to influence the Corporation's programming. In Namibian media, only complaints that fitted the dominant discourse on Namibia and the SWABC were voiced – that is, as in the case of Zambia, the SWABC was held to its own standards. Because the corporation was supposed to cater to all the communities of the country individually, listeners voiced their criticism accordingly. For example, when a Chief of the Mbanderu

Council complained that a Herero announcer had gotten facts on the status of his (the Chief's) father wrong, he claimed this was "misrepresenting" and "misconstruing the real issues concerning the tradition and culture of the Mbanderus."\textsuperscript{803} Others complained about "tribalism" in indigenous language programmes, when songs were played that mocked other ethnic groups. One letter concluded: "To Mr. Piet Venter: let your Corporation practice what your government preaches."\textsuperscript{804} Additionally, nationalist parties inside the country, such as SWANU, exerted pressure on the SWABC as much as they could in the circumstances – as Ngavirue explained, "within their parameters."\textsuperscript{805}

This is not to say that SWABC programmes were not attractive to Black Namibians. The fact that each community in Namibia had 'their own' Service, packed with cultural and entertainment programmes and phone-in programmes which effectively offered a messaging service for relatives who lived far apart, probably accounts for much of the popularity of the Herero or Ovambo Services and others. The Voice of Namibia could not offer elaborate entertainment programmes; the competition for SWABC Language Services in the cultural realm instead came from stations such as Radio RSA or Springbok Radio, which offered modern pop music from South Africa and the rest of the world.

There was much less space in Namibian programmes for a shared musical resistance such as had occurred in colonial Zambia. One important reason for this was that the structure of the SWABC effectively prohibited the formation of a coherent Black audience through the separation into different Language Services, the strong control of the Afrikaans and, later, the National Service. Instead, each Black Language Service, as the numbers quoted above show, only catered for its respective target community, while the geographic limitations of the Services' coverage prohibited audiences from listening in to other Channels. Thus, the audience was far more fragmented than it had been in colonial Zambia. Although the Language Services also produced request programmes and phone-in talk shows, those were censored.\textsuperscript{806} However, in 1980s Namibia, the main political contestant to South African control of the airwaves was the Voice of Namibia.

\textsuperscript{804} "SWABC Racism", The Namibian, 26.06.1987.
\textsuperscript{805} Interview Zedekia Ngavirue, 18.08.2006. cf. Chs. 2 and 4.
\textsuperscript{806} cf. Chapter 4.
Tuning in to the Voice of Namibia

It is difficult to establish substantiated numbers for listeners to the Voice of Namibia. SWAPO itself, under the circumstances, could of course not carry out any kind of listener research, and propagandistic statements about the role of the station in the liberation struggle tell us nothing about its actual impact. VoN broadcasters could not even be sure that the signal came through – only after Namibia’s independence did Robin Makayi, the instructor of VoN broadcasters in Lusaka, find out that the broadcasts from Zambia had been effectively jammed by South African transmitters installed in the Caprivi Strip during the 1980s.\(^{807}\)

Help came from a rather unusual audience: amateur radio operators, an international community that communicates via radio signals and collects Station IDs from broadcast stations all over the world.\(^{808}\) The Station ID is the practice radio stations use to identify themselves on air by means of a call sign, the announcement of the stations’ name, the frequency and broadcasting hours. This is usually repeated at regular intervals. In the case of the Voice of Namibia, it was particularly important to repeat the different frequencies and the dates and hours as well as the languages in which it broadcast as the schedule was very complicated. Amateur radio operators, for whom the challenge lay in picking up signals from as far away as possible, not on-


\(^{808}\) as only very few audio tapes of the Voice of Namibia survived, and at the moment are not in a condition that allows listening to them, Websites of radio aficionados provide one of the few possibilities to get an impression of how the Voice of Namibia actually sounded. The most important ones deserve mention: http://www.clandestineradio.com and http://intervalsignalsonline.net (both accessed on 27.06.2011). The first provides information on historical and still active clandestine stations, the second collects audio files of station signatures from all over the world.

A typical station ID of the Voice of Namibia would sound like this:

“This is the External Service of Voice of Revolutionary Ethiopia, broadcasting to Southern Africa in English on the 31 m band on 9595 KHz. We begin with programs produced by the Voice of Namibia, the radio program of the External Mission of the South West Africa People’s Organisation, SWAPO of Namibia. At 19 hours 30 there will be programs produced by Radio Freedom, the Voice of the African National Congress.

(Song fades in, interrupted by the sound of machine-guns)

(Voice overlay) This is the Voice of Namibia, the radio programme of the External Mission of the South West Africa People’s Organisation, SWAPO of Namibia, transmitting from the Studios of the External Service of Voice of Revolutionary Ethiopia. Our transmitting time from Monday to Sunday is 21 hours Southern and Central African time, 22 hours East African time. We broadcast daily on the following frequency: Shortwave, 31 m band on 9595 Khz.

(Song continues, then fades out)

Good Evening, listeners, countrymen and fellow freedom fighters of our motherland Namibia. You are tuned to the Voice of Namibia, calling listeners particularly in Southern Africa from the studios of Radio Voice of Revolutionary Ethiopia. Today is Saturday, the 12th of November 1981 and we bring you our (?) weekly News Forum programme. Before I hand you over to Comrade Sackey Namugongo, here is a Freedom Song. (Song fades in)"

ly collected them but also wrote to the SWAPO headquarters to report detailed reception statistics. SWAPO's "Namibia Today" proudly presented letters from Australia, the USA, Canada, England and Japan. Nevertheless, the most important information, namely on reception inside Namibia, could not be obtained. SWABC broadcasters, some of whom monitored the Voice of Namibia, claim that VoN transmitters didn't reach Windhoek; however, research in 1978 showed that Radio Tanzania, one of its carriers, was the third most popular station among Oshiwambo speakers in Katutura, the township on the outskirts of the capital. While the South African Apartheid government successfully inhibited the reception of Radio Freedom, because it had established an FM-network early on, thus forcing listeners to buy FM radios, this was not possible in Namibia, where shortwave sets were already common, because listeners had previously depended on foreign stations. All in all, it can be assumed that at least in the area between Windhoek and the northern border, listeners could tune in to the Voice of Namibia if they wanted to do so. Farther to the South, it is highly probable that the signal became too weak, even after it was transmitted from Harare.

In addition to the technical information on whether reception of the SWAPO broadcasts was even possible, there are a few more details that make it possible to give an informed estimate of the station's impact – quantitative as well as qualitative – on the Black majority of the Namibian population. First, some numbers can be found in SWABC listener research and other literature from the period. According to listener research undertaken in 1989, around one quarter of Black SWABC listeners also tuned in to foreign radio stations. Although very few of those admitted to listening to Angolan or Zambian radio – over which the Voice of Namibia was broadcast – the low numbers are probably skewed, because the number of Black respondents was relatively small, and admitting to consuming SWAPO media could be dangerous. As such, respondents may have given false information. The sociologist Gerhard Tötemeyer, in research conducted in 1978 in Namibia's North and Katutura, concluded that while the 'Homeland' station Radio Ovamboland and the external Radio RSA were the most common stations, the Voice of Namibia, broadcast from Tanzania or Zambia, was also very popular. In addition, Tötemeyer surmised that the listeners of

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811 according to research by Lebona Mosia, Charles Riddle and Jim Zaffiro, Radio Freedom only had a regular listenership of 0.3 per cent. Mosia et al. 1994, 16.
the Voice were mostly found among the "modernising élites" – 32 per cent of teachers in Ovamboland indicated they listened in regularly. These elites were all respected community members and multipliers, so that while actual listener numbers may have been not very high, the broadcasts reached a decisive part of the Namibian population. Tötemeyer's research also shows a certain rift between parts 'traditional' elites who might have been attracted by the traditionalism of SWABC programmes, and new elites, who favoured the nationalist discourse mounted by SWAPO media. This, however, is not to say that 'traditional' elites did not support the liberation struggle. Reception is more complex than that – while not just the 'traditional' elites could very much appreciate SWABC cultural programming, they could easily disapprove of the "radio puppet" and support the political struggle for liberation at the same time.

In the interviews conducted for this thesis, as well as interviews and (auto-)biographical information from other sources, ex-Voice of Namibia broadcasters, PLAN soldiers and others give accounts of their experience in listening to the Voice of Namibia. Until the end of the 1970s, the Voice of Namibia could be listened to relatively openly, as repression was not as hard as later: "I should not say that one had to hide by that time. But it came at a later stage, apparently. But I think that by that time, the South African government had not enough personnel to go round and monitor who is doing what. Normally, it happened during the night, around 8, 9, so everybody was at home." Later, as Ekandjo indicates, repression was stepped up. Koevoet units and informers, as well as the apprehended consequences of being caught and possibly tortured in a police station, significantly heightened the risk of tuning in to the Voice of Namibia, at least in the area close to the border. Listeners would, for example, duck under a cover to muffle the noise – especially when jamming transmitters were active, as the broadcast would be overlaid with a high-pitched, ear-piercing beep or other noises which made hearing the actual broadcast difficult and facilitated potential discovery by informers.

Despite the lengths listeners had to go through to tune in to the SWAPO station, much of the information it broadcast was not taken for granted; rather, as in all the cases presented here, they compared and balanced different sources against each other. Information on specific events, especially when they had taken place in the

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813 Mosia et al. 1994, 10. cf. Ch. 4.
814 Interview Theofilus Ekandjo, 10.11.2007.
vicinity, could also be gotten from other media or from personal information. There are many references (e.g. the quoted research by Tötemeyer and the SWABC) indicating that a majority of listeners listened to anticolonial stations as well as the SWABC and even Radio RSA. Apparently, even PLAN fighters in the Angolan camps tuned in to Apartheid radio and compared information. An ex-Plan commander who told his story to Colin Leys and Susan Brown explained that he grew increasingly suspicious of his superiors upon listening to Radio RSA, because he realised that they still stuck to their plans, although the enemy's station had detailed information about the movements of his unit.  

The Effects of Nationalist Broadcasting

While listeners compared the station's claims with other available sources, the effect of the Voice of Namibia broadcasts was psychological. Given the high risk of consuming banned SWAPO media and the experience of day-to-day repression, the fiery broadcasts found listeners that were committed to the nationalist cause even if they were not always convinced of the actual informations given on SWAPO victories. Rather, listeners sought consolation, motivation and confirmation that the fight for the liberation of Namibia continued, that they were not the only ones fighting it, and that it would be successful in the end. Jackson Kaujeua reports in his autobiography that during his time in school, "[...] every evening we would all surround a small wireless. It faintly relayed what we wanted to hear all the way from Tanzania: 'This is the Voice of Namibia coming to you through the external services of Radio Tanzania.' [...] It re-charged our batteries and we became rebellious in many ways [...]"  

For Kaujeua and his schoolmates, the Station ID alone was so powerful psychologically that they "became rebellious" and "recharged" their nationalist feelings and motivation. Many accounts claim that during the second half of the 1970s, listening to the Voice of Namibia helped them in the decision to leave the country and join the struggle.  

With the Voice of Namibia, as with the Voice of UNIP and other nationalist radios, music was not just entertainment, it was a powerful mobilising tool. Although it could

816 Kaujeua, Jackson. 1994. Tears over the Deserts, Windhoek, 98. emphasis mine.
not broadcast entertainment programmes, the Voice of Namibia recorded and broadcast "Freedom Songs", sung by PLAN soldiers or nationalist musicians like Kaujeua and Ndilimani. This function of music in nationalist propaganda has been established in similar historical contexts.  

Julie Frederikse, in her collection of sources on the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, cites one listener of the Voice of Zimbabwe, actually a Rhodesian Special Air Services soldier, who aptly summarised the psychological experience of listening to the nationalist radio during the freedom fight:

"A lot of it was silly, broadcasts of victories that you couldn't believe. But that 'Chimurenga Requests' programme! It was very effective propaganda, because of the songs and the emotion put into it. I felt, hell, this was it; damn Rhodesia, up Zimbabwe, after some broadcasts. It was totally different from our Forces Requests programme. That was just morale-boosting whereas 'Chimurenga Requests' gave a really rousing, spiritual feeling. It had everyone singing." 

"Chimurenga", revolutionary songs, were produced and broadcast by the Voice of Zimbabwe, but also sung and danced by guerrillas and the local population alike, especially at "pungwes", all-night gatherings organised by ZANU or ZAPU fighters, in which the locals were sometimes forced to take part. The music and dance, however, was even enjoyed by those locals who weren't happy about being forced to attend. 

The famous Zimbabwean musician Thomas Mapfumo explained: "The morale they gave to people, this was the most important thing with Radio Mozambique." Although Namibian resistance culture lacked fixed institutions such as pungwe or Chimurenga, SWAPO attached a similar significance to liberation songs. PLAN fighters in Angola listened to the Voice of Namibia and took part in its programmes by composing, writing and recording songs on the experience of exile and the liberation struggle. Some of these were taken over by bands such as the Ndilimani Cultural Troupe. The power of such songs has been described in several instances; a now-famous example is Jacob Zuma's favourite "Umshini Wami" ("My Machine Gun"), the song that he performed on many occasions during the 2009 elections in South Africa, and that was harshly criticised by his political opponents and in the media as promoting violence. Liz Gunner has traced the song's history to show why this specific song, for ANC veterans, evoked much more than the critics assumed. "Umshini Wami" was one of the songs "that travelled with cadres between the camps beyond South Afri-

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819 Frederikse 1982, 105.
820 Turino 2000, 204f.
821 Frederikse 1982, 103. Most of the ZANU programmes were broadcast from Radio Mozambique.
822 cf. Ch. 4.
ca's borders and into the country," songs that "had their genesis in the particular cultural forms that the military camps produced. [...] The songs produced in the camps were often part of wider debates within the liberation movement and tied into the desires of combatants." Gunner, following Alec Pongweni, calls this a "cultural ground" which audiences shared.823 This can also be said of the songs broadcast to PLAN soldiers, schoolboys, SWAPO activists and everyone involved in the struggle by the Voice of Namibia. As in the case of Zambia, the Voice of Namibia was part of a wider resistance culture that effectively mobilised the population through song, literature, visual and performance arts. The songs also differed in other significant ways from those broadcast on the "Radio Bantu"-like Language Services: against 'traditional' culture that divided ethnicities following a preconceived Apartheid scheme and locked the cultural identity of the different ethnic groups at a certain historical point, it provided a new, national, 'modern' culture developed in the camps and embedded in the struggle, a music that blended styles from 'traditional' Namibian, pop and World music. Kaujeua developed a unique style singing in the different Namibian languages (at one point even including San) and would slip into commenting on the songs' content in English in the middle of the song, thus 'explaining' it to other Namibians as well as an international audience. As such, although sources are yet scarce and have to be interpreted with caution, the cultural and psychological effect of Voice of Namibia programmes on Namibian listeners should not be underestimated.

Reception in 1980s Namibia was largely formed by the all-encompassing struggle for the political and social future of the country. However, the lines in this struggle were not always drawn clearly. As in the political landscape of the country, listeners' reactions to radio policy and programmes cannot be described along racial lines, but rather along those of class, language, ethnicity and political affiliation. On the level of listenership, the Voice of Namibia and the SWABC (or Radio RSA) were not mutually exclusive alternatives. Rather, as in Zambia, listeners chose carefully from a variety of offers, and usually opted for a mixture that was reappropriated and reinterpreted in comparison to each other and to information from other sources or discussions. Thus, none of the participants in the ideological war on the airwaves could claim to have brought the listeners to their side. Nevertheless, they helped reinforce existing opinions and, in the case of the Voice of Namibia, mobilise listeners into political or even military action. More than information programmes and obvious propaganda, music

823 Gunner 2008, 40.
and cultural entertainment played a role in this.

4. The Struggle for Hegemony in Post-Apartheid Namibia

At the dawn of independence, Namibia had a much larger broadcasting infrastructure than Zambia in 1964 – it was even better than that of contemporary Zambia, where, in the wake of the political transition from Kaunda's one-party state to a multi-party democracy the broadcaster was itself just undergoing another restructuring process. While the system of Apartheid broadcasting had been intent on fostering separate development, it had provided the new nation with an infrastructure that, on the continent, was only matched by the old occupation regime in South Africa in terms of width of coverage and number of channels for exactly this reason. Nevertheless, the divisive Apartheid heritage posed a problem for ministers, managers and broadcasters alike. As shown in Chapter 4, politicians were well aware of the divisions that the Apartheid broadcasting system had engendered, and they actively discussed which programming policies would best serve the purpose of nation-building and national reconciliation. However, as the ex-SWABC editor Jürgen Hecker, speaking at the NPP 435 Workshop, pointed out, the whole issue of nation building through radio was first and foremost about speaking to the listeners as a nation. Therefore, it was an issue of infrastructure as much as programming content. The first task was to make every one of nine language channels cover the whole country. Programming, and especially the question of what role the National Channel was supposed to fulfil, could only be the next step for Hecker. The merging of the National with the English Channel in 1991 was received well by the public, and the shift of its role from the Afrikaans to the English Service was an important symbol in the process of substituting English for Afrikaans as a national language. However, there were larger issues of language and culture, often intertwined, that broadcasters had to deal with. In the year before the merging, listeners complained that the interruption of all Channels by the National Service in the mornings and evenings limited the time of "their" respective Language Channel, which they usually felt attached to. Additionally, only few listeners even understood English – Afrikaans was still the lingua franca and spoken by the majority of Namibians.

A Fragmented Audience

This was reflected in listener ratings. In a 1992 survey, nearly half of the respondents said they never listened to the National Channel. This figure roughly matched the percentage of respondents listening to the Afrikaans Channel, which points to the problem the NBC was having: it had introduced a National Channel in a language that the majority of Namibians did not understand. In the same survey, over 60 per cent of respondents stated that they understood "nothing" or only "a little bit" of English programmes; in rural areas, the figure was highest, while most urban listeners ("urban" referring basically to Windhoek) could understand at least "about half". For many listeners, the Afrikaans language channel was still the one to turn to for national news and actuality, as the Newsroom structure in NBC was still such that Afrikaans and English news would be put out before reaching the other Services after translation. However, the number of English speakers grew, and listeners showed "interest in English"; twenty per cent even asked for more English on "their" respective Language Service. English as future lingua franca of Namibia had not just been promoted by SWAPO, but already put into practice during the 1980s by key Namibian institutions: the Council of Churches in Namibia used it as common language and educated teachers for English, and the Owambo administration had instituted English as school language in the area. Thus, the change to English as official and administrative language in Namibia possessed some legitimacy, which the NBC could build on.

National News aside, the Language Channels nevertheless remained the most important mass medium in Namibia. Especially "[r]ural listeners favoured broadcasting to be done in local languages for they thought that local languages were being neglected and considered by some to be of no value in society." However, there were other reasons for the popularity of the Language Services. As the researchers of NISER found out during fieldwork, Ovambo and Herero listeners continued to use the radio as a communication medium to send messages to areas that were not connected to the telephone network: "If an extended family member dies, the radio plays an important role in informing other members of the clan." Additionally, the practice of public radio listening lent radio – the medium as well as the actual set – a social and

826 Ibid., 37.
827 Ibid., 17.
community-building relevance that went beyond its informational and entertainment aspects:

"The radio plays continuously in most of the stores, cuca shops, and eating establishments. In the rural areas radios are hung in the trees in the centre of the kraals and played almost continuously. The radio is almost perceived as a community possession as it is vital for communication and information."\textsuperscript{828}

People even attended church services presented on the radio. One researcher stated: "The Herero people make use of the radio as a means of communication, a form of entertainment, and an opportunity to socialise."\textsuperscript{829}

The NISER research is especially interesting because fieldworkers returned reports from the specific regions they had been sent to. These show that regional variations in socio-economic structure, political conflicts, and cultural peculiarities played a significant role in listeners' attitudes, such as preferences for specific Channels or programmes, ideas about the role of the NBC in the independent country, or complaints about radio programming. A few Namibians – e.g. some Ovahimba or San groups – declined the use of radio altogether out of a general refusal of technology because they wanted to live in a 'traditional' way. In the Kavango region, where SWAPO and its main political contender, the DTA, had fought an especially hot election campaign, listening to the NBC was highly politicised, and listener attitudes seemed to be connected to party political affiliation: "some were in favour of certain programmes, even though they rarely listened to them, while others were totally against what they termed the political mouth piece of the ruling Party."\textsuperscript{830} In Caprivi, a region that was affected by a drought, and where a significant part of the population mistrusted SWAPO and felt neglected by the central government, listeners likewise politicised the NBC, but differently: respondents feared that if they said anything "bad" about the NBC, they would lose food aid. Even more suspicious were White farmers in the so-called "commercial farming areas" scattered over the country: "They view the NBC as the symbol of the new government which they still consider a threat." Some complained about bad reception, which they felt had gotten worse since the new government had taken over. Fieldworkers were met with hostility and mistrust. This negative attitude towards the state broadcaster, however, stemmed not

\textsuperscript{828} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{829} Ibid., 14.
\textsuperscript{830} Ibid., 17.
only from political views, but also from the farmers' experience with the drought – especially those in the South felt as neglected by the government as Caprivians. Nevertheless, commercial farmers in many areas depended on the radio for news and the weather report. German-speaking farmers loved the German service, and could show a completely different attitude to the NBC fieldworkers and "heartily" invite them in. In contrast, Afrikaner Farmers in the Southernmost parts of Namibia "still consider[ed] themselves to be a part of South Africa", where they went to shop, and didn't care for the proceedings of Namibian democratic institutions.\footnote{Ibid., 25f.} In the Owambo region, listeners who had described Apartheid broadcasting as "distorted" now wanted the radio to support political change and, for example, "explain to the people their constitutional rights."\footnote{Ibid., 11.} Respondents in rural areas of Rehoboth, where the mother tongue is primarily Afrikaans, complained about the National Service that overrode all other channels in the morning and late evening, because they didn't understand English.

Fieldworkers also noted general differences between rural and urban respondents. In rural areas, the radio retained its importance as source of information and entertainment, while in the towns, it was slowly replaced by TV, at least in the evenings (at the time NBC TV broadcast from 5 p.m.). In bigger towns like Windhoek and Swakopmund, access to commercial South African TV stations further diminished the influence of Namibian state broadcasting.

The differences in attitude show the extent of fragmentation of Namibian society after Independence. In three Surveys conducted before and after elections in 1989, 1991 (before and after the first election of independent Namibia) and 1994 (an exit poll during the second election), it was concluded that differences in the outlook of respondents for the political future depended on the respondents' language groups, social standing, profession and region and/or political affiliation.\footnote{The following data is taken from Weiland, Herbert. 2010. Namibia 1989-1994: Hopes for a Peaceful and Democratic Development – Namibians' Opinions and Attitudes, in: Kößler, Reinhart/William A. Lindeke and André du Pisani (eds.): The Long Aftermath of War – Reconciliation and Transition in Namibia, Freiburg, 41-62.} Black civil servants and DTA supporters, for example, looked sceptically to the future in 1989 and feared "incompetent government and economic decline" after Independence. German-speaking farmers feared losing economic privileges, while English speakers looked more optimistically to the future – especially those who supported the DTA, which
they still hoped would win the elections.

A comparison of the data from the NBC/NISER research and the election surveys shows similarities in political attitudes and those towards the broadcaster, most strikingly for White groups. White farmers, in the three surveys, were sceptical of the new government; in 1989 and 1991, they reported looking pessimistically into the future, fearing a one-party authoritarian state. This is reflected in the mistrust towards the broadcaster voiced by White farmers in the NBC listener survey. Caprivians were also sceptical, albeit less so than White groups. On the other hand, Oshiwambo speakers in the North, among whom were the most fervent supporters of SWAPO, had confidence in the government's policy of National Reconciliation; a policy which they expected the NBC to implement in programming.

In comparison, it seems that many listeners showed similar attitudes towards the NBC and the government in general. It is reasonable to suggest that many listeners saw the NBC as 'mouthpiece' or even an integral part of the government. However, other factors played a role, especially when it came to the specific Language Services. German speakers, who in the three surveys belonged to those harbouring the most fears for the future of the country and mistrusting government, were nevertheless fondly attached to the German Service, which they obviously perceived as 'their' Channel. At the same time, they feared that they would lose it or at least that it would be drastically downsized, after NBC director Nahum Gorelick announced in 1990 that the station faced budget cuts. The example shows the extent to which the different Language Channels could be connected to the communities they were targeting, although the German Service is probably exceptional in the extent of listener retention.

The Struggle for Hegemony in Post-Apartheid Namibia

The continuing conflicts over the role of radio in the new country reflected ongoing struggles over cultural hegemony. These conflicts emerged not in the phone-in programmes of the NBC, where, as shown in Chapter 4, moderators soon found a way to deal with separationist and culturally chauvinist remarks. Instead, they were voiced in other media, especially the different newspapers in Namibia. There are two reasons for this: first, Namibia had a functioning and relatively multifaceted print media
landscape; although they had had to deal with many difficulties and repression during the South African occupation, several independent newspapers as well as an alternative press were already established at Independence.\textsuperscript{834} Some newspapers were connected to certain communities (for example, the German language "Die Allgemeine Zeitung"), while others took a political stand (the Afrikaans language "Republikein" is still close to the DTA and politically conservative; the progressive, liberal "Namibian" and "Windhoek Observer", although pro-SWAPO before 1989, retained their autonomy and often criticised the new government).

Thus, while the reporting of the Allgemeine Zeitung was often concerned with developments in the German Service,\textsuperscript{835} criticism of the NBC in general and other Channels in particular was usually voiced in readers' letters and articles in the English-language opposition and independent newspapers. What is interesting about these letters is that many judged the NBC in light of its confessed policy of national reconciliation and claimed that the NBC did not hold to its own standards. The same argument was invoked by politicians, in either official statements or parliamentary discussions. In the first years, when policy regulations were not yet settled and the NBC structure was still in transition from its Apartheid predecessor, there was much debate about how the broadcaster was supposed to fulfil its role in fostering national reconciliation. Whether or not it had an important role in it was, however, no subject of debate. The vagueness of the concept (partly upheld deliberately by Swapo) ensured its "appeal to the broadest possible cross-section of the population."\textsuperscript{836} It soon became an argument that was used in debates to support one's own point. Nahas Angula, the Minister of Education, Culture and Sport complained in Parliament that NBC news left out "members of the National Assembly who articulated government policy [...] in favour of less informative speakers." This, he claimed, meant that the station "does not serve us as a nation or as a people." An MP of the opposition party, in the same debate, declared that some appointments to the NBC Broadcasting Board could "damage" the aims of nation-building and national reconciliation.\textsuperscript{837} In one instance, the DTA nearly brought the NBC to court over allegations that a Swapo Women's League

\textsuperscript{834} cf. Heuva 2001.
\textsuperscript{835} cf. for example "Gespräch mit dem NBC", Allgemeine Zeitung 31.8.1990, which reports on talks between representatives of the German-speaking community and NBC DG Nahum Gorelick on rumours that the German Service would be downsized because of budget cuts and the implementation of the National Service override.
\textsuperscript{836} Dobell 1998, 111.
\textsuperscript{837} "NBC gets it from all sides", Windhoek Observer, 4.8.1990
member, in a public speech broadcast on the Owambo Service, had incited violence against the opposition party. Her phrase "Let us kill the DTA in our land," the Chief Organiser for the DTA in the region said, in Oshiwambo "in fact means to kill the supporters and people who are members of the DTA, and does not refer to the death and/or destruction of the organisation as a political party only." He connected the speech to a following outbreak of violence, in which two DTA members were killed by Swapo supporters. Similar conflicts developed over instances in which moderators had not (or not in time) reacted to callers inciting violence and hatred in phone-in programmes.

The examples show that in conflicts over how the NBC should fulfil its role in an independent Namibia, all of the groups involved evoked "national reconciliation" to support their argument, which was, however, usually grounded in party political interest. Because of its vagueness, the concept was inclusive of all political or ethnic groups in Namibia, but it also meant that political demands could be connected to the reconciliation discourse by claiming that they had to be met to ensure inclusion of the particular group in whose name the demands were voiced.

Thus, the struggle for hegemony between the different groups in Namibia continued, albeit under very different circumstances. First of all, Black groups were now in a better position to publicly voice their position, while the cultural and political hegemony of Afrikanerdedom was consciously abolished – in fact, this was one of the main tasks of the NBC restructuring. Secondly, the democratic nature of the new political system, in spite of all fears of the opposition that Swapo would eventually establish a one-party autocracy, allowed for all of the groups to compete. The economic position of White groups, however, did not change and still guaranteed them an advantage in the struggle for dominance of the political and cultural arenas. This was especially visible in the ownership and reporting of the major newspapers in Namibia. Some newspapers openly catered to their White readers and, for example, accused the NBC of being "a Swapo institution" and "fueling racial animosities" because it alleged-

838 "DTA withdraws its case against NBC", Windhoek Advertiser, 7.11.1990
839 An example taking place shortly before the DTA charge and connected to it by some commentators in the press was the case of Leonard Engombe. He had allegedly shot at President Nujoma’s plane with a rifle; a caller on air openly called for "anyone with a panga, assegai, knopkie (sic) or simply an axe to kill Mr. Engombe on sight.". The "Windhoek Observer" compared the appeal to Khomeini’s fatwa against Salman Rushdie. cf. "DTA protest over reported NBC broadcast of Engombe death threat", Windhoek Observer, 22.9.1990. A similar accusation was brought forward three years later. cf. "Nahum and Co. in Court on Racism Charges", Windhoek Advertiser 01.06.1993.
ly failed to report on "racial assaults" on Whites while overemphasising instances of racial violence against Blacks.\textsuperscript{840}

One can best observe the way the struggle for cultural hegemony was fought by looking at the "Namlish" debate in 1991 around the quality of English spoken in NBC programmes. The language issue was neither geographically nor historically limited to post-Independence Namibia. Here, however, the issue was especially complex and not just because one lingua franca that was perceived as 'colonial' was exchanged for another; consequently, the motivation behind Swapo's radical move to introduce a language not understood, much less spoken, by a majority of the population, needs to be addressed.

Language Policy in Independent Namibia

Afrikaans, as the language of Apartheid, was more than 'just' a language imposed on colonial subjects. "Afrikaans […] is widely perceived by many South Africans not only as the language of the oppressor but the actual instrument of oppression."\textsuperscript{841} The Soweto riots, which occupy an important place in the history of resistance in South Africa, originated in the forced introduction of Afrikaans as language of instruction in schools. Around the same time, in 1975, a huge monument was erected near Cape Town to honour the Afrikaans language. The Afrikaanse Taalmonument, together with the infamous Voortrekker Monument, was subject of much debate in 1990s South Africa. Since then, Afrikaans-speaking writers, journalists and artists have increasingly critically dealt with this heritage, although few went as far as the artist Anton Kannemeyer, who in a short comic entitled "Die Taal" concluded that Afrikaans is "until today, ideological pivotal of the memory of apartheid."\textsuperscript{842} Thus, while language was and still is an issue in most African states, and African intellectuals have often dealt with it,\textsuperscript{843} the language situation in South Africa, and consequently in Namibia, was

\textsuperscript{840}"The NBC is Helping to Fan the Flames of Racial Animosity", Windhoek Advertiser, 25.1.1992. The NBC answered the attack one day later in the same paper.


\textsuperscript{843}Most famously Frantz Fanon in the first chapter of "Black Skin, White Masks" and Ngugi wa Thiong'o in "Decolonising the Mind", both develop a concept of "alienation through language". Fa-
very different from the rest of the continent. Because of the role of the Afrikaans language in Apartheid oppression, SWAPO had argued in a document published in 1981, that English would be more "acceptable" for Namibians to use. The document additionally claimed that English would reconnect Namibia to the world, arguing that the "Bantu Education Act" that had taken away primary education from the missions and abolished English as language of instruction had isolated Namibia internationally. Arguments of national unity, familiarity and feasibility had also been brought forward. Nevertheless, the replacement of Afrikaans with English as the official language brought with it many problems and was criticised by sociolinguists. The most important objection was that the introduction of English would only benefit "one particular social group, i.e. the élite, who are included in the select speakers of the official language." English was not only the mother tongue of the White group in Namibia, it had also been the lingua franca of the movement in exile. Returning SWAPO-cadres were not fluent in Afrikaans, but English.

Surprisingly, there was little fight against the policy. An according paragraph was included in the new constitution. While Afrikaners in Namibia had been expected to protest most emphatically against the introduction of English and, consequently, the demise of Afrikaans as official national language, it was, in fact, English-speaking conservatives who brought the topic to the fore of public discussion. Their problem was the 'quality' of the English spoken on the National Channel and NBC Television. The word for it was soon found: "Namlish", a derogatory term for the 'bad', 'Namibian' version of English that was spoken by government officials and NBC announcers. The Times of Namibia lead the charge:

"While some members of the public feel that certain presenters innovate elements of pronunciation to suit their comfort, others note that presentations are often made by persons who apparently feel they can be more fluent if they imitate the so-called 'African English.' Some listeners and viewers would like to give the presenters a 'well deserved charge' to catch up while others have 'totally given up' listening to radio programmes."

The paper added that it had undertaken an "opinion poll" that showed "general dissatisfaction" with programme content and language. It cited several prominent per-
sons complaining that they could not understand presenters, but also Reverend Andreas Biwa, an inspector for the Ministry of Education, who declared he "would not really object if Namibians chose to speak 'African-English'" and an American journalist stipulating that the NBC be given more time to develop professional standards. Other opposition papers took up the charges and, among other things, presented English-Namlish dictionaries.

What lay behind these charges? Returning Swapo cadres, among them Voice of Namibia staff, were used to English as colloquial. However, much as in other African countries, it was a form of English often referred to as "pidgin" (in the wider sense of creole English, not the narrow definition of Nigerian Pidgin). Pidgin English, or "African English" as the Namibian newspapers called it, is an amalgam of English vocabulary and pronunciation with grammar stemming from local mother-tongues.

Language and Hegemony

Discussions about the quality of English were not new in broadcasting on the continent; as shown, questions about what was the "right" English to be spoken on air had already emerged in colonial Zambia. Ali Mazrui recounts a similar debate in the Kenyan press on the English spoken in Voice of Kenya broadcasts. In both, some voices formulated a kind of linguistic chauvinism that denied English speakers not originating from the British Isles (or even, in one outstandingly narrow definition, all outside an area "bounded on the North by the Thames and on the South by the English Channel") the status of "native English speaker" and claimed that the language spoken in radio programmes was a "degeneration." This kind of linguistic and cultural purism was now brought up in Namibia, too.

846 All quotes from "Outrage at Namlish", Times of Namibia, 18.4.1991.
847 The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines "Pidgin" as "a language containing lexical and other features from two or more languages, characteristically with simplified grammar and a smaller vocabulary than the languages from which it is derived, used for communication between people not having a common language; a lingua franca." Pidgin English, then, is "a pidgin in which the chief language is English", but is also used depreciatively in the sense of "a simplified, imperfect, or debased form of English." cf. pidgin, n., in: Oxford English Dictionary, 2006; online version June 2011. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/143533; accessed 18.8.2011. Nigerian Pidgin is considered a "new African language" that is connected to a Nigerian identity; a similar case is Krio in Sierra Leone. Ngugi 1986, 23.
849 Ibid., 23.
The issue was initially presented as a problem of understanding programmes on the National Service – listeners complained that they had to "stop whatever you are busy doing in order to listen carefully to what is being announced," and even that was "not always worth the trouble as you often end up not understanding anyway." But, as in Zambia, it turned out that the problems of understanding did not necessarily extend to the rest of the Namibian population. When the NBC undertook a survey on the "Intelligibility of English on the National Channel" in 1993, reactions were much more positive than the opposition press had insinuated. Seventy eight per cent of respondents understood the English spoken on the National Service, more than half of them "very well". Nevertheless, 75 per cent stated that it was never, or sometimes not pronounced "correctly." These were followed by questions about what it was that bothered them about the pronunciation, and 34 per cent said it was the "African accent." The rest gave many other reasons, among them "too fast" (15 per cent), "can't read", "mix with Afrikaans words" or "mother tongues", "pretentious" or "not fluent" (together 17 per cent). This data was taken from a telephone survey among the population of the bigger towns, so it is not representative of the Namibian population as a whole. Nevertheless, some results can be inferred, especially concerning the attitude of different language groups toward the English spoken on the National Service. While a significant majority of English and German speakers said they understood it at least "fairly well", 80 per cent of English and 40 per cent of German speakers "did not like" it. Afrikaans speakers (which included many Black Namibians who gave Afrikaans as their first language) and others had much fewer complaints, and interestingly enough, 85 per cent of Oshivambo speakers liked the way English was spoken on the National Service.

Thus, the question was not whether presenters were professional and proficient enough in English to be understood by listeners. Instead, behind the criticism was a feeling "that the English spoken on the NBC [was] not of a standard with which the articulate elite [could] identify." The pronunciation argument was soon connected to criticism that the NBC had implemented a policy of affirmative action too quickly and now "employed people who actually lacked competence for the job that they were

850 "Outrage at Namilsh", Times of Namibia, 18.4.1991.
851 All numbers and quotes from "The Intelligibility of English on the National Service of the NBC & the Reaction of the Public towards the NBC's 'Switch On' Media Campaign." Survey Research by the Research Section of the NBC, undated. NBC Information Services. The text explains that the research was conducted in February 1993.
called to do." The "affirmative action"-complaint often came from old elites who resented the rise of a new Black upper and middle class. Therefore, as Ellen Dyvi notes, the debate "can be interpreted as the Afrikaans-speaking, in alliance with the English- and German-speaking, wanting to reinforce their class-interests." Their problem with the English spoken on electronic media was not just that they didn't understand it, but actually that others did – and that the needs of these other audiences were put before their own. It meant that the standard radio language on such a symbolically important Channel as the National Service was no longer the language of the elites (the Afrikaans spoken on SWABC having been "High-grade Afrikaans", as Ngavirue puts it), which other social groups were supposed to aspire to learn, but a form of English that was the language of the majority of the albeit yet small group of English speakers in Namibia and of a new elite of returning exiles, to which the old elite now had to adapt. Before the "Namlish" debate, the NBC had been criticised for "having only people with British accent speak on the air", with which "Namibians could not identify." In a rebuttal of the Times of Namibia's claim that listeners objected to "Namlish", published in the same paper, two NBC editors doubted that the Times' claims were representative of a significant part of the population, countered the papers' allegations and turned the argument upside down:

"It is remarkable to note that the two native English speakers [cited in the earlier piece, RH] did not express any dissatisfaction with the pronunciation of the NBC presenters. This is probably indicative of their awareness that English as an international language is spoken with different accents in different parts of the world. [...] It is perhaps also remarkable that the same people who criticise our pronunciation of English have been living in this country for years, and yet most of them cannot even pronounce our simple African names correctly."

Thus, they reiterated an argument that had been made in the Kenyan press nearly thirty years earlier: "It may not be the Queen's English, but then what? Has the Englishman the sole right to decide upon the form and style of a universal language?"

What CABS had experienced as a dilemma when they tried to hold up British English as a standard in radio, but didn't reach the listeners, had, in independent Namibia and its democratic public, turned into a subject of heated debate between groups di-

853 Ibid., 60.
854 Ibid., 59.
855 Interview Zedekia Ngavirue, 18.08.2006. cf. Chapter 4.3.
856 Dyvi 1993, 59.
858 Cit. in: Mazrui/Mazrui 1998, 22.
vided by language as much as by race and class.

The question of language and African identity had in fact sparked fervent African intellectual debates much earlier, the margins of which are signified by Leopold Sedar Senghor and Fanon for the *francophonie*, or Chinua Achebe and Ngugi wa Thiong'o respectively for English speaking countries. While these intellectuals discussed whether Africans should embrace the languages that had been forced upon them by the colonising powers (Senghor, Achebe) or refuse to use them in favour of their respective African mother tongues (Fanon, Ngugi), Nigerians and others embraced Pidgin or Creole languages as medium and symbol of post-colonial national identity. In Namibia, as in Zambia earlier, another factor was involved: as the NBC editors argued, the complaints were about African English speakers, but not those who had Afrikaans as first language and, when speaking English, had a strong accent as well. Moreover, the fact that Afrikaans had been the colonial lingua franca meant that

"there [was] no tradition of diversion of English whatsoever. So even if somebody were to sit down and plan a very comprehensive programme on an indigenalization (sic) of English for Namibia, one would not quite know what that would be, since there has been almost no history of indigenalization [sic] of English. Whom [sic], or which particular group should be used as a model?"

Added to this was the criticism that the introduction of English as an official language in Namibia itself was an elite project:

"we are inclined to believe that the Minister's policy is geared towards the benefit of one particular social group, i.e. the élite, who are included in the select speakers of the official language, in the words of the minister – 'the Government officials, diplomats, and businessmen.'"

The issue of "Namlish" was not about the quality of programming or the professional training of announcers. It was deeply connected to issues of culture, language, race and class, specifically the complex and shifting landscape of hegemony in Namibia. While White groups, especially Afrikaners, had lost political domination, they retained their economic position. Now they fought for cultural hegemony, and NBC programming was one of the most important fields of struggle. The fact that an overwhelming majority of Oshiwambo speakers – more than members of any other language group – liked the English spoken on the National Service supports Dyvi's argu-

860 Dyvi 1993, 60.
ment. Oshiwambo speakers had not only learned English since the Owambo legislative authority (a homeland type institution) had introduced it in the schools of the region after SWAPO's decision in 1981, but they formed a significant part of the returning Swapo cadres, and therefore, of the new political elite. All in all, the Namlish debate can be understood in the context of the project of 'national reconciliation', which, as André Du Pisani put it, "was intended as a class project: harmonising the interest of the old and new elites."

The struggles for political and cultural hegemony that had been suppressed under Apartheid rule reemerged with new vigour after Independence. Radio, especially the National Service, became a focal point of the discussion, precisely because, the language policy Swapo envisaged for the new nation was more visible than the schools. While political discussions continued to be fragmented and dominated by regional issues, the Namlish debate shows how fragile the power balance between the new, Black, and the old, White, elite really was. The tone in which criticism of the NBC's announcers' way of speaking was voiced betrayed the self-assuredness with which the old elite perceived its social and cultural values as standard, as well as its ignorance of the relevance of the issue for other groups in the new country. On the other hand, the government failed to tackle the problems that came with the sudden introduction of a minority language as official national lingua franca. The NBC was caught in between, and the lack of trained personnel together with problems of infrastructure made a compliance with any of the demands nearly impossible. The majority of listeners avoided English language programmes altogether and only listened to the National Channel when it was forced upon them during peak listening times. Thus, the struggle for hegemony was fought between elites, while minority groups were more interested in a continuation of entertainment and cultural programmes for 'their own' ethnic group.

5. (Post-)Colonial Broadcasting, Reception and Hegemony

While previous chapters have questioned the idea that the radio in either colonial

862 Ibid., 181f.
or postcolonial states was a rigid, tightly controlled mediator of ideas and values fed into it from the top, this idea by now has disintegrated into a picture of fragmented, multi-faceted, and highly ambivalent or even contradictory requests from different parts of colonial and post-colonial societies. While there is a difference between the analysed examples in how much direct criticism could be voiced and from whom, it is clear that there was a range of other dissident strategies which were, albeit not publicly, acknowledged by broadcasters. The first and obvious choice listeners had was to simply not listen. Next in line were careful selection of programmes to listen to, and if possible, tuning in to other radio stations. But the picture shown here is much more complex: listeners not only selected from a range of programmes and radio stations, be they colonial, anti-colonial, or international, they also discussed and reinterpreted programmes by comparing them to information from other sources or by simply re-contextualising them as they wished. At the same time, different social, political and cultural groups competed for representation in the most important mass medium. These were struggles for hegemony, for a place from which it was possible to influence society and culture in the interest one particular class, political or cultural group, and most importantly, the thinking about society and culture, the place from which to define the issues at hand and their interpretation. As the examples show, social, political and cultural categories such as class or ethnic group were not neatly separated, but usually combined to form specific discourses about how the nation should deal with its members.

State Broadcasting, Hegemony and Civil Society

As visible from the examples presented in this chapter, not even the extremely repressive system in Apartheid Namibia was able to control its population to the degree of excluding alternative and oppositional thinking and mobilisation. It is actually doubtful if dominant groups in the Apartheid state ever managed to gain hegemony, i.e. to make their worldview the one that was consensually shared by a majority of the population. The increasingly stepped up repression and use of violence to the extent of criminalising political opposition and going to war suggests otherwise. The same is true for the settler minority in the Central African Federation. Also, the struggles for hegemony were not reduced to two groups trying to uphold respectively counter the
dominant pattern of hegemony. Contrary to what William Heuva and André Du Pisani claim for Namibia’s alternative press, this was not simply the place of a “counter-hegemony” defined by its opposition against dominant Apartheid ideology, but a range of media directed at different audiences and catering for different political, social and/or cultural communities. There were different struggles for hegemony in both societies under analysis here – European settlers, colonial officials, African workers, nationalist parties or movements, ruling or opposition parties struggled for dominance in different circumstances. However, while subordinate groups struggled for more influence, hegemonial ideas and values can be discerned in both case studies presented here. All political parties in Namibia, including SWAPO, voiced their demands in terms well established in political discourse, like democracy or nation-state. And both SWAPO and the South African administration tried to delegitimize their counterpart by claiming they stood for the opposite of these values – authoritarian rule and divisive politics. The debate in occupied Namibia was not how society should develop, but which of the contenders for political power was able to lead it there. The same can be observed in 1960s Zambia, where indigenous elites and UNIP cadres did not question the modernisation project for the country, or that it should take place in an inclusive nation-state, but rather if Zambians needed the colonial administration or White minority rule to achieve this goal.

The examples presented in this chapter touch on the issue of hegemony from another perspective, from below. They show how deep certain values and ideas had seeped not just into an African political elite, but into broader society; but they also show how complex and contradictory this process was. The values that the political and ideological system of late colonialism produced had been taken up by large parts of the population, but in the process could be transformed and even gain an oppositional character. The ambivalent use of values such as freedom (used to mobilise soldiers during the Second World War) or democracy allowed for their subversive use in the anti-colonial struggle. Because colonial and White minority regimes used such positive terms to describe political systems that were, in fact, not as democratic as they claimed, nationalist leaders and intellectuals could hold them to their own standards. And, as shown here, the populations that were targeted accordingly with propaganda through different media did the same. The range of reactions mentioned at the

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beginning of this chapter shows that, although certain values and ideas can be seen to be hegemonial, the field of civil society in which these played out was populated by a variety of actors who, although adhering to certain hegemonial ideas, subverted others or tried to establish a hegemony of their own.

This assumption is partly supported by a closer look at SWAPO's media output. Whatever the content, the mere existence of the Voice of Namibia, as well as other SWAPO media, sent the signal that there was an oppositional force, that Apartheid ideology was not without alternative. It helped bridge the gap between SWAPO fighters in exile and those inside the country and to mobilise people inside the country to join the liberation struggle. Additionally, SWAPO in exile adapted a globally hegemonial discourse, with values such as human rights, democracy, anti-racism, and, encompassing those, development. Nevertheless, as an analysis of post-Independence media and the conflicts around them shows, Apartheid had shaped Namibian society, and the 'divide and rule' strategy of the Administration in the 1970s and 80s had left deep marks in it. Because the divisive policy of the SWABC went with an emphasis on cultural programming for the major language groups, its programmes were attractive to most listeners, even those who otherwise abhorred the "mouthpiece" of the occupational regime. But through the cultural and entertainment programmes also came ideas about 'tradition' and 'modernity' that would shape post-Independence discourse. The same holds for issues of language and the values connected to it. The radical solution of Swapo in power to abandon Afrikaans as official language in schools and media was highly contested and its success until today is only relative. Afrikaans remains an important lingua franca in Namibia. Additionally, as shown, the debate over post-Independence language policy involved not Namibian society as a whole, but was primarily fought over by old and new elites. The process of national reconciliation was first and foremost one of integration of the old and new elites into the new political system. In Zambia, radio as a machine (or a consumer good) and as a medium promoted 'modernity' as a kind of value in and of itself. The aspirations of ordinary Zambians at the time were influenced by colonial discourse to the extent that the post-colonial government took over many of the core ideas about how Zambian society should look like. Radio continued to be presented in terms of modernity. Advertisements showed the newest models together with young urbanites singing and dj-ing, attending a political rally, and playing football. An advert from the
Times of Zambia from 1986 depicting a middle class family seated around a 'boom box' strongly resembles those from the colonial period, down to the composition of the photograph.\textsuperscript{865}

Thus, while in both case studies presented here hegemony was contested and by no means uniform and fixed, hegemonial ideas and values by the time of Independence had encompassed broad strata of society and continued to influence radio programmes as well as the debates about which role the media was supposed to play. The most important of these hegemonial ideas was probably the nation-state. While the social reality of colonial rule, with the imposition of borders, state institutions, language and education standardization had imposed social structures on the population and thus formed new societies, in the cultural realm these were supported by an imposition of the corresponding ideas and values, such as the nation-state.

\textsuperscript{865} Spitulnik 1998, 77. cf. Fig. 1 for the colonial picture.
VI. Conclusion

The process of Decolonisation took its time on the African continent, and it has often been argued that it still continues today. The dependencies of African countries, especially economic, of global South from the global North are manifold and strong. Nevertheless, political autonomy, although often severely restricted by economic dependency, has been attained, Nkrumah’s "political kingdom" was sought and found. But all else has not been added, and this was clear even at the very moment of independence.

This thesis operates from the observation that “Decolonising the Mind”\textsuperscript{866}, i.e. a cultural decolonisation process, was needed after the independence of African countries to support and flesh out political decolonisation. Culture, as shown, played a major role in the mobilisation of support for nationalist movements, but after independence nationalist culture was just one among many. In both cases presented here, the most pressing issue after political independence was how to deal with the different identities that had previously existed and were only partially cushioned by political and cultural nationalism. Now that the political kingdom had been attained, the different language, cultural and political groups started to ask questions about their place in this kingdom. Although many politicians shared the idea that “once you have a national identity, the question of culture becomes something which flows automatically”\textsuperscript{867}, it soon turned out to be misguided. Media and education were seen to be the major tools in “decolonising the mind”. However, a close analysis of the electronic media in the two cases presented here shows that the policies for promoting national unity in programmes were largely ineffective. Instead, radio programmes, both before and after independence, provided a space to negotiate issues of national identity. This space was sometimes more, sometimes less restricted, but listeners used it as much as they could.

Colonial media had, for all their focus on political control and censorship, accompanied and mediated social change. As described, this happened specifically in cultural programmes, where broadcasters were much freer in their work. However,

\textsuperscript{866} Ngugi 1986.
\textsuperscript{867} Ibid., 25. Dan Tjongarero, who put forward this view, was at the time the Deputy Minister for Information and Broadcasting.
Northern Rhodesian media were supposed to work as a catalyst to further the process of modernisation, and to help its listeners come to terms with the transition from being 'traditional' to becoming 'modern' Africans. In the Apartheid broadcasting system, culture was used consciously to construct a specific 'ethnic' identity, emphasising cultural traditions of the different language groups. But while the intentions were different, both broadcasting institutions were at the centre of negotiating ideas of tradition and modernity.

Both were also established because there was a need to legitimate the respective political system. Be it the Central African Federation or a 'democratic' "South West Africa/Namibia", the political models promoted by the authorities could not just be imposed on the people. The radios were established to give reality to these constructs, to make listeners identify with a social, political and cultural space that had been defined by colonial authorities. As shown, colonial ideologies not only surfaced in obvious propaganda programmes but also significantly determined the technical and managerial setup of the stations. While radio infrastructure was formed and reformed to structure that space – by linking three territories with different political and social power structures or, following Apartheid ideology, by assigning each language group their own space according to the homeland system – culturally as well as geographically. As shown, infrastructure mirrored the proposed political models, not just in its technical aspects (i.e., the stations' footprints, transmitting posts and frequencies), but also in management structure. As the Federal Broadcasting Services were subdivided in European and African Services, respectively catering for the whole White or Black population of all three territories, the South West African Broadcasting Corporation separated first Black and White, then subdivided the three Departments in the several language Services, each broadcasting to the designated "homeland". This infrastructure not only formed the whole process of programme production and reception but was also part of it as it imparted ideological considerations. The first order of business for independent countries was therefore to restructure the radio according to the needs of the new nations.

While hierarchical structures and censorship regulations ensured that clear ideological guidelines were met, programmes were not all obvious propaganda. As shown, although political and actuality reporting was strictly regulated and of a more or less directly propagandistic nature, the ideological function of programmes as a
whole, as shown, was much more complex and can only be understood completely if the analysis takes the complex interactions between broadcasters and listeners into account. In these negotiated struggles that largely took place in an indirect way (broadcasters testing the popularity of programmes, listeners choosing, reinterpreting and discussing content), an ideological terrain was mapped out. Radio programmes, following infrastructure, defined the parameters of discussion; this is especially clear in the case of Namibia, where every Language Channel was its own world, sharing only the centrally-produced news. As shown, this process played out through the less obviously propagandistic entertainment and service programmes. Because this was as much an offer as it was an attempt to control, this policy was at least partly acceptable to broadcasters as well as listeners. But, as Chapter 5 shows, listeners took this expression of the 'philosophy' of "separate development" for what it was: a thinly veiled attempt at disguising Apartheid policies at a time when the system was under pressure from inside the country as well as internationally.

It could only go so far. No state monopoly could fully guard against alternative messages, and once the nationalist movements had the means to provide them, they did so. The more external stations gave them studios and airtime, the stronger they became, challenging the narratives of colonialism and Apartheid. Although anti-colonial radio covered only a small part of its target region and was limited in time, its impact was significantly enlarged by two factors: first, anti-colonial radio was part of a larger media conglomerate, which included posters, newspapers, and books and brochures. Secondly, these media, as the nationalist movement, became part of a larger culture of resistance, featuring music, performances and grassroots media, all united in a general nationalist cause. Whatever the differences between the various parties, grassroots organisations, churches and movements, they formed a multifaceted social movement that provided a counter-narrative which challenged established colonial narratives.

While anti-colonial radios where under the tight control of their respective parties, the extremely improvised working conditions made this difficult to uphold. Nevertheless, ideological consistency was guaranteed by the commitment of broadcasters, who were either experienced cadres themselves (like Andreya Masiye) or had been selected specifically for their applicability to the job. In contrast to colonial radio, which offered a more or less ambivalent position for African broadcasters, nationalist
broadcasting was unambiguously about propaganda for the cause. And for the broadcasters, it was the right cause. This was mirrored in programmes: the Voice of Namibia and the Voice of UNIP both concentrated on straight political propaganda, due to time constraints there was no programming space for entertainment programmes. Information and counterpropaganda had its place in the anti-colonial struggle, especially taking into account that they could attain a significant international coverage through the summaries issued by the BBC and FBIS. In Namibia, information was passed on by listeners. But as an analysis of reception shows, the effect of the Voice of Namibia inside the country was above all psychological. As in similar cases – especially, Radio Freedom\textsuperscript{868} – the Station ID alone could "recharge batteries"\textsuperscript{869}, enabling a Fanon-like "entering into communication with the Revolution."\textsuperscript{870} To listen to the banned broadcasts was a first act of defiance, a relatively low-risk way to challenge the Apartheid authorities and the narrative put forward by the SWABC and South African media. While the information war was fought out between the Voice of Namibia and Radio RSA on international airwaves, the role of the anti-colonial radios inside the respective territories, despite their general emphasis on counterpropaganda, played out on another level. Broadcasters knew about the importance of cultural programming that had its own propagandistic value. Andreya Masiye in UNIP radio and broadcasters in the Voice of Namibia, although bound by political requirements, considered culture and how to include it in programmes. Liberation songs scheduled at the beginning and between the fifteen-minute actuality segments were the major outlet for cultural programming. These songs circulated on their own, traveling with the soldiers of guerrilla armies and party members. They were sung at rallies and in camps, during campaigns and protests and became part of anti-colonial radio. Consequently, radio became a part of another circulation process that enabled listeners and broadcasters to communicate on new, symbolic levels. While openly anti-colonial songs seldom found their way in the monopoly broadcasters of the colonial state, others were reinterpreted and (re-)appropriated in ways that subverted colonial control. Both the South African state and colonial authorities in the Central African Federation, after discovering that African broadcasters had taken advantage of their lack of understanding, had reacted by stepping up the monitoring process and tightening control in translation. But if the actual type of music, like Congolese Rumba, was enough

\textsuperscript{868} cf. Lekgoathi 2010.
\textsuperscript{869} Kaujeua 1994, 98. cf. Chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{870} Fanon 1994(1965), 83. cf. Introduction.
to remind listeners of the nationalist "Wind of Change" that had already reached other African countries, and if even a perfectly innocuous tune like "How Much Is That Doggie In The Window" could acquire new meaning, effective control was just not possible. The circulation and sharing of music that transcended boundaries between the ethnic and the national, the modern and the traditional, the colonial and the anti-colonial, acted as a catalyst for a culture of nationalism that was a decisive factor in anti-colonial resistance, if only for the fact that it was the audible and visible expression of an alternative to the colonial narrative. If information and counterpropaganda increased the pressure on the Federal and Apartheid regimes, music mobilised the population and rallied them to the nationalist cause. Listening to nationalist broadcasters of engaging the colonial broadcaster amounted to "little actions" that, however,

"can add up to something big: desertion from labor contracts, petty acts of defiance of white officials or their African subalterns, illegal enterprises in colonial cities, alternative religious communities – all these may subvert a regime that proclaimed both its power and righteousness, raise the confidence of people in the idea that colonial power can be countered and forge a general spirit conducive to mobilization across a variety of social differences."^871

The dynamics at play between infrastructures, day-to-day broadcasting work, programmes and listeners were complex and multidirectional. Broadcasters realised that their work could only successfully reach the audience if they played to its tastes. Peter Fraenkel and his colleagues at CABS might not have liked to see themselves as propagandists,^872 but they nevertheless tried their best to present their message. The FBC, however, was too much for the liberal White broadcasters, who, in contrast to their African colleagues, had the financial means to leave as well as other career opportunities. The distinction between the two stations, and the fine line the FBC overstepped, seems to have been direct political propaganda for a system that was too repressive for liberals in Northern Rhodesia. Because most of the staff was taken over, and because Donald Lighfoot as successor to Michael Kittermaster upheld the liberal atmosphere, a large number of the programmes stayed the same. This, however, mattered little for listeners. While the statistics show that they continued to listen to the programmes, the FBC as an institution and the broadcasters as its representatives became extremely unpopular, to the extent of physical confrontation. That listeners could nevertheless enjoy the cultural products put forward by the radio and its

^872 cf. Chapter 3.
staff is shown by Alick Nkhata’s experience with his concert audience. In this situation, politicians, managers and broadcasters could do little to improve the bad image of the broadcaster; but the CABS-style programmes continued.

SWABC broadcasters found themselves in a similar situation: the cultural and entertainment programmes were popular, but listeners did keep in mind that the station was a "radio puppet". Many Black broadcasters seem to have shared this general position, and some broadcasters in the English and German Services criticised the censorship and control of their programmes; but they had little to no room left to change programmes. However, they actively tried to connect with their listenership; during the 1980s, while the South African authorities changed the political models they proposed for a future independent Namibia, the SWABC similarly devised more inclusive models for broadcasting, as, for example, the change in the Music Makers Competition shows. The biggest change, the introduction of a National Channel in English, came too late, and it was too little a change as neither the overall structure nor the ideological content of Apartheid radio in Namibia changed significantly. Nevertheless, in both cases presented here, even colonial stations with a clear propagandistic mission could not fully ignore their own listenership. Voice of Namibia broadcasters in the interviews conducted for this thesis confessed their continuous concern of not knowing if they were heard and who was listening, why and what they would like to hear. Robin Makayi only learned that the Voice of Namibia broadcasts from the Lusaka station had been successfully jammed after his first visit to independent Namibia years later. Andreya Masiye wrote back to UNIP cadres in Northern Rhodesia to ask for information on listeners. In any case, everybody in these stations shared the same nationalist goal, in contrast to the more ambivalent situation in colonial radio, expressed by Alex Kaputu. Because nationalist commitment in the extremely repressive Apartheid state was even more risky for broadcasters than the population in general, there were only few instances in which such engagement was discovered. In the Federation, although membership in the nationalist parties and participation in protests was a problem, the liberal attitude of middle management helped. Nevertheless, Masiye and Alick Nkhata only made their nationalist commitment public when leaving the station.

To summarise, broadcasting during colonial times was affected by the dominating political conflict. Colonial efforts to adapt to the growing nationalist tide quickly
showed in restructuring projects and programme policy changes. Both colonial states presented here were confronted with the problem of how to present viable alternatives to the nationalist project while keeping political control. In particular the models the Apartheid state presented for a transition to an independent, democratic Namibia were, by the time they were implemented, unacceptable to a population who had been fighting an anti-colonial political and eventually military battle against South African occupation for fifteen years. Whatever the South African administration concocted as transitional institutions lost its legitimacy through the simple fact that the occupation itself had been declared illegal, and SWAPO the "sole and authentic representative" of the Namibian people, without whom no elections would ever be seen as truly democratic. Even in the last months before the election of 1989, South African secret services stepped up their propaganda campaign to delegitimise SWAPO; SWABC followed suit with tendentious election coverage. Both attempts were soon decried, and only served to further delegitimise the administration. Federation had been a hated political model for a long time in Northern Rhodesia, first because it was seen by most Africans and their political organisations as just a slightly watered down version of an amalgamation of the three colonies that would ultimately lead there, and worst of all under Southern Rhodesian domination. In both cases, a hated system that was seen as alien was pitted against a mounting tide of nationalist mobilisation. Listeners, as shown, were not susceptible to whatever political model with increasing levels of (pseudo-)participation was thrown at them. Although the political models met with strong opposition, other ideas were to prove more attractive and stable.

The twin heritage of colonial and nationalist broadcasting was to affect the post-colonial stations significantly. This is especially clear in the case of Namibia, where the new government was faced with the challenge to make the NBC the model as well as the promoter of national reconciliation. But the establishment of the NRBC before Zambian independence and the continuing influence of the BBC, which included sending educators to Zambia and taking Zambian broadcasters as interns, ensured the influence of the ex-metropole even after the country had become independent. Additionally, FBC staff members were taken over, to the extent that for several years after independence, Lightfoot continued to head it. This took place in the larger context of ideological continuities. While the nationalists had been unequivocal about who should hold political power, they shared ideas about how that power was to be
used with their colonial predecessors. Development programmes in the ZBS continued to propagate capitalist over subsistent farming techniques, cultural programmes continued to present the same ideas about the regional 'poverty' of traditional music, and news items were censored, although now for the sake of "national unity".

After independence, at least for some time, the legitimacy of the respective new government was unchallenged. UNIP had taken over the nationalist cause at a time when the ANC had been too weak to pressurise the colonial authorities and not radical enough to mobilise an impatient populace; SWAPO had taken up arms while nationalist parties in Namibia let themselves be wooed by the South African administration, and the UN had officially given its blessing to the movement by calling it the "sole and authentic representative" of Namibians. It should be no surprise, then, that the two parties saw themselves this way and equated their staying in power with the survival of the nation as such. In these circumstances, "national unity" was the most often evoked concept to justify censoring. Censorship in the new stations happened on two levels: members of government and party cadres reserved the right to pressurise journalists to not report too critically on the nationalist government; but more pervasive was the favouring of the party and government in news. While this could be simply enjoined by UNIP, especially after it had incorporated the station in the administration, there were too many opposition groups and, respectively, media in independent Namibia to pull such a move. The new government, under scrutiny from the opposition and international organisations whether it would deliver on the promises for guaranteeing democratic procedure, did not clamp down on the parastatal NBC like UNIP did; nevertheless, not necessarily always behind the curtains, politicians directly pressured the Director General, middle management and sometimes broadcasters, to the point of furiously phoning in to live broadcasts.

In such an environment, viable concepts of how to develop and implement programmes for the purpose of nation-building were difficult to design. Programmes that were developed specifically for that purpose sounded bland, official and only let members of political and economic elites drone on, without presenting models for the new nation, and without the slightest hint of criticism for the new government. "Nation and Humanism" and "Building the Nation", respectively the signature programmes for this kind of format in the two countries, presented hardly more than what in studios
around the world is derisively called "talking heads". Others were overly pedagogic, and listeners felt being talked down to. The censorship for the sake of "national unity", the emphasis on ruling party and government in actuality programmes, and the official formats were an inevitable outcome of the fact that the new ruling parties identified themselves with the nation – if Swapo had fought and sacrificed much for the independence of Namibia, and if the Namibian nation was primarily defined over the common experience of the struggle against colonialism, Apartheid and occupation, then it was obvious to them that the Namibian nation could not exist without the party. A similar idea had informed UNIP cadres who felt that the opposition ANC, which had strongholds in the Southern Region, led to regional and ethnic frictions. At the same time, the bureaucratisation of the Zambian Broadcasting Corporation was an element of Zambian nation-building itself as UNIP believed in the essential role of "bureaucratic authoritarianism" in this process. Radio stations were in the double role of symbol and promoter of the nation. While the NBC functioned as a laboratory of national reconciliation, it was also supposed to be the major means for the promotion of it; and while the ZBS was incorporated into a bureaucracy that was deemed essential for the purpose, its programmes promoted the same model. But these politically desired projects were only a part of the role radio played in post-colonial nationalism. The nation in radio was not created in official projects that connected political power with the political and social space of the nation. It was negotiated in an interactive communication between listeners and broadcasters, a process that took place in all kinds of programmes, including those that had not consciously been designed for the purpose.

Nation-building through radio meant above all identity-building. Radio could provide a virtual national space that, technically, connected all of the members of the Namibian or Zambian nation. Entertainment programmes played a major role in establishing a national culture. While listeners discussed the place that 'their' culture – in the sense of their ethnic culture – had in radio programmes, entertainment formats that sported a mix of Western pop music, traditional music, the forms that had developed in the ethnically mixed towns and compounds and the music of the nationalist struggle, as well as songs that borrowed from some or all of these styles formed the foundation of a national culture. In Namibia, call-in radio shows like the National Chat Show were successful and played a central role in fostering a national identity because they did not present government officials talking about policies and instead...
opened up a space where every member of the nation could debate with the others. Although callers were challenged when they resorted to too hateful statements or criticised the government too much (both counted as hate speech), the National Chat Show and its successor formats provided a space that was by definition national and which enabled listeners to debate issues of national scope, like discussing who was part of the nation – and who wasn't. Music request programmes, through which listeners could exchange messages and greetings, also showed every listener the multitude of people who belonged to the Zambian nation, simply because he or she listened to the messages exchanged by people from different regions, who might then go on to request a song he or she knew.

But listeners also thought and discussed their place in the nation. What place did their other – cultural, ethnic, or language – identities have in the nation. The discussions about which languages should be present in programmes or what the quality of English on the National Channel said about the national identity did not necessarily have an anti-national character. Rather, they were discussions about the relationship of national identity to other identities – political, social, ethnic or otherwise – that played a role in their lives. These struggles over cultural and political hegemony did not have the aim to abolish the nation altogether, but to negotiate the position of (usually language) groups in the framework of the nation. They moved on the "ideological terrain" that determined how people "acquire[d] a consciousness of their position" in society.\footnote{Gramsci 1992-2002, 876 (Book 7, § 19). my translation.}

**Imagined Communities through radio?**

What, then, are the consequences of these findings on if and how Anderson's argument on the role of "print capitalism" for the development of nationalism in 19th century Europe and Asia can be transferred to radio in the decolonisation of African countries? Anderson makes an argument about form, in which the actors play only a small and passive role, namely being given the possibility of imagining a community that went beyond their immediate surroundings. Technically, radio went beyond that. More than just making it possible to imagine the nation as community, it also enabled actual communication. Because that communication was regulated centrally, radio also provided a virtual space. Listeners could imagine that they were part of a com-
munity of people who sat in front of their radios and listened to the same voice, the same song, the same crowd in the Independence Stadium cheering for a goal at the precisely same time. But it was not the imagined community held together by radio that had made the nationalist movement possible. Although newspapers played a certain role in nationalist mobilisation in other African countries (most famously Nnamdi Azikiwe's "Zik Press" in West Africa), this was not the case in Zambia and Namibia. In both countries, nationalist mobilisation had preceded the development of newspapers, and the nationalist press was first and foremost concerned with general political campaigning. The Central African Mail, a liberal newspaper for an African readership in the Federation, addressed not Zambia, but another imagined community by its very name.

Also, colonial authorities tried their best to disrupt the imagined national space and construct other spaces, be they federally inclusive or ethnically divisive. The nationalist radios, on the other hand, addressed a national audience, although technically unable to reach the whole country. Here, the imagined community was nationalist rather than national – Fanon's idea of the radio being a tool to "enter in communication with the revolution" and the evidence given by contemporaries suggest that they tuned in to be connected to the anti-colonial revolution, not necessarily the nation. For all the calls for national unity, the nation itself lay in the future, and as Basil Davidson argues, nationalism was first and foremost driven by anti-colonial and social struggles. Although the nationalist movements presented models for what constituted the nation, these were secondary to the anti-colonial struggle – SWAPO's idea of what united Namibians basically was the anti-colonial struggle. After independence, these proved to be simply not viable. UNIP resorted to an authoritarian solution, putting faith in bureaucracy and relying on the figure of Kaunda, who because of his Malawian parentage was supposed to stand above ethnic struggles in Zambia; Swapo, not least because of the fragile social and political balance in post-Apartheid Namibia, only reluctantly endeavoured to complete the painful process of national reconciliation and refused to commit itself completely to it. Also, neither UNIP nor Swapo, when in power, put much significance on the question of culture. If "culture" was something that would "flow[,] automatically" as soon as a national identity had been estab-

874 cf. the still contentious issue of those detained by SWAPO in Zambia and Angola. Until today, Swapo refuses to acknowledge their sufferings and grant access to information about missing persons, cf. Kornes 2010.
lished, there was no need to develop cultural programmes for the purpose of promoting a national identity. If bureaucratic centralism would create the nation through imposing a national framework on the people, culture would eventually follow. It was therefore no surprise that the programmes for the purpose of nation-building remained bland and equated party rule with the stability of the nation.

Against this backdrop, however, other programmes took on the role of fostering national culture and of providing a virtual space that was truly national. The best example, and for Namibian broadcasters today a format they most often refer to if asked what the NBC did for nation-building, was the National Chat Show. Ironically enough, it was also a constant bone of contention for Swapo politicians, who feared the open discussion and regularly tried to rein in moderators on the show. Another irony in the context of the show is that its predecessors lay in messaging and request programmes that in the SWABC had provided a tool to separate the channels and their audiences, and even before that in colonial broadcasting to ease the difficulties that came from the separation of soldiers from their families, and also to keep Africans tuned in to the colonial station. Other important changes included the exchange of programming content between different channels, the inclusion of African music and cultural items in the "National Channels" and the expansion of featured topics beyond the respective language group, programme or channel served. But most of these decisions were made by the professionals in the stations, or followed expert recommendations.

What these examples show in relation to Anderson's arguments is that it was not through the technical form of the medium alone, but through consciously changing the infrastructure and media content that politicians and broadcasters defined the community that was to be imagined through radio. On the other hand, form plays a central role in nation-building insofar as it was through the more subtle, formal changes described here rather than through direct propaganda for nation-building that a national space was successfully constructed. The success of the National Chat Show came from the fact that it let listeners take part in the discussion about Namibian nationhood, and it did so by providing a space for discussion that encompassed the whole nation. Here, nationhood was actively practised instead of imposed by

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876 Private Secretary to the PM Welensky to Minister of Home Affairs, 30.10.1958. Welensky Papers, 336/4.
government officials.

This leads us to expand on Anderson's arguments: it is the form of the medium that enables the imagination of a community, but it is through actively constructing the form, i.e. the infrastructure, that actors such as the state define the form the audience and, therefore, the imagined community takes.

But this is not the whole argument: the audience is not just passive receiver, moulded into the desired shape by a monopolist broadcaster. It actively participates in modelling the nation and negotiates the different identities and their place in the national community. This can be observed very clearly in the countries described here, as the language question – which languages should be represented in which channels and to what extent – was strongly connected to issues of culture and identity in both cases. Therefore, language was at the centre of debates around hegemony in radio. From the way listeners talked about the issue, it is apparent that they saw the issue of language as being connected to issues of political, social, and cultural hegemony in the new nation. Why, they asked, is it ChiBemba and ChiNyanja that get the most airtime, and are included in the National Channel instead the Home Channel? Why should English be the new national language of Namibia, when the majority of the population used Afrikaans as lingua franca? And what did the pronunciation and inflection of the English spoken by announcers say about the new nation? The basis of the debate was a big enough problem: if the radio was the most important medium and the only news source in the rural areas especially, what did it say about a language group and its place in the nation that it was not included in programmes? If a language was left out of radio, its speakers were basically denied access to important news that might affect them directly (e.g. government announcements). This argument is only partially modified by the fact that most listeners were fluent enough in other languages that they could still understand one or more of the languages spoken in radio programmes. Despite the fact that San often listened to the Damara/Nama Service of the SWABC and NBC, the implications of the fact that in independent Namibia, San was the only Namibian language absent from programmes for a long time and was not even considered as a necessary inclusion in the relatively well-equipped state radio, speaks lengths about the ongoing discrimination of San groups in contemporary Namibia.\textsuperscript{877}

\textsuperscript{877} cf. Suzman, James. 1999. "Things from the Bush": A Contemporary History of the Omaheke Bushmen, Basel, 142. Only recently, in 2003, a Service for several San languages was
This problem of who was included in the medium that effectively controlled national discourse was, although it only concerned a relatively small minority of listeners, symbolically important and hotly debated. From this basic problem followed more; because the news was produced centrally in a separate department in English, and then translated in the different language services, priority was placed on the English-language national channel. This pertains to both cases discussed here. In Zambia, the fact that the newsroom was affiliated with the National Service annoyed both broadcasters of and listeners to the Home Service, because they felt that the National Service, and with it the urban, English, Bemba and Nyanja speaking middle class, was prioritised over the other Services and, consequently, this audience was a more important part of the nation. In Namibia, the newsroom also became the scene of the fiercest conflicts between returning Voice of Namibia staff and ex-SWABC broadcasters who had only shortly before been attacked for their biased election coverage. The most pressing issue was to get Black newsreaders in the National Service as well as in Television. Also, in Namibia discussions about the quality of the English spoken on the national channel reflected feelings of anxiety among English speakers about their cultural position in Namibia. While acknowledging the central role the new government gave English as the national language, they felt it was not ‘their’ English, and that it was of low quality. On the other hand, employing 'standard' English on the radio would have effectively excluded those who spoke English as a second language and had grown accustomed to the "Namlish" idiom.

Besides the public discussions about the shape and role of national radio, listeners were also involved in day-to-day practices surrounding radio and its programmes. Because the airwaves transcend international borders, even a state monopoly did not save the stations from competition. This was only too apparent during colonial times, when nationalist radios broadcast from external stations, undermining territorial sovereignty. But besides the international propaganda stations, those from neighbouring states could be heard, too, at least in border regions. Also, international radios like the BBC Empire Service (later World Service), that did not attack specific states or regions, were popular. Using these stations to balance information from colonial or post-colonial state radios was a widespread practice, as was referring to oth-

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er sources like (inter-)national newspapers, personal information or hearsay. A decisive element in enhancing the popularity of a station, however, was the entertainment programmes. The South African propaganda stations, like Radio RSA, but also those more focused on entertainment like Radio Springbok, were popular in the region because of the high quality of reception but also because of their programming of contemporary popular music. By simply choosing one of these stations over others, listeners could force governments and station managers to react. Again, infrastructure and programming are connected in the issue. As shown, people in Southern Zambia preferred South African stations over the ZBS because the reception was much better; government officials (as Nkhata had done before) proposed exempting people in rural areas from the licence fee, so that they would feel free to put up bigger aerials without fear of being caught without a radio licence. Two transmitters donated by the Chinese government were then used to enhance reception quality. But the quality of entertainment programming was also an important issue, as was very apparent to broadcasters from listener research.

Ratings were an important instrument in determining which programmes to continue from the colonial broadcaster, and call-in, request and messaging programmes were amongst the most popular formats. As established, these were also among the most important formats for establishing both a national space of discussion and debates about the form the space was to take. The twist with these programmes, however, was that post-colonial governments were extremely uneasy about formats that allowed listeners to speak their mind. Especially in Namibia, these fears were not unfounded; “hate speech” – discriminatory language on the airwaves – could threaten the fragile process of national reconciliation. But politicians quickly started to subsume criticism of the government under the category, and moderators like Felix Muchila saw hate speech as a symptom rather than the disease, and tried to reason with callers rather than just censor them. There are several instances of the Swapo government trying to force the NBC to discontinue certain Phone-in shows after callers had been too explicitly critical of government policies or members, but public outcry over government interference in the affairs of the autonomous corporation and listener protest forced it to back down. The Phone-in shows are actually a fascinating example of how listeners were themselves actively involved in discussing questions of national identity, inclusion and exclusion, or political issues, all in a
virtual national space, and they even defended that space against too much government interference.

Other examples were more subtle, and are often difficult to trace in the sources. Entertainment and music programmes that broadcast "national", modern pop music instead of "traditional", regionally diverse songs were popular among the urban population. These were concerned with a nationally inclusive culture, but also tended to look down on rural dwellers because of their "backwardness". It would also be wrong to make the converse argument that listeners who favoured 'traditional' music emphasised 'ethnic' over 'national' identity. Rather, as letters to the editor and survey data show, they were concerned with negotiating their place as member of an ethnic or social group or of a religious community, or as urban or rural dwellers in the larger framework of the nation. Listeners who complained that 'their' culture was not represented in the Zambian Home Service or that NBC Language Services broadcast 'traditional' songs that mocked or attacked other groups were not calling into question the nation as such; rather, they mediated different identities. The discussions reveal how issues of hegemony connected to social, cultural and political groups were negotiated in a national civil society. The post-colonial state, the different political groups in it and ethnic interest groups were all actors in this field, and they were not necessarily always neatly separated from each other. Radio was an important part of that civil society, being at the same time an actor defining national space and a contested field of discussion about that space, be it on the level of legislature, in the institutions, in public discussion or that of listeners in front of the speaker, in call-in shows or letters to the editor.

These findings show that it was not in the technical setup of the electronic mass medium radio that a national space was constructed, which then was just passively received and accepted by the audience. Rather, the nation was 'built' through a set of practices involving actors on several levels of power: the state (and government), managers and broadcasters in the station, the general public, and listeners. These interacted in complex ways: listeners tried to influence politics by making their grievances public, and broadcasters reacted to listeners' demands, which often were mirrored in quantitative and qualitative surveys. Radio consequently should not only be regarded in terms of its technical qualities, but as a result of processes of negotiation between the different actors involved in the medium's production cycle, as described
by Stuart Hall. This means taking historical actors seriously and understanding media in their embeddedness in social processes. Rather than being harbingers of social change, they are themselves submitted to it.
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