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Friedensjournalismus und Peace Building: Theorie und Praxis für das 21. Jahrhundert **Peace Journalism and Peace Building: Theory and practice for the 21st century**

Wilhelm Kempf

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English Ruth Wodak (2015): The politics of fear. London: Sage. ISBN 978-1-446247-00-6.

Editorial

Im letzten Heft von *conflict & communication online* hatten wir eine Pressemitteilung zur Kündigung des Bankkontos der Jüdischen Stimme für gerechten Frieden in Nahost e.V. (JS) durch die Bank für Sozialwirtschaft dokumentiert. Nachdem beide Seiten ihre Standpunkte ausgetauscht haben, hat diese unerfreuliche Affäre ein konstruktives Ende genommen, wozu wir erneut eine Pressemitteilung der JS dokumentieren, in der klargestellt wird, dass ihre Unterstützung der BDS-Bewegung durch deren gewaltfreie und politische Orientierung begründet ist und die JS im Einklang mit Beschlüssen der Vereinten Nationen ausschließlich Aktivitäten unterstützt, die auf ein Ende der israelischen Besatzungspolitik drängen und auf die Verwirklichung gleicher Rechte für Israelis und Palästinenser zielen, nicht aber gegen die Existenz des Staates Israel gerichtet sind.

Weiters setzen wir einen Link auf den bedauerlicherweise recht einseitig geratenen und teilweise fehlerhaften Bericht des Unabhängigen Expertenkreises Antisemitismus an die Deutsche Bundesregierung und verlinken mit einem, in der Wochenzeitung *Die Zeit* erschienenen, Kommentar, in dem der frühere israelische Botschafter in Deutschland, Shimon Stein, und der in Tel Aviv lehrende, israelische Historiker Moshe Zimmermann sich kritisch mit dem Bericht auseinandersetzen und davor warnen: „Wer ‚Antisemitismus‘ ruft, wo keiner ist, der schadet dem Kampf gegen Antisemitismus“.

Außerdem dokumentieren wir eine Pressemitteilung des Internationalen Versöhnungsbundes, in dem ein sofortiger Abschiebestopp nach Afghanistan, die Erleichterung und Beschleunigung des Familiennachzuges, die Anerkennung von Kriegsdienstverweigerung und Desertation als Asylgrund sowie ein Bleiberecht für Roma und Sinti in Deutschland gefordert wird.

Berlin, im Oktober 2017

Wilhelm Kempf

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Editorial

In the last issue of *conflict & communication online* we documented a press release on the cancellation of the bank account of the Jewish Voice for a Just Peace in the Middle East (Jüdische Stimme für gerechten Frieden in Nahost e.V. (JS)) by the Bank for a Social Economy (Bank für Sozialwirtschaft). After the two sides exchanged their viewpoints, this regrettable affair was constructively ended, whereby we document a new press release of the JS. This makes it clear that its support for the BDS movement (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) is based on a non-violent and political orientation. In agreement with United Nations resolutions, the JS after all supports actions toward ending Israeli occupation policy and realizing equal rights for Israelis and Palestinians, but is not against the existence of the state of Israel.

Further, we set a link to the regrettably quite one-sided and in part erroneous report of the Independent Body of Experts on Anti-Semitism to the German government and link to a commentary that appeared in the weekly newspaper *Die Zeit*. In it, former Israeli ambassador to Germany Shimon Stein and Israeli historian Moshe Zimmermann, who teaches in Tel Aviv, deal critically with the report and warn: "Anyone who cries 'Anti-Semitism' where there is none harms the struggle against Antisemitism."

In addition, we document a press release of the International Union for Reconciliation (Internationaler Versöhnungsbund), which favors immediately ending expulsions to Afghanistan, and supports facilitating and accelerating family reunion, recognizing conscientious objection and desertion as grounds for asylum, as well as calling for a right to remain in Germany for Roma and Sinti.

Berlin, October 2017

Wilhelm Kempf

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Wilhelm Kempf

Zu einer Theorie und (besseren) Praxis de Friedensjournalismus

Der vorliegende Aufsatz diskutiert das Konzept des Friedensjournalismus im Rahmen sozialpsychologischer und mediensoziologischer Theorien und argumentiert dafür, dass Friedensjournalismus als ein schrittweiser Prozess zu verstehen ist, der an den jeweiligen Eskalationsgrad eines Konfliktes, den Mainstream-Mediendiskurs und das jeweilige gesellschaftliche Klima anzupassen ist. Nur wenn er dies berücksichtigt, hat er die Chance Wirkung zu entfalten und zumindest die gemäßigten und einigermaßen argumentationszugänglichen Segmente der Gesellschaft zu erreichen. Hardliner, die sich bereits einem War Frame verschrieben haben wird er kaum überzeugen können. Im Gegenteil ist damit zu rechnen, dass sie ihren Standpunkt mit allen Mitteln verteidigen und auch vom Versuch der Diskreditierung des Friedensjournalismus nicht zurückschrecken werden. Um ihre Glaubwürdigkeit zu bewahren, müssen Friedensjournalisten daher ihre Integrität unter Beweis stellen und jegliche Rollendiffusion zwischen Journalismus und Aktivismus vermeiden.

Volltext

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Wilhelm Kempf

Towards a theory and (better) practice of peace journalism

Situating peace journalism in the context of social-psychological and media-sociological theories, this paper argues that peace journalism can best be furthered by a gradual process of development that adapts it to the level of conflict escalation, mainstream media discourse and over-all societal climate. Only if it takes these factors into consideration can peace journalism be effective and reach at least moderate segments of society. Hardliners who are already committed to a war frame can seldom be converted, but rather will defend their beliefs using all available means, including attempts to discredit peace journalism itself. In order to maintain their credibility, peace journalists must prove their integrity and avoid crossing the line separating journalism from activism.

[full text](#)

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Abstract: Situating peace journalism in the context of social-psychological and media-sociological theories, this paper argues that peace journalism can best be furthered by a gradual process of development that adapts it to the level of conflict escalation, mainstream media discourse and over-all societal climate. Only if it takes these factors into consideration can peace journalism be effective and reach at least moderate segments of society. Hardliners who are already committed to a war frame can seldom be converted, but rather will defend their beliefs using all available means, including attempts to discredit peace journalism itself. In order to maintain their credibility, peace journalists must prove their integrity and avoid crossing the line separating journalism from activism.

1. Defining peace journalism

In modern diplomacy, media serve as: (1) information sources, (2) communication channels for decision-makers, and (3) means to secure public support (Cohen 1986). They offer citizens means of interpreting the world (Lumsden 1997) and thus enable the political elites that control them to influence peoples' convictions and their resulting actions (Wolfsfeld 2004).

Accordingly, it matters how journalism and the media cover conflicts, and the media's peace mandate is anchored in numerous international treaties and documents, including the 1948 UN *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, the 1966 UN *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* and the 1978 UNESCO *Media Declaration*.

The legal anchoring of the media peace mandate in international law and its practical implementation are two different things, however. Since Lasswell's (1927) famous study of propaganda techniques in World War I, numerous media studies have shown that conventional conflict coverage is (often) biased in favor of perpetuating and escalating conflict and rarely complies with the professional norms of quality journalism.

It is clear from this that something should be done to counteract the escalation prone bias of conventional journalism and achieve good journalism even under the sensitive conditions of war and crisis. This is what the peace journalism project (Galtung 1998, Kempf 1996) is all about, and according to Lynch & McGoldrick's definition:

Peace Journalism is when editors and reporters make choices – of what stories to report and how to report them – which create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent responses to conflict. (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005: 5)

This is a worthwhile viewpoint that raises some key questions and has, however, met with opposition from journalists and media researchers alike.

Creating opportunities to consider and value non-violent responses to conflict requires great commitment (on the part of both journalists and peace researchers who wish to advance the peace journalism project). It may all too easily result in a mistaken understanding of peace journalism to mean active participation as a peace-maker, which is simply not the journalist's role (Loyn 2007). Conflating the roles of journalism and activism and/or trying to promote and impose particular solutions may tempt peace journalism to overstep the borderline between journalism and public relations (Hanitzsch 2007), and the peace journalist himself can easily become a party in a conflict, thus reducing his credibility. This increases the danger that peace journalism could deteriorate into the opposite of good journalism (Loyn 2007). Recent scandals involving Galtung and Lynch show that this danger is more than just hypothetical (Kempf 2016).

Therefore, as a first step towards a theory of peace journalism, I will compare Lynch & McGoldrick's definition with a broader understanding of peace journalism that doesn't yet stipulate concrete requirements for what a peace journalist should do:

Peace Journalism is when editors and reporters are aware of their contribution to the construction of reality and of their responsibility to give peace a chance. (Kempf 2012: 2)

2. Conflict discourses

There are various ways to deal with this claim, and it is obvious that peace journalists must *make choices*. At the least a choice of whether to subscribe to peace journalism philosophy, a choice of how to understand their role in the complex co-construction of social reality, a choice to take responsibility, and a choice of ways to help give peace a chance. It is not obvious, however, whether they should also make choices *of which stories to report and how to report them*, or whether they should aim at creating *opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent responses to conflict*.

Even though there can be no doubt that peace journalism makes a difference in which stories are told and how they are told, and although giving peace a chance includes considering and valuing non-violent responses to conflict, both claims are defined too operationally. First, an explicit decision on which stories to report and how to report them entails the risk that journalists might manipulate their products. Second, peaceful transformation of conflict involves much more than merely non-violent responses.

What a journalist can do, and what a peace journalist should do, however, is to become attentive to the kinds of questions with which he approaches conflict and the kinds of discourses he thereby engages in. These discourses include:

- a war discourse on questions like "Who is guilty?" and "How can he be stopped?" etc.
- a peace discourse that rather asks "What is the problem?" and "How can it be solved for mutual benefit?" and/or
- a reconciliation discourse guided by questions like "Who is the other?" and "How can we relate to each other with mutual respect and appreciation?"

Already the orientation of questioning makes a difference for which stories appear relevant and newsworthy (news selection) and what kinds of problem definitions, causal interpretations, moral evaluations and/or treatment recommendations appear reasonable (framing).

Depending on the kinds of questions with which a journalist approaches a conflict, his perceptions and the way he reports on it inevitably change. For this change to occur, he does not need to slip into the peace-maker role, nor does he need to make an intentional choice of which stories to report and how to report them.

If a journalist does not want to overshoot his goal, already the question of what sorts of discourse he will engage in or what sorts of discourse he will try to initiate is not entirely at his discretion.

Reconciliation is a long-term process that can extend over decades and is not just political-structural, but also entails far-reaching social-psychological changes: from developing a new view of the past to recognizing own guilt to changing the collective memory up to creating a shared historical narrative (Asmal et al. 1996). Trying to set in motion a discourse of reconciliation in the midst of violent conflict thus appears unrealistic and unlikely to succeed.

Co-existence is a precondition for reconciliation. Compared with reconciliation, this is a far more modest goal and certainly not the ideal of harmonious relations between two societies. Still, because it endows both sides with legitimacy, rejects violence and meets the opponent on an equal footing, it represents a necessary intermediate stage on the path to reconciliation. For co-existence, personal convictions, attitudes and emotions play a role that is just as important as that played by political structures and institutions (Bar-Tal 2004, 2005).

To lay the cornerstone for peaceful co-existence, it likewise does not suffice for political elites to conclude a peace treaty. Members of the affected societies must also support it.

It is always the conflict parties themselves that must ultimately find a conflict solution, and it is always they who must themselves take the long road from a peace agreement to reconciliation. What journalism and the media can contribute to this process is to serve as a mediator and improve communication between parties, reduce mistrust, enemy images and prejudices, help conflict parties understand the other side's interests and develop mutual empathy, etc. Only if it is modest enough to be satisfied with this role can peace journalism do justice to the imperative formulated by Kempf (2007: 3) to be not the opposite, but rather the precondition of good journalism:

Peace journalism = responsible journalism = good journalism.

3. Agenda setting, news factors and framing

Lynch & McGoldrick's proposal that peace journalists should decide which stories to report and how to report them is understandable, insofar as (1) media contribute to the social construction of reality. They do this, for one thing, by introducing specific topics into public discourse (agenda setting, cf. McCombs & Shaw 1972), and for another, by the way they treat these topics (framing, cf. Goffman 1974). (2) Galtung's (1998) four-factor news communication model suggests that already so-called news values (negativity, personalization, and elite-orientation on both personal and national levels) constitute a structural frame in which we see the world as divided between rich and poor, and at the same time between "good" and "evil."

The idea of practicing peace journalism by intentionally ignoring and undermining common news factors is a much too simplistic and voluntaristic conceptualization, however. Both,

- news factors that have effects on which stories are newsworthy, what importance and how much space should be assigned to them (Eilders 1997; Kunczik 1990),
- and framing that makes specific aspects of a perceived reality more salient, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (Entman 1993),

are not at the discretion of journalists who feel primarily obligated to offer an accurate representation of reality. Manipulating them is not an appropriate aim of journalism, but rather of propaganda and public relations (Hanitzsch 2007).

What responsible editors and journalists can do, however, is to *not* let an alleged lack of news value restrict the coverage of issues they consider relevant. News factors are not as hard and fast as some authors (cf. Hanitzsch 2007) suggest and a wide range of empirical and experimental studies support this:

1. Content analyses of news coverage on the Middle East conflict during the Oslo Process (Annabring 2000; Kempf 2003a) and of German press coverage on France after the Second World War (Jaeger 2004, 2009) have shown that news factors like simplification, negativism and personalization are dealt with by the media in quite flexible ways.
2. Furthermore, in its preferences the public is far less oriented to news factors than commonly assumed. Thus, Wolling (2002) found that information quality is an essential factor in evaluating news reportage, and as Eilders (1997) has shown, the more political knowledge readers have, the less they will be influenced by traditional news factors. The better informed they are, the more they will have developed their own views about which aspects of an issue are relevant to them.
3. Although research by Bläsi et al. (2005) and Sparr (2004) indicates that traditional news factors like negativity and personalization do have an effect on readers' interest in further information, they also show that this effect is not homogeneous, but depends on the complexity of the articles.

Whether or not a story is newsworthy depends on the discourse in which it is reported. If peace is on the political agenda, news values change by themselves (Jaeger 2009), and there is only one news factor that peace journalism needs to decisively and intentionally reject: the alleged news value of simplification that reduces journalism to offering black-and-white pictures.

Conflict coverage that gives peace a chance necessarily displays a higher degree of complexity, but it can nevertheless achieve this without sacrificing audience interest. Experimental studies have revealed that simplification has no inherent news value, but – quite to the contrary – more complex reportage can stimulate audience interest even for issues that – in terms of traditional news factors – have less news value (Kempf 2005, Möckel 2009).

4. Peace journalism as a process

An antagonistic opposition of war journalism vs. peace journalism can further contribute to voluntaristic misunderstanding of peace journalism. Various tables contrasting the two approaches (Kempf et al. 1996; Galtung 1998; Kempf 2003a; Lee & Maslog 2005, Hussain & Rebman 2015) describe only some features of two extreme cases of conflict coverage, but are unsuitable as a blueprint for manufacturing peace journalism.

They can serve as checklists for evaluating the escalation or de-escalation prone tendency of media products (or discourses), but already here we must take into account the fact that the above-named extreme cases of conflict coverage rarely occur in pure form.

Most conflict reports include both escalation oriented (war journalistic) and de-escalation oriented (peace journalistic) features, whereby it is not sufficient to incorporate the appearance or frequency of certain text characteristics. The direction of a text results from the patterns they form (Kracauer 1952), and taken in itself,

even the escalation or de-escalation oriented valence of a text characteristic is often not unambiguous. If, for instance, proactive conflict coverage goes along with an "us" vs. "them" conception of the emerging conflict, this will not help much in preventing conflict.

The meaning of a text element is constituted by its contextualization. This must also be taken into account in constructing texts for teaching or research, in order to show how differently the same news story can be reported (cf. Lynch & McGoldrick 2004) or to study audience reactions to different versions of the same story (cf. Annabring et al. 2005; Bläsi et al. 2005; Kempf 2005; Kempf & Thiel 2012; Nerad 2009; Schaefer 2006; Sparr 2004; Thiel & Kempf 2014).

Anyone who has tried to write such a text knows how very much thought, time and effort this requires. Already for this reason, the checklists are simply too time-consuming to serve as tools for shaping real life news coverage. Moreover, they are not compatible with journalistic work routines, and beyond that, the very idea of manufacturing texts transforms the questionable impetus to make voluntary choices of which stories to report and how to report them definitely into the production of propaganda or public relations.

Above all, however, the escalation or de-escalation of conflict is a *process* in which war and peace represent only the opposite poles of a continuum (cf. Figure 1).




Figure 1: Stages and steps of conflict escalation (according to Creighton, 1992, and Glasl, 1992; from Kempf 2003a: 45).

Conflict escalation is usually not a linear process, moving forward step-by-step, however. It rather follows the pattern of "two steps forward, one step backward," and on every level of conflict escalation there is a chance of withdrawing, of step-by-step conflict de-escalation. Therefore, if peace journalism aims to reduce the escalation prone bias of conventional journalism and give peace a chance, we should not conceptualize it as simply the opposite of war journalism. We should conceptualize it as a *process* that gradually reduces the escalation prone bias of conventional conflict coverage.

As a result, the characteristic features of escalation- or de-escalation oriented conflict coverage are not constants, but depend on the current level of conflict escalation. Already the type of discourse that a peace journalist may reasonably employ should be adapted to the present state of conflict. For this reason, Kempf (2003a) distinguishes between de-escalation oriented and solution oriented conflict coverage, but this differentiation is still too rough.

5. Cognitive, emotional and social change

Any conflict can be conceptualized as either a competitive (win-lose) or a cooperative (win-win) process (Deutsch 1973, 2000). Cooperative environments characteristically display a mutual relationship between conflict parties based on shared rights and interests, involving cooperative behavior and providing common benefits to all engaged parties. Open communication reduces the danger of misunderstandings. It enables parties to explore interests behind conflict issues, elaborate a more adequate definition of the real problems they must deal with and optimize their contributions to resolving these problems. Working as a team encourages parties to empathize with each other and respect their mutual needs and interests. The process of cooperation thus minimizes defensive strategies and encourages mutually positive attitudes, makes partners more sensitive to common interests and reduces the importance attached to differences.

In a competitive environment, however, conflicts have a tendency to spread and escalate. This may lead to issue inflation, and a conflict may continue long after the original issues have lost their relevance (or even been forgotten). Competition reduces communication among parties: Existing communication resources are either neglected or used to intimidate or deceive the opponent. The opponent's statements or declarations are not trusted, and available information is evaluated in terms of existing prejudices. The win-lose principle implies that a desirable conflict resolution is only possible at the opponent's expense and can only be achieved by overcoming his resistance. Accordingly, it encourages the use of increasingly draconian and ultimately even violent means to achieve goals. In the end, the competitive process leads to mutual distrust and vilification by both parties. It thus reduces their sensitivity to shared interests and exaggerates the relevance of differences. The parties concentrate on power strategies and threats, pressure and deception tactics.

Competition among groups also affects their social structure. In-group coherence becomes stronger. Group members begin to identify more strongly with their group, and a reputation for defying the opponent enhances social standing. Leadership positions go to actors who adopt a confrontational strategy. Victory becomes the main goal, and group members who express a desire to cooperate with the opponent are suspected of disloyalty. Uncompromising belligerents are glorified as heroes, and neutral third parties are delegitimated if they do not intervene for their side's benefit.

Conflicts are open to conceptualization as a win-win process. However, a systematic divergence of conflict parties' perspectives promotes win-lose (or zero-sum) interpretations. Since people interpret their own actions in terms of the intentions they serve, while they experience others' actions through their effects (i.e. in the case of conflict: blocking one's goal achievement), there is a bias in favor of interpreting conflict with a win-lose model.

Conceptualizing conflict as a win-lose process, however, transforms it into an autonomous process (Kempf 2003a) where both parties think they are defending themselves against a dangerous aggressor and each provokes the other to continue and even escalate the threat. Whatever a party does to reach its goals has the negative side-effect of threatening the opponent's goal-achievement and will be experienced by the opponent as aggression. Whatever the opponent does to defend himself against this aggression will have the same negative side-effects on the other party.

The further this process goes, the more drastic become the means that conflict parties resort to in combating perceived threats. The more the struggle against the conflict opponent becomes a dominant group aim, the more influence group members acquire who distinguish themselves in this struggle, and the greater the group's distrust becomes for willingness to compromise and efforts to mediate. Ongoing entanglement in the conflict binds group members to their conflict strategy by justifying their previous participation and shifts perceptions of the out-group toward exaggeration of their dissimilarity from the in-group, with increased condemnation of the out-group.

This process of *competitive misperceptions* (Deutsch 1973, 2000) heats up conflict and becomes a motor of conflict escalation that goes together with specific changes in the conflict's cognitive-emotional representation (Kempf 2003a). Competitive misperceptions become increasingly radicalized along the dimensions of (1) conceptualizing conflict as a win-win, win-lose or lose-lose process, (2) unfairly assessing parties' rights and goals, (3) using double standards to judge their actions and behavior and (4) emotional consequences of these interpretations, which ultimately transform outrage at war into outrage at the enemy (cf. Table 1) and disengage group members from moral control of violence (Bandura 1986, 1999).

It is particularly in long-lasting intractable conflicts that these misperceptions harden into societal beliefs (Bar-Tal 1998). Among other things, these are characterized by belief in the justice of one's own cause and one's own victim status, de-legitimation of the enemy and faith in protecting personal and national security through a policy of strength, as well as in peace as the ultimate goal of war. They construct an interpretation frame (war frame) that makes literally every interaction between conflict parties seem like a further episode in the eternal struggle between good and evil.

Escalation step	Cooperation	Perspective divergence	Competition	Struggle	War
Conceptualization of the conflict	Win-win orientation	Bias towards win-lose but win-win still possible	Win-lose (possibly defused by rules of fairness)	Win-lose (increased by threat strategies)	Zero sum orientation. Violence as the appropriate means of solving conflict, emphasis on military values, transfer from win-lose to lose-lose
Evaluation of rights and aims	Mutual respect for the rights of all participants and emphasis on common interests	Focus on one's own rights and needs (including common interests), the rights of others, however, vanish from the field of vision	Focus on one's own rights and needs; common interests, however, vanish from the field of vision	Emphasis on one's own rights and needs combined with questioning the rights of the opponent and condemning his intentions.	Idealization of one's own rights and needs, at the same time contesting the rights of the opponent, demonization of his intentions and denial of common interests
Evaluation of actions	Consideration of the benefits of each of the parties	Focus on one's own benefits (also those resulting from the mutual relationship)	Focus on one's own benefits	Justification of one's own actions and condemnation of those of the opponent	Idealization of one's own actions and demonization of the actions of the opponent
Emotional involvement	Empathy and mutual trust	Conflict between threat and trust	Focus on threat to oneself, that to the opponent disappears from the field of vision, mutual trust is lost	Emphasis on one's own strength and the danger from the opponent creates a delicate balance between threat and confidence of victory; the threat to the opponent is actively denied; mistrust exists	Balance between threat and confidence of victory continues to exist, mistrust directed also against neutral third parties who attempt to mediate the conflict, outrage at the war turns into outrage at the opponent
Identification offer	Mutual	Self-centered	Dualistic	Antagonistic	Polarized

Table 1: Cognitive-emotional changes during conflict escalation (from Kempf 2003b: 5)

However, the same situations can be placed in a completely different light by changing the type of mental model used to interpret them. Like all other members of society, journalists can choose one of the sides to a conflict and adopt its interpretation frame (war frame). Or they can choose an interpretation frame (peace frame) that admits the justification of both sides' concerns, recognizes mutual victim roles, rejects de-legitimizing the opponent and tries to achieve personal and national security through a peace solution.

People create a picture of a conflict, or – more precisely – a mental model (Johnson-Laird 1983; Radvansky & Zacks 1997; van Dijk 1998) with which to structure their knowledge, interpret causes, judge conflict parties' aims and actions, understand the conflict's logic and give meaning to the whole. This is, however, not just a question of cognitive information processing or respectively the interpretation frame in which they place the conflict. It also has an affective component that consists, on one hand, in emotional closeness to (Kempf 2011; König 2013), and in the given case involvement in the conflict, and, on the other, results from ambivalences in respective interpretation frames.

Both the war and peace frames promise security but, at the same time, also create insecurity: The war frame promises security, because it allows tried and true behavioral patterns to be continued, but it creates insecurity, because it threatens a continuation of violence. The peace frame offers security, because it promises an end to violence, but it creates insecurity because new behavioral patterns must be tried whose effectiveness is still uncertain.

Furthermore, both frames under suspicion of competitive (war frame) or respectively *cooperative misperceptions* (peace frame): As well in cooperative conflict management, there are characteristic forms of misperception and misjudgment. Cooperation tends to weaken perceptions of contradictions and strengthen belief in the opponent's good will. These typical changes often help in reducing conflict and making escalation less probable. But they also carry the risk that conflict issues will be neglected, and conflict parties will engage in "premature cooperation" that does not lead to a sustainable agreement, because it does not sufficiently resolve contradictions, or disputed issues are not adequately worked out (Deutsch 1973, 2000).

If the resulting disappointment is blamed on the opponent, the escalation spiral resumes and gains even greater force. The overestimation of the Oslo agreements, which were really no more than declarations of intent to work out a peace solution, is literally a textbook example of this: euphoria over the supposed outbreak of peace, disillusionment, search for a scapegoat, allocation of guilt, revival of old enemy images (Mandelzisz 2003, 2007) and return to a *fait accompli* policy.

6. Construction of social reality

Most journalists want nothing other than to do good work, report truthfully and be recognized for this. Journalists do not report unrelated facts, however, they tell stories that give meaning to reported events. Which events, themes, etc. they consider worth reporting, how they should be evaluated and how one should react to them is a matter of how they understand the conflict and what relevance the events or respectively themes acquire in the frame of this conflict understanding. What they regard as "the" truth is therefore actually quite subjective and represents at best a socially shared reality. This is especially the case because they are themselves members of society and subject to the same socio-psychological laws that hold for all members of society.

The prerequisite for them to free themselves from socially shared competitive misperceptions and be able to avoid cooperative misperceptions is a foothold in the logic of cooperative dispute resolution, posing the right questions (see above), a healthy distrust of the plausible, analytic ability to recognize misperceptions, self-critique, as well as the right amount of patience, forbearance and tolerance of frustration. Well and good: these competencies previously played hardly any role in journalistic training. If journalists are, however, even just a bit familiar with the escalation logic of conflict perception, they can simply look at mainstream reportage and easily judge the degree of escalation a conflict has reached and how it is likely to develop.

The very concept of misperception has been resisted by authors like Hanitzsch (2004: 185), who claims that the *one* version of reality constructed by war journalism is as compatible with classical standards of truth as *countless other versions*.

Certainly, the relativity of reality is hardly a new idea. Already in 1958, later Nobel Prize Laureate Harold Pinter wrote: "There are no hard distinctions between what is real and what is unreal, nor between what is true and what is false" (Pinter 2005: 1).

Once we begin to understand reality as a social construction, however, new perspectives open up that both go beyond simple relativism and permit a workable solution to the dilemma that troubled Pinter. Almost fifty years later, in His Nobel Prize Lecture he confessed: "I believe that these assertions still make sense and do still apply to the exploration of reality through art. So as a writer I stand by them but as a citizen I cannot. As a citizen I must ask: What is true? What is false?" (op cit.).

For in fact the relativism promulgated (not just) by Thomas Hanitzsch is based on the epistemological inadequacy of the so-called classical definition of truth, which asserts that a statement is true if it corresponds with reality. But as long as the concept of reality has not been defined beforehand and independently of the concept of truth, the classical definition is circular, and even if we had such an independent definition of reality, the classical definition of truth would still be logically incorrect. Statements and the states of affairs they describe belong to different logical categories that cannot be directly compared with each other. Put differently: Statements can only be compared with and correspond with other statements, and in this sense, they likewise cannot be compared with empirical observations, but only with statements about the observed.

Considerations like these already led the founder of formal logic, the mathematician and philosopher Gottlob Frege, to abandon the classical definition of truth, and to suggest that labeling a statement as "true" can be understood as an explicit commitment to prove it. Following this reasoning, the relation between truth and reality can then be conceptualized as a relation between the properties of statements and the properties of the states of affairs they describe: Statements describe states of affairs, and true statements describe real states of affairs (Kamlah & Lorenzen 1967).

Manifest thereby is the dependency of our speaking about "reality" (what actually is the case) on our ability to know in advance the truth of statements. "Not reality decides on truth (say physics or natural historical description), but rather their truth decides what is real" (Janich et al. 1974: 83).

At the same time, however, it is evident that the conceptual category of "true vs. false" does not apply to all statements. It only applies to statements for which there exists a well-defined set of rules on how to argue in favor of or against them, and whose confirmation or refutation can be measured against universal standards. But human action is guided by more than just facts. It is rather based on their meanings (Blumer 1973: 81), and the attribution of meaning does not follow universal rules.

The meaning of a fact depends on its context and on the perspective from which we examine it. The assignment of meaning is an interpretive process based on current interests and biographical experiences and – in our context most importantly – on social and cultural rules. Because different individuals, groups and societies have different interests and experiences, and because different groups, societies and cultures interpret the same facts according to different rules, the world of meaning is not homogeneous. Rather, it is made up of a multitude of alternative worlds that could be called subjective (personal, social and cultural) realities.

But even if we call them realities, we must not fail to see that subjective realities have a different methodological status than the reality of facts – which we might also call objective reality. They are not real in the same sense of the word as defined above. What can be true or false are only descriptions of subjective realities, explanations of how they are constructed, and analyses of their interactions. In itself, however, a subjective reality is neither true nor false.

Accordingly, the version of reality constructed by media is likewise neither true nor false. It is simply there and we must come to terms with it. But doesn't this have the same implications as Hanitzsch's relativism? Doesn't it immunize media reality against criticism? No, it really does not. With regard to subjective realities, however, the dispute about competing reality constructions cannot be a dispute about which of them is true. It can only be a dispute about which of them is *functional*.

Functionality is a relative concept, however, for nothing is functional per se. The concept of functionality relates states of affairs like reality constructions to the aims they serve. Although the way journalism and media interpret a conflict cannot be criticized as false, it can be criticized as avoiding conflict or escalating it, etc. – And insofar as it impedes or even excludes the option of conflict transformation, it can be criticized as misrepresenting reality (Kempf 2006).

In order to avoid falling into the trap of voluntaristic misunderstanding, peace journalism needs to be aware, however, that social reality is a complex co-construction involving a wide range of social actors (political elites and institutions, media companies, editors and journalists, audiences, etc.), and influencing factors that limit journalists' choices.

For a better understanding of this process, peace journalism can draw on a number of media-sociological and social-psychological theories. Among them are Herman & Chomsky's (1988) political economy of the media, Shoemaker & Reese's (1996) hierarchy of influences model, Bourdieu's (1988) conception of the media as a social universe functioning according to its own laws, Bläsi's (2004, 2006) model of social-psychological factors that influence the news production process, and/or Bratic's (2006) critical evaluation of media effect theories.

While Herman & Chomsky's "propaganda model overemphasizes structural determination, however, the hierarchy model may overplay the multiplicity and contingency of influences; and both models risk obscuring the specificity and coherence of journalism as a cultural practice and form of knowledge production" (Hackett 2007: 84f.). Also Bourdieu's conception of the media as a field that has developed a number of destructive characteristics that ominously work against the kind of discourse that peace journalism calls on news media to foster (Hackett 2007: 87). As well, Bläsi's model of influencing factors and the media effect theories reviewed by Bratic show, first of all, the limits of journalistic action and/or the scope of its effects. Peace journalism must take them into account, if it wants to avoid a voluntaristic misunderstanding of itself.

If we do not want to leave it at that and/or shelve the peace journalism project in view of seemingly insurmountable hurdles, we must stop thinking in terms of linear causality. Instead, we must search for strategies with which influencing factors can (partly) be neutralized, and (above all) for loopholes through which they can be circumvented and/or even exploited to reorient conflict journalism in a positive direction. First steps toward this goal are Bläsi's (2009) considerations on the implementation of peace journalism, as well as Bratic's (2006) proposal of ways how various types of media messages, audiences and environmental conditions can be utilized to advance the cause of peace.

7. Audience reactions and effects of peace journalism

To accomplish this, a minimal requirement is that peace journalism must have an audience, but Hanitzsch (2007: 5) questions whether it has one. He argues that news values resonate with audience expectations and concludes: "The main characteristic of news values is that they raise attention; and in our post-modern society, public attention is the central currency and thus becomes an increasingly limited good. Consequently, virtually everything in public communication is geared toward public attention, be it journalism, public relations,

advertising or entertainment. Mainstream media can ill afford to abandon news values, as this would jeopardize the economic base on which they are forced to operate. Ironically, in order to be successful in the 'marketplace of public attention', peace journalism would have to subscribe to the same values as does corporate journalism".

Meanwhile, however, a series of experimental studies speak against this reservation. Experimenting with different types of media and presenting differently framed news stories about a variety of conflicts to various types of audiences (for an overview see Thiel & Kempf 2014), the experiments reveal that conventional escalation oriented conflict coverage is no better at stimulating reader interest than de-escalation oriented peace journalism. Peace journalism does have a public, and recipients are more competent and more interested in differentiated representations of conflict than is often assumed (Kempf 2005, Möckel 2009).

As regards the evaluation of news texts as comprehensible, unbiased, balanced and impartial, etc., de-escalation oriented articles were never accepted less than other text versions (Bläsi et al. 2005, Sparr 2004, Kempf 2008, Möckel 2009, Schaefer 2006, Stuntebeck 2007, Kempf & Thiel 2012)¹. In most experiments (Bläsi et al. 2005, Schaefer 2006, Stuntebeck 2007, Kempf & Thiel 2012), de-escalation oriented texts were even better accepted, and Bläsi et al. (2005) found that lack of interest, in combination with a negative evaluation of articles, decreased steadily the less articles were escalation oriented and the more they were de-escalation oriented.

At the same time, however, these studies also reveal certain limitations that peace journalism should take into account:

- The acceptance of de-escalation oriented news articles is greater if they refrain from interpreting situations within a radically reversed framework (Bläsi et al. 2005, Kempf 2005). Background articles that do not just employ de-escalation oriented framing, but explicitly argue against the escalation oriented frames of mainstream coverage, are regarded as more partisan than articles that follow this approach (Jackson 2006).
- Whether de-escalation oriented media frames are accepted also depends on the audience: A difference in the acceptance of various text versions was not found for the readership of provincial papers (Sparr 2004), which is generally less interested in the topic (Kempf 2005), and Schaefer (2006) found a significant interaction between gender and text versions. Women are more likely to accept de-escalation oriented articles, while men are more likely to accept escalation oriented ones.

At the same time, these experiments also show that de-escalation oriented coverage does have an effect on recipients' cognitive-emotional responses to conflict:

- Lynch and McGoldrick (2013) found that peace journalism is associated with increased levels of hope and empathy and decreased levels of anger and fear, and
- Annabring et al. (2005) showed four versions¹ of three news stories about Yugoslavia after the fall of Milosevic² to a representative sample of German readers and found that the framing of the articles had a clear effect on the way participants understood the reported events and how they framed them in their own re-narration.
- Peleg & Alimi (2005) showed two groups of Israeli students differently (pro vs. contra) framed versions of an article about the Israeli government's ratification of the Road Map. They found that the majority of participants who had read a pro-Palestinian-state text were afterwards divided between "approval" and "approval/disapproval" of the statement that, "a Palestinian territorial continuity is *not* an existential threat to Israel," while "disapproval" dominated among participants who had read an anti-state text.
- Schaefer (2006) showed two groups of participants differently framed commentaries (escalation vs. de-escalation) on terrorist attacks,³ and found that de-escalation oriented texts produced a lesser tendency to moral disengagement and less acceptance of concrete military measures.

The audience is no passive recipient of information, however, but rather a "final arbiter, who chooses which of the available considerations are relevant and who decides how important each consideration should be" (Kinder 2003, 378). Accordingly, the possible effects of peace journalism should not be overestimated:

- A repetition of Peleg & Alimi's (2005) experiment with German students (Kempf 2008) did not find a general framing effect on participants' assessment of whether a continuous Palestinian territory was an existential threat to Israel.

¹ Moderately escalation oriented original articles from the German quality press and three variants of the same articles: (1) moderately de-escalation oriented, (2) de-escalation oriented and (3) escalation oriented.

² (1) Conflict in South Serbia, (2) the extradition of Milosevic to Den Haag and (3) the state treaty between Serbia and Montenegro.

³ Attacks by Al Qaida in New York and Madrid, by the Indonesian army in East Timor and the Aum sect in Tokyo.

- Nerad (2009), who showed two groups of secondary school pupils differently framed news articles about the planned construction of a mosque in Munich, found no general effect of win-win vs. win-lose framing on the degree to which participants perceived Muslim immigrants as a threat.
- Jackson (2006) found no general framing effects, but a frame-independent decline in moral disengagement after she showed three groups of students differently framed background articles on the history of the Russia-Chechnya conflict.
- Möckel (2009) showed two groups of participants Lynch & McGoldrick's (2004) paradigmatic (war- vs. peace journalism) TV features on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and found no general framing effect of the film versions on participants' moral disengagement.
- Stuntebeck (2009) showed two groups of students differently framed news articles about serious misconduct on the part of German soldiers in Afghanistan. After they had read the article, there was a frame-independent negative shift in their attitudes toward overseas German military deployment.

In accordance with prior research on framing effects Thiel & Kempf (2014) postulated that audience effects of peace journalism depend on recipients' *a priori* attitudes and/or the individual frames according to which they understand conflict. Based on this assumption, they explain the lack of general framing effects in these studies through a dominant peace orientation among German students that immunizes them against escalation oriented framing. This interpretation is also supported by

- Stuntebeck's (2009) results, according to which subjects presented with a responsibility frame (favoring foreign military deployment) changed their attitudes in a negative direction more than ones presented with a risk frame (against foreign German military deployment), as well as
- Haack's (2007) study, which presented three groups of students with differently framed news stories about a hypothetical extension of the UNIFIL mandate in Lebanon and found that risk framing reduced participants' support, while 'responsibility' framing was largely ineffective and did not lead to higher support rates.

Summarizing these studies' results, Thiel & Kempf (2014) conclude that news selection has a stronger effect on recipients' attitudes than framing. Merely devoting attention to a topic can be enough to bring about an (at least short-term) change in attitude, which is, however, strongly dependent on recipients' *a priori* mental models.

Strong support for this conclusion is provided by experiments of Kempf (2008) and Nerad (2009), who found frame-independent effects of participants' *a priori* mental models:

- Kempf (2008) captured participants' *a priori* mental models of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict via typical response patterns to the questions of (1) whether the conflict can only be resolved by a political settlement and (2) whether Palestinians are (in)capable of managing their own affairs. He found a decisive effect, although one that was independent of the respective media frame. After reading an article about ratifying the Road Map, participants' conviction increased that Palestinian territorial continuity is no threat to Israel, particularly among participants who interpreted the conflict with a de-escalation oriented mental model.
- Nerad (2009) also found a clear and frame-independent effect of participants' *a priori* mental models on how they changed their immigration-related threat perception after they read an article about the planned construction of a mosque in Munich. Assessing participants' mental models using a selection of items from van Dick et al.'s (1997) acculturation-scale, Nerad found that perceived threat increased among participants with a low acculturation score (which speaks for an assimilation/segregation model), while it decreased among participants with a high acculturation score (which speaks for an integration model).

Drawing on Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance, we may thus conclude that recipients may devalue, suppress or reject issues and frames contrary to their *a priori* mental models. Even on the highest stage of escalation, there is still a possibility of reversal and step-wise de-escalation. However, this is greatly impeded by societal beliefs that have hardened and become part of the societal ethos. As components of the psychic infrastructure that has enabled conflict parties to endure conflict in the past, they bind a society to the previous conflict strategy (Bar-Tal 1998), concede little free space to cooperative conflict management, and as well limit the acceptance and likely effectiveness of peace journalism.

8. Media frames, individual frames, and overall societal climate

In order to study this process, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict served as a real-life laboratory for an experiment (cf. Kempf & Thiel 2012, Thiel & Kempf 2014) that investigated the interaction between news selection, media frames and participants' individual frames (*a priori* mental models of the conflict). These were assessed during a pre-test

that classified them, via their positioning to the conflict, as pro-Israeli or pro-Palestinian hardliners who interpret the conflict according to a war frame, or as moderates who interpret it according to a peace frame.

After filling out a pre-test questionnaire, participants were randomly assigned to six experimental groups. Each of the experimental groups read a news article that reported on either an April 2006 Palestinian suicide attack in Tel Aviv, or an Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip at the end of February/beginning of March 2008. Each of these scenarios was framed according to an escalation oriented pro-Israeli war frame, an escalation oriented pro-Palestinian war frame, or a de-escalation oriented peace frame that focused on the burdens of war for both societies (cf. Thiel 2011).

After reading the articles, participants were asked to evaluate them using a slightly modified version of the Bläsi et al. (2005) text assessment scale and to write an essay based on their own view of the events reported in the articles.

- Participants' evaluation of the articles (cf. Kempf & Thiel 2012) confirmed the hypothesis according to which media frames incompatible with recipients' a priori mental models are rejected as less comprehensible, more biased and less impartial. The stronger their a priori position in favor of one of the parties, the more participants tended to regard even media peace frames as partisan; the more they positioned themselves in favor of one side, the more they regarded reports about this side's use of violence as biased in favor of the opponent.
- Moreover, if hardliners were already committed to a war frame, they regarded balanced reporting which focuses on the burdens of war for both parties as even more partisan for the opponent than openly one-sided coverage in favor of the opponent's position. A possible reason for this may be that balanced coverage has a better chance to convince the moderate spectrum of their own society than coverage that sides with the opponent.

Content analysis of participants' essays (cf. Thiel & Kempf 2014) confirmed findings by Annabring et al. (2005), according to which escalation vs. de-escalation oriented media frames have a direct effect on how recipients make sense of the news stories they read. This effect is limited, however, by recipients' individual frames, which show both a direct effect and a complex interaction with media frames and media contents.

- Contrary to the widespread view that "violence sells," recurring stereotypical reports of Israeli and/or Palestinian violence seem to annoy (German) recipients. As a result, some participants did not really deal with the news items and declined to form a personal opinion about reported events.
- The effect of media war frames diminished if they were incongruent with participants' individual frames, and the propaganda function of reports on violence and victims (cf. Herman & Chomsky 1988) was neutralized if framed according to a media peace frame.
- If participants had already a priori positioned themselves in favor of the Palestinians, reports about an Israeli military operation with casualties on the Palestinian side encouraged a text understanding in favor of the Palestinians, even if the article was framed according to a peace frame.
- If supported by a pro-Palestinian media war frame, reports on a Palestinian attack with Israeli victims also did not reduce partisanship for the Palestinians, but instead stimulated resistance and definitely led to a text understanding favoring Palestinians. In this case, participants dealt in particular detail with the text in order to support and maintain their a priori position.
- Such a strong impact of recipients' a priori mental models was found only with participants who had positioned themselves in favor of the Palestinians, however.
- Pro-Israeli hardliners interpreted the reported events consistently in favor of Israel and more radically than pro-Palestinian hardliners did in favor of the Palestinians, and
- the propaganda effect of reports about Palestinian victims was generally weaker than that of reports about Israeli victims.

In order to explain these differences between pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian effects, Thiel & Kempf (2014) argue that the influence of peace journalism is due not just to interaction of news selection, media frames and individual frames, but also to their interaction with mainstream media discourse and societal climate. (In Germany), these are marked by: (1) ambivalence about the lessons of Auschwitz, which results in a conflict between unconditional solidarity with Israel and engagement for the universality of human rights, (2) suspicion regarding criticism of Israeli policy, (3) broad social consensus that condemns Palestinian attacks more strongly than Israeli military operations (cf. Kempf 2015), and (4) mainstream coverage that counteracts effects of reportage situations unfavorable to Israel through pro-Israeli framing (cf. Maurer & Kempf 2011, Gaisbauer 2012). On the one hand, there is (1) widespread belief that Israeli policy aims at continued oppression and

disenfranchisement of Palestinians (cf. Kempf 2015), and on the other (2) the dominant media image of Israel is that of an overwhelmingly superior power (Hagemann 2011).

Thus, the relatively weaker propaganda effect of reports about Israeli violence may be due to the stronger condemnation of Palestinian violence. The strong impact of a priori positioning in favor of the Palestinians may be understood as a counter-reaction to the inherent contradictions of mainstream coverage; and pro-Israeli hardliners' more radical interpretations may be attributed to long-term effects of the pro-Israeli bias of German mainstream reportage.

That pro-Palestinian hardliners are more reserved in this regard may, however, also be attributed to ambivalence about the lessons of World War II and/or fear of being labeled anti-Semitic.

This combination of sympathy for the Palestinians and efforts to avoid being labeled anti-Semitic could also explain the reluctance to form one's own opinion about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that was found with participants who had already a priori avoided taking a position on the conflict. This is, however, not an alternative interpretation. Rather, one can assume that all these factors are at work simultaneously.

9. Conclusions

No matter how we interpret these experiments' results, they show one thing above all: news selection and framing definitely exert influence on how recipients perceive conflict. This effect is, however, by no means homogenous, and how recipients actually understand news depends very strongly on whether and how they integrate it in their previous conflict understanding.

The latter, again, depends on whether they have any mental model at all of the respective conflict, whether they have already formed a rigid mental model of it, or whether they feel torn back and forth between alternative models (Thiel & Kempf 2014).

- If they haven't yet formed a mental model of the conflict, there is a good chance that they will adopt the media frame and – in the long-run – develop a mental model consistent with it.
- If their model is consolidated, and the media frame is compatible with recipients' individual frames, news will harden their mental model, but since it does not induce a change in the model, this (positive) framing effect will seldom be quantifiable.
- If the media frame is incompatible with recipients' mental models, however, it will most probably either be ineffective or produce a negative effect (in a direction contrary to the media frame) that immunizes the mental model against modification.
- If competing mental models are available to recipients, the media frame will activate the model consistent with it, produce a positive effect (in the direction of the media frame), and – in the long-run – this model may become dominant.

The influence of political news on recipients' conflict perceptions can thus be understood as a two-step process: In a first step, the media frame guides which mental model is actualized. In a second step, information is integrated into this model and aligned with existing attitudes (Haider-Markel & Joslyn 2001, Nerad 2009, Stuntebeck 2009), and as a result, the model itself undergoes gradual modification (Kempf 2008).

Although it is unwise to assume that individual news stories will have great effects on recipients' attitudes, we can still expect peace journalism to have long-term effects. As news-selection and framing influence recipients' text comprehension, and since it is not the information provided by a news story but rather the sense that recipients make of it which is integrated into their mental models, we can assume that consistent peace framing will gradually transform their mental models in a more constructive direction.

The target groups of peace journalism can, however, only be segments of society that are moderate and still more or less open to persuasion. Hardliners already committed to a war frame can rarely be convinced, and we must expect that they will devalue, suppress or reject issues and frames inconsistent with their a priori mental models. One must accept this and display the necessary self-restraint.

Interpreting conflict in a war frame not only sharpens perceptions of the opponent as despicable, it also strengthens distrust of mediation efforts. It causes even members of the in-group who simply want to promote balance and reconciliation to be regarded as covert saboteurs. This is also foreseeable, and peace journalism must anticipate that misguided radicals will try to defend their beliefs with all available means, question the integrity of peace journalism and/or denounce it for spreading hostile propaganda.

Refusing to participate in conflict, even if one is a target of attacks, requires a high level of frustration tolerance. One can most easily summon up this attitude if one does not take attacks personally, but rather views them as what they actually are: a widespread negative social-psychological phenomenon. Above all, however,

peace journalism must strive not to discredit itself by being drawn into conflict, whether by taking a stand for a specific conflict solution, propagating certain non-violent conflict strategies or even siding with one of the conflict parties.

The danger of becoming a conflict party is of course not specific to peace journalism, but exists quite generally for third parties. These only too often abandon a mediating position, pursue their own interests, try to impose a specific solution on conflict parties, perceive parties that resist this as their opponents, and end by siding with the party that appears more receptive to their position.

This is one reason why in the foreseeable future peace journalism will remain the domain of alternative media, and a broad implementation of peace journalism can most likely succeed in those conflict phases when conflicts are (still) taking place on a non-violent level. A society will be far more willing to accept peace journalism ideas and practices in a non-violent conflict stage than in wartime, when it feels itself massively threatened and/or its competitive misperceptions have already hardened into societal beliefs.

Only if it is successfully anchored in society and the peacetime media system does peace journalism have a real chance to also produce enduring effects in wartime (Bläsi, 2009).

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Kimberly Kelling & Beverly Horvit

Die Realisierbarkeit des Friedensjournalismus in westlichen Medien

In der Literatur über Friedensjournalismus wird sowohl zugunsten als zuungunsten seiner Machbarkeit argumentiert und eine umfassende Beweisführung vorgelegt, die entweder für einen friedensjournalistischen oder für einen kriegsjournalistischen Praxis spricht (Lee & Maslog, 2005; Lee, Maslog, & Kim, 2006; Maslog, Lee, & Kim, 2006). Entgegen Hackett (2006), der die Hindernisse des Friedensjournalismus aus drei theoretischen Perspektiven ableitet – dem Hierarchy-of-Influences-Modell, dem Propaganda-Modell und dem Journalistic-Field-Modell – vertreten wir die Auffassung, dass es in einem westlichen Medienumfeld trotz dieser Hindernisse Möglichkeiten des Friedensjournalismus gibt und diese auch genutzt werden. Der vorliegende, theoretische Aufsatz führt Lee & Maslogs (2005) Friedens- und Kriegscharakteristika zu einer modifizierten Grundstruktur des Friedensjournalismus zusammen, die Galtungs (2000) Modell auf die drei Dimensionen Frieden vs. Krieg, Menschen vs. Eliten und Konfliktlösung vs. Sieg herunterbricht.

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The viability of peace journalism in Western media environments

Conversations in peace journalism literature often argue for or against its feasibility in media environments, providing ample evidence of both peace and war journalism practices (Lee & Maslog, 2005; Lee, Maslog, & Kim, 2006; Maslog, Lee, & Kim, 2006). Although Hackett (2006) acknowledges challenges to peace journalism through three theoretical lenses – the hierarchy of influences model, the propaganda model, and the journalistic field model – we argue that peace journalism opportunities do exist and are employed in Western media environments despite those challenges. This theoretical paper consolidates Lee and Maslog's (2005) peace and war characteristics into a modified peace journalism framework that collapses Galtung's (2000) orientations into peace/war, people/elite, and solution/victory orientations.

[full text](#)

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Kurzfassung: In der Literatur über Friedensjournalismus wird sowohl zugunsten als zuungunsten seiner Machbarkeit argumentiert und eine umfassende Beweisführung vorgelegt, die entweder für eines friedensjournalistische oder für eine kriegsjournalistische Praxis spricht (Lee & Maslog, 2005; Lee, Maslog, & Kim, 2006; Maslog, Lee, & Kim, 2006). Entgegen Hackett (2006), der die Hindernisse des Friedensjournalismus aus drei theoretischen Perspektiven ableitet – dem Hierarchy-of-Influences-Modell, dem Propaganda-Modell und dem Journalistic-Field-Modell – vertreten wir die Auffassung, dass es in einem westlichen Mediumfeld trotz dieser Hindernisse Möglichkeiten des Friedensjournalismus gibt und diese auch genutzt werden. Der vorliegende, theoretische Aufsatz führt Lee & Maslogs (2005) Friedens- und Kriegscharakteristika zu einer modifizierten Grundstruktur des Friedenjournalismus zusammen, die Galtungs (2000) Modell auf die drei Dimensionen Frieden vs. Krieg, Menschen vs. Eliten und Konfliktlösung vs. Sieg herunterbricht.

Abstract: Conversations in peace journalism literature often argue for or against its feasibility in media environments, providing ample evidence of both peace and war journalism practices (Lee & Maslog, 2005; Lee, Maslog, & Kim, 2006; Maslog, Lee, & Kim, 2006). Although Hackett (2006) acknowledges challenges to peace journalism through three theoretical lenses – the hierarchy of influences model, the propaganda model, and the journalistic field model – we argue that peace journalism opportunities do exist and are employed in Western media environments despite those challenges. This theoretical paper consolidates Lee and Maslog's (2005) peace and war characteristics into a modified peace journalism framework that collapses Galtung's (2000) orientations into peace/war, people/elite, and solution/victory orientations.

1. Introduction

Conflict is pervasive and inevitable. Although not all conflicts lead to violence, violent conflicts have left a measurable toll of devastation, and it is impossible to quantify the lasting impact of human suffering. As a global community, how are citizens expected to understand the complexities of conflicts in a way that enables conflict resolution?

Peace journalism aims to frame the news in a way to provide a comprehensive understanding of conflict. In a peace journalism training manual prepared for the United Nations, Johan Galtung (2000) identified media as the "fourth pillar," the first three being State, Capital and Civil Society. As this fourth pillar, it is a journalist's "right and duty to make what goes on in one pillar transparent to the other two. The goal is social transparency" (p. 159). It matters if the media's reporting enhances the likelihood of peace or violence. Therefore, media are in a privileged position to serve as advocates or contributors to peace (Peleg, 2006; McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000).

Peleg (2006) analyzed the possible impact of peace journalism as a facilitator of peace through the application of conflict theory. Conflict theory states that conflict should be evaluated in terms of the situation (the existence of controversy), attitudes, and behaviors (Peleg, 2006). Attitudes reflect the stigmatizing language or "de-legitimizing processes" (Peleg, 2006: 2) each side uses against the other. Attitudes in conflict are, in turn, responsible for behaviors in conflict—how the parties act in response.

This paper will build on other scholars' attempts to measure peace and war journalism attributes (see for example, Lee & Maslog, 2005, and Lynch & McGoldrick, 2012) through, in an extension of Hackett's (2006) work, the perspective of the propaganda, hierarchy of influences, and journalism as a field theories to assess the feasibility of peace journalism practices in the current global media landscape. As originally categorized by Galtung (2000), peace frames focus on peace, truth, people and solutions; and war frames conversely focus on war/violence, propaganda, elites and victory. Some scholars have further operationalized Galtung's orientations into various characteristics. For example, in Lee and Maslog's (2005) study, they operationalized Galtung's orientations of war and peace journalism into 13 categories each (see Table 1). We argue some of the similar categories defined in Lee and Maslog's (2005) study could be consolidated. Even in Galtung's orientations, we believe there is room for some consolidation. More specifically, if journalists are covering conflict in accordance with peace, people, and solution orientations, their work should already encompass the truth orientation. Therefore, this paper will consolidate Lee and Maslog's (2005) thirteen characteristics into peace/war, people/elite, and solution/victory orientations.

War Journalism	Peace Journalism
APPROACH	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reactive (waits for war to break out, or about to break out, before reporting) 2. Reports mainly on visible effects of war (casualties, dead and wounded, damage to property) 3. Elite-oriented (focuses on leaders & elites as actors and sources of information) 4. Focuses mainly on differences that led to the conflict 5. Focuses mainly on the here and now 6. Dichotomizes between the good guys and bad guys, victims and villains 7. Two-party orientation (one party wins, one party loses) 8. Partisan (biased for one side in the conflict) 9. Zero-sum orientation (one goal: to win) 10. Stops reporting with the peace treaty signing and ceasefire and heads for another war elsewhere 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Proactive (anticipates, starts reporting long before war breaks out) 2. Reports also on invisible effects of war (emotional trauma, damage to society and culture) 3. People-oriented (focuses on common people as actors and sources of information) 4. Reports the areas of agreement that might lead to a solution to the conflict 5. Reports causes and consequences of the conflict 6. Avoid labeling of good guys and bad guys 7. Multiparty orientation (gives voice to many parties involved in conflict) 8. Nonpartisan (neutral, not taking sides) 9. Win-win orientation (many goals and issues, solution-oriented) 10. Stays on and reports aftermath of war—the reconstruction, rehabilitation, and implementation of peace treaty
LANGUAGE	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 11. Uses victimizing language (e.g., destitute, devastated, defenseless, pathetic, tragic, demoralized) that tells only what has been done to people 12. Uses demonizing language (e.g., vicious, cruel, brutal, barbaric, inhuman, tyrant, savage, ruthless, terrorist, extremist, fanatic, fundamentalist) 13. Uses emotive words, like genocide, assassination, massacre, systematic (as in systematic raping or forcing people from their homes) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 11. Avoids victimizing language, reports what has been done and could be done by people, and how they are coping 12. Avoids demonizing language, uses more precise descriptions, titles, or names 13. Objective and moderate. Avoids emotive words. Reserves the strongest language only for the gravest situation. Does not exaggerate.

Table 1.1: Coding categories for peace and war frames (Source: Lee & Maslog 2005)

Peace Journalism	War Journalism
PEACE/CONFLICT ORIENTATION	WAR/VIOLENCE ORIENTATION
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Proactive; reporting on causes and consequences 2. Reports also on invisible effects of war 3. Avoid dichotomous labeling and partisan reporting 4. Avoids victimizing, demonizing, and emotive language 5. Win-win orientation 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reactive; focus on here and now 2. Reports mainly on visible effects of war 3. Dichotomizes between the good guys and bad guys; partisan reporting 4. Uses victimizing, demonizing, and emotive language 5. Zero-sum orientation (one goal: to win)
PEOPLE ORIENTATION	ELITE ORIENTATION
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Giving a voice to the voiceless 7. Multiparty orientation (gives voice to many parties involved in the conflict) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Giving voice to elite sources of information 7. Two-party orientation (one party wins, one party loses)
SOLUTION ORIENTATION	VICTORY ORIENTATION
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. Seeking solutions (report on the areas of agreement that might lead to a solution to the conflict) 9. Stays on and reports aftermath of war – the reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. Focuses mainly on differences that lead to the conflict 9. Stops reporting with the peace treaty signing and ceasefire and heads for another war elsewhere

Table 1.2: Proposed and revised peace journalism model

2. Restructuring peace journalism

Although Galtung's (2000) peace journalism model has gained widespread acceptance by peace journalism scholars, we believe that it could benefit from further simplification in an effort to make the model more digestible to journalism practitioners. As Kempf (2007) argues, peace journalism can be broken down into two elements: *peace* and *journalism*. Journalism, although a form of public communication, is quite distinct from public relations – a tool used by governments and organizations to have a certain effect on the attitudes of external audiences (Hanitzsch, 2007). News publications that have received numerous accolades for their reporting universally rely on the ethic of truth-telling and avoidance of conflict of interest, including maintaining autonomy from government or corporate interests (see *The New York Times* staff, Sept. 2004; *The Washington Post* standards and ethics). These values are even institutionally recognized as tenets of ethical journalism, according to the *Society of Professional Journalists'* code of ethics (SPJ code of ethics).

In fact, many cultures around the world reflect a pattern of accepting professional values of detachment and non-involvement among journalism practitioners (Mellado, Moreira, Lagos, & Hernández, 2012). Mellado and her colleagues also found that only a handful of journalists in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico believed the journalists' role involved conveying a positive image of government or business leadership, or supporting official policies – characteristics of a propaganda-oriented press. News institutions and organizations throughout the Western world, then, continually socialize journalists to accept and practice the ethics of autonomy and truthfulness, regardless of the adopted journalistic model.

Rather than viewing this revised peace journalism model as an attempt to omit or devalue truthfulness in conflict reporting, we argue that through responsible reporting and ethical journalistic practices required in obtaining the other three orientations, truthfulness will prevail. According to Galtung (2000), the truth orientation involves exposing untruths on all sides of a conflict. We argue that this is accomplished through effective conflict exploration, historical perspectives, and a focus on invisible effects (all tenets of the peace/conflict orientation). Additionally, truth prevails when reporting focuses on suffering all over and gives voice to the voiceless (tenets of the people orientation), as well as focusing on structural and cultural concerns (components of the solution orientation). Although peace journalism toes the line with advocacy journalism – a framework of journalism commonly criticized for its similarity to public relations – peace journalism still represents a journalistic model that bears the ethical duty of truthfulness and autonomy. Due to its ethical obligations and normative expectations of peace/conflict, people, and solution orientations, we believe a distinct truth-orientation is redundant.

3. Theories

What factors contribute to the way media frames conflict news? Do media theorists' ideas offer another lens by which to make sense of Galtung's advocated mode of reporting, peace journalism? The theories applicable in this consideration include Herman and Chomsky's (1988) propaganda model, Shoemaker and Reese's (1996) hierarchy of influences theory, and Bourdieu's (1998) journalistic field model. Although Hackett (2006) examined peace journalism through these three theories, he did not undertake a close examination of the feasibility of each characteristic of peace journalism operationalized by Lee and Maslog (2005).

The propaganda model addresses the power government and corporations have in shaping the public agenda through control of the media. In this model, media coverage, especially during conflict, is elite-oriented—what is considered newsworthy depends on the ability of the journalist to relate the conflict to elite nations or focus on elite persons as mouthpieces—and media are not resilient against pressures from corporate ownership, advertisers, or sources. In a similar theory, the hierarchy of influences model assumes various levels of influences shape news content, and media, in turn, are successful in setting the agenda of the public. This theory offers five different levels of influence: micro (media professionals), whose own morality influences content; work routines that structure journalists' practices; organizational influences, including corporate structure and profitability; "extra-media influences" (Hackett, 2006: 4), which include sources, advertisers, technology and other outside factors; and ideological influences. Bourdieu's concept of journalism as a field, however, does not address the influences of media content but rather explains how journalism as a field is its own structured social space. This theory addresses the role of journalism as a field in relation to politics, economy, sociology, history, and other such fields (Bourdieu, 1998: 40). We will now closely examine the consolidated components of Galtung's orientations of peace versus war journalism—peace/conflict; people/elites; and solutions/victory—in light of the three theories.

4. Peace/conflict orientation

Although it may seem contradictory to combine peace and conflict orientations as a classification of peace journalism, the idea is that "peace journalists must first accept that a conflict exists" (Lee & Maslog, 2005). They must also report on "the underlying conflict formation, the roots of conflicts," and "the many people of good will

in and outside the arena struggling for an end to violence and transformation of the conflict" (Galtung, 2000: 159). Of Lee and Maslog's (2005) 13 traits of peace journalism, the peace/conflict orientation includes proactively reporting on a crisis long before violence occurs; reporting on invisible effects of war; exploring the conflict through a "win-win" orientation and opportunities for agreement that might lead to a solution; and the avoidance of labeling or using demonizing, victimizing, or emotive language. Conversely, war/violence frames place emphasis on a zero-sum game with one goal of winning (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000). From this perspective, journalists present the news using war frames to express an "us-them" orientation and tend to be reactive in reporting, emphasizing the occurrence of violence.

4.1. Proactive versus reactive reporting; reporting on causes and consequences

The premise of peace journalism relies on the ability of the journalist to first understand the signs of conflict and begin reporting long before violence or war breaks out. The goal is for journalists to educate the public on key issues, bringing in background information on each party, including goals and potential solutions. Ideally, this proactive reporting could help ameliorate the situation before it reaches violence. Proactive reporting depends on the journalist's recognition of tension, disagreement and polarization (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000) and includes coverage or acknowledgement of structural or cultural conflicts.

Similar to the idea that journalists should practice proactive reporting is that journalists should provide comprehensive reporting on the causes of conflict. For example, what is the history between the conflicting parties, what events have led to disagreement, how have the parties suffered in the past? Furthermore, what long-term consequences might result or have resulted from conflict; if the conflict has escalated to violence, what longitudinal effects does the violence have on affected societies?

Is there room for proactive reporting in light of various media theories, such as the propaganda model and hierarchy of influences? Herman and Chomsky's (1988) propaganda model addresses the consideration of newsworthiness in terms of elitist interests. According to the theory, newsworthiness follows a socialized ideology premised on money and power. Therefore, to proactively report on causes and consequences of conflict in culturally or geographically distant locations may appear to be a wasted effort—unless the story discusses the impact the conflict may have on elite parties. However, given the United States' vast military and economic connections throughout the world, journalists would not always be hard-pressed to find an angle relevant to the U.S. and other Western audiences. Additionally, reporting on issues related to immigration (such as the Syrian refugee crisis) or income inequality – issues that suggest the potential for violence or other economic disruptions – can be considered proactive reporting.

According to Bourdieu's (1998) journalism as a field model, the journalistic field is autonomous from other socially constructed fields, but still suffers from economic and commercial pressures. Although Bourdieu's theory was constructed as a critique of French television media, the economic and political factors in French media are still factors in other Western media environments and, therefore, pose a threat to peace journalism (Hackett, 2006). Similar to the propaganda model, journalism as a field proposes a threat to peace journalism in the justification of newsworthiness: Entertainment and violence have increasing relevance as news values (Hackett, 2006).

Reese's (2001) hierarchy of influences model also poses challenges for proactive conflict coverage based on the economic concerns of resource allocation in the media environment. Due to a demand for greater profits, institutions are cutting expenses where they can; budgets for international reporting have been slashed over the past few decades, forcing many news organizations to rely on parachute journalists (Ricchiardi, 2006). By definition, the parachute journalist is reactive, jumping into a situation only when violence explodes. Ricchiardi (2006) argues that local reporters or reporters based in a particular culture for a longer period are more knowledgeable about an area's history and culture and have a better understanding of the impact of conflict on the region. Seib (2004) argues that journalists who arrive after the violence occurs have done the public a disservice by not covering the causes leading to the event in a "timely way that might alert the world in time to snuff out the fuse" (p. 24).

Yes, the propaganda and hierarchy of influences theories explain limitations of resources and pressure to produce stories quickly; however, journalists can work to redefine what is considered newsworthy through practice. This implies less production of what the public *wants* to know and more reporting on what the public *needs* to know. The challenge is to cultivate audiences who want to know what they need to know—to encourage a thirst for context. The Internet may be the perfect platform. With every breaking news story and stirring image, news organizations could provide a link to a Q & A, for example, that provides context in perhaps more easily digested nuggets. So, a photograph of a lifeless Syrian child lying on a coastline far from home could be accompanied by an easily updated explainer such as one provided by *Time* magazine, "The 5 Big Questions About Europe's Migrant Crisis" (Bajekal, 2015). The answers would only occasionally need updating but always could be readily available—and visible—to audience members perusing content. Although magazine writers are often given time and space to fully report the complexities of a conflict, hyperlinks provide a relatively inexpensive way to provide audiences with context.

Other multimedia tools may perhaps offer an even more engaging way to help audiences understand conflict from a new perspective, while eliciting empathy. One trend from 2015 involved the merger of news and virtual reality, resulting in *Syrian Journey*, the BBC's interactive game that allows audiences to customize their experience as a Syrian refugee (Edge, 2015). As users interact and make decisions from the perspective of a Syrian refugee fleeing for Europe, they are exposed to survivors' stories (BBC News staff, 2015).

Journalists who are experiencing a depletion of fiscal resources, rather than temporal resources, can pursue fellowships and other financial assistance and make a case for covering the world's *future* hot spots—places where tensions are brewing and where resources are scarce or unevenly divided. Often, this enables proactive reporting on structural conflict that could manifest into violence. A selling point to both funders and the news organizations' top decision-makers might be Ted Koppel's comment captured in Ricchiardi's (2006: 43) article:

Our enemies are recruiting and planning and preparing all over the world, and we are closing our foreign bureaus down. ...The approach now is, 'Well, don't worry about it. When something happens, we can take a jet and we can access satellites and we'll have it for you in 24 hours.' Have what? ...You'll have the aftereffects. You'll have the result of what you should have been telling America for the last six months. You'll have the crisis after it breaks. You're no longer a warning system.

4.2. Invisible effects

For Galtung, another important component of the peace/conflict orientation is reporting not just on events themselves but also the long-term, longitudinal, or other invisible effects of those events. Visible effects, as defined by McGoldrick and Lynch (2000), are the measurable effects of conflict and violence, such as destruction, fatalities, injuries or displacements. These are the effects typically covered in war journalism pieces; however, peace journalism requires the journalist to analyze the invisible effects of each of these actions, as well, resulting in a larger picture of the realities of all parties involved in the conflict.

For each visible effect, there are several invisible effects that may have more long-term importance (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000; Galtung, 2000). The invisible effects they outline include the hatred that stems from bereavement; a psychological need for revenge and victory, perpetuating the cycle of violence; and damage to the social structure (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000). In the long term, failing to address these invisible effects may make the society vulnerable to future violence (Galtung, 2000).

Reporting on the invisible effects shows the public the true long-term consequences of conflict; however, there is a time element involved for the journalist compiling information for a story. Under Reese's (2001) hierarchy of influences model, the work routines of journalists inhibit the ability to dedicate time to fully develop a story exposing invisible effects. One flaw in this theory Hackett (2006) notes is the assumption that Western work routines are universal. Although a shift in Western mass media routines may be necessary to provide journalists the time and resources to build a contextual framework for covering conflict, some journalists already excel at multi-tasking – working on covering multiple in-depth and complex stories at a time – and the journalism profession does honor those who have made the investment. (See, for example, Dele Olojede's 2005 Pulitzer Prize for international reporting for his reports in *Newsday* on the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide.) In addition, news organizations also have the option of accepting material from individuals they have vetted. In 2014, *The Atlantic* published a firsthand piece from Hannah Myrick Anderson, a medical school student working in a Syrian refugee camp in Jordan. In her piece, Anderson showed how the Syrian civil war and resulting displacement of civilians had harmed the social fabric of the Syrians living in the camps. Rather than reporting on falling bombs, Myrick highlighted a far less visible effect of the war: the harm to women's health when they did not feel safe using the camp's restrooms. *The Atlantic* was able to share the story with its readers without having to pay to station a journalist in the camp for several weeks.

Of course, the visible effects of conflict may lead to exciting visuals and, as a result, more consumers and higher profits. The hierarchy of influences model, as well as the journalism as a field and propaganda models, helps explain the financial considerations for producing riveting visuals or depictions of violence. All three models, in some way, address the importance of audience size in media's market structures. Developing content according to insight from focus groups, news organizations deliver stories based on what will result in the most viewers, readers or listeners. News executives who are concerned about maintaining an audience "sometimes forsake news gathering while trying to conform to the public mood of the moment" (Seib, 2004: 30). Rooted in commercial interests, news organizations favor sensationalized articles over slower stories. This means there may be more market demand for stories illustrating the violence and visible effects of conflict than articles exploring the invisible and consequential effects of conflict.

However, we believe that modern multimedia trends in newsrooms provide potential to shift this dynamic yet again. In 2015, the *Miami Herald* produced an engaging and interactive series titled "Rats, bugs and 'natural' deaths at nation's largest women's prison" that incorporated testimonials, videos, graphics, and detailed data

throughout six articles (Brown, 2015). Kovacs (2016) credits the skillful, thoughtful use of multimedia elements for this series' high score on the American Press Institute's Engagement Index. This in-depth example of the psychological and physical toll associated with the indecencies at Lowell Correctional Institution for Women exemplifies successful reporting of invisible effects of structural issues.

Additionally, many renowned photographers already seem to gravitate toward covering social issues through a peace journalism lens. Greenwood (2012) highlighted the use of peace journalism frames in coverage of the 2009 presidential election in Iran. Analyzing visual framing in photographs submitted to the Pictures of the Year contest, Greenwood found that the award-winning images were more likely to portray violence or civil unrest. However, the majority of photographs submitted—what photographers deemed their best work—did not contain war journalism frames, but rather non-violent rallies, candidates, women participants, mass crowds, and even the Iranian soccer team. Greenwood's research exemplifies a challenge in the media industry: Although photographers in the field are practicing components of peace journalism and find value in their products, the professional photojournalists who collaborate as Picture of the Year judges perpetuated the notion that sensational war frames merit more attention. Nonetheless, the individual photojournalists doing the work have maintained their own standards for what constitutes excellent journalism.

4.3. Avoid dichotomous labeling and partisan reporting

A third component of Galtung's peace/war orientation involves his desire for journalists to avoid dichotomous labeling to indicate "good" or "bad" sides of a conflict as is typical in war journalism frames. "Dichotomizing between the bad guys and the good guys involves casting simplistic moral judgment about the parties involved and assigning blame to the party who started conflict" (Lee & Maslog, 2005: 320). Avoiding this component of peace journalism may be tricky for journalists to practice, as Lee & Maslog note, because journalists are prone to assigning roles (i.e., "villain" and "victims") in their stories. However, journalistic codes of ethics call for truthfulness, autonomy, and unbiased reporting (*The New York Times* staff, Sept. 2004; *The Washington Post* standards and ethics; SPJ code of ethics) that when followed would resolve the use of dichotomous language.

In an attempt to stay impartial, journalists should avoid assigning labels based on moral orientation because that label illustrates bias. For example, McGoldrick and Lynch (2000) explain: "no-one ever uses [demonizing labels] to describe himself or herself and so for a journalist to use them is always to take sides" (p. 32); instead, the journalist should refer to the parties by the names they give themselves, or use literal terms in descriptions, such as "bombers" rather than "terrorists." We believe Lee and Maslog's (2005) call for nonpartisan reporting fits here. Similar to the avoidance of dichotomizing language, nonpartisan reporting requires the reporter use the most factual objective phrasing in the linguistics or impressions provided in a story. As journalists provide audiences with context, Galtung (1986, 2000) and McGoldrick and Lynch (2000) ask that they do so as impartially as possible.

Providing accounts of atrocities or, conversely, attempts at resolution, evenly and by all parties of a conflict will help illustrate the conflict in its full context. This means avoiding the focus of one party's wrongdoings and instead reporting all wrongdoings, regardless of the side, and objectively addressing the allegations made by each side. This latter concept includes "making equal efforts to establish whether any evidence exists to back them up, treating the victims with equal respect and the chances of finding and punishing the wrongdoers as being of equal importance" (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000: 32). C.J. Chivers of *The New York Times* shows it is possible for journalists to report on the wrongdoings of their own government. He documents how the U.S. government originally denied military honors to U.S. troops harmed by chemical weapons and shows the long-term consequences to those troops' exposure (Chivers, 2014). Similarly, Chivers and Schmitt (2011) are not afraid to document when NATO airstrikes have destroyed the lives of others. Anthony Shadid did the same in his 2004 Pulitzer Prize-winning coverage on the impact of United States' bombs on the Iraqi people (Pulitzer.org, 2010).

Of course, most news organizations do not have the resources *The New York Times* invested in Chivers and Schmitt's long-term reporting, but the stories' existence points to the ability of components of peace journalism to survive market forces. The stories are also notable because they did not resemble the news content disseminated by embedded journalists that makes both the Pentagon and the public happy because of the bravery exhibited by troops through the reporting, as well as the pure entertainment value of the riveting content—what Seib (2004) refers to as similar to reality programming.

Although *The New York Times* uses its immense resources to investigate issues of public importance, it, too, has often relied on embedded reporters as a means of covering conflict. Having journalists working alongside military units during deployment poses a risk to impartiality during reporting and subjects them to government or military public relations manipulation. If a journalist spends time embedded with the military, there is a chance the jargon used by the military, or even a sense of the journalist as a member of that unit, seeps out in the reporting (Seib, 2004). No longer is the embedded journalist covering a militarized unit as "them," but frequent live

televised accounts may depict the journalist referring to group as “we,” threatening that journalist’s ability to critically cover the military.

Nonetheless, individual journalists still strive to maintain and protect their independence. For example, when freelance journalist Kevin Sites was embedded with the U.S. Marines in Fallujah, Iraq, he filmed a U.S. soldier shooting a presumably defenseless Iraqi insurgent point-blank. Over the past three weeks, Sites recounts, he had “developed a good relationship” with the Marines (Sites, 2007: 6). While reporting for NBC News, Sites also produced his own war blog, which the troops and their families greatly appreciated – for a time. In his book *In the hot zone*, Sites explains the agonizing decisions he made related to his video as he weighed how best to edit or not edit the video, keeping in mind the need to tell the truth about war, the video’s potential impact on the soldier who fired, and public opinion in both the United States and the Middle East. Sites’ stated goal is to be a responsible, ethical journalist – not a purveyor of propaganda for the U.S. military. Ultimately, he and his bosses released two versions of his video – a complete one and an edited one that includes the sound of the gunshot but not the image. The ensuing backlash, including death threats and hate mail, from military families and their supporters shows the commercial pressures faced by news organizations that report on the potential misdeeds of U.S. troops, but Sites’ action also demonstrates a basic tenet of peace journalism – not avoiding stories that show one’s own country as a potential perpetrator of violence.

The propaganda model would assert that government and corporate interests would directly contribute to an “us” versus “them” approach, especially in the context of Western media and in the use of embedded journalists during media campaigns. A rather significant challenge to peace journalism exists in conflict coverage in the journalistic practice of news domestication. Domestication refers to telling the story in a way that renders it more familiar and consumable to local audiences (Gurevitch et al., 1993). From this perspective of news construction, journalists tell stories of events in a way that garners attention and comprehension from their audience. As an outcome of domestication and general public acceptance, news is often constructed to depict dichotomous labels. Sometimes this is due to fear of reprimand for appearing sympathetic to other parties, but often it is ingrained in the journalistic culture. Still, the Chivers and Schmitt examples show the ideologies can be overcome.

4.4. Avoid victimizing, demonizing, and emotive language

Closely related to acknowledging and understanding bias is an awareness of government-promoted labels (such as “terrorist” or “terrorism”) in communicating information. Using precise language, rather than victimizing, demonizing or emotive language, is a key precept of peace journalism.

McGoldrick and Lynch (2000) define victimizing language as terminology that only depicts what has been “done *to*” a group of people and what could be “done *for*” that group of people. The disempowering language includes phrases like “tragedy,” “defenseless,” “devastated,” and “pathetic” (p. 31). They argue that journalists should report in ways that *empower* the people and describe what the people in trying situations have done or could do. An example of this includes the use of feature stories that “accentuate the positive of an individual or individuals in miserable circumstances by finding something innovative they have done to survive. Give a sense of how their day pans out” (Apps, 2009: 263). Empowering the subjects through feature-writing further disseminates the story of their resilience, rather than treats the subjects merely as those afflicted or victims of conflict.

Examples of demonizing language include “vicious,” “cruel,” “brutal,” and “barbaric” (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000). The use of these terms reflects the journalist’s moral judgment of the action and confines the journalist to one side of the conflict, as well as furthers the emotional appeal of the supposedly afflicted side toward violence. In this sense, journalists should report what they know about specific events and give as much information as possible regarding the reliability of other reports or descriptions of the wrongdoing (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000). In other words, the peace journalist should follow the maxim for good writing: show, don’t tell. Precise details about events are better than demonizing labels. They also are more truthful.

Similar to demonizing language, the use of emotive language can further escalate conflict by emotionally resonating with audiences. McGoldrick and Lynch (2000) suggest reporters avoid words such as “genocide,” “tragedy,” or “massacre,” and instead be precise about what is known. Not to be confused with minimizing suffering, the avoidance of emotive language is merely an attempt to maintain rationality in reporting and “reserve the strongest language for the gravest situations” (p. 32). In other words, carefully chosen words are more accurate and more truthful.

Peace journalism requires that a Western journalist reporting for a Western audience not be a product of the dominant ideology, where othering and ethnocentrism lead to both dichotomous labeling and emotive, victimizing, or demonizing language. Propaganda theory, the hierarchy of influences model and the journalistic field model all acknowledge the importance of public acceptability to economic factors (i.e., ratings); therefore, it could be risky for journalists to appear as sympathizers to groups determined by the government or populous as evil or bad. For example, if military or government media representatives discuss conflict in terms of demonizing

language ("terrorists," "savages," etc.) media must be conscious of this terminology and find language that is not prone to propagating violence or fueling hatred (just as discussed in dichotomous labeling).

In a study of conflicting frames used by Australian press and Indonesian press in "War on Terror" coverage, Mahony (2010) found that the Indonesian press was more likely to contextualize acts of violence from militant groups according to the group identities behind the attacks, rather than the Islamic affiliation. In addition, "the main topic of 7.6 percent of the Indonesian articles in this sample was the rejection of the bombers as Muslims because their violent acts and hate-filled values were incongruous with the peaceful principles of Islam" (Mahony, 2010: 747), whereas the majority of articles analyzed in the Australian sample contextualized acts of violence as terrorism by Islamic extremists or Muslim radicals.

Reuters addresses the use of descriptive and specific language labeling in its handbook on journalism, expressing the expectation that reporters avoid "referring to specific actions or events as terrorism or terror, or to individuals or groups as terrorist, unless actually quoting someone" (Reuters Handbook on Journalism, 2015). Reuters clarifies that it is the responsibility of the reporter to communicate the identity of subjects or context of events with specificity to avoid using generally ambiguous terms. The Reuters guideline arguable paves the way for actively choosing not to directly quote officials using demonizing labels.

4.5. Win-win orientation

Galtung's fifth component of the peace/war orientation is using a "win-win" approach: Peace journalism frames should depict the solution of the conflict in terms of the best possible outcome for each party. Rather than report with a zero-sum orientation, Galtung calls for journalists to examine the possibility of a win-win approach. Journalists could identify potential win-win scenarios by revealing the nature of the conflict—asking, "*who is involved*," "*what are the goals of each party*," "*what issues are important to each party*," and "*where are the relevant parties willing to negotiate*" (Galtung, 2000)?

Additionally, framing the news in conjunction with a "win-win" orientation does not appear to detract from audience interest. In a series of experimental studies, Kempf (2005) measured responses to escalation- and de-escalation-oriented news articles on three events in the former Yugoslavia, where escalation-oriented frameworks focused on "win-lose" scenarios, identified an aggressor, and reported on ways to stop the aggressor. De-escalation-oriented frames addressed the overarching issues of a conflict and how they could be resolved. Through this experiment, Kempf found that news with de-escalation frames had the same effect as escalation frames in arousing audience interest. Although many studies illustrate the complexity of the relationship between media frames and audience interest (Kempf, 2005; Möckel, 2009; Schaefer, 2006; Thiel & Kempf, 2014) - often depending on text format, gender of audience member, *a priori* mental modes, and other contexts - it has not been empirically determined that escalation-orientation frames are more appealing or interesting among news viewers, readers, or listeners.

Conflicts are rarely simple (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000; Galtung, 2000). The journalist should expand on the situational factors leading up to the conflict to include the goals and perspectives of the affected smaller groups, increasing the likelihood of developing a broader range of conflict outcomes and better definition of what resolution may entail for each side of the conflict. This tenet implies journalists must alter the questions asked of their sources to identify the reasoning behind the conflict and overall goals of all stakeholders.

5. People/elite orientation

Galtung's people orientation calls for giving voice to the voiceless and recognizing that ordinary people can present worthy ideas that contribute to peace. From Galtung's perspective, peace journalism would focus on suffering of all people from every side of the conflict. This orientation stresses the value to providing a voice to those who may otherwise be voiceless, including women, the elderly, and children (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000) and focusing "on common people as actors and sources of information" (Lee & Maslog, 2005). Alternatively, war journalism frames focus on "our" atrocities—the suffering of "our" victims—and typically portray elitist efforts toward peace, opposed to peace journalism's focus on all peacemakers, not just elite.

5.1. Giving a voice to the voiceless

This people-oriented approach to journalism means sourcing information from the people engaged in and affected by the conflict, who may not otherwise be heard. Done correctly, these interviews or analyses can help a journalist understand and report the invisible effects of war, violence and conflict.

From a propaganda model perspective, this tenet is unlikely to exist. War journalism frames are elite-oriented and focus on leaders throughout the peace process and rely on elites as sources of information. The propaganda model supports this notion of source favoritism and asserts that one influence on media is the reliance on

government for information. However, this is not the case in all media practices. The flaw in this theory assumes that media across the globe rely on government-fed information and operate consciously according to elite influences (advertisers, owners, etc.) Elaborating on this further, the hierarchy of influences model addresses the work routines of journalists and the tendency to contact government sources in military or conflict zones. Numerous studies have documented U.S. media's reliance on official sources on foreign policy issues (Bennet, 1990; Entman, 1991). For peace journalism to prevail, journalists must somewhat detach themselves from government sources and seek perspectives otherwise unheard. Understandably, mainstream media cannot altogether ignore the leaders of their countries; however, not all journalists need to go to the news conferences or briefings. Some can spend time with civilian sources and develop an understanding of non-elitist viewpoints. Indeed, sometimes that reporting is honored as was Anthony Shadid's work for *The Washington Post* on the Iraqi people's "struggle to deal with the legacy of war" (Pulitzer.org, 2010). Ricchiardi (2006) asserts that reporters familiar with the history and culture of an area are more likely to know whom to talk to in seeking information or new perspectives. Although war journalism reporting cannot be altogether avoided, perhaps it can be mitigated through peace journalism stories. Of course, finding local sources requires more effort. Galtung and Ruge (1965) acknowledged that decades ago: The more culturally distant an event occurs, the higher the tendency to report on elite interests, such as how the event will impact elite nations.

5.2. Multiparty orientation

A more people-oriented approach naturally allows for a multiparty orientation, another component of the people/elite orientation. Giving weight to all voices affected by the conflict may establish the journalist or media entity as sympathetic to parties castigated by the public for political reasons; however, Seib (2004) argues, "patriotism does not require backing down from truth" (p. 32). In conflict resolution, the more solutions or alternatives to violence, the more likely the conflict can be resolved in amicable or peaceful ways (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000). Therefore, threats to this characteristic of peace journalism are similar to those discussed in the sections related to dichotomous labeling, using particular language and "win-win" orientations.

According to McGoldrick and Lynch (2000), the peace journalism approach requires journalistic insight into each party's sentiments, fears, resentments, and grievances. This also includes highlighting grassroots peace initiatives—parties working to create dialogue between conflicted parties. In a 2012 study, Lynch and McGoldrick analyzed the effect of peace/war frames on Australian and Filipino audiences and found significant effects on the viewers' sense of *hopelessness*, where exposure to peace journalism stories that "gave a voice to all parties—not merely the government and main opposition party" (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2012: 1047)—left viewers feeling less hopeless, less scared, and less disgusted.

6. Solution / victory

The solution orientation in peace journalism aims to capture peace initiatives and present information in a way that exposes structures, cultures, and opportunities for peaceful coexistence. Recognizing that conflict does not always lead to violence, this framework offers hope that peace can be achieved before and after violence breaks out. Peace journalism encourages emphasis on the aftermath of the conflict and active engagement in the community on behalf of the reporter to continue coverage of the conflict-stricken state as it achieves resolution, reconstruction, and reconciliation (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000). Conversely, war journalism's victory orientation assumes peace can only be achieved as a product of victory and ceasefire. Contradictory to peace journalism's obligation to report on the aftermath of conflict, war journalism implies that the media depart from the conflict area and only return if violence arises again (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000). In other words, war journalism accepts the government's view of when a conflict is over. Peace journalism is dependent on verifying the truth by staying in the area and continuing coverage.

6.1. Seeking solutions

Understanding the goals of each party may help the journalist identify commonalities or a basis for solutions. Galtung (2000) argues that the "Golden Rule" of conflict states, "a conflict with only two parties and the same goal (like territory, control, victory) exists only in abstract models. Real life conflicts are more complex: there are more parties, more goals" (p. 82). By recognizing the expanse of stakeholders and each party's goals, the journalist can report on patterns or combinations of interests and goals that could lead to solutions and resolution.

Using the example of Search for Common Ground's news service as a non-governmental organization that produces "balanced and solution-oriented articles," Peleg (2006) believes conflict resolution reporting can effectively dissuade public support for conflict continuation by limiting sensational stories that drive the desire for retaliation or violence, and instead focus on providing balanced and contextual accounts. "Such a balanced and composed account, devoid of the cutthroat anticipation for action does not serve the stimulation of readers

toward supporting the escalation of conflict" (Peleg, 2006: 15). Journalists practicing peace journalism, therefore, would be encouraging public discourse on events and conflicts that were reported in a way that promoted "constructive perspectives"(p. 14), leading to enlightened public discourse.

In an almost identical argument, Hackett (2006) proposes that the journalistic field, in the context of social structure, is weak, and one solution that enables peace journalism as a practice is the ability to limit "the dominance of mass media" and challenge the traditional definition of institutional journalism through the use of "oppositional and grassroots Internet-based outlets" (p. 10). Common Ground News Service is accomplishing just this by providing representative reporting outside of a mass-mediated institution.

6.2. Reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation

The popular focus in war journalism frames consists of the reporting on the *here* and *now*, with little emphasis on post-violence or post-conflict reporting (Galtung, 2000; McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000). Peace journalism favors the idea that journalism should report on the conflict's aftermath, no longer pontificating on what the long-term effects may be, but observing and reporting on how the conflict affected stakeholders and invisible effects that are still developing. This stage of reporting relies on the journalists' ability to maintain contact with the afflicted people and area to continue the story of the reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation.

To help prevent recurring conflict, media should focus on the issues that remain and may still fuel hatred, resentment, or future violence; and asking, "what is being done to strengthen the means on the ground to handle and resolve conflict non-violently, to address development or structural needs in the society and to create a culture of peace" (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000)? In many ways, the journalists are serving as watchdogs holding the government accountable for sustained peace after a treaty or deal have been reached.

The theoretical implications already addressed in the sections on proactive reporting and reporting on causes and consequences hold true for this characteristic, as well. Economic and political factors restrict the way news organizations continue coverage after peace treaties or resolution begins. Parachute journalists now may simply navigate to a different region area to cover a new story (Ricchiardi, 2006). This eliminates continual post-conflict coverage on the reconstruction, rehabilitation and long-term resolution. When news organizations can only schedule periodic updates from the conflict region, perhaps a solution is to seek funding through new startups that are dedicated to connecting freelancers and editors, similar to dating websites (Dyer, 2014). Companies like Storyhunter work to "match editors' needs and journalists' story ideas" (Dyer, 2014: 34). In addition, other groups, such as Reporters Without Borders or Human Rights Watch, also provide financial assistance and on-the-ground training to reporters in conflict zones (Hammer, 2014).

7. Conclusion

As Hackett (2006) also discovered, the propaganda model, hierarchy of influences model, and journalism as a field theory all present challenges for peace journalism; however, in consolidating and exploring the characteristics of peace journalism outlined by Lee and Maslog (2005), we have found evidence that peace journalism can and does exist in Western media environments. In other areas of the world, predominantly conflict-stricken territories, there are media and training organizations that dedicate resources to developing "responsible" reporting of conflicts. A great example of peace journalism at work is Search for Common Ground (Peleg, 2006). By acknowledging that conflict is inevitable, but violence is not, Search for Common Ground's Common Ground News Service strives to bring people together, share goals and differences, and find solutions to conflict before violence breaks out, during war—working to end violence—and in the aftermath (About CGNews, Common Ground News Service).

Although institutions like Search for Common Ground are active in conflict areas, there needs to be a mass mediated standard for responsible reporting of conflict and violence. Reporting on the here and now is not enough to educate and inform public opinion; conflict coverage should involve dismissing the notion of being a reactionary journalist and instead telling a story providing historical context from all sides of the conflict. Even in the face of economic constraints, news organizations can find creative ways to partner and/or train local news organizations of conflict-stricken areas, to procure contextualized and impartial accounts of the precursory events, ongoing struggle, or aftermath.

Indeed, even mainstream profitable news organizations recognizing the need to extend conflict coverage in war zones find a way, as evidenced by the resources devoted to coverage by Chivers, Schmitt, and Shadid. From a historical perspective, the argument against peace journalism based on limited funding or resources should be reconsidered. Western media cannot rely on parachute journalism to construct the news in its full context. Through no fault of the journalists, it is unreasonable to expect parachute journalists to become an expert in the history and culture of all geographic areas included in their coverage. Instead, news organizations should

cooperate with non-profits such as Reporters Without Borders or Human Rights Watch to help provide the contextualized content needed to regain the public's appetite for news that illuminates rather than provokes.

Hackett (2006) concludes that one solution to enable peace journalism, as a practice, is the citizens' power in demanding a better media. From an entertainment value perspective, peace journalism frames have no less power than war journalism frames in "awakening reader interest" (Thiel & Kempf, 2014), and Lynch and McGoldrick (2012) found that audiences felt "less hopeless" after viewing peace journalism pieces. Therefore, perhaps it is not necessarily in the public's hands to demand peace journalism practices, but is a responsibility of educational or media institutions training journalists to ensure journalists and future editors understand the value and impact of fully contextualized reporting, as well as its newsworthiness as public need-to-know information. Journalism training should also address how reporters can identify systematic bias of sources and motivations of sources in providing information. Understanding the motivations of sources and the bias implied in such words as "terrorist" or "terrorism" will help news organizations produce content that is more congruent with peace journalism.

It does not seem so far-fetched to think characteristics of peace journalism could be incorporated into codes of ethics or used to describe responsible conflict coverage, if they are not already addressed. Reflecting on Greenwood's (2012) study, photojournalists submitted what they deemed to be their most award-worthy work to the Pictures of the Year competition, and from a framing perspective, the majority of submissions did not depict violence. The challenge in Greenwood's example, then, is the institutional desire to award war journalism photographs depicting violence, and the lack of reinforcement by the judges by not awarding peace journalism photographs.

Evaluating the current and past states of conflict coverage across the globe, there is hope for peace journalism even in the challenges imposed by governments, institutions, and professional routines. Although Western media may have to rely on a paradigmatic cultural shift in the journalism industry to fully acknowledge and understand the benefits of peace journalism reporting, international organizations that focus on providing comprehensive and holistic coverage have already been small-scale exemplars for peace journalism viability. The hope for institutional change, then, may rely somewhat on the ability of journalists to incrementally integrate peace journalism methodologies into current journalistic practices. Journalists should embrace peace journalism for its ability to help audiences make sense of and resolve conflict. Numerous characteristics of peace journalism suggested by Maslog and Lee (2005) already incorporate the idea of truth- rather than propaganda-focused reporting. The overall concept of truth-telling, then, is a given that becomes operationalized in the details of reporting all sides of a conflict, the causes and consequences, and the voice of the voiceless in ways that do not dehumanize or demonize.

Future research could include the prevalence of peace journalism frames in conflict coverage by Western media organizations. Additionally, have institutional accolades, such as the Pulitzer Prize, acknowledged or awarded peace journalism? Findings of this research could be impactful in understanding the current state of global conflict coverage, as well as cultural acknowledgement of the importance and value in peace frames.

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Najma Sadiq & Sehar-un-Nisa Hassan

Die Berichterstattung über den Konflikt in den pakistanischen Stammesgebieten: Perspektiven des Friedensjournalismus

Die Berichterstattung zweier englischsprachiger, pakistanischer Tageszeitungen über den Konflikt in den pakistanischen Stammesgebieten lässt signifikante Variationen der Indikatoren für Kriegs- und Friedensjournalismus erkennen. Insgesamt fanden sich im Durchschnitt mehr kriegs- als friedensjournalistische Elemente. Trotz unterschiedlicher ideologischer Ausrichtung der beiden Zeitungen, waren die Berichterstattungsmuster in beiden Zeitungen dieselben. Innerhalb des Kriegsjournalismus zeigten sich signifikante Unterschiede zwischen den berichteten Ereignissen und zwischen den Textgenres. Im Lichte von Theorie und Kontext diskutiert, lassen sich aus den Ergebnissen Vorschläge für friedensjournalistische Interventionen ableiten. Die Dominanz des friedensjournalistischen Indikators „Ursachen und Folgen“ scheint Raum für die Analyse von Konflikt dynamiken zu versprechen.

Volltext

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Coverage of Pakistani tribal areas conflict: Prospects of peace journalism

Conflict coverage of Pakistani tribal areas from two Pakistani English-language newspapers demonstrated significance of variations on indicators of war and peace journalism. Overall, the mean on war journalism was significantly higher than peace journalism. Despite dissimilar newspapers' ideologies, the reporting patterns were the same across newspapers. The mean differences within war journalism were significant across events and types of stories. The findings discussed in the light of theory and context suggested areas of interventions for peace journalism. The dominance of peace journalism indicator, "causes and consequences", is promising in a way to create a space for analysis of the conflict dynamics.

[full text](#)

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Coverage of Pakistani tribal areas conflict: Prospects of peace journalism

Kurzfassung: Die Berichterstattung zweier englischsprachiger, pakistanischer Tageszeitungen über den Konflikt in den pakistanischen Stammesgebieten lässt signifikante Variationen der Indikatoren für Kriegs- und Friedensjournalismus erkennen. Insgesamt fanden sich im Durchschnitt mehr kriegs- als friedensjournalistische Elemente. Trotz unterschiedlicher ideologischer Ausrichtung der beiden Zeitungen, waren die Berichterstattungsmuster in beiden Zeitungen dieselben. Innerhalb des Kriegsjournalismus zeigten sich signifikante Unterschiede zwischen den berichteten Ereignissen und zwischen den Textgenres. Im Lichte von Theorie und Kontext diskutiert, lassen sich aus den Ergebnissen Vorschläge für friedensjournalistische Interventionen ableiten. Die Dominanz des friedensjournalistischen Indikators „Ursachen und Folgen“ scheint Raum für die Analyse von Konflikt dynamiken zu versprechen.

Abstract: Conflict coverage of Pakistani tribal areas from two Pakistani English-language newspapers demonstrated significance of variations on indicators of war and peace journalism. Overall, the mean on war journalism was significantly higher than peace journalism. Despite dissimilar newspapers' ideologies, the reporting patterns were the same across newspapers. The mean differences within war journalism were significant across events and types of stories. The findings discussed in the light of theory and context suggested areas of interventions for peace journalism. The dominance of peace journalism indicator, "causes and consequences", is promising in a way to create a space for analysis of the conflict dynamics.

1. Introduction

Substantial research debates suggest the importance of the role that the media, especially the news media, can play in peace processes. The way media highlight the resolution has significant effect on the way conflict can be dealt with (Becker, 2004). Political leaders use their understanding of the news for developing counterstrategies (Hackett, 2007). Taken from the perspective of basic cultural processes, connections between war and the media are deeply rooted (Hackett, 1991). During war, media act as a battlefield, a combatant, a target, a weapon and a source of intelligence (Hackett, 2007). According to Wolfsfeld (2004), the media can be central in promoting peace by stressing its benefits, by increasing the credibility of leaders and people endeavoring for peace and by altering the enemy image. In contrast to this, the actual patterns of media reporting are viewed as more on the destructive side. The focus of the media and peace research is to see how media can be used for conflict prevention and de-escalation (Luostarinen, 2002; McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000; Lynch, 2013). Considering the significant role of media reporting, which at times determines the nature, strength and direction of conflicts' impact at regional and global levels, the analysis of the media coverage can provide an insight into the way conflict is presented.

The objective of the present research was to evaluate the coverage of tribal areas conflicts on indicators of war and peace journalism by selecting coverage items from two leading English newspapers (Shah, 2010) of Pakistan: *Dawn* and *The News*. *Dawn* is considered a high quality and balanced newspaper and its op-eds and editorials are considered as authentic reference material (Ghuman, 2015). *The News* is a high circulation newspaper, which is known for its pro- and anti-government bias based on the publisher's political affiliation with the sitting government.

Four significant conflict events, from the years 2004 to 2008, reflecting the transitional nature of the conflict in the tribal areas were chosen for the analysis. These included Wana Operation, Waziri-Uzbek Fight, War in Waziristan and Loyesam fight. By evaluating the presentation of indicators of war and peace journalism across newspapers, story types, events and their linkages with contextual factors, this study aimed at broadening the perspective on practical implications of peace journalism. The analysis was further used to make appropriate recommendations for promotion of peace through journalism.

2. Covering conflict and war: The peace journalism perspective

Peace journalism pioneer, Johan Galtung, denounced the mainstream journalism for its inclination towards war. His contention with the way news media portray war and conflict was based on several grounds: focus on violence and propaganda, highlighting the causes backed by the elite and establishment notions, and reducing the reality construction of the conflict in terms of its victory and defeat orientation (Galtung & Ruge, 1965). Peace journalism evolved at conceptual and professional level in the past few decades and is now seen as a distinct approach by theorists and media professionals (Becker, 1982; Hackett & Gruneau, 2000; Galtung 2000; Höjjer, Nohrstedt, & Ottosen, 2002; Bläsi, 2004). It includes a solid framework to study complex and competing frames

to construct debate and set of strategies to improve media coverage (Kempf, 2003; Knightley, 2000; Lynch & Goldrick, 2005a). Many scholars came up to explain the term peace journalism, its prospects (Keeble, 2001; Gibbs & Warhover, 2002; Tehranian, 2002a; Tehranian, 2002b; Wolfsfeld, 2004; Lynch, 2013; Aslam, 2016) and provided the epistemological basis to the theory (Lee & Maslog, 2006; Fahmy & Eakin, 2014; Anderson, 2015; Tenenboim-Weinblatt, Hanitzsch, & Nagar, 2016). However, there is also a group of scholars who questioned its distinctiveness, expressed their concerns on the theoretical basis and practical aspects of peace journalism, and disapproved it as a mere reinvention of the wheel (Fawcett, 2002; Loyn, 2007a; Loyn, 2007b).

Countering this criticism, peace journalism advocates (Lynch, 2013) argued that the lens of peace journalism actually provides strong background and context of conflict formation rather than focusing on violence and propaganda. Consequently, it makes media sources, processes, and effects more pertinent. It offers the opportunity of looking at diverse views, and the coverage of the perspectives of all parties involved in the conflict. Its focus is to present the conflict as a problem to be solved (Peleg, 2007). The scholars believe that instead of focusing on zero-sum orientation it is required to have a sensitive and win-win approach. The focus should be on a need to consider the context; to identify the parties involved; to examine their stakes, to distinguish between stated and underlying demands, to identify voices which are working for non-violent solutions and creative approaches for transforming and transcending lines of the conflict (Shinar, 2009).

Erosy (2004) stressed that deliberate distortion in news reporting act as a trigger of violent conflict by aggravating the tension between oppositional groups. The bases for peace journalism are: a balanced approach, accommodating attitude for news selection and appropriate way of language use in reporting of conflict events (Ersoy, 2006b). It is a socially responsible journalism (Bandakov, 2006) which makes the problem transparent (Ersoy, 2006b) establishes empathy, prevents violence and creates awareness which contributes (Shinar, 2007a) to peace promotion and maintenance.

Hanitzsch (2004a; 2004b; 2007) and Loyn (2003; 2007a; 2007b) however, criticized peace journalism for its incompatibility with the journalistic norms. They believe that the focus of the media should be on presenting the observed reality without any alteration of content and its framing. On the other hand, the proponents of peace journalism emphasize that the media should not act as detached and unobtrusive observers but as participants in the conflict cycle. However, this participatory role has to be that of a mediator rather than furthering personal agendas through promotion and imposition of specific solutions by journalists (Kempf, 2016).

War journalism contributed significantly to negative globalized impact of conflicts, due to its focus on violence, elite orientation, propaganda and disharmony (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000; Lee & Maslog, 2005). Using Galtung's classification of peace journalism (1986; 1998), Lee and Maslog (2005) categorized the news coverage of conflicts as war vs peace journalism frame by employing quantitative methodology. By choosing coverage patterns of four conflict events in different Asian newspapers on indicators of war vs peace journalism, they buildt a case for promotion of peace journalism. They observed that, among the selected events, more indicators of war journalism were found in the coverage of Kashmir issue in Pakistani and Indian newspapers. They observed more space for peace journalism in the coverage of Mindanao conflict and the Tamil Tiger movement by the Philippine and Sri Lankan newspapers respectively. At the same time, the dominant indicators within peace journalism were less of interventionist nature and more of descriptive kind. This pattern raised questions about actual space for peace journalism in news coverage of conflicts and possible reasons for it. In this context, it is important to evaluate reporting patterns of different news agencies through the lens of war and peace journalism. This would not only advance understanding about theoretical underpinnings of peace journalism but would also provide prospects of peace journalism in regions which are suffering from the perpetual effects of such wars and conflicts.

Through selected events from the tribal areas conflict, the present study endeavors to answer the following research questions to further understanding of theory and practice of peace journalism and its role in promoting peace:

RQ1: Does the pre-established indicators of war and peace journalism sufficiently tap the various aspects of war and peace journalism in case of tribal area conflicts news coverage?

RQ2: What are the dominant frames of journalism and patterns of presentation of the indicators of war and peace journalism in selected stories?

RQ3: Are there significant differences in frames of journalism across newspapers, events and types of stories?

RQ4: Is there an association between type and length of story with frames of journalism?

The overarching goal is to see the prospects and role of peace journalism, and to identify points of intervention by discussing the findings in the light of peace journalism theory and contextual factors.

3. Method

The content analysis of 234 coverage items, from two prominent English-language newspapers of Pakistan i.e. *The News* and *Dawn*, was conducted to identify their war and peace journalism orientation. These coverage items were about four major events occurring between the years 2004 and 2008, namely: Wana Operation, Waziri-Uzbek Fight, War in Waziristan and Loyesam Fight.

3.1 Background of the selected events.

Throughout history, the tribal areas held international value due to their geo-strategic importance (Ahmed, 1978). In the early 80s, with Pakistan-US alliance, these areas were considered to play a significant role in dismantling a former world power, the Soviet Union. However, the presence of American and allied forces in Afghanistan, in 2001, had its ripple effect in these areas. Starting with the deployment of Pakistan Army in 2003, the armed conflict between the Pakistan Army and the militant groups in the tribal areas had gone through different phases. Rapid shifts were observed in affiliations of local people and the Pakistan Army with militant groups involved in conflict. The ground situation kept on changing at a fast pace. Within four years, the conflict spread from Waziristan to Bajaur and had a strong impact on different cities across Pakistan.

The first-ever armed intervention by the Pakistan Army in the tribal areas was the Wana Operation (also called Battle of Wana), on 16th March, 2004 at AzamWarsak near Wana, a town in South Waziristan. The aim of the operation was to capture Al-Qaeda members escaping into the Pakistani tribal areas across the Pak-Afghan border. According to Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) (2004), 166 militants including 93 Pakistani tribesmen and 73 foreigners were captured. The reported casualties in the operation included: 63 militants, and 46 soldiers whereas 26 soldiers were reportedly wounded in the operation. The operation ended on 24th March, 2004. However, it started the armed conflict in the tribal areas.

The successive period of conflict saw escalated militancy in the tribal areas. In 2007, armed struggle gained a new dimension. The rift between the local tribesmen and foreign militants over killing of an Al-Qaeda linked Arab, Saiful Adil, led to the Waziri-Uzbek Fight on 18th March. The local militants and tribesmen demanded the Uzbeks either to leave, or to disarm. The number of killed and injured was not confirmed through independent sources, however, the casualties included children as well (BBC News, 2007). The ceasefire was announced on 13th April, 2007. The media coverage highlighted this fight to show the divide of local and foreign militants. However, this internal rift had not contributed much for building trust between local militants and the Pakistan Army.

On 3rd July 2007, Red Mosque (also known as *Lal Masjid*), came under siege in the capital city Islamabad. The pretext of the siege was the kidnapping of foreigners and the introduction of a parallel judicial system by the *Jamia Hafsa*, the madrassa, adjacent to the mosque (Dawn, 2007b; Raza, 2007). The exact number of casualties under the siege remained unconfirmed (Dawn, 2007c) which raised many speculations and concerns. This event was used as an excuse from the militants in the tribal areas to formally broke the truce which was already dysfunctional. Three consecutive suicide attacks after the siege led to the war in Waziristan on 24th July 2007. This war got massive coverage and lasted till 24th August 2007. This was an important event because after Red Mosque incident there were speculations even within the Pakistan Army over whether they are fighting with the militants or with their own fellow citizens (Rashid, 2007). The following periods contributed to a further escalation of the conflict.

By the year 2008, the armed conflict had spread throughout the tribal region, from Waziristan to Bajaur, across a more than 400 kilometers area. There was a fight at Loyesam between 6th to 10th August 2008. This was the starting part of the six-months long Bajaur Battle which ended on February 28th, 2009 resulting in the displacement of 300.000 people (Kalay, 2009). The fight started between Pakistan Army and militants in Loyesam, 12 kilometres from the Bajaur Agency headquarters, in a bid to reclaim important nearby Taliban strongholds. This event was not just a starting period of the Bajaur battle but also an important victory of the militants over the Pakistan Army. These four incidents are a key for recognizing the major transitions in the tribal areas conflict and the associated news coverage.

3.2 Data coding and analysis process.

The content analysis of the text body of the selected items coded different sections of the coverage items with respect to indicators of war and peace journalism as proposed in the model by Lee and Maslog (2005). The model's indicators were comprised of two premises: approach and language. The approach-based criteria included: (1) reactive or proactive approach, (2) visible or invisible effects of war, (3) elite or people orientation, (4) differences or agreements, (5) focus on here and now or on causes and effects, (6) good vs. bad dichotomy or no labelling, (7) two or multiple party involvement, (8) partisanship or non-partisanship, (9) zero-sum or win-

win approach, and (10) the continuation of reports. The language-based criteria included: (1) demonizing, (2) victimizing, and (3) emotive words (Lee & Maslog, 2005).

An initial screening of the contents revealed that some sections of the the coverage items focused on the preparation of war or on the process of negotiation which cannot be coded appropriately in the pre-established coding categories. Since these are important constructs of peace journalism ideology, two indicators "war preparation" and "negotiation process" were added to the coding schedule. These indicators were also tested for their statistical significance in the model.

The selected events were peak points of the conflict. Therefore, indicators related to pre-and post-conflict scenario categories were not relevant here. The content items or type of stories included news, features, op-eds and editorials. The unit of analysis was a single content item and the presence of a particular indicator is counted as 1 each time it is revealed in the story (Lee & Maslog, 2005). The present study has selected only those coverage items that were directly addressing these four conflicts.

4. Findings and discussion

A total of 234 coverage items or story types from the two main newspapers of Pakistan were selected as data for this research. The sub-categories of the story types in the selected events were news (N=180; 77%); op-eds (N=28; 12%); editorials (N=16; 7%) and features (N=10; 4%). Out of the four events, maximum coverage was given to the War in Waziristan (N=119; 51%) followed by the Wazir-Uzbek Fight (N=56; 24%). Wana Operation was the third important event (N=43; 18%) and the lowest coverage was observed for Loyesam Fight (N=16; 7%) due to its short time span. Table 1 shows proportions of types of stories across newspapers and events.

Variables	News	Op-eds	Editorials	Features
	f(%)	f(%)	f(%)	f(%)
Newspaper Type				
<i>The News (N = 118)</i>	91 (77.1)	16 (13.6)	8 (6.8)	3 (2.5)
<i>Dawn (N = 116)</i>	89 (76.7)	12 (10.3)	8 (6.9)	7 (6.0)
Event Type				
Wana Operation (N = 43)	32 (74.4)	2 (4.7)	4 (9.3)	5 (11.6)
Waziri-Uzbek Fight (N= 56)	42 (75.0)	7 (12.5)	6 (10.7)	1 (1.8)
War in Waziristan (N = 119)	93 (78.2)	17 (14.3)	5 (4.2)	4 (3.4)
Loyesam Fight (N = 16)	13 (81.3)	2 (12.5)	1 (6.3)	0 (0.0)

Table 1: Frequency distribution of story types across newspapers and events (N = 234)

RQ1: Does the pre-established indicators of war and peace journalism sufficiently tap the various aspects of war and peace journalism in case of tribal area conflicts news coverage?

RQ2: What are the dominant frames of journalism and pattern of presentation of the indicators of war and peace journalism in selected stories?

The content analysis revealed that there was adequate presentation of pre-established indicators of war and peace journalism in these stories. However, at the same time, some of the content related to "war preparation" and "negotiation process". Therefore, it was coded separately. The emergent categories were found to be significantly associated with other indicators of war journalism and peace journalism respectively at $p < .001$. Overall "war preparation" was significantly associated with war journalism at ($r = .40$; $p < .001$) and "negotiation process" was significantly associated with peace journalism ($r = .388$; $p < .001$). These findings suggest that the reporting of negotiation process among parties involved in the conflict could also be used as tool for peace journalism.

The descriptive statistics showed that overall the mean score on frequency of war journalism was higher ($M = 13.29$; $SD = 8.93$) than the mean score on frequency of peace journalism ($M = 6.27$; $SD = 5.46$). Paired sample t-test was conducted to assess the significance of mean differences which also supported that war journalism was significantly higher than peace journalism ($t = 11.09$; $df = 233$; $p < .001$). These findings were not surprising keeping in view the socio-political situation of region, reporting hazards and nature of these tribal conflicts which also heated up the wave of terrorism across the country and region due to misperceptions, poor negotiation strategies and vested interests of parties involved in conflicts. These findings also align with the pattern reported by Lee and Maslog (2005), where the strongest war journalism framing was found in the Kashmir coverage by newspapers from India and Pakistan.

The comparison of means within indicators of war journalism showed that "elite oriented" frame was most dominant ($M = 3.15$; $SD = 3.03$) followed by "visible effects" ($M = 3.06$; $SD = 3.5$) and "here and now" ($M = 2.63$; $SD = 2.68$). Rest of the indicators had lower mean frequencies. The elite oriented information was mostly based on official and government sources. These findings conformed with previous studies (Sigal, 1973;

Tuchman, 1978; Paletz & Entman, 1981; McLeod & Hertog, 1998; Siraj, 2009) that showed the inclination of reporters towards official sources. However, it is important to highlight that the official sources referred to in the coverage are mainly from either the military and pro-military government officials or in some instances spokespersons of the militants groups. The newspapers mentioned that the access to information and verification from local sources was not possible due to disruption in telephone system and shift of the local journalists from the conflict areas towards settled districts. While covering the dangerous places of Waziristan such as Miranshah, Mir Ali and Wana, news reporters were facing pressure from all the conflict parties: militants, Pakistani intelligence agencies, tribal chiefs and criminal gangs (Yusufzai, 2007). Safety of journalist in the area was and is also major concern. The attacks on journalists and their families had forced journalist to move from the conflict areas. By the year 2015, a total of 26 journalists were killed and 20 were injured in tribal areas and the adjacent province, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Khyber Union of Journalists, 2016).

The other important aspect found in the coverage was the strong presence of "visible effects" and "here and now" indicators of war journalism. This reinforces the general perception that the default mode of the press is to cover violence, conflict and tensions (Wolfsfeld, 2004). It is a trend that peace proponents are long questioning (Kempf, 2003). In such type of journalism, number of casualties and injuries were more emphasized even when the number was based on speculations. It would be more appropriate to adopt a journalism approach, which focuses more on the context of conflict, less inflammatory, deflate stereotypes and prejudice to support negotiation process among parties involved in conflicts. The focus on invisible effects humanizes the conflict and leads to peaceful conflict resolution.

The comparison of mean frequencies within indicators of peace journalism showed that most dominant indicator was "causes and consequences" ($M = 3.05$; $SD = 4.62$) followed by areas of "agreement" ($M = .89$; $SD = 1.53$). This is the most encouraging finding, indicating some space for peace journalism in coverage of tribal area conflicts. By focusing on "causes and consequences", and "agreement" journalism takes its responsibility to contribute in peace processes. This at times facilitates a timely resolution of conflicts thus mitigating the negative impacts of conflicts at several levels. These peace journalism indicators were comparatively more in op-eds and features than in news items where official sources were given more space. The emergent category of "negotiation process" is an indicator of responsible journalism and it is presumed that it can play a significant role in conflict resolution. However, there is need to generate more conclusive empirical evidence. The op-eds' explicating the construction of the conflict parties and the importance of *Jirga*, council of elders, for conflict resolution and generating local support has added to the peace journalism orientation. The extremely low presentation of other indicators of peace journalism in news coverage of tribal area conflicts is alarming and strongly call for immediate action. This requires change in media policies, more awareness and training of media professionals as well as students in field of media studies to adapt and implement principles of peace journalism theory.

The correlation analysis showed that labeling was significantly associated with the cumulative frequency of war language indicators ($r = .288$ $p < .01$) and partisanship was significantly associated with the cumulative frequency of peace language indicators at ($r = .288$; $p < .01$). The ground reality is that the partisanship of the newspapers was mostly towards the pro-military stance, mainly, because most of the elite sources used for information gathering were from the intelligence agencies, Pakistan army and the pro-army government officials. The content analysis showed that reporters did show some indices of partisanship towards the stance of local militants while explaining their commitment towards peace treaties and actions of the government that had negatively affected the peace process. The significant association of labeling with war journalism provides insight into the dilemma of the conflict parties. Pakistani newspapers portrayed militants sometimes as bad and sometimes as good people. Such labeling leads to perpetuation of media generated stereotypes and prejudices, which slow down the peace process and sometimes contribute to aggravation of conflict. However, it is important to note that the newspapers played their role in the identification of militants according to their origin, aims and objectives. Yusufzai, (2004) identified that Arabs who were directly related to real al-Qaeda were fighting with Pakistan Army, however, they were fewer in numbers than their Uzbek, Chechens and Pakistani allies. The identification of conflict parties, their rights, intentions and action has important role in understanding the conflict (Kempf, 2003).

RQ3: Are there significant differences in frames of journalism across newspapers, events and types of stories?

The frequency distribution pattern also showed that war journalism was higher than peace journalism (Figure 1). The patterns of reporting related to war journalism and peace journalism were similar across newspapers which is also supported by non-significant mean differences though independent t- test (Table 2).




Figure 1: Comparison of War and Peace Journalism across newspapers and events

Type of Newspaper	War Journalism (n= 118)		Peace Journalism (n=116)		t	df	p
	M	SD	M	SD			
The News	13.29	9.12	6.65	5.40	.324	232	.746
Dawn	13.10	8.76	5.89	5.51	1.07	232	.285

Table 2: Mean differences on war and peace journalism across newspapers (N = 234)

These findings support the notion that in general there is still less space for peace journalism in news reporting of conflicts in South-Asian and particularly tribal area conflicts. Keeping in view the multifold implications of these conflicts at regional and global level, there is a need to promote peace journalism in this region. Based on well-established evidence about effects of media (Bennet, 2003; Combs, 1993) it can be assumed that such superficial approach of media might have contributed to disharmony in society and mistrust among people of Pakistan.

A specific pattern across events in reporting of war and peace journalism was observed: A slow but declining trend of war journalism until War in Waziristan, after which war journalism rapidly increased during the coverage of Loyesam fight. Since they are competing frames, this also influenced peace journalism which was lowest in case of Loyesam fight.

Type of Event	War Journalism (n= 118)		Peace Journalism (n=116)	
	M	SD	M	SD
Wana Operation	14.00	10.51	4.91	3.91
Waziri-Uzbek Fight	15.07	9.68	7.09	5.86
War in Waziristan	11.50	7.24	6.63	5.73
Loyesam Fight	18.50	10.23	4.44	4.82

Table 3: Mean differences on war and peace journalism across events (N = 234)

This was also supported by comparison of mean differences on war and peace journalism across events through ANOVA. Results showed that in case of war journalism the mean scores for Loyesam Fight were highest (M = 18.5; SD = 10.23) followed by Waziri-Uzbek Fight (M = 15.07; SD = 9.68). The F statistic showed that mean differences were significant (F = 4.42; df = 3; p = .005). In case of peace journalism, the mean scores for Waziri-Uzbek Fight (M = 7.09; SD = 5.86) were highest followed by War in Waziristan (M = 6.63; SD = 5.73). There was less difference on mean frequencies of peace journalism between Wanna Operation and Loyesam Fight. Overall the F statistic showed that the mean differences across events for peace journalism were not significant (F = 2.11; df = 3; p = .09). (See Table 3)

The analysis of this reporting pattern in light of contextual factors reveals some linkages. During Waziri-Uzbek fight, the newspapers focused more on explaining the construction of the militant groups. As reported in *Dawrr's* (2007a) Editorial, "the first obvious task is to identify who are parties to the on-going violence in Fata. First, there are the Taliban, local and Afghan; then the foreign militants; their local supporters, often with flexible commitments, and then the vast majority of tribesmen who are neutral but who can react violently to any perceived challenge or hurt to their notions of tribal honour. Who picks up guns and on what pretext cannot be predicted. Even the mere presence of security forces can sometimes draw a violent reaction"

The local militants, during Waziri-Uzbek fight, were presented with good tone whereas the foreign militants were projected as bad guys. The newspapers mentioned Uzbeks mostly as foreign militants and not as Al-Qaeda operatives. They also made a distinction between local Taliban and foreign Taliban. Local Taliban were militants from local tribes who had favorable attitude towards Taliban in Afghanistan. The foreign Taliban were the ones who are operating inside Afghanistan. Local Taliban were further divided into two groups: Pro-Taliban and Pro-Pakistan Taliban; the first group is the group of local militants which was in the favor of Afghan Taliban group and wanted to fight along with foreign Taliban against NATO and other security forces within Afghanistan; Pro-Pakistan Taliban was a militant group which was against Pakistani government and forces. The second group, also known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), initially had the same aim as the first group, however, it was against the Pakistani government and local people for helping US and allied forces in Afghanistan. The prominent division of local Taliban was found in Pakistani newspapers during Waziri-Uzbek Fight and especially during War in Waziristan.

The trend during the course of events showed that although the war journalism had dominated the coverage, however, the frequency of war journalism from Wana Operation to War in Waziristan decreased. The War in Waziristan had more presentation of peace journalism indicators in the 4-years of the coverage. The reason might be that the social construction of the militant groups, aims and objectives of the government, military and the militant groups were clearer to the media persons as compared to the time when the conflict started in 2004. However, Loyesam Fight reporting pattern focused more on war journalism orientation as compared to other selected events. The reason could be that it was just the start of armed conflict in Bajaur and the coverage had just started to get momentum.

These findings again suggest here some areas of intervention to see the positive outcomes of peace journalism. Advocates of peace journalism (Youngblood, 2016; Lynch, 2013) stressed that journalists need to take proactive rather than reactive approach to see the positive impacts of peace journalism. The adoption of peace journalism at the beginning of the conflict can be more promising as it can offer early solutions to resolve conflicts by adopting a win-win approach.

RQ4: Is there an association between type of story and length of story with frames of journalism?

The lowest mean on peace journalism categories was observed in case of news stories ($M = 4.46$; $SD = 3.25$) followed by editorials ($M = 7.25$; $SD = 2.82$). The F-statistic showed significant mean difference across four content types at ($F = 86.61$; $df = 3$; $p < .001$). The highest mean for war journalism was observed in case of op-eds ($M = 16.43$; $SD = 9.41$) followed by features ($M = 13.90$; $SD = 8.94$) and news ($M = 13.33$; $SD = 8.97$). The lowest war journalism was found in editorials ($M = 7.06$; $SD = 3.28$) and the difference was significant ($F = 3.90$; $df = 3$; $p = .01$).

The Pearson correlation showed that length of story is significantly associated with frame of journalism. Longer stories are more likely to be associated with peace journalism ($r = .753$; $p < .001$) as compared to war journalism in which the coefficient value was slightly lower ($r = .571$; $p < .001$).

In line with the findings by Lee and Maslog (2005), the present study also observed that there is a stronger and significant relationship of peace journalism with length of story. However, war journalism was also moderately but significantly associated with length of the story. Op-eds have the highest war journalism orientation. As observed in another study (Sadiq & Qureshi, 2010) there was a tendency of Pakistani newspapers to use more judgements and inferences in op-eds and editorials as compared with factual information. In line with Erosy's (2006a) observation, in the tribal areas conflict only few journalists make a conscious effort for covering the conflict from the peace journalism approach. The others lean between both war and peace frames without realizing their inherent contradiction (Erosy, 2006a).

This study also had few limitations as it included only two Pakistani English newspapers. However, the selection of these two newspapers had relevance due to their national and international readership that included the audience which could play more effective role in policy making. The analysis was limited to coverage of four tribal conflicts within timeframe of four years. It provided a broader understanding of the tribal area conflict, however, it did not cater to micro transitional aspects of these conflicts due to absence of pre and post-conflict analysis.

5. Conclusion and suggestions for future research

This study extended understanding about certain aspects of war and peace journalism orientation by taking example of the news coverage of Pakistani tribal area conflicts. Keeping an eye on the repercussions of these tribal area conflict and inclination of all news agencies toward war journalism orientation across events and types of stories, a change in media policy and practices is strongly suggested.

There is need to investigate that other than reporting hazards what are some of the underlying reasons for low presentation of peace journalism indicators in news coverage of conflicts in this region. This study extended the debate on role and space of peace journalism in news media coverage and suggested that future researches specifically explore the linkage of framing with the conflict development and resolution in these regions as well its relationship with local and foreign policies of countries involved in conflicts. There is also a need to explore why op-eds written by some of the famous opinion leaders focus more on war journalism. The op-eds have direct and indirect influences on public opinion and policy making thus it is important to use it as intervention tool in peace development and conflict resolution. In order to get latent understanding, this study will be followed by another research that will qualitatively analyze the op-eds to probe further for their escalation and de-escalation aspects (Kempf, 2003) and overall direction.

Findings of this study acted as a guide for exploring few more relevant questions in context of peace promotion through journalism for instance testing the how the "negotiation process" an emergent indicator of peace journalism is a relevant indicator of peace journalism by looking its specific contribution in conflict resolution.

Learning from the case of tribal areas conflicts, media agencies should focus on adaptation of peace journalism theory and practices to intervene appropriately for other equally important issues in this region such as political unrest and terrorism.

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**Ruth Wodak (2015): The politics of fear. London: Sage.
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The British decision to leave the European Union, Donald Trump's victory in the 2016 American presidential elections, and Marine Le Pen's entry into the second round of the French presidential elections are just some recent examples of seemingly rampant right-wing populist successes. In her recent book, *The Politics of Fear*, the Austrian linguist Ruth Wodak, diagnoses a general move to the right in large parts of Europe and the US, and argues that "right-wing populism is not a passing phenomenon" (p. 30). First published in English and translated into and published in German in 2016 [1], the book received the highly regarded Austrian *Wissenschaftsbuch des Jahres* award in 2017.

The author's aim is to trace, understand and explain the trajectories of right-wing populist parties from the margins of the political landscape to the centre. Wodak accomplishes this using a discourse-historical perspective, focussing on European countries and the USA, and illustrating her points with vignettes. In the course of her book, she describes and explains several common strategies of right-wing populist movements, e.g. scapegoating, offending political opponents, creating a rift between 'Us' and 'Them', legitimising the politics of exclusion, dramatisation, etc. She not only identifies common characteristics of right-wing populist parties/movements (revisionism, nativism, anti-intellectualism and chauvinism, among others), but also addresses differences in the respective rhetoric of Eastern and Western populist movements. After introducing some central elements of right-wing populism, Wodak defines this phenomenon "as a political ideology that rejects existing political consensus and usually combines laissez-faire liberalism and anti-elitism" (p.7). She elaborates on the role of the media for right-wing populists as means to set the agenda by provoking scandals (chapter 1). Based on reviews of the scientific literature on right-wing populism and analyses of some election results, the author concludes that there are differences between the European populist movements which can best be explained in terms of socio-political as well as historical factors, e.g. different political regimes in Western and Eastern European countries resulting in differing identities (chapter 2).

Next, Wodak presents the specific discursive strategies of right-wing populist parties and how they are combined with discriminatory, exclusionary practices. Since blunt ways of expressing racist attitudes are taboo (at least in Western Europe), there are coded ways of expressing them (calculated ambivalence). Wodak shows how the Discourse-Historical Approach can help identify and explain argumentation schemes, topoi and fallacies in discourses. She illustrates this by showing how some right-wing populist parties appeal to security needs and – when it suits them and despite their general EU-scepticism – invoke the EU, thus creating an image of Muslims as 'dangerous others'. She explains how provocative statements serve as an effective means of attracting and holding public attention, followed by different forms of denial, ambivalent apologies or blame shifting (chapter 3). The revival of nationalism, a (re-)invention of "traditional, parochial, closed nation-states" (p.74), encompasses the construction of national identity and belonging along ethnic, nationalistic and/or religious lines. This entails the construction of 'Us' versus 'Them', the depiction of migrants as parasites threatening the 'fatherland' and the 'mother tongue'. In this logic, protecting the border means protecting the nation, its culture and values. Wodak argues that this exclusionary rhetoric becomes increasingly normalised as established parties try to follow the right-wing populist path in order to retain their voters (chapter 4).

As anti-Semitism cannot be openly expressed, coded language has become the rule. Therefore, Wodak argues, the analysis of verbal expressions should take into account collective memories, ongoing debates, the functions of public interviews and discussions, settings, contexts, etc. She summarises and explains major strategies of blame and denial that are often used by right-wing populist parties and stresses the role conspiracy theories play in victim-perpetrator reversal (chapter 5). Next, the author discusses how the charisma and authenticity of right-wing populist leaders are created. She argues that media play an important role in this process. In this context, charisma is not to be understood as a personality trait but rather as a social construction (chapter 6).

Wodak notes that the gender discourses of right-wing populist movements have been under-researched. She argues that men are the main victims of globalisation and modernisation. Right-wing populist movements nurture hopes that the "old order" can be restored. Accordingly, conservative family values (the dominant father (patriarch), the caring mother, obedient children), homophobia and anti-abortion campaigns are a central part of these movements. Wodak assumes an underlying fear "of both empowered and independent white women as well as women symbolizing the 'Other', namely the veiled Muslim woman as metonym for the 'post-modern stranger'" (p.153). Hence, it could be seen as a *contradictio in adiecto* that, increasingly, women can be found in leadership positions of right-wing populist movements. Wodak explains this in terms of the ambiguous roles women play in right-wing populist discourses. The fear of strangers is "accompanied by a gendered discourse which, on the one hand, appeals to the liberation of women according to Human Rights Conventions and is directed against Muslim women and, on the other hand, restricts women's rights via traditional Christian religious values directed against freedom to choose abortion and to live independent lives" (p.153). Because open racism and anti-Semitism are taboo, Wodak regards chauvinistic nationalism and Islamophobia as "a functionally equivalent ideology," as authoritarianism *sensu* Adorno et al. [2]. She underpins her analysis by providing examples from, among others, the Swiss SVP, the British BNP and the Austrian FPÖ (chapter 7).

Finally, Wodak posits a "Haiderization of Europe" (p.177), an increasing normalisation of xenophobic, anti-Semitic and exclusionary rhetoric, accompanied by corresponding legislation. Right-wing populist movements have become a mainstream political force, with the entire political spectrum moving to the right. For this, the author provides several interrelated explanations: (1) the presence of threatening abstract phenomena like climate change, globalisation or the financial crisis; (2) rising unemployment, poverty, migration, and the growing gap between rich and poor which entail a general discontent; (3) the recurrent efforts of centre-right and centre-left parties to implement demands of right-wing populist parties in order to retain their voters; (4) the media being in a catch-22. If they do not report scandals, they seem to accept them. If they do report them, they help right-wing populists spread their message. Wodak also suggests alternatives to current ways of dealing with right-wing populism: reforms instead of scapegoating, a politics of well-being, developing an inclusive "We" instead of the division between "Us" and "Them," recovering agenda-setting powers in lieu of merely reacting to populists, striving to uphold values, alternative patterns of media reporting and advancing a politics of solidarity (chapter

8).

With her book, Wodak presents a coherent overview and analysis of the current wave of right-wing populist movements and parties. By providing, contextualising and analysing examples of racist and anti-Semitic statements by actors across different countries, she illustrates her central assertions and makes right-wing populist discourses and their inherent logic more tangible for readers.

Although we cannot agree with her claim that the role of gender in right-wing populist movements has been neglected in previous research [3][4][5], it is particularly commendable that Wodak devotes special attention to the aspect of gender in right-wing populist discourses. She not only provides explanations for the presence of women in leading roles, but also highlights how certain parts of emancipatory discourses are (ab)used to create a front against “outsiders,” specifically Muslims.

A glossary at the end of the book lists and briefly describes 27 right-wing movements or parties in Europe and the USA (Tea Party Movement) and thereby provides a comprehensive overview. However, *cum grano salis* only, since it does not always become clear according to what criteria Wodak chose to include certain parties while omitting others. Thus, it is somewhat puzzling that she includes the German right-wing extremist NPD but not the Hungarian Fidesz.

While it must be conceded that, to date, there is no generally agreed-upon definition of right-wing populism, and the boundaries between right-wing populism, traditional right-wing extremism and conservatism are blurred, Wodak does not really resolve this problem. Her definition of right-wing populism “as a political ideology that rejects existing political consensus and usually combines laissez-faire liberalism and anti-elitism” (p.7) is not adequately explained. While she gives reasons for including the element of anti-elitism, she does not explain why she includes laissez-faire liberalism as a definition criterion.

The Austrian *Wissenschaftsbuch des Jahres* award is given to books that present scientific topics to a wide public in a comprehensible and enlightening manner. That it aims at a broader public might explain some minor weaknesses of Wodak’s book, such as the lack of a more comprehensive methodological chapter. Aside from that, her book is not only worth reading, it should be recommended to every reader who is concerned about the current wave of right-wing populism and related developments in society at large.

Stephanie Thiel

Notes

[1] Wodak, R. (2016). *Politik mit der Angst. Zur Wirkung rechtspopulistischer Diskurse*. Wien: Edition Konturen.

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[3] Meret, S. & Siim, B. (2013). *Gender, Populism and Politics of Belonging: Discourses of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Denmark, Norway and Austria*. In: Siim B. & Mokre M. (eds.) *Negotiating Gender and Diversity in an Emergent European Public Sphere*. Gender and Politics Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

[4] Norocel, O.C. (2010). *Romania is a family and it needs a strict father: conceptual metaphors at work in radical right populist discourses*. *Nationalities Papers* 38 (5): 705-721.

[5] Yuval-Davis, N. (1997). *Gender & Nation*. London: Sage.

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