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Konfliktjournalismus II
Conflict Journalism II

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Deutsch Der BDR Aufruhr in den bangladeschischen Medien. Von einer ‚proletarischen Revolution'
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Sahin Sanem & Susan Dente Ross
Deutsch Die unsichere Anwendung von Friedensjournalismus: Der Fall der türkisch-zypriotischen
Presse
English The uncertain application of peace journalism: The case of the Turkish Cypriot press

Rezensionen
Book reviews

English Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan (2011). Why civil resistance works: The strategic
logic of nonviolent conflict. New York: Columbia University Press.

English Stig Arne Nohrstedt (ed.) (2010). Communicating risks. Towards the threat society?
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Kristin Skare Orgeret & Hillol Sobhan
Der BDR Aufruhr in den bangladeschischen Medien. Von einer ‚proletarischen Revolution' zu einem ‚brutalen Massaker'

Der Aufsatz analysiert die Medienberichterstattung über den BDR-Aufruhr in Bangladesch im Februar 2009 und untersucht die journalistischen Prozesse und die Art und Weise, wie die bangladeschischen Medien über den Konflikt berichteten, mit Blick auf die Anwendbarkeit friedensjournalistischer Konzepte in der aktuellen Konfliktberichterstattung. Mittels einer Kombination verschiedener Methoden untersucht der Aufsatz die vorherrschenden Trends der Berichterstattung über den Aufruhr. Die detaillierte Analyse der Berichterstattung dreier Zeitungen zeigt, dass fast zwei Drittel der Berichte den Konflikt auf Gewalt und Gewalttätigkeit reduzierten, während ein Drittel einem Peace-Frame folgte. Interessanterweise hatten sämtliche Editorials einen Peace-Frame. Gestützt auf Ausschnitte aus Interviews mit Journalisten und Redakteuren trägt der Aufsatz zur Diskussion darüber bei, wie Journalisten und Redakteure selbst den Prozess der Konfliktberichterstattung interpretieren und ihn als gegeben hinnehmen oder in Frage stellen.

| Volltext |

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Kristin Skare Orgeret & Hillol Sobhan
The BDR mutiny in Bangladeshi media. From a 'proletarian revolution' to a 'brutal massacre'

The article analyses the media coverage of the BDR mutiny in Bangladesh, February 2009. In examining journalistic processes and how the Bangladeshi media reported the violent conflict, the article looks at how the approaches of peace journalism can be used in actual conflict reporting. Through a combination of methods the article discusses the dominant trends in the news coverage of the mutiny. Studying three newspapers' coverage in detail, it was found that nearly two-thirds of the news reports reduced conflicts to force and violence, while one-third had a 'peace frame'. Interestingly all the editorials analyzed had a 'peace frame'. Presenting excerpts from interviews with journalists and editors, the article talks to the discussion about how journalists and editors themselves interpret, accept or challenge the process of conflict reporting.

| full text |

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Kristin Skare Orgeret & Hillol Sobhan

The BDR mutiny in Bangladeshi media. From a 'proletarian revolution' to a 'brutal massacre'

Kurzfassung: Der Aufsatz analysiert die Medienberichterstattung über den BDR-Aufruhr in Bangladesch im Februar 2009 und untersucht die journalistischen Prozesse und die Art und Weise, wie die bangladeschischen Medien über den Konflikt berichteten, mit Blick auf die Anwendbarkeit friedensjournalistischer Konzepte in der aktuellen Konfliktberichterstattung. Mittels einer Kombination verschiedener Methoden untersucht der Aufsatz die vorherrschenden Trends der Berichterstattung über den Aufruhr. Die detaillierte Analyse der Berichterstattung dreier Zeitungen zeigt, dass fast zwei Drittel der Berichte den Konflikt auf Gewalt und Gewalttätigkeit reduzierten, während ein Drittel einem Peace-Frame folgte. Interessanterweise hatten sämtliche Editorials einen Peace-Frame. Gestützt auf Ausschnitte aus Interviews mit Journalisten und Redakteuren trägt der Aufsatz zur Diskussion darüber bei, wie Journalisten und Redakteure selbst den Prozess der Konfliktberichterstattung interpretieren und ihn als gegeben hinnehmen oder in Frage stellen.

Abstract: The article analyses the media coverage of the BDR mutiny in Bangladesh, February 2009. In examining journalistic processes and how the Bangladeshi media reported the violent conflict, the article looks at how the approaches of peace journalism can be used in actual conflict reporting. Through a combination of methods the article discusses the dominant trends in the news coverage of the mutiny. Studying three newspapers' coverage in detail, it was found that nearly two-thirds of the news reports reduced conflicts to force and violence, while one-third had a 'peace frame'. Interestingly all the editorials analyzed had a 'peace frame'. Presenting excerpts from interviews with journalists and editors, the article talks to the discussion about how journalists and editors themselves interpret, accept or challenge the process of conflict reporting.

1   Introduction and aims

In February 2009, Bangladesh witnessed one of the bloodiest military coups since its independence in 1971[1]. The soldiers from the paramilitary Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) revolted against their commanding officers, on deputation from the Bangladesh Army. The event popularly referred to as *BDR mutiny* took place at the BDR headquarters in the capital Dhaka. The mutineers killed a total of 74 people including 57 army officers[2]. Given the magnitude of the incident the mutiny received huge coverage by print, electronic and online media.

The aim of this article is twofold, as it sets out to explore how the Bangladeshi media covered the incident. The shifting media frames of the coverage during and after the incident will be central to the discussion. In examining journalistic processes and how the Bangladeshi media reported the conflict, the article looks at how the approaches and methods of peace journalism and conflict sensitive reporting can be used in actual conflict reporting. The broader analysis is based on 155 articles related to the mutiny from some of the major newspapers in English, television news from the 25 and 26 of February 2009 and blog material from the same dates from the first and largest Bengali blog: *somewherein*[3]. Secondly the article seeks to dive deeper into a selected amount of material, and more thoroughly identify the war and peace journalism trends in the BDR mutiny coverage by three leading English-language newspapers: *The Daily Star*, the *New Age* and www.bdnews24.com. Building on Johan Galtung's war and peace journalism model (Galtung, 2002) and the discussions the model has incited, the article will through a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods discuss the dominant trends in the news coverage of the BDR mutiny.

Research on war and conflict reporting has often stressed how such journalism constitutes a litmus test of all sorts of reporting and might challenge our perceptions of what the role of a journalist should be (Allan and Zelizer, 2004; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005). An exclusive focus on the manifest content of media representations would, however, not disclose the operation of journalistic agency, or provide any direct evidence of how journalists and editors themselves interpret, accept or challenge the process of conflict reporting. This would be reductive not least because there often is a considerable space between how media scholars write about conflict reporting and how the journalists and editors in the field experience their work. Hence, in this article some journalists' and editors' views and experiences are included in addition to the discussion of media representations[4].

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1.   *Scenarios-Uncertainty lingers in Bangladesh despite mutiny end* by Anis Ahmed, Reuters, Mar 1, 2009
     http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSDHA391723
2.   *BDR probe misses another deadline* bdnews24.com http://bdnews24.com/details.php?id=158948&cid=32
3.   http://www.somewhereinblog.net
4.   Interviews with journalists and editors were conducted in Dhaka in May 2009 and November 2010. Please see appendix for a full list of interviewees.

1.1   The BDR mutiny

Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) is a paramilitary force mainly tasked with guarding the country's borders and assisting the military and police during national emergencies. The BDR follows a unique command structure: the soldiers, known as *jawans*, are directly recruited, whereas their commanding officers are deputed from the Bangladesh Army.

What was to be known as the BDR mutiny broke out at *Pilkhana,* the BDR headquarters, in the center of Dhaka on 25 February 2009 and continued till the following day[1]. On 25 February, the BDR *jawans* and officers gathered at the annual *Darbar* (assembly). At the *Darbar*, in presence of the BDR sector commanders, battalion commanders, and officers from the headquarters, the *jawans* started accusing them of misappropriation from the *Dal-Bhat* (Rice-Lentil) programme, a country-wide initiative to provide people with essential food items at a lower-than-market price. These allegations apparently led to altercation and the mutiny sparked shortly after 9 am. The armed *jawans* took control of the armory, held the officers and their families hostage and the entire BDR headquarters was under siege for the following more than thirty hours. On the first day the firing continued until 2 pm with breaks. Within an hour after the *jawans* took over, heavily equipped army personnel from the Dhaka cantonment reached the spot and took positions around the BDR Headquarters. However, they still could not enter the compound and waited for government's directives. In the afternoon of 25 February, government envoys held talk with the rebels to break the siege, but without progress. Later on that day a group of rebels met with Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina who promised them general amnesty and asked them to give in. This announcement momentarily tranquilized the situation and a number of hostages were released soon after. However, the team that negotiated with the PM apparently failed to get the message across and the siege continued till the next day. In the meantime, rebellion at battalions and outposts in different parts of the country were also reported. On the second afternoon (26 February), the Prime Minister through a televised speech urged the *jawans* to surrender and warned of tough actions if they failed to comply. Shortly after her speech, the army tanks and military vehicles began to close in and the situation further intensified. This ostensibly intimidated the rebel soldiers and finally they laid down their arms and many managed to flee the headquarters. It still remains an open question as to how a couple of thousand soldiers fled the 'surrounded' compound at that stage. With the mutineers' surrender, the more than 30 hours mutiny finally came to an end. A total of 150 hostages including women, children and 34 officers were rescued from the BDR premises. Eventually, Police and Armed Police Battalion took charge of the BDR headquarters and its armory. The day after the mutiny ended, a full-fledged rescue and recovery operation was launched to trace out the unknown number of missing BDR officers including the Chief, Major General Shakil Ahmed. In the afternoon, the bodies of 45 slain army officers were found in a mass grave and more dead bodies of officers were recovered from in and around the headquarters. In the end, the death toll stood at 74 including 57 army officers making it one of the most gruesome military coups in the history of Bangladesh. The extent of violence still to a large degree remains shrouded in mystery.

More than a year after the mutiny, on 27 May 2010, the government published a formal investigation report on the BDR mutiny suggesting that it was instigated by "unidentified" masterminds who cashed on the issues of deprivation of the BDR soldiers. The report states, "the main motive of the mutiny was to break the BDR's chain of command . . . expose BDR and army to a conflicting state, cause an overall damage to army, destabilize the newly elected government, endanger Bangladesh's internal security and stability." However, the Chairman of the investigation committee acknowledged that the real causes and objectives behind the mutiny could not be clearly identified and further investigation was imperative. Furthermore the report strongly criticizes the role of the media, and private television channels in particular, during and after the BDR rebellion.[2]

In November 2009, the government formed six special courts to try about 3500 border guards accused in 40 cases around the country. At the time of writing this article (February 2011), the rebel *jawans* are being tried in different military courts, which triggers controversy as the BDR members are not part of the military.

1.2   Bangladesh's media landscape

Despite its constitution of 1972, where Article 39 guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression of every citizen, and the Right to Information Act of 2009, which ensures "free flow of information and people's right to information"[3], Bangladesh still has a long way to go when it comes to press freedom. The country ranked 126 out of 178 countries in the

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1.   The following overview of the event is based on a reading of many different media versions and discussed with journalists and editors too. It is of course problematic to base the background of an analysis of the media on facts taken from the media, but the authorsof this article believe that they have reached a rather 'neutral' description of the incident here, as a common description one-and-a-half year after it took place.

2.   *Defiance, deprivation led to BDR mutiny: Probe report* the Financial Express 28 May 2010
      http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/2009/05/28/67951.html

3.   Ministry of Information, Bangladesh Govt. http://www.moi.gov.bd/RTI/RTI_English.pdf

World Press Freedom Index 2010[1] by the Reporters without Borders.

Television is the most-popular medium in Bangladesh with more than 60 million viewers (Rahman 2009: 5). Bangladesh Television (BTV), the only state-owned and terrestrial channel covers 93% of the country's population through 15 relay stations. There are also 13 privately owned satellite channels. Apart from the only state-run radio channel *Bangladesh Betar*, a number of FM radio channels have been launched in recent years. When it comes to daily newspaper, around 20-22 daily newspapers are published regularly[2]. Unlike TV and radio, all newspapers in Bangladesh are privately-owned with *Prothom Alo*, *Ittefaq*, *Jugantor*, *Kaler Kantho, Amader Shomoy* etc. being some of the popular Bengali ones. On the other hand, the English-language dailies e.g. *The Daily Star*, the *New Age*, www.bdnews24.com, *The Financial Express, the Bangladesh Today,* are quite popular among educated urban readership. Most major Bengali and English-language dailies have online versions as well. Bangladesh has 2 million internet users as of November 2010. The further potential for electronic media is considered enormous, as there are 68.65 million mobile phone users in Bangladesh[3] and people working in the digital media sphere expect a 'revolution' when people start to use internet on their mobile phones (interviews, Dhaka, 2010).

The blogosphere is increasingly becoming important in Bangladesh. *Somewherein* is the first and largest Bangla blog community in the world. It was started in 2005 and rapidly turned out to be a flagship within electronic communication in Bangladesh. The blog community has worked to bring the Bengali language to internet[4] and today the blog community has 60 thousand Bengali bloggers The front page is organized around the latest 15 blogs, in addition the monitors can choose the topics they highlight and keep on top on the first page, hence they undertake editorial work as well (interview, Chowdhury, 2010).

2   Peace journalism and conflict sensitive reporting

2.1   Peace journalism

Peace journalism stems from the work of Johan Galtung and seeks to counter the established journalistic practices of war journalism. Peace journalism, Galtung (2002) argues, attempts to depolarize by showing all sides and de-escalate violence through a process of peace and conflict resolution. In recent years the term 'peace journalism' has been developed further, for instance by Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick:

„Peace journalism is when editors and reporters make choices, about what to report and how to report it, which create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value the non-violent, developmental responses to conflict" (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005: 5).

Peace journalism as opposed to the established practices of war journalism demands contextualization of a conflict. It suggests the reporter should refrain from mere event coverage on violence and delve deep into the root causes of the conflict in order to find possible peaceful long-term resolutions (Galtung, 2002). According to the peace journalism model, an important task is to report in relation to the context and historical issues in the conflict area, identifying 'its history, recent causes and internal composition' (Francis in Lynch 2007: 8). Peace journalism is hence a more complex and time consuming process of gathering information, providing a wide range of balanced facts to analyse and propose possible solutions. As several scholars have pointed out, this is where one of the main challenges to peace journalism lies, as most mainstream media face constraints in relation to time and resources (e.g. Hanitzsch, 2007; Loyn, 2003). The peace journalism paradigm has met harsh criticism from active journalists and editors criticizing the 'prescriptive' nature of peace journalism (e.g. Hanitzsch, 2007; Loyn, 2007). Some would argue that when put in a proper perspective there is no real contradiction between serious quality journalism as such and working with a peace perspective in reporting. It is interesting that many of the strongest critics to peace journalism both argue that it is incoherent with the integrity of journalism and at the same time that it 'is already there in the outfit of good journalism' (Hanitzsch, 2007; Loustarinen, 2002). The proponents of 'good quality journalism', insisting on what Loyn (2007) refers to as training on better 'emotional literacy', are in many ways talking the same language as the proponents for peace journalism. One main difference might be that many of the critics of peace journalism still highlight the need for objectivity and 'reporting the world as it is' (Loyn, 2003). This is at loggerheads with an increasing body of literature the last years showing how objectivity itself might be a relative term (e.g. Schudson, 1978 and 1997; Allan and Zelizer, 2004).

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1.   http://www.rsf.org/IMG/CLASSEMENT_2011/GB/C_ASIA_GB.pdf
2.   Internews *Bangladesh* http://www.internews.org/regions/mena/amr/bangladesh.pdf
3.   Bangladesh Telecom Regulatory Commission (December 2010)
       http://www.btrc.gov.bd/newsandevents/mobile_phone_subscribers/mobile_phone_subscribers_december_2010.php
4.   *Somewherein* introduced the first Bengali keyboard. When they started in 2005 there were only around 75 bloggers in the entire country operating on individual platforms. *Somewherein* contacted each of them personally by email and invited them to the new blog. Everybody accepted the invitation. From 2007 it is possible to send a message to the net and join the conversation on a specific topic.

Some of Galtung's central concepts on conflict analysis are presented in a table (Galtung, 2002), which has become a conventional reference within the field of war and peace journalism. The table (see Annex-1) is based on the dichotomy between peace/conflict journalism on the one side and war/violence journalism on the other. The four different axes of this table, namely Peace/conflict versus war/violence orientated; Truth versus propaganda orientated; People versus elite-orientated and Solution version victory orientated will serve as inspiration for the following discussion. The recent contributions to the field further indicate that the peace journalism idea has been able to include some of the major criticisms against it, and redefined some of its core arguments. Lynch for instance emphasizes, "Conflict reporting does not have to include all the elements called for in the Galtung table if it is to be regarded as peace journalism" (Lynch, 2007: 10). He continues "if peace journalism is about creating opportunities for society to consider and to value non-violent conflict responses, then that ought to be enough". Peace journalism is supposed to be "an alternative journalistic programme where the idea is to escape from the war propaganda trap of symbolically constructing armed conflicts as polarized, black and white, zero-sum games" (Nohrstedt and Ottosen, 2008: 13). This approach has a lot in common with the school of conflict-sensitive reporting, where the central concept is that violent conflict attracts intense news media attention that requires greater analytical depth and skills to report on it without contributing to further violence or overlooking peace building opportunities (Howard, 2009).

2.2   Frames in the news

It is the argument of this article that it makes sense to use Galtung's dichotomies in combination with some of the central notions from framing theories. The concepts of *frames* and *framing* have increasingly gained popularity in journalism studies the last years as a way of analyzing media production, media content and media impact (Iyengar, 1991; de Vreese, 2002; Entman, 2004; Reese, 2003). The core idea is that frames are needed to organize fragmentary items of experience or information and promote a certain understanding of a phenomenon. In the words of Stephen D. Reese frames are:

"*organizing* principles that are *socially shared* and *persistent* over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully *structure* the social world" (Reese, 2003: 11, original emphasis).

A frame is hence not only a question of choosing the adequate description of an event or development, but rather a question of the value given to the element in question, with implications of how the actual society should treat it.

The approach in the first part of this article is inductive in nature and analyses the news stories on the BDR mutiny without *a priori* defined news frames in mind, to explore what 'issue-specific frames' (de Vreese, 2002) the news stories about the BDR event used. The second part of the article looks into a selection of news stories using a rather deductive approach, investigating frames that are defined and operationalised prior to the analysis, namely the 'peace frame' and the 'war frame' based on Galtung's table referred to above.

In order to determine 'war frame', and 'peace frame', 11 variables for each category were developed, built on Galtung's table (Annex-1). All 22 variables were applied to every news item and a score of 1 was given against each variable present in that particular news item. In the end, the total score was counted and a news item either fell under 'war frame' or 'peace frame' whichever score was higher. In some cases the scores leveled and the news item was considered having a 'neutral frame' (see e.g. Lee and Maslog, 2005).

The frames prime the audience members' responses by activating associations between the information highlighted in the text and concepts already stored in their schema systems (Reese, 2003: 28). The frames with the greatest potential for influence, Robert Entman argues, "use words and images highly salient in the culture, which is to say *noticeable, memorable* and *emotionally charged*" (2004: 6). Hence Entman explicitly includes visual images. Rune Ottosen (2007) argues that the visual aspects of journalism often are underestimated and that more focus should be given to such aspects in the concept of peace journalism. Images both live and still are given some attention in this present analysis, as they constitute an important part of the explanation of how the Bangladeshi media framed the news from the so-called BDR mutiny.

3   Framing the event

3.1   The Proletarian Revolution frame

The news about BDR mutiny first broke in the Bangladeshi blogosphere:

„The news broke on *Somewherein* only some 45 minutes after the mutiny started, at around 10 am the 25 February. It was a big chance to collect the very first information from the blog. From a news point of view the first half of the day was very smoky. What was clear was that something very unusual was happening. The discussions really started in *Somewherein* at 10:30 am. After that the first media to respond was television. Private TV channels rushed to the spot but could not go far into the hot zone. Live telecast started around 11-11:30 am. There were many un-confirmed news in the air and in *Somewherein*. That the head of BDR was killed, that many officers were kidnapped ..." (Interview, Chowdhury, 2010)

For the first day and at least half of the second it was difficult for most people to actually make sense of what was going on at the BDR Headquarters. Adding to the uncertainty the newly elected government refused to comment on the situation until the afternoon of the second day. Here the blogosphere became important. During the first day, 25 February 2009, the Bangladeshi media were full of reports that showed how increasing frustration among the border guards over unfulfilled demands and anger over the lifestyle of their seniors from the army led to the mutiny in Pilkhana. This media frame was rebellion centered and focused on the suffering of the BDR men that had led to the mutiny.

Due to 'zero-access' to the headquarters the *jawans* were the primary source of information for the media as to why this mutiny had broken out in the first place and what was happening inside the compound. Therefore, the reasons justified by the *jawans* behind the mutiny received slanted coverage in many national dailies that often sympathised with the 'mutiny causes' and provided for what this article will refer to as the 'Proletarian Revolution' frame. One of the journalists who was to play a core role in this drama, Munni Saha[1] from ATN Bangla, describes this particular morning:

„I reached my office at 9.30 in the morning, after the news came in, I kept calling the spot since I was in charge of news management, but I couldn't get any information. I thought of my viewers, of their dissatisfaction because of the lack of information. People could see the helicopters flying overhead, they could hear the sound of gunshots; they could see that the army had surrounded the BDR Headquarters. There was tremendous anxiety, rumors were flying wildly, there was a near complete lack of factual information, and this was bound to create further panic, to feed grist to the rumor-mill. Till 10 we had thought that the gunshots were because of the BDR parade, but from 11 onwards, that idea was shattered. Rumors and SMSs were flying around wildly each contradicted the earlier one. What were we to make of the situation? What *was* happening? And, for god's sake, why?" (Interview, Saha, 2010)

Shortly after, Munni Saha decided to go to the place of action where she was able to conduct one of the most praised and controversial interviews with the *jawans*. Saha received lots of credit for her interviews not least because she put herself in a highly vulnerable situation joining the excited BDR rebels without any kind of protection in a very unpredictable situation.

„I couldn't tell where the BDR soldiers had positioned themselves but they seemed to be firing at the army. My camera person and I got footage of the scene, half-crouching, for fear of bullets. As we were sitting there, one of the men from the crowd of curious people who had gathered there, called out, `Apa, why don't you try to get in? I'm sure you can manage.' Now this was something that no reporter in his or her right mind would not attempt, of course, as long as you didn't think about the risks involved...about death. I knew that Taposh[2] was trying to enter the headquarters, but was not succeeding. Not even with a white flag. And it was still not known whether the Prime Minister would declare an amnesty or not. So I thought, if I can manage to get in and speak to them, if I can gain their confidence and help convey what they want from the government, if it helps in any small way to resolve the crisis that would definitely be a good thing. And of course, since we didn't know about the brutal killings inside, it made sense to call it a `*bidroho'* (mutiny), to call them our `brothers', to plead with them to sit for negotiations with the government." (Interview, Saha, 2010)

The private television stations served as what Tumber and Webster have called 'frontline definers of reality' (2007: 70), and were to a large degree used to send messages live from the rebels to the public and the leading politicians during this first period of the incident. They also became crucial in defining the frame of the first phase of the event. Most of the attention during this first period was given to the disparities between the BDR personnel and the army officers, and the incident was to a large degree seen as a (quite understandable) revolt. The 'Proletarian Revolution' frame explained how the BRD *jawans* revolted because they had been suffering for long: over pay, rations, corruption among their superiors and lack of opportunities.

On ATN Bangla, a BDR *jawan* wearing helmet and speaking behind a window, his face covered, stated that the BDR personnel wanted to speak to the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and that she would have to declare amnesty for them and meet their demands. "Otherwise we will not stop the war!" he declared. Another BDR *jawan* told the private television station Bangla Vision that they would talk to the government delegates if they entered the BDR compound through the third gate. On the 25th afternoon, a BDR *jawan* telephoned from inside the besieged headquarters in Pilkhana and was allowed to express his grievances on air on Bangla Vision. He told the viewers that the needs and aspirations of the paramilitary border guards had always been neglected by their commanding officers from the army and were never conveyed to the highest authorities. The angry *jawan* continued that the BDR personnel now had realized that their fate was not going to change after the new Awami League government had taken over. What appeared to have been the most frustrating was army control, since the BDR administration and nearly all its officers are from the army. In the words of one *jawan*, "We are not against the nation, or the Government. We want that the BDR should belong to the BDR" (Bangla Vision, 25 February 2009).

The 'Proletarian Revolution 'frame was supported univocally by the media and facilitated by interviews with rebels in masks who were allowed to talk almost uninterruptedly on several television stations broadcasting live from the premises. The

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1. Munni Saha is considered a leading female TV journalist, often referred to as one of the representatives of the first generation of TV reporters as private television started in Bangladesh.
2. Fazle Noor Taposh, Member of Parliament

labels used within the 'Proletarian Revolution' frame were 'angry and aggrieved' BDR soldiers, rebel soldiers. The news stories gave the background story to a certain degree and focused quite a lot on non-elite sources.

Within the 'Proletarian Revolution' frame, a wide range of such stories showed how increasing frustration among the border guards over unfulfilled demands and anger over the lifestyle of their seniors from the army led to the mutiny in Pilkhana. The soldiers expressed grievances to the media over poor pays and benefits, discrimination and repression by the BDR (army) officers, restrictions on joining the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission abroad, inadequate allocation of food rations, corruption, and irregularities by the BDR top brass. They also demanded the withdrawal of army officers from the BDR's chain of command. Simultaneously, the blogosphere was functioning both as amplifier and inflector of the news. The continuous discussions, not least in the blogosphere, commented upon the television news as they evolved.

„In the first day, the BDR soldiers were represented as heroes, if not as the "revolutionists". At about 3 pm we saw the first interview with revolutionists with covered faces. Munni Saha, the ATN Bangla reporter went close to the gate of the hot zone to get the interview. This short interview was repeatedly shown on TV. We also saw the political leaders who tried to make a dialogue with the revolutionists. They were trying, but the firing remained. At 5 pm a more close approach was shown, as they tried to go in with a white flag to negotiate. So far there had been no formal statement from the government about what really was happening. We saw the overview shots from different rooftops but no close up or clear view." (Interview, Chowdhury, 2010)

Munni Saha's interview clearly shows how eager the mutineers were to talk. The agitated BDR men fought for attention, and for more than four minutes twenty seconds several of them were allowed to talk without much interruption. Saha did ask a few questions e.g. about casualties and the whereabouts of the officers, trying to direct the news story, but nobody really responded to that. The BDR personnel were mostly delivering their demands and complaints. Some of the mutineers had their faces partly covered by orange scarves and these images become emblematic visuals of the 'Proletarian Revolution' frame, both in the live television reports, on internet and in the printed press during the first period of the revolt. In retrospective, the ATN Bangla interviews were also the ones receiving most criticism.

„It was a most frightening situation, the nation's borders were unprotected, bodies of army officers were being recovered; we didn't know how many had survived, what had happened to their family members. Instead of pointing out these things, senior media persons went on air, they started apologizing for the role of the media. They started saying that we should not have uttered the word 'mutiny', we should not have wanted to hear what the soldiers had to say, things like that. As a media person, I think I should be asking the nation's forgiveness for this, this was highly irresponsible. From 26th night, some senior journalists went on air, spouting things like these, like puppets being pulled on strings." (Interview, Saha 2010)

Without doubt to identify the 'history, recent causes and internal composition' (Francis in Lynch 2007: 8) of the crisis was most difficult, if not impossible as the BDR conflict broke out. Many of the journalists and editors interviewed described the situation as one similar to 'the fog of war' (Interviews 2009, 2010). The then Head of News at ATN Bangla[1], Monjurul Ahsan Bulbul told in an interview that the ATN Bangla did not segment their topics along the lines of peace journalism:

„There is a lack of considering non-violent responses to a conflict in the reports. This is not really the fault of the reporters, but rather of people like me – the editors. I think there is a need to include courses in the curriculum for journalists that focus on less drama driven news. At the same time this was a big dramatic event and it was covered as such." (Interview, Bulbul, 2009)

Drawing on conflict analysis, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005: 42) emphasise the need of mapping a conflict in order to explore what kinds of goals the parties to a conflict have. They argue that members of the press should detect the real needs of parties to a conflict, not only their fears and positions. To unravel the real goals they believe it is essential to keep asking the parties why they want what they say they want. After the BDR incidents, the television journalists hardly discussed or defended their positions during the more than 30 hours in any public forum[2]. Whether this was due to directives from the channels or any pressure is not clear.

Nevertheless, some of the interviewees held that the media coverage especially the first day of the Pilkhana crisis did add fuel to the fire. Nohrstedt (2009: 84) stresses how "media and journalists have gained an increasingly central position due to developments in media technology such as satellite TV channel broadcasting 24/7 news so rapidly that it is possible to report live from a combat zone". This was exactly what happened during the first stage of the BDR incident when the television stations broadcast live from the conflict zone and when bloggers played the role of witnesses. Nobody was prepared for the BDR incident and the speed of live reporting may certainly make the sensitivity towards conflict more difficult. Some of the journalists and editors from the printed press expressed in interviews that the time delay and the process of editing a newspaper give you time to reflect and digest the material. This is of course a dimension that is lost with the development of internet papers. Especially ATN Bangla, the first satellite television of Bangladesh was criticised for making drama out of the BDR case. Several of the newspaper editors stressed how the BDR incident was not handled well from the side of the

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1. As of February 2011, with Boishaki TV, a private TV channel
2. Munni Saha is somehow an exception here, as she has been given interviews and participated in conferences explaining her experiences covering the BDR case.

electronic media:

„I blame the media for having gone crazy at the first stage of the coverage. In a war you have to get there the fastest with the most if you want to win the battle. Bringing in reporters there and putting them on live they forgot the ideal of objectivity. The journalists were of course not prepared for this to happen." (Interview, Khan, *The Daily Star,* 2009)

„The BDR case was not a conflict it was a mutiny. It was not handled properly from the electronic media side. From the newspapers side it was a bit better. The mutineers should not have been allowed to talk to the media. The story was very biased. We had no formal government statements in 24 hours. The only voice you got was the mutineers', they were on the screens in uniforms and with their arms. There is an acute shortage of good journalists in Bangladesh." (Interview, Alam, *The Independent,* 2009)

ATN Bangla reporter Munni Saha, explained the situation from a different angle:

„As we all know, the BDR soldiers were armed, Pilkhana grounds was under their control. It was not possible to storm the compound with the help of tanks and cannons. Therefore, in that context, what was urgent was to gain their trust, to speak to their leaders, or those who were directing them, to try and gain their confidence, to make them think they have public support, the media's support, to work towards softening their attitude, to persuade them to sit for negotiations, to get them to agree to the Prime Minister's proposals -- if these were the reasons, I have no problems with that. I think it was the correct thing to do." (Interview, Saha, 2010)

According to Galtung's peace journalism table (please see Annex-1), peace/conflict journalism would look beyond the manifest violence towards a broader context of conflict formation where resolutions may be found. It is important to remember that the journalistic process does not start when the journalists arrive at the scene of manifest conflict, as in the case of the BRD mutiny. The explanations for the violence are to be found also in the history and culture, and a wide spectrum of investigative journalism. For instance the accusations of corruption among the army could have led to uncovering and prevented the conflict to become so violent. It should be noted that some Bangladeshi journalists had covered the corruption stories in relation to the *Dal-Bhat* programme under the caretaker regime the year before, and this perhaps had served as a broader opening to a larger conflict formation in line with the ideal of the peace/conflict side of Galtung's dichotomy.

This is closely related to what Iyenagar (1991) in his approach to framing theory argues when saying that news reports may be analyzed by their thematic or episodic content. Thematic news places events in a broader context of related events. In general, thematic news does better at informing citizens. Episodic framing merely provides snapshots of an issue, with any explanations based on sensational or emotional appeals. Where the coverage within the 'Proletarian Revolution Frame' failed fatally according to both general theories of peace journalism and Galtung's table (see Annex-1), is when it comes to 'giving voice to all parties' and 'uncover cover-ups'. However the editor of one of the largest Bengali newspaper in Bangladesh *Amader Shomoy,* would not give in to all the criticism that came in retrospective:

„The BDR incident was not covered in a completely wrong way. We went in with cameras and the BDR *jawans* did not lie – they did not justify themselves, they were telling their truth. The question that came after of course was that what many journalists did not ask in the initial hours: What happened to the generals? We must remember that this is the very first time anything like this happened in the area of television in Bangladesh. If you watch the television news from the first two days nobody was critical." (Interview, Khan, *Amader Shomoy,* 2009)

3.2   Change of frame: 'A Brutal Massacre' frame

The change of frame started in the middle of the night in the blogosphere and was fulfilled in the general media during the second day of the mutiny (26 February). Throughout the 26th, the general media increasingly focused on how panic was spreading among ordinary people in the streets of Dhaka as the mutiny went on. There was a visual shift in focus on the television coverage from the BDR *jawans* to the huge crowd of anxious relatives who gathered outside the Pilkhana compound, telling media their personal stories about the loved ones being inside the gates. When the bodies of army officers who had been killed and dumped in sewage canals were shown on television and internet, and later in the printed newspapers, the shift of frame was total. Then a mass grave containing 38 dead bodies was discovered in the compound and a real sense of horror set in and pervaded the general media coverage. The 'Proletarian Revolution' frame disappeared extremely quickly from the Bangladeshi media scene and the new frame that this article refers to as 'A Brutal Massacre' took over. On the internet and television the change was most sudden and remarkable.

Such an extreme and abrupt change of media frame reminds us what framing really is about. At the same time, the definition of a frame is somewhat challenged here in terms of the time span as the 'Proletarian Revolution' frame only lived for about a day and a night. It is argued that to "frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (Entman, 1993: 52).

In the new 'Brutal Massacre' frame the focus was on the 'heroic officers' and their suffering wives and children. In grim opposition to the *jawans* who now were labeled 'the killers' and 'murderous troops' conducting acts described as 'carnage', 'killing spree', 'bloody massacre', 'brutal massacre', and 'barbaric acts'. As part of the rhetoric shift, the incidence was now

referred to as 'the Pilkhana tragedy' or 'attack'. As the second day went on there was increasingly less room for nuances in the portrayals of neither 'the heroes', nor 'the inhumane murderers' in the media.

Rune Ottosen has showed (1995: 97) how *giving name to evil-doers* enemy images that are obstacles to analytical jour-nalism are created. The example also shows how the public's sympathy and empathy changed along with which side it felt it could trust and wanted to support. The discursive distinction between 'worthy' and 'unworthy' victims that Stig Arne Nohrstedt has described (2009: 97) was very clear within the 'Evil Massacre' media frame[1]. Some BDR *jawans* had been killed too, but these men or their suffering families were not treated as 'worthy victims' in the media coverage at all. Several explanations were now presented along the lines of a conspiracy and pre-planned revolt to demolish the Bangladesh army.

The shift also represented a sudden criticism against the first media frame and the media that had covered the incident so far:

„...from the 26th night things changed drastically. There was a total reversal. The media was held to be responsible for what had happened – its news reporting was to blame, speaking to the rebels was to blame. And it is this *reversal* that I consider to be `irresponsible.' I had repeatedly said at the time that we don't know what has happened inside the Pilkhana campus, how many people have died, how many officers have been killed, we had no idea that looting that had taken place inside -- we knew next to nothing." (Interview, Saha, 2010)

Even though the Bangladeshi media in general applied both the 'Proletarian Revolution' and 'Brutal Massacre' frames in a rather unison manner, *The Daily Star* stood out as more nuanced or careful in the exercise of both frames. During the first 'Revolution' frame *The Daily Star* seems to be to be only newspaper that put "angry and aggrieved" BDR soldiers in brackets (25 February, internet version). Interestingly the change of frame and accompanying rhetoric alteration was also less re-markable within *The Daily Star* where, even during the month of March 2009, when other news desks hauled violent de-scriptions of the BDR soldiers, *The Daily Star* in a more temperate manner stuck to descriptions as 'BDR personnel', 'rebels', 'BDR men' and still mostly used the term 'mutiny' to describe the incident. The term 'bloody mutiny' was used (10 March) however, but compared to other media the labeling of the event was more sober.

4   A closer look into three newspapers' coverage of the BDR mutiny

4.1   A quantitative approach

In this part of the article we take a closer look into three newspapers' coverage of the BDR case. The findings are based on an in depth study of a total of 310 news items e.g. reports, editorials, feature articles on the BDR event published during the first week of the mutiny[2] by the three leading Bangladeshi English-language dailies - *The Daily Star*[3], the *New Age*[4], and www.bdnews24.com[5].

In order to determine the desired sample, systematic random sampling was used by selecting every 4th unit from the pop-ulation (*N*) of 310 units (Neuendorf, 2002). However, given the significance of the very first news items from the three newspapers, they were also included. The quantitative analysis was done on a final sample (*n*) of 80 "units of analysis" (Deacon et al. 1999: 118). Out of the total 80 stories (*n*), 70 were reports (87.5%); 2 were feature articles (2.5%) and 8 were editorials (10%). The majority of the stories - a total of 75 stories (93.75%) - were produced based on the newspa-pers' own sources while only 5 stories (6.25%) were based on national news agencies' sources. No international news agen-cy sources were found quoted in any of the three newspapers stressing the national frame of the event.

When it comes to the use of sources, the findings show that military and law enforcing agencies were the highest quoted sources (38.04%), followed by political sources (35.87%) as shown in Table 1.1 below. Ordinary people were not used much as sources.

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1.   Also several months after the incident there was very little media focus on the families of the BDR men. Many BDR *jawans* were in prison without their families knowing anything about whether they were dead or alive.
2.   The period slightly varies between the newspapers e.g. in the case of *The Daily Star* and the *New Age* the period spans from 26 February to 4 March while the time period for the www.bdnews24.com stretches from 25 February to 3 March. As the mutiny broke out on 25 February, the 'regular' newspapers had their first coverage on the following day i.e. 26 February whereas www.bdnews24.com being the online daily could publish news in 'real-time' starting from 25 February.
3.   *The Daily Star*, launched in 1991, is the highest circulated English newspaper in Bangladesh (http://www.thedailystar.net/aboutus.htm)
4.   The *New Age*, launched in 2003, has the second largest circulation, given the fact that the second largest English daily The Finan-cial Express focuses entirely on business and economics (http://www.newagebd.com/2009/oct/09/nat.html)
5.   The first online English-language newspaper launched in 2005 with no printed edition (http://www.bdnews24.com/about.php?cna=ABOUT%20US)

Sl.	Source by Social Category	Frequency	Percentage
1.	Political	33	35.87
2.	Military and Law Enforcing Agencies	35	38.04
3.	Civil Society	3	3.26
4.	Ordinary people	9	9.78
5	Others	12	13.04
	Total	92	99.99

Table 1: Sources by social category

Out of the 80 stories (n), 47 stories (58.58%) had 'war frame' whereas 25 stories (31.31%) carried 'peace frame', and the other 8 stories (10.01%) had 'neutral frame'. The dominant trend was definitely 'war frame' across the three dailies.

The highest number of what this article defines as 'war frame' was from the www.bdnews24.com with 17 stories (62.96% of the paper's totality of BDR stories), followed by *The Daily Star* that carried 17 stories as well (58.62% of the paper's totality of stories) while the *New Age* had 13 stories in this category (54.17% of the paper's totality of stories).

There could be two immediate reasons behind the highest number of 'war frame' stories on www.bdnews24.com. First, this is an online newspaper which allowed them to publish and update stories in 'real time' and the reports obviously focused on the events taking place in the "conflict arena" (Galtung, 2002). Secondly, www.bdnews24.com did not carry any editorials on the issue. In fact this online daily does not publish editorials. Given the findings from the other two dailies where, as we will see in the following, all the editorials were peace-oriented, it can be argued that perhaps the introduction of editorial pieces could have affected/reduced the number of war journalism stories on this online newspaper and also the entire impression the reader is left with when reading a newspaper.

In terms of peace journalism stories, *The Daily Star* had the highest with a total of 11 stories (37.93% of the paper's totality of stories), closely followed by the *New Age* which had 9 stories (37.50% of the paper's totality of stories) and www.bdnews24.com with 5 stories (18.52% of the paper's totality of stories). The findings, especially from *The Daily Star* and the *New Age* look quite promising and deserve further investigation as to what the motives and decisions were behind such coverage.

A hint might be found in an interview with the editor of *The Daily Star*, Mahfuz Anam (Dhaka, May 2009). Anam told that he truly believed that process journalism was important for good reporting. Using the climate change as an example, Anam stressed the need for process journalism at the expense of the more traditional journalistic event reporting. Without wanting to use the concept of peace journalism, he described how the two most important things in the 18 years of creating and leading the largest English newspaper in Bangladesh was the people perspective and process journalism.

With regards to neutral framing www.bdnews24.com had the highest: 5 stories (18.52%), the *New Age* had 2 (8.33%) and *The Daily Star* had 1 (3.45%). As evident from the findings, the neutral stories had very low presence compared to war or peace journalism frames.

War frame indicators: Frequency Percentage

The four salient indicators of 'war frame' in the three newspapers were reactive (23.12%), elite-oriented (16.47%), focus on conflict arena (15.60%), and focus on visible effects of violence (12.13%).

	War journalism indicators	Frequency	Percentage
1.	Focus on conflict arena	54	15.60
2.	Two party orientation	20	5.78
3.	Partisan approach	18	5.20
4.	Zero-sum perspective	16	4.62
5.	Differences-orientated	30	8.67
6.	Reactive	80	23.12
7.	Focus on visible effect of violence	42	12.13
8.	Propaganda-orientated	18	5.20
9	Elite-orientated	57	16.47
10	Victory orientated	11	3.17
11.	Stops reporting and leaves after war	00	00
	Total	346	100.00

Table 2: War frame indicators in the three newspapers

Peace frame Indicators: Frequency Percentage

The four salient indicators of 'peace frame' in the three newspapers were: truth-oriented (18.61%), non-partisan approach (18.61%), stays on to report in the aftermath of war (15.00%), and multiparty orientation (9.09%).

	Peace Journalism Indicators	Frequency	Percentage
1.	Focus on root causes and consequences	24	7.20
2.	Multiparty orientation	30	9.09
3.	Non-partisan approach	62	18.61
4.	Win-win orientation	21	6.30
5.	Agreement-orientated	23	6.90
6.	Proactive	0	0.00
7.	Focus on invisible effects of violence	23	6.90
8.	Truth-orientated	62	18.61
9	People-orientated	13	3.90
10	Solution-orientated	25	7.50
11.	Stays on to report in the aftermath of war	50	15.00
	Total	333	100.00

Table 3: Peace frame indicators in the three newspapers

Arguably one of the most interesting findings when looking into the two printed newspapers is that as opposed to reports and feature articles, the editorials had unique characteristic. All of the analyzed editorials (8 out of 8) from the two newspapers had peace journalism framing. The finding is indeed interesting and calls for further investigation in order to reveal what had prompted the same newspapers to carry peace journalism editorials while both the dailies had dominant war journalism trends in their reports.

One explanation could be that editorials allow journalists more freedom and time to reflect on and investigate into a particular issue. Given this comparative advantage, as opposed to day-to-day reporting, perhaps the peace-oriented journalists used the editorial platform to express their 'true feelings' and counter-balance the 'traditional' war reporting. However, a formal investigation into the matter could uncover as to what prompted them to adopt such framing in the editorials. The findings could certainly be utilised and perhaps infused into day-to-day reporting towards promoting peace oriented coverage.

4.2   A closer look on one article: 'Mutiny, bloodshed at BDR HQ'

In the following we will focus on one specific news article in the analyzed material, which contrary to the dominant trend presented a mixture of war and peace journalism elements. To illustrate how meaning is constructed, this highly polysemic (Hall 1980: 134) article is analyzed with a range of semiotic tools and techniques. The semiotic findings are then put into the war and peace journalism model (Galtung 2002) in order to determine the trends of the headline, subheading, photographs and captions[1].

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1.   It should be noted here that we have drawn suggestive lines on the photograph to help readers understand the compositional aspects and their connotations. However, the lines are not necessarily mathematically precise; rather they give an impression of the presence of invisible/imaginary lines in any given photographic composition.

Mutiny, bloodshed at BDR HQ

Photo caption: BDR men wait at the gate of their Pilkhana headquarters in the capital for a negotiation team yesterday afternoon. Awami League lawmaker from Gaibandha-2 constituency Mahbub Ara Gini braves fear and heads towards the gate carrying a white flag, a symbol of peace.
Source: The Daily Star 26 February 2009 Front Page, viewable at http://edailystar.com/index.php?opt=view&page=1&date=2009-02-26 (accessed 24 November 2010)

The horizontally spread, full-page headline 'Mutiny, bloodshed at BDR HQ' belongs to a first lead news item of the daily from 26 February. At the very onset, this visually dominating 'banner' headline in red, right below the masthead (masthead not visible here), connotes a paradigm of an eerie feeling of danger, threat, and alarm etc. and immediately tends to grab readers' attention. The signifiers 'mutiny' and 'bloodshed' connote the whole paradigm of war, conflict, confrontation, opposition, tension, violence, killing, brutality, body counts and so on. The readers, in no time, could apply their "a priori codes" (Deacon et al. 1999: 136) to be able to comprehend and visualize the extent of the anarchy at the BDR HQ (i.e. Bangladesh Rifles Headquarters).

Scrutinized from the war and peace journalism framework (see Annex-1), the headline clearly features certain war journalism trends. It focuses on the "visible effects of violence" (mutiny, bloodshed etc.), and "conflict arena" (i.e. BDR HQ). The war-journalism oriented tone of the headline is further accented by the subheading that offer further details on the "visible effects of violence" with the use of words like '5 killed', '23 bullet-hit', and 'hold hostage' etc. Moreover, both the headline and the sub-heading are "reactive", waiting for violence before reporting, which again is a war-journalism trait as suggested by Galtung (see Annex-1).

However, aside from the heavily dominant war-journalism elements, the sub-heading bears one interesting peace-journalism feature i.e. multi-party orientation of a conflict as opposed to the two party orientation of war journalism. Although the subheading 'apparently' indicates the conflict is between the mutineers (BDR soldiers) and the army officials, a minute look at the subheading suggests that more than two parties are involved in the process. With the words like 'government offers amnesty', it is implied that the conflict involves multiple stakeholders. However, it should be mentioned that given the overall tone of the subheading, this notion of multiparty orientation is rather side-lined. On the whole, the war-journalism features are dominant in the headline and the subheading.

The first photograph, placed almost centrally right beneath the red banner headline, clearly dominates the whole news item with its iconic as well as symbolic connotations. The viewers are persuaded to look at the photograph, perhaps at the very first glance due to its placing and size. The "reactive" photograph is roughly more than twice the size of both the single column text part and the other photograph. The metonymical presence of a group of armed soldiers "who threw the first stone" (Annex-1) symbolises all the mutineers and connotes the whole paradigm of the rebellion. The soldiers in their uniform with some of them being masked signify the ominous aura of the "closed space, closed time" of the conflict (ibid).

The symmetrical composition of the photograph with horizontal and vertical lines (of the gate) suggests a "static and self-contained" (Deacon et al., 1999: 194) presence of the main signifier i.e. the BDR soldiers in the "conflict arena" (Annex-1) are apparently unmoved, imbided with a goal 'to win' (ibid). The gate placed in the foreground of the composition symbol-

ically suggests a clear division and distance between "us and them" (ibid). The mid-long shot photograph, taken from an eye-level presumably with a telephoto lens, appears to be normal and objective and visually persuades us to "see 'them' as the problem" (ibid) on the other side of the fence.

The war-oriented first photograph is then juxtaposed with a relatively smaller 'cut-out' photograph of a negotiation team. The photo is both iconic and symbolic as the team symbolizes the ongoing negotiation efforts from the government. It is particularly interesting to note that although this smaller photograph is not physically connected with the bigger one, we subconsciously apply our common sense here and link the two photos in order to derive meaning from it. We tend to realize that the people in the second photograph are in fact heading towards the BDR compound to meet with the rebels. The strong diagonal lines (note the dots on the photo) in this 'cut-out' photograph make it dynamic and a part of "a continuous flow of action" (Deacon et al., 1999: 194) i.e. the negotiation efforts are in progress to bring an end to the mutiny. The main signifiers the woman and two men holding white flags connote a "solution-oriented approach" (Annex-1), highlighting peace initiatives.

One particularly striking signifier of the photograph is the woman in *sari* leading the team that contradicts with Bangladeshi "cultural codes" (Deacon et al. 1999: 141). In Bangladesh, women in general are chauvinistically perceived to be timid, frail, and dependent, and therefore incompetent in many cases. Therefore, this signifier manages to break the "tradition or social myth" (ibid: 139, 188) and immediately draws readers' attention to the photo and its peace-oriented approach.

Unlike the headline, the two photos taken together, there appears to be a sense of balance and neutrality between the war-journalism oriented first photograph and the second one with peace-oriented features.

In the photo caption, the signifier 'BDR men' has metonymical connotation as if this small group of soldiers (in the photograph) signifies the whole of BDR men (soldiers) who are waiting for the negotiations team. At the same time it suggests war-oriented tone as the caption "see[s] 'them' as the problem, who prevails in war" (Annex-1). The other signifier in the same sentence "*their* Pilkhana headquarters" connotes an "us-them" and "conflict arena" orientation that 'they' had already taken over (zero-sum perspective) the compound and therefore it is '*their* headquarters' which in reality does not belong only to them. However, the dominant theme of the first sentence is 'negotiation' which is an obvious element of peace-oriented journalism. The first part of the second sentence, especially the signifier 'braves fear', is quite intriguing as it significantly contributes to the visual treatment of the news item by drawing the readers to the second photo, already discussed above. The signifier 'braves fear' breaks the chauvinistic cultural code with regards to how women are typically perceived in Bangladesh society. This code-breaking adds an 'unusually' strong dimension to the second part of the same sentence that essentially promotes messages of peace with the signifier 'white flag' that both denotes and connotes peace.

It is interesting to note that the photo caption essentially attempts to "anchor"[1] peace-oriented message in order to narrow down the connotations the images carry (encoding) and encourage readers to activate (decoding) the particular associations the producers had in mind (Hall, 1980). In line with the connotations of the two photographs, the caption carries balance and neutrality as well. Both the photographs and the caption significantly differ from the war-journalism prone tone of the headline. However, what the photographs and caption share in common with the headline is that they are also "reactive".

Taking the banner headline, the subheading, the photographs and captions together, the news item as a whole sends out a 'mixed message'. Therefore, it is difficult to put this in a certain basket. Such findings call for further investigation as to why such opposing trends had been chosen; whether it was deliberate or not. The headline of the report could easily have been rephrased in line with the photograph and the caption that advocated for peace and negotiation. In that case, the same report could have conveyed an entirely different peace-oriented message. Given the strong presence of the peace-oriented photograph that managed to give a 'balanced tone' to the news, it can be argued that emphasis on the visual aspects is imperative in order to promote peace journalism (Ottosen, 2007). Moreover, choosing a war or peace angle "is essentially an ethical question" whether "to stimulate more violence or more peace" (Galtung, 2006: 5).

4.3   Gender focus

The gender perspective is interesting here. Both in terms of the discussion of the above analysed photo, of the fact that we have seen how a female journalist carried out some of the most dangerous interviews with the BDR *jawans* in the first period of the mutiny, and in relation to the representations of nation and grief in the analyzed media material.

In earlier work on post conflict journalism it has been argued that women – and the female body not least – often is used to represent more than itself, and that we often find that women are used to represent the 'good and respectable' values

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1.   *A Semiotic Analysis of a Newspaper Story* Helen Gambles http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Students/hlg9501.html (Accessed 9 September 2010)

of the nation, not least in times of conflict and war (see e.g. Alison, 2007). This was to a large degree the case also here. In many articles from the Bangladeshi media under and especially after the BDR mutiny, the nation's suffering is illustrated visually by crying women searching for/ mourning their husbands, sons, brothers or fathers.

But, interestingly in relation to theories of masculinities and nationhood, conflicts and war, in the aftermath of the BDR there were also a lot of representations of suffering men and of suffering army men in the media reports. There were strong media visuals of the pain and agony felt by the men discovering the dead bodies. Both newspapers television and the internet showed images of male military personnel crying while burying their colleagues. The mediated images of how men represented the grieving of the nation were highly interesting, as this role traditionally is one left to women (see e.g. Orgeret, 2009). In an interview the editor of *Amader Shomoy* admitted that they had been too quick to place women in the victim's role:

„We did some mistakes in the printed press too. My newspaper for instance reported about rapes inside the BDR compound on the second day (26 February) and we should not have done that. We had no proofs. The wife of a Brigadier who was killed asked me – why did you report about rapes? She was there and nobody had been raped as far as she knew. We did excuse ourselves for that." (Interview, Khan, *Amader Shomoy,* 2009*)*

4.4   Broader perspectives and the blogosphere

In the time of such deep national grief having a broader perspective and to provide "responsible and conscientious media coverage of conflict" (Shinar 2007) was obviously difficult. It is easy to find examples internationally, even from recent history that when a nation experiences trauma and grief, professional, investigative journalism often loose terrain as it is even harder than normal to ask those critical questions. But conflict sensitive reporting does not involve ignoring difficult and disturbing questions.

„... in conflict situations the role of the media is critical in providing the public with full, reliable and non-partisan information to manage the conflict and make intelligent decisions. Conflict sensitive journalism empowers reporters to report conflicts professionally without feeding the flames. It enables journalists to report conflicts in depth, to cover all sides and ventilate issues related to the conflict." (Mwaura, 2008: 8)

It is exactly at times where one media frame seems to rule unanimously that other approaches should be sought for. A more balanced view also came to the surface in *The Daily Star*'s monthly publication *Forum,* where the assistant editor *Hana Shams Ahmed* argued that

„... whoever are the architects behind this horrific killing at Pilkhana, they cannot have had the welfare of the BDR personnel in mind. The scale and nature of the killings has in fact created a strong backlash against all BDR *jawans"* (*Forum,* 4 April 2009).

Rahnuma Ahmed (2009) points at how during the BDR mutiny it was mainly in the blogosphere, 'calmer, more reasoned voices' found an arena to argue that a military operation would "probably have resulted in more deaths, of hostage officers and their family members, and also of civilians, living in adjacent densely-populated neighborhoods". The idea that the blogosphere was the arena for the more reasoned voices is interesting in light of the many discussions about the democratic potential of audiences' digital participation.

Interactive media can be seen to increase people's participation as a "legitimizing mechanism of mass democracy" (Bucy and Gregson, 2001). On the other hand it has been argued that debates on the Internet tend to fragment and polarise the public discussion and that the participations often are characterised by weak quality (Wright and Street, 2007). At their worst, blogs provide a somewhat muddy stage for hate speech and several such examples were found in relation to the BDR mutiny too. However, Ahmed (2009) interestingly argues that it was in the blogosphere that voices stressing that news of an army operation could have led to a nationwide escalation since the rebellion had spread to other parts of the country came through. This view was further supported by interviews (Dhaka 2010).

5   Conclusion

This article has explored how the BDR incident was covered by the Bangladeshi media. The approach in the first part of the article was inductive and analysed the news stories on the BDR mutiny without *a priori* defined news frames in mind. The two main frames found here, the 'Proletarian Revolution' frame and the 'Brutal Massacre' frame, are pertinent only to the specific BDR case and may therefore be labeled 'issue-specific frames' (de Vreese, 2002). These frames emerged from the material during the course of analysis. Studies taking such an inductive approach have been criticised for relying on too small a sample and for being difficult to replicate (Hertog & McLeod, 2001). However in the context of this article, the inductive approach was crucial in analysing certain aspects of the media coverage of the BDR case, such as the construction of different narratives, the sudden shift of focus in the reporting, and the qualitative change of attention given to different kinds of actors in the news stories. The analysis improved our understanding of the BDR mutiny as a mediated process and

showed some interesting differences among the analysed media. Even though the Bangladeshi media in general applied both the 'Proletarian Revolution' and 'Brutal Massacre' frames in a rather unison manner, *The Daily Star* stood out as more nuanced or careful in the exercise of both frames, while at the same time having the highest amount of both war frames and peace frames of the three newspapers analysed in depth.

Looking into a selection of news stories from three Bangladeshi newspapers using a rather deductive approach, the second part of the article has investigated news frames that were defined and operationalised prior to the analysis, namely the 'peace frame', the 'war frame' and the 'neutral frame'. These frames are what de Vreese (2002) calls 'generic frames', they transcend thematic limitations and can be identified in relation to various topics over time and in different cultural contexts.

The three newspapers had a dominant amount of 'war frames' as nearly two-thirds of the news reports and features showed a tendency to reduce conflicts to force and violence with little focus on addressing the complexities of a conflict (Kempf, 2007). Confined in the 'conflict arena' (Galtung, 2002) the coverage focused on tension, drama, and emotion perhaps to satisfy the news values (Boyd-Barrett, 2004; Thussu 2003, cited in Powers & el-Nawawy, 2009). Focus on descriptions of visible destruction like human casualty, or infrastructural damage was quite common. The 'us-them' dichotomy was also evident in the coverage with 'elite-oriented' slant where stories primarily focused on 'our sufferings'. On the other hand, one-third of the news reports and features had 'peace frame' where the conflict was presented in a way where more than two parties were involved. This frame aimed to expose untruth from all sides and remained impartial.

The findings also showed that online news had a higher percentage of war frame stories. We have discussed two reasons for this. The first is directly linked to being an *online* newspaper, which allowed the journalists to publish stories in real time. Hence the reports obviously focused on the events taking place instantaneously, with less time to investigate and discuss implications or the broader picture. Secondly, the analyzed online daily did not carry any editorials on the issue which could have presented a broader picture of the stories.

However, the semiotic analysis showed how war and peace journalism elements may co-exist in the same story and convey a 'mixed' message.

Interestingly on the other hand, all the editorials analysed from the two dailies were peace-oriented that somewhat challenged the notion of media being structurally and institutionally prone to escalation-oriented conflict coverage (Kempf, 2002). Editorials are opinionated news stories usually about a significant topic that has a current news angle and hence the BDR event was perfect material. Editorials are generally meant to influence public opinion and promote critical thinking. It is hence highly remarkable that the editors and journalists consciously or subconsciously resorted to peace journalism when writing the editorials. Such interesting findings feed into the discussion as to how journalists and editors themselves interpret, accept or challenge the process of conflict reporting, and call for further investigation so as to determine how such trends can be embraced, bolstered and multiplied in the mainstream media's conflict coverage in Bangladesh.

Interviews

Mahbubul Alam, Editor *The Independent*, Dhaka, May 2009

Mahfuz Anam, Editor and Publisher *The Daily Star*, Dhaka, May 2009

Monjurul Ahsan, Bulbul, ex-Head of News, *ATN*, Dhaka, May 2009

Moyen Zalal Chowdhury, Somewhereinblog, Dhaka November 2010

Naimul Islam Khan, Editor *Amader Shomoy,* Dhaka, May 2009

Shahedul Anam Khan, Editor, Defence and Strategic Affairs, *The Daily Star*, Dhaka, May 2009.

Munni Saha, Senior Reporter, ATN Bangla, Jakarta February 2011/ notes from interview in Dhaka 2010 provided by Munni Saha, Saha is currently working for ATN News.

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Annex-1: Peace/conflict journalism and war/violence journalism table by Johan Galtung (2002)

Peace/conflict journalism	War/violence journalism
I. Peace/conflict-orientated	I. War/violence-oriented
– explore conflict *formation* x parties, y goals, z issues	– focus on conflict *arena,* 2 parties, 1 goal (win), war
– general win-win orientation	– general zero-sum orientation
– open space, open time; causes and outcomes – anywhere, also in history/culture	– closed space, closed time; causes and exits in arena, who threw the first stone
– making conflicts transparent	– making war opaque/secret
– giving voice to all parties; empathy, understanding	– 'Us-them' journalism, propaganda, voice, for 'us'
– see conflict/war as problem, focus on conflict creativity	– see 'them' as the problem, focus on who prevails in war
– humanisation of all sides, more so the worse the weapons	– dehumanisation of 'them'; more so the worse the weapon
– *proactive:* prevention before any violence/war occurs	– *reactive:* waiting for violence before reporting
– focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma and glory, damage to structure/culture)	– focus only on visible effect of violence (killed, wounded and material damage)
II. Truth-orientated	II. Propaganda-orientated
– expose untruths on all sides / uncover all cover-ups	Expose 'their' untruths / help 'our' cover-ups/lies
III. People-orientated	III. Elite-orientated
– focus on suffering all over; on women, aged, children; giving voice to voiceless	– focus on 'our' suffering; on able-bodied elite males, being their mouth-piece
– give name to all evil-doers	– giving name of their evil-doers
– focus on people peace-makers	– focus on elite peace-makers
IV. Solution orientated	IV. Victory orientated
– peace = non-violence + creativity	– peace = victory + ceasefire
– highlight peace initiatives. Also to prevent more war	– conceal on peace initiatives, before victory is at hand
– focus on structure, culture, the peaceful society	– focus on treaty, institution, the controlled society
– aftermath: resolution, reconstruction reconciliation	– leaving for another war, return if the old flares up again

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Hizb ut-Tahrir in der Presse: Eine transnationale Perspektive darauf, was die Organisation in 2002-07 in Deutschland, Großbritannien und Kirgisien in 2002-07 berichtenswert gemacht hat

Die vorliegende Studie analysiert 226 Zeitungsartikel aus der deutschen (5 Zeitungen), 396 Artikel aus der britischen (5 Zeitungen) und 325 Artikel aus der kirgisischen Qualitätspresse (1 Zeitung) um –sowohl quantitativ als auch qualitativ - den Nachrichtenwert einer radikalen internationalen islamistischen Gruppierung, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), während des Zeitraumes 2002 bis 2007 zu rekonstruieren. Eine zweistufige Latent-Class-Analyse ergab in jedem der drei Länder vier verschiedene Berichterstattungsmuster und bestätigte die Annahme, dass die Gruppierung in Deutschland von geringem, in Großbritannien und Kirgisien dagegen von größerem öffentlichem Interesse war. Eine qualitative Analyse der Artikel, die jeweils während der Zeiträume von (relativ) größtem Interesse erschienen, identifiziert die Ereignisse, welche HT berichtenswert machte, die salientesten Aspekte und die Frames der Berichterstattung über die Gruppierung während dieser Perioden.

Volltext

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Hizb ut-Tahrir in the press: A transnational perspective on what made the group newsworthy in Germany, Great Britain, and Kyrgyzstan in 2002-07

This study analyzes 226 newspaper articles from five German, 396 articles from five British and 325 articles from one Kyrgyz quality newspaper(s) in order to quantitatively and qualitatively reconstruct the newsworthiness of a radical international Islamist group, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), in the period 2002-07 in Germany, Great Britain and Kyrgyzstan through a media prism. A two-step latent class analysis revealed four distinct patterns of coverage in each country and confirmed the assumptions that the group was not of great interest to the German public, but was much more interesting to the British and Kyrgyz publics. A qualitative analysis of articles written in the periods when the group received the greatest media attention identified the events that made it newsworthy, the most salient aspects of its coverage during these periods, and how it was framed in different contexts.

| full text |

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Abstract: This study analyzes 226 newspaper articles from five German, 396 articles from five British and 325 articles from one Kyrgyz quality newspaper(s) in order to quantitatively and qualitatively reconstruct the newsworthiness of a radical international Islamist group, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), in the period 2002-07 in Germany, Great Britain and Kyrgyzstan through a media prism. A two-step latent class analysis revealed four distinct patterns of coverage in each country and confirmed the assumptions that the group was not of great interest to the German public, but was much more interesting to the British and Kyrgyz publics. A qualitative analysis of articles written in the periods when the group received the greatest media attention identified the events that made it newsworthy, the most salient aspects of its coverage during these periods, and how it was framed in different contexts.

1   Introduction

Indicating the main subject of research in the sub-title, this paper presents some of the findings of a large-scale empirical study of the coverage of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) in German, British and Kyrgyz quality newspapers, which have already been presented in detail (Volf, 2011). As previously stated, "Given the highly limited amount of empirical research on HT in general, this study fills a gap not only in understanding this radical Islamist organization from a cross-national perspective, but also in providing a deep pool of empirical data on HT's media representation in politically, culturally, and linguistically different countries." (Volf, 2011: 9) Therefore, a short introduction to the group and its activities in the three countries will be followed by a presentation of the study's country-specific hypotheses and methodology. The quantitative findings related to patterns in the coverage of HT and qualitative findings on the events that made HT newsworthy will be first given a closer consideration on the country level and then discussed from a transnational perspective.

1.1   Introduction to Hizb ut-Tahrir

Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami, from the Arabic, "Party of Islamic Liberation," is an Islamist organization founded in 1952 in the suburbs of East Jerusalem by a Palestinian Islamic legal scholar and political activist with the aim to liberate Palestine and re-establish the 'Islamic caliphate'. The organization is radical and controversial, and while it insists that it will only use non-violent means, in three stages, to restore the caliphate, it has been banned in many countries for allegedly extremist and/or terrorist activities.

Unlike Hamas, Hezbollah or the Taliban – Islamist organizations tightly linked to geographical units like the Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Afghanistan – HT is a transnational movement that, like Al-Qaida and the Muslim Brotherhood, recruits members and supporters around the world, including in Western Europe. HT is particularly popular among second-generation Muslim immigrants in Western Europe, who had never had to "...flee from tyrannical states as many of their parents did...." and thus are "...more critical of democracy and the inequalities of capitalism and correspondingly attracted to Hizb ut-Tahrir's message of a just Islamic order" (ICG, 2003:11). To announce that its goal was to overthrow governments and establish a caliphate in Britain, for example, would be fatal to the organization; HT instead limits its activities in Europe to recruiting members, fundraising and media activities. It remains basically in the first stage of its program there, i.e., recruiting and educating members for the formation of the party group (Whine, 2006; Horton, 2006).

1.1.1   Great Britain

The British branch of HT was founded in 1986 by Omar Bakri Mohammed, an asylum seeker from Saudi Arabia, and a Syrian, Farid Kassim. In 1995, HT was banned from UK university campuses by the National Union of Students for inciting hatred, its strong anti-Semitic sentiments and its pressure on young women to wear hijabs (Morgan, 2007; Swick, 2005; Mandaville, 2007: 267). Bakri's provocative statements in 1995, urging "Queen Elizabeth to convert to Islam and threaten-

ing that Muslims would not rest until 'the black flag of Islam flies over Downing street,'" led to his formal removal from control of the British branch (Wiktorowicz, 2005: 9). After Bakri's departure, HT kept a low profile in the UK between 1996 and 2002.

Since 2002, HT has tried to re-launch its activities and to improve its image. It is well organized and elects an executive committee every two years from among its UK male and female members. The British branch of HT has ca. 10,000 active members, predominantly of Indian and Pakistani origin, and has been attracting young Muslim second- and third-generation immigrants by providing them a sense of belonging, identity and goals, which they miss in British society (Swick, 2005; Morgan, 2008; Mandaville, 2007: 263). Although HT has been charged with violating British law but has never been convicted, there have been debates on banning HT. Following the terror attacks on London in July 2005, Tony Blair urged banning HT, but as his successor Gordon Brown revealed two years later, there was not enough evidence to prohibit the group. However, legal measures by some Western states led HT to take steps to make its activities more transparent. Once strongly critical of democratic institutions and freedoms, HT has started using them to promote its own ideas. To reach new constituencies, HT campaigned against the invasion of Iraq and against Pakistan's President Musharraf during his visit to the UK; it also conducted a number of activities to shape Muslim opinion on debates about citizenship, multiculturalism and integration (Hamid, 2007: 148).

The growth of HT in Great Britain in the 1990s was attributed by Husain (2007: 103-4), a former HT member, to media coverage of his group's events, which boosted its morale and motivated members to reach out to new audiences of millions.

„Boosted by the intense media interest, we [HT] went from strength to strength. Nothing gave us greater motivation than to hear our ideas being amplified in the national media, reaching new audiences of millions. To us it did not matter whether the coverage was favourable or otherwise. We were resigned to biased reporting, but we knew that there was a crucial constituency of Muslims who would look upon us as their leaders, their spokesmen against the attacks of the infidels. It was this recognition we needed more than anything else. The British media provided us with it and more: Arab dictators were now increasingly worried about the rising profile of a group they had banned four decades previously. Britain breathed new life into the Hizb" (Husain, 2007: 103-4).

1.1.2 Germany

Germany, like many other European countries, has not been a target of HT, but rather a place of exile for members, moving from Palestine to Jordan, from Jordan to Lebanon and thereafter to Europe (Whine, 2006). HT supporters in Germany were mainly Muslim academics and students, who were usually based in university towns and active in small groups. HT was banned on 15 January 2003 by Otto Schily, then Minister of Internal Affairs, officially because the group was "against the idea of international understanding" (Federal Ministry of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany, 2004:189), and unofficially for its anti-Semitic slogans, and suspicion that HT and the NPD, a German far-right, radical nationalist party, might find a common basis for violent activities. Since HT was not considered a religious organization, the ban was not a restriction of religious freedom (Baran, 2004: 39). Although on 25 January 2006 the German Federal Administrative Court rejected HT's appeal against the ban on its activities (Federal Ministry of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany, 2008:188), its presence in this country should not be underestimated. Thus in 2008 the authorities found no legal grounds to refuse to license the "Morgenland" association and allowed it to start a kindergarten that was indirectly controlled by HT members (Jürgens, 2008). Furthermore, although the organization denied this, one of the four suspects charged with plotting two train bombings in July 2006 and held in custody in Lebanon was an HT member (Morgan, 2007).

In October 2002, HT first attracted public attention and received some news coverage in Germany. At that time Shaker Assam, a HT representative in Germany, made an anti-Semitic speech at the Berlin Technical University and sought contacts with some NPD members who were also present at the meeting (Whine, 2004: 104). Ali Yildirim, the only TV journalist at the meeting, once claimed that it was good that NPD leaders had participated, because otherwise HT would not have attracted attention and thus wouldn't have been outlawed (Wierth, 2006).

1.1.3 Kyrgyzstan

HT became active in Central Asia in the late 1990s when, after seven decades of official Soviet atheism, the Central Asian states declared their independence from the Soviet Union. They then opened their societies to many different religious movements, which rapidly filled the vacuum left by the bankrupt communist system. According to many scholars, however, 'Muslim identity' and the spiritual needs of Central Asian populations were not the main reasons for HT's success in the region. Rather, poor economic conditions, a weak political culture, an absence of a civil society to channel public initiatives, limited access to power and widespread suppression of freedom of speech were the factors that strongly helped HT to spread its message (ICG, 2003: 83; Khamidov, 2003; Mihalka, 2006; Karagiannis, 2010).

In November 2003, the Kyrgyz Supreme Court outlawed HT as an extremist organization. Since then, members caught distributing literature with extremist content that might instigate religious and ethnic tensions have faced years of imprisonment. As an ICG (2009: 7) report indicated, "Any evidence linking a person to the HT – party literature, reports by neigh-

bours, or an anonymous tip – are grounds for police action." The official statistics on HT membership in Kyrgyzstan vary widely. While in April 2009 the Ministry of Internal Affairs claimed there were only 118 active members and 1,630 supporters (ICG, 2009: 6), in 2011 then-president Roza Otumbaeva claimed that the number of HT members in the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan was about 15,000 (Zpress.kg, 2011). ICG (2009: 6) suggested, however, that Kyrgyz HT membership could be as high as 7,000 to 8,000, of whom some 800 to 2,000 could be women.

Reportedly, close contacts with the media have strategic importance for the HT branch in Kyrgyzstan as well. In 2006 *Vecherniy Bishkek*, a Kyrgyz daily newspaper, published an interview with an HT member who claimed that his group was ordered to cooperate closely with media representatives in order to discourage them from associating the HT name with public clashes and using HT as a scapegoat for social conflicts (Urumbaev, 2007). Thus as a Russian-speaking Kyrgyz, he was responsible for Russian language newspapers, a friend maintained contacts with Kyrgyz language newspapers and TV stations, and Uzbek members were assigned to strengthen contacts with Uzbek journalists.

2 Country-specific hypotheses

It is widely maintained that the private media in democratic societies take their cue from news consumers, in order to increase their profits from marketing their reportage (Hafez, 2000: 11), which thus makes the news flow "inherently audience oriented" (Östgaard 1965). Therefore, it was hypothesized that the German and British public's interest in HT will be indirectly reflected in the high or low priority, intensity, amount and extent of coverage of HT in European quality newspapers. Given HT's illegal status, its low membership and the low profile of HT's German activities, we assumed that in 2002-20007 the organization would *not* be of much interest to the German public. Due to the legal status of HT, its international headquarters in London and heightened public attention to the group after the 7 July 2005 terrorist attacks on the London transportation system, we assumed that the organization would still be of great interest to the British press during the 2002-2007 period.

However, in Kyrgyzstan the privately owned newspapers have never been entirely independent of political, economic and judicial pressures by the ruling elites (Allison, 2011; Kenny, 2008; Manzella, 2005). Thus, we expected that via a demonstration of the growing threat of Islamic radicalism in the country, press 'interest' in HT would be more or less artificially heightened in order to justify the at times undemocratic governmental policies and/or the presence of foreign military bases in the country. Given the enormous growth of HT's membership in Kyrgyzstan, despite its illegal status, and in view of various different political developments in the country and in the Central Asian region, it was hypothesized that this organization was of great interest to the Kyrgyz public in 2002-2007.

In light of the virtual non-existence of empirical social-scientific investigations of the newsworthiness of radical Islamist organizations in general and of HT in particular, the formulated hypotheses are exploratory in nature and based solely on a literature review related to the scope of HT's presence in the three countries studied. Thus not limiting the operationalization of HT's newsworthiness solely to news factors, I attempt to reconstruct the degrees of HT's newsworthiness in the three countries studied from quantitative and qualitative analyses of newspaper articles.

3 Methodology

To test the formulated hypotheses empirically, this study analyzed 226 articles from the German quality newspapers *Die Tageszeitung (Taz), Frankfurter Rundschau (FR), Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) and Die Welt (DW)*; 396 articles from the British newspapers *The Independent, The Guardian, Financial Times (FT), The Times, and The Daily Telegraph (DT);* and 325 articles from the Kyrgyz quality newspaper *Vecherniy Bishkek (VB)*. They made up a total sample of articles published between 2002 and 2007 that mention HT at least once. While the German and British articles were mainly extracted from the Lexis-Nexis database, the Kyrgyz articles were collected from *VB's* on-line archives.

The unit of analysis was each article. The coding books for the German, British and Kyrgyz samples were treated and analyzed as three independent sets of data and consisted of more than 100 variables covering the general qualifications of newspaper articles, such as source and date of publication, attribution, page, length, section, presence of pictures, main and sub-topics, main and sub-countries/regions of articles; and HT-specific variables, such as presence of the organization's name in headlines or leads, relevance of an article to HT, mentioning of arrests/imprisonment of HT members, legal status of HT, quotations and references in relation to HT by different actors in the society, terms used to describe HT members/ organization, as well as various aspects of HT's ideology, goals and activities.

The numbers of articles used to establish inter-coder reliability indices were calculated in accordance with a formula provided by Riffe, Lacy and Fico (2005: 146). Thus, 70 articles of the German sample, 81 of the British sample and 77 of the Kyrgyz sample were coded by three graduate students who were native speakers of German, English and Russian respec-

tively. The inter-coder reliability coefficients were registered for all the variables that required the coders' personal judgment. Cohen's Kappa varied between 0.64 and 1.0; the simple percentage agreement varied between 0.88 and 1.0.

The data was analyzed with a two-step Latent Class Analysis (LCA), a multivariate method similar to factor analysis, which allows establishing latent classes in multivariate categorical data or, in other words, dividing heterogeneous groups of articles into homogeneous subgroups (Reunanen & Suikkanen, 1999: 6). The first-order latent class analysis was applied to several sets of binary variables that could be logically grouped as: 'Terms applied to HT', 'Ideology of HT', 'Goals of HT', 'Activities of HT', 'Main countries/regions of articles', and 'Main topics of articles'. In the second step, classes revealed by the first-order LCA were used as categories of newly created variables, which were then analyzed together to test the country-specific hypotheses and to find patterns of coverage distinctive for every country.

4 Findings

4.1 Germany

4.1.1 Quantitative findings

The first-order LCA was conducted with two sets of variables called 'Overarching variables' and 'Countries/regions of articles'. The first set indicated whether at least one of the sub-categories of the variables: 'Legal status of HT', 'Quotes/references related to HT', 'Terms used to describe HT', 'Ideology of HT', 'Goals of HT' and 'Activities of HT' was present or absent in an article. The second set consisted of twelve predefined countries/regions, including Germany, Great Britain, Denmark, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, USA, Afghanistan, Europe (as a region and other countries than those mentioned), the Middle East and Central Asia (as a region and other countries than those mentioned) and indicated if one of these countries/regions was the main country in an article.

Using the AIC-Criterion, the application of LCA to the set of 'Overarching variables' identified three latent classes that were called (1) not informative articles (52.52%), (2) very informative articles (32.53%) and (3) informative articles (14.95%). See Table 1 and Figure 1.

Figure 1: First-order LCA of the 'Overarching variables' (N=226)

Using the AIC-Criterion, the application of LCA to the set of variables related to the main countries/regions of articles identified three latent classes called (1) Germany and the Middle East (50.99%), (2) Uzbekistan and Russia (32.27%), and (3) Europe/Great Britain and the Middle East (16.75%). See Table 1 and Figure 2.

Figure 2: First-order LCA of the variable 'Countries/regions of articles' (N=226)

For the second-order LCA, the classes identified by the first-order LCA were recoded into new variables and analyzed together with the variables: 'Mentions of prosecutions of HT members', 'Mentions of origin of the HT organization', 'Length of an article in words', 'Relevance of a whole article to HT'. The lowest value of the AIC-Index identified the four latent classes. See Table 1 and Table 2.

	N of classes (h)	N of parameters (n(P))	Log-Likelihood	Degrees of freedom (df)	Likelihood ratio	p-value	AIC-Index
First-order LCA (Overarching variables)	1	6	-807.74	57	167.49	0.00	1627.49
	2	13	-763.78	50	79.65	0.26	1553.56
	3	**20**	**-748.32**	**43**	**48.64**	**0.29**	**1536.64**
	4	27	-744.14	36	40.28	0.00	1542.28
	5	34	-738.82	29	29.65	0.43	1545.65
First-order LCA (Countries/regions)	1	12	-922.49	4083	461.11	1	1868.98
	2	25	-845.7	4070	307.54	1	1741.41
	3	**38**	**-778.85**	**4057**	**173.83**	**1**	**1633.71**
	4	51	-766.82	4044	149.77	1	1635.65
	5	64	-755.54	4031	127.2	1	1639.07
Second-order LCA testing the Germany-specific hypothesis	1	12	-1183.3	503	455.38	1	2390.60
	2	25	-1110.74	490	310.24	1	2271.48
	3	38	-1087.76	477	264.3	1	2251.52
	4	**51**	**-1068.96**	**464**	**226.69**	**1**	**2239.92**
	5	64	-1056.31	451	201.4	1	2240.62

Table 1: Goodness of fit statistics of the LCA of the 'Overarching variables', 'Countries/ regions of articles' and a second-order LCA (N=226)

Variables	Stdev	Categories				
		0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**
Overarching variables	0.73	Not informative (0.54)	Very informative (0.314)	Informative (0.146)	***	***
Prosecutions	0.37	Not mentioned (0.836)	Mentioned (0.164)	***	***	***
Origin	0.26	Not mentioned (0.929)	Mentioned (0.071)	***	***	***
Length	1.32	1-300 (0.239)	301-600 (0.279)	601-900 (0.212)	901-1200 (0.146)	1201 – (0.124)
HT relevance	0.86	Highly relevant (80-100%) (0.274)	Relevant (50-79%) (0.181)	Irrelevant (< 50%) (0.544)	***	***
Countries/ regions	0.76	Germany & the Middle East (0.54)	Uzbekistan & Russia (0.288)	Europe/Great Britain & the Middle East (0.173)	***	***

Table 2: Categories and distribution of variables analyzed to test the Germany-specific hypothesis (N=226)

Ov		erarching variables	Prosecutions	Origin	Length	HT relevance	Countries
Class 1	0	1	0.998	0.998	0.045	0	0.562
(32.66%)	1	0	0.002	0.002	0.296	0.162	0.202
	2	0	---	---	0.207	0.838	0.236
	3	---	---	---	0.301	---	---
	4	---	---	---	0.151	---	---
Class 2	0	0.15	0.797	0.949	0.001	0.011	0.266
(27.75%)	1	0.403	0.203	0.051	0.209	0.097	0.543
	2	0.446	---	---	0.445	0.892	0.191
	3	---	---	---	0.089	---	---
	4	---	---	---	0.256	---	---
Class 3	0	0.599	0.669	0.973	0.787	0.667	0.775
(26.51%)	1	0.317	0.331	0.027	0.213	0.247	0.225
	2	0.084	---	---	0	0.086	0
	3	---	---	---	0	---	---
	4	---	---	---	0	---	---
Class 4	0	0.097	0.857	0.621	0.118	0.723	0.587
(13.09%)	1	0.902	0.143	0.379	0.516	0.277	0.087
	2	0	---	---	0.162	0.001	0.326
	3	---	---	---	0.175	---	---
	4	---	---	---	0.028	---	---

Table 3: Second-order LCA testing the German-specific hypothesis (N=226)

The first class, with 32.66%, was characterized by articles that were always: 'not uninformative' (100%) and mainly 'irrelevant' to HT (83.8%). 'Germany and the Middle East' (56.2%) were often the main country/region of such articles; 'Europe/ Great Britain and the Middle East' (23.6%) and 'Uzbekistan and Russia' (20.2%) were relatively often the main countries/ regions as well. This class was named 'Not informative, HT irrelevant articles often with Germany and the Middle East as main country/region'. The second class, with 27.75%, was characterized by articles that were often informative (44.6%) or very informative (40.3%), but as a rule 'irrelevant' to HT (89.2%). Such articles often had 'Uzbekistan and Russia' as the main countries (54.3%). This class was named 'Informative, HT irrelevant articles often with Uzbekistan and Russia as

main countries'. The third class, with 26.51%, was characterized by articles that were often not informative (59.9%), relatively often very informative (31.7%) and very often either HT 'highly relevant' (66.7%) or 'relevant' (24.7%). Such articles often had 'Germany and the Middle East' (77.5%) and relatively often 'Uzbekistan and Russia' (22.5%) as the main countries. This class was named 'Relatively often informative and as a rule HT relevant articles with Germany and the Middle East as the main country/region'. The fourth class, with 13.09%, was characterized by articles that were as a rule very informative (90.2%) and always either 'HT highly informative' (72.3%) or 'HT relevant' (27.7%). 'Germany and the Middle East' (58.7%) were often, and 'Europe/Great Britain and the Middle East' relatively often, the main countries of such articles. This class was named 'Very informative and always HT relevant articles with Germany and the Middle East as the main country/region'. See Table 3.

The results indicated that there is not always a clear relationship between the relevance of articles to HT and how much information they provide about this group. Thus, mainly HT irrelevant articles could often provide some information about the organization, like articles of the second class, and HT relevant articles could be rarely informative, like articles of the third class. Although Germany, together with the Middle East, was often the main country in the German sample, only about 13 percent of the articles were very informative, always relevant to HT and having Germany as the main country; HT relevant articles with mainly Germany as the main country, however, failed to provide information about the organization. Furthermore, the qualitative analysis of selected most typical articles of four latent classes suggested that the names given to the latent classes revealed by the first and second order LCA are arbitrary and serve as indicators of the general tendencies in the coverage of HT by those articles. Nevertheless, a two-step LCA supported the Germany-specific hypothesis that during 2002-2007 HT was not of much interest to the German public.

4.1.2 Events that made HT newsworthy

The statistically significant relationship between the variables 'Relevance of articles to HT' and 'Year of publication', χ^2(10, N=226)=37.25, p<0.001 indicates that the number of HT irrelevant articles increased over time. The cross-tabulation of the variables 'Month' and 'Year' identified ten periods when HT was mentioned most often. See Table 4.

Month	Year*						Total
	2002	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	
January	4	17=11+2+4	6=3+0+3	3	5	2	37
February	0	1	0	0	5	0	6
March	1	0	10=1+0+9	5	1	1	18
April	1	11=9+1+1	3	1	0	2	18
May	3	0	0	11=0+3+8	0	1	15
June	1	7	4	5	1	1	19
July	1	1	3	14=2+3+9	3	6=3+1+2	28
August	2	1	4	8=4+2+2	24=4+8+12	0	39
September	0	1	1	5	5	1	13
October	2	0	1	0	4	1	8
November	8=5+2+1	0	1	3	3	1	16
December	1	0	3	1	1	3	9
Total	24	39	36	56	52	19	226

Table 4: Year*Month cross tabulation (N=226)
* The first number after the 'equal' signs in the formulae indicates the number of articles 'highly relevant to HT'; the second number indicates the number of articles 'relevant to HT'; and the third number indicates the number of articles 'irrelevant to HT'.

Qualitative analysis of articles published when HT received wide media attention revealed events that made HT newsworthy for the German press, the most salient aspects of HT coverage during these times and how the group was represented in different contexts.

The cross-tabulation of latent classes revealed by second-order LCA with 'Month' and 'Year' of articles' publication suggested that coverage of HT in specific times and contexts was dominated by certain styles of coverage, i.e. latent classes. For example, articles about the first and second nation-wide raids in November 2002 and April 2003 in Germany aimed at locating Islamists were primarily written using the third pattern. Articles about the official ban of HT in Germany in January

2003 were written primarily using the third and fourth patterns. Articles about the popular uprising in Andijan in May 2005 were written primarily using the second pattern. Articles about the prevention of terrorist acts in Germany in August 2006 were primarily written using the first pattern. Such a distribution of patterns across topics was predictable, because the second-order LCA included the variable 'Countries/regions of articles', which heavily influenced the formation of classes. Due to space limitations, these events and patterns and how they were covered are briefly summarized in Table 5.

Year	Month	Event	Latent classes (in articles)				Total
			1	2	3	4	
2002	November	First nation-wide raid in search of 25 HT Islamists who allegedly had contacts to the al-Qaida network	0	1	5	2	8
2003	January	Official banning of HT in Germany by Otto Schily, then Minister of Internal Affairs	4	1	5	7	17
	April	During the second nation-wide raid in search of HT Islamists, officials searched 80 apartments, confiscated computers and HT materials but did not make arrests.	1	0	8	2	11
2004	January	Different events (including HT's court appeals against the ban)	2	1	3	0	6
	March	Different events (suicide bombings in Uzbekistan and the sentencing of three British HT members to five-year jail terms in Egypt)	4	4	2	0	10
2005	May	HT was mentioned in the context of a popular uprising in the Uzbek town of Andijan.	3	8	0	0	11
	July	Different events (partially follow-up stories on the July 7 terror attacks in London; the 'honor killing' in Germany of a Turkish girl by her own brother, who was a HT member)	6	3	1	4	14
	August	Different events (partially follow-up stories about the July 7 terror attacks on London; four HT members located in Germany using a computer-aided search for potential terrorists; Muslims and Islamist organizations in Britain and Denmark)	2	1	2	3	8
2006	August	Prevention of terrorist attacks on regional trains in Germany. The attack was planned by two Lebanese men, at least one of whom was suspected of belonging to HT, because his family belonged to the HT group in Lebanon.	13	3	3	5	24
2007	July	British government decided not to ban HT	1	2	0	3	6

Table 5: Second-order LCA*Year*Month cross-tabulation (Germany)

4.2 Great Britain

4.2.1 Quantitative findings

Since the coverage of HT in the British newspapers was more extensive and differentiated than that in the German newspapers, it was decided to analyze in the first-order LCA not only 'Overarching variables' and 'Countries/regions of articles', but also 'Technical variables', including variables related to 'HT name in a headline or a lead', 'Page', 'Attribution', 'Length', 'Section' and 'HT relevance'. See Table 6.

Using the AIC-Criterion, the application of LCA to the set of 'Technical variables' identified five latent classes that were called (1) middle size, HT 'irrelevant' articles (39.59%), (2) long, HT 'irrelevant' articles (24.08%), (3) very short HT 'highly relevant' articles (19.74%), (4) short, HT 'relevant' articles (10.92%) and (5) short articles, about equally often 'highly relevant', 'relevant' and 'irrelevant' to HT (5.67%). See Table 7 and Table 8.

Variables	Stdev	Categories				
		0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**
HT in a headline or lead	0.20	No (0.96)	Yes (0.04)	***	***	***
Page	0.64	Other pages (0.85)	Front page (0.05)	2nd or 3rd page (0.11)	***	***
Attribution	0.55	Journalist's by-line (0.90)	Other attribution (0.02)	Not attributed (0.08)	***	***
Length (in words)	1.17	1-300 (0.17)	301-600 (0.33)	601-900 (0.26)	901-1200 (0.15)	1201- (0.08)
Section	1.20	International news (0.14)	Home news (0.52)	Comments (0.11)	Features (0.12)	Other (0.11)
HT relevance	0.79	Highly relevant (80-100%) (0.22)	Relevant (50-79%) (0.29)	Irrelevant (< 50%) (0.49)	***	***

Table 6: Categories and distribution of 'Technical variables' (N=396)

Variables		HT in a headline or lead	Page	Attribution	Length	Section	HT relevance
Class 1	0	1.00	0.83	1.00	0.00	0.21	0.04
(39.59%)	1	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.48	0.72	0.32
	2	***	0.08	0.00	0.42	0.00	0.64
	3	***	***	***	0.08	0.00	***
	4	***	***	***	0.02	0.07	***
Class 2	0	1.00	0.97	0.88	0.00	0.06	0.00
(24.08%)	1	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.09	0.19	0.08
	2	***	0.00	0.08	0.22	0.31	0.92
	3	***	***	***	0.43	0.31	***
	4	***	***	***	0.26	0.12	***
Class 3	0	0.81	1.00	0.94	0.44	0.15	0.74
(19.74%)	1	0.19	0.00	0.06	0.22	0.37	0.26
	2	***	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.15	0.00
	3	***	***	***	0.09	0.19	***
	4	***	***	***	0.06	0.15	***
Class 4	0	0.97	0.82	0.53	0.65	0.11	0.29
(10.92%)	1	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.31	0.78	0.71
	2	***	0.16	0.47	0.04	0.03	0.00
	3	***	***	***	0.00	0.08	***
	4	***	***	***	0.00	0.00	***
Class 5	0	1.00	0.00	0.84	0.29	0.00	0.37
(5.67%)	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.71	0.53	0.33
	2	***	1.00	0.16	0.00	0.00	0.30
	3	***	***	***	0.00	0.00	***
	4	***	***	***	0.00	0.47	***

Table 7: First-order LCA of 'Technical variables' (N=396)

Using the AIC-Criterion, the application of LCA to the set of the 'Overarching variables' identified four latent classes that were named (1) partially informative articles (33.5%), (2) not informative articles (30.9%), (3) very informative articles (26.2%), and (4) focus on HT's legal status (9.4%). See Table 8 and Figure 3.

Figure 3: First-order LCA of 'Overarching variables' (N=396)

Using the AIC-Criterion, the application of LCA to the set of the variable 'Countries/regions of articles' identified three latent classes that were named (1) Great Britain (78.32%), (2) Uzbekistan and USA (14.39%), (3) the Middle East and Great Britain (7.3%). See Table 8 and Figure 4.

Figure 4: First-order LCA of the variable 'Countries/regions of articles' (N=396)

For the second-order LCA, the classes identified by the first-order LCA were recoded into new variables and analyzed together with the variables: 'Mentions of prosecutions of HT members' and 'Mentions of origin of the HT organization'. The lowest value of the AIC-Index identified the four latent class solutions. See Table 8.

|	N of classes (h)	N of parameters (n(P))	Log-Likelihood	Degrees of freedom (df)	Likelihood ratio	p-value	AIC-Index
First-order LCA of the 'Technical variables'	1	15	-1970.77	1310	621.79	1	3971.54
	2	31	-1881.32	1294	442.89	1	3824.64
	3	47	-1833.52	1278	347.28	1	3761.04
	4	63	-1817.25	1262	314.74	1	3760.5
	5	**79**	**-1798.65**	**1246**	**277.54**	**1**	**3755.3**
	6	95	-1784.09	1230	248.43	1	3758.18
First-order LCA of the 'Overarching variables'	1	6	-1448.43	57	237.25	0.00	2908.87
	2	13	-1374.22	50	88.82	0.00	2774.44
	3	20	-1360.93	43	62.25	0.30	2761.86
	4	**27**	**-1348.73**	**36**	**37.85**	**0.38**	**2751.47**
	5	34	-1343.13	29	26.64	0.59	2754.25
First-order LCA of the variable 'Countries/ regions of articles'	1	12	-1245.01	4083	539	1	2514.03
	2	25	-1088.5	4070	225.98	1	2227
	3	**38**	**-1069.2**	**4057**	**187.38**	**1**	**2214.41**
	4	51	-1060.1	4044	169.18	1	2222.21
	5	64	-1048.14	4031	145.26	1	2224.29
Second-order LCA testing the British-specific hypothesis	1	11	-1554.33	208	254.51	0.05	3130.66
	2	23	-1499.34	196	144.52	0.99	3044.68
	3	35	-1480.53	184	106.91	1	3031.06
	4	**47**	**-1467.54**	**172**	**80.92**	**1**	**3029.08**
	5	59	-1457.41	160	60.66	1	3032.82
	6	71	-1452.7	148	51.24	1	3047.4

Table 8: Goodness of fit statistic of LCA of the 'Technical variables', 'Overarching variables', 'Countries/ regions of articles' and a second-order LCA (N=396)

Variables	Stdev	Categories				
		0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**
Technical variables	1.21	Middle size, HT 'irrelevant' articles (0.407)	Long, HT 'irrelevant' articles (0.237)	Very short, HT 'highly relevant' articles (0.217)	Short, HT 'relevant' articles (0.078)	Short articles, about equally 'highly relevant', 'relevant' and 'irrelevant' to HT (0.061)
Overarching variables	0.96	Partially informative (0.328)	Not informative (0.346)	Very informative (0.232)	Focus on the legal status of HT (0.093)	***
Countries/ regions of the articles	0.56	Great Britain (0.795)	Uzbekistan & USA (0.144)	The Middle East & Great Britain (0.061)	***	***
Prosecutions	0.35	Not mentioned (0.859)	Mentioned (0.141)	***	***	***
Origin of HT	0.21	Not mentioned (0.955)	Mentioned (0.045)	***	***	***

Table 9: Categories and distribution of variables analyzed to test the Britain-specific hypothesis (N=396)

The first class, with 39.17%, was characterized by articles in which Great Britain (98.1%) was always the main country. Such articles were mainly 'irrelevant' to HT (83.1%) and not informative (50.2%). This class was named 'HT irrelevant, not informative articles with Great Britain as the main country'. The second class, with 36.79%, was characterized by articles

in which Great Britain was often the main country (88.1%). Such articles were relatively often 'highly relevant' (24.2%) or 'relevant' (15.9%) to HT and had partly informative content about HT (57.0%). This class was named 'partly HT 'relevant' and partly informative articles with Great Britain as the main country'. The third class, with 13.13%, was characterized by articles in which the main countries/regions were often Uzbekistan and USA (57.1%) and the Middle East and Great Britain (40.2%). Such articles were often 'middle size, HT 'irrelevant'' articles (69.2%) and either not informative (51.1%), partly informative (28.8%) or very informative (20.1%). This class was named 'mainly HT 'irrelevant', sometimes informative articles without Great Britain as a main country'. The fourth class, with 10.9%, was characterized by articles in which the main countries were often Great Britain (76.5%) and sometimes Uzbekistan and USA (16.4%). Such articles were always very informative (95.5%) and often 'very short, HT 'highly relevant' articles (75.9%). This class was called 'HT highly relevant, very informative articles with Great Britain as the main country'. See Table 10.

Classes and variables' subcategories		Technical variables	Overarching variables	Countries	Prosecutions	Origin of HT
Class 1 (39.17%)	0	0.389	0.194	0.981	0.996	0.998
	1	0.442	0.502	0.019	0.004	0.002
	2	0.116	0.136	0	***	***
	3	0.047	0.168	***	***	***
	4	0.007	***	***	***	***
Class 2 (36.79%)	0	0.423	0.570	0.881	0.743	0.998
	1	0.054	0.223	0.118	0.257	0.002
	2	0.242	0.131	0	***	***
	3	0.159	0.075	***	***	***
	4	0.121	***	***	***	***
Class 3 (13.13%)	0	0.692	0.288	0.027	0.998	0.998
	1	0.257	0.511	0.571	0.002	0.002
	2	0	0.201	0.402	***	***
	3	0.011	0.001	***	***	***
	4	0.04	***	***	***	***
Class 4 (10.9%)	0	0.07	0.044	0.765	0.585	0.587
	1	0.097	0	0.164	0.415	0.413
	2	0.759	0.955	0.071	***	***
	3	0	0.001	***	***	***
	4	0.074	***	***	***	***

Table 10: Second-order LCA testing the Britain-specific hypothesis (N=396)

The results point to some relationship between the HT relevance of articles and how much information they provide about HT. Since Great Britain was very often the main country in the sample, only one class did not point to this country as the main one. Furthermore, among three classes with Great Britain as the main country, the prevalence of the second and third classes over the first class suggests that there were more HT relevant informative articles than irrelevant and not informative articles. Therefore, HT was of great interest to the press in Great Britain during 2002-2007.

4.2.2   Events that made HT newsworthy

Similarly to the German press, the statistically significant relation between the variables 'Relevance of articles to HT' and 'Year of publication', $\chi 2(10, N=396)= 34.29$, $p<0.001$, indicated that the number of HT irrelevant articles increased over time. The cross-tabulation of the variables 'Month' and 'Year' identified 11 periods in which HT was mentioned most often. See Table 11.

Month	Year						Total
	2002	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	
January	3	0	3	3	3	0	12
February	1	1	2	0	22=3+7+12	3	29
March	2	2	13=5+2+6	5	11=2+6+3	0	33
April	2	2	4	5	6	2	21
May	1	5	1	30=3+7+20	0	5	42
June	1	3	0	1	1	3	9
July	3	2	1	22=4+4+14	10=2+6+2	28=2+2+24	66
August	5	1	2	48=16+15+17	6	3	65
September	4	0	2	22=5+8+9	4	3	35
October	10=2+8+0	1	1	9	4	4	29
November	5	0	2	12=0+3+9	9	3	31
December	4	7	0	6	2	5	24
Total	41	24	31	163	78	59	396

Table 11: Year*Month cross tabulation (N=396)

Year M	onth	Event	Latent Classes				Total
			1	2	3	4	
2002	Octtober	Three British HT members tortured in an Egyptian prison for attempting to revive the HT party in Egypt and to undermine the Egyptian government. The issue was covered in the frame of a 'violation of human rights', providing details of ill treatment of the defendants and describing torture techniques used on them or other prisoners in Egypt.	0	9	0	1	10
2004	March	Suicide bombings in Uzbekistan and accusing the Uzbek government of torturing and killing political opponents under the pretext of combating Muslim extremism. Criticizing trial procedures in Egypt, and the British government for failing to intervene when British HT members in Egypt received five-year prison sentences.	0	4	7	2	13
2005	May	The popular uprising in the Uzbek town of Andijan. HT was called a banned 'Islamist' or 'Muslim' group accused by President Karimov of organizing the rebellion. Journalists often referred to the official HT statement from London denying any involvement in the uprising and rejecting violence as a political tool.	1	6	20	3	30
	July	Discussions of reasons why certain British Muslim youths made terrorist attacks on the London transport system. The newspapers became in general very critical of HT and questioned many aspects of HT's activities in Britain.	12	7	3	0	22
	August	Tony Blair's plan to ban HT and curb terrorism and extremism in Britain. HT was more often called 'a Muslim political party', rather than 'a radical Islamist organization'. Four articles advocated a ban, and 14 argued that HT should be kept legal.	20	15	3	10	48
	September	Public debates on HT's possible proscription. Three favored HT's proscription, and four opposed it. HT was called a 'political', 'Islamist', 'extremist', 'radical' and sometimes 'terrorist' organization.	7	10	2	3	22
	November	Public debates on HT's possible proscription. These articles were mainly not informative in regard to HT, and the group was often called 'a radical Islamist organization'.	5	3	4	0	12

Year M	onth	Event	Latent Classes				Total
			1	2	3	4	
2006	February	Different events (British HT members were released from Egyptian prisons; Blair secured ‚anti terrorism' legislation; HT organized protests against the publication of Muhammad caricatures in Western media.)	12	8	2	0	22
	March	Three British HT members were released in Egypt; HT supported a girl who wanted to wear a hijab to school before a British court; HT was mentioned in the context of a potential bomb plot in London.	5	5	0	1	11
	July	Two Muslim groups were banned, but not HT. Police, intelligence officers and civil groups advised Blair against banning HT, which would otherwise backfire by driving a non-violent group underground.	5	5	0	0	10
2007	July	Brown's failure to answer Cameron's question of why HT was not banned; terrorist attack on Glasgow airport prevented.	23	3	0	2	28

Table 12: Second-order LCA*Year*Month cross-tabulation (Great Britain)

Qualitative analysis of articles from periods when HT received widespread media attention revealed events that made HT newsworthy for the British press, the most salient aspect of HT coverage during these times and how the group was represented in different contexts. Table 12 illustrates that reportage on HT in specific times and contexts was dominated by certain patterns of coverage. For example, the coverage of internal British affairs, including Blair's intention to ban HT and his successor Brown's being questioned about why the Labour government failed to do so, was dominated by the use of the first patterns. The coverage of the three British HT members arrested and tortured in an Egyptian prison, as well as public debates on reasons for the 7/7 terror attacks and their aftermath, were dominated by articles written using the second pattern. The coverage of the terror attacks and the popular uprising in the Uzbek town of Andijan was dominated by the articles written using the third pattern. The widest use of the fourth pattern in reporting on HT was present in August 2005, when Blair announced his intention to ban HT; this class, however, did not dominate coverage of HT in this period. Since the second-order LCA testing the Britain-specific hypothesis included the 'main country/region' variable and was heavily influenced by it, such a distribution of classes across topics was predictable.

4.3   Kyrgyzstan

### 4.3.1   Quantitative findings

Figure 5: First-order LCA of the 'Overarching variables' (N=325)

Similar to the German sample, the first-order LCA was made using two sets of variables that were called 'Overarching variables' and 'Countries/regions of articles'. However, unlike the German and British samples, the 'Overarching variables' in the Kyrgyz sample included not only the variables related to 'Legal status of HT', 'Quotes/references related to HT', 'Ideol-

ogy of HT', 'Goals of HT' and 'Activities of HT', but also the variables 'Prosecution of HT members', 'Confiscation/discovery of HT leaflets' and 'Other informative points about HT'.

Using the AIC-Criterion, the application of LCA to the set of 'Overarching variables' identified four latent classes that were named (1) informative not crime stories (35.81%), (2) informative crime stories (35.77%), (3) not informative articles (18.99%), and (4) very informative articles (9.44%). See Figure 5.

Using the AIC-Criterion, the application of LCA to the set of the 'Overarching variables' identified two latent classes that were named (1) Kyrgyzstan (87.79%) and (2) Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (12.21%). See Figure 6.


Figure 6: First-order LCA of the variable 'Countries/regions of articles' (N=325)

For the second-order LCA, the classes identified by the first-order LCA were recoded into new variables and analyzed together with the variables 'Mentions of HT's name in a headline or a lead, 'Length of an article in words' and 'Relevance of a whole article to HT'. The lowest value of the AIC-Index identified the four latent class solutions. See Table 13 and Table 14.

	N of classes (h)	N of parameters (n(P))	Log-Likelihood	Degrees of freedom (df)	Likelihood ratio	p-value	AIC-Index
First-order LCA of the 'Overarching variables'	1	8	-1514.4	247	3044.74	1	3044.74
	2	17	-1429.8	238	2893.49	1	2893.49
	3	26	-1393.9	229	173.84	1	2839.86
	4	35	-1379.85	220	145.68	1	2829.71
	5	44	-1373.5	211	133.05	1	2835.07
First-order LCA of the variable 'Countries/ regions of articles'	1	12	-497.41	4083	150.93	1	1018.81
	2	**25**	**-461.91**	**4070**	**79.93**	**1**	**973.81**
	3	38	-459.79	4057	75.69	1	995.57
	4	51	-447.02	4044	50.16	1	996.04
Second-order LCA testing the British-specific hypothesis	1	11	-1476.31	208	536.93	1	2974.62
	2	23	-1328.56	196	241.42	0.01	2703.12
	3	35	-1294.82	184	173.93	0.55	2659.64
	4	**47**	**-1278.25**	**172**	**140.81**	**0.80**	**2650.5**
	5	59	-1269.63	160	123.57	0.75	2657.26

Table 13: Goodness of fit statistics of LCA of the 'Overarching variables', 'Countries/ regions of articles' and a second-order LCA (N=325)

Variables	Stdev	Categories				
		0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**
Overarching variables	0.95	Not informative crime stories (0.329)	Not informative crime stories, often with the HT name in headlines/ leads of articles' (0.366)	Very informative crime stories (0.215)	Not informative articles (0.089)	***
Length	1.2	1-300 (0.508)	301-600 (0.209)	601-900 (0.154)	901-1200 (0.077)	1201 - (0.052)
HT name in a headline or a lead	0.47	No (0.677)	Yes (0.323)	***	***	***
HT relevance	0.88	Highly relevant (0.526)	Relevant (0.169)	Irrelevant (0.305)	***	***
Countries	0.3	Kyrgyzstan (0.902)	Kyrgyzstan and Uz-bekistan (0.098)	***	***	***

Table 14: Categories and distribution of variables analyzed to test the Kyrgyzstan-specific hypothesis (N=325)

		Overarching variables	Length	HT name in a head-line or lead	HT relevance	Countries
Class 1	0	0.122	0.900	0.337	1	0.998
(34.76%)	1	0.773	0.093	0.663	0	0.002
	2	0.086	0.007	***	0	***
	3	0.019	0	***	***	***
	4	***	0	***	***	***
Class 2	0	0.444	0.222	0.998	0	0.869
(30.43%)	1	0.141	0.222	0.002	0	0.131
	2	0.414	0.334	***	1	***
	3	0.001	0.131	***	***	***
	4	***	0.091	***	***	***
Class 3	0	0.528	0.510	0.878	0.242	0.814
(20.92%)	1	0.187	0.298	0.122	0.756	0.186
	2	0.284	0.091	***	0.002	***
	3	0.001	0.072	***	***	***
	4	***	0.029	***	***	***
Class 4	0	0.295	0.148	0.517	0.921	0.861
(13.88%)	1	0.112	0.338	0.483	0.079	0.139
	2	0.001	0.224	***	0	***
	3	0.592	0.157	***	***	***
	4	***	0.133	***	***	***

Table 15: Second-order LCA testing the Kyrgyz-specific hypothesis (N=325)

The first class, with 34.76%, was characterized by articles in which Kyrgyzstan (99.8%) was always the main country and articles were always 'highly relevant' to HT (100%). Such articles were often very short (90.0%), 'informative crime stories' (77.3%) with 'HT name in a headline or a lead' (66.3%). This class was named 'HT 'highly relevant', very short and informative crime stories with Kyrgyzstan as the main country'. The second class, with 30.43%, was characterized by articles in which Kyrgyzstan was very often the main country (86.9%). Such articles were always 'irrelevant' to HT (100%) and

never had the 'HT name in a headline or a lead' (0.0%). Such articles could be of a different length and with different amounts of background information about HT. They were never 'very informative' articles (0.0%). This class was named 'HT 'irrelevant' and partly informative articles with Kyrgyzstan as the main country'. The third class, with 20.92%, was characterized by articles in which Kyrgyzstan (81.4%) was very often the main country. Such articles were often 'informative not crime stories', very short (51.0%) or short (29.8%) and always either HT 'highly relevant' (24.2%) or HT 'relevant' (75.6%). This class was named 'mainly HT 'relevant' and informative not crime stories with Kyrgyzstan as the main country'. The fourth class, with 13.88%, was characterized by articles in which Kyrgyzstan (86.1%) was very often the main country and articles were often 'very informative' (59.2%) and, as a rule, HT 'highly relevant' (92.1%). About half had the 'HT name in a headline or a lead' (48.3%). This class was named 'HT 'highly relevant' and very informative articles with Kyrgyzstan as the main country'. Because Kyrgyzstan was the main country in the overwhelming majority of articles, each of four latent classes had Kyrgyzstan as the main country. Therefore, this indicates that during 2002-2007 HT was of great interest to the press in Kyrgyzstan. See Table 15.

4.3.2   Events that made HT newsworthy

The statistically insignificant relation between the variables 'Relevance of articles to HT' and 'Year of publication', χ^2(10, N=325)=10.89, p>0.05, indicated that the proportion of articles with different degrees of relevance to HT fluctuated only slightly over the years. The cross-tabulation of the variables 'Month' and 'Year' identified ten periods when HT was mentioned most often. See Table 16.

Month	Year						Total
	2002	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	
January	4	2	4	5	4	6	25
February	6	6	4	8=6+0+2	3	3	30
March	8=3+2+3	4	4	0	4	2	22
April	3	7	9=5+0+4	1	6	2	28
May	0	7	2	6	5	6	26
June	1	6	3	5	2	0	17
July	3	4	4	9=5+0+4	8=2+3+3	4	32
August	2	1	5	4	13=6+4+3	5	30
September	8=2+3+3	0	2	5	13=6+2+5	4	32
October	5	5	9=5+3+1	5	6	5	35
November	6	9=8+1+0	6	2	3	1	27
December	3	2	4	3	2	7	21
Total	49	53	56	53	69	45	325

Table 16: Month*Year cross tabulation (N=325)

Qualitative analysis of these articles helped identify events that made HT newsworthy for <u>VB</u>. Table 17: Second-order LCA*Year*Month cross-tabulation (Kyrgyzstan) illustrates that the coverage of HT in specific times and contexts was dominated by certain styles of coverage. For example, in November 2006, when HT was officially banned in Kyrgyzstan, HT suddenly became very newsworthy, with the number of very informative articles being very high and the number of 'irrelevant' and not informative articles being zero. In April 2004, when references to HT were mainly made in the context of terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan, coverage did not include any informative non-crime stories; HT was either a focal point of crime stories or was merely referred to in the news stories by authors without additional information about the group. The high number of informative crime stories and very informative articles in July, August and September 2006 could well be attributed to the governmental order for the law enforcement institutions to intensify their efforts in combating extremism. However, since crime stories dominated coverage of HT in VB in general, wide use of this pattern in all time periods was expected.

Year	Month	Event	Latent classes				Total
			1	**2**	**3**	**4**	
2002	March	Different events with 'religion' as a general theme and only passing references to HT.	3	3	2	0	8
	September	HT became more active in spreading its propaganda, and this was used as a justification for introducing a moratorium on its assembly.	2	3	3	0	8
2003	November	The extensive and highly negative reporting on HT culminated in the 'breaking' news that activities of this 'extremist' organization were banned by the decision of the Kyrgyz Supreme Court.	2	0	1	6	9
2004	April	Arrests of HT members in Kyrgyzstan and references to HT in the context of terror acts in Uzbekistan in March 2004.	4	4	0	1	9
	October	HT coverage is seen as an attempt to highlight the threat of terrorism and extremism in Kyrgyzstan after the president's order to launch widespread propaganda to stop the dissemination of religious-subversive ideas.	4	1	3	1	9
2005	February	HT calling on Muslims to boycott parliamentary elections, on one hand, and HT supporting certain candidates from the opposition, on the other.	4	2	0	2	8
	July	Different issues, including presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan, arrests of HT members and interviews with HT members.	4	4	0	1	9
2006	July	Different stories, including those on the efforts of law enforcement officials to combat extremism, often connecting HT to either crime or terrorism.	2	3	3	0	8
	August	The killing of a leading imam in the south by law enforcement officials when he was found in a car with suspected terrorists spurred public debates about official clergy supporting radicals, on one hand, and negligent actions by law enforcement officials, on the other.	5	3	4	1	13
	September	HT was often mentioned in a crime context or in interviews with various social actors.	4	5	1	3	13

Table 17: Second-order LCA*Year*Month cross-tabulation (Kyrgyzstan)

5 Discussion and conclusions

In formulating the sub-hypotheses for each country and conducting latent class analyses, it was desired to make the three samples as mutually comparable as possible. However, owing to the different extents of HT's influence and activities in the three countries, and to the different methods of data compilation, it was not possible to operationalize newsworthiness in the three samples in an entirely equivalent manner. Nevertheless, although HT's newsworthiness could only to a certain extent be evaluated in a comparative perspective, this analysis did establish a number of commonalities and distinctions regarding HT coverage in the three countries.

It appears that the journalists and editors of the well-established German and British newspapers found it unnecessary to draw close attention to HT through the publication of reports on HT on title pages, mentioning it in headlines or by including visual images. Making the HT name "more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences" (Entman, 1993: 53) would certainly set a public agenda and raise more questions about a 'foreign' movement in Europe. Due to technical limitations, it was not established how many articles appeared on the front pages of the Kyrgyz newspaper, but one-third of the Kyrgyz articles contained the HT name in a headline and/or lead; half the 'highly relevant' and 'relevant' articles contained a visual image. In Kyrgyzstan, these tendencies were attributed to 'sensationalism' as a determining news factor for Kyrgyz reporting, in general, and to social and political pressures on journalists to highlight the presence of 'threatening' and 'dangerous' movements in the region, in particular.

The established negative relationship between the 'relevance' of articles to HT and their length has a practical explanation. Since in the short articles references to HT inevitably appeared in the first and often only paragraph, these articles were coded as 'relevant' or 'highly relevant'. Longer articles only rarely focused solely on the organization and, therefore, were often rated as 'irrelevant' or 'relevant'. Thus, the increase in mainly 'irrelevant' articles could be explained less by HT's diminishing newsworthiness than by a growing tendency to refer to the group in irrelevant contexts or along with other controversial organizations.

The fact that the main countries of articles in the three samples were predominantly Germany, Great Britain and Kyrgyzstan suggested that the 'proximity' news factor (Galtung and Ruge, 1965) played a crucial role in these countries, but was more influential in Kyrgyzstan and Great Britain than in Germany. Furthermore, the majority of British articles were published in the 'Domestic News' section (52%); the majority of the Kyrgyz articles were published in the 'Overview of the Day' (27.1%) and 'Actual/Main Topic' (14.8%) sections; and, the majority of the German articles were published in the 'Politics' section (42.9%). Since HT was not very active in Germany during the time-frame of the research, German reporting on HT was often foreign-oriented, including reporting on its activities in Uzbekistan, the Middle East, Great Britain, Russia and other European countries. The strong influence of 'the Middle East' as the second main region in the German sample was explained by the fact that German journalists often referred to HT's goals as 'To destroy Israel' and 'To kill Jews'. These goals were never mentioned in the Kyrgyz sample and almost never in the British sample. At times, it seemed that HT was newsworthy and banned in Germany only because of its anti-Semitic slogans, which were often salient in the German articles. Although the British and Kyrgyz newspapers are poles apart in economic resources for foreign news reporting, in both cases reporting on HT was predominantly 'domestically' oriented.

It was not surprising that the most relevant and informative articles with Germany, Great Britain and Kyrgyzstan as the main countries in the three samples respectively were present in the smallest classes in the samples. It was surprising that these classes constituted from ten to fourteen percent of the national samples, which suggested that every tenth article was highly relevant to and very informative about HT, independently of the degree of the group's newsworthiness in each country. The cross-tabulation of latent classes with 'Year' revealed, however, that such articles appeared only during certain 'big' events in Germany, Great Britain and Kyrgyzstan. Thus in Germany such articles appeared mainly in January 2003, when HT was officially banned there; in July 2005, following the terror attacks in London; and, in August 2006, when a terror attack against German regional trains was prevented. In Great Britain, ten such articles appeared in August 2005, when Blair announced an investigation to find grounds to ban HT's activities there; at other times this number was never more than three. In Kyrgyzstan, six such articles appeared in November 2003, the month HT was banned; at other times, this number was never more than three.

To conclude, the quantitative and qualitative findings on the coverage of HT in German, British and Kyrgyz quality newspapers lent support to the hypotheses that in 2002-2007 HT was not very interesting to the German public, and was, in contrast, very interesting to the British and Kyrgyz publics.

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Sanem Şahin & Susan Dente Ross

Die unsichere Anwendung von Friedensjournalismus: Der Fall der türkisch-zypriotischen Presse

Anhand der türkisch-zypriotrischen Presse untersucht dieser Aufsatz die Anwendbarkeit der philosophischen und praktischen Konzepte des Friedensjournalismus in journalistischen Kulturen, die vom Mainstream des westlichen Journalismus abweichen. Die Untersuchung des türkisch-zypriotischen Journalismus wirft ein Licht auf einige abweichende Wesenszüge, welche der Friedensjournalismus sorgfältiger in Rechnung stellen muss, wenn sein Paradigma eine effektive Reform journalistischer Praktiken in diesem und ähnlichen Kontexten leisten soll. Mit Fokus auf den andauernden Friedensverhandlungen, die auf eine Wiedervereinigung der Insel als Föderation zweier Zonen und Gesellschaften abzielen, zeigt die Studie einige Hindernisse auf, die der Implementierung des Friedensjournalismus als Mittel zur Verbesserung der Qualität der Berichterstattung und der Rolle der Presse bei der Förderung von Wiederannäherung und gegenseitigem Verständnis der zypriotischen Gesellschaften entgegenstehen.

Volltext

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Sanem Şahin & Susan Dente Ross

The uncertain application of peace journalism: The case of the Turkish Cypriot press

Using the press in North Cyprus as a focal case, this research explores the application of peace journalism's philosophical and practical formulations in journalistic cultures that diverge from Western mainstream journalism. Turkish Cypriot journalism highlights those divergent traits that peace journalism needs to consider more carefully if the paradigm is to offer effective reform of journalism practices in this and similar contexts. Focusing on the on-going peace negotiations aimed at reuniting the island as a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, this study suggests several obstacles to the implementation of peace journalism as a means to enhance the quality of news coverage and the role of the press in promoting rapprochement and mutual understanding between the communities of Cyprus.

full text

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Kurzfassung: Anhand der türkisch-zypriotrischen Presse untersucht dieser Aufsatz die Anwendbarkeit der philosophischen und praktischen Konzepte des Friedensjournalismus in journalistischen Kulturen, die vom Mainstream des westlichen Journalismus abweichen. Die Untersuchung des türkisch-zypriotischen Journalismus wirft ein Licht auf einige abweichende Wesenszüge, welche der Friedensjournalismus sorgfältiger in Rechnung stellen muss, wenn sein Paradigma eine effektive Reform journalistischer Praktiken in diesem und ähnlichen Kontexten leisten soll. Mit Fokus auf den andauernden Friedensverhandlungen, die auf eine Wiedervereinigung der Insel als Föderation zweier Zonen und Gesellschaften abzielen, zeigt die Studie einige Hindernisse auf, die der Implementierung des Friedensjournalismus als Mittel zur Verbesserung der Qualität der Berichterstattung und der Rolle der Presse bei der Förderung von Wiederannäherung und gegenseitigem Verständnis der zypriotischen Gesellschaften entgegenstehen.

Abstract: Using the press in North Cyprus as a focal case, this research explores the application of peace journalism's philosophical and practical formulations in journalistic cultures that diverge from Western mainstream journalism. Turkish Cypriot journalism highlights those divergent traits that peace journalism needs to consider more carefully if the paradigm is to offer effective reform of journalism practices in this and similar contexts. Focusing on the on-going peace negotiations aimed at reuniting the island as a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, this study suggests several obstacles to the implementation of peace journalism as a means to enhance the quality of news coverage and the role of the press in promoting rapprochement and mutual understanding between the communities of Cyprus.

1 Introduction

Interethnic conflict between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, followed by the division of Cyprus in 1974, continues to affect the communication and potential for reconciliation between the two. The border that divides the island is, as Anastasiou puts it, 'not so much in itself an obstacle to communication as it is a symbol of a communication problem that goes far deeper than the physical barriers' (Anastasiou, 2002:581). Recent research shows that, despite decades without violent conflict between them, the two communities continue to mistrust each other and to lack confidence in the ongoing peace process (Kaymak, Lordos and Tocci, 2008; Lordos; Kaymak and Tocci, 2009; Sözen, Christou, Lordos and Kaymak, 2010). The media have played a central role in the formation and maintenance of this stasis by acting as vehicles for the dissemination and amplification of nationalist narratives, thus becoming modes of nationalist identity formation in each community. Thus, while formal political peace negotiations continue without noteworthy progress, pro-peace groups have begun to explore the news media as a mechanism for promoting peace and increasing mutual understanding between the bifurcated communities of Cyprus.

Peace journalism, a form of journalism that aims to contribute to peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts (Hackett and Schroeder, 2009; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005), may provide useful insights and context for such an exploration. But, given its grounding in a liberal, pluralistic model of journalism, its reform prescriptions may not apply effectively to news media within social, cultural, and economic milieus that diverge from the normative assumptions of Western democratic societies. This research, using journalism in North Cyprus as a case study, questions the utility of peace journalism's formulations in journalistic cultures that differ from the Western mainstream. Studying a leading newspaper's coverage of the most recent settlement negotiations between the north (Turkish) and the south (Greek) sides of Cyprus between 2008 and 2010, it explores the challenges to implementing peace journalism within the Turkish Cypriot news media.

2 The North Cyprus context

The Cyprus problem

The root of the Cyprus problem is the development of conflicting nationalisms (Bryant, 2004; Kızılyürek, 2002; 2003). The identities of the two major communities on the island were constructed around ethno-nationalisms derived from the so-called motherlands of Greece and Turkey, precluding the creation of a single, common Cypriot identity. The two communities saw themselves as part of their 'mother' nations and sought unification with them (Kızılyürek, 2002; Papadakis, 1998; Ross and Alankus, 2010). Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) in 1960 as an independent state, with Greece, Turkey, and Britain as its guarantors, did not halt the nationalist ambitions of the two communities, and inter-communal violence erupted. Turkey's military intervention in the name of protecting the rights of Turkish Cypriots in 1974 divided the island into northern and southern parts in which Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, respectively, live separately until today.

While Greek Cypriots retained the administrative structure of the ROC, Turkish Cypriots established their own state, the

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983. Although the TRNC claims to be an independent, legal state, it is unrecognized by the international community, which views its territory as part of the ROC that is illegally occupied by Turkey. Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, having withdrawn in 1963 from all structures of the ROC, claim that the ROC represents only the Greek Cypriot community, illegally disenfranchising Turkish Cypriots.

Seeking resolution

The search for a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem is as old as the division itself. The latest international iteration, in November 2002, came in the form of a UN settlement plan, also called the Annan plan, which sought to reunite the island as a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation. Greek Cypriots rejected the plan in a public referendum in April 2004, resulting in its failure. The ROC entered the European Union in 2004 as the legal representative of the whole island, but North Cyprus is excluded from EU regulations and benefits until a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem is found. Meanwhile, in April 2003, the Turkish Cypriot side relaxed border-crossing policies, allowing Cypriots from either side to cross more freely to the 'other' side.

The peace process, which was halted after the referendum, resumed in 2008 between Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat and Greek Cypriot Demetris Christofias. Christofias and Talat, both moderates who campaigned on a stated commitment to reach a settlement on the island, again raised hopes for a solution. Peace negotiations are still underway in 2011 but involve the new, less moderate Turkish Cypriot president Derviş Eroğlu, who replaced Talat in April 2010.

Turkish Cypriot news media

Since the outbreak of inter-communal conflict roughly 50 years ago, the media in the north have been used by Turkish Cypriot authorities as their mouthpiece (Bailie and Berberoğlu, 1999; Dedeçay, 1989). Through the media, Turkish Cypriot authorities played on and played up a fear of Greek Cypriot domination of the island to convince their people that they faced a serious threat from the south. This ideological control mechanism (similar to the anticommunism filter expounded by Herman and Chomsky's (1988) propaganda model) helped the Turkish Cypriot leadership justify curtailment of individual and press freedoms to silence challenges or criticism directed at its policies (Kızılyürek, 2002).

The media were subject to overt and covert political pressures. Journalists who challenged or criticized state policies were publicly branded as traitors, threatened, jailed, or even killed.[1] These pressures produced media institutions that actively avoided criticizing authorities and became extremely dependent on those authorities as the primary and unquestioned source of publishable news (Azgın, 1998). Today, long after the end of violent conflict, journalistic practices remain largely unchanged.

3   Peace Journalism

Peace journalism is a reform movement (Hackett and Schroeder, 2009) that aims to improve journalism by redefining its role in conflicts and developing a new approach that encompasses peaceful resolution within its sphere of conflict coverage (Shinar, 2007; Spencer, 2005). It questions existing attitudes and behaviors in media coverage of conflicts and highlights problems with journalism practices and representation of conflicts.

According to Galtung (2002), peace journalism encourages a journalism that is peace, truth, people, and solution oriented. According to his model, journalists should: give voice to all parties involved in a conflict, rather than portraying it as a tug of war between two polarized sides; broaden their sources to include people outside official and political elites; focus on the effects of violence, such as trauma, damage to structure, and culture, rather than just the number of dead or wounded; and expose untruths and cover-ups on all sides (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2007; Shinar, 2009). The argument is that such journalism would provide more balanced, fair, and accurate accounts of conflicts and offer a greater resource from which to build shared understandings and collaborative problem-solving.

Peace journalism is not free from criticism (Ross, 2006). Two types of criticisms are frequently expressed. One is related to peace journalism's approach to principles of news reporting, such as objectivity and neutrality, and argues that active promotion of peace leads to the abandonment of the founding principles of journalism (Lyon, 2007) and diverts political

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1.   For example, the murder of Kultu Adalı, a Turkish Cypriot journalist, in 1996 was believed to be a response to a story he had been working on about Turkish military officers in North Cyprus. In another example, Şener Levent, the editor-in-chief, and Memduh Ener, a journalist, of *Afrika* newspaper, were sentenced to six months in prison in August 2002 for criticizing the president in an article titled, 'Who is the No. 1 traitor?' On appeal in October 2002, the court reduced their sentences to six weeks. In 2006, Serhat İncirli, another journalist, was sued by Turkey's General Attorney for criticising Turkey's position in Cyprus.

responsibility from policy makers to journalists (Hanitzsch 2004b). Second, peace journalism fails to take into consideration the structural constraints of journalism; it relies on the initiative of individual journalists without addressing the systemic influences of news production, media structures, capitalist incentives, and professional norms (Fawcett, 2002; Hanitzsch 2004a; Hanitzsch, 2004b; Hanitzsch, 2007).

In response, its proponents argue that peace journalism acknowledges its intentions to affect political outcomes but emphasizes moral concerns as well as journalistic responsibilities (Spencer, 2005). Advocates of peace journalism recognize a necessity for structural change and highlight the need to develop a comprehensive strategy based on news production dynamics as the basis for effective implementation of peace journalism (Blasi, 2004; Hackett, 2006).

4   This tudy s

This research focuses on news coverage of the peace talks between the two community leaders, Talat and Christofias, in *Kıbrıs*. *Kıbrıs* is a popular, commercial, daily paper with the highest circulation[1] in the TRNC. It is a member of the largest media group in the North Cyprus, *Kıbrıs* Media Group; has published steadily since its founding in 1989; and is one of the few media organizations with a well-established newsroom with a team of journalists and editorial staff. It has a tabloid format and employs large headlines and dominant, colorful pictures.

This critical analysis of *Kıbrıs*'s news texts, informed by peace journalism precepts, seeks to uncover the norms and characteristics of journalism made explicit in news content in North Cyprus. This study therefore focuses on the inclusion (or omission) of specific individuals and categories of sources from news coverage and studies the representation of the 'other' and the peace process. Due to the inherent nature of a peace process, which is complex, lengthy, and with a need for diplomatic secrecy, journalism practices may diverge from normal routines. Moreover, peace processes offer a unique and highly significant opportunity for exploration of the potential benefits or deficiencies of peace journalism's recommendations.

 The authors examined online issues of *Kıbrıs* between 9 September 2008 and 30 March 2010, the entire period during which Christofias and Talat engaged in publicly reported negotiations on the Cyprus problem. The meetings between the leaders ceased after 30 March 2010 when Derviş Eroğlu replaced Talat after the April 2010 presidential elections in North Cyprus. *Kıbrıs* published more than 1,000 articles that mentioned the peace negotiations during this period. A composite data sample was constructed by studying every sixth full week of *Kıbrıs* coverage. A total of 14 weeks of coverage generated a total of 211 news articles that appeared in the home news section as the basis of this study.[2] Therefore, only the Greek Cypriot stories on the negotiations that appeared in this section (not Greek Cypriot media stories in other sections of the paper) were included.[3]

5   Findings

Stenographers or journalists?

Kıbrıs reporters generally simply record and repeat verbatim the information they receive without much editing or further detail or information from additional sources. They rarely if ever engage in enterprise reporting or standard Western journalistic procedures of fact checking, investigation, and rewriting. This means important stories are missed, crucial information may be omitted, and errors of fact go unchallenged. For example, when Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister Ferdi Sabit Soyer issued a statement criticizing Christofias for remarks about Talat, the newspaper simply reproduced Soyer's statement. The paper quoted him, in a headline, as urging Christofias to 'Focus on the negotiation process rather than making improper remarks about Talat' (21 October, 2008). Yet, the story failed to include any information about precisely what Christofias had said, or when and where. This was not an isolated case; many news texts similarly reproduced officials' comments without providing the exact comments, the context, or the facts behind them. During the entire period analyzed,

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1.   In North Cyprus, circulation rates released by newspapers may not always correspond with the actual figures. Even the results of a recent independent survey on newspaper reading habits in North Cyprus were interpreted differently by the media, presenting the public with conflicting figures. Yet, in each version, *Kıbrıs* was reported to have the highest newspaper readership in the TRNC, with figures changing from 87.5 % to 92.1%. The paper that followed it had only 22.1% (or 18.1%) readership.
2.   Coverage was examined for the following weeks:
       8-14 September 200823 Feb-1 March 200910-16 August 200925-31 January 2010
       20-26 October 20086-12 April 200921-27 September 20098-14 March 2010
       1-7 December 200818-24 May 20092-8 November 2009
       12-18 January 2009 29 June-5 July 200914-20 December 2009
3.   Appearance of some Greek Cypriot stories within the home news section indicates the significant news value given to them as compared to the other Greek Cypriot news items.

Kıbrıs published no exclusive or investigative stories about the peace talks, and only nine stories, or less than 5 percent, carried a journalist's byline, which generally signals more reportorial enterprise.

Kıbrıs coverage routinely demonstrates overdependence on officials and other powerful elites as credible and authoritative sources. These sources not only shape and frame (Entman, 1993; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989) the news for Turkish Cypriot media but also supply the media's steady demand for information, effectively setting the media agenda (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). Among the 211 discrete news stories sampled across the 18 months of active peace negotiations, more than half of them (110) relied upon Turkish Cypriot government authorities and political figures as their primary, and often only, source.[1] *Kıbrıs* obtained the information from press releases, press conferences, and public announcements, all of which are expressly designed to attract and shape media coverage. The reporting was limited to verbatim accounts of who said what. For example, when the Foreign Minister issued a press statement on the topics considered non-negotiable by Turkish Cypriots, the report simply reproduced the official announcement:

Foreign Minister Hüseyin Özgürgün, emphasizing that the Turkish Cypriot people will never give up Turkey's effective and active guarantee, said "Turkey's effective and active guarantee is the Turkish Cypriot people's red line and a vitally important issue which will definitely not be allowed to be negotiated."
In his written statement Minister Özgürgün responded to the claims in the Greek Cypriot press that Alexander Downer, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Cyprus, would bring up the issue of guarantees during his visit to Ankara and ask Turkey to make some concessions on this issue.
Özgürgün stated that although they knew that the overall agenda of Downer's visits to Ankara and Athens is the negotiation process, they did not know the details of his agenda. He also remarked that "it is useful for Downer and everyone else to know that the Turkish Cypriot people will not give up on Turkey's effective and active guarantee. We would like to stress once more that Turkey's effective and active guarantee is the Turkish Cypriot people's red line and a vital issue that will definitely not be allowed to be negotiated" (19 May, 2009).

Nearly 70 percent of *Kıbrıs's* stories concerning the peace negotiations during a year and a half of almost daily coverage reported from only one source and simply repeated that source's views. TRNC official sources accounted for 64 of the 146 single-source stories,[2] representing 30 percent of the newspaper's entire coverage of the talks. For example, reporting on the contentious negotiations on the property issue (related to payment for or reinstatement of formerly owned property), the newspaper included only statements by Talat, Christofias, and Turkish Cypriot Deputy Minister Turgay Avcı, which were published in separate news articles. Such reporting clearly aligns with the peace journalism critique that news media represent peace as a government process, untainted by the needs and interests of the people whose welfare is at issue. It also confirms media's myopic focus on the nationalist, 'home' perspective of conflicts and excludes other perspectives, falls far short of providing a wide range of contributors to the peace dialogue, skews public understanding of how peace can be achieved, and magnifies the power of government officials.

Such coverage also helped to discursively [re]produce separation between the 'sides' of the Cyprus problem. *Kıbrıs* coverage of the negotiations included comments and perspectives from 92 TRNC officials, as compared to 32 ROC officials, for a ratio of nearly three to one. The disproportionate reliance on TRNC sources solidifies 'our' perspective as the majority view, reinforces us/them representation of the negotiations, and offers little discursive common ground upon which the leaders could build a lasting peace.

Stories about the peace talks based entirely on a single TRNC official's comments blurred the distinction between news coverage and governmental public relations/propaganda. They empowered the authorities to portray the talks ideologically, present the demands of the TRNC as just and reasonable, and characterize the expectations of the ROC as manipulative and unreasonable. Such reports placed the blame for lack of substantive progress or for new disputes on the 'other' side. In one representative example, the paper reproduced a state news agency report[3] in which Talat was quoted as overtly blaming his Greek Cypriot counterpart for lack of progress in the process:

We have set the middle of next year as a target and no objection came from the other side. However, now with this pace, this target is difficult to meet. In addition to starting without a basis, the meetings are held with many intervals. I said: "Let us leave all our affairs and give all our energy to continue negotiations. If needed, let us meet every day." Christofias objected to this and said: "I have other obligations." He is continuously holding visits abroad. It is difficult to achieve the target we have set with this speed (5 December, 2008).

Similarly, reporting on the presidential spokesperson's weekly press conference, *Kıbrıs* cited him as saying that 'Greek Cypriot spokespeople are telling certain things not in the exact way but by adding or decreasing them. Furthermore, they do not present this as a solution they desire but a solution that both sides have agreed' (22 October, 2008). The imprecision

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1. The total number of stories that used authorities and other political elite figures as sources is 176, or more than 83 percent. 38 of them included Greek Cypriot sources, 110 Turkish Cypriot, and 51 official sources from other countries such as the UK, Turkey, or international organizations such as the UN or the EU. Some of the stories included two or three of these sources.
2. There were 146 single source stories of which 23 of them were Greek Cypriots, 26 were Turkish Cypriot sources other than officials and 33 of them were from other countries such as the UK, Turkey, or international organizations such as the UN or the EU.
3. Lack of content editing is demonstrated by publication of the same item in multiple Cypriot newspapers.

of such accounts empowers readers to ascribe their own content to the Greek Cypriot message and to interpret the Greek comments as manipulative or dishonest. Such framing is constructed both in individual stories and in the composite coverage of *Kıbrıs,* wherein 44 articles (or fully one-fifth of the coverage) expressed criticism of the ROC position or the Greek Cypriot leader's conduct in the negotiations while only 18 reports (or 8 percent) criticized the Turkish Cypriot leader or the TRNC behavior.

When government officials themselves do not dominate news coverage, the official state news agency, *Türk Ajansı Kıbrıs* (Turkish Agency Cyprus or TAK) controls the flow and focus of information on the peace negotiations. TAK provides the bulk of news information about the island and also supplies state-sanctioned (i.e., non-problematic for the outlet) news and information to all North Cypriot media. While reliance on material supplied by news agencies is commonplace for media worldwide, *Kıbrıs* employs agency copy almost to the exclusion of other sources of news. During the period studied, 88 percent of news articles in *Kıbrıs* came from TAK and were printed with little editing, as is confirmed by the publication of identical stories in multiple North Cypriot newspapers (Şahin, 2010). For example, reporting on a meeting between the Turkish Cypriot President and the UN Secretary General's Special Adviser for Cyprus, Alexander Downer, *Kıbrıs* reprinted TAK's version: 'Downer, despite saying "as usual I have very few things to say" in an answer to Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot journalists' questions, gave one of his longest statements on these meetings' (*Kıbrıs,* 9 April, 2009 and TAK, 8 April, 2008 item 76). *Kıbrıs* also reported on a public opinion survey by repeating TAK's interpretation: 'According to a survey conducted in the TRNC and South Cyprus, both sides have a "strong desire for a solution" but "low expectations" of it' (*Kıbrıs,* 19 December, 2009 and TAK, 18 December, 2009, item 47)[1]. The high percentage of news on the talks provided exclusively by TAK biases news coverage toward what one TAK reporter described as 'officially approved news' (Şahin, 2008). Accordingly, TAK-sourced stories might accurately be viewed as an extension of the previous category of TRNC official-sourced reports.

The coverage examined here provides further evidence of the North Cypriot news media's obsession with the concerns and articulations of elite and official sources whose perspectives and comments filled 92 percent of the stories. Out of the 211 news articles examined in this study, only 17 (of which two expressed public opinion and three represented Greek Cypriot views) reflected the voices and opinions of any other group, such as women's organizations, average citizens, trade unions, chambers of industry, or business owners. Only three stories included women's opinions in relation to the negotiations. These reports covered demonstrations organized by Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot women's groups and the statements they issued in support of the peace process. Such extremely limited access to news columns may be an indication that women must form groups and stage events to attract media attention. The existence of such stories, however, makes clear that reporters do have access to and knowledge of alternative sources for news coverage. Even such limited coverage of the views of non-officials and 'outsiders' also provides the news media with a ready defense against claims that North Cypriot journalists fail to convey the full spectrum of voices and ideas about the peace talks to their readers. At the same time, however, the scarcity of these stories makes any alternative views they present easy to dismiss and undermines the power of these sources. As such, these exceptions to the nearly exclusive focus on official news – the rare and tiny life raft adrift in a sea of official-sanctioned news accounts – serve to reinforce the powerful control of the news by male government officials and political elites.

These findings make clear that *Kıbrıs* reported the peace process as occurring only in the political arena; discussions were not broadened to include other publics or parties whose concerns were deemed un-newsworthy and rendered invisible. Members of the public were reduced to mere spectators, not only by the political elite but by the news media that left them outside the forum for discussions of peace.

Who 's in control, journalists or sources?

The relationship between journalists and their sources plays a key role in shaping news content and its impact on public understanding of issues (Davis, 2009, Berkowitz, 2009). Whether journalist or source exerts the greater influence in shaping the news has been one of the main questions concerning the interaction between the two. Berkowitz (2009) makes the case that the relationship between the two represents more than just a daily battle to sway public opinion but, in the longer term, contributes to the shaping of dominant ideological positions and common sense understandings of individuals, institutions and occurrences. If alternative frames for an issue are rare or unobtainable, then the presented news frame becomes the hegemonic perspective for the understanding and construction of a particular social reality (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). Therefore, whose reality is represented becomes an important issue.

The findings highlight that, in the case of *Kıbrıs,* official sources have control over the news production. They show how officials dominate the public sphere with their discourses and perspectives, influencing popular understanding of the issue. They also demonstrate that these sources have the power not only to determine what information is disseminated publicly

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1. The *Kıbrıs* headline misrepresented the main finding of the survey, which was that the 'desire for solution is low'.

but also how this information is framed, leading to official control of information and the production of propaganda. Whether the source is a government official or the state press agency, TAK, the news is aligned with state ideology and almost entirely uncritical of state policies. Predictably, this creates a bias in favor of the authorities. As heavy reliance on the agency is not limited to *Kıbrıs* but applies to all the Turkish Cypriot news media, it also leads to centralization and homogenization of information. The overwhelming predominance in *Kıbrıs* of verbatim, official accounts of the peace talks raises serious questions about whether journalism in North Cyprus is merely an exercise in recording what officials say, without processing and contextualizing the information, and thereby justifying the pejorative label of 'stenographic journalism'. It also suggests that while peace journalism concepts offer fertile critical perspectives on North Cypriot journalism, they may prove ineffective in transforming or reforming a press that is private and independent largely only in name.

Double mediation

The Turkish Cypriot news media routinely print daily news summaries of extracts from the Greek Cypriot press.[1] Turkish Cypriots depend primarily on this information conveyed through the media to construct Greek Cypriot identity, ideologies, and policies (Howarth, 2006: 7). Among the Greek Cypriot news stories that were reported in *Kıbrıs,* 54 appeared within the home news section. Yet, only two of these involved news gathered by Turkish Cypriot journalists talking to Greek Cypriots. One of these exceptional stories involved a *Kıbrıs* report on an interview with a Greek Cypriot trade union representative by Kıbrıs TV, a station owned by the same company as *Kıbrıs* (10 September, 2008). The other was a report on Greek Cypriot leader Christofias' speech during an event in London (21 September, 2009). All other information concerning the views and actions of Greek Cypriots, a category that in *Kıbrıs* pages encompasses only Greek Cypriot officials and politicians, came from the Greek Cypriot media. Rather than initiate independent coverage, *Kıbrıs* engaged in a recurrent act of double mediation; the stories on Greek Cypriots were simply lifted and translated from the Greek Cypriot media. That is to say, any views or accounts given by Greek Cypriots were re-reported in the Turkish Cypriot media after they had been broadcast or printed by the Greek Cypriot media. For example, the reporting of press conferences held by Greek Cypriot leader Christofias following negotiations with his Turkish Cypriot counterpart consisted of a reproduction of news items by the Greek Cypriot public radio station, Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CyBC) (11 April, 2009 and 3 July, 2009). In these stories, the paper first gave Talat's statements at length and then presented Christofias', usually in a shorter form.

Stories from South Cyprus were usually political stories related to the Cyprus issue, peace process, and ROC -Turkey affairs. Some news items that appeared in the Greek Cypriot media concerning the Turkish Cypriot side were also included in the news from the Greek Cypriot side, but they were reported without context, investigation, or confirmation from the Turkish Cypriot authorities. Like the representation of Turkish Cypriot viewpoints, the representation of Greek Cypriot perspectives focused exclusively on male officials and elites. Ordinary Greek Cypriots were nearly invisible. There were only three examples of any Greek Cypriot group other than political elites receiving coverage in the Turkish Cypriot media. Two of them involved the joint Turkish Cypriot /Greek Cypriot women's peace activities (9 September 2008 and 20 October 2008), and the other was a story from a right wing Greek Cypriot daily reporting on a group calling on the Greek Cypriot leader to discontinue the talks (10 August, 2009). The republished Greek Cypriot news was selected, translated, and distributed by TAK, and thus may be viewed as part of TRNC management of the news. In fact, 89 percent of the *Kıbrıs* stories related to the Greek Cypriot side were channeled through the official news service, TAK.

Representation of the bilateral talks

Kıbrıs did not attach the term 'peace' to the ongoing process engaged in by TRNC and ROC officials. Rather, the talks were consistently, and ambiguously, called simply 'negotiations' (*müzakere*). Similarly, the stated aim of these negotiations was a 'solution' to the 'Cyprus problem' rather than peace or an end to the conflict. The phrase, 'comprehensive negotiations that started with the aim of finding a solution to the Cyprus problem' was repeated frequently in the reports on the leaders' meetings, but subsequent sentences failed to elaborate on the meaning of 'comprehensive,' 'solution,' or 'problem'.

One headline likened the process to bargaining, stating that 'haggling has started' (12 September, 2008). The verb haggle, which usually refers to extended bartering to obtain the lowest price for a desired purchase, conveyed a sense of obstinacy, frustration, and pettiness. The reports also presented the negotiations as a process by and between the 'leaders' of the ROC and the TRNC. A closer examination showed that 'our' leader was identified with the authoritative title of 'president', while 'theirs' was simply the 'leader of the administration'. The newspaper described 'our' side as a 'republic', that is a state that is elected by and responsive to its people. In contrast, 'theirs' was an 'administration', or a collection of managers that direct rather than respond to their people. This distinction in labels positions the leader of the TRNC as the elected head of a nation and demotes the leader of the ROC to the post of bureaucratic functionary; ironic given the respective positions of the TRNC and the ROC in the eyes of the international community. This discourse adopts the official TRNC perspective

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1. The same practice does not exist in the Greek Cypriot press.

to frame the 'other side' not as the duly elected ROC government in the south but, instead, only as the Greek Cypriot management. This subtle linguistic turn speaks volumes to an audience primed to distinguish between the current Greek Cypriot administration and the 'real' ROC, which, in their view, would include Turkish Cypriot representation and empowerment.

News reports also explicitly described the Greek Cypriot 'other' as aggressive, unreasonable, untrustworthy, hostile, and disingenuous. One story on the ongoing process to reach a solution reported that the Greek Cypriot side did not want to achieve a united state (1 March 2009). Another described Christofias as 'attacking President Talat with aggressive words at every opportunity' (7 December, 2008). Headlines quoting official statements reinforced this message, sometimes extending the Greek Cypriot threat to the fundamental liberties of Turkish Cypriots. For example, one headline said: 'Turkish Cypriots' basic rights and interests are being attacked' (5 December, 2008), and another said 'They [Greek Cypriots] are presenting the solution *they* desire as the agreed solution' (22 October, 2008, emphasis added). The paper also portrayed 'us' positively and as the misunderstood victim with headlines like, 'We are the side seeking an agreement with good intention, the world should understand this' (23 May, 2009). This practice shifted blame for lack of progress in the negotiations onto Greek Cypriots. The demarcation of 'us' and 'them', with the latter repeatedly being negatively attributed, also occurred through the structure of stories, in the consistent oppositional positioning of speakers, and the specific use of labels to reinforce conflict rather than conciliation. In both subtle and overt ways, by repeating official discourses and through newspaper representations of events, *Kıbrıs'* reporting helped shape perceptions of Greek Cypriots as the threatening 'other' and their participation in the talks as less than wholehearted.

6   Peace journalism in North Cyprus

Despite sharing problems of the media worldwide, journalism in North Cyprus exhibits practices that contravene established Western conventions of the profession. Extreme overdependence on official sources, dominance of official discourse and state-run press agency reports, and the virtual absence of multiple-source stories, fact checking, research, and rewriting of externally produced texts undercut the role of an independent and credible press as they serve the interests of government officials rather than the public. Rather than being exceptional, these practices are the norm and form the basis of a journalism culture distinct from that envisioned as the foundation of peace journalism reforms.

However, in response to public and professional dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, recent reform initiatives have included some efforts to introduce peace journalism in North Cyprus. Some believe peace journalism, as a necessary component of good journalism (Kempf, 2007), can contribute to improving the quality of news reporting in North Cyprus. For example, peace journalism's parameters of peace and solution orientation may be useful, especially in providing balanced and accurate representations of the settlement efforts and offering both sides' perspectives. Already, the Faculty of Communication and Media Studies in one North Cypriot university has added peace journalism to its curriculum, participated in peace journalism training of local journalists, and held an international conference of academics and journalists dedicated to peace journalism. A series of stories about people from both communities who went missing during the interethnic conflict published by *Yenidüzen*, a North Cypriot daily newspaper, is another example of efforts to employ peace journalism. However, these are rather fleeting, individual efforts that cannot be generalized to the news media more widely.

Journalism practices as challenges

Peace journalism encourages journalists to make choices, about what to report and how to report, that create opportunities for the public to consider and value non-violent responses (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005: 5). Peace journalism suggests that the incorporation of new sources and ideas, in place of the nationalist discourses that now predominate in North Cypriot newspapers, could contribute to reconciliation efforts in Cyprus. Yet, suggesting that peace journalism should simply be adopted in North Cyprus too readily dismisses the difficulty of applying its prescription to a situation in which the dynamics of journalism diverge significantly from the models and assumptions on which peace journalism is based.

In places like North Cyprus, where journalists in some cases may have neither the freedom to make decisions about what and how to report nor a culture that encourages such practices, peace journalism's suggestions may be quite difficult to implement. Recommendations for journalism practices derived from the assumptions of journalism that exist in Western democratic societies present certain challenges for Turkish Cypriot journalists. For instance, reporting on issues and events that involve state authorities may, in some cases, be required for journalists because either the news organizations or state officials demand that their actions be reported. Moreover the nature of this reporting is largely preordained by an entrenched power relationship in which state officials usually retain the upper hand and may, on occasion, reinvigorate their supremacy through overt and covert forms of repression or violence against reporters.

Far from being adversarial or even symbiotic, journalism in North Cyprus contributes to the control of information by authorities with the control mechanism embedded within existing journalism practices. Apart from relying on official sources

and reporting them verbatim, dependence on TAK creates indirect control over the news media. Most, or in some cases all, of the Cyprus-related news that appears in the diversely owned news media in the north comes from TAK and generally is printed verbatim without additional comment or reporting (Şahin, 2010). In this situation, neither the individual journalist nor the media institution always has the final say in how events that involve powerful elites are reported. As one reporter with the state news agency noted, if authorities asked TAK not to include information in their reports, they would comply with the request and certain information would never reach the news outlets (Şahin, 2008). While it is clear that elimination of that control and the changing of certain journalistic practices are crucial to effective reform of journalism in North Cyprus, it is difficult to judge how best to achieve those fundamental alterations in journalism structures and practices. As presently articulated, the peace journalism model, which assumes relative autonomy for journalists, fails to offer effective tools to journalists who do not enjoy such freedom.

Peace journalism's criticism of media's focus on only two of the many sides of a conflict also misses the mark when considering Turkish Cypriot journalism. In the Turkish Cypriot media, not even two but usually just one side is reported. This tendency applies to both the reporting of internal affairs and external relations with the 'other' side. Reporting only one side of the story results from a parroting of limited sources rather than journalistic effort. In relation to the Cyprus conflict, it is predominantly Turkish Cypriot perspectives that are reported. The predomination of official and political elite sources, who use the media to justify the Turkish Cypriot position, means that Greek Cypriot views are absent or distorted to conform to Turkish Cypriot ideology, reducing representation to only one side. There is also a lack of communication between Turkish Cypriot journalists and the Greek Cypriot community. Even with increased direct access and potential communication with the 'other' through open public border crossings between the north and the south, the Turkish Cypriot media interact very little with and report scant news gathered directly by themselves from the Greek Cypriot community. Turkish Cypriot journalists are reluctant to contact Greek Cypriots directly to get information, relying instead on excerpts from the Greek Cypriot media to report on issues in the south of Cyprus[1]. No Greek Cypriot journalists work for the Turkish Cypriot media, although a number of Turkish Cypriot journalists work in the Greek Cypriot media.[2]

As a result, peace journalism's general prescription to cover all sides of an issue runs headlong into the wall of government control mechanisms internalized by the media and embedded in the political structure of the TRNC. Moreover, selective reporting of Greek Cypriot perspectives that highlight conflict and antagonism does not contribute to constructive dialogue but rather suggests how more expansive incorporation of alternative voices might aggravate rather than reduce frictions.

Other challenges

Nationalism, which presents one of the biggest challenges to the practice of peace journalism and which is called up with particular virulence in situations of ongoing conflict, so far has been inadequately addressed by peace journalism. Despite being the root cause of conflict in cases like Cyprus, the obstacles to peace journalism practices posed by nationalism and national attachments largely are being overlooked. As Millas says, national identity has become 'a silenced aspect of the peace journalist' (2006: 14). Journalists in these situations, who are members of their national communities and define their identities in national terms, cannot simply step outside of or cast off their nationally determined views on the conflict. Unlike foreign journalists, they are inside that conflict and inevitably affected by it and, therefore, may find it extremely difficult not to take sides. By simply calling for journalists not to be biased toward one side in the conflict, peace journalism fails to provide adequate, effective tools for journalists whose homeland is involved. Journalists like those in North Cyprus may find it hard to challenge nationalist pressures or they simply may accept the acculturated nationalist position. To some extent, they may be effectively blind to any embedded bias in favor of the Turkish Cypriot side in their own reporting.

Establishing a peace narrative is an important step in reconciliation attempts (Hackett, 2006). Yet, as in the Cyprus case, a peace narrative may not necessarily be singular or shared. In Cyprus, peace discourse is closely linked to different interpretations of origins and perspectives on the Cyprus problem, as well as alternate possibilities for resolving it. For some, peace means the reunification of the island as a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. For others, such a 'solution' is not progress but disruption of the 'peaceful' coexistence of two autonomous communities on the island. They see unification as the

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1. Several reasons may explain this lack of direct Turkish Cypriot reporting on Greek Cypriots. First, language is a barrier; few Turkish Cypriot journalists have Greek language skills (and vice versa). English is often used as a common language between the two communities, but lack of confidence in language skills may be an obstacle. Second, the established practice of secondhand reporting saves time, labor, and expense. Third, ideological differences caused by nationalism may be a factor. From a Greek Cypriot point of view, the TRNC is an illegal state and all its institutions are 'self-styled' or 'so called' and the land is illegally 'occupied' by Turkey. Such ideological frames may make Turkish Cypriot journalists feel uncomfortable and reduce their desire to speak to members of the other community.
2. According to Cenk Mutluyakalı, the president of Cyprus Turkish Journalists Union in North Cyprus, the exact number of Turkish Cypriot journalist working in the Greek Cypriot media is not known but estimated to be around 10. (Personal Interview, 31 January, 2010).

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inevitable subjugation of the Turkish Cypriot community, and they view peace as the continuation of the status quo of a divided island with full recognition of the TRNC. Alongside different understandings of a solution to the problem, conflicting peace discourses complicate a shared peace narrative. The different peace discourses are conflicting and largely mutually exclusive. Compromise is logically impossible, and achieving 'the' peace means choosing one of the two paths. In the absence of an answer to the crucial question of 'which peace?', journalists are relegated to simply articulating the disparate positions of the political leaders. In fact, promoting a single path toward peace would entail choosing one or the other version and would interject a new form of bias into the news.

Through this study of the Cyprus example, we hope to draw attention to the need for peace journalism proponents to clearly articulate what is meant by peace or peaceful resolution, especially in long-standing, non-violent conflict situations. If peace means simply nonviolence or absence of war, then peace has been achieved in Cyprus, which would argue for representation of the status quo as a peaceful outcome. Yet, this version of peace fails to include efforts toward rapprochement between the communities that overcomes nationalism. At the same time, it suggests that journalists who represent the two-state solution as peace are fulfilling this precept of peace journalism. This contravenes reality.

The fact that peace negotiations continue indicates that the existing situation is not acceptable to a significant number of the residents of Cyprus and that there is a will to find solutions to the problems caused by the conflict. Yet, if the situation in Cyprus is understood as a form of conflict comprised of verbal pressure, inequality, threats of violence, and the imposition of economic sanctions (Blasi, 2009), the effective and productive implementation and practice of peace journalism seems unclear.

Positive points

Journalism in North Cyprus also has certain characteristics that may help in the adoption of peace journalism. The usual assumption that there is a contradiction between news values and the nature of peace processes (Hanitzsch, 2004b; Wolfsfeld, 2004) may not apply to Turkish Cypriot journalism. Reporting of the processes of the Cyprus problem has a high news value. The media ascribe great importance to it and daily report it as the most important topic on the news agenda. While, in broadcast news, it always occupies the first item, in print media there is always a front-page story on the issue. Some newspapers, and *Kıbrıs* is one of them, even have pages set aside for stories on this issue. Regardless of whether they give any new information, statements made by officials, political figures or foreign diplomats concerning the Cyprus problem are always reported as news. The Cyprus issue is regarded as so newsworthy that if a political figure makes a speech on this topic during an event, not the event itself but the politician's words on the Cyprus issue will be highlighted in the news. For example, when President Talat delivered a speech at the inauguration of a university, his comments relating to the negotiations were given lead position in the newspaper and the event itself was reported lower down (21 October 2008).

The Turkish Cypriot news media's interest in covering peace negotiations, which involve lengthy and complicated negotiations, suggests a focus away from media's well-documented attention to events with immediacy, drama, and simplicity (Hanitzsch, 2004b; Wolfsfeld, 2004). Therefore, Turkish Cypriot press values may find no contradiction between peace processes and news values. That is to say, the Turkish Cypriot form of journalism that is extremely elite-centered and reliant upon the verbatim statements of officials generally fails to place priority upon values such as immediacy and drama. Such a difference in news values may actually aid the implementation of peace journalism.

7   Conclusion

This study focused on journalism in North Cyprus to draw attention to divergent traits and approaches to news that peace journalism should consider in order to offer an effective reform of journalism practice in such contexts. The aim was to highlight how particular political and structural conditions may limit the ability of peace journalism to offer guidance and practicable suggestions to journalists in such cultures – guidance without which the model of peace journalism may be difficult to implement.

There are two main conclusions to be drawn from this research. First, the Turkish Cypriot news media's preoccupation with powerful and elite groups and failure to take other views and discourses into account makes them instruments of centers of power. Focusing on *Kıbrıs* coverage of the latest peace process in Cyprus as representative of dominant characteristics of journalism in North Cyprus, the findings identify the predominance of 'stenographic journalism', with practices similar to public relations, and a news culture dominated by official nationalist discourses that offers little space for alternative voices. These characteristics are similar to many media practices around the world, but there is a difference of degree. It is their frequency and intensity within the Turkish Cypriot media that make them distinct and alarming. And it is their vigor that raises special challenges to the practice of peace journalism even as it makes clear the absolute need for journalism in North Cyprus to rethink its relationship with power and its established practices.

Second, peace journalism requires clearer formulations or even re-theorizing to improve its performance and acceptance by a wider range of journalism cultures outside of Western journalism. For example, peace journalism provides limited concrete help to Turkish Cypriot journalists mainly because its underlying assumptions, which are based on a liberal and pluralistic understanding of journalism, are not always applicable to the news culture in North Cyprus. With its particular dynamics of news production, source-journalist relationships, and the information-control mechanisms embedded within journalism practice, Turkish Cypriot journalism exhibits different characteristics from Western journalism. These problematic traits – exacerbated by pressures from nationalism and national identities, conflicting discourses of peace, and a lack of communication between the sides–present serious questions about the implementation of peace journalism in North Cyprus to which current articulations of the peace journalism model do not offer satisfactory answers.

For peace journalism to be effective in different news cultures similar to that exhibited in North Cyprus, it needs to develop a comprehensive strategy that takes into account all the relevant factors that influence news production, including political, historical, cultural, and geographical conditions (Blasi, 2004). As this research shows, these factors play a crucial role in shaping the news in North Cyprus. Therefore, especially in the case of North Cyprus, 'peace journalism must embrace awareness of the varied identities and realities of parties to a conflict, the subjective and contextual nature of root causes, and the trap of dualisms' (Ross, 2006: 1) if it is to offer a truly effective strategy for improving journalism in geographies and cultures that diverge from the Western model.

There is an awareness of and willingness to adopt peace journalism in North Cyprus in an effort to reform journalism,[1] increasing the chances for its implementation there. This openness to peace journalism mostly comes from groups that support peaceful attempts at a re-unification of the island, yet it shows that there is some incentive to reform journalism. However, there is a need for clearer formulations and suggestions that are relevant to the realities of the island. Such clarification of the peace journalism model would not only help encourage its adoption and contribute to peace-building attempts there but would also further peace journalism's theoretical and operational principles.

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Rezensionen
Book reviews

Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan (2011). Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict. New York: Columbia University Press.

Stig Arne Nohrstedt (ed.) (2010). Communicating risks. Towards the threat society? Gothenburg: Nordicom.

Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan (2011). Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict. New York: Columbia University Press.

The *Time's* choice of The Protestor as Person of the Year for 2011 testifies to the socio-political upheaval gripping our world today; in a hopeful future we may also see this as the year that nonviolent conflict came of age. From long-term efforts at political reform in countries such as Burma, to the Arab Spring uprisings across the Middle East and Northern Africa, to the Occupy movement in hundreds if not thousands of cities across the US people have been challenging their governments for greater democratic freedom. Most of these civil resistance movements have used nonviolent methods to pursue their goals, and almost all of them have been countered with some degree of violence by the State's security forces. This form of political expression is known my many names, including people power, civil resistance, nonviolent struggle, resistance or revolution, and what may best describe the process when successful, strategic nonviolent conflict.

Research on the tactics and success of civil resistance has increased in the last two decades and today we better understand the power unique to this form of conflict. But we have also found that it requires as much planning, organization, and luck as outright war: there are many variables to success, there are no guarantees, and we still have to learn how to maintain our freedoms once achieved. Resisting those who abuse their power is a continual process and learning to do so without violence paves the way for a more peaceful world.

One of the largest and most recent studies comparing violent insurgencies with nonviolent resistance was published this year by Erica Chenoweth, an assistant professor of government at Wesleyan University and Maria J. Stephan, a strategic planner at the U.S. Department of State in, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.* Chenoweth is a past fellow at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and a visiting fellow at the University of California at Berkeley's Institute of International Studies, while Stephan has served as director of policy and research at the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, as an adjunct professor at Georgetown and American Universities, and as a fellow at the Kennedy School of Government's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Why Civil Resistance Works is an important informational tool for people directing policy and future research. Chenoweth and Stephan's prose is clear, direct, and concise; the authors explain their methodology and findings in language accessible to the informed public and those who are leading nonviolent struggles around the world. The authors integrate their experience and explore why some nonviolent campaigns succeed where violence has not (such as the People Power movement that ousted Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos in the mid 1980's), and why some efforts fail at one point in time but then reignite to succeed decades later (such as the eventual success of the South African anti-apartheid movement in the 1990's, which occurred over four decades after the failure of the initial Defiance Campaign in the early 1950's). These questions fall under their more general inquiry into why nonviolent resistance has been more successful than violent insurgencies, and what factors determine the success of those efforts. But while the research on nonviolent conflict increasingly demonstrates its effectiveness, Chenoweth and Stephan explain that many researchers still make the assumption that physical violence is the ultimate sanction of last resort.

Chenoweth and Stephan limit their research to campaigns with goals that are "maximalist in nature: regime change, anti-occupation, and secession" (p. 69), which if achieved would result in fundamental changes to the country's political order. Covering the period from 1900-2006, they analyze 323 violent and nonviolent resistance movements in their Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) data set. Chenoweth and Stephan's research hinges on whether a campaign's goals have been met and they classify these movements as being either successful, partially successful, or a failure. In this way they are able to show not only the relative success of nonviolent methods over violence, but also the relationship existing between the movement's goal and the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance to achieve it. For example, their research shows that even when accounting for variables such the type of regime or its level of oppression that nonviolent struggles have increased in number and rates of success over the last 100 years, while the success of violent insurgencies over that period has decreased. But, this relationship changes when the goal of the movement is also considered in the analysis. While nonviolent methods have a strong advantage in anti-regime campaigns and a slight advantage when the goal is anti-occupation or self-determination, they are *not* more successful than violent insurgencies when secession is the goal. But, Chenoweth and Stephan's research also shows that violence has only been successful in

less than 10% of those cases, indicating that secession is seldom successful regardless of method. By tying the success or failure of the movement's goals to the elements related to that outcome they are stating that the means and the end influence one another, which their findings seem to support. This approach and the author's willingness to combine their fields of knowledge demonstrate complex thought and a degree of transdisciplinary inquiry. Alfonso Montuori describes these concepts in his forward to Edgar Morin's (2008), *On Complexity,* as the opposite of simplistic thought and discipline driven research that deconstructs reality within disciplinary agendas. Chenoweth's and Stephan's research design does not conform to the positivist assumption that defines reality in linear terms of cause and effect, but rather implies that there is a recursive dynamic existing between those potentials that defines the whole. And, similar to how Montuori describes Morin's approach as an attempt to find the knowledge necessary to understand our "lived experience" (p. xii), Chenoweth and Stephan seem to recognize that the complexity of nonviolent campaigns precludes any one discipline claiming its territory.

Chenoweth and Stephan's approach is different than that of more traditional social scientists such as Sharon Erickson Nepstad (2011), who also presented research on nonviolent conflict this year in *Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century*. Nepstad is a Professor of Sociology at the University of New Mexico, and her research design follows Morin's idea of simplistic thought. For her methodology Nepstad used John Stewart Mills' method of difference, which is a test to determine a factor's causal role in an event when all else is held constant. She limits her research to the point of the regime's fall with no concern about the subsequent political system; she claims she is targeting political not social revolutions. Nepstad is firm in her position that research should not mix the means with the end, which in this case means the factors related to the overthrow of a dictator should be kept separate from efforts to build the subsequent government. She states that, "When researchers conflate these processes, we lose analytic clarity and obfuscate causal dynamics" (p. xiv).

I side with Chenoweth and Stephan's approach for three reasons. First, the vision people have of their future influences to some degree their actions today, and that dynamic includes factors that are not present if the means is separated from the end. For example, David Lake and Donald Rothchild (1996) explain in their article, "Containing Fear: the Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict" that the often cited reasons for ethnic strife such as ancient feuds, religious differences, or suddenly being able to express pent-up frustrations paint an inaccurate picture of ethnic battles. Instead, they argue that ethnic conflict arises from "collective fears of the future" and that "as groups begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and difficult-to-resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them the potential for tremendous violence" (p. 41). In other words, future potentialities affect how people and groups act in the present moment and an event cannot be understood by looking at either in isolation. This is an important consideration when designing the master strategy for an opposition campaign: If civil resistors hope for eventual reconciliation and a unified democratic society after overthrowing a dictatorship, then leadership needs to paint that vision of their future from the beginning of the movement.

The second reason I side with Chenoweth and Stephan's methodology is because I see reality as a continuous dynamic interplay between first, second, and third person perspectives; isolating any one of these elements perverts our perception of the whole. In other words, in an ultimate sense there is no us, it, or me but only the dynamic that arises when we, it, and I interact; like pixels in a digital picture these points of intersection illuminate the creative matrix of which we are members, and no perspective alone presents a clear picture of an event. Finally, I know from experience that any goal I attempt is conditioned by the process to achieve it and that process—constantly engaging the recursive loops linking us, it, and me to the future—is for me the purpose of life. Any effort to separate the goal from the process and to not allow the knowledge acquired in that process to influence the goal is an attempt to freeze the evolution of the kosmos at some arbitrary point in time: it is an arrogant stance claiming more knowledge and control than we have. Obviously, these views counter a rational scientific approach to research and some people in those communities still discount the validity of nonlinear dynamics. But I am, like everyone else, a person with beliefs and my ideas of reality and future potentials condition how I act today, just like they will the members of a civil resistance movement.

Chenoweth and Stephan present their case in three sections. Part One, "Why Civil Resistance Works," begins with the chapter titled "The Success of Nonviolent Resistance Campaigns." The authors describe the purpose of their research, the questions they are pursuing, the data set they developed for their analysis, and some of the findings that arose. Their primary argument is that nonviolent campaigns are more successful because they generate greater participation than violent insurgencies. They put their research in context with that of others, and address the importance of comparing violent and nonviolent methods for academic purposes and designing public policy. The first chapter concludes with a concise breakdown of the rest of the book.

In Chapter Two, "The Primacy of Participation in Nonviolent Resistance," Chenoweth and Stephan

present their argument that nonviolent campaigns are more successful because they have a participation advantage and that the diversity associated with larger sections of society increases the ability to promote massive noncooperation throughout the country's economic and socio-political institutions. They begin by explaining their definition of participation and how they estimated the number of participants in the campaigns included in the NAVCO data set. Then they discuss how mass mobilization occurs and the informational difficulties, commitment problems, and physical and moral barriers related to participation. Chenoweth and Stephan explain how massive participation enhances mechanisms such as coercion, loyalty shifts in the regime's troops, the concept of backfire (where excessive oppression by the regime backfires and works to turn past supporters against them), international sanctions and external support, tactical diversity and innovation, and the resilience movements need to weather the course of a campaign. The authors then present those factors they feel are the most important to success, and the key outliers that arise in the data set when violent campaigns do succeed.

In Chapter 3, "Exploring Alternative Explanations for the Success of Civil Resistance," Chenoweth and Stephan address two critiques of their approach. The first is the predominate view among the social science and contentious politics communities that structural conditions are the most important factor in determining the success of nonviolent movements. The authors use multivariate analysis to support their case and look at various types of opponents and movement goals as well as different regions in the world and the historic time the campaign took place. Their findings continue to support the relationship between nonviolent methods and success even when structural and environmental factors are considered. The second potential critique of their research is that their findings are endogenous and that nonviolent methods are more a symptom than the cause of the high success of nonviolent campaigns. The concerns are that nonviolent movements are successful because they emerge after a regime has shown its vulnerability, and that violent campaigns are often unsuccessful because they only emerge in the worst situations and after nonviolent efforts have already failed. Chenoweth and Stephan's statistics refute those concerns and their evidence continues to show that the reasons people choose to use violence do not affect the results of their research.

In the four chapters comprising Part 2, Chenoweth and Stephan compare and contrast the relative success of four case studies in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. They chose these examples because they have various degrees of success, wide variation in their independent variables, both violent and nonviolent periods in the campaign (allowing for inter-case comparison), and because each of these cases pits nonviolent resistors against militarily superior forces in environments of extreme repression. Chenoweth and Stephan explain that the case studies are important to their argument because they allow them to test theory, identify other variables for future research, and consider alternatives to their argument. Chapters Four and Five look at two resistance movements that are current in the Middle East—Iran and the Palestinian Territories—and in Chapters Six and Seven the authors examine the People Power Revolution that toppled the Marcos regime in the Philippines in the mid-1980's, and the continuing failure of the prodemocracy movement being led by Aung San Suu Kyi in Burma. In each of these cases Chenoweth and Stephan provide an historical accounting of the movement and use their research to support their discussion and analysis. Part Two concludes with a summary of the case studies and a comparison between nonviolent and violent campaigns and successful and unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns.

Part Three of Why Civil Resistance Works is titled "The Implications of Civil Resistance," and includes one primary chapter and the book's conclusion. In Chapter Eight, "After the Campaign: The Consequences of Violent and Nonviolent Resistance,"
Chenoweth and Stephan look at the relative effect violent or nonviolent methods have on the potential for subsequent democracy or eventual civil war after a successful change in a country's political order. They discuss the requirements for civil peace and a democratic society, show how violent insurgencies can compromise democratic ideals, and discuss the implications of their research. Their findings suggest that nonviolent resistance campaigns, whether successful or not, work to encourage a subsequent transition to democracy while successful violent campaigns reduce the likelihood of a future democracy and increase the potential for post-conflict civil war.

In Chapter Nine, the conclusion, Chenoweth and Stephan review their presentation and discuss the significance of their findings for nonviolent insurgents and policy makers who want to support resistance movements working for democratic change. They conclude by countering the commonly held beliefs that violence is always the method of last resort, that violence is the only recourse against repressive regimes, or that there are some types of states where nonviolent efforts are ineffective. Their evidence refutes these claims and instead shows that nonviolent methods have a strategic advantage over violent insurgencies in almost all cases. According to Chenoweth and Stephan, nonviolent resistance is almost always a viable option to violence, it enhances the quality of the subsequent political order, and it strengthens the citizenship skills necessary to maintain a functioning democracy.

Why Civil Resistance Works is a strong and timely contribution to the study of nonviolent conflict; it

offers empirical evidence that if confirmed will bring greater clarity to our understanding of democracy and it should help to increase the acceptance of nonviolent civil resistance around the world. The research presented in *Why Civil Resistance Works* is invaluable and supports my hope that we can find our way to a more fair, equitable, and compassionate world system where socio-political conflict is embraced without violence.

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Nohrstedt, Stig A. (ed.) (2010): *Communicating risks: Towards the threat society?*
Gothenburg, Sweden: Nordicom.

As introduced by the editor, Stig-Arne Nohrstedt, this volume is the main publication of a research project on *Threat Images and Identity*, an intensive interdisciplinary collaboration between researchers in media studies, political science and rhetoric at universities in Stockholm and Örebo, as well as at the National Defense College in Stockholm. This collection not only contributes to the theoretical discourse on the notion of the "threat society," but also presents a number of empirical case studies from Sweden, Denmark and Finland of ongoing discussions related to media representations of identity conflicts connected with the imagined dangers and risks of late modernity. To provide an overview of the book, each of its nine chapters will be given closer consideration.

By introducing, discussing and defining the central concepts of the book – 'danger', 'risks' and the 'threat society' – in the first chapter, Stig A. Nohrstedt offers a solid theoretical foundation for the following contributions and concludes that "the late-modern society in which we live today, as well as its obsession with risks and threats, should be regarded as a newly emerging phase – a *Threat Society.*" Relying on the theories of the 'risk society' developed by Ulrich Beck, the 'culture of fear' by Frank Furedi and 'liquid fear' by Zygmunt Bauman, Nohrstedt summarizes five points on how a *threat* society differs from a *risk* society, and five points that characterize the political discourses of the threat society. Focusing mainly on studies by David Altheide and Simon Cottle, the author exemplifies the new role of journalism and the media in relation to a growing culture of fear in the cases of the war on terror and global climate change.

In the second chapter, Brigitte Mral, Helena Hansson Nylund and Orla Vigso take a look at risk communication from a rhetorical perspective and analyze two public hearings on the question of nuclear waste management in Sweden which were held in 2008 by the Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste. The authors argue that because in the past discussions of this issue were limited to a small, closed circle of experts and decision-makers, a broad gap emerged between *risk analysis* (technosphere, or how scientists assess the risks of nuclear energy) and *risk perception* (demosphere, or how the public perceives the threats of nuclear energy). Although the analyzed public hearings employed a method of public discussion called RISCOM (risk communication), based on the principles of impartiality, honesty and credibility, the authors conclude that the hearings failed to build understanding through open dialogue. The opposing threat perceptions of the "other" side prevented an authentic consensus from emerging.

In the third chapter, Johanna Jääsaari and Eva-Karin Olsson attempt to move beyond the characterization of journalists as simple rule-followers constrained by structural bureaucratic factors. They analyze the responses of Finnish and Swedish TV news organizations to the 9/11 crisis as the outcomes of decisions made in terms of the interplay between specific organizational identities and institutional constraints. Based on more than 30 interviews with top managers from these organizations, in-house documents, ratings, newspaper and magazine articles, the authors reconstruct the decision-making processes that occurred at that time. They conclude that both public news services suffered an organizational crisis, were reluctant to employ an "open gate" approach in their crisis coverage, and did not include any potentially unexpected audience reactions in any strategic discussion on how to cover the events.

In the fourth chapter, Ulrika Olausson empirically analyzes the "climate threat" discourses and constructions of identity in Swedish news media. Acknowledging the transnational nature of climate change and the nation-state logic of news reporting, Olausson examines 216 news items and attempts to determine how this transnational threat has been framed in the national media. Rather than concluding that debates between "climate believers" and "climate skeptics" reflect the scientific "state of the art," the author shows how national identity permeates the reportage on climate change and how a European identity emerges partly through the discursive construction of the USA as the "other." To a considerable extent, the reason is because the EU is portrayed as the "good guys" who act in a wise, "climate-friendly" manner and the USA as the "bad guys" who refuse to even discuss climate issues.

The fifth chapter, by Anna Rosvall, asks what it is that the West finds threatening. Examining a sample of 1,162 foreign news articles from selected time periods, in 1987, 1995 and 2002, Rosvall aims to explore Swedish media representations of Middle Eastern Islam and (post-) Communism and how they are related to the West over time. Neither quantitatively nor qualitatively could the author find discourses that used an either-Communism-or-Islam-as-arch-enemy approach. Instead, Rosvall

finds that both Communism and Islam were represented as enemies, both before and after the end of the Cold War, and both before and after September 11, 2001. There is a persistent discourse of either Islamic/(post)Communist irrationality or Western rationality.

In the sixth chapter, Leonor Camauer presents part of a large empirical study of coverage related to the 2007 publication of the Mohammed caricatures in the Swedish newspaper *Nerikes Allehanda* and the reactions it elicited. By applying quantitative and qualitative methods to 211 items and conducting interviews with the newspaper staff and different Muslim organizations in Örebro, Camauer concludes that in this crisis the newspaper constructed "distant" and "close" Muslim communities. It is, however, not geography that makes the two identities different, but rather the (textual) actors' alignment, support for or dissociation from peaceful dialogue, textually locating some Muslim voices closer to 'Sweden' and hegemonic Swedish values and other Muslim voices closer to a distant Muslim identity, which is constructed as a distinct *other*.

In the seventh chapter, Lisa S. Villadsen scrutinizes two different reactions on the part of Danish politicians to a terrorist attack on the Danish embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, relying on the norms of rhetorical citizenship, which are based on the concepts of deliberative democracy and rhetorical agency. The publicly expressed view of two prominent Danish politicians that this terrorist attack was an occasion to reconsider Denmark's foreign policy was met by aggressive criticism for being disloyal to the country in a time of crisis. Instead, it was argued that it was indispensable at such times to signal Danish resolve to terrorists, and not to connect this occasion with Danish foreign policy. Whereas citizens in a deliberative democracy should be able to freely exercise their right of self-expression, this example illustrates the problems besetting contemporary Danish public political culture at times when criticism of official political course is perceived and stigmatized as threatening to the country's credibility and security. By framing the issue in terms of mutually exclusive positions, Danish politicians missed an opportunity for a constructive discussion informed by insightful reflection.

The starting point of the presentation of research by Mats Eriksson in the eighth chapter is a sociological acknowledgment of the transformation that has taken place in a mobile communication environment in relation to emergency calls: we live in an age of increasingly overt expressions of fear and anxiety. Whereas historically Swedish emergency phone calls were associated with only very serious emergencies, recent data shows that 90 percent of the 112 calls made during storms concerned valid but non-urgent matters. Conducting eight focus groups made up of 36 Swedish citizens aged 16 to 71 years, Eriksson attempted to gain a better understanding of changing emergency communication conditions from the citizen's viewpoint and to contribute empirical findings to the theory of the culture of fear and anxiety. He concludes that although communication channels change, the importance of verbal interaction and interpersonal communication between citizens and operators at the emergency call center is increasing together with the growing need for a feeling of security.

In the final chapter, Joel Rasmussen undertakes to explain incident reporting as an emerging risk-management technique and to examine the identity positions that employees construct for themselves. To this end he analyzes 46 semi-structured interviews conducted at three chemical plants, and the factories' different forms of incident reporting. Identifying three salient discourses, called administrative objectivity, employee examination, and discretion, Rasmussen shows how the relations of power and responsibility between different groups and strata in the organizations change. The 'otherism' aspect of risk communication in this study is partially reflected when employees with different positions in the organizational hierarchy describe each other as part of the safety problems rather than as part of the solutions.

To conclude, offering a variety of empirical and theoretical contributions, this collection is highly recommended for everyone interested in new developments in the fields of public relations, information management and journalism in general, or applied research on risk communication in particular.

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