

UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ  
Research Group Sociology of Knowledge

# Crime

# & Culture

**Crime as a Cultural Problem**

**The Relevance of Perceptions of Corruption to Crime Prevention. A Comparative Cultural Study in the EU-Accession States Bulgaria and Romania, the EU-Candidate States Turkey and Croatia and the EU-States Germany, Greece and United Kingdom**

Effi Lambropoulou, Stella Ageli, Nikos Papamanolis,  
Eleftheria Bakali

**Views on Corruption in Greece: Between  
"Low Morals" and a "Culture of Compromise"**



Sixth Framework Programme of the European Commission  
Specific Targeted Research Project



Email: [crimeandculture@uni-konstanz.de](mailto:crimeandculture@uni-konstanz.de) | Project Website: [www.uni-konstanz.de/crimeandculture/index.htm](http://www.uni-konstanz.de/crimeandculture/index.htm)



**SIXTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION**



**RESEARCH PROJECT: CRIME AND CULTURE**

**Crime as a Cultural Problem. The Relevance of Perceptions of Corruption to Crime Prevention. A Comparative Cultural Study in the EU-Accession States Bulgaria and Romania, the EU-Candidate States Turkey and Croatia and the EU-States Germany, Greece and United Kingdom**

**Effi Lambropoulou, Nikos Papamanolis, Stella Ageli,  
Eleftheria Bakali**

**Views on Corruption in Greece: Between "Low Morals"  
and a "Culture of Compromise"**

**Discussion Paper Series**

**No 12**

**2008**

**Dr. Effi Lambropoulou**, professor of criminology, Panteion University of Social & Political Sciences, Athens, Greece. LL.L (Athens, Greece); postgraduate studies in sociology of criminal law and Ph.D. in penology and correctional policy (Universities of Bielefeld & Freiburg i.Br., Faculties of Law, Germany); worked with the Criminological Research Group at the Max-Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law (1983-1987, Freiburg i.Br., Germany). Professional experience, research, teaching and publications in: Police reform and policing, evaluation of national drug control policies, correctional policy and treatment of offenders, prison subcultures, social and crime control, sociology of criminal law, transnational crime policy, mass media. Member of Greek and European scientific societies in the field.

**Nikos Papamanolis**, civil servant, Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs: European Directorate of Education and Culture, Athens, Greece. Degree (Dipl.) in history (Department of History, Ionian University, Kerkira, Greece); MA in modern European and Greek history (School of Philosophy, Department of History and Archaeology, University of Crete, Rethymno, Greece); studies in history of arts with a Greek scholarship at the University of Leicester, UK; diploma of National School of Public Administration, Athens, Greece. Participation in several educational committees of the European Union in Brussels on behalf of the Greek Ministry of Education.

**Stella Ageli**, BSc(h) in criminology and sociology, University of Northumbria/ Newcastle, UK; MA in criminology, University of Northumbria/Newcastle, UK. Since 2004, PhD student in criminology, Sociology Department, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, Greece.

**Eleftheria Bakali**, civil servant, administrative executive in the Ministry of Transport & Communications: General Directorate of Communications, Athens, Greece. Degree in agriculture engineering & natural resources management (B.Sc. & M.Sc.) (Agriculture University of Athens, Greece); MBA (Economic University of Athens, Department of Business Administration and Marketing); participation in student exchange program (Erasmus University, Faculty of Economics, Rotterdam, The Netherlands); diploma of National School of Public Administration, Athens, Greece. Administrative executive in the Central Management Unit of 3<sup>rd</sup> Common Support Framework (Ministry of Economics & National Economy, 2003); agriculture engineer (Ministry of Agriculture – Directorate of Land Reclamations Works & Development of Water and Soil Resources, 2002-2003); participation in “B2B Marketing: Market Research for the procuring methods of Greek Industries” (Economic University of Athens, 2002) and in Cross – Boundary Program between Greece & Bulgaria “Sustainable Water Management of River NESTOS – MESTA” (Agriculture University of Athens, 1998 – 1999).



## 1. Introduction

The overall conclusion of the first period of research was that according to the texts analyzed, the TGs perceptions of corruption in Greece are not considerably different from the corresponding reports of international organisations (TI, OECD, World Bank, etc). The research interest of the national group was also focussed on the inconsistencies between Greece's score in the CPI index that is decreasing, despite improvements in the normative and administrative fields (public sector, private sector, institutional changes) to promote transparency, as well as the remorseless criticism from the media and the high rates of disapproval of citizens. Greece's low rank can be attributed to several reasons, but none of them can adequately explain it fully.

The usual argument is the non enforcement and/or the fragmentary or inefficient implementation of policy for which no further explanations are given. In general, the evaluations of implemented policies in Greece are often restricted to quantitative data of the issued and ratified measures, laws etc. (Lambropoulou, 2005: 214-215). If we accept that the legislation on corruption is not fully enforced or is (selectively) used against offences, which in itself does not affect the final scores, it eventually indicates that the legislation does not correspond to the socio-political background of society and especially the reference groups of the legislation. It has to be taken into consideration too, that the creation of new laws, not only in Greece, is sometimes preferred in order to stress the importance and the will of the political system and governing authorities to fight the problem in the eyes of the public. Eventually however the essence of the issue is lost and the resulting legislation does (can) not affect those targeted groups nor the general system to which they belong. Therefore, it is beyond the possibilities of such anti-corruption legislation and the CPI indicators are influenced by certain factors, being either much more complicated than they can imply, or much less than we supposed. Some of the aforementioned thoughts seem to be explained in the discourse of present research period.

Until now, neither the governments nor the relevant TI-Hellas have shown any special interest in being informed about the construction of CPIs by those involved, instead regarding them as a fatal, castigating society, issuing new laws and new bodies of control. As now evident, the government has recently taken on board a number of well-considered and effective measures in order to improve the country's mark in the index of economic freedom (where corruption is included in the index of Legal and Political Environment – LP), which may be reflected in CPIs. Greece's scores as a developed country in the Index of economic freedom (International Property Rights Index/ IPRI by Property Rights Alliance) are likewise low [57.6]. In 2007 it was ranked 36th out of 41 countries in the European region and 94th in the world ranking,

coming in both, according to the index below Albania [61.4/ E 30th – W 66th] and FYROM [60.8/ E 32nd – W 71st] (Kane et al., 2007). In 2008 there is a slight increase [60.1]: the country is ranked 30th in the European region and 80th in the world ranking, ranking again i.e. below Albania [63.3 / E 27th –W 56th] and FYROM [61.1/ E 31st – W 71st] (Holmes et al., 2008).

## **2. The research: methodology, methods and analysis**

In the second phase of the project, the research team interviewed representatives of all target groups under examination (a total of six: Politics in which Public Administration is included, Justice, Police, Media, NGOs and Economy) in order to assess existing conceptualizations of corruption in Greece and to compare these findings with the results of the previous period. The process of analysis and data generation was in technical terms the same as the first phase, yet, in the second phase it was much more challenging because of the rich nature of the material collected and complicated, because several candidates were very reluctant to contribute during the interviews for different reasons, but mostly due to time constraints.

In the second phase the discourse of the target groups interviewed was analyzed in order to synthesize their views about the forms and the extent of corruption in modern Greece. Yet, in the first phase either texts referring to corruption and ‘scandals’ were analyzed or texts referring to the case studies (e.g. parliamentary proceedings, prosecutors’ findings, newspaper articles). Because of this, the comparison of the TGs discourse between the first and the second phase was not always possible.

After intensive efforts, 24 interviews with 27 persons in total were finally arranged. The number of positive answers finally rose to 56% of the initial sample (39) including only four (18,1%) women (three MPs and one police officer). 22 of the 24 interviews were transcribed and analyzed, while the recording of two interviews, both from TG NGOs, was unsuccessful due to technical problems. The selection criteria for the interviewees were their position, their familiarity with the project’s topic, their accessibility and the likelihood of a positive response. The duration of the interviews was approximately two hours.

The instrument for the interviews was the questionnaire that the team had formulated and adjusted in accordance of the project guidelines. The questionnaire was structured around four main issues: a) perceptions of general anti-corruption legislation (EU and Greek); b) definitions of corruption according to the views of the interviewees, to society’s attitudes towards the problem, his/her view on its seriousness, its causes, the public discourse on the issue and the role of media; c) target group oriented issues coming from his/her own

experience and the TG he/she belongs; d) concepts of policies and measures enforced or of those that should be enforced against corruption, as well as their eventual success.

The content analysis was carried out with the software Atlas-ti 5.0. The analysis includes coding, comments and free memos. The coding procedure focused on the above mentioned issues of the questionnaire. Both *open coding* and *coding-in vivo* were used depending on the content of the interviewees' statement. Codes revealed conceptualizations of 'corruption', its seriousness, causes, perceptions of general anti-corruption legislation, 'victims', 'offenders' etc.

Comments were very useful because they were related to the codes, resulting in a better *in depth analysis*. Finally, memos were used in order to capture general thoughts concerning the interviews, noteworthy segments to be compared and some initial ideas for analysis with respect to relations in the data that were not obvious. All these three ways of analysis were quite helpful for the analysis of the present phase.

### 3. Findings of Target Groups analysis and comparison between the two research phases

**POLITICS (Target Group I).** In the interviews with the politicians who participated in the research, the term and the concept of corruption are dealt with in very different ways. The common broad elements for all political parties seem to be the role of the state and of profit seeking behaviour as significant characteristics of corruption. Nevertheless, each party uses, defines or approaches those elements differently. All interviewees agree that corruption is a serious problem in the country. What differentiates Greece from other (especially developed countries) is the widespread phenomenon of 'petty', 'everyday' corruption.

Regarding the main causes of the problem, two lines of arguments were identified. The first line justified corruption with the lack of moral standards due to a series of reasons (e.g. consumerism). The second line of argument views corruption as a phenomenon with primarily systemic-structural characteristics. These refer either to the Greek socio-economic and political structure, development and history or to broader structures which are related to the functions of the global capitalist system. Consequently, corruption is not an 'anomaly' caused by immoral state bureaucrats but an innate characteristic of capitalism.

As regards the media, politicians stressed that the media's use of 'corruption', as well as the place of the issue in their agenda is characterized by overstatement. The media itself is thus one of the most important reasons for the spread of the '*culture of corruption*' in society. This

culture means that citizens view corruption as a normal way of getting things done and that this way of thinking and practice is becoming deeply embedded into the conceptual, moral and practical attitudes of everyday life. Therefore it is extremely difficult to mitigate the phenomenon.

The vast majority of interviewees, and especially those affiliated with the two largest parties, aim to defend the political system and to challenge the main responsibility of corruption attributed to it, just as in the first period.

As regards the role of the judicial system, some interviewees expressed the opinion that in critical issues like corruption, justice can be influenced by the government and thus it is impossible for it to play a key role in the fight against the problem. Justice is unqualified and powerless to investigate powerful organised interests. Thus, the political and economic system uses it as 'Siloam pool', for legitimating their decisions and preferences (Savelsberg & Brühl, 1988).

Similar concerns are expressed by some of the interviewees about the independence of NGOs since they are funded by the state and consequently their ability or intention to become a major actor for mitigating such practices is limited. Although NGOs can, generally, play a significant role and are mostly appreciated for having the potential to organise and give a voice to civil society, they are usually, according to several interviewees, either 'governmental armies' or 'mouthpieces of extra-institutional centres'.

The majority of interviewees acknowledge that there is little or no political desire to eliminate corruption. This belief contradicts to a certain extent the 'individualistic-ethicist' discourse (lack of moral standards or low quality of a person) as it gives emphasis to a structural element of the reproduction of corruption and notably to the unwillingness of the political system to fight it effectively. Additionally, the acknowledgments question the anti-corruption campaign of the leaders of the two big political parties started in the new millennium.

Comparing the findings with the previous phase, the language of the interviewees is not sentimental, aggressive, severe, denunciatory or demagogic, as it was in the documents of the first research period. Nevertheless, there are occasionally some dramatic and exaggerated expressions, some of which were even mind-blowing. Moralistic rhetoric is present in both periods.

The approach of the Communist Party (KKE) differs from the other parties, as in the first period. Corruption in both phases is closely related to economic structures of the modern western democracies, namely the functions of the global capitalist system, while for Greece it



views corruption as related to its socio-economic and political structure, development and history.

Left Coalition (Synaspismos) shares several viewpoints with KKE, such as the one above, as well as the broader meaning of corruption, which it associates with social inequalities and injustice. These were not evident in the first period.

The term 'corruption' was widely used without clarification and analysis in the first period. In the second it is similarly used frequently, because it has been established in the political rhetoric as a means of communication with the public. But since in the interviews the politicians were asked to define it further, each party member used the term in a different way.

In the second period the reasons and causes are mainly attributed to overregulation, complexity of legislation, resistance of citizens and institutional crisis. In the first period corruption is either accounted for as a contemporary phenomenon or directly related to parliamentary practice in modern times and public administration. In the second phase emphasis is given to lack of computerization and new technologies in the public services, as well. Public administration is presented as a victim of party politics and working conditions.

Even though it cannot be said that citizens' responsibility was totally missing in the first period, in the present phase there is special reference to it. In both periods the target group considers that in order to fight corruption 'organized efforts' and radical changes are needed. In the first scientific period there was a general reference to control. In this phase (second) the focus was on regulatory and administrative reform, simplification of legislation and recasting, law enforcement, education of citizens and modernization of public administration (computerization, new technologies).

The idea of 'zero tolerance' to corrupt behaviour at the individual level was referred to randomly, but was not accepted by the majority of the interviewees<sup>1</sup> (see also Newburn & Jones, 2007)<sup>2</sup>. Corruption control ('anti-corruption crusade') was still on the main agenda of both big political parties during the elections of 2000 as well as of 2004, but not in the last of September 2007, especially in the case of the governing party. While in the previous elections it was overstated and dramatized, in the last one it was rationalized and adjusted to fit certain

---

<sup>1</sup> Cf. TG Politics Parliamentary Proceedings 11.06.2005, p. 15; 22.11.2005, p. 60; 13.04.2006, pp.12, 49.

<sup>2</sup> According to the authors, it is empty rhetoric, representing rather a set of ideas and symbols and a distinctive policy 'style' than a concrete set of interventions.

policies by PASOK and downplayed, referring to previous governments by ND (the governing party). ‘Catharsis’ was used too as a major communication issue with dubious effects during the last two pre-electoral debates and as a joker between political rivals.

In addition to the Communist Party, criticism of EU bureaucracy for nourishing corruption, its inability to confront it and stigmatizing came up from other parties’ representatives in this research phase; yet its role is strongly supported by most of the politicians.

**PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (Politics, Target Group I).** The representative of the control body of Public Administration, the General Inspector, underscores that corruption is not only a Greek issue but a global one, which needs international cooperation in order to be confronted. EU, international cooperation and joint actions for the reduction of corruption rates are considered as having positive effects for Greece, but EU policies give more emphasis on ‘grand’ rather than on ‘petty corruption’ which remains a local problem. According to the General Inspector, corruption takes place mainly in the lower levels of public administration and only in services where (big) money is (‘where one finds money, one finds corruption’).

For the General Inspector local administration along with trade unionism and mass media are the three ‘wounds’ of modern Greek society, and responsible for eroding morals and contributing to the legitimization of corrupt practices.

The working term for the General Inspector’s Office is that of the World Bank (abuse of public power for private benefit). This definition is used as an ‘umbrella’ which incorporates some of its derivatives (opacity, synchronizing of interests etc.). It is very interesting to note GIPA’s argument that on the basis of the above definition, corruption refers only to Public Administration and not to the private sector. By this, he unwittingly admitted that the content of the term determines the policy measures as well. Consequently, if the measures are targeted towards petty corruption it is not possible to tackle grand corruption.

Regarding Public Administration, three main factors produce corruption. The first is the administration’s reliance on governments and party politics, the second is monetary transactions between citizens and public services and the third is overregulation, complex legislation, as well as ambiguities in legislation (‘grey zone’) offering high discretionary power to public administration.

Therefore the following steps have been suggested: 1) regulatory reform: recasting, consolidation of legislation, simplification, as well as 2) administrative reform: simplification



of procedures and full computerization in order to avoid ‘contact points’ between citizens and public servants. However, it is noted that none of the measures will be effective if the involvement of politics in public administration continues.

Somehow the Inspector’s approach to the issue of corruption is closer to the views of the Civil Servants’ Union (ADEDY) of the first phase which shares a more elaborated and critical view and emphasized party-politics than that of the Inspectors Controllers Body in the first research period. This seems quite justified firstly, because he has great authority and secondly because of its institutional role as controller of the whole area of public services, which provides him with an overview of the issue in comparison to his senior colleagues of the first phase.

The above-mentioned difference is more obvious in respect to the definition of corruption. In the first phase, the texts of the high ranking civil servants who participated – the Inspectors Controllers’ Body of Public Administration, the General Inspector of Public Administration included, et al – referred to corruption as a given term, without any further comments on bribery, breach of trust or duty etc. They associated it with ‘misgovernment’, bureaucracy and non enforcement of procedural simplification. They presented their efforts for improving “inexpedient” and “unfortunate practices” to face the situation rather than analyzing it.

In any case, the texts of the Public Administration analyzed in the first phase, as well as the General Inspector’s interview in the second phase complement one another in terms of the causes of corruption (bureaucracy, inefficient control mechanisms, overregulation, party-politics, etc.) and practices in confronting the problem in public administration.

**JUSTICE (Target Group II).** The judges have a distant and moderate approach to the issue of corruption. They refer to the point without exaggerating with rational arguments corresponding to their personal view. Corruption is discussed and analyzed as a social issue: the interviewees tried to define its causes, extent, forms and the best practices to fight it, which in the first phase revealed legal shortcomings and service inefficiency.

The term “corruption” is regarded as general and not adequate to describe a crime. Even though it is useful for communication, it is still *broad*, offering the opportunity for moralizing, since this element is inherent to it. This is the reason why in the first phase the term ‘corruption’ is not used at all. In the first phase the language of the texts was strictly legal, especially the decision of the courts as it should be. They (First instance court and the Court of Appeal) choose all those references and statements of the plaintiffs that could



support their mutual accusations in order to construct their deductive reasoning and support their decision.

In the second phase the discussion is open to all relevant issues. But they still refer basically to the crimes included in the chapter of Criminal Law concerning duties and service and underscore that corruption is, in essence, economic in its core.

Corruption is regarded as a global phenomenon, existing always and everywhere and in every strata of society. Moreover, it is not considered as identical to deviance and crime. It is differentiated into corruption for legal and corruption for illegal activities (see also Kaufmann & Vicente, 2005). The first one - for legal activities, whereby its process is illegitimate but the product is legal - is not regarded as having special side effects for the society, though it is rejected; the second one has serious negative consequences, not so much because illegal activities are committed, but because they undermine society's trust in the political system, public administration and justice.

The reliability of CPIs is disputed - because Greeks generally exaggerate, they overemphasize mainly the negative and unfavourable aspects that harming them (cf. TG Politics). Perceptions and attitudes are not considered reliable measures of corruption; instead they support statistics and specifically research among court decisions, decisions of disciplinary councils and of judicial councils as a way of collecting more reliable data.

Concerning the reasons for corruption, two main aspects are defined, 1) a macro-level and 2) a micro-level.

- 1) The first aspect (micro-level) considers greed, money grabbing, egoism, conceit, arrogance, mimicry and avarice responsible for corruption.
- 2) The second attributes corruption to overregulation, low quality of legislation, reproduction of a compromise culture between politics and several organised, powerful interest groups and the serving of small party-political expediencies. This is an interesting issue analyzed in the sociology of law (Druwe, 1987; Böhret et al., 1988). Only those interests that are organized are able to exercise pressure and are taken into account by the legislative power.

The interviewees distinguish interests in *formal*, *informal*, *'black'* or *'dark'* and *organised*. During the process of legislation several pressure groups and institutions with various and conflicting interests are involved. This is the reason why laws must be formulated in such a way that they can satisfy as many interests as possible, or at least give the impression of indulging them all. A regulation, a bill which strives for innovations against existing powerful interests has very little chance of being accepted and enforced. When a law foresees a surfeit



of prerequisites for its enforcement it shows that it is the result of conflicting interests which have been accommodated. It is an agreement that has been achieved while each group was trying to avoid decisions that could be against its interests. This is the reason why it is very difficult to find the sort of interests serving the laws in modern societies and that in contemporary legislation there are neither obvious winners nor obvious losers. Taking also into consideration that according to the interviewees, the access to power in Greece has been 'widened', the intensive conflict of interests during the last decades can be explained. Additionally, party politics and populism used by the political system after the reestablishment of democracy in 1974 resulted in State's debunk and disrespect.

Furthermore, the fragmentation of a policy problem in bureaucracy, in order to reduce its complexity and support its arrangement result in the restriction of the services, departments, or public servants who have an overview of it. Therefore, the interest of the services focuses on their own separate area and the elimination of the side effects eventually coming from a different decision to their own. In relation to that, legislators are oriented rather towards finding solutions corresponding to the institutions of their enforcement than to the improvement of the situation, meaning the better arrangement of a problem (op.cit.).

Low quality of legislation is regarded as a general phenomenon, not restricted to Greece. However, in Greece it is stronger because of the keen conflict of interests and party-political profit. Yet, the quality of legislation along with overregulation is not enough to explain corruption. It is associated with *low* aesthetics – especially of politicians, *low* social education and *rotten civilization* due to an increase in wealth and state's disapproval. What is more, the difficulties of everyday life in Greece exhaust citizens and weaken their resistance. Corrupt practices can be regarded as a means of fighting inequality, although they result in incomplete equality, unequal treatment, law insecurity, discrediting state's authority and undermining trust in political and judicial system, as well as in civilization and society. Poverty is not an excuse for corruption; it is rather a 'populist' justification for corrupt practices. Yet it can be considered as a mitigating reason.

In a similar context the other approach attributes corruption to politicians, because they decide on the basis of party political criteria, political cost and re-election interests making them tolerant to corruption.

Although the Greek state has made improvements regarding technology and infrastructure, it suffers from '*décollage*', meaning that a gap exists between the country's needs, citizens' wishes and state offers. Moreover, public administration is underpaid, works without support in 'miserable' conditions lacking recognition. Therefore it sometimes engages in petty



corruption. Nonetheless, since state employees are public/civil servants employed in a sphere of liability and trust and not a regular job, their responsibility is higher than that of ordinary people.

The main areas of corruption are to be found in taxation, urban planning, forest protection, garbage and trash policy. In all these areas, and especially the first, legislation is characterized as a 'medley of regulations' serving a network of mutual interests, thus generalizing corruption. The present argument recalls that of GIPA, according to whom 'where one finds money, one finds corruption'. In the remaining areas of public life, the interviewees regard the existing legislation as sufficient. What is lacking is the political desire to control or better still, to enforce the necessary policies.

On the whole, the interviewees do not think that corruption in Greece is higher or much higher than in other countries, but that mass media exaggerate for reasons of impression and sensation. This causes diffusion among the citizens who in turn accept it as real and true, reproducing and exaggerating in their own right. Since the media serve their own (economic) interests, they exercise a demolishing critique by presenting a disintegrating Greek state and society, a view which is disputed by all interviewees, and eventually results in the control of the political system.

Summing up, in the second phase the causes of 'corruption' are not only attributed to party-politics as in the first research period, but also to economic interests, overregulation and its side effects, legislative ambiguities, unprofessional attitudes of the public servants, as well as to low citizen's resistance and low education.

The judges consider the following to be better measures against corruption: education, cultivation of people, strengthening moral standards, as well as modernization of public administration, recasting and simplification of legislation. It is interesting that unlike the first phase, none of them approved repressive policy as a means of control, but recommended education, information and cultivation of people and efficient control. However, the bar associations expressed in their plenary session in March 2007 their worry for the increased severity of sentencing *in general*, the de facto abolishment of the clemency principle, so that the courts are not blamed for partiality, the increasing corporatism of justice, and the big delays in court procedures and adjudication.

Justice is regarded as independent, the 'key stone' and 'bedrock of democracy', but one interviewee regards it as inefficient in confronting the needs of society, overloaded, slow, and expensive. Interviewees admitted to the influence of the political climate of the time on the



selection politics of justice is and thus indirectly recognized the unequal treatment of citizens (powerful unlike the ordinary people).

All interviewed judges appreciate the work of the EU; they contended that its main interest lies in improving competition in the global economy and controlling the *capital of corruption*, though. Yet, the EU cannot be counted as a working model anymore for the country's improvement and citizens' education, due to its problems of coordination and political integration. It is noted too that legislation should be adjusted to the legal culture and system of each country. Only in this way can one expect a positive impact on the intra-European cooperation in the area which is necessary to face the issue. Nevertheless, the preparation for the legal discussion is a duty of each country's government. Otherwise, it cannot do anything else than to put itself in others' shoes and fail in transformation and law enforcement.

**POLICE (Target Group III).** The representatives of the police remain loyal to the legal concept as defined in criminal law. However, all three describe it as a social 'phenomenon', oscillating between a sociological approach (social 'phenomenon') and a medical one (social 'sickness').

One interviewee was very sceptical about the international definitions and consequently the policies used. He adopts a constructivist approach, emphasising that different interpretations and attributes are given to the same fact or activity ('everything is an issue of interpretation'), followed by different consequences and side effects. Corruption is regarded as having various forms, like organized crime. According to him the term corruption is strongly related to the peculiarities of each society, the offenders' group and the formulation of charges.

The interviewee attributes corruption initially to Greek society's superstructure, which affects its legal, social, cultural and political institutions. By that, he tries to explain the development of collective attitudes and forms of corrupt practices, as well as their control. From the above point of view he also refers to the organizational structure of the state and public administration. Bureaucracy, overregulation and complex legislation are considered to be the main reasons for corruption.

The police are the only group, which tried to shift the blame usually put on Greek society, though not always successfully, by countering that most of the citizens criticize and disapprove of corruption. Generalizations due to lack of statistics and other valid data, along with the over-presentation by the mass media during the last decade, have created a *false image* about the seriousness and size of the problem in Greece.

As concerns corruption in the corps, the interviewees attributed it to strong hierarchical structures of the organization followed by heavy bureaucracy and low wages, along with the *anonymity* afforded in big cities and the increase of illegal opportunities. Besides, the *low interest of the leadership* (political and institutional) in the financial situation of police officers, and their everyday problems, but above all its ‘failure to inspire and represent the officers’ results in the de-legitimization of leadership, which is enhanced by discriminatory treatment among the rank and file in the corps.

The analysis of the first phase is based on the general reports of the Division of Internal Affairs of the Hellenic Police (DEY), while in the second on interviews of its representatives. These as well as of the Police Officers’ Union (PFPS) believe that corruption in the Hellenic Police is not an issue of concern, especially in comparison to the rest of Public Administration: a point referred to several times in the reports of the first phase.

Regarding the degree of social acceptance of the Hellenic Police today the representative of the Union considers it extremely low. Opposite to him, DEY’s interviewees, as well as its reports analyzed in the first phase, refer to the Police as enjoying high acceptance by the Greek citizens. This seems compatible with European (ESS1-2002, November 2003; EKKE/NCSR 2003: 17)<sup>3</sup> and Greek research (*Ta Nea*, 10/10/2002, pp. 24–25; see also WEF, 1998, Table 8.14; de Waard, 1999: 163, Table IX)<sup>4</sup>. Furthermore, in both phases the politicians and public administration are considered to (re-)produce high corruption, described in particular ‘dark colours’. Finally, in the analyzed texts of both phases the policy measures focus on prevention and education and not on higher sentences and strong control.

---

<sup>3</sup> According to the results of the European Social Survey, the average public satisfaction with the police was among the highest in European countries (6.4; England 6.1; Holland 5.8 – EKKE/NCSR 2003). EKKE is the participating Greek organization in the Survey.

<sup>4</sup> According to this survey, the police rise to the third place of public acceptance (59.9%) in Greece after the Church, which is put first (77.8%), followed by the European Union (66.8%). Source: *Ta Nea*, 10/10/2002, pp. 24–25. *Ta Nea* (The News) is a Greek daily newspaper of high circulation. A public opinion research company carried out monthly on behalf of the newspaper these years a research called “Political Barometer”. The above results refer to the Research Period 11-28 September 2001 (9/2001, 31) and a sample of 1,659 persons over 18 years from the general population; see more details at URL: [www.v-prc.gr/4/11/1\\_gr.html](http://www.v-prc.gr/4/11/1_gr.html) and [www.v-prc.gr/2/polvar31/index\\_gr.html](http://www.v-prc.gr/2/polvar31/index_gr.html).

In de Waard (1999) the Greek score is 21 of 22 (Scale from 0-7, score 3.72) countries and in WEF (1998) 38 of 53 countries in ranking of police effectiveness. In a more recent survey 20/11/2005 by the same public opinion research company, from a sample of 614 households in Attica prefecture 43% of the respondents over 18 years, in contrast to the 54%, indicated that they generally trust the Police (URL: [www.v-prc.gr/2/1249/2\\_gr.html](http://www.v-prc.gr/2/1249/2_gr.html)).

**MEDIA (Target Group IV).** The media representatives define the phenomenon as ‘social, political, and cultural’, with ranging seriousness (petty – grand corruption), ‘an exchange which is not necessarily monetary and not always illegal’ (in terms of law), in any case money is very often at the core of the exchange. They regard corruption as inherent to the capitalist system of western democracies (*‘the political-economic system cannot live without corruption’*). Notwithstanding corruption’s existence in Western societies, what differentiates it from its Greek version is the absence of ‘rules of the game’.

Their analysis refers to the structure of social power and its division among the dominant social groups (‘social elites’). A significant factor for the extent of corruption is considered to be the ‘distorted development of the social and financial structures’, which took place in the post-war era (after the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War). According to the interviewees, during the 80s the problem in Greece expanded and took on modern forms, while during the 90s corrupt practices were established, improved and refined.

All interviewees accept that corrupt practices (mainly petty corruption) may operate for the ‘redistribution of wealth’. Yet it should not be considered real redistribution of resources in favour of the socially disadvantaged and poor population, but as a way through which a certain part of the middle class exploits a ‘grey zone’ of the public sector (not defined by the interviewees and rather extended) with corrupt exchanges and mutual services (bribery, clientelism).

Comparing the media’s discourse in the first with that of the second phase, more differences than similarities were noted. The media in the first phase referred to specific cases, the case studies included, either for scandalization or exercising a demolishing critique against the country and only occasionally to clarify and inform with respect to the general issue. Sharp criticism was expressed especially after the publication of European and international reports. Hence their presentation of corruption as a *social illness* is justified.

The interviewees approach the issue less from its commercial, scandalous point of view and more from its socio-political one. Corruption is not regarded as a social illness but as a social phenomenon formed in historical process and defined by the culture of the country, which is associated with the development of political systems and economic interests as well. Consequently the acceptance of international organizations’ rankings by the media in the first phase is explained. In contrast, the interviewees in the second phase are very sceptical about CPI’s indexing and the position of Greece.



Finally, it is worth mentioning that apart from the extreme media criticism of the political system, public administration with all its problems and dysfunctions has a special place in their appraisal.

**CIVIL SOCIETY-NGOs (Target Group V).** NGOs regard corruption as a negative *socio-political and economic phenomenon* associated with the State and economic structures. According to this view, corruption is considered a process whereby a person uses his/her power and authority not for the benefit of the organization he/she participates in – either public or private – but for his/her own good.

Concerning grand corruption, the interviewees focus on politics. They contend that the Greek electoral system, with its big electoral districts and the subsequent expensive pre-election campaigns, makes politicians susceptible to private donors and interests; the same applies to the parties.

In relation to corruption in the private sector and economy, there are two approaches. According to the first, the interviewees reject corruption in the private sector using the argument of the economy: rules and ethics of competition and market forces as well as corporate governance do not keep up with corrupt practices. Besides, the reputation of and the enterprise itself are put in danger. According to them, such cases are rare and related either to low moral standards of people or insufficient internal controls of the enterprises.

Contrary to the above, the second approach notes the use of corrupt practices in the private sector, when the economic activities are not based on free competition and innovation. Such examples are attaining state supplies and public procurement, illegal business by stockbrokers, unlawful completion, fraud – especially securities fraud – and other economic crimes and commercial violations. Several Greek enterprises are nourished by the State, which they blame for corruption, and are over protected, thus facilitating oligopolistic practices (e.g. collusion by firms).

The interviewees neither overestimate, nor underestimate the CPIs; they consider that such indexes show only the trend of the phenomenon; moreover that only by comparing Greece with other ('better') countries would there be a motivation for Greece to be improved.



It is interesting that NGOs believe too that citizens exaggerate the problem, creating as a result a negative image of their country (cf. PI & TI-Hellas, 2008)<sup>5</sup>. As they note, ‘there are honest and dishonest people in every country’. However, according to them, in developed countries corruption emerges only among elites (grand corruption), and if it is discovered, it is usually punished, contrary to what occurs in Greece. In such cases, the law is enforced selectively and unequally. Consequently, politicians are unable to operate as models of behaviour for citizens (*‘corruption begins from the top’*).

The status of NGOs is also questioned regarding their financing and integrity. Some representatives admit that several NGOs are controlled either by the government since they strongly depend on state funds, parties, private enterprises, or various economic and political interests outside the country. In contrast, some other interviewees reject both political submission and external control.

The interviewees highly appreciate international efforts against corruption because each state is ineffective by itself, but they question whether there is a political commitment and intention on behalf of the governments to confront corruption and be engaged in reforms.

Compare to the first phase’s results, NGOs have a less emotional approach to corruption as a social issue. Their discourse is more rational and coincides with the views of the target group-economy, but they still refer to it as a *‘social illness’*.

The interviewees show special interest in petty corruption, which was not explicitly referred to in the first phase. Attention is similarly given to the negative effects of police corruption on public order, because it puts the state’s core in danger and threatens social cohesion. Grand corruption was not an issue of reference in the first phase, while in the present phase it is limited to party financing and transparency in electoral expenses, illegal or extra-legal exchanges between politicians and the private sector, mainly mass media enterprises. What is new in this phase is that NGOs refer to the role of economy and the mass media. Their view coincides with that of the economy group about the negative effects of corruption on free competition and business ethics; it is interesting that they justify (small) enterprises’ illegal practices as being unavoidable to bypass bureaucracy. Four of six of the interviewees in the present target group, are either businessmen or executives. This can eventually explain why their discourse and arguments can be seen to conflict with the group to which they belong. NGOs regard the commercialization of the news as the main reason for scandalizing and

---

<sup>5</sup> However, Public Issue (a public opinion research company) conducted a research (10-14/11/2007) on behalf of TI-Hellas itself, reducing the results of the sample (N=6,027) to the general population causing generalisations and rather confusion.

'overpresentation' of the problem. Similar to the first research phase, NGOs regard corruption as leading to poverty and underdevelopment and do not consider it as having any positive effect.

With regard to anti-corruption policies NGOs emphasize, as in the first period, the involvement of the civil society and the cooperation with EU countries. Furthermore in this phase, the interviewees point to citizens' education, sensitization and the role NGOs can play. They note NGOs' limited influence on society and politics due to their short history, scarce resources (staff and budget) and the low interest of the mass media in promoting their work because of their low profile.

Summing up, NGOs seem, as in the first phase, very concerned about corruption and were willing to discuss it. Their discourse and views still seem to be rather simplistic, as was noted in the first research period. Their argument is a medley of other target groups' views, especially those regarding the economy.

**ECONOMY (Target Group VI).** Representatives of employers (credit institutes and enterprises) composed 2/3 of the target group and of employees 1/3. The economy in Greece has only become recently interested and involved in corruption and transparency topics. The first subgroup strongly disapproves of corrupt practices as it undermines free competition and competitiveness. Interviewees maintain that enterprises – especially large corporations – are against such practices because they jeopardize their reputation and good name. Paraeconomy, tax and insurance evasion do not go hand in hand with prevailing business ethics.

For the target group, corruption is regarded as a *process* as well as a form of *behaviour*. As a process, it refers to acquiring income beyond the legal context or the official economic network (outside the formal financial and state structures – see *paraeconomy*, Kanellopoulos, 1990)<sup>6</sup>. As behaviour, corruption means the positive attitudes of people to acquire income through illegal means and methods. Therefore, positive attitudes, tolerance and involvement in illegal practices are regarded as corruption.

They dispute corruption's positive effects as a mechanism of income re-allocation, although they finally accept that paraeconomy is the (hidden) 'engine' of the country's economy. It creates extra (non official) income for the population to improve its life, which otherwise

---

<sup>6</sup> Paraeconomy is the officially non-active but *de facto* active economy (otherwise *grey economy*).



could not be possible because of their low wages. This remark seems contradictory to the judges' view, who associate corruption with an increase in wealth.

Like in the first phase, the state is heavily criticized for being bureaucratic, thus illegal (corrupt) methods employed mostly by small enterprises, they were justified as a means to bypass (state's) bureaucracy as well as in order to overcome legislation shortcomings (overregulation, lack of legislative consolidation); nevertheless these methods were rejected by the interviewees. They do not dispute that economic scandals may take place in private sector and economy (for example on the stock exchange and in small family enterprises where employees are mistreated – illegal employment), but according to them, such cases are rare and related either to low moral standards of people or insufficient internal controls of the enterprises.

The interviewees consider the state in general and the Greek state specifically as an 'unsuccessful' entrepreneur, since it operates against free competition and efficiency, along with the public sector and its major shortcomings – inefficient controls, discontinuity of management, big size – as significant factors in the cause of corruption. This subgroup maintains that petty corruption is widespread in the country and grand corruption is restricted exclusively to party financing. Its justification is rather superficial and short.

The representative of the Employees' Confederation has a different opinion, though; corruption is present in the economy and private sector, which is criticized as much as the state. Businessmen advance corruption (paraeconomy and illegal employment) using every means available to maximize their profit. Most Greek companies are not structured on a sound basis (achievement of competitive advantage through innovation and quality), but promote labour cost squeezing and depend on public procurement and privatizations. All in all, he describes corruption as a *vicious cycle* nourishing itself: it starts from merging of interests among political system, economy, mass media and spreads through out the public sector and society.

He describes corruption as: *the commercialization of democratic values, the dominance of firms' profit over human capital, wages and interests, illegal work, and employment of non-insured workers*. He notes, further, that the essence of corruption lies in the fact that citizens do not have the rights and benefits they are entitled to through institutional – official – meritocratic processes, but must use unofficial processes and methods or their party political vote.

In the second phase, all interviewees refer to the media's and NGOs' role in fighting corruption. They have a very positive attitude towards NGOs, especially their role to inform and mobilize citizens, while with regard to the media the interviewees question their integrity and objectivity in special issues, such as 'corruption', human rights etc.

Regarding measures against corruption, both sides stress, as in the first phase, the role of education. The representatives of Greek industries and banks also put emphasis on regulatory and administrative reform in order for bureaucracy and overregulation to be reduced (*'less state is better'*). They recognize the role of the political system as important but not catalytic. What is missing in Greece is not only or not so much control structures, a culture of control and realistic policies, rather persons in whatever area with a vision, skills and character, *'like the judges in Italy who confronted the mafia'*.

Summing up, in the present phase the interviewees focus less on morals and more on economic reasoning: corruption harms economic development and investments, impairs economic integration, modernity, the competitive market and economy, causing (indirect) costs in financial transactions.

#### **4. Conclusions and discussion**

All interviewees agree that *petty* corruption is prevalent in Greek society, but when requested to define the specific areas, they refer to *public administration* and then they *specify certain services where (big) money is*, while every target group strongly denies that the whole public sector is corrupt. The transparency of the operation of political parties is regarded as the most serious issue, while the role of private economic interests and the media is not ignored. The role of NGOs is also strongly disputed.

The discourse of the majority of the target groups was positive and constructive. In addition, it is acknowledged that corruption in modern Greece must be eliminated, because it is incompatible with democratic values and economic growth.

Concerning the definition of the term corruption, there is some disagreement about its content; some admit it is very broad and diffuse and though useful for communication, not for dispensation of justice, and not suitable for including grand corruption. The term usually causes confusion amongst those not involved with the law who include economic crime, tax evasion, insider information etc., even fraud and theft as corruption. Those that have better

knowledge of law refer to *coercion* as a necessary element to distinguish the practices, which have to be regarded as corrupt and must be punished.

The approaches concerning the causes of corruption mainly follow two lines with some variations within each one. The historical dimension exists more or less in all views.

- a) An individualistic-ethicist or economist approach: Corruption reflects low morals and the low quality of a person; corruption is the result of rational choice.
- b) A sociological approach with either political, or economic and legal accentuation: Corruption is a product and side effect of distorted economic and political development; corruption is a product and reflection of capitalism; corruption is attributed to overregulation, low quality of legislation, reproduction of a compromise culture between politics and several organized and powerful interest groups, as well as the serving of small party-political expedencies, which discredited state institutions and eroded social morals.

No groups apart from some interviewees in economy and NGOs accepted that corruption in Greece is higher or even much higher than in other developed European countries. The European and international research findings with the CPIs reflect, according to them trends, which are not particularly reliable. However, the measurement is not denied or rejected, but it is emphasized that more research is needed with the use of other instruments.

The EU's support in confronting corruption is appreciated and its role is considered positive for the country. Yet, in the discourse EU's role as a prototype for the country's improvement and citizens' education is declining due to its rapid and big enlargement, which resulted in its worn-out, debunk and heavier bureaucracy. This reflects a hidden worry, which was not verbally expressed, about the absence of a model, an example which citizens must aspire for. The pessimistic feelings can be associated with the references to the fact that the Greek state is much less appreciated than before by the citizens, because of the party politics and populism used by the political system, which encourages and tolerates corruption and arbitrariness. Despite this, all interviewees stated that they were hopeful for the future. The optimism was justified with arguments about better education, the exhaustion of the population's tolerance of such practices, the increasing resentment and signs of popular reaction. However, no answer could be given why in spite of the alleged improvement in education, cultivation and cosmopolitanism of people, corruption is higher than in the past, as they noted.

All target groups focus on the need for reforms at the legislative and/or economic level, as well as the improvement of quality of public administration. Moreover, anti-corruption



legislation is regarded as sufficient, but the political determination for reforms and transparency is lacking.

Concerning anti-corruption policies, the majority of the target groups and the interviewees reject repressive methods and severe punishment and place emphasis on the strengthening of preventative measures with improvements in the education, information, sensitization, mobilization and awareness of the citizens. Moreover, they insisted on private media control – in particular electronic control, without making concrete suggestions about the means for influencing them to improve the quality of their discourse and role. All agree about their detrimental effects, the confusion and disillusionment they create among the population and the reproduction of their discourse by politicians and vice versa. They underline the need for the upgrading of political life, the emancipation of politics from economic interests, the reform of electoral law (voting system), more efficient (and occasionally less) control mechanisms, as well as effective law enforcement.

The use of the term *culture* by the interviewees was frequent, although its meaning remained obscure. It was related to the economic development of the country and of politics, the influence of various internal powerful groups and external power centres, the party politics of the governments which disables meritocracy and erodes social conscience, leading to lack of faith in the state institutions.

It is also interesting that some interviewees mainly from economy and NGOs criticize, among other things, tolerance and clemency as a national attitude having historical, socio-cultural origins, as well as a principle with long tradition in law enforcement (administrative, criminal procedure, civil law etc.). This is in contrast to the general attitudes about punishment and control policy already described and can be regarded as a side effect of the ‘modernization’ discourse and the contest of several cultural characteristics of the country and its population as negative remnants of the past. It is not the first time, even though with different versions. More recently this kind of criticism and controversy has been strongly promoted and supported by the media as a way of fulfilling various objectives.

As stressed in the previous phase, from the research it became obvious that a promotion of views among different social systems operates (Media, Politics, NGOs, and Economy). Those social groups who do not have access to the media are an easy target for condemnation and stigmatization. The same applies to large and diffuse groups either because it is difficult for them to defend themselves (citizens – ‘private individuals’) or because they serve better their own interests and eventually protect themselves through apathy (public administration). The research encountered a moral and more or less emotional understanding of the issue in the

discourse of the majority of Target Groups, which is usually either case- or person-oriented (i.e. TG: Media/Press). This *free* interpretation of 'corruption' corresponds to the everyday views of moral/good and immoral/evil, which cannot be disputed since they are never empirically verified. Amplifying facts are that in the second research period the interviewees hyperbolize about several situations to the disadvantage of Greece, comparing them with other countries, either due to lack of or false information (i.e. TG Politics). They frequently described corruption as wide-spread. However, when requested to provide more information and be more concrete, they were obliged to restrict it more and more. Both confirm what some interviewees from various TGs (Justice, NGOs) emphasized about a general tendency of Greek citizens' to exaggerate a problem, thus creating a negative image of their country. It causes further a new behaviour which in turn induces new practices proving the initial false attribute to be real.

As discussed in the first period, corruption debates and legislation offer a broad area for symbolic politics, which has been often used by Greek governments, who serve party-political and other interests. This form (the symbolic use of politics) is preferred in order to stress its importance and the will of the governments to deal with the issue. It is expressed in perpetual and sometimes unhelpful legislative innovations, with several of them still in the pipeline. Arguably, this is done without reflection by politicians, who prefer to hastily draft some new legislation under 'public pressure' than to effectively confront the problem. The consequences of the above practice for the legal system are overregulation, frequent law changes, a reduction in their quality, their vaporous meaning and contradictions in their content, a frequently lacking correspondence between legislation and the needs of the country, and inadequate law enforcement. They all reduce knowledge and awareness of law, and - together with lawmaking for the promotion of party-political or other organised interests - endanger its acceptance. Thus they affect citizens' attitudes and consequently the legal culture.

An example of the impasse is the establishment of several control bodies during the last decade in Greece to fight corruption and increase transparency, which soon resulted in the need for the creation of a second level of control bodies as the initial bodies were not as successful as expected. It remains to be seen whether social, political and economic reforms in the context of good governance as the interviewees underlined can overturn the state of equilibrium based on corrupt practices. How important are informal structures and social networks when implementing reforms? What are the roles played by international organizations and multinational companies (see i.e. the 'export' of Siemens) in fostering as well as combating corruption? Can such an approach fit with justifications of corruption grounded in national tradition, culture, geographic area, transition in market economy etc.? Or are they oversimplified, and thus create a basis for stereotypes and ultimately have no effect?



And if corruption is reduced in one system, does this exclude its transfer or increase in another social system? It reminds us of the *symbiotic* relationships, in which two organisms co-exist in the same space and one organism benefits, while neither harming nor helping the other (cf. Serres, 1980).

## Bibliography\*

- Böhret, C., Jann, W. & Kronenwett, E. (1988). *Innenpolitik und politische Theorie. Ein Studienbuch*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., Westdeutscher Verlag: Opladen.
- De Waard, J. (1999). “The Private security industry in international perspective”, in: *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* 7 (2): 143-174.
- Druwe, U. (1987). “Politik”, in: *Handbuch der Politikwissenschaft*, Görlitz, A., Prätorius, R. (eds.), Rowohlt: Reinbek bei Hamburg, pp. 393-397.
- European Social Survey/ESS1 (2002) Ed. 6.0 (<http://ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp/>), Field work period: Greece - 29.01.03 - 15.03.03.
- EKKE/NCRS (National Centre for Social Research) (2003). *Greece – Europe. Society-Politics-Values* (Results of the first Round of the *European Social Survey*) (URL: [www.ekke.gr/ess/ess\\_results.doc](http://www.ekke.gr/ess/ess_results.doc)) (in Greek).
- Holmes, K.R., Feulner, E.J., O’Grady M.A. et al. (2008). *2008 Index of Economic Freedom*. Washington, DC and New York: The Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal (URL: [www.heritage.org/index/](http://www.heritage.org/index/)).
- Kane, T., Holmes, K.R. & O’Grady, M.A. (2007). *2007 Index of Economic Freedom: The Link Between Economic Opportunity and Prosperity*. Washington, DC and New York: The Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal.
- Kanellopoulos, K. (1990). “The paraeconomy in Greece: what the official data show”, Discussion paper, No.4, KEPE: Athens.
- Kaufmann, D. & Vicente, P.C. (October, 2005). *Legal Corruption*, Second Draft (URL: [www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/legalcorporatecorruption.html](http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/legalcorporatecorruption.html)).
- Lambropoulou, E. (2005). “Crime, criminal justice and criminology in Greece”, in: *European Journal of Criminology* 2 (2): 211-247.
- Newburn, T. & Jones, T. (2007). *Policy Transfer and Criminal Justice*, Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- Savelsberg, J.J. & Brühl, P. (1988). *Politik und Wirtschaftsstrafrecht. Eine soziologische Analyse von Rationalitäten, Kommunikationen und Macht*, Opladen: Leske u. Budrich.
- Serres, M. (1980). *Le Parasite*, Paris: Grasset.
- World Economic Forum/WEF (1998). *The Global Competitiveness Report*, Geneva: WEF.

---

\* References in primary documents are included in the Scientific Report Greece 2007, Phase 2, available on line at the Projects’ site (<http://www.uni-konstanz.de/crimeandculture/reports.htm>).



**SIXTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION  
PRIORITY 7, FP6-2004-CITIZENS-5**



**SPECIFIC TARGETED RESEARCH PROJECT: CRIME AND CULTURE**

**Crime as a Cultural Problem. The Relevance of Perceptions of Corruption to Crime Prevention.**


**A Comparative Cultural Study in the EU-Accession States Bulgaria and Romania, the EU-Candidate States Turkey and Croatia and the EU-States Germany, Greece and United Kingdom**

**Members of the Project Consortium**

University of Konstanz, Germany (Co-ordinator)  
University of Tübingen, Germany  
Police University, German Federal State of Baden-Württemberg (Affiliated)  
Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, Bulgaria  
Research Institute for Quality of Life (Romanian Academy), Bucharest, Romania  
Galatasaray University, Istanbul, Turkey  
University of Zagreb, Croatia  
National School of Public Administration and Local Government, Athens, Greece  
Panteion University, Athens, Greece  
South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX), United Kingdom  
Center for Research and Policy Making (CRPM), FYR Macedonia (Affiliated)

**Contact**

- Prof. Dr. Hans-Georg Soeffner, Person in Charge  
[Hans-Georg.Soeffner@uni-konstanz.de](mailto:Hans-Georg.Soeffner@uni-konstanz.de)
- Dr. habil. Dirk Tänzler, Scientific Co-ordinator  
[Dirk.Taenzler@uni-konstanz.de](mailto:Dirk.Taenzler@uni-konstanz.de)
- Dr. Angelos Giannakopoulos, Head of the Project Office  
[Angelos.Giannakopoulos@uni-konstanz.de](mailto:Angelos.Giannakopoulos@uni-konstanz.de)



**University of Konstanz**  
Research Group Sociology of Knowledge  
Universitätsstr. 10  
Box D 35  
D-78457 Konstanz  
Germany  
Phone: ++49 (0)7531 88 3129  
Fax: ++49 7531 88 3194

Project Homepage: [www.uni-konstanz.de/crimeandculture/index.htm](http://www.uni-konstanz.de/crimeandculture/index.htm)

**Email:** [crimeandculture@uni-konstanz.de](mailto:crimeandculture@uni-konstanz.de)