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Media Construction of National Identities in Post-War Europe

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Media Construction of National Identities
- Introduction to a project

In this article I briefly introduce some conceptual and theoretical considerations concerning the project "Media construction of national identities in the changing state structures of post-war Europe. Nationalism and the press in Austria, Finland, England, Estonia, Germany, Russia, Scotland and Switzerland in 1945-1995". This project is a joint effort by four universities: University of Edinburgh (Scotland), University of Konstanz (Germany), University of Tampere (Finland) and University of Tartu (Estonia). First reports linked to the project have already been published (Mattenschlager 1997, Riedle 1997 and Luostarinen 1997) and some of the results are presented in this publication. The final report of the project is meant to be out by the end of 1999.

It is not possible or necessary to describe here the complete design of the comparative multi-national analysis and its various national case studies, methodologies which are applied and detailed aims of the content analysis. What I am trying to do here is to summarize those discussions which led to the practical operationalization of the study.

The launching of the project "Media construction of national identities" was motivated by a serious and important background, familiar to all of us:

- Integration process in the European Union, its consequences and counter-reactions.
- Demands for regional autonomy or independence (Scotland, Catalonia, Flanders etc.)
- Growth of ethnic and religious minorities in Europe.
- Growth of xenophobic and racist parties and movements in many countries.
- New nation states in former socialist Europe and the reconstruction of national identities.
- War in former Yugoslavia.

To put it short, nationalism which some years ago was largely regarded as an archaic, receding phenomenon, is still here with energy and vitality and with a lot of problems, challenging both our academic intelligence and political ability. However, nationalism which as a concept has a rather gloomy and negative connotation in contemporary European political discourse, has also proved to possess a lot of positive energy which empowers people to develop democratic self-government and original forms of culture. Everybody who starts to study phenomena like nationalism or national identity must be prepared to face a considerable conceptual mess. There is a large spectrum of different types of nationalisms, historically and geographically, and national identities have been defined in numerous ways.

This multitude of concepts and approaches reflects on the one hand the complex nature of the issue. Nation has been the leading organising principle of social life during the whole 20th century in Europe, and it has taken many forms from totalitarian imperiums to peaceful democracies. On the other hand the conceptual and theoretical unclarity is a result of multidisciplinary research in which each discipline brings its own concepts and definitions into the field.

One way to make sense of the mess is to describe the various determinants and the respective contents of national identity, for instance in the following way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determinant</th>
<th>Content</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>regional identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>language, heritage, religion, sub-culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genealogy</td>
<td>kinship, race, ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>status, class</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All such categorizations are naturally in part arbitrary and vague; in the practical identity production categories overlap, and there is always something missing. However, we can assume that there are respective media contents which help in building and maintaining certain aspects of identity. For instance the media coverage of administrative orders, rights and duties of citizens, the common political agenda and national symbols contribute in the formation of a more or less coherent feeling of citizenship.

Another way to analyze the various forms of national identity is to look at those dimensions which make an identity strong and clear or weak and vague:

- **Coherence**: coherent/split
- **Differentiation**: in-group oriented/out-group oriented
- **Imperativeness**: compelling/complementary
- **Continuity**: durable/changeable

A strong identity must be able to be broadly recognised by both insiders and outsiders; identity itself must be clearly identifiable and coherent. A strong identity also often makes clear distinctions in relation to other groups (us and the others), emphasizing either the positive elements of the in-group or negative elements of some out-group (enemy images), or both. It must have some compelling force in social life, in its extreme case to get the citizens to sacrifice their lives in war for the nation. A strong identity constructs an identity hierarchy in which it shows its social power. Other forms and dimensions of identity such as gender, class, religion etc. are (in the case of a very strong identity) subservient to national solidarity. And in most cases a strong identity is linked to coherence and continuity in the image of history and hopes and fears for the future; we have a common past and we make our future together.

The respective media contents deal with stereotypes and characteristics on us and the others, they give us models to be followed and teach objects of loyalty. Media also plays a role as a forum which interprets common history and sets goals for the future.

The third way to look at the various identities is to analyze the phase of the identity production:

- **Creation**: young nation
- **Maintenance**: matured, stable nation
- **Transformation/dissolution**: nation in transition

Let me take Finland as an example. Before its independence and long after that, Finland was a country in which national identity was distributed in an active and conscious way by education and by the media. When the nation was more matured, national feelings were more often enforced and maintained. And now when Finland will possibly join the European Monetary Union, a transformation process of nationalism is going on. It must be explained to the citizens why national symbols, such as the own currency and border control - so important in a young nation - are not needed any more. Media takes different roles in these phases. In the first one it is like a teacher, in the second phase it creates consensus by repeating national symbols and points of view, and in the third it helps to re-interpret the old forms of nationalism.

Like all conceptual categorizations, those mentioned above are rather useless without a historical context. In this study the context is the contemporary situation in Europe, as described briefly earlier in this presentation.

Some more specific points of view are also needed. The whole phenomenon itself is much too broad to be tackled in one study. One has to have a more narrow focus. In this study we assume that there are both positive and constructive dimensions in nationalism but also negative and destructive:
freedom  repression
rights  obligations
opportunities  restrictions
inclusion  exclusion
diversity  unity
contractualism  essentialism
"civilianism"  militarism
equality  hierarchy
complementarism  antagonism

Let me explain some of the concepts above. By "contractualism" we mean for instance the American (USA) tradition of nationalism in which everybody accepting the political principles of the state can hypothetically obtain citizenship, regardless of race, religion, language or original nationhood. Citizenship is primarily a political contract and agreement in which the citizen accepts rights and duties and the political system of the state. In the opposite "essentialist" tradition nationhood is not changeable. According to complementarist nationalistic thinking, nations as cultural and economic units complement each other. In antagonist nationalism, nations are thought to be eternal competitors, strugglers in the battle for survival of the fittest.

This kind of binary categorizations naturally simplify multiform and complex reality, but they help us keep in mind the ethos and the motivational aim of the study. In the original outline of the study we formulated this in the following way: "One important background aim of our study is...to try to increase knowledge about European nationalism in order to better understand the conditions under which nationalism tends to develop in a positive, tolerant, multi-cultural and non-destructive direction". (Kempf, Luostarinen & MacInnes 1996)

And finally, we need some (theoretical) understanding about the role of the media in the process of constructing national identities. And to be more specific: What we talk about here is journalism, not all forms of media content.

In some studies on nationalism and the press, the role of the media has been seen important, even crucial in the creation of nation states. Concepts such as "imagined community" or "community in anonymity" by Benedict Anderson (1983) have often been used to describe the process in which people start to identify with unknown country-fellows, to feel solidarity and to believe in their common fate.

The media, it has been said, create a common national time which manifests itself in the form of common behaviour, common rites, habits, celebrations, subjects of interest and political agenda. The media distributes symbols, stereotypes and models to integrate thinking and behaviour. To put the idea in a very simple way, the media synchronize time and values by giving a common agenda of interest for their audiences.

Here, in this idea, we meet one tradition of mass media research, for instance the Americans John Dewey and James Carey. According to them the media are mainly about community and consensus.

From that perspective journalism is a form of shared experience, typical of bigger societies outgrown their oral and physical ways of community and communication. According to James Carey (1975) the, as he calls it, "ritual" way of understanding journalism emphasizes the drama and identification possibilities of news stories. Journalism is not only cold and mechanical transportation of information, but an emotionally loaded drama in which the audience is invited to take part. Reading a newspaper enables you to take different roles, to feel sorrow or pride, to evaluate statements from your ethical and interest positions, to hate and to love.

In the case of nationalism, journalism offers for its audience identification positions in which the national dimension has a predominant role. Journalism often invites us to co-act on the scene as members of the nation. It suggests that we set our empathy and identification from the national perspective.
This is a reasonable start, but we have to remember a few things: First, the media are not omnipotent and all-powerful. There are other forms and places of socialization, like the family, workplace and friends. Second, media content cannot be directly identified with public opinion and the real thinking of real people. Media often reflects more the hopes and efforts of some elites which try to create or reformulate national identity according to their own interests. Third, national and international elements are very mixed in contemporary media, and respectively the very concept of "national" is unclear in the current media flow. However, this is something to start with.

Based on these discussions, we have been trying to make an empirical operationalization which enables us to make international comparisons but is also sensitive to national and local special characteristics.

What we are able to manage will be seen in a few years time.
Some Aspects of National Identity in Post-War Austria

After having a look at the Austrian Neutrality Law and giving an overview of the military and political developments in defence- and neutrality between 1945 and 1995, I would like to formulate hypotheses about the change of national identity in respect to neutrality. The hypotheses refer to a system of categories, which was developed in the frame of the international research project "Media construction of national identities in the changing state structures of post-war Europe" (cf. Kempf, Luostarinen & MacInnes, 1996). Finally I would like to focus on these hypotheses by the example of two newspaper articles. An empirical test of the hypotheses, based on a quantitative content analysis of Austrian newspaper articles from 1946 to 1995 will be presented in a forthcoming paper.

The Neutrality Law of Austria, was passed by the "Nationalrat" on October, 26, 1955. It reads:

**Neutrality Law of Austria**
Federal constitutional law
26/10/55

**Article I**
(1) With the purpose of supporting the permanent claim of its independence and with the purpose of supporting the inviolability of its territory, Austria declares by free will its perpetual neutrality. Austria will maintain and defend this by every possible means.

(2) Austria will in protection of this purpose not join any military alliance in the future and will not allow foreign military bases to be established on its territory.

**Article II**
The federal government is entrusted with the execution of this federal constitutional law.

BGBl. 1955/211

Due to the notification from November, 14, 1955 and the explicit or silent acknowledgement, the perpetual Neutrality of Austria was embodied in international law and mutual rights and duties were created.

These duties are derived from the V th and the XIII th Haag agreement and as well as from international law.

For further reasons, I would like to name only one of four kinds of duties: **Duties of prevention** (see also Article I, (2)): Military actions of war parties, for example the marching through of troops or the building of military bases, are not allowed on state territory. If these duties are extensively neglected, the damaged war party has the right to help itself, that means to expand the fighting actions on neutral territory. This special right of permanent Neutrality in peace is not yet mentioned in any contract in international law. It rests explicitly on customary law.

Switzerland — the "model case for Austria" — published in 1954 their official concept of permanent Neutrality. In this document a distinction between two independent or main duties and secondary duties or pre-effects of perpetual neutrality on political, military and economic areas is made:

- **First main duty**: A neutral state is not allowed to begin a war.
- **Second main duty**: (see also Article I, (1)): Preservation and defence of neutrality and independence.

The neutral state has, especially in times of peace, the duty to acquire the necessary military means in order to defend future damage of neutrality. According to the extent of the prescribed preparations of defence, the international right grants the concerned states some room to move between an upper and a lower limit: At the upper limit they are not committed...
to a provision of defence that would threaten their financial and economic viability. The lower limit is normally determined by the science of international law by the so called "international standard".

- **Pre effects:** A perpetual neutral state must do everything during peace, so that in the case of the outbreak of a war the above outlined "common" right of neutrality can be fulfilled, and it must refrain from anything, that would make its compliance impossible or very difficult.

However, the government in Vienna has never carried out the self-appointed "execution assignment" of their neutrality law. They never requested guarantees nor acknowledgements of the neutrality.

The neutrality, which like the Swiss is an armed one, surely has influenced the military and political development of Austria since 1955 deeply. In the following I will present a short overview over the military and political developments in defence- and neutrality between 1945 and 1995.

- In 1952 a small Austrian army (called the "B-Gendarmerie") was founded, because the occupying powers did not want to leave a military vacuum.
- In May 1955 the Paris contracts were ratified and West Germany joined the West-European-Union and NATO.
- In July 1955 the prohibition of military activity was abolished.
- In September 1955 a military law set the basis for the general conscription of a military service of nine months. The weaponry was mainly provided by the USA. They made equipment available for a fully motorised army of 60 000 men.
- In October 1955 the declaration of perpetual neutrality and the departure of the last occupying soldier occurred.
- In 1956 there was revolt in Hungary: Austria's young army with 23 000 men went into position at the border in order to receive vast numbers of fleeing Hungarians and to prevent the extension of the fighting onto Austrian territory. The soldiers had received the order to shoot if necessary.
- Since 1961 the Austrian army takes part in United Nations peace missions. All in all approximately 35 000 soldiers until today.
- In 1968 during the "Prager Frühling" the Austrians sent their army 30 km behind the border. But they soon retreated in order to prevent a provocation of the Russians.
- In 1970 Kreisky created the foreign policy as an additional strength to the policy of defence. He can be mentioned as the founder of the so called active neutrality of Austria.
- After 1971 during a period of reform the military service was shortened to 8 months, civil service was introduced and the government decided for the extensive defence of the country.
- Since 1990 the Austrian army has been deployed at the eastern borders in order to apprehend illegal border crossers and to hand them over to the civilian authorities. Also there arose a discussion about the question of a professional army.
- In the Summer of 1991 the Yugoslavian conflict began and led to the third serious deployment during which the Austrian airspace was violated. Already during the Gulf war, Austria had allowed to transport American tanks across Austrian territory.
- In 1993, during the preparations for Austria's joining of the European Union, the Russian prime minister Tschernomyrdin formulated in Vienna: "We agree to the Austrian neutrality."
- In 1995 the Austrian foreign minister Alois Mock signed the "Partnership for peace" document and a de facto co-operation of the Austrian military with the NATO began. With this the discussion about joining the NATO started.
Since 1955 Austria has changed its concept of defence three times: They began with the defence of the whole territory, changed to the concept of space defence and finally switched to protection of borders.

The budget of defence never reached the same standard that was usual in other European countries. Because of the missing conditions, the planned number of soldiers, therefore, would never have been reached in case of emergency.

The international relationships were continually carried by the three pillars: foreign policy, neutrality and defence policy, but their weight has often changed over time.

In the following, I would like to formulate some hypotheses about the change of national identity with respect to neutrality. These hypotheses are based on the background of the historical and political developments between 1945 and 1995, and refer to the different emphasis put on the three previously mentioned elements. Especially two phases are focused on. Phase A is the time period from 1955 until approx. 1961, which was still under the direct influence of the state contract and the declaration of neutrality. Phase B stands for the begin of the discussion of joining the European Union, approx. from 1988 until 1995. These phases were chosen, because in both periods there was much effort to define Austrian neutrality.

**First hypothesis:**

1.0.1 Neutrality as an important value (as identity / national self-image)  
   Denial: Neutrality is not an important value.

In phase A it seems that the neutrality was perceived mainly as an international agreement with the four signatory powers of the state contract. Whereas in phase B the opinion seems to dominate, that the choice of neutrality was a deliberate decision on the part of the Austrian "Nationalrat", which could be repealed any time.

A too strong emphasis of neutrality as an important value could be an obstacle to the realisation of the European Union as a political union. At the latest this would be the case, when a common foreign and defence policy would be created, which is anchored as a goal in the Maastricht contracts. Above all the possibility of joining the NATO would be made impossible by an overemphasis of neutrality. Joining the NATO would mean a reduction of the defence budget, because it would be cheaper to be in a military alliance than to be alone, as in the case of neutrality. This is an argument that, at the latest, in times of strong economical pressures due to internationalisation and a rigorous policy of austerity, should not be lost out of sight.

Many politicians and specialists also claim, that neutrality has lost its purpose with the end of the cold war, because the initial intention had been to avoid to get involved in a conflict between the two superpowers.

Because of all of this, there are mainly three different positions in respect to neutrality: One group openly demands the abolition, whereas another one tries to ignore it in the hope, that one day it won't be so important any more. A third group tries to reinterpret it for the purpose of agreeableness with upcoming developments.

Certainly there must not be forgotten that the neutrality in the time between phase A and phase B has become a symbolic value especially for the population. It represents the active policy of neutrality, initiated by Kreisky, as well as the Austrian engagement in the United Nations and last not least the mediating role of Austria in countless conflicts.

In spite of this only subsequently reached value of neutrality, we can suppose that neutrality was a more important value in phase A than in phase B. Concretely this would mean that the before described variable should have a higher frequency in phase A than in phase B, whereas to a certain extent the denial should also be found in phase B.
Table 1: Operationalization of the hypotheses.

Neutrality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0.1+</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>h (A) &gt; h (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0.1-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>h (A) &lt;= h (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7+</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>h (A) &gt; h (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>h (A) = h (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.12+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>h (A) &gt;= h (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.12-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>h (A) &lt;&lt; h (B)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
0 = not mentioned
+ = sometimes mentioned
++ = mentioned
+++ = often mentioned

Second hypothesis:

4.7 Neutrality as an obstacle for entry into common security systems

Denial: Neutrality is not an obstacle for entry into common security systems.

With the explicit formulation of the prohibition of joining military alliances in article I, sentence 2 of the Neutrality Law seems to be an unavoidable obstacle. This is especially the case in phase A, which was directly influenced by this law. In phase B three strategies will probably be found to maintain the possibility of joining such a system: The first strategy simply tries to mention the neutrality as an obstacle rarer and rarer. The second strategy reinterprets a military alliance into a system of common security. With this an entry in spite of neutrality is possible. This is also the case in strategy three: Here it is said, that the system you want to join is de facto neutral and therefore automatically compatible with one's own neutrality. In summary, because of the existence of the first strategy, the neutrality will be seen more as an obstacle to the joining of military security structures in phase A than in phase B. Concretely this means, that this variable will have a greater frequency in phase A than in phase B. Because of the explicit formulations in the Neutrality Law, denial should not be found in either of the two phases.

Third hypothesis:

6.12 Neutrality as an obstacle to join the European structures of alliance

Denial: Neutrality is not an obstacle to join the European structures of alliance.
Because of the prohibition of union with Germany and the impossibility to be able to fulfil the pre-effects resulting from neutrality, which were taken very seriously in phase A, the entrance into European alliance structures seemed to forbid itself. Whereas in phase B the positive valence of the European Union had reached its climax, as a result of the increasing internationalisation of the economy and, therefore the increasing Austrian dependency on other nations, and the creation of the European internal market. In order to reach this goal, which was strived for with all means, it was necessary to emphasise that the neutrality is no obstacle to the joining of the EU. You can find the argument here, too, that the EU is neutral and because of that conflicts with one’s own neutrality could not emerge. Beside this, the above named pre-effects could easily be neglected after the end of the cold war. All the things considered, we can say that neutrality should be more of an obstacle to the joining of European alliance structures in phase A than in phase B. Concretely this will probably be shown in the denial of that variable. Here it will be more often emphasised that the neutrality is no obstacle. Probably it will be the case that the frequency of both the positive and negative version of the variable is rather low. This is due to the fact that the question of a common Europe was not up to date at that time.

An overview of the hypotheses is shown in Table 1. In order to illustrate the hypotheses, I will now give some examples from newspaper articles published in 1958 and 1991.

**Excerpt from "Weder Chauvinismus noch Hurra-Patriotismus"**
("Die Presse", 1958)

"Aktive Neutralität"

"Der Tag der österreichischen Fahne soll nicht nur ein Tag der Freude sein, sondern auch ein Tag der Besinnung", sagte Raab zu den Jugendlichen. "Ihr sollt darin ein Symbol unserer Verpflichtung sehen, alle Kräfte einzusetzen, damit Österreich auch die schweren Probleme meistern kann, die noch vor uns liegen." Aus der Situation unseres Landes, am Schnittpunkt nationaler, kultureller und machtpolitischer Gegensätze, ergebe sich Österreichs historische Mission, Mittler zu sein und für den friedlichen Ausgleich der Gegensätze zu wirken. "Unsere Neutralität ist kein Akt der Passivität, sondern wir wollen sie zu einem aktiven Instrument unseres politischen und geistigen Wirkens für die friedliche Verständigung der Völker, für die Wahrung von Menschenrecht und Menschenwürde machen."

Typical for this time is the presentation of the neutrality as an important value, done by the chancellor Raab in the last sentence. Here he claims the neutrality as an active and central entity for future.

The other two themes of neutrality do not appear in this article.

**Excerpt from "Neutralitätsdebatte: Jetzt noch nicht ..."**
("Arbeiter-Zeitung", 1991)


As predicted by our hypotheses hypotheses, we see that the third variable (6.12) occurs as a denial. Here Mr. Khol states that neutrality is not compatible with joining the EU at the moment. Also the second variable (4.7) is mentioned. The foreign minister says that there are only two things explicitly forbidden: Joining a military alliance and foreign military bases. Conspicuous is, that in the whole article, which is an article about neutrality, it is never explicitly said, that neutrality is an important value. But this is not very surprising after considering the previous thoughts.

Sources:


For the inhabitants of Konstanz, Switzerland seems to be a quite well-known neighbouring country: Kreuzlingen in the Canton Thurgau can be reached within some minutes on foot from our city centre, and Zurich, the biggest Swiss city, is just somewhat more than an hour away. Throughout the whole post-war period, Switzerland experienced mainly internal stability, and the Swiss-German relations were also very stable. So at the beginning of my national identity study concerning Swiss print media (cf. Riedle, 1997) we were quite interested whether some clear tendencies or changes could be detected in the material.

For empirical content analysis 401 news articles and editorials of three national papers (the "Neue Züricher Zeitung", the "Tagesanzeiger" and the tabloid "Blick") and one regional paper (the "Thurgauer Zeitung") of German speaking Switzerland were selected. The papers represent a high variety of different political and journalist viewpoints, and the time period was from 1946 to 1995 in order to reflect historical changes within a longer time. We decided to analyse nationally relevant articles from the national holiday (August, 1st), where it was highly probable to find issues on national identity. Nine dimensions - or groups of variables - were analysed by means of Latent Styles Analysis (Kempf, 1994):
1. patriotism, 2. historical aspects, 3. militarism, 4. multicultural attitudes, 5. European integration, 6. political neutrality, 7. regional conflicts due to multilingualism, 8. mechanisms of national identity and 9. contents of national identity. Besides, descriptive variables as national and historical reference points or secondary national and international symbols have been analysed. In the present paper I will concentrate on some essential conclusions and the most interesting results.

1. Western integration in spite of neutrality

As the descriptive variable "national points of reference" shows (cf. Figure 1), Switzerland has always defined itself as a member of the western political and economic system. The "Western world" (which means the political system of the West as it was opposed to Eastern Communism up to 1990), the USA, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and especially the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) were mostly referred to in a positive way while the "Eastern Block" and the Soviet Union were strongly rejected. For the rather conservative Swiss newspapers, the Soviet Union and her satellite states seemed to be an "Evil Empire", because positive references could hardly be detected in the sample. Switzerland's neutral status doesn't induce the press to construct an intermediate position between the "East" and the "West". In spite of an occasional role as a mediating state in international diplomacy (e.g. in the CSCE process) nobody could doubt the Swiss Western integration. Interestingly enough, the most frequent positive reference point is the European Community - Switzerland is no member, and in 1992 a majority of the people decided not to intensify cooperation with the European Union, but at least the press tends to describe the "bilateral relations" with Brussels in a mostly optimistic way.

2. Cold War, the role of the Army and time-dependent transformations of national identity

In dimension 4 "militarism" I found a second argument for Switzerland's strong political Western integration: Cold War took also place in the Swiss media. Among the four coverage styles identified by Latent Class Analysis (cf. Table 1), the second one describes a radicalized pro-militarist position emphasizing military competence and power of the own army unanimously, legitimizing the army (defence of the own country, doubt of criticism) and presenting external dangers to national security while neglecting criticism of a military-oriented security policy. This style could be found in 6,6% of the analysed articles and its frequency never exceeded 7% - with the exception of the time period 1950 - 1959, when Cold War was at its peak and style 2 was used in 22,5% of the articles (cf. Figure 2). Style 1 is a rather moderate pro-militarist position which reached a frequency of almost 30% in the fifties and sixties, but decreased rapidly later on (only 6,5% of press articles in the 1990s were written in that style).

The discussion of Swiss neutrality, which has been analysed in dimension 10, also reached its peak in the 1950s. Throughout the whole post-war period, about 10% of the articles treated neutrality themes, while in the 1950s 24% did this. If the press deals with neutrality, it mostly (about two thirds of articles) consents to it, but there are also critical positions in about one third of the relevant articles. So we can say that political and journalist propaganda of Cold War also exists in Switzerland, and Switzerland is a resolute member of the Western side. If military neutrality had been given up (as suggested in some, but not very many texts), the Swiss would have probably joined the NATO, and certainly not the Warsaw Pact. In the 1980s, which were marked by a second peak of Cold War (e.g. the SDI programme) and finally the breakdown of the Eastern system, neutrality was also discussed slightly more often.
than in the decades before. While in the 1950s a stronger Western integration could protect
Switzerland against potential (Eastern) aggressions, the disappearance of East-West-dualism
gives Swiss foreign policy somewhat more flexibility, because the country is no more in the
centre of international political tensions.

Variables:

1+ Military competence and power of the own army is emphasized and/or demands of disarmament are
rejected
1- Doubt/Denial/Questioning of own military competence and/or demands of disarmament
2+ Internationalization of national security, Emphasis of alliances (including alliances Switzerland does not
belong to) and/or presentation of an external danger
2- Internationalization of national security: Doubt/Denial/Questioning of external dangers
5+ Legitimation of the military: It is said that the only task of the military is the defence of the own country
and/or Doubt/Denial/Questioning of criticism of the army's role
5- Criticism of the army's role, its too high importance in society or too high military expenditure

Number of classes = 4

g | pg | 1+ | 1- | 2+ | 2- | 5+ | 5- |
---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
1  | 0.183 | 0.478 | 0.088 | 0.546 | 0.052 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
2  | 0.066 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 0.822 | 0.055 | 1.000 | 0.169 |
3  | 0.714 | 0.000 | 0.002 | 0.007 | 0.008 | 0.007 | 0.020 |
4  | 0.037 | 0.574 | 0.536 | 0.353 | 0.238 | 0.703 | 1.000 |

1.000 | 0.175 | 0.037 | 0.172 | 0.027 | 0.097 | 0.062 |

LCA results: Coverage styles in dimension 4 (militarism)

" Style 1 (18,3%) is characterized by a mostly positive view of the military. Power and Importance of the
Swiss army are often emphasized and / or demands of disarmament are rejected. The style tends also to
refer to external enemies and alliances. Doubts or general criticism of the military do not occur.
" Style 2 (6,6%) is a more radical version of style 1. The army's power, a rejection of disarmament and
legitimations of the military are mentioned in all articles of this group; often we also find references to
external enemies. General criticism of the military is rather rare.
" Style 3 (71,4%) doesn't mention arguments relevant for this group of variables.
" Style 4 (3,7%) presents balanced arguments for and against military defence with a stronger emphasis on
anti-militaristic criticism. The army's legitimation is denied in all articles of this group.

Table 1: Dimension 4 (militarism): Latent styles and over-all distribution of style characteristics

Dimension 4 gives - apart from the Cold War discussion - some impressions of the role the
army plays for Swiss national identity. Most of the texts (style 3, 71%) do not treat themes
relevant for the militarism variables. But already the second most frequent style (style 1; 18%)
is characterized by a mostly positive view of the military. Military competence and power is
often emphasized (48%) and demands for disarmament are rejected; the style also emphasizes
the importance of international alliances and the danger of external enemies
(internationalization of national security, 55%). Doubts of military importance or general
criticism are very rare or do not occur at all. Style 2, which has already been presented, can be
seen as a radicalized version of style 1. It has a general frequency of 6,6%. The least frequent
style (style 4; 3,7%) presents pro- as well as anti-militarist positions with a special emphasis on
criticism of the army and military conflict management. The legitimation of military institutions
is questioned in all articles of this group. Nevertheless, this critical style is the rarest one in our
sample. If Swiss media refer to the army, they do this in a mostly consenting and legitimizing way. The Swiss press reflects the high social status of the militia army obvious in regular military exercises of almost all Swiss men, the omnipresence of military institutions (like barracks and military training areas) and a long discrimination of conscientious objectors. Style differences between the four analysed papers are not statistically significant; so the rather positive view of armed defence seems to be in a majoritarian and rather consensual position.

Figure 2: Time-dependent development of coverage styles in dimension 4 (militarism)

The high social status of armed defence need not be maintained in the present and future, however. As the development throughout the fifty post-war years shows, pro-militarist styles decrease in favour of anti-militarist and neutral ones. The strong time-dependent transformations are similar to those found in other dimensions - in my study I describe these striking changes as consequences of modernisation of national identity favoured by different lifestyles (e.g. urbanization), new social movements and a progressive tendency including "national self-criticism". The less radical pro-militarist style 1 was detected in about one third of the articles between 1946 and 1969, but later on it decreased continously. The more radical pro-militarist style 2 shows much more constancy since the 1960s (always between 2 and 6%), but has its above-mentioned maximum in the Cold War-fifties. Articles on non-military themes (neutral, style 3), became more frequent; today they dominate press coverage with 83% of the material. While among the rest pro-militarist positions are still stronger than their opposite, critical articles (style 4) are on the increase. Today, in the 1990s, they have a
frequency of 6.7%, while they were almost non-existent in the years immediately after World
War II.

The generally positive attitude towards the military could be partly explained by history or
rather the social construction of history. Recent Swiss history includes almost no armed
violence, no cruel dictatorships and no wars with neighbouring states; so the army could
maintain its reputation as a peaceful, pure defensive institution which is still strengthened by its
social integration. In other states the army was discredited more often by actual war and actual
war crimes, and it is not so narrowly linked to society. But nevertheless we cannot conclude
that Switzerland is a purely militaristic state. There is a strong pacifistic movement for a
"Switzerland without an army" ("Gesellschaft für eine Schweiz ohne Armee"), which found
much support in a referendum. In the press, anti-militarist positions increase, perhaps because
some constructions of history are corrected. If the country was spared from Nazi attacks rather
for economic than "defensive" reasons, if negative social consequences of militarism are more
and more recognized and if the Eastern enemy image disappears suddenly, a critical attitude
will be favoured.

3. Gradual opening towards European integration

The third aspect of construction of national identity which I have selected for this paper is the
Swiss relationship to European integration and especially the connection of the nation to a
bigger form of organization, for instance the European Community / European Union.

In the most frequent class of the selected four-class-solution (cf. Table 2) European integration
is not discussed (style 3; 83.6%). Among the remaining styles, Latent Class Analysis separates
a pro-integration, a counter-integration and a comprehensive style presenting arguments for
both positions. 8.3% of the articles contain the pro-European style 1. This means that the
majority of articles relevant for the European variables advocates a strengthening of economic
and political internationalism - a tendency we have already seen in the national reference points
above, where coverage was rather favorable for the European institutions. Style 1 always (in
100% of the texts) evaluates European integration in a positive way and never evaluates it in a
negative way. Frequently (39% of style 1) abandonment of certain aspects of national
sovereignty is described as reasonable or desirable in the European context. Again, there are
no statements against an abandonment of certain sovereignty aspects. Quite often we also find
the notion that European nations should know each other better (29.5%), an emphasis of the
own dependence on international development (47%) and a critical evaluation of the present,
rather isolated Swiss role (44%).

On the other hand, in style 2, which occurs in 5.4% of the sample, negative evaluations (91%)
of Swiss European integration are more important than positive ones (72%). Consequently, the
authors are rather sceptical towards an abandonment of sovereignty aspects in favour of
European institutions (66% rejected). Variables reflecting a general internationalist attitude do
not occur here. Finally, the rarest style of the sample (style 4; 2.7%) is a comprehensive one
presenting balanced arguments for both positions. A potential abandonment of sovereignty
aspects is at the same time appreciated and criticized. Again we find variables reflecting a
general internationalist attitude as the notion that European states should know each other
better (56%) and a critical evaluation of the present, rather isolated Swiss role (46.5%). In
spite of the balanced view voices in favour of European integration (91%) are more frequent
than those against it (65%).

So Swiss European integration is mostly appreciated in the press while at the same time the
population was rather sceptical, for instance in their rejection of the EWR treaty with the EU
in 1992 - we observe a discrepancy between media and public opinion similar to the one found
in the militarism themes. A more detailed description of press coverage is given in the time-
dependent development I analysed throughout the post-war decades. The development differs
remarkably from the rather continuous and slow changes observed in other dimensions as e.g.
militarism or production of national identities. After long years of non-mentioning of European integration ideas (the irrelevant style 3 always reached 90% or more), the topic is given suddenly more journalist attention in the 1990s, where I found about 29% pro-European (style 1) and 10% Europe-sceptical (style 2) articles. The nineties were and are the decade of Europe-relevant referenda, of the 700th Swiss anniversary celebrated, of bilateral negotiations between Switzerland and EU on alpine transit transportation etc...- The press prepares and reflects public discussions, but produces a general attitude different from public opinion. In the decades before 1990, there is only another time period with European coverage worth mentioning: The time between 1950 and 1969, containing for instance the foundation of the EFTA and early European discussions in other states. Within this period, Swiss print media were mainly Europe-sceptical; so thirty years later the former majoritarian position has changed to its opposite (cf. Figure 3).

Variables:

3+ Positive evaluation of aspects/the idea of Swiss integration inside European structures
3- Negative evaluation of aspects/the idea of Swiss integration inside European structures
4+ Abandonment of certain aspects of national sovereignty (for instance border control, legislation) is described as reasonable/desirable in the European context
4- Doubt/Denial/Questioning of the abandonment of certain aspects of national sovereignty
7+ Notion that the European states should know each other better
8+ Emphasis of the own dependence on international (political, economic...) development
9+ Critical evaluation of Switzerland's role: Isolationism, no responsibility taken

Number of classes = 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>g</th>
<th>3+</th>
<th>3-</th>
<th>4+</th>
<th>4-</th>
<th>7+</th>
<th>8+</th>
<th>9+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>0.000</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>0.444</td>
</tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>0.914</td>
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<td>0.664</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.836</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.907</td>
<td>0.652</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.558</td>
<td>0.558</td>
<td>0.465</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.000 0.167 0.067 0.067 0.072 0.052 0.165 0.077

LCA results: Coverage styles in dimension 6 (European integration)

Style 1 (8.3%) describes a pro-European position. European integration of Switzerland is always evaluated in a positive way and never evaluated in a negative way. Often, the abandonment of certain sovereignty aspects is described as reasonable or desirable in the European context. There are also often general internationalist arguments like the emphasis of one's own dependence on international development.

Style 2 (5.4%) on the contrary presents a rather sceptical position towards European integration. Negative evaluations of the integration process are more frequent than positive ones, and most of these texts reject an abandonment of certain sovereignty aspects. General internationalist variables do not occur.

Style 3 (83.6%) doesn't mention arguments relevant for this group of variables.

Style 4 (2.7%) presents at the same time arguments for and against further Swiss integration into European institutions. All variables of this dimension occur frequently, including general internationalist positions. In spite of the two-sided argumentation, pro-European positions predominate over their opposite.

Table 2: Dimension 6 (European integration): Latent styles and over-all distribution of style characteristics
Figure 3: Time-dependent development of coverage styles in dimension 6 (European integration)
Construction of National Identities in (East and West-) German Print Media

1. Introduction

With the end of world war II and the resulting division of Germany by the allied nations, a new historical era began. In the context of national identity this new era was defined by some new and characteristic features:

- First of all, the national identity had been abused by Hitler to legitimate his policy of violence, intolerance and suppression. As a consequence the position of the post-war generations concerning national matters was clearly discredited.
- On the other hand, since 1949 both - the FRG and the GDR saw themselves confronted with the problem that the citizens of the new (two) German states still had a common identity which had been developed for many years. But the concrete political situation in which both parts of Germany found themselves to be after the war was characterised by the antagonist systems and as a result, the feelings of competition and demarcation cumulated.
- Additionally, the German-German frontier symbolised one of the most threatening boundaries between the western and the eastern part of the world. Because of that the positions between the two German states got more and more hardened and polarised in the international dispute. These processes certainly had influences on the national identities of the Germans in both parts. Or in other words: the international policy of comparison and hostility in the 'Cold War'-period got manifest in the way national identities were produced in both parts of Germany.

Now, after the reunification, people in Germany see themselves confronted with the problem that the long time of division has left deep marks. To reach the so-called 'inner Union' is not as easy as perhaps supposed in 1990. This can be seen for example in an article published in the Frankfurter Rundschau - one of the most important daily papers in Germany - in 1996\(^1\). In this article it is referred to a research report of the Wissenschaftliches Forschungszentrum Berlin-Brandenburg (SFZ), indicating that six years after the reunification only 9% of the East-Germans feel as members of the FRG. Today the so called 'Ossi-Wessi'-conflict is still going on and it's still visible in everyday life.

One of the aims of my study was to have a closer look on the role of the daily newspapers in these processes.

2. Some methodological aspects

Before coming to some selected results, I'd like to mention some methodological aspects:

Method

The empirical study, which I will refer to (Mattenschlager, 1997) is part of an international research project on 'Media construction of national identities in the changing state structures of post-war Europe' (cf. Kempf, Luostarinen & MacInnes, 1996). Within this project, it was the first pilot-study in which the methodological framework was developed and tested.

\(^{1}\) Frankfurter Rundschau, 2.10.1996, S.1: "Ostdeutsche werden nicht unzufriedener, sondern verlieren die Hoffnung".
The system of variables which was used to examine the selected articles was combined of formal variables (year, paper, size etc.) stylistical variables (illustrations with national symbols, historical references, national references etc.) and several groups of variables covering aspects of the meaning / of the content of the analysed articles. Despite descriptive measures, the analysis was mainly based on Latent Class Analysis (Lazarsfeld 1950). This method can be used to identify different patterns of the occurrence of aspects in a text, allowing conclusions on argumentative structures and styles of coverage (Kempf, 1994).

Sample

Four daily newspapers were analysed: the most influential prestige paper and a regional-paper, both, from the FRG and from the former GDR. These were the 'Neues Deutschland' and the 'Berliner Zeitung' for the East-German, and the 'Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung' and the 'Südkurier' for the West-German subsample. Additionally the 'Bild-Zeitung', a West-German tabloid paper, was examined. Since there was no comparable paper in the GDR, I will not refer to this one in the following, however.

During the timeperiod from 1945 to 1995, the media coverage of one day was chosen for analysis (cf. Table 1). Following the design of the international project, I selected the media coverage of a national day or a national relevant anniversary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949 - 1990: GDR</td>
<td>7. October (Foundation of the Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953 - 1990: FRG</td>
<td>17. June (&quot;Day of the German Unity&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 - 1995:</td>
<td>3. October (Anniversary of the Reunification)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Timespots

All news-items or comments on the politic-, news-, opinion- or front-pages were selected on these days which dealt with the topic. The huge amount of material as afterwards reduced by a random selection to about 100 items per newspaper. Coming to a total amount of 574 articles which were included in the analysis (cf. Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neues Deutschland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berliner Zeitung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Südkurier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bild-Zeitung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Number of analysed articles per paper

Dimensions

The themes which were analysed with six up to fourteen variables each, were coverage the following dimensions of nationalism / national identity:
One of the points I was interested in was the question, whether the usage of different styles was dependent from the political situation and the historical development of the international relationships. For this purpose, the analysed timespan from 1945-1995 was subdivided into shorter periods of time (cf. Table 3), and the frequency of style usage during the various periods was compared with each other.

**Table 3: 12 timeperiods of the German history from 1945-1995**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Period 1 (1945 - 22.5.1949):</td>
<td>Post-war period</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period 2 (23.5.1949 - End of May 1954):</td>
<td>Foundation of the new states</td>
<td>'Grundgesetz' of the FRG (23.5.1949) Foundation of the GDR (7.10.1949) 17.6.1953 'Arbeiteraufstand' in the GDR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period 3 (June 1954 - December 1961):</td>
<td>Securing of the 'Status Quo'</td>
<td>FRG becomes a member of the WEU (7.5.1955) and NATO (9.5.1955) Signatory of the Warsaw Treaty (14.5.1955) Building of the Berlin Wall (beginning with the 13.8.1961)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period 4 (January 1962 - November 1966):</td>
<td>Ease of the coexistence</td>
<td>e.g. 'Passierscheinaabkommen' 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period 5 (December 1966 - 10.Oktober 1969):</td>
<td></td>
<td>'Great Coalition' in the FRG ends the refusal of communication with the GDR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period 9 (November 1981- October 1985)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Helmut Kohl becomes Bundeskanzler (1.10.82). Climax of the tensions between the USA and the Soviet Union (R. Reagan is US-president; soviet troops invade in Afghanistan etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period 11 (3. October 1990):</td>
<td>Reunification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period 12 (3.10.1990 - December 1995):</td>
<td>After the reunification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Selected results

I will now proceed with some selected results. By doing this I’ll concentrate mainly on two of the before introduced dimensions of nationalism: the Relationship between the two German states and the Production of national identities.

Relationship between the two German states

My intention with the variables covering this dimension was to seize the special situation of the two German states. For that I defined a set of 14 variables (cf. Table 4).

1. Demanding for or agreement with the reunification of East- and West-Germany
2. The other German state is described as a sovereign, independent nation
3. Evaluation of the FRG political system as free, peace willing, human, tolerant,...
4. Evaluation of the GDR political system as free, peace willing, human, tolerant,...
5. Capitalism / free market economy is described as basis for welfare and economic security
6. Socialism and planing economy is described as basis for welfare and economic security
7. References to differences between East- and West-German people

[each of these variables could appear either in a positive (allegation) or negative (query) version]

Table 4 Variables covering aspects of the relationship between the two German states

The result of the LCA indicated that the solution using seven different argumentation-styles was fitting best to describe the data. In figure 1 these seven styles are visible in a graph which I'll use to explain them shortly: By doing so I'll add the information in which paper and in which timeperiods the respective style is from particular importance, which is not visible in the graph.

- Style 1: This style can be characterised by the rarity in which aspects of the topic are discussed. In the East- and West-German newspapers this was the style used most often (a total of 41.8% of the articles are following this style).
- Style 3 and 6 have in common that both of them have a clear position in favour of the reunification. This can be either retrospective (agreement with) or prospective (demand for reunification).
  - Style 3: This style can be found in all papers, but its getting mainly influential with and after the reunification. It can be seen, that in style 3 - beside the agreement with the reunification a general dissatisfaction and criticism is presented. For example: in none of the six other styles are negative aspects of the economic system emphasised as often as in this "reunification-style".
  - Style 6 is more typical for the West-German papers, and it can be observed during the whole timespan - with some special importance in the coverage of the ceremonies of the reunification. The claimed superiority in the context of society and politics of the FRG compared to the GDR, is presented as legitimation of the reunification. Economical aspects are not from interest here.
- Style 2 and 4 have in common, that the comparison of the economic system is in the focus here:
  - Style 2: a positive evaluation of the FRG economic system and a negative evaluation of the economic system of the GDR at the same time characterise this style, which can be found nearly exclusively in the West-German papers.
In contrast to this, the East-German equivalent, style 4 is arguing much more massive and equivocal. Additionally to the economical superiority, positive evaluated aspects of the political system are emphasised. This style completely disappears with the reunification.

The styles 5 and 7 have as a common aspect, that they both focus on the political systems. Style 5 is a mostly East-German style in which the devaluation of the political system of the FRG and the positive selfpresentation appear to be the characteristic elements. The sovereignty of the other German state is not denied - if mentioned at all, it is recognised.

The more West-German style 7 is characterised by the devaluation of the political system of the GDR and a very intensive and controversial discussion of its sovereignty. The own political system is not from a primary interest, but if mentioned, it is evaluated positively. But it is clear to see that the argumentation is based on the devaluation of the GDR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Style</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Reunification</th>
<th>Sovereignty of other state</th>
<th>Devaluation of the political system of the GDR</th>
<th>Intensive discussion of sovereignty of the other state</th>
<th>Devaluation of the economic system of the GDR</th>
<th>Positive selfpresentation of the political system of the GDR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Style 1</td>
<td>41.80%</td>
<td>neg</td>
<td>east: 37.3%</td>
<td>west: 40.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style 3</td>
<td>8.33%</td>
<td>neg</td>
<td>east: 7.5%</td>
<td>west: 8.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style 6</td>
<td>17.81%</td>
<td>neg</td>
<td>east: 4.7%</td>
<td>west: 24.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style 2</td>
<td>4.25%</td>
<td>neg</td>
<td>east: 1.8%</td>
<td>west: 7.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style 4</td>
<td>7.70%</td>
<td>neg</td>
<td>east: 20.4%</td>
<td>west: 0.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style 6</td>
<td>13.45%</td>
<td>neg</td>
<td>east: 27.34%</td>
<td>west: 6.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style 7</td>
<td>6.64%</td>
<td>neg</td>
<td>east: 0.9%</td>
<td>west: 12.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Style-characteristics of the variable-group 'Relationship between the two German states'
This style, in which the demarcation and the hostility to the GDR can be observed more clearly than in all other West-German styles, is in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (it appears in 16.3% of the articles) more common than in the Südkurier (9.1%). After the reunification, this style disappears completely.

Figure 2: "Relationship between the two German states". Usage of the stiles in the different time-periods (for a definition of this timeperiods, see table 3).

Summary:

The media coverage in the East-German papers is dominated by the styles 1 (theme is not picked up intensively - 37.31%), 5 (superiority in the political system - 27.34%), 4 (positive selfpresentation of the political and economical system - 20.40%), and 3 (mainly retrospective agreement to the reunification, mixed up with a clear criticism of the situation after it - 7.51%)
In contrast to this, in the West-German papers style 6 (demanding /agreement to the reunification combined with the emphasis on the political superiority of the FRG - 24.77%) is used most often despite style 1. Styles 3, 2 (economical superiority of the FRG - 7.23%) and 7 (political devaluation of the GDR) complete the coverage.
In both, the East- and the West-German papers, the comparison and hostility between the two parts of Germany is visible, even if the West-German papers seem to prefer argumentation-structures which are a bit more subtle and less massive and equivocal.
An interesting point going beyond this, and which possibly can give at least a partial explanation of the current differences in the approach between the East- and the West-Germans can be observed in the usage of variable 7, which covers the mentioning of differences between the East- and West-Germans or the emphasise of common aspects between them.
We saw, that in both parts of Germany the media coverage concerning economical and political matters is characterised by hostility and comparison. On the level of differences between the people, the East-German styles - if they mention this point at all - emphasise mainly on common aspects of the Germans from the FRG and the GDR (styles 4 and 5). In the styles typical for the West-German coverage, on the other hand, there can be observed a dominance of stressing differences between the people (styles 2 and 6).
The only style emphasising differences, which is also used by the east-media is style 3. But as mentioned before, this is a style which is most influential after 1990. After the reunification and the approach of the eastern papers to the coverage in the west-media, obviously there is no attempt visible to break or refute the 50 years polarisation, but it is even reinforced and also taken over by the East-German papers. This style 3 - in my opinion - reflects the so called 'Ossi-Wessi-Conflict' after the reunification and by this it could be at least one little explanation for the difficult approach between the East- and the West-Germans.

At the same the only West-German style emphasising common aspects (style 7) disappears.

**Style usage during the timecourse**

At some points I have already mentioned results, concerning the variation of the style-usage during the timespan of 50 years from 1945-1995.

In Figure 2 some more aspects of this matter are visible:
- as mentioned before, style 3 is mainly influential with and after the reunification. That's the style which emphasises so strongly on the differences between the Germans from the eastern and the western part.
- Period 11 (Celebration of the reunification) is completely different from all other periods. The styles 3 and 6 - both emphasising the agreement with the reunification are - and that's not very surprising - dominating the coverage of this day. This can be described as a kind of 'holiday'-mood.
- Additionally I would like you to take note of the styles 4 and 7. Style 4 is the offensive and massive arguing style of the East-German papers. Style 7 is the West-German (mainly FAZ) style, which tries to document the own superiority mainly by a devaluation of the GDR. Style 4 is very influential in the period 2 and disappears with the reunification (period 11). In the periods 5-7, which can be characterised as a time of political cooperation between the FRG and GDR (see table 3) this style is not really important. The necessity of this kind of self-glorification was obviously not so important in this era. Contrary to this the West-German style 7 is extremely important in this periods. This can probably be interpreted as a conservative counteraction of (mainly) the FAZ to the arrangements making the coexistence of the both Germanys more easy - and by this fixing the status quo. The fact, that style 7 is disappearing in period 11 emphasises the instrumentalisation of this style as political tool in the era of the divided Germany, which lost its purpose with the reunification.

**Mechanisms used to produce national identity**

In addition to the relationship between the two parts of Germany, I'd like to add some results from the variable-group "mechanisms used to produce national identity". The idea was to observe the way, how contents of the national identity (for example attributes like peaceful, friendly etc.) are transmitted. In the present study, 11 different ways to do so were taken into consideration (cf. Table 5).

According to the LCA results, 5 different styles give the best description of the data (cf. Figure 3).

The West-German coverage is extremely dominated by style 4 (49% of the articles) which is characterised by a very little usage of these production-mechanisms. The most frequent one is thereby the construction of counter-identities, which were defined as an implicit self-definition by a negative presentation of other nations suggesting the conclusion. "we are not like this". The proportion between direct positive versus negative attributes is more or less balanced.
1. Members of the own nation ("the Germans are..."), the nation ("a peaceful nation...") or its representatives (the government etc.) are described by using **positive attributes**.
2. Members of the own nation ("the Germans are..."), the nation ("an aggressive nation...") or its representatives (the government etc.) are described by using **negative attributes**.
3. **Construction of counter-identities** (implicit self-definition by describing the outgroup negatively, or explicit statement that "we are not like ...")
4. **Common aspects with other nations**.
5. Emphasis of common **factors which keep the nation together** (language, territory etc.).
6. Reference to **national rewarded behaviour** as an example for desirable behaviour.
8. Description of **identification-models**.
9. Emotional **conditioning on national symbols**.
10. **Counter-identities** concerning the own national history (for instance the cruelties of the national socialism).
11. **Common aspects** with the German history.

Table 5: Variables covering the mechanisms used to produce national identity

In contrast to this, the **East-German coverage** is mainly characterised by two styles which are more direct and massive in the usage of such mechanisms:
- Style 5 (7,6%) is stressing always (!) positive attributes, counter-identities factors keeping the nation together and it is often mentioning identification-models. Additionally, conditioning processes on national symbols are more often mentioned here than in all other styles. Nearly all relevant mechanisms are used in the articles following this style.
- Style 1 can be described as a style, mainly stressing rather direct mechanisms: positive attributes, description of politically desired behaviour and presentation of identification models.

Additionally, in both subsamples two styles are used in a comparable quantity. These can be described as stressing mainly indirect production mechanisms: for example counter-identities. One of them - the style 3 - is most important with and after the reunification. In these periods after 1990 it is - together with style 4 (little mentioning of the theme) - dominating the media coverage. May be it's also interesting, that no other style uses negative attributes as often as the style dominating the media coverage after the reunification.

In figure 4 - which shows the variation of the style-usage in the timecourse - it can be seen that after 1990 the East-German styles 5 and 1 are no longer from interest. Instead of them the styles 4 (little mentioning of the theme) and 3 are getting more important. The latter is - as mentioned before - the one stressing in a extremely high rate negative attributes.

Once again, we can see here, how different epochs of the history of the divided Germany find their manifestation in the media coverage. For example the phases 6 and 7 (which were periods of political contacts and cooperation between the two states) have a very different pattern of styles compared to the other periods: the massive East-German style 5 is nearly not existent at all. Instead, style 4 which pays little attention to the theme appears extremely frequent. Obviously in periods of decreasing hostility it was less important for both parts of Germany to present themselves in such a way of massive self-glorification.

Identity is a construct, which - though it is variable - is defined by a high degree of constancy and stability. The amount, to which the media construction of national identity was sensitive to changes in the political and historical situation, therefore, must not be interpreted as descriptions of changed identities of the people. They rather reflect attempts of the media that tried to influence national identity.
Figure 3: Style-characteristics of the variable-group 'Production of national Identities'
Figure 4: "Production of national Identities": Usage of the stiles during different time-periods.

References