

## Nachrichtenmedien in internationalen Konflikten News media in international conflict

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**Deutsch** Österreichisches Studienzentrum für Frieden und Konfliktlösung (ed.), 2005. "Die Wiedergeburt Europas". Von den Geburtswehen eines emanzipierten Europas und seinen Beziehungen zur einsamen Supermacht. Münster: agenda.



*Chanan Naveh*

## **Die Rolle der Medien bei der Etablierung internationaler Sicherheitsregime**

In diesem Aufsatz wird der Einfluss der Medien auf internationale Sicherheitsregime untersucht: Wie beeinflussen die Medien den Lebenszyklus internationaler Regime von ihrem Entstehen über die Phase ihrer Etablierung, Konsolidierung und Stabilisierung bis hin zu ihrem Niedergang? Obwohl der Beitrag besonders auf die Rolle der Medien bei der Entwicklung von abhebt, steht außer Frage, dass die Medien den Lebenszyklus aller internationalen Regime beeinflussen, wie auch immer diese beschaffen sind.

Die Analyse sowohl der Beziehungen zwischen Medien und Sicherheitsregimen im Allgemeinen als auch des spezifischen Beitrags der Medien zu jeder einzelnen Entwicklungsstufe der Sicherheitsregime erfolgt mit kommunikationswissenschaftlichen Methoden. Untersucht werden die Medienagenda, die "Nachrichtenergebnisse" der Medien und deren verschiedene Funktionen sowie die Fähigkeit der Medien, öffentliche Unterstützung für das jeweilige Anliegen des Regimes zu mobilisieren.

Die meisten bisherigen Studien haben die Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Mustern der Medienkommunikation und globalen Entwicklungen auf der Ebene von Staaten bzw. hinsichtlich der Formulierung der Außenpolitik dieser Staaten untersucht. Die internationale Dimension dieser Beziehungen dagegen wurde weitgehend ignoriert. Anliegen des vorliegenden Beitrags ist es, dieses Desiderat zu beseitigen. Die entsprechenden Prozesse werden anhand der Fallstudie des internationalen Anti-Irak-Sicherheitsregimes dargestellt. Auch wenn sich der Beitrag auf das spezifische Anti-Irak-Regime konzentriert, muss dabei beachtet werden, dass dieses wiederum Teil eines allgemeineren Anti-Schurken-Regimes ist, das den Krieg gegen den weltweiten Terrorismus führt.

Die Untersuchung der Entwicklung der Medien in Wechselwirkung mit dem Anti-Irak-Sicherheitsregime lehrt uns, dass die Medien in internationalen Krisen einhellig das Regime unterstützen, das "die Bösen" bekämpft. Wenn das Regime sich jedoch weiter entwickelt, sich auf umstrittenes Terrain begibt und an Legitimität verliert, verringert sich auch die Unterstützung durch die Medien. Die Medien können sich dann sogar in eine oppositionelle Kraft verwandeln und mit denjenigen verbünden, die sich dem Regime widersetzen.

Die Untersuchung des Falles Irak zeigt, dass die Akteure, die ein internationales Regime forcieren und befördern (unabhängig davon, ob es sich dabei um eine Sicherheitsregime oder ein anderes Regime handelt), sich auch auf die richtige Handhabung der internationalen Medien vorbereiten müssen. Sie müssen geeignete Medienstrategien ausarbeiten und Instrumente der Public Relations entwickeln, mit denen die Medien dazu befähigt werden, diejenigen Kräfte zu unterstützen, die das Regime und dessen Normen repräsentieren.

Volltext (in Englisch)

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*Chanan Naveh*

## **The role of the media in establishing international security regimes**

This article focuses primarily on the media's impact on international security regimes. It explores the ways in which the media affect the lifecycles of international regimes, from the time they are first conceived of, through their establishment, consolidation and stabilization, up until their ultimate demise. Although this paper highlights the media's role in the evolution of security regimes, it is clear that, regardless of the regime in question, media play a role throughout the lifecycle of all international regimes, whatever their character.

In order to analyze the relationships of the media with security regimes in general, and specifically their contribution to each stage in their development, the article utilizes methodologies from the field of communication studies. It examines the media's agenda, "news values" and various functions, and their ability to mobilize public support for the particular issue of the regime.

To date, most studies have explored the interaction between media communication patterns and global developments at the state level, or in relation to the formulation of foreign policy, while largely ignoring the international dimension of the relationship. This article attempts to remedy this situation, and the relevant processes are analysed in a case study of the anti-Iraq international security regime. It should be noted that although the paper focuses on the specific anti-Iraqi regime, it is part of a more general Anti-Rogue actors regime which includes the war against global terrorism.

The study of the development of the anti-Iraq press-security regime teaches us that during international crises the media mobilize and unanimously support the regime fighting the "bad guys." But, when the regime develops and enters disputed turfs and begins to lose its legitimacy, media support diminishes, and the media may even develop into an opposing force and may join the actors fighting against this regime. Moreover, the study of the Iraqi case shows that the actors who operate and promote an international regime (whether it is a security regime or any other sort of regime) also need to prepare themselves for managing the international media. They must prepare proper media strategies, developing public relations systems that will try to influence the media to support and join forces with the regime and its norms.

[full text \(in English\)](#)

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Chanan Naveh

## The Role of the Media in Establishing International Security Regimes

*Kurzfassung:* In diesem Aufsatz wird der Einfluss der Medien auf internationale Sicherheitsregime untersucht: Wie beeinflussen die Medien den Lebenszyklus internationaler Regime von ihrem Entstehen über die Phase ihrer Etablierung, Konsolidierung und Stabilisierung bis hin zu ihrem Niedergang? Obwohl der Beitrag besonders auf die Rolle der Medien bei der Entwicklung von abhebt, steht außer Frage, dass die Medien den Lebenszyklus aller internationalen Regime beeinflussen, wie auch immer diese beschaffen sind.

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*Abstract:* This article focuses primarily on the media's impact on international security regimes. It explores the ways in which the media affect the lifecycles of international regimes, from the time they are first conceived of, through their establishment, consolidation and stabilization, up until their ultimate demise. Although this paper highlights the media's role in the evolution of security regimes, it is clear that, regardless of the regime in question, media play a role throughout the lifecycle of all international regimes, whatever their character. In order to analyze the relationships of the media with security regimes in general, and specifically their contribution to each stage in their development, the article utilizes methodologies from the field of communication studies. It examines the media's agenda, "news values" and various functions, and their ability to mobilize public support for the particular issue of the regime.

To date, most studies have explored the interaction between media communication patterns and global developments at the state level, or in relation to the formulation of foreign policy, while largely ignoring the international dimension of the relationship. This article attempts to remedy this situation, and the relevant processes are analysed in a case study of the anti-Iraq international security regime. It should be noted that although the paper focuses on the specific anti-Iraq regime, it is part of a more general anti-Rogue actors regime which includes the war against global terrorism.

The study of the development of the anti-Iraq press-security regime teaches us that during international crises the media mobilize and unanimously support the regime fighting the "bad guys". But, when the regime develops and enters disputed turfs and begins to lose its legitimacy, media support diminishes, and the media may even develop into an opposing force and may join the actors fighting against this regime. Moreover, the study of the Iraqi case shows that the actors who operate and promote an international regime (whether it is a security regime or any other sort of regime) also need to prepare themselves for managing the international media. They must prepare proper media strategies, developing public relations systems that will try to influence the media to support and join forces with the regime and its norms.

## 1. Introduction

"Ladies and gentlemen, this is a difficult moment for America. I, unfortunately, will be going back to Washington after my remarks. Secretary Rod Paige and the Lt. Governor will take the podium and discuss education. I do want to thank the folks here at Booker Elementary School for their hospitality.

Today we've had a national tragedy. Two airplanes have crashed into the World Trade Center in an apparent terrorist attack on our country. I have spoken to the Vice President, to the Governor of New York, to the Director of the FBI, and have ordered that the full resources of the federal government go to help the victims and their families, and to conduct a full-scale investigation to hunt down and to find those folks who committed this act.

Terrorism against our nation will not stand.

And now if you would join me in a moment of silence. May God bless the victims, their families, and America. Thank you very much."  
(President Bush at the Emma Booker Elementary School, Sarasota, Florida – September 11, 2001, 9:30 a.m.<sup>1</sup>).

With these words, US President George Bush set the stage for the founding of a global regime whose declared aim is to fight terrorism. Born on 11 September 2001 and led by the United States, it developed into the celebrated *War against Terrorism Regime*. This up-and-coming regime soon gave rise to a second regime designed to secure the compliance and/or capitulation of rogue states.

These developments served to highlight, yet again, the close links between international processes and the media. They pointed to the significant contribution of one branch of the political media – the global news media – to the shaping of diplomatic – military cum security processes.

In recent years, academics in the field of international relations, along with experts from the field of communication studies, have examined the media's effect on international developments, and, more specifically, their bearing on the making of foreign policy. However, most these studies tended to overlook the fact that contemporary technical innovations have transformed the media, in their various guises, written, visual and audio, into a global phenomenon capable of influencing global processes. In recent years, the media have played a significant part in molding various international regimes, including security regimes. How the global news media affect the evolution of security regimes is the focus of this article.

Current writings on international relations define international regimes as a phenomenon in which international actors (usually states) form an association and co-operate with one another in order to: tackle a particularly taxing problem, realize a joint interest or confront a common challenge. International regimes address a wide range of issues, most commonly economic and security problems. But they also touch on human rights and environmental issues, and even on questions of communication and technology.

The present paper will highlight the multiplex links between international regimes and the global news media. It will focus primarily on the way in which the global news media help to shape international regimes, in general, and security regimes, in particular. To this end, it will put forward and analyze various patterns characteristic of the relationship between the global news media (and when necessary national news media) and security regimes. It will explore the nature of that relationship as it develops throughout the lifespan of the regime. It will start with a breakdown of the security regime's incipient beginnings, when the problem at stake is first identified; a stage in which it would appear that the media play a crucial role in both pinpointing the problem and proposing ways of dealing with it. It will then consider the media's contribution to a security regime's crystallization and consolidation processes, when regime expectations, as well as the norms defining its character and governing its behavior, are formed.

International security regimes need the global news media in order to secure and maintain public legitimacy and status. Furthermore, by identifying the international actors who have strayed from the regime's norms, the media also assists the regime to function on a daily basis. Spelling out the price the guilty parties will have to pay should they continue to break the regime's rules, or worse dispense with them altogether, the media helps bring the offenders into line. And, should the latter willfully ignore the regime and the media's warnings, the media may, on occasion, help to apply sanctions against them. These processes owe much, among other things, to the existence of technologically extremely sophisticated global news media. Examining them requires a detailed study of the media's various functions. These include: the way they cover stories and comment upon them, but also their ability to mobilize public support for a particular issue. In order to gain a full picture of the global news media's effects on a regime, the links among these various functions must also be taken into account. All these functions have a strong influence on the establishment and consolidation of security regimes. The same holds true of the global news media's agenda. By setting its own news agenda, the global media will not only single out and underscore the security problem at stake, but also suggest ways of tackling it, suggestions which will probably filter back into the regime. The media's "news value" judgments, its estimate of the newsworthiness of certain issues, may also push forward, or retard, the development of a security regime.

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1. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911.html>

Though the focus of this article is theoretical, it is worth pointing out that the global news media helped bring into being the global security regime born in the aftermath of the devastating attack on the World Trade Center. The media, among others, dubbed that attack "9/11," a term now embedded in the public mind. Encapsulating the entire affair, factually as well as emotionally, the term has since become an integral part of international discourse. But the expression "9/11" captured more than the emotions of that day, it also served to denote its various political, military, social and ethical consequences, some of which the world is still living with today.

"9/11," the Twin Tower attack, President Bush's speech, and the subsequent steps taken by the United States and the international community, especially the United Nations, to combat terrorism, marked the advent of a new international regime designed to wage war on terrorism. It was followed by a second regime charged with confronting rogue states; states which by supporting terrorism and/or seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction, struck at the very heart of two of the first regime's most basic norms. Both regimes spawned a number of sub-regimes. The first was to embark upon a war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The second was the *Pro-War in Iraq Regime*, formed just a year later, and following it the *Anti-War in Iraq Regime*. The role played by the global news media in the life of these complex, multifaceted and still existent, albeit in new guises, security regimes, deserves a more detailed and extensive analysis in the form of a separate article.

## 2. The Relevant Fields of Study and Research

Inevitably, any comprehensive appraisal of the global news media's variegated contribution to the evolution of security regimes must draw upon the findings of a wide range of academic fields. One pertinent field of study is the analysis of international processes, which encompasses among other things both security issues and communications processes. Another focuses upon the key processes characteristic of the political media, while a third explores the nature of international regimes, and in this context of security regimes, as well. Together they combine to create a multiplex, theoretical framework upon which to hang the analysis of the relationship between the media and international security regimes.

### 2.1 International Regimes

An international regime consists of 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations' (Krasner, 1983:2). Another slightly less vague, more rigorous and so perhaps more practical definition characterizes international regimes as *a phenomenon in the course of which international actors, adopting clearly defined patterns of behavior, co-operate with one another in order to tackle a problem of common concern*. International regimes do not, it must be said, arise in periods of total harmony or conversely, at times of acute and bitter conflict. Of no relevance in zero sum situations (Krasner, 1991:337), these regimes usually come into being when actors find themselves facing a common dilemma, sharing a joint interest or conversely a mutual aversion. Whatever the motive behind the regime's establishment, it is a phenomenon, event or process which, taking place beyond state level, addresses a range of international issues in a comparatively orderly manner and which can, therefore, be rigorously scrutinized, studied and assessed (Levy, Young and Zuern, 1995). But, if international regimes are organized, they are not an institutionalized phenomenon, since they lack official organizations or institutions. Once an international regime institutes a formal organization, it is no longer an international regime, but rather an international organization, and so belongs to a different field of study altogether.

One of the key questions in the study of international regimes is that of the conditions under which such regimes appear. Why, scholars ask themselves, do countries seek to co-operate in order to tackle tricky or tough problems (Young, 1986; Haggard and Simmons, 1987). The answer given often depends on which of the two primary schools of thought in the field of international relations the respondent belongs to: the Realist or Liberal school. Realists argue that regimes come into being in one of two ways: either the dominant, hegemonic power imposes the regime on the other actors, or the actors themselves conclude that the alternative to co-operation – severe conflict – is infinitely worse. In other words, an international regime is a product of cost-benefit calculations. By contrast, adherents of the Liberal school of thought believe that actors co-operate instinctively out of a genuine desire to tackle common problems together. They honestly believe that collaboration is the best, most ethical response to their problems. But, whatever the answer, moral or utilitarian, both interpretations, throw some light on the global news media's influence on international regimes.

International regimes can be classified according to the type of issues they tackle, the number of issues they deal with, and, finally, their geographical scope. The vast majority, however, deal with security and military problems, and this article will focus on these regimes. It is generally accepted that members of such regimes co-operate in order to overcome what is to their mind an existential problem, a threat to each and every one of them (Jervis, 1982).

### 2.1.1 The Dynamics of International Regimes

One of the more interesting fields of inquiry in the context of international regimes studies focuses on the processes whereby such regimes appear, consolidate, stabilize and eventually disappear. Some academics have concentrated on the regimes' birth cycle, whilst others have studied their development and eventual consolidation. But, only a few have bothered to examine their disappearance. The table and figure (Table 1) below depict the dynamics of international regimes, a dynamic in which, as will be seen, the global news media play an important part:

1. The Advent of an International Regime
2. The Regime's Consolidation and Stabilization
3. Junction Marking Three Possible Regime Endings
4. Withering Away
5. Stabilization and Continuation until the Establishment of an International Organisation
6. Collapse




Table 1: The dynamics of international regimes

This dynamic, applicable to security regimes as well, will prove of the utmost significance, particularly once the global news media's contribution to the evolution of international regimes is added to the mix.

*Birth of International Regimes.* Oren Young argues that international regimes come into being in one of several ways. Of these, some are rooted in the Liberal persuasion, while others stem from the Realist school of thought (Young, 1994: 44–45). In some cases, he suggests, a powerful state may impose a regime on its fellow actors. Others regimes are the product of negotiations between actors with a common interest. But, there are also, he admits, regimes that appear spontaneously. A closer look at the process of setting up an international regime reveals that the procedure is far from simple and can be broken down into several key stages (Young and Oshrenko, 1993; Young, 1994; Levy, Young and Zuern, 1995).

During the first stage, the problem addressed is identified. Someone, be it a state, international organization, national interest group, public figure or even private individual, kick-starts the process by drawing attention to a particularly worrisome problem, thus placing it on the international agenda. In the second stage, the process of tackling the issue at stake is pushed forward. This occurs when an international actor, usually a member of the great power club (see the actors mentioned by Young in Young, 1994:44–45) impresses upon others the need to confront and resolve said problem. Acting as a catalyst, this actor campaigns for the establishment of a regime, arguing that it is the best, if not the only way to resolve the problem at hand. As the mainspring of the regime, this actor will also identify prospective regime members and suggest ways of tackling the problem. During the third – consolidation – stage, other actors will join the regime. This stage also sees the formulation of the several shared principles and norms that will determine both the regime's nature and its modus operandi. Throughout this stage, regime members endeavor to devise new rules and regulations, as well as common decision-making processes. Having completed their labors, they may decide to stage an event marking the regime's foundation, be it in the form of an international gathering or a public ceremony during which they will sign a formal accord.

*Consolidation of the International Regime.* There are various mechanisms that enable international regimes to develop and become stronger or, conversely, prevent other actors from undermining them (Krasner, 1991:342). There is little doubt that a regime's continued existence is largely dependent on its ability to persuade or compel its members to adopt its norms. This, in turn, demands, among other things, a degree of regime transparency, with regime members having free, unrestricted access to information about their associates, the regime's norms, as well as various developments within the regime (Mitchell, 1998:110–119). While the full range of resources allowing for regime transparency is yet to be established, the international news media is clearly one of them and an important one at that.

As noted, there is no set limit on the lifespan of an international regime. Some are long-lived, other less so. Equally, there are also no hard and fast rules as to the manner in which regimes end. However, this usually occurs when a regime's members challenge its norms, regulations or decision-making processes. When this happens, and especially if the members in question were key to its establishment and subsequent operation, the regime will decline until it eventually vanishes from the scene. The process marking the demise of a regime can be fairly drawn out, with a regime withering away, as the

motivation behind its establishment slowly disappears. By contrast, some regimes simply collapse. This happens either when one or more of a regime's key members decides to rebel against it, or if the problem that initially led to its establishment has finally been solved. Members may also abandon a regime if another, more important question requiring attention and the establishment of a new regime has arisen. Whatever the manner of its demise, the global news media, as will be seen, play an important role in a regime's extinction.

Up to this point, this article has focused upon two separate fields of inquiry. It has discussed methodologies, concepts and processes derived from the field of media studies. Moving on to the discipline of international relations, it has scrutinized the various principles underlying the term international regimes. Now, combining these two perspectives, it will examine if and how media processes affect international regimes. It will consider the validity of the claim that the global news media are among the many mechanisms that shape international regimes.

### 2.1.2 Security Regimes

Robert Jervis, the world's leading scholar in the field of security regimes, defined a security regime as 'those principles, rules and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate.' Actors must also, he adds, 'believe that others share the value they place on mutual security and cooperation', while 'war and individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as costly' (Jervis, 1982:357-8 and 361). According to Jervis, the aforementioned norms, laws and principles constitute the key variables that underpin and, in effect, determine the behavior of the regime's members. From this he concludes that regime members internalize the moral principle of self-restraint and do not exercise it out of self-interest or fear. Moderation, self-control and reciprocity, he argues, acquire a normative value for the members of the regime, with the result that concessions are no longer considered a weakness, but rather a natural part of their new regime-based give-and-take relationship (Jervis, 1982:367).

It would thus appear that a security regime is a process in which international actors have a shared interest in co-operating with one another in order to solve a common problem which threatens their security or, possibly, their very existence. This interest is rooted in the fear that not to tackle the problem jointly would prove much too costly. For example, failure to co-operate might engender dangerous developments in the international arena or encourage the intervention of a third party who will demand a high price for his intercession.

*The Conditions required for Establishing Security Regimes.* Jervis maintains that the following three conditions must all be present if a security regime is to come into existence. First, the principal powers in the international arena must have an abiding interest in setting up such a regime. Second, all prospective regime members must ascribe a similar value to the principles of common security and co-operation. The third condition is a negative one, in that if one or more actors ultimately conclude that the best way for them to obtain security is through expansion, a security regime cannot be created.

According to Janis Gross-Stein, some security regimes are rooted in the common interests of rival actors who, as a result, pursue a dynamic form of collaboration. Other regimes, she claims, are moved by selfish motives, and usually emerge when potential members share an aversion to a common enemy. In these cases, rather than create a system of full-blown co-operation, the actors will tend to limit their association to coordinating their actions. Gross-Stein maintains that security regimes instill in their members a variety of norms that, in turn, allow the regime to function properly. Inertia, produced by the members' expectations from the regime, also explains why such regimes persist. Moreover, given that members of security regimes often develop an aversion to change, these regimes, Gross-Stein contends, tend to sanctify and formalize the status quo. Finally, over time, as the members of the regime co-operate with one another, the regime's norms, structures and patterns of behavior not only evolve but also acquire a level of legitimacy. One result will be that the member governments of the regime are able to pursue and justify domestically unpopular policies by arguing that they are in keeping with the regime's principles.

Gross-Stein also discusses the question of the security regime's survival. She argues that such a regime endures mostly as a result of its leading members' aversion to war. But their continued existence is equally dependent upon the conclusion of agreements designed to increase the amount, accuracy and dissemination of information among regime members. This information is needed in order to inspire mutual trust, the assumption being that no regime can survive for very long without such trust. The regime must also at least give the impression that it reduces its members' vulnerability (Gross-Stein, 1987). Conversely, if rational calculations are thrown to the winds and the idea of a possible confrontation begins to gain credibility, a security regime may simply collapse. This may occur when the regime's members no longer fear the prospect of war, which suddenly does not appear to them to be either such a horrific or costly affair. It may also come about when the regime members' subjective opinions or moods change, leading them to conclude that the cost of the regime outweighs its benefits. Often, at the same time, the belief that they can rely on no one but themselves begins to worm its way slowly into the regime members' minds, undermining the principle of co-operation that lies at the heart of the regime. In some cases, the passage of time engenders a degree of forgetfulness, indifference, if not outright ignorance of the terrible price extracted by war. Finally, dwindling global stability and escalating conflict among the regime's more powerful sponsors may also give rise to the conditions likely to terminate a security regime (Burgin, 1994).

*Types of Security Regime.* Academics in the field of security studies have identified a wide range of security regimes, classifying them according to the type and number of issues they tackle, as well as their geographical scope (Mandell, 1990; Vayrynen, 1992; Schimmelfennig, 1994; Steinberg, 1994; Inbar and Sandler, 1995).

Some security regimes are single-issue regimes that address only one specific global security problem. They include, the *NPT Regime*, the *Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Regime*, the *Missile Control Technology (MTCR) Regime* or the regime established to combat anti-personnel mines, etc. As can be seen, most of these regimes are arms control regimes, one of the principal types of security regime.

Some security regimes are born as part of a political settlement (a phenomenon Gross-Stein discusses in some detail) like the Egyptian-Israeli security regime. This regime came into being in January 1974 and ended in 1979 with the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The Israeli-Jordanian security regime was established in 1970 following the events of "Black September," its aim being to wrestle with the problem of the Palestinian terrorist organizations. It was still in existence in 1971 and, in fact, continued to function throughout the 1993–1994 peace process until the conclusion of peace between Israel and Jordan. The security regime accompanying the Oslo process also belongs to this kind of security regime. It first appeared during the formulation of the September–October 1993 accords and survived the series of agreements signed between the two sides during the 1990s, which culminated in the "Sharm El-Sheik Understandings" of October 2000. It collapsed soon after the outbreak of the Second Intifada. The political processes linked to the violent struggles in the Balkans following the breakup of Yugoslavia, in 1991 gave rise to a number of similar security regimes. Amongst this type of security regime, some could be more accurately described as settlement and conciliation regimes, for example, the regime associated with the peace process in Northern Ireland or the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) regime.

A third type of security regime is more akin to a security cum political coalition. These coalitions are formed in order to challenge international actors that coalition members regard as "aggressors", "pariahs" or even "lepers." One such regime was the 1991 anti-Iraq coalition, which was also largely an anti-Saddam coalition; another was the coalition formed during the Bosnian and Kosovo Crises in order to contain Yugoslavia cum Serbia and its leader, Slobodan Milosevic. The first was the anti-South African front launched by the Black African states bordering South Africa. The *Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) Regime* operated alongside a global regime that, among other things, imposed a strict arms embargo on South Africa. The second regime, which in fact predated the first, came into being following Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. This anti-Rhodesian regime was partly a political embargo and partly a security coalition seeking to prevent White Rhodesia from acquiring weapons.

These are actually the anti-rogue states regimes, and the coalition against Iraq in 2003 is such a regime as well.

## **2.2 Concepts from the Field of Communications**

The field of political-media studies contains a number of terms, concepts and perspectives which proved useful when delving into the relationship between the global news media and international, specifically security, regimes.

### **2.2.1 The Functional Approach**

In their groundbreaking article "Mass Communications, Popular Taste and Organized Social Action" (1971), Lazarsfeld and Merton examined, among other things, the media's role in awarding legitimacy and status to issues and processes taking place in the public sphere. They also noted the media's function of enforcing social norms and exposing irregular phenomena that do not accord with accepted public norms (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1971). These two media functions are not limited to the national stage, but are to be found in the international arena as well. Accordingly, it is possible to examine how the global news media bestow legitimate status on issues, people and processes in the international domain, for example, how it can focus a spotlight on international actors who defy accepted global norms.

The media's traditional functions (McQuail, 1994: 78–81) include news coverage, correlation (i.e. general context), commentary, continuity (imparting a particular heritage) and mobilization. Together these functions create a distinctive media perspective that affects the interaction between the global media and international processes.

News coverage of international developments has a distinctive nature, a result, among other things, of the "news value" the media applies to international events. The international political agenda affects the way the news is reported as well, mostly because it influences the way in which the media see events. News coverage is also linked to framing procedures, which, in turn, is associated, to a degree, with the problem of "media imperialism" (Lee, 1979; McBride, 1980; McPhail, 1981; Golding and Harris, 1997; Mowlana, 1997).

The media's correlative (i.e. general context), appraisal and mobilization functions also play a role in the global developments associated with regimes. Often the global media will rally to the side of those actors and processes defined as "Good"

by the key international players. At the same time, it will cry out against the "Bad Guys," condemning them for violating accepted global norms. This happened in Iraq before, during and after the 1991 Gulf War, as the media railed against the "villainous" Saddam Hussein. It was also the case in Yugoslavia, when the media joined forces and pilloried that "scoundrel" Milosevic.

Continuity is another important media function, in that the media tend to disseminate specific heritages. This media function has frequently led to accusations that stories tend to be framed exclusively from the standpoint of the world's strong imperialist powers, the result being that the voice of the developing and Third World states is scarcely heard, their heritage virtually ignored.

### 2.2.2 Constructing Reality

"Agenda Setting" is one of the principal methodologies used to tackle the question of how reality is constructed. This school of thought points to the presence of strong and reciprocal links between the media, on the one hand, and the political and public arenas, on the other (McCombs, 1981; Rogers and Dearing 1994; Dearing and Rogers, 1996; McCombs, Shaw and Weaver, 1997). When applied to the international arena, its findings can help ascertain the international agendas of the dominant players', such as the United States, the G8 countries or the European Union. In covering these issues, the global news media help make public and disseminate these agendas, thus contributing to the construction of a new and constantly evolving global reality (Jonssen, Kronsell and Soderholm, 1995:2-4, 9-11).

The framing method discusses how attitudes, beliefs and opinions determine the way in which the media organize information (Entman, 1991; Iyengar, 1991; Wolfsfeld, 1997). As such, it also sheds light on how reality is formed in the international arena. It is worth noting that more often than not the media's framing processes are rooted in the *Weltanschauung* of the world's stronger states. Similarly, the media tend to gauge the newsworthiness of events from the perspective of the developed, capitalist world.

The above trends are closely connected to the question of newsworthiness. Studies in the field of media "news value" patterns have revealed a marked tendency on the part of the global news media to focus upon the world's more powerful, elite states and their leaders. In this context, it is worth noting that, as a rule, the media tend to adopt a sympathetic attitude towards the West, the G8 states and countries from the developed world, and are generally approving of developments within in the Northern Hemisphere. This is opposed to its overall negative stance towards the rest of the world, reflected in its habit of constantly highlighting the various disasters that beset those areas (Galtung and Ruge 1970; Westerstahl and Johansson, 1994).

### 2.2.3 International Media Environment

During the 1990's, several developments in the international arena, together with the advent of a number of innovations in the world of communications combined to augment and amplify the above media processes. Mass globalization, breaches in the hitherto impregnable wall of national sovereignty, cross-border economic processes, the rise of giant media conglomerates and of smaller co-operations, some specializing in reporting international news, others focusing on entertainment, sport, etc., merged to create a new media map, which became one of several environments within which international regimes operate (Stephens, 1991; Stevenson, 1992; Frederick, 1993; Hamelink, 1994; Barker, 1997; Herman, E. and McChesney, 1997; Zuckerman, 1999; Mowlana, 1997; Monge, 1998; Tehrenian, 1999).

This media-based environment – i.e. the media's global behavioral patterns – banded together with other relevant media characteristics to form one of several independent variables that not only contribute to the process of setting up international regimes, but constitute an important element in their future operation.

## 3. The Convergence Point: International Regimes and the Global News Media

Among its many functions, the global news media, employing a variety of reality-building tools, helps to interpret and thus characterize international events. It will define the type of issue under discussion. Is it a security matter? A political affair? An economic question? Or perhaps an environmental issue? The media will also identify the nature of the event: whether it is a sudden crisis; an on-going conflict or, conversely, part of a peace and reconciliation process? With framing processes, the media will present a particular take on events, one that politicians and diplomats, charged with shaping foreign policy, can ignore only at their own peril. Governments, as a rule, obtain a great deal of information on events from the media and are thus heavily influenced by framing procedures.

There have been several studies of the media's role in the making of foreign policy, and particularly its contribution to decision-making process. What has emerged from these studies is that the media's input in this respect – known as the CNN effect – is such that it can be reasonably considered an international actor capable of shaping global processes. However,

most of these studies examined the media's influence on the foreign policy of a single actor, thus focusing on processes that take place at the micro level alone (Gutstadt, 1993; Livingston and Eachus, 1995; Jakobsen, 1996; Strobel, 1996; Strobel, 1997). But, there is also a legitimate case to be made for the claim that the global news media can mould international events at the macro-level and affect, among other things, the development of international regimes. In order to test this hypothesis, this paper will highlight and analyze the global news media's impact on the dynamics of international regimes – its part in their rise, consolidation and eventual disappearance. Simply put, it will investigate the reciprocal relationship between two variables: on the one hand, international regimes and, on the other, the global news media; the assumption being that of the two, the global media are the independent, and the regime the dependent variable. Hence, the various aforementioned media processes become, in effect, a series of independent sub variables, which also affect the evolution of international regimes. The media's several functions – awarding an issue status and legitimacy, the way in which it reports events, its correlative (i.e. general context) and mobilization functions, its ability to construct reality, whether by setting the agenda or framing processes, and its "news value" calculations – all play a part in the development of international regimes, in general, and security regimes in particular.

### 3.1 The Media and the Establishment of International Regimes

Oren Young's observations on the evolution of international regimes clearly suggest that the global news media have a crucial part to play in the establishment of such regimes, at least as far as those regimes that surface spontaneously or as the result of negotiations are concerned. In both cases, prospective regime members will, for example, make use of the media to glean background material on issue at stake.

International regimes emerge spontaneously when the global news media (concurrent with other regime-stimulating mechanisms) identify the problem at issue and align with the actors set to tackle it. The media processes involved at this stage vary. If the problem under discussion is sufficiently acute to provoke a sharp reaction from the relevant international actors, the media, driven by news value considerations, will report extensively on the story. Recognizing the gravity of the issues at stake, they will tend to rally to the side of those taking part in the impromptu establishment of the regime. At this point, the media's framing processes may also come into play. Dominating the media's agenda, owing to the importance attributed to it by the regime's prospective members, the issue at hand will be subjected to broad media coverage. Regimes founded extemporaneously to address environmental issues which do not make too many demands on their prospective members often have the benefit, during their initial stages of development, of precisely such extensive media coverage.

A similar process occurs in regimes established by negotiation. In such cases media coverage helps push forward the negotiation process, with the global media quite often taking a stand on the issue and urging the parties to the negotiations to make progress in creating a regime. This kind of media contribution is especially marked in security and human rights regimes, whose members have the benefit of a democratic system of government.

Regimes formed by hegemonic processes leave less scope for media intervention. In such instances, a regime's role is generally confined to disseminating information vertically from the powers instigating the regime down to the actors compelled to join it. Security regimes are particularly susceptible to this process.

It is worth noting that whatever the circumstances of the regime's birth, media activity encourages the kind of widespread international discourse and debate which is crucial to the regime's developmental stages. The media may also help launch an international regime by homogenizing concepts, dovetailing expectations and aligning perspectives, all of which serve to increase co-operation among the regime's prospective members.

When examining the various sub stages of a regime's establishment, it soon becomes apparent that the media does more than simply accompany the process from a distance. In many cases, by generating public awareness of the regime and publicizing its norms, it becomes an integral and vital element of the process itself. What follows is a detailed description of the part played by the global news media in the several stages leading up to the birth of an international regime.

*The First Sub-Stage: Identifying the Problem and Launching the Regime:* In the most extreme case, the media locate and expose the problem, placing it at the top of its agenda.<sup>1</sup> Such media activity has served to prompt a number of security regimes. For example, in 1990–91, by informing the public at large of Saddam Hussein's iniquitous activities in Kuwait, the global news media helped launch the regime that was to eventually wage war on the Iraqi dictator. Similarly, the media, by pinpointing and disseminating information about human rights violations, may trigger human rights regimes, as was the case with the regimes formed to help human rights activists in China, or the Jews of Iran. In instances where the initiative

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1. It is worth noting that only very few scholars in the field of international relations have studied the processes by which political elements in the global arena set the international agenda (Livingston, 1992; Jonssen et al., 1995; Levy, Young and Zuern, 1995). Moreover, those that have examined the issue failed to take note of the possibility that the national and certainly the global media can help shape, even establish the international agenda.

for the regime lay with a state, organization, national interest group, public or private individual the media may choose to champion the regime. Placing it high on its agenda (not necessarily due to purely professional news value considerations), it will provide the nascent regime with extensive coverage, while using sympathetic framing procedures.

*The Second Sub-Stage: Promoting the Problem and Regime.* The media can nudge this process along by awarding the issue at stake a measure of factual as well as moral validity (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1971). As a rule, it is at this point that an international actor, usually one of the great powers, emerges as the driving force behind the prospective regime, emphasizing the gravity of the problem and pushing forward the measures necessary to tackle it. This holds true for both non-hegemonic and hegemonic regime establishment processes. In both cases, the national media of the above actor will sign up to the cause and help promote the budding regime. In due course, with the advent of a cyclical pattern of reciprocal media influence, whether as regards "news value" considerations or setting the international news agenda, it is joined by other national media, as well as by global news conglomerates. This stage is decisive in creating public international awareness of both the seriousness of the problem at stake and the regime established to deal with it. The media has a vital role to play here, in that it can validate the regime and bestow a degree of legitimacy on those choosing to join it. In addition, by covering developments and events in the field, as well as disseminating information about prospective members – reports to which both the actor prompting the regime and his potential allies have access to – the media will also help the regime to progress further. Finally, the media may suggest ways of tackling the issue at stake, suggestions which will eventually become part of the regime's behavioral patterns, that is its norms, principles, etc. The media's contribution to the evolution of security regimes at this stage of their lifecycle is particularly striking.

*The Third Sub-Stage: Consolidation.* During this third stage, the media will follow with interest the process of joining the regime. At this point, the regime's members also begin to formulate the core norms and principles that will determine its behavior patterns, and ultimately its nature. The global news media, by legitimizing the proposed norms and placing them center stage may have a strong influence on the process. In time, employing congenial framing procedures and giving prominence to its affairs, the media may enlist even further in the regime's service. Frequently, when the consolidation process requires Confidence Building Measures (CBM), as is the case in regional security regimes, the national and global media will endorse these measures. Prompted by framing considerations, given that these measures are designed to reduce violence in the international arena, they will report on and analyze the CBM's effects, accounts that will be read and assimilated by various interested parties (Weiman, 1994:301,305).

Once a regime's members have finalized its norms – this being the point at which the regime's content is established (Schimmelfennig, 1994), they may decide to celebrate their achievement with a ceremonial event. They may initiate an international gathering or decide to sign an accord in public. Since its being staged is essentially a "media event," it is at this point that the international political and media processes are most obviously and closely intertwined. The significance of the media event lies in the fact that by increasing public awareness of the new regime and creating a public commitment to it on the part of its members, a commitment difficult, almost impossible to shrug off, it helps cement the regime, taking it yet another step forward (Dayan and Katz, 1992). This is what happened when the NPT regime, founded in 1995, was launched with a special public meeting of the United Nations General Assembly.

*The Fourth Sub-Stage: Stabilization and Consolidation.* This involves reinforcing the regime's frameworks, delineating and clarifying its modus operandi and establishing the rules regulating its common decision-making processes. The sanctions to be applied to actors who have violated the regime's norms are also spelt out at this point. All this serves, among other things, to strengthen the regime and enhance its stability. The media role, at this stage is limited to reporting on events using sympathetic framing techniques. It is in this context that the media driven function of enforcing social norms while exposing phenomena that do not accord with customary public values kicks in (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1971). The media will underscore and validate the regime's principal tenets, highlighting the norms endorsed by the regime's participants. In security regimes, the global media, drawing attention to individuals, groups or states in breach of the regime's norms, encourage the latter to put pressure on and/or take action against the guilty parties. The security regimes formed to resolve the problems of Milosevic and Iraq respectively, benefited from precisely such political cum media processes. The juxtaposition of media and political processes also occurs in environmental regimes, such as the Rio or Green Peace regimes, as well as in human rights regimes. For example, the short-lived regime formed against China in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square affair, when the media, by reporting on China's violations of human rights helped the regime carry out its self-imposed task.

The media may also help forge the machinery required to enforce the regime's norms. In addition, they play an important part in creating the various other mechanisms needed if the regime is to function properly and carry out its mission. The media will, for example, highlight the need for funds to finance the regime's activities and insist that something be done about this. It will list the various mechanisms required to uphold the regime's norms and demand their establishment. As the regime gradually stabilizes, its functions crystallize and are, if necessary, divided among its members. This requires the development of mechanisms designed specifically to discharge the regime's tasks. In some instances, the regime's members will create this machinery from scratch; in others they will rely on pre-existing mechanisms. In both cases, the media,

arguing the case for the introduction of such machinery, will follow and report first on its construction and then on its operation. Hence, the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency and United Nations inspection team in Iraq, both part of the arms control regime set up at the end of the Gulf War, were subjected to extensive media coverage.

Over time, a security regime will forge an independent identity, boasting its own particular interests. The media, both national and global, by utilizing their mobilization and continuity functions, can push this process along. For example, it is often during the stabilization period, though this may occur in the earlier stages of its development as well, that a regime's ideological identity becomes apparent. The media's reports, depending on their particular political leanings, will either endorse or challenge the regime's ideological posture.

The demand for high quality, easily accessible information is one of the more interesting characteristics of regime formation. There is an overriding need for information, which by providing maximum transparency will help keep regime members in line and prevent them from playing fast and loose with its norms. There is also a call for well balanced and varied information on all the regime's participants, so that members with greater access to sources of information will not have an edge over others less fortunate in this respect. Given that this information, by dispelling uncertainty, helps ensure their survival, international regimes are naturally eager to do all they can provide members with such data and are quite happy for the media to lend a hand. The demand for transparency is one of the reasons why closed political regimes, lacking in transparency and in possession of a tightly controlled media, find it difficult to join international regimes as opposed to open, democratic countries, which have the benefit of a free press (Keohane, 1982:343–35; Keohane, 1984:92–96, 100–103; Hasenclever, Mayer and Ritterberger: 1996: 206–207).

### 3.2 The Media and Regime in Action

A regime's lifespan depends on several factors, one of which is how successfully it negotiates the problem at hand. Once the regime is fully functional, many of the political cum media processes, noted above, instead of grinding to a halt, keep on going. Perhaps the most important factor in any regime's ability to function and survive is its adaptability. The key question is to what degree the regime is capable of adjusting to change: to changes in the actors (members and non-members), in the problem, or in the international arena? The answer depends on whether the regime was prescient enough to fashion both norms allowing it to adjust to change and the mechanisms needed for it to modify itself in accordance with changing circumstances. If the answer to the above question is yes, then the regime will, despite changing circumstances, become sufficiently flexible to deal with the issue at hand and thus enjoy a measure of stability.

One important sub-branch in the field of international regimes scrutinizes the learning processes of international regimes (Nye, 1987; Levy, Young and Zuern, 1995). A regime's decision-making processes, its members' ability to communicate with one another, the frequency and content of these communications and the various transparency mechanisms in operation, which together enable the regime's members to know what is happening within and without the regime, are all crucial to the learning process (Mitchell, 1998). The global news media, with their contributions to such factors as regime transparency, plays a vital part in this process. While, admittedly, a regime may establish its own internal information service, the processes discussed here take place in the international arena, which is the playing ground of the global news media, and is dominated by the global media's behavioral patterns, i.e. their news coverage and agenda setting. It worth noting that today, with the advent of new technologies that easily cross national borders, the global media's ability to carry out these functions is much greater than ever before.

### 3.3 The Media and the End of the Regime

As can be seen in the diagram describing the dynamics of the regime, it may either gradually fade away or suddenly collapse. In either case, this is because: (a) the problem that engendered the regime has been solved; or (b) the key members of the regime have decided to abandon it; or (c) other more important issues have appeared on the international agenda. Sometimes, however, a regime is terminated because it can no longer enforce its norms or because the norms themselves are no longer relevant but have yet to be replaced by a new set of norms. On occasion, members of a regime may decide to devote more time to their individual interests at the expense of their shared, regime-based interests. But, whatever the reason for a regime's demise and regardless of the form it takes, the media will follow and report on these developments with interest. In some instances, the media, can abet the process of a regime's disappearance by taking an obvious stand on the matter, either through framing procedures or by introducing a new international agenda. Global political considerations may also encourage the media to promote the dissolution of a regime. Such considerations often underlie the activities of the national media services, which tend to act in accordance with the interests of actors seeking to terminate a particular regime.

It is possible to argue that, in theory, once the media stop covering an international regime, whether for professional or ideological reasons, it, like Schroedinger's cat, ceases to exist. This is the flip side of the claim that the media, by awarding a regime public legitimacy and status, turns it into a tangible entity. In sum, the media not only help bring international regimes into being, but also contribute to their demise.

The following table (Table 2) summarizes the media's part in the evolution of international, including security regimes:

International Regime Processes	Media Processes
1. Identifying the Issue	a. Functions: Legitimacy and Awarding Status
2. Sponsor	b. Function: News Coverage
3. Promoting the Issue: Formulating Norms	c. Function: Commentary
4. Initial Co-operation	d. Function: Mobilization
5. Recruiting New Members	e. Setting the Agenda
6. Regime Consolidation	f. Framing Procedures
7. Regime Stabilization: Formulating Decision-Making Process	g. Highlighting
8. Locating Deviant Elements	h. News Value
9. Imposing Sanctions on Offenders	i. Media Event
10. Regime's End: Withering away or Collapse	

Table 2: Regime and media processes

The column on the right represents the key stages in the lifecycle of an international regime: its establishment, its stabilization period, and its eventual demise. The column on the left lists the specific media processes that accord with each particular stage. It appears that each phase in the life of an international regime is associated with the relevant media process.

### 3.4 The Role of the Media in Security Regimes

Security regimes come into being when actors on the international stage, fearful of the prospect of violence, even war, decide to co-operate with one another in order to prevent such an eventuality from coming to pass. Like other international regimes, security regimes are also heavily influenced by media activity. Here too, media and regime processes intermingle, affecting the regime's development. The global news media play an important part in the process of establishing security regimes. It will, for example, promote the initiative to set up the regime, by, among other things, impressing upon elements within the nation states as well as in the international arena, the fact that the alternative, war, will exact a very high price. The media will also detail the regime's incipient norms and explain how they will prevent further acts of violence. In order to generate maximum transparency and facilitate the decision-making process, the media will provide information on potential regime members, to both their prospective partners and rivals within the nascent regime. Finally, covering media events such as the formal establishment of a coalition, signing ceremonies etc., the media place the security regime firmly in the public eye and so on the international stage.

During the security regime's consolidation period, the media help to develop Confidence Building Measure by reporting on developments within and without the regime, and by acting as a channel of communication between actors wishing to converse, albeit indirectly, with one another, forge a degree of trust among regime members. Media activities also increase the levels of transparency needed to uphold the regime. Lastly, the media help the regime by drawing attention to actors in breach of its norms and reporting on the measures taken against the offenders.

When, for whatever reason, a security regime ends, the media will be quick to inform both members and non-members of its demise. On occasion, the media may push the process along by accentuating the security regime's failures, thus encouraging its termination.

Both the national and global media have played a part in the lifecycles of numerous security regimes, as demonstrated in the examples.

The media proved indispensable to the evolution of the *Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) Regime*. The CSCE regime was first broached during the Helsinki conferences of the 1970s. Its consolidation phase culminated in the establishment of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). During each stage of its development, the media, reporting on events, helped push the process along. They rallied to the cause by portraying the CSCE regime as vital to European security because, as the media noted, the regime, among other things, was careful to integrate the Soviet Union into the process.

The *Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime*, one of the world's key arms control regimes, exploited the media in order publicize its activities and obtain legitimacy. The media also proved useful in identifying offenders against the regime, that is states that either refused to sign the Treaty or violated its articles. The *Anti Personnel Mine Regime* took advantage of Princess

Diana's media appeal. Enlisting the Princess in its service, it sent her to Angola, where she was to meet with land mine victims. Not surprisingly, the visit, part of the regime's promotion campaign, received wide news coverage. The media war waged by MTV on France, following French nuclear testing in the Moruroa Atoll was a unique and still unrivalled instance of media involvement in a security regime. Producing its own campaign ads, MTV embarked on a public crusade against the French government and its blatant violation of the NPT regime.

The global news media play a similar role in security regimes integral to peace and reconciliation processes or which are formed in order to underwrite an international settlement. During Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, media activity gave the embryonic Egyptian-Israeli reconciliation regime (which was also, as noted, a security regime), a significant push forward. The visit received extensive media coverage and is rightly remembered as an archetypal media event, i.e. an event in which the media are involved a priori. The media's contribution to the Israeli-Jordanian and Israeli-Palestinian security cum reconciliation regimes was much the same. Both regimes were mixed security cum political regimes, and the media, by publicizing their norms (sometimes even before any formal agreement had been signed) in effect sponsored the regimes and helped bring them into being. Later, by exposing infractions and violations of the regimes' norms on the part of all parties to the regime, the media helped prop up these regimes and ensure their continuity. In reconciliation regimes, the media, by using framing techniques and by agenda setting, help determine and define the key issues under discussion. They may also help to mobilize national and international support for the reconciliation process throughout the regime's life.

The part played by the media in the establishment of the coalitions formed to challenge Saddam's Iraq and Milosevic's Serbia was much the same. In both cases, the media took a definite stand on the issues at stake. Adopting, virtually without question, the pro-war coalition members' view of things, it sided unreservedly with the "Good Guys" against the "Bad."

#### **4. The War in Iraq – The Media and International Security Regimes:**

##### **4.1 The Advent of The Anti-Iraq Regime**

The period prior to the outbreak of the war in Iraq saw the birth of two parallel yet antithetical regimes. First, there was the regime founded by those states that held Iraq to be a rogue state in the process of developing weapons of mass destruction, supported the war against it. Then there was the regime formed by elements opposed to the war, starting with France, and Germany and Russia, who were soon joined by broad swathes of society across the globe. Both regimes exploited the global news media, as well as the local and national media, in order to advance their cause and garner support.

Prior to the Pro-war regime, the United States led the anti-terrorist regime established on September 11th 2001 after the attack on the World Trade Center (see introduction). On September 20th 2001, the UN General Assembly internationally adopted the regime's norms, followed eight days later by the Security Council (resolution 1373<sup>1</sup>). On October 7th 2001 we see the next stage of the anti-terror regime – the War in Afghanistan, implementing the regime's norms by fighting El-Qaida terrorists. The United States led in this war a coalition of 40 states in Afghanistan, but it was as well a war against a "rogue state", as the Taliban internal regime in Afghanistan was perceived.

The majority of the international media supported the anti-terror regime, as they did when it developed into the pro-war (anti-Iraq) regime.

The pro-war regime was led by the United States. Having identified the problem: "*Iraq is a rogue state in possession of weapons of mass destruction*", and its solution: using force. The United States became the driving force and mainspring behind the nascent regime. It stage-managed the entire affair, it instigated the regime, and it defined and validated its underlying norms. Finally, it offered the world proof, often elicited from media reports, that Iraq had broken the rules and was in breach of said norms. It should be noted that at present there is more than some doubt as to the nature, indeed worth of the administration's evidence. But valid or not, the fact that the United States exploited the media to make public both the regime's norms and Iraq's alleged violations, is a prime example of the way in which the media and the Pro-War security regime converged on the eve of war.

##### **4.2 The Formal Declaration of the Regime**

One of the main milestones of establishing this regime was President Bush's declaration of the "Axis of Evil" in his State of the Union Address (January 29th 2002), referring to Iraq, Iran and North Korea<sup>2</sup>. Here the anti-terror regime was broadened and became the anti rogue states<sup>3</sup> regime, focused specifically on Iraq, and its members endeavored to devise new rules and regulations, as well as common decision-making processes and actual targets. In this regime, the United States served as the catalyst, arguing that it was the best way to resolve the problem at hand.

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1. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm>

2. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>

3. For definitions of *Rogue States* see: Klare, 1995; Rubin, 1999; Chomsky, 2000; O\_Sullivan, 2000.

The international media adopted the White House slogan "Axis of Evil" and framed it in its reports without hesitation. It was a worldwide mobilization of the media, legitimizing the regime with hardly any criticism (except for the BBC, which expressed concern about the US position<sup>1</sup>).

### 4.3 The Consolidation of the Regime

The next stages of the regime centered around US activity in the United Nations, and especially the Security Council's deliberations were particularly noteworthy. The media, focusing especially on the frequently contentious discussions within the Security Council, followed almost word for word the grueling diplomatic process leading up to Resolution 1441.<sup>2</sup> Well aware of this, pro-war Security Council members used the debate on the regime's norms and Iraq's violations as a platform from which to publicly expound their views (the same held true of members of the anti-war regime). Happy to play along, the media became an important factor in the crystallization of the anti-Iraq regime.<sup>3</sup>

### 4.4 The Opposing International Regime

On the other side of the Iraqi divide was the coalition sponsored by France, Germany and Russia. The members sought to create a rival regime that would offer a different, less violent, solution to the same problem: *Iraq is a rogue state in possession of weapons of mass destruction*. But, as soon became clear, some members of the regime thought this problem to be less serious than generally assumed, while others denied its existence altogether. In any case, the anti-war regime hoped to forge and validate its norms using the same mechanisms as its rival, the United Nations Security Council. This proving difficult, the regime fell back on other international organizations such as the European Union. The anti-war regime's activities received wide media coverage. The result was an increased awareness of the anti-war stand, which in turn generated public support for the regime. This, in turn, galvanized states opposed to the war to form an unofficial counter-alliance. It is not unreasonable to assume that one reason why Turkey felt able to turn down the United States' request that it play a greater, more public part in the war against Iraq was because it was encouraged by news reports on the up-and-coming anti-war regime.

Alongside official, state activity, extra-parliamentary organizations, groups and individuals across the world rallied to the anti-war cause. Opposed to aggressive action against Iraq, they formed a cross-border global coalition which, whenever it seemed that events were moving yet another step closer to war, would engineer a series of protests across the world. Indeed, as the political process leading to war accelerated, the number of demonstrations rose, increasing in size and intensity as well. The two biggest and most striking demonstrations took place on 26 October 2002 and 19 January 2003 respectively. Both received extensive domestic as well as global media coverage. At this point, it is worth noting the anti-war coalition's astute exploitation of the WEB. Making effective use of the Net's communications potential, it set up anti-war sites<sup>4</sup>; took advantage of Internet news resources, such as Indymedia; distributed petitions; composed blogs, most famously the journals written by the "human shields" who had traveled to Iraq to prevent the bombing of civilian targets; set up discussion forums; dispatched carbon copy e-mails, etc.

During this period, the global media's activity was confined to two key media environments: the global news television networks, such as the BBC, Sky News and CNN, and the Internet. In the months leading up to the war in Iraq, but even more markedly during the war itself, the leading global news networks' national affiliates (a) determined their editorial decisions and (b) supported their "news value" judgments. This was certainly true of the American CNN, but also, if to a lesser degree, of the two British networks, the BBC and Sky News. CNN emerged as a patriotic American channel par excellence, while Sky News took a markedly pro-British, pro-government view. Only the BBC adopted, on occasion, a slightly more critical approach to the 'powers that be'. Thus, the three networks, thanks to their well-disposed reporting, helped the United States (and Britain) to establish their pro-war regime.

### 4.5 The Regime in the Pre-War period

The American drive to promote the anti-Iraq regime reached its peak six weeks prior to the outbreak of the war. US Secretary of State Collin Powell spoke at the UN Security Council on 5 February 2003. In the course of his speech, Powell, conscious of the power of television, introduced a series of visual aids in order to prove the existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.<sup>5</sup> This was also the peak of international media support of the anti-Iraq regime, and it was broadcast live by all the major television stations, internationally, and in many countries domestically as well.

1. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1796034.stm>
2. <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement>
3. <http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/11/08/resolution.text/>  
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F2061EFF3E550C7A8CDDA80994DA404482>
4. <http://www.internationalanswer.org/>; <http://www.unitedforpeace.org/>; <http://www.peacenowar.net/>  
<http://www.notinourname.net/>; <http://stopwar.org.uk/>; <http://www.antiwar.com/>; <http://www.indymedia.org/or/index.shtml>
5. <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm>

President Bush did not succeed in getting formal international approval for a military move, but he moved on towards war, and on March 17th 2003 used the media to present a "last minute" public ultimatum to Saddam Hussein<sup>1</sup>. As expected, the ultimatum got maximum media coverage, and there was no questioning of the move (almost mobilized media).

#### 4.6 The War

The offensive started on March 20th 2003 with missile attacks on Saddam's suspected hiding place. This war witnessed a new development in the utilization of the media with the effective communication management technique of "embedded journalists." This media strategy helped the Pentagon in gaining press support and mobilization for military action in the field (Bennett, 2003; Wells, 2003; Shinar, 2004)<sup>2</sup>. This way of controlling the media continued until the takeover of the Baghdad airport<sup>3</sup>. It should be noted that the international press legitimized the war, and it can be seen symbolically by adopting the Pentagon terms of "Coalition" and the "Shock and Awe" bombing in Iraq.

#### 4.7 The Regime's Demise

Two events covered live and extensively by the media symbolized the official end of the anti-Iraq regime. First, there was the demolition of Saddam's statue in Baghdad (April 9th 2003), an image that became an icon of the end of the war.<sup>4</sup> The second came eight months later when the US governor of Iraq initiated a media event by convening a press conference to announce the capture of Saddam Hussein, using the phrase "We got him," another media icon symbolizing the end of the former regime in Baghdad (December 13th 2003).<sup>5</sup>

In between, another media event was initiated by the White House to proclaim the formal end of combat. Here On the 1<sup>st</sup> of May 2003 President Bush, standing on the deck of the USS Lincoln, declared: "Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed. And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country."<sup>6</sup>

Officially, the regime ended on the day the American Administrator of Iraq, Paul Bremer, announced the capture of Saddam (December 13th 2003). This was an obvious media event (Dayan, and Katz, 1992), televised all over the world and the Middle East, repeating again and again Bremer's words, "We got Him."<sup>7</sup> This was a brief and last mobilization of the press, while making clear that the anti-Saddam regime was over. But the parallel regime of fighting terrorism is still active, while the media support and mobilization fades, and the robustness of the regime is questioned.

### 5. Conclusion

This paper dealt with two perspectives on the dynamics of international regimes and the media: a theoretical one, and the anti-Iraq case.

The theoretical perspective describes the processes of setting up international regimes, together with methods of classifying them. These combine to underline the strong links between international and security regimes and the global news media. Though the relationship is, in many ways, a reciprocal one, this article focused primarily on the media's impact on regimes. It explores the ways the media affect international regimes' lifecycles, from the time they are first conceived, through their establishment, consolidation and stabilization, until their ultimate demise. Though this paper highlights the media's role in the evolution of security regimes, it is clear that, regardless of the regime in question, the media are involved throughout the lifecycle of all international regimes, whatever their character.

In order to analyze the media's relationship with security regimes in general, and specifically its contribution to each and every stage in their development, the article utilizes methodologies from the field of communication studies. To date, most studies have explored the interaction between media communication patterns and global developments at the state level, or in relation to the formulation of foreign policy, while largely ignoring the international dimension of the relationship. This article is intended to remedy this, and these processes are demonstrated in the case study of the anti-Iraq security regime.

Table 3 summarizes the links of these regimes with the global news media.

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1. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html>
  2. See also: The Berkeley Media at Iraq War Conference: <http://journalism.berkeley.edu/conf/mediaatwar/index.html>
  3. <http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/03/sprj.iqr.war.main/> [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/2917381.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2917381.stm)
  4. A demonstration of world newspapers at: <http://www.newseum.org/frontpages/iraq/baghdadtoppled.asp>
  5. <http://www.newseum.org/frontpages/iraq/saddamcaptured.asp>
  6. [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/images/20030501-15\\_lincoln9-515h.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/images/20030501-15_lincoln9-515h.html)
  7. <http://www.newseum.org/frontpages/iraq/saddamcaptured.asp>

Event	Regime Stage	Media Process
September 11th 2001	The advent of the anti-terror regime	Coverage (News values); Awarding Status; Mobilization, Agenda setting; Framing.
UN anti-terror Resolutions (SC no. 1373) Sept. 2001.	Consolidation	Coverage (News values); Awarding Status; Mobilization, Agenda setting; Framing.
The war in Afghanistan (October 2001)	Regime Stabilization – applying policy	Support of the 5 processes
Bush declaration of the "Axis of Evil"	Proclamation of the anti-Iraq regime; defining norms	Support of the 5 processes
Formation of the civic global anti-war coalition (end of 2002 – beginning 2003)	Opposing regime	Seeking legitimacy; Agenda setting
UN Security Council resolution 1441 (November 8th 2002)	Defining norms	Coverage (News values); Awarding Status; Mobilization, Agenda setting; Framing.
Political anti-war coalition – Germany's Kohl and France's Chirac summit (January 22nd 2003)	Opposing regime	Seeking legitimacy; Agenda setting
US Secretary of State Powell at the UN Security Council (February 5th 2003)	Consolidation and defining norms	Seeking legitimacy; Agenda setting
Ultimatum (March 17th 2003)	Stabilization prior to policy application	 Coverage (News values); Awarding Status; Mobilization, Agenda setting; Framing.
Offensive (March 20th 2003)	Policy application	
Turning-point: the occupation of Baghdad (April 3–7, 2003)	Policy application	
Toppling Saddam's statue (April 4th 2003)	Peak of the regime	
Bush declaration: "Major combat operation ended" (May 1st 2003)	Beginning of the regime's end?	
Capture of Saddam (December 13th 2003)	The end of the regime	

The gray colored stages are the formation of the opposing regime: the anti-war coalition.

Table 3: Regime and media processes - The anti-Iraq case

The table demonstrates the various actual stages of the development of the regime and matches them with the relevant media processes, pointing to the significant contribution of the global news to the advent, consolidation, stabilization and demise of this regime. It also demonstrates the connections between part of the global media and the opposing regime, the coalition of the anti-war civic groups with Germany and France.

The international media activity around and with the regimes was channeled mainly in the international TV news channels – CNN, BBC and Sky, but also in the main global newspapers, as well as in the Internet environment.

It should be noted that although the paper focuses on the specific anti-Iraq regime, it is part of a more general anti-rogue actors regime that includes the war against global terrorism. During the entire period the United States was and still is determined to confront rogue actors, be they states, for example, Iran, Syria, and North Korea, or terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda, Hamas and the Hizbollah, wherever they may be found. It is interesting to note that the global news media, despite all the problems faced by the anti-Iraq regime, still belong to the ranks of this regime. Totally committed to the anti-terrorist and rogue states regime and anxious to promote its aims, the media have adopted in full the jargon employed by the regime's most prominent member: the United States.

This study of the development of the anti-Iraq press-security regime teaches us that during international crises the media mobilize and unanimously support the regime fighting the "bad guys." But, when the regime develops and enters disputed turfs and loses legitimacy, media support diminishes. The media may even develop into an opposing force and may join the actors fighting the regime. Moreover, the study of the Iraqi case shows that actors who operate and promote international regimes (whether security regimes or any others) also need to prepare themselves for managing the international media. They have to prepare proper media strategies, developing public relations systems that can influence the media to support and join forces with the regime and its norms.

Finally, this interdisciplinary field deserves more extensive examination in order to discover, for example, how these links affect other types of security regimes. Nor should future investigations of the media's impact on international regimes be solely confined to the question of security regimes. Given the recent explosion in global news services, there is clearly a need to study the media's influence, be it that of television networks such as CNN or of the more complex WEB, on a wide range of international regimes.

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## **Psychologische Hindernisse des Friedensprozesses im Nahen Osten und Vorschläge zu ihrer Überwindung**

Die Analyse der Beziehungen zwischen israelischen Juden und Palästinensern im Kontext der Al Aksa Intifada offenbart ein trauriges Paradoxon. Einerseits ist in beiden Gesellschaften die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung bereit für weitreichende Kompromisse, um eine friedliche Lösung des palästinensisch-israelischen Konflikts zu erreichen. Andererseits jedoch pflegt die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung in beiden Gesellschaften Stereotype über das Gegenüber, die von extrem negativen Eigenschaften geprägt und mit tiefem Misstrauen verbunden sind, so dass jegliche Verhandlung und Konfliktlösung unmöglich gemacht wird.

Der vorliegende Aufsatz erklärt dieses Paradoxon auf der Basis der Theorie des transitional context, wobei der Fokus auf die israelisch-jüdische Gesellschaft gerichtet ist. Ein transitional context besteht aus beobachtbaren, klar definierten physischen, sozialen, politischen, ökonomischen, militärischen und psychologischen Bedingungen, die vorübergehend sind und in ihrer Komplexität die Umwelt darstellen, in welcher Individuen und Kollektive agieren. Diese Bedingungen entstehen in der Folge von wichtigen Ereignissen und Informationen, die von den Mitgliedern der Gesellschaft wahrgenommen und verinnerlicht werden und die ihrerseits deren Verhalten und Handeln beeinflussen.

Im Fall der israelisch-jüdischen Gesellschaft bestand dieser Kontext aus wichtigen Ereignissen und Informationen im Zusammenhang mit dem Gipfel in Camp David und dem Beginn der Al Aksa Intifada im Jahr 2000. Dies bildete die Grundlage für die Entstehung von Angst, für die Delegitimierung der Palästinenser und die kollektive Sichtweise, selbst Opfer zu sein. Daraus entwickelten sich gravierende Hindernisse für Verhandlungen in Richtung auf eine friedliche Konfliktlösung. Sie führten zur Unterstützung von Gewalthandlungen gegen die Palästinenser; zur Unterstützung eines Führers, der aus seiner Entschlossenheit, mit dem Gegner unnachgiebig umzugehen, keinen Hehl macht; zu einem Gefühl der Unversöhnlichkeit und zur Unterstützung einer einseitigen Trennung von den Palästinensern.

Der letzte Teil des Aufsatzes behandelt auf allgemeiner Ebene den psychologischen Zustand, nach dem beide Gesellschaften - in der augenblicklichen Situation eines gewaltsamen Konflikts ohne Verhandlungen - streben sollten. Nach beinahe vier Jahren gewaltsamer Konfrontation sollten Israelis und Palästinenser versuchen, einen Zustand friedlicher Koexistenz zu erreichen, welcher gekennzeichnet ist durch einen beidseitigen Prozess der Legitimierung, des Ausgleichs, der Differenzierung und der Personalisierung sowie durch neue Hoffnung und gegenseitige Akzeptanz. Im Kern bedeutet Koexistenz eine Geisteshaltung, die von den Mitgliedern der Gesellschaft geteilt wird. Um zu einer Koexistenz zu gelangen, ist es notwendig, das psychologische Repertoire der Gesellschaften zu verändern, die in den

Friedensprozess involviert sind. Das Erreichen dieser Veränderung hängt zuallererst ab von den Intentionen, den Aktivitäten, der Entschlossenheit und der Stärke derer, die den Friedensprozess unterstützen: sowohl unter Führungspersonlichkeiten als auch in politischen Parteien, in den NGOs und bei einzelnen Mitgliedern der Gesellschaft. Zum zweiten hängt die erfolgreiche Etablierung eines Klimas der Koexistenz in der Gesellschaft davon ab, inwiefern die gesellschaftlichen Institutionen mobilisiert werden können, die neuen Botschaften des Friedensprozesses zu verbreiten. Die Massenmedien und das Bildungssystem spielen bei dieser Aufgabe eine wichtige Rolle.

Abschließend wird herausgearbeitet, dass eine ausstehende Veränderung des psychologischen Repertoires dem Friedensprozess bislang entgegensteht. Grundlegende Voraussetzungen dafür, um dies ändern/angehen zu können, sind erstens Verhandlungen zwischen den Gegnern, welche die Entwicklung einer beidseitig akzeptablen Übereinkunft ermöglichen, und zweitens die Beendigung oder zumindest ein deutlicher Rückgang aller Arten von Gewalt.

[Volltext \(in Englisch\)](#)

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## **Psychological obstacles to peace-making in the Middle East and proposals to overcome them**

Analysis of the relations between the Israeli Jews and the Palestinians, in the context of the Al Aqsa Intifada, suggests a sad paradox. On the one hand, the majority of people in both societies are ready for far-reaching compromises in order to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict peacefully. But, on the other hand, the majority of people in both societies stereotype their opponents with extremely negative characteristics and feel a profound mistrust that prevents any possible negotiation and solution of the conflict.

The paper explains the described paradox on the basis of the theory of transitional context, focusing on the Israeli Jewish society. The transitional context consists of observable and well-defined physical, social, political, economic, military and psychological conditions that are of a temporary nature and construct the environment in which individuals and collectives function. These conditions arise as a result of major events and major information that are perceived and apprehended by society members, and then they affect their behavior and functioning.

In the case of the Israeli Jewish society, the context consisted of major events and provided major information that shed light on them, related to the Camp David summit and the beginning of the Al Aqsa Intifada in 2000. This context served as a basis for the emergence of fear, delegitimization of the Palestinians and a self-collective view as a victim, which became major obstacles that prevented any meaningful negotiation towards the achievement of a peaceful solution. They in turn led to support for violent acts against the Palestinians, support of a leader who projects a determination to deal harshly with the rival, feelings of irreconcilability and support for unilateral separation from the Palestinians.

The last part of the paper describes in general terms the psychological state that both societies should strive to reach in the present situation of violent conflict without negotiations. After almost four years of violent confrontations, Israelis and Palestinians should try to achieve a state of peaceful coexistence, which means mutual legitimization, equalization, differentiation, and personalization, as well as the introduction of hope and mutual acceptance. In essence, coexistence refers to a state of mind shared by the members of a society. In order to achieve coexistence, it is necessary to change the psychological repertoire of the societies involved in the peace process. The achievement of this change depends first of all on the intentions, determination, activism and strength of those who support the peace process, including leaders, political parties, NGOs, and individual society members. Second, a successful process of establishing a climate of coexistence in a society depends on the mobilization of societal institutions to propagate the new messages of the peace process. Mass media and the educational system play an important role in this mission.

As its final point, the paper suggests that the fundamental prerequisites for changing the psychological repertoire that inhibits the peace process are: a. negotiations between the rivals which will allow the development of mutually acceptable agreement and b. cessation, or at least a significant reduction, of all types of violence.

[full text \(in English\)](#)

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## Psychological obstacles to peace-making in the Middle East and proposals to overcome them<sup>1</sup>

*Kurzfassung:* Die Analyse der Beziehungen zwischen israelischen Juden und Palästinensern im Kontext der Al Aksa Intifada offenbart ein trauriges Paradoxon. Einerseits ist in beiden Gesellschaften die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung bereit für weitreichende Kompromisse, um eine friedliche Lösung des palästinensisch-israelischen Konflikts zu erreichen. Andererseits jedoch pflegt die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung in beiden Gesellschaften Stereotype über das Gegenüber, die von extrem negativen Eigenschaften geprägt und mit tiefem Misstrauen verbunden sind, so dass jegliche Verhandlung und Konfliktlösung unmöglich gemacht wird.

Der vorliegende Aufsatz erklärt dieses Paradoxon auf der Basis der Theorie des transitional context, wobei der Fokus auf die israelisch-jüdische Gesellschaft gerichtet ist. Ein transitional context besteht aus beobachtbaren, klar definierten physischen, sozialen, politischen, ökonomischen, militärischen und psychologischen Bedingungen, die vorübergehend sind und in ihrer Komplexität die Umwelt darstellen, in welcher Individuen und Kollektive agieren. Diese Bedingungen entstehen in der Folge von wichtigen Ereignissen und Informationen, die von den Mitgliedern der Gesellschaft wahrgenommen und verinnerlicht werden und die ihrerseits deren Verhalten und Handeln beeinflussen.

Im Fall der israelisch-jüdischen Gesellschaft bestand dieser Kontext aus wichtigen Ereignissen und Informationen im Zusammenhang mit dem Gipfel in Camp David und dem Beginn der Al Aksa Intifada im Jahr 2000. Dies bildete die Grundlage für die Entstehung von Angst, für die Delegitimierung der Palästinenser und die kollektive Sichtweise, selbst Opfer zu sein. Daraus entwickelten sich gravierende Hindernissen für Verhandlungen in Richtung auf eine friedliche Konfliktlösung. Sie führten zur Unterstützung von Gewalthandlungen gegen die Palästinenser; zur Unterstützung eines Führers, der aus seiner Entschlossenheit, mit dem Gegner unnachgiebig umzugehen, keinen Hehl macht; zu einem Gefühl der Unversöhnlichkeit und zur Unterstützung einer einseitigen Trennung von den Palästinensern.

Der letzte Teil des Aufsatzes behandelt auf allgemeiner Ebene den psychologischen Zustand, nach dem beide Gesellschaften – in der augenblicklichen Situation eines gewaltsamen Konflikts ohne Verhandlungen – streben sollten. Nach beinahe vier Jahren gewaltsamer Konfrontation sollten Israelis und Palästinenser versuchen, einen Zustand friedlicher Koexistenz zu erreichen, welcher gekennzeichnet ist durch einen beidseitigen Prozess der Legitimierung, des Ausgleichs, der Differenzierung und der Personalisierung sowie durch neue Hoffnung und gegenseitige Akzeptanz. Im Kern bedeutet Koexistenz eine Geisteshaltung, die von den Mitgliedern der Gesellschaft geteilt wird. Um zu einer Koexistenz zu gelangen, ist es notwendig, das psychologische Repertoire der Gesellschaften zu verändern, die in den Friedensprozess involviert sind. Das Erreichen dieser Veränderung hängt zuallererst ab von den Intentionen, den Aktivitäten, der Entschlossenheit und der Stärke derer, die den Friedensprozess unterstützen: sowohl unter Führungspersönlichkeiten als auch in politischen Parteien, in den NGOs und bei einzelnen Mitgliedern der Gesellschaft. Zum zweiten hängt die erfolgreiche Etablierung eines Klimas der Koexistenz in der Gesellschaft davon ab, inwiefern die gesellschaftlichen Institutionen mobilisiert werden können, die neuen Botschaften des Friedensprozesses zu verbreiten. Die Massenmedien und das Bildungssystem spielen bei dieser Aufgabe eine wichtige Rolle.

Abschließend wird herausgearbeitet, dass eine ausstehende Veränderung des psychologischen Repertoires dem Friedensprozess bislang entgegensteht. Grundlegende Voraussetzungen dafür, um dies ändern/angehen zu können, sind erstens Verhandlungen zwischen den Gegnern, welche die Entwicklung einer beidseitig akzeptablen Übereinkunft ermöglichen, und zweitens die Beendigung oder zumindest ein deutlicher Rückgang aller Arten von Gewalt.

*Abstract:* Analysis of the relations between the Israeli Jews and the Palestinians, in the context of the Al Aqsa Intifada, suggests a sad paradox. On the one hand, the majority of people in both societies are ready for far-reaching compromises in order to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict peacefully. But, on the other hand, the majority of people in both societies stereotype their opponents with extremely negative characteristics and feel a profound mistrust that prevents any possible negotiation and solution of the conflict.

The paper explains the described paradox on the basis of the theory of transitional context, focusing on the Israeli Jewish society. The transitional context consists of observable and well-defined physical, social, political, economic, military and psychological conditions that

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are of a temporary nature and construct the environment in which individuals and collectives function. These conditions arise as a result of major events and major information that are perceived and apprehended by society members, and then they affect their behavior and functioning.

In the case of the Israeli Jewish society, the context consisted of major events and provided major information that shed light on them, related to the Camp David summit and the beginning of the Al Aqsa Intifada in 2000. This context served as a basis for the emergence of fear, delegitimization of the Palestinians and a self-collective view as a victim, which became major obstacles that prevented any meaningful negotiation towards the achievement of a peaceful solution. They in turn led to support for violent acts against the Palestinians, support of a leader who projects a determination to deal harshly with the rival, feelings of irreconcilability and support for unilateral separation from the Palestinians.

The last part of the paper describes in general terms the psychological state that both societies should strive to reach in the present situation of violent conflict without negotiations. After almost four years of violent confrontations, Israelis and Palestinians should try to achieve a state of peaceful coexistence, which means mutual legitimization, equalization, differentiation, and personalization, as well as the introduction of hope and mutual acceptance. In essence, coexistence refers to a state of mind shared by the members of a society. In order to achieve coexistence, it is necessary to change the psychological repertoire of the societies involved in the peace process. The achievement of this change depends first of all on the intentions, determination, activism and strength of those who support the peace process, including leaders, political parties, NGOs, and individual society members. Second, a successful process of establishing a climate of coexistence in a society depends on the mobilization of societal institutions to propagate the new messages of the peace process. Mass media and the educational system play an important role in this mission.

As its final point, the paper suggests that the fundamental prerequisites for changing the psychological repertoire that inhibits the peace process are: a. negotiations between the rivals which will allow the development of mutually acceptable agreement and b. cessation, or at least a significant reduction, of all types of violence.

## Introduction

Analysis of the relations between the Israeli Jews and the Palestinians, in the context of the Al Aqsa Intifada, points to a sad paradox. On one hand, the majority of people in both societies are ready for far-reaching compromises in order to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict peacefully. A national survey, made in November 2002, indicates that about 70% of all Palestinians and Israelis are ready to begin a settlement process with the aim of establishing a Palestinian state based on the 1967 border, provided the Palestinian refrain from further violence (see Kull, Ramsay, Warf, & Wolford, 2002). But, on the other hand, the majority in both societies stereotypes the opponent with extremely negative characteristics and experiences intense fear and a profound mistrust that prevent any possible negotiation and solution of the conflict. In addition, a majority in both societies supports the use of force against their opponent, which only intensifies the negative stereotyping and the mistrust (see Kull, Ramsay, Warf, & Wolford, 2002). These data indicate that at this stage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, psychological factors play a very important role. After long experience of negotiations and contacts, both societies are aware of the general contours of a possible solution to their conflict, and a majority in each society supports various aspects of the solution. However, due to the above-noted psychological obstacles, which are often exploited by various political forces, the solution of the conflict seems to members of both societies to be unachievable in the near future.

In the present paper, after briefly describing the general outlines of the background of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I would like to focus on one of the societies involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, namely the Israeli Jewish society, which I know better, and analyze the psychological obstacles that prevent any meaningful negotiation towards the achievement of a peaceful solution. Then, I would like to propose several psychological approaches that might help to remedy the present stalemate. It is important to note that there is substantial evidence that similar psychological factors operate on the Palestinian side and cause similar effects (see for example Bar-Tal, 1988; Kelman, 1999). From a psychological perspective, there is much mirror imaging in the psychological repertoires of each side, as the perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, emotions and behaviors of the Palestinians are in many respects similar to those of the Israelis, and both repertoires nourish each other and lead to mutually destructive types of behavior. Therefore, the proposed remedial steps apply to the Palestinian side, as well. But before turning to the above-promised analyses, there is a need to first describe the background of the present conflict situation.

## Background of the present Israeli-Palestinian conflict

The discussed case concerns the intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has a history going back for nearly a century. It developed over territory claimed as a homeland by two national movements, Palestinian nationalism and Zionism (the Jewish national movement). Both sides clashed recurrently over the right to self-determination, statehood and justice (see Gerner, 1991; Tessler, 1994 for details). Only in 1993 was there a historic breakthrough, when Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) signed an agreement in which the PLO recognized the right of Israel to exist in peace and security, and Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people in peace negotiations. Moreover, the two sides signed a Declaration of Principles (DOP) that specified the various stages for the peace process and set the framework for the five-year interim period of Palestinian self-rule. This interim period was intended to allow a gradual building of trust and reduction of animosity and hatred between the two nations that would enable them to construct relations of peaceful coexistence. These developments were expected to lead to a subsequent permanent settlement of the conflict in which the issues at the core of the conflict would be resolved (see Hirschfeld, 2000).

Seven years later, the two parties eventually convened to try to complete the final agreement and resolve all the outstanding issues peacefully. Many of the events and processes that occurred during the seven-year period did not facilitate the emergence of a peaceful climate of mutual trust, but it is beyond the scope of the present paper to analyze the nature of these developments. Thus, on July 11-24, 2000 top-level delegations of Israelis and Palestinians met at Camp David, USA, with the participation of a US team led by then President Bill Clinton, to try to reach a final agreement and end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the two sides did not succeed in reaching an agreement, and the peace summit failed.

In order to understand the threatening background for the evolved psychological repertoire we must describe not only the events that took place, but also the information provided to the Israeli Jewish public by their society's epistemic authorities. This information claim, accepted as valid by the great majority of Israeli Jews, framed the knowledge of many citizens and had a determinative influence on the development of the psychological repertoire to be described (Bar-Tal, in press). Thus, in the case of the summit meeting, first, the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak provided a major information claim by building the expectation that the time had come for crucial decisions in the negotiation process with the Palestinians (Drucker, 2002; Pressman, 2003; Sher, 2001; Wolfsfeld, 2004). This major information claim implied that Israelis and Palestinians were ready for historical compromises and that this was the moment that would reveal whether the Palestinians really wanted to settle the conflict peacefully. Second, when these negotiations failed, Barak made another major information claim by asserting that he had done all he could, turning every stone in search of peace by making a very generous and far-

reaching offer at Camp David, that Arafat had refused to accept it and had made no acceptable counter-proposals. This placed all the blame for the failure of the talks on the Palestinian side (Drucker, 2002; Pressman, 2003; Wolfsfeld, 2004; Swisher, 2004). This message was supported by statements by U.S. President Bill Clinton and all the Israeli participants at the Camp David conference. Subsequently, almost all the country's political, social and religious leaders, as well as the Israeli mass media, widely and repeatedly circulated this message (Wolfsfeld, 2004). This was a major information claim and had a strong effect on the construction of the Israeli people's views. It implied that although Israel had made an ultimate compromise and offered to "give everything," the Palestinians had refused to accept this generous offer. It meant that Arafat, together with the Palestinian leadership, was not interested in resolving the conflict through compromises and in a peaceful way, but was still striving to annihilate Israel, especially by insisting on the right of return of millions of Palestinian refugees to Israeli territory.

On September 28, 2000, violent conflict erupted. In response to the controversial visit of Israel's opposition leader at the time, Ariel Sharon (presently Israel's Prime Minister), to the Temple Mount, where a major Palestinian mosque is located, Palestinians began disturbances including stone throwing, demonstrations and shooting. These were met with violent responses by Israeli security forces, and in the first four days of the uprising, 39 Palestinians and 6 Israelis were killed; within a month the death toll rose to over 130 Palestinians and 12 Israelis (Dor, 2001).

As the violence began, a major piece of information claimed by the Israeli government was that the outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada had been planned in advance by Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (Bar-Siman-Tov, Lavie, Michael, & Bar-Tal, 2004; Dor, 2004; Wolfsfeld, 2004). This was the explanation given, even though at the beginning of the violence most of the security sources had a different interpretation of the events (Dor, 2001). Nevertheless, very soon all security and government sources rallied behind this major information claim, which was continuously disseminated by the media. As the violence continued, both government and military sources and much of the media kept providing information to the effect that the goal of the Palestinians was to destroy Israel, so that Israel was caught up in a war for its very survival (Dor, 2004; Feldman, 2002). Also, governmental and military sources continuously repeated major information claims that Arafat was personally responsible for each terror attack and that the Palestinian leadership (especially Arafat and leaders associated with him) was not a partner for negotiation, because of its involvement in terror and refusal to fight terrorism.

In the months that followed, Palestinians launched violent terrorist activities, mostly in the occupied territories, and the Israeli army continued military attacks to contain the uprising and prevent terror. During the fall of 2000 and early 2001, continuous attempts at negotiation to end the violence and complete the agreement were still being made. The climax of these efforts took place in Taba, where the Israeli and Palestinian delegations made a sincere effort to negotiate the framework for a final settlement of the conflict (Matz, 2003). But these attempts ended on February 6, 2001 with the election of Ariel Sharon as the Prime Minister of Israel by an overwhelming majority of Jewish voters.

Since the election of Ariel Sharon, the level of violence on both sides has escalated, and relations between Israelis and Palestinians have deteriorated. The Palestinians increased their terror attacks, mostly through suicide bombings in public places all over the country. At the same time Israeli security forces, in an attempt to contain the violence and especially the terror, engaged in violent acts against the Palestinian Authority, assassinated Palestinians suspected of terrorist activity, imposed severe restrictions on the Palestinian population, severely affecting their daily lives, and made frequent incursions into the Palestinian territories. The climax of these activities was the operation "Defensive Shield," carried out by the IDF in April and May of 2002, which culminated with Israeli forces re-occupying the West Bank almost entirely (Reporters without borders, 2003).

By April 14, 2004 (Independence Day of the State of Israel) the violence had claimed over 2,720 lives and 25,000 injured on the Palestinian side, many of them civilians, and 943 lives (276 security forces and 667 civilians) and 6,300 injured on the Israeli side. Various attempts by external mediators, especially American and European, failed to stop the violence.

The above-described context is very threatening, and as can be expected, it led to various psychological reactions. I will focus on major reactions of Israeli Jewish society members that have served as major obstacles to the peace process.

Before we begin with the analysis, however, two points must be made. First, it is important to note that the peace process with the Palestinians which began in 1993 was not viewed uniformly. That is, although many members of Israeli Jewish society supported the peace process (there were periods when a significant majority belonged to this group), trusted the Palestinians and hoped for a successful conclusion to the peace process, a large segment of Israeli Jewish society opposed it consistently and was unwilling to make any compromises, did not trust the Palestinians and continued to view the situation as conflictual and threatening (see Arian, 1995; Peace Index for the results of the polls). Nevertheless, a major change in Israeli Jewish public opinion took place in fall 2000: at this time a large share of the peace process supporters began to mistrust the Palestinians (see Arian, 2003; Bar-Tal, 2004a; Peace Index for description of the change). In spite of this change and the formation of a clear majority view, Israeli society is not fully consensual, as the presented data will show.

Also, it is important to note that the below-described specific repertoire that concerns the relations with the Palestinians, which was assessed during the Intifada Al Aqsa, is based on the ethos of conflict and collective memory which has domi-

nated Israeli Jewish society throughout decades of intractable conflict with the Arabs, and with the Palestinians in particular (Bar-Tal, 1998, 2000a). Prominent in narratives of ethos and collective memory are societal beliefs about the justness of a conflict's goals, a delegitimation of Arabs and particularly Palestinians, positive self-collective view and self-view as a victim. *Societal beliefs about the justness of one's own goals* deal with the reasons, explanations and rationales of the goals that are at stake in a conflict and, above all, justify their crucial importance; *societal beliefs that delegitimize the Arabs* deny the adversary's humanity; *societal beliefs supporting positive self-collective images* concern the ethnocentric tendency to attribute positive traits, values and behavior to one's own society; and *societal beliefs about one's own victimization* concern one's self-presentation as a victim (Bar-Tal & Salomon, in press). These societal beliefs are shared by society members, appear in public discourse, including mass media, are expressed in cultural products and featured in school textbooks. They lost some of their dominance during the peace process in the 1990s, but they reemerged in the latest cycle of violent conflict that started in the fall of 2000 (Sharvit & Bar-Tal, in press).

## Psychological obstacles

The analysis of the psychological obstacles deals with three major reactions: Fear, delegitimation of the Palestinians and self-collective view as a victim.

### Fear

One of the major psychological obstacles to renewing the peace process is the widespread fear in the Israeli Jewish society. Fear, as a primary aversive emotion, arises in situations of threat and danger to the organism (the person) and/or his/her environment (the society), and enables people to respond to them adaptively (Gray, 1989; Öhman, 1993; Plutchik, 1980; Rachman, 1978). It is experienced on the personal and collective levels in situations of violent conflict that are usually characterized by threat and danger to society members as individuals and to society as a whole. (Bar-Tal, 2001).

Fear prepares society members for better coping with the stressful situation on the very primary level (Collins, 1975; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). This preparation is achieved in a number of ways: (a) it mobilizes a constant readiness to face potential dangers in the form of unanticipated threats; (b) it directs attention and sensitizes society to cues that signal danger and to information that implies threat; (c) it increases affiliation, solidarity and cohesiveness among society members in view of the threat to individuals and to society at large; and (d) it mobilizes society members to act on behalf of society, to cope with the threat, to act against the enemy and to defend the country and society.

But fear may also lead to a collective freezing of beliefs. That is, it leads to adherence to certain beliefs about the causes of threats, about the conflict, about the adversary and about ways of coping with the dangers, on the one hand, and to difficulty in entertaining alternative ideas, solutions or courses of actions, on the other hand. As Maslow (1963) noted, "all those psychological and social factors that increase fear cut the impulse to know" (p. 124). Furthermore, the collective fear orientation tends to limit society members' perspectives by binding the present to past experiences related to the conflict, and by building expectations for the future exclusively on the basis of the past. A society over-sensitized by fear tends to be driven by affectively primed heuristics and appraisals of continued threat and thus misinterprets cues and information as signs of threat and danger, searching for the slightest indication in this direction, even in situations that signal good intentions. Fear also causes great mistrust and delegitimization of the adversary and prevents rational and creative evaluation of the situation. In addition, a line of political research has showed that fear leads people to increased ethnocentrism and intolerance towards out-groups (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995). Finally, the collective fear orientation is a major cause of violence (see Brubaker & Laitin, 1998; Lake & Rothchild, 1998). A fearful society tends to choose to fight in response to threatening conditions. Fighting is a habituated course of action, based on past experience, and thus again a society fixates on coping with threat in a conflictive way, without trying new avenues of behavior that can break the cycle of violence.

The previously-described Palestinian violence directed towards Israeli Jews, together with its framing as an attempt to destroy the Jewish state, led to a feeling of fear as a result of implied threat. In June 2001, 67% of Israeli Jews reported that they were anxious about the future of Israel, and 63% reported higher anxiety than in the past regarding their personal security and that of their family (*Maariv*, June 8, 2001). With the increase in violence, Israelis' fear increased and influenced all aspects of life, in particular their behavior in public places and their use of public transportation (Klar, Zakay, & Sharvit, 2002; Lori, 2002). In addition, in the spring of 2002 almost all Israeli Jews (92%) reported a feeling of fear that they or a member of their family might fall victim to a terrorist attack, while in February 2000 this percentage was only 79%, and in 1999 only 58% (Arian, 2002). Finally, in 2002, 78% of the respondents reported that their personal security had deteriorated, whereas in 1999, 80% of Israeli Jews reported that their personal security was greater since the peace process began in 1993 (Arian, 2002, 1999).

## **Delegitimization of the Palestinians and their leaders**

Violence and threat perceptions arouse a need for explanation and justification of own acts and differentiation between one's own group and the rival. Delegitimization, which refers to stereotypes with extremely negative connotations, fulfils these functions. Specifically, *delegitimization is defined as the categorization of a group or groups into extremely negative social categories that exclude it or them from the sphere of human groups that act within the limits of acceptable norms and/or values, since these groups are viewed as violating basic human norms or values* (Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990 Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). Delegitimization is the categorization of an out-group into such categories as primitive persons, murderers, terrorists, aggressors and so on. In this view, delegitimization is a type of denial of humanity and moral exclusion (see also Bandura, 1999; Bar-On, 2000; Kelman, 1973; Opatow, 1990; Staub, 1989). In fact, it implies maximal differentiation between one's own group, which is viewed positively, and the delegitimized opponent. It provides rigid, persistent and durable categories that are unlikely to change while the conflict lasts, and most probably long after. This implication is based on the tendency of in-group members to explain the violence as due to the other group, and to attribute the continuation of the conflict to stable internal dispositions of the out-group (Pettigrew, 1979).

Delegitimization homogenizes the delegitimized group as one entity, not allowing the individualization of its members or differentiation among its subgroups. It automatically arouses strong negative emotions and implies behavioral intentions. That is, the use of labels such as murderers, terrorists, colonialists or fascists indicates that the delegitimized group, which is in conflict with the delegitimizing group, has the capacity and the intention to harm the opponent. Thus, delegitimizing characteristics imply threat to the delegitimizing group, since the labels used imply behavioral intentions. In turn, the violence and use of delegitimizing labels, which indicate threat and possible harm, arouse fear and deep mistrust. Finally, delegitimization implies a readiness to use violent means in order to punish the delegitimized group for the violence it has committed, and also to prevent future aggression by the group.

Indeed, during the Al Aqsa Intifada, systematic and institutionalized mutual delegitimization of Palestinians and Israeli Jews has been occurring (see Oren & Bar-Tal, 2004; Wolfsfeld & Dajani, 2003). The delegitimization of the Palestinians began with their leader. Within a very short time after the eruption of violence, Yasser Arafat was portrayed as not a partner for peace. Later, Arafat was portrayed as a terrorist, and he was blamed personally for every terror attack carried out by any Palestinian group. This line of delegitimization intensified after September 11, 2001, when the USA and other western states declared a "world war against terrorism". In this context, Arafat was compared to Bin Laden and to Saddam Hussein. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon claimed, "There is a need to delegitimize Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority. There is a need to connect Arafat to terror and to destroy his image as a peacemaker" (Ben, October 19, 2001, p.3a). Finally, he was portrayed as "irrelevant," and formal contact between him and the Israeli authorities ceased. The Israeli public concurred with this presentation. As the polls showed, already in October 2000, 71% of Israeli Jews thought that Arafat behaved like a terrorist, in comparison to two years earlier, when only 41% thought so (Peace Index, October 2000). Similarly, the Palestinian Authority was represented by the Israeli government as a "terrorist entity" which initiated and supported terror attacks (Herald Tribune, March 1, 2001) and 67% of the Israeli Jews supported this view (*Maariv*, December 7, 2001).

As for negative stereotyping of the Palestinians, while in 1997 only 39% of the Israeli Jewish respondents described the Palestinians as violent and 42% portrayed them as dishonest, by the end of 2000 68% of Israeli Jewish respondents perceived the Palestinians as violent and 51% as dishonest. Also, in November 2000 78% of the Jewish public agreed with the statement that Palestinians have little regard for human life and therefore persist in using violence despite the high number of their own casualties (Peace Index, November 2000). In April 2001, 23% of Israeli Jews thought that all Palestinians support violence against Israel, 32.7% thought that the majority of them support it, and 17.3% thought that half of them support it (Peace Index, May 2001). In addition, while in 1999 64% of the Israeli Jews believed that the majority of the Palestinians want peace, in 2002 only 37% believed so (Arian, 2002), and in 2004 43% believed so. Finally, the lack of trust that goes with delegitimization is clearly reflected in the following beliefs: 70% of the Israeli Jewish public estimated that Arafat personally lacked the desire, or the capability, to sign an agreement to end the conflict with Israel, even if Israel agreed to all of his demands – and that he would make additional demands aimed at defeating the agreement; and 80% believed that the Palestinians would not honor an agreement signed by them (Peace Index, May 2001). Moreover, the great majority of Israeli Jews started to believe that the Palestinians were striving to destroy Israel and therefore peace with them could not be achieved (Arian, 2002).

## **Collective self-perception as a victim**

One clear effect of group life in the context of violence, perceived threat and fear is the emergence of a sense of victimhood. The perception of being a victim emerges because an ingroup always focuses on the violence of the other group and assigns responsibility for the erupted violence and the continuation of the conflict to the out-group. At the same time, however, it views its own violence as a reaction to the harm caused by the out-group. This perception is especially pronounced when

the violence of the out-group harms civilians, including children and women. A self-perception as a victim is also based on a collective self-image as a peace-loving group striving to end the bloody conflict and a perception of the out-group as vicious, evil, bloodthirsty and unwilling to end the violence and solve the conflict peacefully.

A collective self-perception as a victim gives rise to feelings of anger and wishes for vengeance. Thus, it often leads to acts of violence represented as reactions to out-group aggression. Also, this perception causes a focus on the self. Ingroup members are wholly preoccupied with their own fate, since the threatening events are central and prominent in their awareness. They are preoccupied with their own danger, human losses, injury, damage, the future of the violent confrontation, and so on, without realizing that their behavior may be threatening to the rival group and may also be a cause of the violent cycles. Moreover, locked within the vicissitudes of their own losses, ingroup members have difficulty in being empathetic to out-group members, in being attuned to their suffering, hardships, grievances, needs or goals (Mack, 1990).

The sense of being a victim began to evolve especially with the increasing perception that the Palestinians had instigated violence in spite of the fact that, in the view of most Israelis, Ehud Barak had made the most generous possible proposals to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In November 2000, about 80% of Israeli Jews blamed the Palestinians for the eruption of the violence (Peace Index, November 2000), and in 2002, 84% of Israeli Jewish respondents thought that the Palestinians were solely or mostly responsible for the deterioration in the relations between them and the Israelis, while only 5% thought Israel solely responsible for the conflict (Arian, 2002). Similarly, in August 2002, 92% of Israeli Jews believed that the Palestinians had not fulfilled their commitments as specified in the Oslo agreement, while 66% believed that Israel had fulfilled its own part (Peace Index, August 2002). It was not just the attribution of responsibility for the eruption of violence that set the stage for the Israelis' deep sense of victimhood, it was powerfully underlined by the continuous terror attacks that claimed many Jewish lives, most of them civilians. All members of the Israeli Jewish society thought and felt that the terror hurts innocent people enormously, is unjust and is far beyond the legitimate means of Palestinian struggle against the occupation. A sense of victimhood came to dominate the thoughts of Israeli Jews, and every attack on Israeli Jews, including on Israeli soldiers, was called terror and received immense exposure as such in the media. The Israeli media not only provided detailed accounts of terror attacks, their rescue actions following them, reports from hospitals and funerals; it also personalized the victims by describing their lives and publishing descriptions by those who knew them (Wolfstfeld & Dajani, 2003). In contrast, the great majority of the Israeli Jews was not interested in the great suffering of the Palestinian people and even supported the military actions which necessarily led to civilian casualties among the Palestinians. For example, 62% of the Israeli Jews supported army efforts to kill persons suspected of being involved in terror, even if there is a reasonable likelihood that the Palestinian civilian population would be harmed (Peace Index, July 2002).

The above-described psychological repertoire that characterizes society members involved in violent intractable conflict has serious consequences that will now be described.

## Consequences

When group members believe that the other group initiated the violent confrontations unjustly, experience fear, delegitimize the out-group and perceive their own group as a victim. Then they tend to support aggressive ways to cope with the violence, especially when they believe that they have the ability to resist the enemy. But first of all, situations of violent intergroup conflict cause people to look for a leader who projects determination to cope forcefully with the rival and can assure security. Israelis went to the polls on February 6, 2001 and elected Ariel Sharon (with a 60% majority), the Likud party candidate, over Ehud Barak, of the Labor party (Dowty, 2002). This outcome was not surprising, in view of the fact that the majority of Israeli Jewish voters believed that Barak had not only made the Palestinians an overly generous offer (44% thought so already in July 2000, Peace Index, July 2000, and 70.4% thought so by January 2001, Peace Index, January 2001), but also had been too lenient (70% thought so) in handling the crisis that led to the increased Palestinian violence (even 51% of Barak's own supporters accepted this view, Peace Index, January 2001).

The newly elected Prime Minister, an ex-general, had been involved in all of Israel's major wars, took an extremely hawkish position, vehemently opposing the Oslo agreement. He was, moreover, behind the building of many of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In Israel and outside it, Sharon had come to stand for force and a powerful determination to subjugate the Arabs, and especially the Palestinian. In his election campaign, he promised peace and security, and on taking office, he stopped negotiations with the Palestinians and insisted on the cessation of Palestinian violence as a precondition for any political negotiation. At the same time, he outlined the contours of an eventual conflict resolution proposal that promised Palestinians very small political gains (see interview with Sharon in *Maariv*, April, 13, 2001). During his incumbency, terror and violence increased, and Israel stuck to a policy of forceful and violent "containment" of Palestinian violence. Sharon gained great approval (about 60-70%) among Israeli Jews and consistent support for his security position, policy and actions.

Specifically supporting Israeli military policies, in March 2001 72% of Israeli Jews thought that additional military force should be used against the Palestinians (Peace Index, March 2001). A survey poll of February 2002 revealed that 75% of

Israeli Jews thought that the Intifada could be controlled by military action; 57% thought that the measures employed to put down the Intifada were too lenient, while only 9% thought that they were too harsh, and 34% thought that they were appropriate (Arian, 2002). Also, 58% supported the policy of investing more in the country's military apparatus in order to avoid another war and as an alternative to peace talks, while two years earlier only 40% supported this option (Arian, 2002).

With regard to specific actions, in April 2002 about 90% of Israeli Jews supported Operation Defensive Shield, in which the Israeli army re-conquered the West Bank cities that were under the control of the Palestinian Authority (Peace Index, April 2002); in 2002, 90% supported the so-called "targeted assassination" of Palestinians suspected of terrorist activity (Arian, 2002), 80% supported the use of tanks and fighter planes against the Palestinians, 73% supported the use of so-called "closures" and economic sanctions, and 72% supported military invasion of the cities under the control of the Palestinian Authority (Arian, 2002).

Finally, fear, the perception of one's own group as a victim and especially delegitimization led to a sense of irreconcilability, which implied that the conflict would continue to be violent and could not be resolved peacefully. Public opinion surveys taken before and during the relevant period reveal a dramatic change in the percentage of the Israeli Jews who thought that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could come to an end through peace agreements: In 1999 the evaluations about peace agreements were optimistic, as 69% of the Israeli Jews preferred peace talks over strengthening Israeli military capacity, 68% believed that peace would come in the next three years, 59% thought that only through negotiations would terror attacks be curtailed, and a majority was ready to negotiate with the Palestinians over various core issues of their conflict (Arian, 1999). But in 2002 this mood changed: 58% of the Israeli Jews preferred strengthening Israeli military capacity over peace talks, 77% believed that war would erupt in the next three years and 68% thought that it was impossible to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians (Arian, 2002). Moreover, the polls showed an increase in the degree to which the conflict was perceived as insolvable in the near future: in 2001 and 2002 at least 50% of Israeli Jews believed that the conflict would deteriorate and at least 50% predicted that the conflict would continue for many years (Globes, November 15, 2001, April 25, 2002). In 2002, 77% assessed the likelihood of war between Israel and Arab states within the next three years as being of medium or high probability compared with 44% in 1999 (Arian, 2002). Similarly, a decline in support for the Oslo agreement was evidenced in the polls: from support of 70% in 1999 to support of 31% in 2003 (Arian, 2003).

One result of the violence is the tendency to draw clear distinctions between one's own group and the rival. Thus, the Israeli public first differentiated psychologically between themselves and the Palestinians by perceiving the latter negatively as obstructionists, as having bad intentions, as perpetrators of violence and as having generally negative characteristics. In contrast, Israeli Jews perceived themselves as victims with predominantly positive characteristics.

Moreover, the violence, threat perception, fear, delegitimization of the Palestinians, self-image as a victim and sense of irreconcilability led many Israeli Jews to support physical separation between Jews and Palestinians. The notion that "they should be there, and we should be here" was propagated by politicians across the entire political spectrum. In the relevant period, they proposed at least nine different plans for unilateral separation (Galili, April 5, 2002). This reflected not only a desire for self-defense, but also a wish for psychological differentiation from the Palestinians (Baskin, 2002; Nadler, 2002). The Israeli public supports (at least about 60%) separation from the Palestinians by physical means (Peace Index, May 2001), and 56% prefer it to agreement with the Palestinians (*Maariv*, May 10, 2002). The direct reflection of this desire is the construction of a fence that is supposed to separate Israelis and Palestinians and to prevent, at the same time, terror attacks (Rabinowitz, 2002). The government eventually yielded to these demands, and in the summer of 2002 decided formally for physical separation between the Palestinians and the Israelis, which includes building a wall and other physical means of separation. A survey poll made in February 2004, after many controversial views about the wall were published, showed that 84% of the Israeli Jews support the dividing wall. About 66% believed that the wall should be built, in accordance to the government's security policies, and 64% believe that the suffering of the Palestinians should be a secondary or only negligible consideration.

### **Psychological steps for de-escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict**

The above analysis suggests that psychological factors play a major role in the stalemate that characterizes the present conflictual relations between Israelis and Palestinians. While the contours of a possible solution of the conflict are more or less clear to members of both societies, and a substantial majority in each society supports large parts of it, the described psychological obstacles prevent the realization of the solution, allowing the extreme leadership and obstructionist fractions to dictate the course of the conflict.

Political psychology can suggest various specific steps that each society can take in order to reduce the effects of the psychological obstacles (Bar-Tal, 2000b; Kelman & Fisher, 2003; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Ross & Ward, 1995). Among them I note reduction of the incitement carried in each society by the leaders, positive statements about peace support by lead-

ers, extensive descriptions of the civilian victims of the rival society, elimination of the double standard in reporting about violence by the mass media, and so on. In this paper, I would like to describe in general terms the psychological state that both societies should strive to reach in the present situation of violent conflict without negotiation. After almost four years of violent confrontations, Israelis and Palestinians should try to achieve a state of peaceful coexistence.

Coexistence in my opinion refers to conditions that serve as fundamental prerequisites for the peace process, on a societal level. It refers to the very recognition of the right of the other group to exist peacefully with its differences and to the acceptance of the other group as a legitimate and an equal partner with whom disagreements have to be resolved in non-violent ways. This state has been reached when the majority of society members share this view (Bar-Tal, 2004b). I would argue that the following are the main components of the shared psychological state of coexistence:

*Legitimization* allows viewing the opponent as belonging to an acceptable category of groups behaving within the boundaries of international norms, with whom it is possible, and even desirable, to terminate conflict and construct positive relations. This allows recognition of the legitimate existence of the other group with its differences, which may be in the realm of goals, values, aspirations, religion, nationality, ethnicity, culture, and other domains. Legitimization implies that the other group has the same right to exist and live in peace as one's own group and has the right to raise claims and grievances that are then to be resolved in nonviolent ways. Legitimization implies acceptance of the elected leaders of the rival group as legitimate partners in the peace process. As such, it provides the basis for trust that is an essential condition for starting the process of conflict resolution leading eventually to the construction of peaceful relations. Trust raises expectations for future positive relations and catalyzes the continuation of the peace process. Legitimization thus plays a crucial role in changing the nature of intergroup relations. It enables the initiation of negotiations with the opponent to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict and to eventually build peaceful and cooperative relations. Therefore, encouraging legitimization is one of the first conditions and primary building blocks for the construction of new relations between former rivals.

*Equalization* makes the rival into an equal partner with whom it is possible to establish new relations. This requires recognition of the principle of status equality between the groups, a principle that is brought to bear first in negotiations and later in all types and at all levels of intergroup interactions. Equalization implies that leaders as well as ordinary persons perceive members of the rival group, first and foremost, as equals, without superiority, and then treat them accordingly. Also, it is important not to set any large-scale societal-structural conditions for negotiation that imply paternalization and unequal treatment. This constitutes a major change after years of extreme differentiation between one's own group and the opponent, which was a result of viewing the rival as inferior with delegitimizing labels. Without equalization, it is impossible not only to construct new peaceful relations, but also to carry on successful negotiations to resolve the conflict. Equalization thus allows meaningful interaction between past adversaries.

*Differentiation* leads to the pluralization of the rival group. It enables a new perception of the rival, previously regarded as a uniformly hostile entity. The new perception implies that the rival group includes various sub-groups that differ in their views and ideologies. Differentiation thus also makes it possible to see that members of the rival group differ in their opinions regarding the conflict and its resolution. This is an important change, because there are always social forces that oppose the peaceful resolution of the conflict and who do not hesitate to resort even to violence to stop it. Differentiation thus enables people to at least distinguish between those who support peace and those who do not support it and as result to establish different relations with these two groups. But differentiation does more than just that – it provides a more human view of the opponent group and does more justice to its complex structure. It enables people to acknowledge sub-groups that hold similar values and beliefs to one's own, especially those relevant for establishing peaceful relations.

*Personalization* allows people to view the rival group not as a depersonalized entity, but as made up of individuals with ordinary human characteristics, concerns, needs and goals. This is a process of individuation after a period of de-individuation and constitutes a further step after differentiation. Personalization may be reflected in differentiation on three levels: within an individual, among individual members, and among roles. Within an individual, differentiation refers to the level of complexity of individual perceptions. Differentiation among individuals allows the acknowledgement of individual differences, namely to view groups as composed of individuals who differ in appearance, characteristics, opinions, concerns, needs and goals. Finally, it allows viewing members of groups in different personal or social roles such as mothers, sons, students, teachers, physicians, peasants, etc. Any type of individuation of group members defuses generalizations and enables people to perceive similarity and even commonality with them. These may include shared attributes, ideology, beliefs and feelings, at least with some members of the rival group. It facilitates the development of new individual and group representations that go beyond the stereotyped ones. These in turn, facilitate personal references to members of the rival group, empathy for their hardships and identification with some of their needs or aspirations. Those are important psychological elements for developing co-existence. They allow seeing the members of the rival group as human beings who are also victims of the conflict and likewise have just claims and moral justifications for their demands.

*Reduction of negative affect and introduction of hope and acceptance* On the affective level, two concomitant process need to occur: On the one hand, there is a need for a reduction of collective fear and hatred, and on the other hand, there is a need to initiate collective hope, trust, and mutual acceptance (Bar-Tal, 2000b; Kelman, 2004; Kriesberg, 2004). The col-

lective emotion of hope arises when a concrete positive goal is expected (Lazarus, 1991; Stotland, 1969). It includes the cognitive elements of visualizing and expecting, as well as of the affective element of feeling good about expected events or outcomes (Staats & Stassen, 1985). The development and maintenance of hope involves the higher mental processes of vision, imagination, goal setting, planning and considering alternatives, all of which require openness, creativity and flexibility (Snyder, 1994, 2000). Developing a collective orientation of hope for peace implies the formation of new goals such as living in peaceful coexistence and cooperation with yesterday's enemy. This implies stopping bloodshed, destruction, misery, hardship, and suffering and at the same time allowing for the emergence of peace, tranquility, prosperity and growth. It also requires adopting new ways of achieving these goals, such as negotiation, mediation, compromise, concession and reciprocity (Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2004). In addition, there is a need to create a collective affective orientation permitting the former rival's acceptance, which should replace hatred. It denotes a positive evaluative reaction toward the other group and implies at least trust and the intention to form positive relations. These emotional changes are necessary for the establishment of new relations.

The above-described conditions of coexistence create a positive climate in the society that facilitates the achievement of peaceful conflict resolution. But it is absolutely clear that while the psychological state of coexistence is a necessary facilitator of the peace process, it does not solve the long-standing disagreements between the Israelis and Palestinians. The primary condition for progress towards peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is negotiation between the rivals that allows the development of mutually acceptable agreement. Without negotiation, it is impossible to make any progress towards conflict resolution. It is, however, obvious that even when negotiations begin, there will be a need to reduce the psychological obstacles that inhibit the peace process. I firmly believe that the reduction of psychological obstacles should begin as early as possible, independently of the beginning of formal negotiations.

Finally, but not least of all, it is also absolutely clear that the peace process requires the cessation, or at least a significant reduction, of all types of violence by the Israelis and Palestinians (Violence and its alternative, 2003). This is a fundamental prerequisite for changing the psychological repertoire that inhibits the peace process. Inter-group violence is the physical or psychological harm that results from one group acting against another. When perpetrators act as members of groups, individual acts that harm others can be regarded as inter-group violence. This definition encompasses various forms of violence, including those carried out by states, ethnic groups or organizations, which may not only kill, injure, torture, destroy, expel or commit ethnic cleansing and genocide, but also exploit, discriminate against, deprive, harass, exert pressure on or subjugate other groups. The continuing violence between the Israeli Jews and the Palestinians is tragic and unnecessary. Both sides inflict losses, pain and suffering on the other. At present, the Palestinians mostly engage in terror attacks using suicide bombers, targeting public places, indiscriminately killing civilians and causing fear among the whole Israeli population. They also terrorize civilian Jews in the occupied territories by attacking them on the roads and in their settlements. In addition, they carry out guerrilla activities against military targets. On the other hand, Israeli Jews continually confiscate and settle on Palestinian land and prevent economic development, arrest and torture Palestinian suspects, deny them civil rights, pressure Palestinians to collaborate, destroy their olive groves and orchards, inflict collective punishments, impose curfews and closures and set up checkpoints and roadblocks, assassinate Palestinians suspected of terrorist activity and destroy their homes, bomb the buildings used by the Palestinian security forces, kill civilians during fighting and make incursions into the Palestinian territories.

Each side is convinced that its violence is justified and that the other side is brutal, untrustworthy and violent. It generally does not occur to either side to think about the other – to realize that losses of human life are terrible, irreplaceable and therefore unforgettable. They feed fear, hatred, delegitimization and self-perceptions as victims, which in turn perpetuate violence. In essence, the process describes the vicious cycles of violence in which violence contributes to the construction of a negative psychological repertoire which in turn leads to the continuation of violence, and so on.

Coexistence implies that although conflict and disagreement may still be intact, the involved groups have decided to abandon violent ways of confrontation and choose peaceful means to achieve their goals. It means that the groups are ready to establish mechanisms of negotiation to deal with their lists of grievances in order to resolve them.

It is obvious though that it is easier to stop state sponsored violence than violence committed by organizations and individuals, as happens mostly on the Palestinian side. This type of violence should not have veto power on the continuation of the peace process. Hostile and aggressive acts do not stop immediately, but usually continue for years, with a downward slope. Their decrease depends on the satisfaction of the basic needs of the people. It is thus a challenging task to carry on the peace process even while signs of conflict are still present. In such a situation, the reactions of leaders and the media to the threatening cues are crucial. When they frame the events in ways that support fear, hatred and generalized delegitimization, then the peace process has very little chance to evolve. But when, in contrast, the leaders and media on both sides explicitly condemn the acts and their perpetrators, when they minimize their importance, reassure the public and repeat their commitment to peace goals, then the chances are high that the peace process will survive and gain momentum.

I would like to suggest that the described conditions are essential for starting new kinds of intergroup relations on the way to peaceful conflict resolution. Coexistence does not just involve the acts implied by the described requirements. Acts such

as agreements on ceasefires, the beginning of negotiation, and eventually conflict resolution are important parts of coexistence. But, as noted, the core of coexistence refers to *a state of mind shared by the members of the society*. In this sense, coexistence is primarily a formative process of the psychological repertoire of society members. The accompanying acts of cooperation, integration, or exchanges are direct behavioral products of coexistence. Individual acts that occur in response to formal agreements, orders or decisions, without psychological changes in society members, do not indicate a state of coexistence.

The present conceptual and practical proposal thus focuses on societal change. Such change rarely takes place only due to the mere existence of the peace process, which includes the cessation of violence and negotiation. These conditions are necessary, but not sufficient. Of great importance are well-planned and executed steps aimed to change the psychological repertoire of the societies involved in the peace process. These steps should be of wide scope and an extensive nature and thus affect many society members. I will note few such possible steps.

First of all, a change in the psychological repertoires of society members depends on the intentions, determination, activism and strength of those who support the peace process, including leaders, political parties, NGOs, and individual society members. After years of mistrust, hatred and hostility, both parties must exhibit much good will in order to change these feelings. There is need for well-publicized conciliatory acts, including verbal statements and symbolic acts, both formal and informal, by both parties that will set the tone for reciprocity, positive spirals of behavior, and eventually create a new climate of peace. The change requires the involvement of individuals, groups and organizations in persuading hesitant and opposing group members of the importance of peaceful resolution of conflict through negotiation (Maoz, 2004).

The moves of peace supporters are often met with opposition within their own society in the form of pressure, public mobilization and sometimes even smear campaigns and/or violence- all aimed at obstructing the peace process. Thus there is need to overcome these obstacles and show great resolve and devotion to the peace process. Peace supporters must signal to society members that they are determined to advance the peace process successfully despite the opposition.

Second, the successful process of establishing a climate of coexistence in a society depends on the mobilization of societal institutions to propagate the new messages of the peace process. The mass media and educational system play an important role in this mission.

The mass media can be a very powerful tool for promoting a peace process (Barnes, 1997; Bruck & Roach, 1993; Calleja, 1994; Chadha, 1995; Elhance & Ahmar, 1995; Kopstein, 1997; Kriesberg, 1998; Norval, 1998). Potentially they can act without much planning and preparation and reach all segments of a society. They can transmit information about the new peaceful goals, the rival group, one's own group, about the developing relations, and so on. However, first and foremost, the media serve as channels to communicate leaders' messages about the peace process. The media in itself constructs public reality by framing the news and commentaries. Its support for the peace process is crucial. In democratic states, however, the media cannot be mobilized simply by decrees and orders; instead, they too must be persuaded of the importance of peace.

Another important institution that serves as a societal channel of information is the educational system. Education constitutes one of the most important methods for promoting change in the societal psychological repertoire (Asmal, Asmal, & Roberts, 1997; Calleja, 1994; Chadha, 1995; Chetkow-Yanoov, 1986; Gordon, 1994; Kriesberg, 1998; Maoz, 2002). This mostly involves using the school system for peace education, since this system is often the only institution the society can make formal, intentional, and extensive use of to change the psychological repertoire of society members. Peace education aims at constructing students' worldviews (i.e., their values, beliefs, attitudes, motivations, skills and patterns of behavior) in a way that reflects the reality of the peace process and prepares them to live in an era characterized by a peace process (Salomon & Nevo, 2002). In order to achieve this objective, the school system must provide pupils with knowledge that is in line with the principles of the peace process (for example, about the other group, about the course of the conflict, about future peaceful relations, about the nature of peace, about conflict resolution, etc.). In addition, peace education ought to develop new attitudes and skills in pupils (for example, tolerance, self control, sensitivity to others' needs, empathy, critical thinking, openness, etc.). This is a large-scale endeavor that requires setting educational objectives, preparing curricula, specifying school textbook contents, developing instructional material, training teachers, constructing a climate in the schools that is conducive to peace education, and so on (Bjerstedt, 1988, 1993; Burns & Aspeslagh, 1996; Harris, 1988; Hicks, 1988; Reardon, 1988).

In sum, the above-described conditions of coexistence are limited. They serve as good societal foundations for support of the conflict resolution. Coexistence does not include the development of sensitivity to the other group's needs, the establishment of full economic or cultural cooperation, compensation for past sufferings and harm, forgiveness or healing, change of past narratives, and other important elements of harmonious relations (see Ackermann, 1994; Hayner, 1999; Lederach, 1998; Lipschutz, 1998; Staub, 2000; Wilmer, 1998). These elements may begin to evolve within the framework of coexistence, as necessary steps towards reconciliation. Still, coexistence is an important phase after years of violent con-

flict during which Israeli Jews and Palestinians came under the spell of hostility, mistrust, delegitimization, fear, anger and hatred. This is an important phase in the long journey towards reconciliation. It is necessary that Israeli Jews and Palestinians select this road in order to stop the bloodshed and suffering of both nations and move towards the peace and prosperity so needed by both societies.

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*Sonia Gutiérrez-Villalobos*

## **Konflikt- und kooperationsorientierte Berichterstattung: Der Rio-San-Juan-Konflikt**

Dieser Beitrag analysiert die Medienberichterstattung über den Rio-San-Juan-Konflikt zwischen Costa Rica und Nicaragua. Hierbei handelt es sich um einen lang andauernden Konflikt um die Verwaltung eines Flussbeckens, welches sich entlang der Grenze der beiden Länder erstreckt. Im März 2002 vereinbarten die Regierungen, von einer konfrontativen zu einer kooperativen Strategie überzuwechseln.

Das Ziel dieser Studie ist es, zu untersuchen, wie die costa-ricanische Presse über den Konflikt sowohl während der Konfrontationsphase als auch nach dem Wechsel zu einer kooperativen Strategie berichtete. Dabei ist das Augenmerk insbesondere auf die jeweilige Konflikt- bzw. Kooperationsorientierung der Berichterstattung gerichtet. Ausgewählt wurden zwei große Zeitungen: La Nación (LN) und La República (LR).

Inhaltsanalytisch ausgewertet wurden 81 Nachrichtenmeldungen aus zwei verschiedenen Zeiträumen:

- Juli 1998 - Phase der Konfrontation, und
- Juni 2002 - Phase der Kooperation.

In der Studie wurde eine zweidimensionale Skala angewendet, die 12 Sets von Indikatoren beinhaltet. Jeweils sechs Sets indizieren je eine konfliktorientierte bzw. eine kooperationsorientierte Berichterstattung über den Konflikt.

Die Ergebnisse der Analyse der Berichterstattung von 1998 weisen eher auf eine Unterstützung von Konflikt und Konfrontation hin als von Kooperation:

- In der Analyse der LN von 1998 ist die konflikt- und konfrontationsorientierte Berichterstattung im Vergleich zur kooperationsorientierten Berichterstattung stärker, sowohl bezüglich der Variable "Konzeptualisierung des Rio-San-Juan-Konflikts" als auch der Variable "negative Bewertung der nicaraguanischen Handlungen". Somit dominiert in dieser Zeitung eine konfliktorientierte Berichterstattung.

- Die Analyse der LR von 1998 zeigt die Dominanz einer konfliktorientierten Berichterstattung in drei Variablen: den höchsten Score weist die Variable "Bewertung der nicaraguanischen Handlungen" auf, gefolgt von "Bewertung der nicaraguanischen Rechte und Intentionen" und "negative Emotionen". Dagegen deutet die Variable "Konzeptualisierung des Rio-San-Juan-Konflikts" eher auf eine Kooperations- als auf eine Konfliktorientierung hin.

Insgesamt indizieren vier Variablen eine konfliktorientierte und eine Variable eine kooperationsorientierte Berichterstattung.

Die Ergebnisse der Analyse der Berichterstattung von 2002 offenbaren einen Rückgang der konfliktorientierten Berichterstattung zugunsten der kooperationsorientierten:

- In der LN zeigt sich dies in der Konzeptualisierung des Rio-San-Juan-Konflikts: Die Variable "Konzeptualisierung des Rio-San-Juan-Konflikts" indiziert überwiegend Kooperation. Im Jahr 2002 dominiert nach keiner Variable eine konfliktorientierte Berichterstattung. LN wechselt folglich von einer konfliktorientierten zu einer kooperationsorientierten Berichterstattung, nachdem sich die politische Agenda von Konfrontation zu Kooperation verschoben hat.

- In der LR manifestiert sich eine Dominanz der konfliktorientierten Berichterstattung in zwei Variablen und eine Kooperationsorientierung in der Variable "Konzeptualisierung des Rio-San-Juan-Konflikts".

Insgesamt zeigt sich in zwei Variablen noch immer ein Übergewicht einer konfliktorientierten Berichterstattung, während zwei Variablen eine Kooperationsorientierung aufweisen.

Im Ergebnis lassen sich zwei Tendenzen identifizieren:

1. ein Rückgang der konfliktorientierten zugunsten einer kooperationsorientierten Berichterstattung
2. die Resistenz gegenüber einer kooperationsorientierten , obwohl sich die politische Agenda in Richtung Kooperation verändert hat.

Die Ergebnisse sind hilfreich, um den Beitrag der costa-ricanischen Presse zur Förderung von Kooperation und zur Deeskalation von Konflikten zu bewerten.

Frieden ist ein wichtiges Leitprinzip der Außenpolitik Costa Ricas. Im Unterschied zu Befunden, nach denen Medien als Werkzeug für Politiker fungieren, bleiben die beiden Zeitungen LN und LR hinter der Politik, die Kooperation und Frieden befürwortet, zurück und statt dessen der medientypischen Präferenz für Konflikt, Konfrontation und Dramatik verhaftet. Ihre Resistenz gegenüber einer kooperationsorientierten Berichterstattung wird zudem durch ihre Beharrlichkeit, das Rio-San-Juan-Becken als ein Grenzflussbecken anzusehen, verdeutlicht: Die Region als Flussbecken zu konzeptualisieren, ist immer noch eine Innovation. Innovationen rufen normalerweise Widerstand hervor, und entsprechend reagierten beide Zeitungen mit Widerstand auf diese Innovation.

[Volltext \(in Englisch\)](#)

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*Sonia Gutiérrez-Villalobos*

### **Pro-conflict and pro-cooperation coverage: The San Juan River conflict**

This paper analyzes media coverage of the San Juan River conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. It is a long-lasting conflict over the shared management of a river basin located along the border between the two countries. In March 2002, the governments of both countries agreed to change their approach from confrontation to co-operation.

The aim of this study is to see how the Costa Rican press covered the conflict during confrontation, and after its change to co-operation, in terms of pro-conflict versus pro-cooperation coverage. Two major newspapers were selected: La Nación (LN), and La República (LR).

A total of 81 news stories were content analyzed in two different periods of time: July 1998, when the confrontation reignited, and June 2002, after the change to co-operation.

This study applied a two-dimensional scale. It has 12 sets of indicators. Six sets indicate pro-conflict coverage of the conflict; the other six indicate pro-cooperation coverage.

The results for the 1998 coverage analysis show support for conflict and confrontation rather than co-operation:

- In the analysis of LN in 1998, pro-conflict and confrontation coverage is higher compared to pro-cooperation coverage regarding the variables "conceptualization of the San Juan River conflict" and "negative evaluation of Nicaraguan actions." Thus pro-conflict coverage is dominant in this newspaper.

- The analysis of LR in 1998 shows a dominance of pro-conflict coverage in three variables: the "evaluation of Nicaragua's actions" has the highest score, followed by "evaluation of Nicaragua's rights and intentions" and "negative emotions." However, the "conceptualization of the San Juan River conflict" is oriented to co-operation rather than conflict.

In sum, four variables score pro-conflict coverage, versus one that scores pro-cooperation.

The results of the 2002 coverage analysis show a decrease of pro-conflict coverage and an increase in pro-cooperation coverage:

- LN presents a shift from pro-conflict to pro-cooperation coverage in its conceptualization of the San Juan River: the "conceptualization of the San Juan River conflict" is predominantly oriented to cooperation. There is no predominance of pro-conflict coverage in 2002. Thus, LN changes to pro-cooperation coverage after the political agenda changed from confrontation to co-operation.

- LR manifests a dominance of pro-conflict coverage in two variables, and the "conceptualization of the San Juan River conflict" as co-operation.

In sum, two variables still show the predominance of pro-conflict coverage, while two variables exhibit pro-cooperation coverage.

Altogether, the results allow us to identify two trends:

1. A decrease in pro-conflict coverage and an increase in pro-cooperation coverage.
2. A resistance to change to pro-cooperation coverage despite the change to cooperation in the political agenda.

The results are useful in assessing Costa Rican press support for cooperation and the de-escalation of conflict. Peace is an important axis in Costa Rican foreign policy. Contrary to findings about the media as policy makers' tools, the two newspapers LN and LR lag behind in favoring the policy that supports co-operation and peace. Thus, the two newspapers endorse media culture's preference for conflict, confrontation and drama. The two newspapers' resistance to change to pro-cooperation coverage also indicates their attachment to seeing the San Juan River basin as a border river. To think about the region as a river basin is still an innovation. Usually innovations generate resistance, so the two newspapers exhibited resistance to the innovation.

[full text \(in English\)](#)

*On the author.*

Sonia Gutiérrez Villalobos, Ph.D., born 1948 in Puntarenas, Costa Rica. 1976 Licenciante in Literature at the University of Costa Rica (UCR). 1990 Master's degree in Communications at the University of Kentucky. 1995 Ph.D. in Communications at the University of Massachusetts. Works presently at the Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales (IDESPO) at the Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica (UNA). Publications inter alia: Support for the U.S. Administration During the Panama Invasion: Analysis of Strategic and Tactical Critique in the Domestic Press (1994, with Rush and Hertog), Three Theories to Test Press Support (1996), Los Medios y la Cultura de Paz (2001, with Kempf), Media and Reconciliation in Central America (2002, in: Gilboa, Media Diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli Conflict).

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Sonia Gutiérrez Villalobos

## Pro-conflict and pro-cooperation coverage: The San Juan River conflict<sup>1</sup>

*Kurzfassung:* Dieser Beitrag analysiert die Medienberichterstattung über den Rio-San-Juan-Konflikt zwischen Costa Rica und Nicaragua. Hierbei handelt es sich um einen lang andauernden Konflikt um die Verwaltung eines Flussbeckens, welches sich entlang der Grenze der beiden Länder erstreckt. Im März 2002 vereinbarten die Regierungen, von einer konfrontativen zu einer kooperativen Strategie überzuwechseln.

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- Die Ergebnisse sind hilfreich, um den Beitrag der costa-ricanischen Presse zur Förderung von Kooperation und zur Deeskalation von Konflikten zu bewerten. Frieden ist ein wichtiges Leitprinzip der Außenpolitik Costa Ricas. Im Unterschied zu Befunden, nach denen Medien

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1. A preliminary version of this article: "Conflict escalation, negotiations and the press: The case of the Rio San Juan conflict", was presented at AIMCR's 23rd Conference and General Assembly, Barcelona, July 2002.

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*Abstract:* This paper analyzes media coverage of the San Juan River conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. It is a long-lasting conflict over the shared management of a river basin located along the border between the two countries. In March 2002, the governments of both countries agreed to change their approach from confrontation to co-operation.

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
1. A decrease in pro-conflict coverage and an increase in pro-cooperation coverage.
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The results are useful in assessing Costa Rican press support for cooperation and the de-escalation of conflict. Peace is an important axis in Costa Rican foreign policy. Contrary to findings about the media as policy makers' tools, the two newspapers LN and LR lag behind in favoring the policy that supports co-operation and peace. Thus, the two newspapers endorse media culture's preference for conflict, confrontation and drama. The two newspapers' resistance to change to *pro-cooperation coverage* also indicates their attachment to seeing the San Juan River basin as a border river. To think about the region as a river basin is still an innovation. Usually innovations generate resistance, so the two newspapers exhibited resistance to the innovation.

## 1. Introduction

The San Juan River is a basin that integrates a river-lake system. The system begins with Lake Nicaragua, near the Pacific coast, and continues towards the East along the San Juan River. It runs from West to East along the border between Costa Rica and Nicaragua down to its delta in the Atlantic Ocean.

The San Juan basin is the second largest in Central America. It has an area of 38,500 km<sup>2</sup> (López, A., 2002; Jiménez, 2002). 24,500 km<sup>2</sup> (64% of its territory) belong to Nicaragua, 14,000 km<sup>2</sup> (36% of its territory) to Costa Rica. The region has been used for navigation purposes since colonial times.<sup>1</sup>



Several elements have contributed to transforming the region into a contested strategic zone (Rabella, 1995; Tarracena & Piel, 1995; Obregón, 2001):

1. The San Juan River runs through the Atlantic region, which constituted the margins of the Spanish Empire.
2. The British Empire expanded into the Atlantic region and used it for slave trade, logging, the black market, and piracy. A legacy of its presence is the English language and Protestantism.
3. The river basin later came under American geopolitical influence due to its potential to provide an alternative to Panama as a canal route<sup>2</sup>.
4. The region experienced a clash of interests manifested in different cultural uses of its space (Demyk, 1995.). For instance, the indigenous peoples applied a territorial logic different from the one applied by the colonial empires. For the indigenous peoples connecting the two Oceans did not have priority. They moved along the territories rather than across them. One example is "la Ruta del Cacao" (the Cocoa Route), which established a connection among territories rather than dividing them.
5. Under imperial territorial logic, the region and its basin were transformed into a strategic zone, similar to Panama or the Tehuantepec Gulf. From this perspective, the national borders' importance decreased every time the empires needed to act across national boundaries. An instance occurred when plans to build a canal became salient.
6. The territorial logic applied by the national governments of the Central American countries was also different from that applied by indigenous groups. The national governments made sovereignty a national issue because the territory created the nation. The nation's immediate delimitations were the national borders, usually demarcated by rivers.
7. The indigenous groups' territorial logic also conflicted with national sovereignty: their routes extended across national borders.

1. For more historical details, see Rabella, 1995; Obregón, 2001; and the collection of essays published by Tarracena and Piel, 1995; and a debate in *De lo Jurídico*. These sources include Costa Rican and Nicaraguan perspectives on the issues.

2. For a historical analysis of British and American conflicts and negotiations over the San Juan River, see Rabella, 1995.

The above-mentioned dynamics endowed the San Juan River basin with a potential for conflict. It also generated a history of negotiations and hostile interactions among the different actors.<sup>1</sup>

## 2. Origins of the conflict

Costa Rica and Nicaragua have experienced a border conflict since 1821, when Spain granted both provinces their independence. According to Demyk (1995), after gaining independence from Spain, the new republics entered into a process similar to what happened in the Balkans: the new republics' fragmentation, contained under colonial rule, surfaced in a conflicting fashion after independence. In the Central American context, borders turned into major issues for disputes.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, the San Juan River, which flows along the border between the two countries, has been part of the conflict since then (Obregón, 2001,<sup>3</sup> Carmak, R., 1993).

Many factors intervened to keep the disputes alive according to these authors. As we can see from the following list, some of them were local and some global.<sup>4</sup>

1. In 1850, the British and the Americans signed the Clayton-Bulwer treaty to build a canal along the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua (Rabella, 1995; and Obregón, op. cit., includes the treaty's full text).
2. In 1856, Costa Rica defeated the U.S. invader William Walker<sup>5</sup> and his army. Advancing from North to South, he had conquered the Central American countries north of Costa Rica, including Nicaragua and the San Juan River (Arroyo, 1983).
3. Two years later, in 1858, Costa Rica and Nicaragua signed a border treaty which assigned the San Juan River to Nicaragua but gave navigation rights to Costa Rica (*De lo Jurídico*, 1999).
4. In 1871, Nicaragua demanded that the treaty be voided (*De lo Jurídico*, op.cit.).
5. In 1888, the treaty was submitted for arbitration to U. S. President Grover Cleveland. President Cleveland ruled that Costa Rica had the right to navigate the river for commercial rather than military purposes (*De lo Jurídico*, op cit.).
6. After the arbitration, the dispute lingered on and off for over a century (*De lo Jurídico*, op cit.; Tarracena & Piel, 1995). For instance, in 1915, Costa Rica took Nicaragua to the Central American Court of Justice because of the Bryan-Chamorro treaty signed between Nicaragua and the U.S. Costa Rica opposed both countries' agreement to build a canal. In 1916, the Court ruled that:
  - The San Juan River's shore on the Costa Rican side is Costa Rican territory.
  - Both countries have rights over the San Juan del Norte harbor on the Atlantic coast, and Salinas Bay on the Pacific coast.
7. Since the 1940s, relationships between the Somoza dictatorship of Nicaragua and most Costa Rican governments

1. A conflictive interaction characterizes not only the border between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. It also characterizes the Nicaraguan borders with Honduras and Colombia as well. El Salvador and Honduras have gone to war over border disputes. Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador have confronted each other about the Fonseca Gulf.
2. During colonial rule, the territory that is now Central America was divided into provinces, and unified under colonial rule with Guatemala as the *Capitanía General*. After independence from the Spanish Empire in 1821, the provinces were turned into separate countries. This fragmentation into independent republics generated conflicts and wars to define borders among themselves. The San Juan basin conflict is one of the surviving conflicts, aggravated by the interest the U. S. had until recently in building a canal along the San Juan River.
3. This author offers an abundant bibliography about borders and the San Juan River's past and current history.
4. The journal *De lo Jurídico*, Volumes 17 and 18, published a debate on these issues, including Costa Rican and Nicaraguan perspectives.
5. The official U.S. version is that William Walker was an adventurer. The official Costa Rican version is that Walker, with his army of mercenaries, had enslaved the Central American countries north of Costa Rica. More critical historians regard him as a conqueror struggling to introduce the U.S. Southern plantation system into Central America, thus transforming peasants into slaves.

From a political point of view, he embodied the Monroe Doctrine: America for the Americans. Thus his occupation furthered U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America.

On April 11, 1856 Costa Rica defeated Walker near the border between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. According to some historians, British military intelligence was key in helping Costa Rica to defeat Walker. April 11th is Costa Rica's major national holiday after Independence Day.

To some historians, foreign occupations need national support. For instance, they mention the fact that Nicaraguan liberals and conservatives were struggling against each other. One part called on Walker to help them defeat the other fraction. Walker took advantage of the situation and ended up becoming the "president" of Nicaragua.

Unfortunately, defeating Walker and his mercenaries did not save Central America from the plantation system. It was introduced some decades later by U.S. multinational companies such as the United Fruit Co. These corporations also managed to change governments they didn't like. Thus Walker's occupation was just another means to accomplish the same goals.

For more details on these issues, see this article's bibliography.

were often unfriendly.

8. During the 1980s, Central America experienced revolutions and counterrevolutions. The border between Costa Rica and Nicaragua played a key role in harboring the Contras, a guerrilla organization trained and supported by the Reagan administration to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. This situation brought the region international news coverage again (UPAZ, 1999). Finally, the Central American countries signed several peace treaties: one regional and two at the national level (Gutiérrez, S., 2002; UPAZ, op cit.).
9. During the 1990s, the conflict surfaced again over Costa Rica using the river for activities such as tourism, fishing and hunting. This time environmental and immigration issues contributed to the confrontation.<sup>1</sup> Environmental issues generated conflict whenever they were framed within a nationalistic perspective, more specifically, within the sovereignty issue. For example, according to Nicaraguan officials, Costa Rica's agricultural activities pollute the San Juan River. Since it is Nicaraguan territory, they considered pollution to be an invasion. Immigration from Nicaragua to Costa Rica contributed to provoking confrontation when Costa Rica repatriated Nicaraguan immigrants.
10. In July 1998, Nicaraguan military officials forbade Costa Rican police to navigate the river carrying arms<sup>2</sup> (see a debate in *De lo Jurídico*, op cit.). The Nicaraguan government and military officials considered this act to be not only a violation of the treaty and their national sovereignty by the Costa Rican government, but also an attempt at expansionism.  
The Costa Rican government reacted to the prohibition by threatening to take Nicaragua to The Hague International Court. The Nicaraguan government responded by charging fees to navigate the river.

However, in 2002 this historical confrontation changed to co-operation. Newly elected presidents in both countries decided to follow a policy of good neighborliness and support regional integration.

- Already at the Lima Summit between the Central American Republics and Spain, on November 24, 2001, the Central American Republics had agreed to take steps toward resolving their conflicts in order to strengthen integration.
- The agreements at the summit between the European Union and SICA members,<sup>3</sup> on May 18, 2002, finally, led the Central American countries to take concrete steps to remove obstacles to their regional integration.
- In June 2002, the newly elected Costa Rican president decided to write the San Juan River conflict off his agenda. The new Nicaraguan president joined the initiative, and Costa Rica abandoned the project of bringing Nicaragua before the Hague International Court.

Also, the environmental approach supported cooperation between the two countries and among several actors, local and international. Researchers on both sides produced insights on the basin's depletion: that an emergency could easily arise. The evidence they brought to the situation affected decision-making at the national, bi-national, and international levels.

### 3. Method

The aim of the present study is to investigate how the Costa Rican press covered the conflict during confrontation, and after its change to cooperation, in terms of *pro-conflict* versus *pro-cooperation coverage*.

Some 81 news stories were content analyzed for two different periods of time: July 1998, the entire month of re-ignition of confrontation, and June 2002, after the change to cooperation.

The study applied a two-dimensional scale that has twelve sets of indicators.<sup>4</sup> Six sets register *pro-conflict coverage*; the other six record *pro-cooperation coverage*. The twelve sets are summarized below.

- 
1. Although the environmental perspective is predominantly oriented towards cooperation, it can also be used to intensity conflict and enmity between the two countries. The 1993 special report published by *Panorama Internacional* (issue No. 164) is a good example: It uses criminological terminology to report on the pollution that affects the San Juan River.
  2. For a debate among representatives from Costa Rica and Nicaragua, see *De lo Jurídico*, 1999 issue.
  3. SICA stands for *Central American Integration System*. The Conference (*XVIII Conferencia Ministerial del Diálogo de San José*) took place in Madrid, Spain, on May 18th, 2002. Consult their *Comunicado Conjunto* for more details.
  4. These indicators have been developed in a joint project of the Universities of Örebro (Sweden), Kostanz (Germany), Tampere (Finland) and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (Norway) on "Journalism and the New World Order". A first version was published in Kempf, Reimann & Luostarinen (1996). The present version was first published in Kempf & Gutiérrez (2001). An English translation is available in ASPR (2003). In the present paper the sets of indicators are applied to study *pro-conflict* and *pro-cooperation coverage* rather than *pro-escalation* and *de-escalation*. This is due to the nature of the conflict and its change to cooperation.

### 3.1 Pro-conflict variables and indicators

1. **Conceptualization of the conflict (E1 in Charts):** This set looks at how the conflict is created so that it supports confrontation and the zero-sum game of military and war logic. This set registers preferences for military values and force, and rejection of peaceful alternatives.  
Specifically for our analysis, this set deals with the process that constructs the conflict for public consumption. To construct the San Juan River conflict, the press highlights past and present confrontations between the two countries.
2. **Negative evaluation of the opponent's rights and intentions (E2 in Charts).** The evaluation is based on antagonism: one party idealizes its rights and intentions while demonizing the opponent's. Thus, the evaluation eliminates any space for joint action.  
In the case analyzed here, the news stories present the reader with Nicaragua accusing Costa Rica of violating its sovereignty by using the river, or present Costa Rica's claims to its navigation rights, and so on.
3. **Negative evaluation of the opponent's actions (E3 in Charts).** The evaluation is based on antagonism: one part justifies its own actions while condemning and mistrusting the opponent's. The evaluation rejects mediation and cooperation leading to a win-win situation. It prefers actions that lead to win-lose results.  
This evaluation leads to characterizing the opponent as the enemy. For instance, the news stories tell about the Nicaraguan official's arrogant behavior and declarations.
4. **Destructive emotions (E4 in Charts).** This set deals with emotions such as confrontation, trust in military values, dehumanizing the other party and mediators, disregard for destruction and suffering, and negation of cooperation. The news stories support mistrust of the opponent and mediators. The emotions undervalue common grounds for cooperation.  
The news stories provide the population with clues as to how to face the enemy: with indignation, mistrust, malignancy, and violence.  
In the case presented here, the news stories encourage readers to view each other as enemies: Nicaraguan actions are portrayed as arrogant, rude, and against the law, because they violate the treaties. Thus, the Costa Rican government's response should be harsher: taking them to the International Court to show them we are not weak.
5. **Social and individual identification with confrontation and destruction (E5 in Charts).** This set refers to disregard for a peaceful, conflict-free, and reconciled future and world.  
The news stories in the Costa Rican press emphasized self-righteousness in first place, followed by nationalism and sovereignty. Self-righteousness gives the Costa Rican public a sense of superiority to those who used military force. In this connection, the press stressed nationalism's concept of personal and national identity in order to support confrontation. It stressed sovereignty over self-righteousness. The lawyers and courts (or the army for the Nicaraguan press) emerged ready to defend national sovereignty.
6. **Motivation to support war and confrontation (E6 in Charts).** This set deals with news stories according to which war protects against destruction and brings about a better future.

### 3.2 Pro-cooperation variables and indicators

1. **Questions the conflict and redirects it to cooperation (D1 in Charts).** This set registers a win-win situation in which both parties benefit. There is a demand for cooperation and peaceful solutions while abandoning antagonism.  
In the San Juan River case, both governments ended the conflict when they removed it from their agendas. Instead, they included dialogue and regional integration.  
The news stories covered integration and the beauty of the region. The Costa Rican president was quoted as saying that the river (San Juan) was drying out. Thus, no one in his right frame of mind would ever fight over something that might not even be there in the near future (La República, July 20, 2002).
2. **Fair evaluation of the parties' rights and intentions (D2 in Charts).** News stories based on this type of evaluation highlight common interests and *win-win* results of ending the conflict.  
For instance, the news stories gave voice to good neighborliness and integration goals. They told the public that the Costa Rican president had Nicaraguan ancestors. This brotherhood approach fostered respect for each other's rights and intentions.
3. **Fair evaluation of the parties' actions (D3 in Charts).** The evaluation assesses the need for mediation and cooperative actions. For the San Juan River conflict, the news items stressed good neighborliness, brotherhood, and bi-national approaches at all levels, as well as future plans for development.
4. **Constructive emotions (D4 in Charts).** This refers to emotions such as respect and trust for the opponent's rights and actions; the suffering and destruction for both parties generated by war and conflict; the need to end the conflict in order to enter the reconciliation and cooperation stages.  
In the San Juan River, the news stories reminded the public about unsolved issues while presenting it with emotions of brotherhood, common interests, and dialogue between the two countries.
5. **Social and individual identification with cooperation and reconciliation (D5 in Table 1, and Charts).** This set refers to

positive reactions and initiatives oriented to ending violence and confrontation, and to constructing a world based on cooperation and tolerant values.

The news items distance themselves from those identified with confrontation.


6. *Motivation to support peace and cooperation* (D6 in the Table and Charts). This set points to news stories in which cooperation and peaceful relationships are valid alternatives to war, and to assuring a better future.

#### 4. Results

Average Percentages	E1D1		E2D2		E3D3		E4D4		E5D5		E6D6	
	Conf	Coop	Conf	Coop								
<b>La Nación 98 (LN98)</b> n=24	39.17	14.17	1.39	1.39	27.78	4.17	5.00	1.67	2.08	0	0	2.00
<b>La República 98 (LR98)</b> n=22	18.00	40.00	60.00	6.67	86.67	23.33	32.00	22.00	13.33	21.67	0	0
<b>La Nación 02 (LN02)</b> n=19	20.00	29.23	7.69	7.69	20.51	20.51	4.62	6.15	0	0	0	3.5
<b>La República 02 (LR02)</b> n=16	20.00	50.00	48.15	18.52	70.37	40.74	20.00	26.67	5.56	18.52	0	0

Table 1: Percentage of pro-conflict and pro-cooperation coverage

##### 4.1 1998 results, newspaper La Nación (LN)



The results (Chart LN98) show *pro-conflict coverage* dominance in two variables:<sup>1</sup>

*"Conceptualization of the conflict"*: 39.17% of the news items conceptualize the Río San Juan as a conflict, versus 14.17%

1. For the other variables the percentages are too low (cf. Table 1) and, therefore, not discussed in the following.

that question this.

The news stories conceptualize the San Juan River as a conflict when they present it as a border endowed with border disputes. Thus, the issues are which country has rights over the river, which one owns it, which has rights to navigate it, which pollutes it, and so on.

Some news stories turn the situation into a "conflict of declarations." News items create this when they quote government officials who make contradictory statements on issues.

This mechanism is farther-reaching than contradictory information about events, because the "conflict of declarations" is embodied by government officials from each party to the conflict. Thus, the *conflict of declarations* not only adds more drama, but also more credibility to the contradictory information.

In *La Nación* of July 17, 1998, a news item quotes the Costa Rican minister stating that the problem between the two countries had been resolved. Prior to the Foreign Ministers' meeting, *La Nación* (July 21, 1998) quotes the Nicaraguan newspaper *La Prensa* as saying that according to a Nicaraguan army officer, nothing had been resolved.


The news story (LN, July 26, 1998) questions the conflict based on several journalists' tour of the region. After interviewing some residents, they concluded that there was no conflict locally, and that the conflict existed only at the national and international levels. The finding created a new contradiction.

"Negative evaluation of Nicaraguan actions": 27.78% of the news items expressed negative evaluations of Nicaraguan actions versus a fair evaluation: 4.17%.

The news-items based their conceptualization of the conflict on sovereignty: each nation has rights over the San Juan River. The news stories create antagonism with negative evaluations of Nicaraguan political and military actions against Costa Rican rights: banning navigation on the river, charging fees and using the conflict for internal political purposes.

The negative evaluation affects actions that happened in the past as well. This newspaper created a "pseudo dialogue" with the past when a news item reproduced a verbal exchange between Tomás Borge and the Costa Rican foreign minister. Both government officials acrimoniously discussed sovereignty issues and navigation rights. Their dialogue took place in 1983. The news item in 1998 (LN, July 26) reproduces a news story published fifteen years before. The revival of the dialogue strengthened confrontation rather than understanding because of the negative evaluation.

#### 4.2 2002 results, newspaper La Nación (LN):



The results (Chart LN02) show *pro-cooperation coverage* dominance in one variable:


"Questioning the conflict": 29.23% of the news items conceive the San Juan River in terms of cooperation versus 20% that conceptualize it as a source of conflict.

The change from confrontation to cooperation follows the logic of cooperation: undoing the polarization of national identities, stressing dialogue and brotherhood, opportunities to cooperate, and integration issues.

Compared to 1998, LN's 2002 results present:

- A shift from *pro-conflict* to *pro-cooperation* coverage: the "*conceptualization of the San Juan River as a source of conflict*" changes to "*conceptualization of the San Juan River as cooperation*". The news items changed the San Juan River portrayal from conflict to cooperation. However, the San Juan River is not yet regarded as a basin.
- There is no predominance of *pro-conflict* coverage in any variable.

#### 4.3 1998 results, newspaper La República (LR):



The 1998 results (see Chart LR98) show three variables dominated by *pro-conflict coverage*:

*"Negative evaluation of Nicaraguan actions"*: The news items' negative evaluation of Nicaraguan actions is 86.67% versus a *"fair evaluation"*: 23.33%.

The news items support Costa Rica's defense of its rights against the Nicaraguan government's actions. This generates a negative evaluation of Nicaraguan actions.

For instance, an interview with historians and lawyers (LR, July 25, 1998) offers several arguments against Nicaraguan actions and intentions. The news story argues that the Nicaraguan government is putting pressure on the Costa Rican government to accept more Nicaraguan immigrants. Another argument blames the Nicaraguan President for creating the conflict: he incited nationalistic sentiments against Costa Rica to reverse his popularity decline. The article quotes historical arguments that polarize national identities and support confrontation as well.

*"Negative evaluation of Nicaraguan rights and intentions"*: This is present in 60% of the news items versus a *"fair evaluation"*: 6.67%.

Rather than a negative evaluation, the news items demand Nicaraguan recognition of and respect for Costa Rican rights to the San Juan River. The news stories refer to treaties, arbitrations, and taking Nicaragua to international courts.

*"Destructive emotions"*: 32% of the news items present *"negative emotions"* versus *"constructive emotions"*: 22%. The news items portray a belligerent, militaristic Nicaraguan identity against civilian Costa Ricans.


The 1998 results show the dominance of *pro-cooperation coverage* in one variable:

*"Questions the conflict and redirects it to cooperation"*: The news items conceive the San Juan River in terms of cooperation: 40%, versus *"confrontation"*: 18%.

An editorial supports this transformation and calls for mediation or third party arbitration (LR, July 25, 1998). It warns about the danger of poisoning the relationships between the two countries.

Another editorial (LR, July 30, 1998) calls for negotiations between the two countries. It argues in favor of bi-national agreements regarding development while urging the governments to put aside confrontation on issues such as immigration and integration. The editorial accentuates the beauty of the San Juan River region and its potential for business as well.

#### 4.4 2002 results, newspaper La República (LR):



The 2002 results (see Chart LR02) show *pro-conflict coverage* in two variables:

*"Evaluation of Nicaragua's actions"*: The negative evaluation is higher than the positive: 70.37% versus 40.74%, although its 2002 score is lower than the one in 1998: 86.67%.

*"Evaluation of Nicaragua's rights and intentions"*: The negative evaluation is 48.15% versus the positive evaluation: 18.52%.

The 2002 results (see Chart LR02) for the following variable show *pro-cooperation coverage*:

*"Questions the conflict and redirects it to cooperation"*: As in 1998, the news items portray the San Juan River in terms of cooperation: 50% versus *"confrontation"*: 20%.

In sum:

- The 1998 results indicate that four variables show the predominance of *pro-conflict coverage* versus one that exhibits *pro-cooperation coverage*.
- The 2002 results indicate that two variables show the predominance of *pro-conflict coverage*, and one variable exhibits *pro-cooperation coverage*.

## 5. Conclusions

The coverage analysis suggests three main conclusions:

### 5.1 Support for conflict and confrontation in 1998

The results for the 1998 coverage analysis show support for conflict and confrontation rather than cooperation:

1. In LN's 1998 analysis, pro conflict and confrontation coverage is higher compared to pro-cooperation coverage regarding the variables "*conceptualization of the conflict*" and "*negative evaluation of Nicaraguan actions*." Thus, pro-conflict coverage is dominant for this newspaper.
2. LR's 1998 analysis shows a dominance of pro-conflict coverage in three variables: the "*evaluation of Nicaragua's actions*" shows the highest score, followed by "*evaluation of Nicaragua's rights and intentions*" and "*negative emotions*". However, the "*conceptualization of the San Juan River*" is in terms of cooperation rather than conflict.

In sum, four variables score *pro-conflict* coverage versus one that scores *pro-cooperation*.

## 5.2 The two newspapers decrease their pro-conflict coverage and increase their pro-cooperation coverage in 2002

The results for the 2002 coverage analysis show a tendency to balance *pro-conflict* and *pro-cooperation* coverage:

1. LN presents a shift from *pro-conflict* to *pro-cooperation* coverage in its conceptualization of the San Juan River: the "*conceptualization of the San Juan River*" is predominantly in terms of cooperation. No predominance of pro-conflict coverage is found in 2002. Thus, LN changed to pro-cooperation coverage after the political agenda changed from confrontation to cooperation.
2. LR manifests a similar pattern in 1998 and 2002: a dominance of pro-conflict coverage in two variables, plus the "*conceptualization of the San Juan River*" in terms of cooperation.

In 2002, two variables show a predominance of *pro-conflict* coverage, and two variables exhibit *pro-cooperation* coverage.

## 5.3 Resistance to change to pro-cooperation coverage

Following from the two previous conclusions, there is resistance to changing to *pro-cooperation* coverage, despite the change to cooperation in the political agenda.

Although both newspapers present a predominance of pro-cooperation coverage in one variable, cooperation is still under-reported. According to recent San Juan basin research (López, 2002a; López, 2002 b), there is a lot of cooperation in the San Juan basin, at both levels, governmental and non-governmental. Based on those findings it becomes clear that there are enough cooperation sources and voices which offer an opportunity for these newspapers to free themselves of pro-conflict and confrontation coverage.

For instance, a report by journalists who toured the San Juan River found no local conflict. The authors found that conflict was present only at the national and international levels (LN, July 26, 1998). Their finding was incomplete: they failed to find cooperation.

As was stated before, basin research shows that several local organizations, NGOs, GOs and international organizations manage several cooperation programs and projects in the region. These various organizations bring into the San Juan basin a plurality of cooperation agendas. Therefore, the San Juan River as a basin does offer the media an opportunity to report cooperation. However, the different organizations that work together in the San Juan River basin did not get their voice into the news stories analyzed here, because the journalists were looking for conflict rather than cooperation. They did so because they consider the region as a border rather than as a basin.

After the tour along the river, the journalists only found that there was no conflict in the border region. If they had considered the border region as a basin, it would have been easier to find cooperation. Thus, the news items neglected cooperation due to source shortage and a one-sided agenda. The question then is how to improve cooperation source recognition and acceptance in order to improve its coverage.

One more intervening factor is what Luostarinen (2002) identifies as the "polarization of identity indicators".

Regarding the San Juan River conflict, the polarization affects two national identities: Costa Rican and Nicaraguan. In this case, which is based on national identity, the two identities became salient after their polarization. Once polarized, the news stories incorporated them to incite antagonism among the public. However, there are several identities besides the national one. For instance, in Nicaragua regional identity is usually more important than national.

In the San Juan basin case, in order to polarize national identities, it was necessary to undergo a process that can be called "identity reduction". Identity reduction, when combined with polarization, suits a coverage held captive by the conflict's logic.

Once the national identities underwent reduction and polarization, they were applied to negatively evaluate Nicaraguan rights and actions, and activate destructive emotions. This procedure hindered *pro-cooperation* coverage.

The results for the 2002 coverage analysis show a tendency to balance *pro-conflict* and *pro-cooperation* coverage.

This tendency to balance pro-conflict and pro-cooperation coverage suggests that the two newspapers covered the change in the political agenda with resistance to transforming the pattern that had dominated the coverage of the San Juan River conflict for so many years.

Considering that media culture usually favors confrontation (Roach, 1993), the resistance to changing the *pro-conflict* coverage to *pro-cooperation* suggests that these two major Costa Rican newspapers followed the international media culture trend. Media culture prefers antagonism and its drama. This preference may have had a greater impact on these two newspapers than the Costa Rican civilian tradition.

Another factor may also have contributed to the resistance to abandoning *pro-conflict coverage* despite the change to cooperation in the political agenda:

The newspapers' resistance to change also indicates the papers' attachment to seeing the San Juan River basin as a border river. To think about the region as a river basin is still an innovation. Usually innovations generate resistance, so the two newspapers exhibited resistance to the innovation.

In conclusion, LN and LR not only resisted the change from pro-conflict to pro-cooperation, but also the change in the conceptualization of the San Juan River from a border to a basin.

These results are important for assessing the two newspapers' support for promoting cooperation and de-escalating conflicts. Peace is an important axis in Costa Rican foreign policy. Contrary to findings about media as policy makers' tools (cf. Gilboa, 2002), the two Costa Rican newspapers LN and LR lagged behind the policy change to supporting cooperation and peace.

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**Österreichisches Studienzentrum für Frieden und Konfliktlösung (ed), 2005.  
Die Wiedergeburt Europas. Von den Geburtswehen eines emanzipierten  
Europas und seinen Beziehungen zur "einsamen Supermacht". Münster:  
Agenda.**

Welche Rolle soll/darf/will/kann Europa in dieser gewandelten Welt spielen, so lautet die zentrale Frage dieser Publikation. Nicht die einer zweiten Supermacht, also kein Pendant zu den kriegsbegeisterten, hochgerüsteten USA, dem Weltpolizisten à la carte - darüber sind sich die zahlreichen namhafte Autoren, darunter Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Ekkehart Krippendorff, Gerald Mader, Ottfried Nassauer, Werner Ruf u.a.m., einig. Jedoch auch darüber, dass sich Europa bzw. die Europäische Union mit der gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik genau in diese Richtung zu entwickeln droht! Die Zeichen stehen auf Sturm - ist das Ende des Traums von einer europäischen Zivilmacht nahe?

Klammheimlich wollen wir immer schlagkräftiger werden; wollen zeigen, dass wir auch mitmischen können im "befrieden" der friedlosen Welt. Vergessen scheint beispielsweise die Erklärung zum Selbstverständnis der EU anlässlich des Gipfels von Laeken, in der hehre Ziele verewigt wurden wie jenes, dass das geeinte Europa zwar die Rolle einer Weltmacht spielen sollte, jedoch die einer humanitären - ein Kontinent der Vielfalt, Freiheit, Solidarität und gegenseitiger Achtung also. Europa als Macht, die jeder Form von Gewalt, Terror und Fanatismus den Kampf ansagt und, anstatt die Augen vor jeglichem Unrecht auf der Welt zu verschließen, die Verhältnisse für alle Länder zum Vorteil verändern möchte; kurzum: eine Macht, die der Globalisierung durch Solidarität und nachhaltige Entwicklung einen ethischen Rahmen geben will.

Heute hingegen tönt der Ruf nach "Coalitions of the Willing" und "War on Terrorism" aus den Lautsprechern der alten Welt, die scheinbar willfährig und gehorsam sich den Vorgaben der Militarisierungsmaschinerie aus Übersee anzupassen bereit ist. Darf das die Zukunft des vereinten Europas sein?

Blickt man ausgehend von der kriegerischen Vergangenheit unseres Kontinents nunmehr auf die Gegenwart, da ehemalige Kriegsgegner und verfeindete Staaten näher zusammenrücken als je erträumt, so sollte man meinen, dass sich Europa wie Phönix aus der Asche in neuem Glanz erhebt und mit frischer Energie ans friedvolle Werk schreitet. Doch statt mit gestärktem Selbstbewusstsein europäische Antworten auf globale Herausforderungen zu suchen, begibt sich der Kontinent blindlings in US-amerikanische Geiselnhaft und lässt sich beinahe naiv auf militärisches Wettrüsten als Allheilmittel der Weltpolitik ein. Jedoch drohen gerade durch eine derartige gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik in der EU-Verfassung zahlreiche Gefahren, deren Konsequenzen wie ein Damoklesschwert über dem ganzem Globus schweben: Krieg als Mittel der Politik wird weiter enttabuisiert, ja sogar als ggf. unausweichliches Mittel legitimiert. Die EU-Mitgliedsstaaten verpflichten sich zur uferlosen nationalen Aufrüstung, was in

absehbarer Zeit weltweit neue Rüstungsdynamiken provozieren wird, nicht zuletzt weil eine gemeinsame EU-Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik die eigenmächtige militärinterventionistische Lösung regionaler und lokaler Krisen bedeuten könnte. All das ist freilich Wasser auf die Mühlen der weltweiten Gewalt!

In der vorliegenden Publikation setzen sich zahlreiche Experten aus der Friedens- und Militärwissenschaft, des Völkerrechts, der Gewerkschafts- und Friedensbewegung kritisch mit der Entwicklung Europas - den Chancen und Risiken - auseinander. Ausgehend von einer vielfältigen und tiefgründigen Analyse des außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Weg Europas, erarbeiten sie Optionen des Kontinents im transatlantischen Verhältnis und zeigen argumentativ und wissenschaftlich fundiert, dass die Medaille immer zwei Seiten hat.

*Ursula E. Gamauf*

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