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Socio-psychological reconstruction as a qualitative method^[1]

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1. The communication model

Communication is not simply just information processing from a sender to a recipient. It is an interactive process that has its own specific dynamics by which the communicators themselves become entangled in the topic of the communication.

The meaning of any message results from the context in which it is placed and can be understood on three different levels.

Take a man, for instance, riding in a car with a young woman besides him, and she says "There is a red traffic light ahead." One can ponder about the meaning of this message.

First of all, it provides information on the traffic light. This is the *report aspect* of communication, which conveys information on some topic and is, therefore, synonymous with the (propositional) content of communication.

Secondly, it means a challenge to react, such as "Stop the car." This is the *parade aspect* of communication, which imposes a particular behavior on the recipient and provokes his or her response.

As most communication events are ambivalent challenges, the message in our example might also be a demand to argue, i.e. "I know how to drive very well." Which of these interpretations carries the real meaning can only be determined based upon the context of the communication.

Imagine that the two people in our example are a married couple involved in one of those conflicts in which the husband always withdraws to himself while his wife usually grumbles all the time (cf. Watzlawick et al., 1967). In this case, the message may easily be understood as a challenge to argue (even though it might not be meant this way in the specific case).

Within another context, however, this interpretation would be rather unlikely. Imagine that the man and the woman in our example just met and fell in love that very evening. Now they are driving home to his or her place, involved in heavy kissing and not very aware of what is happening outside. When the young woman takes a glance, she suddenly realizes that the lights have changed...

But it is not only the parade aspect of communication which is ambiguous. The same holds for the report aspect as well. Also in our example it is not self-evident that the propositional meaning of the young woman's message involves information on the traffic light. It might be information on the color as well. For instance, the two people in our example might be young parents with their child on the backseat and, while driving along, they might play a game, teaching the names of the colors.

Communication events are ambiguous, both with respect to their parade aspect and even with respect to their report aspect. Knowing the context in which a communication event takes place will help us to understand which meaning is most likely. But still, the meaning of a message is not uniquely determined by this *external context*. Even the grumbling wife in our first story might not want to argue in this very situation. The woman in the second story might intend to tell her lover that it was too dangerous to go on kissing and fumbling around while driving the car, and the mother in the third story might want to interfere in her husband's driving as he seems to be inattentive to the traffic while playing with the child.

In order to understand the meaning of a message it is crucial to take into account the *internal context* of the communication event as well. This internal context does not only refer to *what* information has been given so far and what challenges have been made, but it also refers to *how* the information is presented.

Seite 2

If the wife in our first story grumbles in a harsh voice, if the woman in the second story shrieks as if she were scared, or if the mother in the third story turns to her husband and speaks in a technical voice, the meaning of their messages will be quite clear - and not in any case what we would have at first expected.

In order to understand a message we thus have to consider its *command aspect* as well, which refers to what sort of message it is to be taken as (Watzlawick et al., 1967) and includes information about the very sender of the message (the "self-manifestation" aspect according to Schulz von Thun, 1981) as well as information about the relation between the communicators (the "relationship" aspect).

Each of the aspects of communication can be verbalized explicitly, e.g.:

- "There is a red traffic light ahead." (report aspect)
- "Stop the car." (parade aspect)
- "I am scared." (command aspect: self manifestation)
- "Your inattentive driving frightens me." (command aspect: relationship).

Whatever aspect is actually verbalized in a message,^[2] the others are always present as well. They are either implicit to the communication event (such as the information on the red traffic light implies the challenge to stop the car) or they are expressed by non-verbal means (such as grumbling in a harsh voice, shrieking when scared, turning to the husband, and so on), or they are expressed by the choice of words (such as "Better watch the damned traffic lights.>").

Due to its command and parade aspects any communication produces an interactive dynamic by which the communicators themselves become entangled - not only in an interaction with each other, but in the very (propositional) topic of the communication event as well. The propositional content of the communication event thus becomes a medium in which the communicators give a psychodramatic expression to their self-comprehension as a subject in relation to the other.

An extreme example for this is the amorous communication between lovers, in which it nearly does not matter at all *what* they are talking about.

While the communicators debate some topic (as the *manifest content* of their communication) they simultaneously negotiate their own identity (as its *latent content*). By doing so the latent content determines the point of view from which the manifest topic is perceived, thus interpreting the meaning of its propositional content and excluding other interpretations (and even facts) from the communicators' horizon (cf. Kempf, 1991).

An impressive example of this was exhibited at a workshop on *Dealing with Strangeness in Conflict-Management*, held by Nina L. Dulabaum at the Bergof-Seminar on *Intercultural Mediation* in Berlin, November 30 - December 2, 1994. During one of the exercises, Dulabaum formed five groups consisting of three people who did not know each other in advance, say A, B and C. These were each given secret instructions:

- A was to assume the role of an observer and should not actively take part in the communication between the others.
- B should only talk about the weather in the north.
- C should only talk about the weather in the south and was given some secret which should make him or her suspicious about B, but which was not to be referred to during the communication.

Although no one playing the B-role was really fond of the weather in the north, it finally turned out that none of them simply talked about it, or - which would have been much more likely - complained about the weather in the north. They *defended* it.

Though none of them could tell so, they obviously felt the reservation of the people playing the C-role and adopted a habit of defense; this excluded all the unpleasant feelings which they would usually associate with humidity, coldness, lack of sunshine and so on from their point view on northern weather.

Seite 3

Though the communicators are usually not conscious of such processes, one should be careful to avoid psychoanalytical mystifications, however. The selective unawareness of certain aspects of a topic is *not* in the first instance *produced* by psychological defense mechanisms, but primarily results from the subjects' entanglement, which determines their point of view.

If, for example, the parties in a conflict have contrary interpretations of each other's actions, this is primarily due to the divergence of their perspectives. Whereas one experiences one's own actions by looking at one's intentions, other persons' actions are experienced by looking at their consequences. From this perspective the opponent simply appears as an aggressor.

Since this point of view is the basis on which the subjects cope with the situation, it cannot be changed arbitrarily, however, but will be *maintained*, if necessary, by psychological defense mechanisms.

Having to deal with an aggressor, for example, implies both, the necessity and the justification of defense, and the more the subjects get involved in such aggressive interaction, the less room will be left for empathy towards the other. Otherwise one would jeopardize the very basis on which one believes to have control of the situation (cf. Kempf, 1994).

The manifest content of a communication event is thus interpreted by its latent content, through which the communicators simultaneously become bound to this interpretation. They cannot change it without giving up - or at least modifying - their understanding of themselves as a subject, nor without taking the risk of losing control.

2. The rationale for interpretation

Qualitative content analysis does not only focus on the propositional content of a communication event but rather on its underlying intentions and its presumable effects on the audience (cf. Berelson, 1952). It thus has not only to do with

- *logical understanding*, which considers the communication event as conveyance of information and analyzes its report aspect, but also with
- *psycho-logical understanding*, which deals with the communication event as an interaction process and analyzes its command and parade aspects, and finally with
- *socio-logical understanding*, which considers the communication event as an instance of defense against information and analyzes those aspects of a topic which are excluded or distorted by the communication event.

In order to accomplish this, the logical and psycho-logical analyses do not only have to reconstruct the internal context of the communication event, but also the external context in which it is embedded and/or which it refers to.

Since the meaning of every detail of a communication event is dependent on its context and vice versa (cf. Heinze & Klusemann, 1980), the process of analysis, moreover, will have to go *outward and return*

- from the reconstruction of the internal micro-context within any single message
 - "What information is given?" (report aspect)
 - "How is the information presented?, (command aspect)
 - "What response is provoked by this?" (parade aspect)
- to the reconstruction of the internal macro-context within the communication event
 - "What is the content of the communication event?" (report aspect)
 - "How do the communicators refer to each other?", or (in the analysis of one-sided communication) "How is the audience referred to?" (command aspect)
 - "What challenges are implied by this?" (parade aspect)

and finally

- to the reconstruction of the external context of the message

Seite 4

- "What is the material^[3] situation in which the communication event takes place?" (report aspect)
- "How is the relationship between the communicators?" (command aspect)
- "What is the communicators' *a priori* attitude towards the topic of the communication event?" (parade aspect)

Analyzing the dynamics of interaction between the communicators will finally give access to the latent content of the communication, i.e. to the identification of those psychodramas which are put into scene and through which the communicators become entangled in the (propositional) topic of the communication.

On the psychological level, these psychodramas can be considered as specific modes of coping with the fundamental contradiction between *autonomy and intimacy* (Bischof, 1994), while, on the sociological level, they represent modes of coping with the problem of *alienation*, i.e. modes of coping with the fundamental contradiction between understanding oneself as the subject of one's actions, while - at the

same time - the products of our hands and minds approach us as alien powers that impose their will upon us (Sève, 1978).^[4]

Since it is this latent content of a communication event which determines the point of view from which the manifest topic is perceived by the communicators, the reconstruction of those psychodramas finally provides the basis for the socio-logical understanding of the message, giving answers to the questions

- "What information is distorted or excluded from the communicators' horizon through the communication event?", and
- "Why (if any) psychological defense mechanisms are mobilized against bringing this information into the core of consciousness".

In order to carry out this last step of analysis, one has to look for the secondary rewards which the communicators gain from defense against this information, or - more concretely - one has to look for the role that the exclusions and distortions play for the maintenance of the psychodramatic form of the communication event.

3. The empirical basis

Obviously, the socio-psychological reconstruction of a communication event becomes the more speculative, the more we proceed from the manifest content of the message to the presumable effects which it has on the communicators.

Although the method can be applied to every kind of communication, determining how far the analysis may go depends on the type of material to be analyzed.

An optimal basis for socio-psychological reconstruction would be highly interactive communication events such as group discussions (cf. Palmbach & Kempf, 1991) or partner-centered dialogues (cf. Kempf et al., 1987; Kälble, 1991) rather than standardized interviews. In order to take the non-verbal aspects of communication into account, it would also be desirable that the communication events not simply be transcribed but videotaped instead. If there is sufficient background information on the external context of the communication event available, such material will usually allow for socio-psychological reconstruction on all three levels of understanding.

The analysis of mass communication such as media coverage (cf. Kempf, 1990; Kempf & Palmbach, 1990) or movies (cf. Kempf et al. 1987/88; Palmbach & Kempf, 1990) cannot usually go beyond identifying the implications of the latent content for the audience's perspective. Whether this perspective actually is adopted and (if necessary) maintained by psychological defense mechanisms will not be accessible.

Seite 5

In order to study the impacts of mass communication on the audience, one might make use of a two step approach, however, as was done by Palmbach & Kempf (1990, 1991) in their analysis of the Hollywood movie *Under Fire*. After having analyzed the movie itself, they arranged a group discussion on the movie, which provided the empirical basis for determining the degree to which the perspective suggested by the movie was adopted and defended by the audience.

4. The procedure of interpretation

The best way to explain how the method of socio-psychological reconstruction works is to demonstrate it with an example. In order to do so let us consider an article by Fritz Wirth (cf. Appendix 1)

"Abgeschossene Piloten im irakischen Fernsehen:
Der technische Krieg zeigt erste häßliche Bilder"^[5]

which appeared in the German newspaper *Die Welt* on Wednesday, January 23, 1991 (cf. Figure 1).

A. As a first step of analysis we might give a rough estimate of the external context, to which the headlines refer (report aspect of external context):

- On January 17, 1991, the Gulf War Allies started the air war against Baghdad. The media coverage presented it as a high-tech event.
- On January 19, 1991, it was publicly announced that Iraq had captured allied pilots who had either crashed or been shot down.
- On January 20, 1991, the pilots could be found on the front page in almost all German newspapers. It was reported about the "parading" of seven allied pilots on Iraqi television. According to the media coverage, the pilots had obviously been tortured by the Iraqis.
- On January 23, 1991, the day on which the present article was printed, first doubts about the torture of prisoners arose in a few newspapers. The rescue of a pilot from Iraqi captivity, and the presentation of a further prisoner on Baghdad television were reported (cf. Kempf & Reimann, 1994).

B. As a second step we may now turn to the internal macro-context of the article, performing a sequence analysis (cf. Südmersen, 1983), which will provide a first rough logical understanding of what the article is all about (report aspect of the internal macro-context).

In order to do so, we read the article very carefully, noting for each paragraph what its main theme is, who the main protagonists are, and which of the subsequent paragraphs are connected by a common theme in a sequence.

The present article contains a total of 18 paragraphs which can be condensed into 6 sequences:

1. The first sequence contains the paragraphs No. 1-2 and deals with the parading of the American pilot Jeffrey Zaun on Iraqi television.
2. The second sequence contains paragraph No. 3 and deals with President Bush's spontaneous reaction to the parading.
3. The third sequence contains paragraph No. 4 and deals with the coverage of the war which so far had shown high-tech weapons only, but neither perpetrators nor victims.
4. The fourth sequence contains the paragraphs No. 5-8 and leads from Jeffrey Zaun's face to the reproach of torture.

Der technische Krieg zeigt erste häßliche Bilder

Von FRITZ WIRTH

Ein aufgedunsenes Gesicht, blaue, blutunterlaufene Augen, eine schleppende, monotone Stimme. Das war nach Tagen der Euphorie das erste Bild dieses Krieges, das Schrecken, Zorn und Mitleid zwischen New York und Kalifornien weckte.

Es war das Gesicht des Marineleutnants Jeffrey Zaun, abgeschossen über dem Irak, gefangenengenommen und von Saddam Hussein triumphierend als erste Kriegsbeute und Siegestrophäe der Welt vorgeführt.

Am Montag morgen erreichten diese Bilder auch George Bush in seinem Wochenenddomizil Camp David. Ihr Anblick wurde für ihn zur bisher zornigsten Stunde dieses Krieges. Er bestellte unverzüglich den Hubschrauber „Marine One“ und kehrte zwei Stunden früher nach Washington zurück als ursprünglich geplant. Dort lief er unverzüglich vor die Fernsehkamera der Nation: „Amerika ist zornig über diese Mißhandlung. Ich werde Saddam Hussein verantwortlich machen für diese brutale Behandlung von Kriegsgefangenen.“

Die Bilder des Jeffrey Zaun, Guy Hunter, Clifford Acree und zweier britischer Piloten waren ein einschneidendes Ereignis in diesem Konflikt. Denn bisher war dies ein fast anonymer Krieg der High-Tech-Waffen. Man sah kaum oder nur schattenhaft die Folgen und die Ausführenden dieser Kriegsmaschinerie. Nun schaute man zum ersten Mal in die Grimasse dieses Krieges, in gedemütigte und zerschundene Gesichter.

Die Eltern des Jeffrey Zaun wußten seit Freitag, daß ihr Sohn von seinem ersten Einsatz in diesem Krieg nicht zurückgekehrt war. Am Montag morgen hörten sie zum ersten Mal von einem AP-Reporter, daß er noch lebe. Ihre Freude und Erleichterung wurde indes schon Stunden später scharf gedämpft, als sie ihn auf den Fernsehschirmen sahen.

„Ich wette, er hat dies nicht freiwillig gesagt“

Dies war ein Jeffrey Zaun, wie sie ihn Zeit ihres Lebens nicht gekannt hatten. Ein entstelltes Gesicht, und aus seinem Mund kamen zähflüssig diese Worte: „Ich glaube, unsere politischen Führer haben das friedfertige Volk des Irak zu Unrecht angegriffen.“ Kurze Zeit später wurde der Vater des Piloten Zaun vom Pentagon gebeten, sich zu diesen Bildern nicht öffentlich zu äußern. Die Freunde des Jeffrey Zaun indes taten es spontan. Thomas Hall, ein ehemaliger Marinepilot, der sechs Jahre lang in vietnamesischer Gefangenschaft verbracht hatte: „Ich wette meinen letzten Dollar, mein Leben und meine Familie: Jeffrey Zaun hat dies nicht freiwillig gesagt. Dieser Mann ist kein Verräter.“

Alles spricht dafür, daß Hall recht hatte. Denn mit Jeffrey Zaun wurde der ebenfalls gefangene Pilot Guy Hunter vorgeführt, dem nahezu die

gleichen Worte in den Mund gelegt wurden: „Ich verurteile diesen Angriff gegen das friedfertige irakische Volk.“ Guy Hunters Vater: „Wer so mißhandelt wird, sagt am Ende alles.“

Denn nur wenige glauben, daß die entstellten Gesichter der Gefangenen die Folge der Ausstiegs mit dem Schleudersitz aus ihren zerstörten Maschinen waren. Sie sind überzeugt, daß sie von den Irakern mißhandelt wurden und mit Gewalt für die Fernsehauftritte gefügig gemacht wurden. Stunden nach ihrer Gefangennahme waren die angeblichen „Krieger des Salans Bush“ bereits mit verbundenen Augen durch Bagdad geführt worden.

Das alles zeigt: Saddam Hussein ist entschlossen, diese Männer zu Zeugen und Waffen seines sogenannten Heiligen Krieges zu machen. Vorzeitgestützte für sein eigenes fanatisiertes Publikum, das diese Gefangenen als Beweis wertet, daß der Irak mit Saddam Hussein auf dem Weg zum Sieg ist.

Zugleich sind sie offensichtlich Teil seines Nervenkrieges gegen die USA. Denn wenige Stunden später reichte Hussein diese Bilder und Aussagen bereits dem amerikanischen Fernsehen weiter. In diesem Augenblick wurde deutlich, warum er dem Korrespondenten des amerikanischen Fernsehsenders CNN als einzigen ausländischen Journalisten die Erlaubnis gab, in Bagdad zu bleiben. Er will ihn in seine Propagandakampagne einschalten und ein neues Vietnam Syndrom schaffen, indem er die Schrecken des Krieges in die amerikanischen Wohnzimmer trägt.

Nicht alle amerikanischen Sender machen dieses Spiel mit. Die Fernsehgesellschaft ABC zeigt zwar die Bilder der Gefangenen, überträgt jedoch nicht die Worte, die ihnen von den Irakern in den Mund gelegt werden. „Es ist eine langfristige Politik unseres Hauses“, begründet man bei ABC. „Wir haben seit Jahren auch nicht die Botschaften übertragen, die libanesischen Terroristen ihren amerikanischen Geiseln aufzuzwungen haben. Wir verbreiten keine Propagandabotschaften des Saddam Hussein.“

Die spontanen Reaktionen der amerikanischen Öffentlichkeit zeigen, daß Hussein sich mit seinem Coup verkalkuliert hat. Nach dem ersten Schock über diese Bilder breitet sich Mitleid und schließlich Zorn aus. Es ist der gleiche Zorn, den Hussein vor Wochen mit seiner Geiselpolitik erntete.

Außerdem gibt es zu viele Kronzeugen dieser Methoden aus dem Vietnamkrieg. Zum Beispiel den Kongreßabgeordneten Pete Peterson aus Florida, der sieben Jahre von den Vietnamesen gefangengehalten wurde. „Dies ist die gleiche Methode und Folter, wie wir sie erlebten. Es ist ein hartes Los, Gefangener von Diktatoren zu werden.“

Jody Powell, einst Pressechef von Präsident Carter, ist sicher, daß diese Inszenierung für Hussein zu einem Bumerang wird. „Sie wird die Kriegs-

entschlossenheit der amerikanischen Bürger nur noch weiter verschärfen“, behauptet er. Powell weiß, wovon er spricht. Er erinnert sich der Wirkung, die die Veröffentlichung amerikanischer Geiseln durch den Ayatollah Khomeini vor elf Jahren hatte. „Sie haben damals nicht die amerikanische Nation geteilt, sondern sie nur noch zorniger und entschlossener gemacht. Es ist eine alte Erfahrung: Die arabischen Führer wissen nichts über Reaktionen, Emotionen und Motivationen der westlichen Gesellschaft. Sie kennen nur die Karikatur des Amerikaners.“

Protest gegen Verletzung der Genfer Konvention

Am Montag protestierte das State Department beim irakischen Geschäftsträger über den angedrohten Plan Husseins, die Kriegsgefangenen wie einst die Geiseln an strategisch wichtigen Punkten unterzubringen. Es sei eine eindeutige Verletzung der Genfer Konvention. Der irakische Diplomat erwidert stoisch: „Der Irak verstößt gegen keine internationalen Konventionen. Das geschieht lediglich auf amerikanischer Seite mit der brutalen Bombardierung von Zivilisten.“

George Bush indes akzeptiert diese Erwiderung nicht. Das Weiße Haus betont, daß genau das Gegenteil der Fall sei. „Selten ist in einem Krieg so intensiv darauf geachtet worden, die Zivilbevölkerung zu schonen.“ George Bush selbst hakt nach: „Dies ist kein Krieg gegen das irakische Volk, dies ist ein Krieg gegen einen gewissenlosen, brutalen Diktator.“

Der Satz enthüllt mehr als nur Zorn. Zum ersten Mal läßt der amerikanische Präsident indirekt erkennen, daß ein Arrangement mit Saddam Hussein, das diesen Krieg mit seinem Rückzug aus Kuwait kurzfristig beenden könnte, ausgeschlossen ist. In diesem Satz steckt mehr als die Entschlossenheit, Kuwait zu befreien. Bush will zugleich den Irak und die Welt von diesem Mann befreien. Ein Ende dieses Krieges mit einem Kompromiß steht für ihn nicht mehr auf dem Programm.

Es gibt außer den Angehörigen selbst, die das weitere Schicksal der Gefangenen zwischen Furcht und Bangen verfolgen, kaum jemanden in den USA, der spontaner und zorniger auf ihren Mißbrauch durch Hussein reagierte. Es hat etwas mit Ereignissen zu tun, die 46 Jahre zurückliegen. Damals, am 2. September 1944, wurde der 19jährige Bomberpilot George Bush im Südpazifik von den Japanern abgeschossen und 90 Minuten später von einem amerikanischen U-Boot aus dem Wasser geholt. Viele Jahre später erfuhr George Bush, daß jene seiner Kameraden, die gefangen wurden, von den Japanern zu Tode gefoltert wurden. Wenn es ein Trauma für diesen Mann im Umgang mit Kriegsgefangenen gibt: Es wurde am 2. September 1944 geprägt.

Figure 1: Facsimile of an article by Fritz Wirth in *Die Welt*, January 23, 1991.

- Paragraphs 5-6 deal with Jeffrey Zaun's family and friends and their reaction to the parading.
- Paragraphs 7-8 argue in favor of the reproach of torture and refute alternative explanations.
- 5. The fifth sequence contains the paragraphs 9-(16)^[6] and discusses Saddam Hussein's media strategy.
 - Paragraphs 9-(10) describe the strategy.
 - Paragraphs (10)-11 describe how the American media cope with it.
 - Paragraph 12 deals with the public reaction in the U.S.
 - Paragraph (13) switches to the theme of torture and refers to the Vietnam experience.
 - Paragraphs (13)-14 introduce authorities who give the reproaches more weight and doubt the success of Saddam Hussein's media strategy.
 - Paragraphs 15-(16) deal with official American reactions.
- 6. The sixth sequence contains the paragraphs (16)-18 and presents President Bush as the liberator of Iraq and the world.
 - Paragraph (16) refutes reproaches against the Allies.
 - Paragraph 17 interprets President Bush's war aims.
 - Paragraph 18 tells a heroic story of Bush's World War II experiences which motivate his war aims and give them historical legitimation.

C. In order to analyze how the audience is referred to by the article (command aspect of the internal macro-context) we can refer to a study by Kempf & Reimann (1994) on the German newspaper coverage of allied POWs during the Gulf war.

Based on a propaganda model by Herman & Chomsky (1988) the authors analyzed a representative sample of 146 newspaper articles with a total of 911 paragraphs, 480 of which dealt with the topic of allied POWs (either directly or indirectly). In a latent styles analysis (cf. Kempf, 1994) of these 480 paragraphs, Kempf & Reimann identified three latent styles of featuring worthy victims:

1. 71.4% of the analyzed paragraphs contained a relatively unbiased press coverage: they portrayed, however, Iraq unequivocally in the role of the perpetrator:
 - "with just rage", that is, through the use of aggravating words (28.2%), with the occasional humanization of allied victims (14.1%), the Iraqi responsibility was occasionally searched for at the top (6.9%), occasionally, though, also taking the Iraqi perspective (8.7%);
 - dramatic featuring of the stories (0.1%) and the inclusion of elements from the everyday world of the allied forces (0.0%), however, are basically never deployed, that is, never as a style means.
2. Following on the second place, with 17.8% of the analyzed text passages, a propaganda style was identified which does not occur, in this form, in the model by Herman & Chomsky, and which can be described as a propaganda construction of human interest stories:

- Humanization (96.0%) and usually also dramatic featuring (80.4%) of the allied protagonists with frequent inclusions of elements from their everyday world (38.0%), and with the occasional use of aggravating words (25%), remain in the foreground of the represented reporting.
- On the other hand, it is hardly the case, however, that the responsibility is searched for at the top (1.2%). The stories speak for themselves.
- In this respect, as Iraqi protagonists also appear in human interest stories, there also minimally appears a focusing on the Iraqi perspective, i.e. the humanization of Iraqis (2.7%).

Seite 8

3. On the third place only (10.8% of the analyzed paragraphs) followed the propaganda style described by Herman & Chomsky:

- Usually through the use of aggravating words (88.5%), the responsibility is usually searched for at the top (78.1%). Allied victims are frequently humanized (43.8%) and dramatically featured (40.5%). There is also often an inclusion of elements from the everyday world of the Allies (28.1%).
- The Iraqi perspective, in contrast, is never taken up (0%).

A significant difference between this explicit propaganda style and the propaganda construction of human interest stories lies in the fact that the reader is presented here with a completed judgement: concerning the atrocity of the action, as well as concerning the responsibility at the top.

This is missing from the human interest stories. In these, the readers must (apparently) form their own judgement, even when this is already given by the characteristic style of the story, and cannot be interpreted in any other way than is intended by the propaganda.

In the present article by Fritz Wirth we find a propaganda functioning of 67.54%, either in the form of human interest stories (25.12%) or in form of the explicit propaganda style described by Herman & Chomsky (42.42%). The ratio of the two propaganda styles is 1:1.69.

D. A better understanding of the propaganda functioning in the present article will be achieved if we relate it to the usual amount of propaganda functioning in Die Welt and in German newspaper coverage on Allied POWs of the Gulf War in general (command aspect of the external context):

Though, among all serious nationwide German newspapers, ^[7] *Die Welt* shows the highest amount (49.34%) of propaganda functioning in the featuring of worthy victims (cf. Kempf & Reimann, 1994), ^[8] and thus contains a propaganda functioning which is more than twice as high as the average of all newspapers analyzed by Reimann & Kempf (22.30%), the present article shows an even higher degree of propaganda functioning (67.54%) than is usually found in *Die Welt*.

The ratio of the two propaganda styles in *Die Welt* (1:1.06) shows a stronger tendency to present the audience with a completed judgement than is found in the average propaganda functioning of all newspapers (1:0.77). In the present article this preference for explicit propaganda is even stronger (1:1.69).

E. Parade aspect of the external context.

Among all serious nationwide German newspapers, *Die Welt* is the one that most strongly tried to influence the audience in a pro-American direction when reporting on the Gulf War and especially on allied POWs. In the focusing on and substantiation of reproaches against the war parties (cf. Kempf &

Reimann, 1994), a critical attitude towards the allied forces (5.46%) and the defense of Iraq (3.46%) occurred only half as frequently as in the average of all newspapers analyzed (9.2% and 7.1%).

F. Parade aspect of the internal macro-context.

A first understanding of how the present article tries to influence the audience can be gained by analyzing the sequence in which various styles of featuring worthy victims are used:

Seite 9

- after starting with propaganda construction of human interest stories (paragraph 1), and a (2:1) mixture of relatively unbiased coverage and explicit propaganda (paragraph 2) in the first sequence,
- the explicit propaganda style dominates the second sequence (paragraph 3),
- and is reduced (1:2) for the benefit of human interest stories in the third sequence (paragraph 4),
- which continues through most of the fourth sequence (paragraphs 5-7), which then ends with relatively unbiased coverage (paragraph 8).

Having read the article so far, the audience might have drawn its own conclusions and will be prepared to accept more explicit judgements.

- Accordingly, the article changes to an even mixture of explicit propaganda (paragraphs 10-14)^[9] and relatively unbiased coverage (paragraphs 9 and 15-16) throughout sequence five.
- This type of style usage is also characteristic of the last sequence which starts with relatively unbiased coverage (paragraph 17) and ends up in a grand finale of explicit propaganda (paragraph 18).

The course of style usage thus implies the assumption that the whole article focuses on making the audience adopt those conclusions which are drawn at its end.

G. Command aspect of internal macro-context revisited

Additional evidence for this assumption can be gained from the thematic structure in which the two main themes of the article are presented. Roughly spoken, the article deals with only two major themes:

- Saddam Hussein's media strategy and
- President Bush's reactions to it.

In the presentation of these themes the first two sequences are some kind of overture which shows the same thematic course as the rest of the article.

- Starting with the parading of Jeffrey Zaun on Iraqi television, the overture gives a concrete example of Saddam Hussein's media strategy and ends up with president Bush's concrete reaction to that event.
- The rest of the article again starts with the parading of Jeffrey Zaun - which is not dealt with as an isolated case, however, but Jeffrey Zaun is one among several allied POWs who have been paraded on Iraqi television - and deals with Saddam Hussein's media strategy under a more general point of view, which finally results in a more general and fundamental reaction of the American president concerning the allied war aims.

Obviously, it is this reaction - and the way in which it is interpreted by the article - that the audience is challenged to adopt.

H. Before we can come to final conclusions we have to perform a detailed analysis of the internal micro context of the article.

1st headline (kicker):

"Shot down pilots on Iraqi television:"

1. Beginning with the headline, we analyze the article, sentence by sentence, paying particular attention to the individual details which are contained in them (*report aspect*: "What information is given?").

- a) (Allied) pilots (were shown) on Iraqi television.
- b) The pilots had been shot down.

Seite 10

2. At the same time, we note its *command aspect* ("How is the information presented?"):

- a) objective, without the use of aggravating words.
- b) incomplete information that can only be comprehended when the topic as such is known.

3. We further note the *parade aspect* ("What response is provoked by this?"):

- a) in order to conceptualize the topic.

4. Additionally, we note *whether the sentence refers to previous sequences* of the text, i.e. to any previously occurring information (report aspect), interpretations (command aspect) or challenges (parade aspect):

- since this is not the case here (particularly as it deals with the initial line of the text), this point does not apply.

At the same time, we go back to the previous position and note at that location that the topic is taken up again, including in which sequence the information occurs:

- in this article, for example, the first sequence contains a description of the parading of allied pilots on Iraqi television. We will therefore include this observation later on, with the micro-analysis of the first sequence:
 - a) 1st headline <=and return to the first headline, the kicker, in order to make the observation forthwith of:
 - a) => 1st sequenceWe proceed in the same manner, wherever possible, with subsequent sequences, provided that the topic is once again taken up.

5. We further note possible *references to the external context*:

- a) The parading on television of allied pilots on Iraqi television was also shown on German television stations the previous evening.

6. Finally, we note whether relevant information is *excluded or distorted* based on the way in which it is presented:

- since this is not detected here, this point does not apply.

With that, the micro-analysis of the first headline (kicker) is complete, and we are able to continue with the analysis of the following sentence:

2nd headline (headline proper):
"The technical war reveals first ugly pictures"

1. *Report aspect* ("What information is given?"):

- a) The war reveals pictures.
- b) It is a technical war.

Seite 11

- c) They are ugly pictures.
- d) They are the first ugly pictures.

2. *Command aspect* ("How is the information presented"):

- a) Aggravating words are used to describe the pictures: as ugly.
- b) The war itself is characterized as "technical".
- c) "Ugliness" appears as a new quality which had not existed in this war until then.

3. *Parade aspect* ("What response is provoked by this?"):

- a) Abhorrence (with regard to the pictures).
- b) The pictures, which had been shown of the war up to that point in time, should be taken as the (previous) reality of the war: simply a technical event. Attractive pictures.
- c) People should be alarmed about the rules of the game being broken, rules that had governed the (thus understood) war so far.

4. *Cross references*:

- i) *Reference to previous sequences*:
 - Does not apply.
- ii) *Reference to subsequent sequences*:
 - Will be touched upon later.

5. *References to the external context*:

- a) The television pictures from the previous evening.
- b) The television pictures shown thus far create the impression that the war is merely a high-tech event in which weapons battle against weapons, without perpetrators and without victims.

6. *Excluded or distorted information*:

- a) That the war is a real war and is not identical with the pictures that are presented on television; (distorted).
- b) The devastation and the victims that had been caused by a week of allied air-raids on Baghdad; (excluded).

With that, the micro-analysis of the headline proper is complete, and we are able to continue sentence by

sentence with the analysis of the article. Since this would require a lot of space, however, these steps of the analysis will not be documented here. [\[10\]](#)

J. When the micro-analysis of the text is complete, the details will again be joined to form a whole in order to gain a more detailed understanding of the structure of the entire article - especially with respect to its command and parade aspects.

Therefore we proceed, beginning with the headline block, in sequences and pay particular attention to those passages which are linked to cross-references with other sequences.

At the same time, some details may prove to be more important; others to be less important since they play no role in the overall context of the article; and still other interpretations

Seite 12

might be determined as having been prematurely formulated and, in light of the overall context, cannot be maintained.

Thus, for example, we would have to reject the interpretation of the headline proper given below 6.a) if the identification of the war with its media image were dismissed at a further location as being misleading.

This is, however, not the case in the article at issue. Even though it is admitted (in paragraph 4) that "the war machinery" had already brought about "results" that one however only "vaguely saw," and that the public finally saw "for the first time the grimace of this war, the humiliated and mistreated faces."

- But this "grimace" of the war is *reduced* at the same time to these very "humiliated and mistreated faces", so that they are, further below (paragraph 10), "*the horrors of the war*" which Saddam Hussein has "brought into the living rooms of America" through his media strategy (and therefore turning the American civilian population into victims as well);
- whereas the victims of the allied air-raids on Baghdad (in paragraph 16) are denied and excluded.

Thus from the allied war conduct remains the image of the pictures so far transmitted on television of a neat, technical war without any further consequences.

K. As result of this procedure in the analysis we obtain initially a detailed description of the psychodramatic character of the article with all of its secondary lines of argumentation, as well as those items that are distorted or excluded from the world of the readers. At the same time, we obtain clues which suggest a resistance against bringing this information into the core of consciousness to be reckoned with if the readers themselves take on as their own the way of thinking that is formed by the way in which the material is presented (socio-logical understanding). In order to have the psychodramatic character of the article as a whole stand out graphically, this description is eventually focused on the primary lines of argumentation of the article:

1. Headline block:

The headline block takes up the television pictures from the previous evening in order to give the impression that the war (which had been made out to be a technical war - without perpetrators, without victims) had taken on a new (ugly) dimension. It is not clearly shown that the reality of the war had always been another, and not the one presented in the television pictures which we got to see; nor is the public been made aware that the war had already brought devastation and victims (in Baghdad) and that it not only consisted of a demonstration of target accuracy of weapon systems.

At the same time, the reader is disturbed and alarmed.

2. Sequence 1:

The readers are greatly more troubled by being drastically made aware of this ugly dimension of the war. The parading of U.S. Navy Lieutenant Jeffrey Zaun on Iraqi television had abruptly ended the euphoria over the television spectacle of a nice, technical war, and the American public was horrified, bringing about their outrage and empathy. While this is a public made up of the normal American per se ("between New York and California"), the readers are called upon to identify with a civilian population which appears to be a unified and cohesive general public without dissent and opposition. They should share their horror, their outrage and their empathy, and they should direct their rage at Saddam Hussein who had broken the rules of the game, causing the 'nice' war to suddenly turn ugly when he presented the captured pilots "triumphantly as the first booty and victory trophy to the world." Thus comes about the wish: something must be done to stop this man.

Seite 13

3. Sequence 2:

This wish is immediately fulfilled: by President Bush personally, spontaneously and in a self-sacrificing manner^[11], because also he shares the outrage of America "about this mistreatment" of the prisoners of war. This "mistreatment" becomes at once, with its first reference in the article, an already established fact, about which the reader can have no doubts without coming under the suspicion of lacking solidarity. On television Bush announced: "I will hold Saddam Hussein responsible for this brutal treatment of prisoners of war."

As Bush reacts in such a spontaneous, self-sacrificing and resolute way, the public's confidence in him is at the same time strengthened: He is the man we can depend on to do the right thing at the right time.

4. Sequence 3:

In the following sequences the topics of this overture are taken up once again, developed further and expanded.

The parading on television of allied prisoners of war is "a far-reaching event in this conflict." Something *new* (so far unimaginable) has happened, which instills in the reader the desire for a *new response*.

5. Sequence 4:

The shock of Jeffrey Zaun's family is presented along with the show of solidarity by his friends who have no doubts about the alleged claims of torture. And it is given to be understood that "only a few believe," what was reported on same day in other media,^[12] that the disfigured faces of the prisoners of war shown on television were not the result of torture, but were instead the result of bailing out of their aircraft with ejector seats.^[13]

Because the friends and relatives of the prisoners are convinced "that they were mistreated by the Iraqis" so too are the readers called upon to share this belief in order to not appear to be lacking in solidarity or to betray the prisoners, the actual victims of this war.

6. Sequence 5:

The parading of allied prisoners of war on Iraqi television is an occasion taken in order to emphasize the contemptibility of Saddam Hussein's media strategy, which is directed to a fanatic audience whereby, at the same time, the suspicion is (implicitly) dispelled that the article itself could attempt to fanatize its readers.

Saddam Hussein is accused of waging a "war of nerves against the US," wanting "to create a new Vietnam syndrome" by drawing the American television network CNN "into its propaganda campaign." At the same time, a certain degree of confidence is brought about that "not all American stations are going along with this," and that "Hussein has miscalculated his coup."

Those who now still entertain doubts are not only at risk of being considered guilty of not showing solidarity, but also put themselves on the side of untruth and propaganda, which will be unmasked as a lie, particularly as there are "too many credible witnesses who experienced these methods in the Vietnam War."

The authorities that finally are quoted (Congressman Pete Peterson, who had been held seven years as a prisoner of war in Vietnam, and Jody Powell, former press secretary under President Carter) testify once again for that which has already been the tenor of the article: the prisoners of war were tortured and Saddam Hussein's media strategy will fail, and "the willingness of the American citizens to go to war will only intensify further."

Whoever now still entertains doubts, disavows all expertise and historical experience.

The protest of the State Department about threats to position prisoners of war at strategically important locations is reported. At the same time it is made safe that the response of the Iraqi chargé d'affaires according to which "Iraq is violating no international conventions," cannot be understood as an assurance that Iraq would give up these intentions. The article says "the Iraqi diplomat replied so stoically" and thus suggests that he did not show any concern about violating the Geneva Convention. The latter served him (evidently) only as pretext for reproaches against the USA, which he had accused of "brutally bombing civilians."

Perceiving the reply of the Iraqi diplomat from such a point of view, (implicitly) dispelles the thought that the Allies could exhibit a similar biased record with regard to current human rights.

Since it cannot be simply denied that there were in fact civilian victims in the course of the bombing attacks on Baghdad, the White House issues the reply that "seldom (...) in a war before has such an attempt been made to spare the civilian population."^[14] Eventually it is President Bush himself who dispelles all doubts about American war conduct: "This is not a war against the Iraqi people, This is a war against an unscrupulous, brutal dictator."

7. Sequence 6:

Based on this statement by the American president, which basically only has the character of a disclaimer, the author of the article, Fritz Wirth, construes the *new response*, which the (supposedly) changed war situation requires (and for which, after all doubts have been dispelled, the right time has come). It is the expansion of the aims of the war beyond the liberation of Kuwait:

"For the first time the American president revealed indirectly that an arrangement with Saddam Hussein is out of the question that this war could be ended immediately with his withdrawal from Kuwait. This sentence contains more than the resolve to liberate Kuwait. Bush wants at the same time to rid Iraq and the world of this man. An end to this war with a compromise is for him no longer on the agenda."

As the further course of the Gulf War has shown, this interpretation is highly imaginative and blatantly incorrect. Nonetheless, it appears credible (and desirable) to the reader who has followed Fritz Wirth's line of argumentation.

The far-reaching implications of this interpretation can only be realized in connection with the background,

- that at this point in time there still existed a strong resistance to the Gulf War in the Federal Republic of Germany,^[15] and

- that there was considerable doubt about the real aims of the war on the part of the Allies.

The liberation of Kuwait had been, so far, made out to be the only - and legitimate - goal of the war by the

supporters of the Gulf War - from *Die Welt* to the press attaché of the American Embassy (cf. Walsh, 1991); but now it only appears as a *compromise* that, in view of the most recent events, can no longer be desired by anybody. Thus the readers of *Die Welt* are prepared to accept as justified literally every aim of the war, that should still come on the day.

In order to protect the credibility of a *change of mind* of the American president (who until then had only had the liberation of Kuwait as a goal), the reason for this is finally traced back to an alleged "trauma" that George Bush had experienced during World War II, when he himself was shot down by the Japanese over the South Pacific.

At the same time, it is taken caution against the possible response that the fate of the world should not be entrusted in this man if he has not gotten over his own traumatic war-time experience:

- it was not the fact that he was shot down that had traumatized him so greatly, but
- it was the fate of his comrades who did not share his same fortune in being rescued after 90 minutes by an American submarine. They were taken as prisoners of war by the Japanese and tortured to death.

Thus it is once again not his own fate that directs the president's actions, but instead the fate of others. Whom could we trust more than the one who unselfishly only considers the welfare of the world (and therefore also our welfare) in whatever he still might do or decide in this war.

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Seite 17

Appendix 1:

**Abgeschossene Piloten im irakischen Fernsehen:
*Der technische Krieg zeigt erste häßliche Bilder***

Von FRITZ WIRTH

Ein aufgedunsenes Gesicht, blaue, blutunterlaufene Augen, eine schleppende monotone Stimme. Das war nach Tagen der Euphorie das erste Bild dieses Krieges, das Schrecken Zorn und Mitleid zwischen New York und Californien weckte.

Es war das Gesicht des Marineleutnants Jeffrey Zaun, abgeschossen über dem Iraq, gefangengenommen und von Saddam Hussein triumphierend als erste Kriegsbeute und Siegestrophäe der Welt vorgeführt.

Am Montag morgen erreichten diese Bilder auch George Bush in seinem Wochenenddomizil Camp David. Ihr Anblick wurde für ihn zur bisher zornigsten Stunde dieses Krieges. Er bestellte unverzüglich den Hubschrauber "Marine One" und kehrte zwei Stunden früher nach Washington zurück als ursprünglich geplant. Dort lief er unverzüglich vor die Fernsehkameras der Nation: "Amerika ist zornig über diese Mißhandlung". Ich werde Saddam Hussein verantwortlich machen für diese brutale

Behandlung von Kriegsgefangenen."

Die Bilder des Jeffrey Zaun, Guy Hunter, Clifford Acree und zweier britischer Piloten waren ein einschneidendes Ereignis in diesem Konflikt. Denn bisher war dies ein fast anonymer Krieg der High-Tech-Waffen. Man sah kaum oder nur schattenhaft die Folgen und die Ausführenden dieser Kriegsmaschinerie. Nun schaute man zum ersten Mal in die Grimasse dieses Krieges, in gedemütigte und zerschundene Gesichter.

Die Eltern des Jeffrey Zaun wußten seit Freitag, daß ihr Sohn von seinem ersten Einsatz in diesem Krieg nicht zurückgekehrt war. Am Montag morgen hörten sie zum ersten Mal von einem AP-Reporter, daß er noch lebe. Ihre Freude und Erleichterung wurde indes schon Stunden später scharf gedämpft, als sie ihn auf den Fernsehschirmen sahen.

"Ich wette, er hat dies nicht freiwillig gesagt"

Dies war ein Jeffrey Zaun, wie sie ihn Zeit ihres Lebens nicht gekannt hatten. Ein entstelltes Gesicht, und aus seinem Mund kamen zähflüssig diese Worte: "Ich glaube, unsere politischen Führer haben das friedfertige Volk des Irak zu Unrecht angegriffen." Kurze Zeit später wurde der Vater des Piloten Zaun vom Pentagon gebeten, sich zu diesen Bildern nicht öffentlich zu äußern. Die Freunde des Jeffrey Zaun indes taten es spontan. Thomas Hall, ein ehemaliger Marinepilot, der sechs Jahre lang in vietnamesischer Gefangenschaft verbracht hatte: "Ich wette meinen letzten Dollar, mein Leben und meine Familie: Jeffrey Zaun hat dies nicht freiwillig gesagt. Dieser Mann ist kein Verräter."

Alles spricht dafür, daß Hall recht hatte. Denn mit Jeffrey Zaun wurde der ebenfalls gefangene Pilot Guy Hunter vorgeführt, dem nahezu die gleichen Worte in den Mund gelegt wurden: "Ich verurteile diesen Angriff gegen das friedfertige irakische Volk." Guy Hunters Vater: "Wer so mißhandelt wird, sagt am Ende alles."

Denn nur wenige glauben, daß die entstellten Gesichter der Gefangenen die Folge des Ausstiegs mit dem Schleudersitz aus ihren zerstörten Maschinen waren. Sie sind überzeugt, daß sie von den Irakern mißhandelt wurden und mit Gewalt für die Fernsehauftritte gefügig gemacht wurden. Stunden nach ihrer Gefangennahme waren die angeblichen "Krieger des Satens Bush" bereits mit verbundenen Augen durch Bagdad geführt worden.

Das alles zeigt: Saddam Hussein ist entschlossen, diese Männer zu Zeugen und Waffen seines sogenannten Heiligen Krieges zu machen. Vorzeigestücke für sein eigenes fanatisiertes Publikum, das diese Gefangenen als Beweis wertet, daß der Irak mit Saddam Hussein auf dem Weg zum Sieg ist.

Seite 18

Zugleich sind sie offensichtlich Teil seines Nervenkrieges gegen die USA. Denn wenige Stunden später reichte Hussein diese Bilder und Aussagen bereits dem amerikanischen Fernsehen weiter. In diesem Augenblick wurde deutlich, warum er dem Korrespondenten des amerikanischen Fernsehsenders CNN als einzigem ausländischen Journalisten die Erlaubnis gab, in Bagdad zu bleiben. Er will ihn in seine Propagandakampagne einschalten und ein neues Vietnamsyndrom schaffen, indem er die Schrecken des Krieges in die amerikanischen Wohnzimmer trägt.

Nicht alle amerikanischen Sender machen dieses Spiel mit. Die Fernsehgesellschaft ABC zeigt zwar die Bilder der Gefangenen, überträgt jedoch nicht die Worte, die ihnen von den Irakern in den Mund gelegt werden. "Es ist eine langfristige Politik unseres Hauses", begründet man bei ABC. "Wir haben seit Jahren auch nicht die Botschaften übertragen, die libanesische Terroristen ihren amerikanischen Geiseln

aufgezwungen haben. Wir verbreiten keine Propagandabotschaften des Saddam Hussein."

Die spontanen Reaktionen der amerikanischen Öffentlichkeit zeigen, daß Hussein sich mit seinem Coup verkalkuliert hat. Nach dem ersten Schock über diese Bilder breitet sich Mitleid und schließlich Zorn aus. Es ist der gleiche Zorn, den Hussein vor Wochen mit seiner Geiselpolitik erntete.

Außerdem gibt es zu viele Kronzeugen dieser Methoden aus dem Vietnamkrieg. Zum Beispiel den Kongreßabgeordneten Pete Peterson aus Florida, der sieben Jahre von den Vietnamesen gefangengehalten wurde. "Dies ist die gleiche Methode und Folter, wie wir sie erlebten. Es ist ein hartes Los, Gefangener von Diktatoren zu werden."

Jody Powell, eins Pressechef von Präsident Carter, ist sicher, daß diese Inszenierung für Hussein zu einem Bumerang wird. "Sie wird die Kriegseschlossenheit der amerikanischen Bürger nur noch weiter verschärfen", behauptet er. Er erinnert sich der Wirkung, die die Veröffentlichung amerikanischer Geiseln durch den Ayatollah Khomeini vor elf Jahren hatte. "Sie haben damals nicht die amerikanische Nation geteilt, sondern sie nur noch zorniger und entschlossener gemacht. Es ist eine alte Erfahrung: Die arabischen Führer wissen nichts über Reaktionen, Emotionen und Motivationen der westlichen Gesellschaft. Sie kennen nur die Karikatur des Amerikaners."

Protest gegen Verletzung der Genfer Konvention

Am Montag protestierte das State Departement beim irakischen Geschäftsträger über den angedrohten Plan Husseins, die Kriegsgefangenen wie einst die Geiseln an strategisch wichtigen Punkten unterzubringen. Es sei eine eindeutige Verletzung der Genfer Konvention. Der irakische Diplomat erwidert stoisch: "Der Irak verstößt gegen keine internationalen Konventionen. Das geschieht lediglich auf amerikanischer Seite mit der brutalen Bombardierung von Zivilisten."

George Bush indes akzeptiert diese Erwiderung nicht. Das Weiße Haus betont, daß genau das Gegenteil der Fall sei. "Selten ist in einem Krieg so intensiv darauf geachtet worden, die Zivilbevölkerung zu schonen." George Bush selbst hakt nach: "Dies ist kein Krieg gegen das irakische Volk, dies ist ein Krieg gegen einen gewissenlosen, brutalen Diktator."

Der Satz enthüllt mehr als nur Zorn. Zum ersten Mal läßt der amerikanische Präsident indirekt erkennen, daß ein Arrangement mit Saddam Hussein, das diesen Krieg mit seinem Rückzug aus Kuwait kurzfristig beenden könnte, ausgeschlossen ist. In diesem Satz steckt mehr als die Entschlossenheit, Kuwait zu befreien. Bush will zugleich den Irak und die Welt von diesem Mann befreien. Ein Ende dieses Krieges mit einem Kompromiß steht für ihn nicht mehr auf dem Programm.

Es gibt außer den Angehörigen selbst, die das weitere Schicksal der Gefangenen zwischen Furcht und Bangen verfolgen, kaum jemanden in den USA, der spontaner und zorniger auf ihren Mißbrauch durch Hussein reagierte. Es hat etwas mit Ereignissen zu tun, die 46 Jahre zurückliegen. Damals, am 2. September 1944, wurde der 19jährige Bomberpilot George Bush im Südpazifik von den Japanern abgeschossen und 90 Minuten später von einem amerikanischen U-Boot aus dem Wasser geholt. Viele Jahre später erfuhr George Bush, daß

Textanfang	Literaturverzeichnis
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Footnotes

- [1] The author wishes to thank Michael Reimann for his assistance in the empirical work on which this paper is based.
- [2] Challenges (e.g. "Stop the car") or questions (e.g. "Don't you see the red traffic light") are messages as well (e.g. "You have to stop the car"; "There is a red traffic light").
- [3] Cf. biographical, historical, sociological, economical etc.
- [4] Or - as Marx put it - the contradiction between understanding ourselves as the subjects of history, while history goes on behind the backs of its actors.
- [5] "Shot down pilots on Iraqi television: the technical war reveals the first ugly pictures"
- [6] Paragraphs which build a bridge between subsequent sequences are put into parentheses.
- [7] *Die Tageszeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Die Welt.*
- [8] A still higher propaganda functioning is found only in the tabloid *Bildzeitung* (82.06%).
- [9] In paragraph 11 there is a mixing ratio of 2:1 between explicit propaganda and relatively unbiased coverage.
- [10] To avoid losing the overview in the abundance of those details which are brought out in the course of the micro-analysis, it is recommended that the evaluation sheet in Appendix 2 be utilized.
- [11] He returned from "his weekend retreat at Camp David (...) to Washington two hours earlier than originally planned.
- [12] Among others in the *Frankfurter Rundschau*.
- [13] This fact was confirmed after the release of the prisoners.
- [14] That is easily said, because since the beginning of the modern warfare there had not been a single war in which the civilian population had been spared. And it is believable that at that point in time the Western public was still completely fascinated by the alleged accuracy of the modern weapon systems that were deployed in the Gulf War. That the video demonstrations about their alleged accuracy do not correspond with the facts, but represent instead allied propaganda measures, only became public months after the end of the war.
- [15]. Thus the mass demonstration of the peace movement against the Gulf War in Bonn on January 26, 1994, three days after the publication of the analyzed newspaper article at hand (cf. Liegl & Kempf, 1994).

Zum Textanfang

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