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## Konflikt, Feindbildkonstruktionen und Versöhnung - Der Fall Israel-Palästina Conflict, enmification and reconciliation - The Israeli-Palestinian case

*Dov Shinar*

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English Peace process in cultural conflict: The role of the media

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English The changing image of the enemy in the news discourse of Israeli newspapers, 1993-1994

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**Deutsch** Veränderungen des politischen, sozialen und medienbezogenen Umfelds und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Berichterstattung über Konflikte: das Beispiel der arabischen Bürger Israels

English Changes in the political, social, and media environment and their impact on the coverage of conflict: The case of the Arab citizens in Israel

## Freie Beiträge Non-thematic contributions

*Andreas Mattenschlager & Hubert Riedle*

**Deutsch** Medienkonstruktion nationaler Identitäten in Deutschland und der Schweiz, 1946-1995

English Media construction of national identities in Germany and Switzerland, 1946-1995



## Editorial

Mehr als 7300 Volltext-Downloads im ersten Erscheinungsjahr haben conflict & communication online einen respektablen Start verschafft, davon über 3000 während der ersten 7 Monate nach Erscheinen von Heft 1, Ende Januar 2002, und mehr als 4300 in den 4 Monaten nach Erscheinen von Heft 2, Ende August 2002, bis zum Jahresende.

Weit weniger erfreulich war die friedenspolitische Entwicklung während dieses Zeitraums, die vor allem den Nahen Osten in den Blickwinkel der Weltöffentlichkeit gerückt hat und durch die Eskalation des Terrors auf beiden Seiten des israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikts sowie durch den (am Ende gescheiterten) Versuch der USA und Großbritanniens geprägt war, die Vereinten Nationen zur Legitimation ihres längst beschlossenen Krieges gegen den Irak zu funktionalisieren. Schon im November 1998 hatte Tony Blair vor dem britischen Unterhaus angekündigt, dass die amerikanisch-britischen Luftangriffe bis zum Sturz Saddam Husseins fortgesetzt würden und auf der Welle der internationalen Solidarität mit den USA nach den Terroranschlägen des 11. September 2001 schien die Stunde günstig, der im Golfkrieg propagierten Neuen Weltordnung endgültig zum Durchbruch zu verhelfen. Dass sich der Weltsicherheitsrat dieser Strategie verweigert hat, konnte den Krieg nicht verhindern. Doch wenngleich die Vereinten Nationen und das internationale Recht mit dem Beginn des Krieges gegen den Irak eine schwere Niederlage hinnehmen mussten, zeigten die anhaltenden Proteste gegen die Kriegspolitik (auch in England und in den USA), dass nicht nur die politische Führung des "alten Europa", sondern auch die Weltöffentlichkeit dem Prinzip der Streitbeilegung mit friedlichen Mitteln weit größeres Gewicht einzuräumen bereit sind als dies noch in Bosnien oder im Kosovo der Fall war.

Die Bush-Administration hat auf diese prekäre Lage mit einer neuen Propaganda-Strategie geantwortet. Verglichen mit dem Golfkrieg, als Journalisten im Konvoi zu ausgewählten Schauplätzen gekarrt wurden, mag das diesmal praktizierte "Embedding", das Einbetten von Reportern in die Kämpfende Truppe, auf den ersten Blick als Gewinn für die Informationsfreiheit erscheinen. Noch nie hatten die Medien einen so nahen Zugang zum Kriegsgeschehen, versprach US-Verteidigungsminister Rumsfeld, und Chris Cramer, Chef des Nachrichtensenders CNN, versuchte dies als einen historischen Schritt für den Journalismus zu verkaufen. Doch, wie Alexander Michel im Südkurier vom 28. März zu Recht festgestellt hat, ist "an Euphrat und Tigris nicht nur der Medientross, sondern auch die Wahrheit eingebettet. Konkret wird der Mangel an Informationen weniger durch die Praxis der Zensur, die alle Photos, Filme und Texte einer Prüfung unterzieht. Vielmehr wird offenkundig, dass die kameradschaftliche Nähe zwischen Reporter und Soldat - die zusammen essen, schlafen und im Graben liegen - einer nüchternen, Abstand wahrenden Berichterstattung schadet. Distanz schwindet, Verbrüderung bahnt sich an, und Propaganda bricht sich Bahn, wenn ein CNN-Reporter meldet: (Wir sind weiter auf dem Vormarsch.' Oder (Wir sind auf starken Widerstand getroffen.'"

Anders als im Golfkrieg, als Peter Arnett von CNN als einziger in Bagdad ausharrte, gab es aber diesmal auch eine Vielzahl von Journalisten, die von der anderen Seite

der Front berichten, und die seit dem Golfkrieg gewachsene Einsicht, dass Journalisten nicht bloß neutrale Berichterstatter sind, sondern einen Einfluss auf das politische Geschehen haben, hat dazu geführt, dass sich die Medien (zumindest in Deutschland) heute weit stärker mit dem Krieg und mit ihrer eigenen Rolle in diesem Krieg kritisch auseinandersetzen. Für die Entwicklung einer konstruktiven Konfliktberichterstattung als Gegenpol zu herkömmlicher Propaganda ist damit eine neue Situation entstanden, deren Tragfähigkeit es erst noch zu untersuchen gilt und deren Lehren noch aufzuarbeiten sein werden. Wenn der gesamtgesellschaftliche Rahmen ihre Entfaltung zulässt, sind die professionelle Kompetenz und die Kreativität der Journalisten selbst zweifellos eine der wichtigsten Quellen, aus denen sich etwas über die Chancen und Grenzen von Friedensjournalismus lernen lässt.

Die vorliegende Ausgabe von *conflict & communication online* untersucht den Beitrag, welchen die Medien zur Konstruktion des Umfeldes leisten, in dem sich Außenpolitik vollzieht, anhand des israelisch-palästinensischen Konfliktes. Dov Shinar plädiert dafür, den israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt vorrangig als Kulturkonflikt zu verstehen, untersucht die schwerwiegenden Konsequenzen, welche die Fehleinschätzung der Natur von Konflikten für die Konfliktberichterstattung haben (können) und arbeitet einige der Konsequenzen heraus, die sich aus dem Modell der Konflikttransformation für eine konstruktive Konfliktberichterstattung über Kulturkonflikte ergeben. Lea Mandelzis analysiert die Veränderungen des Feindbildes im Nachrichtendiskurs israelischer Zeitungen während des israelisch-palästinensischen Friedensprozesses und der Aufsatz von Anat First & Eli Avraham ist der Frage gewidmet, wie sich die Veränderungen des politischen, sozialen und medienbezogenen Umfelds auf die Berichterstattung über die arabischen Bürger Israels in den israelischen Medien ausgewirkt haben. Der damit begonnene Themenschwerpunkt "Konflikt, Feindbildkonstruktionen und Versöhnung" wird im kommenden Heft von *conflict & communication online* fortgesetzt werden, das über den Fall Israel-Palästina hinausgehende theoretische Konzepte und internationale Erfahrungen zum Gegenstand hat. Neben Fallstudien zu anderen Konfliktgebieten enthält Vol. 2, No. 2 eine Studie von Susan Dente Ross über den Niederschlag, welchen die Terroranschläge des 11. September 2001 auf das Framing des israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikts in den Editorials der New York Times gefunden haben, und in einem Aufsatz von Wilhelm Kempf wird das Konzept einer konstruktiven Konfliktberichterstattung unter sozialpsychologischer Perspektive entwickelt.

In der Rubrik "Freie Beiträge" findet sich in der vorliegenden Ausgabe von *conflict & communication online* ein Aufsatz von Andreas Mattenschlager und Hubert Riedle, der die Ergebnisse zweier Fallstudien aus dem von Heikki Luostarinen (Universität Jyväskylä, Finnland) initiierten Forschungsprojekt über die Konstruktion nationaler Identitäten in den europäischen Printmedien der Nachkriegszeit (1945-1995) zum Gegenstand hat. Während der Fokus der deutschen Fallstudie auf der Konstruktion nationaler Identität unter den Bedingungen der Zweistaatlichkeit (BRD/DDR) liegt, sind es die graduelle Überwindung des Isolationismus der "neutralen" Schweiz und ihre zunehmende Europaintegration, die im Zentrum der schweizerischen Fallstudie stehen.

## Editorial

Over 7300 full text downloads in its first year of publication gave conflict & communication online a respectable start. These included over 3000 in the first seven months after the appearance of the first issue in late January 2002 and more than 4300 in the four months from the publication of the second issue in late August 2002 to the end of the year.

Developments in peace policy during this period were much less satisfying. The Near East has been propelled into the international center of attention through the escalation of terror on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the (ultimately unsuccessful) attempts of the USA and Great Britain to instrumentalize the United Nations to legitimate a war against Iraq which they had already decided to launch. As early as November 1998, Tony Blair announced to the British House of Commons that US-British air strikes would be continued in an effort to overthrow Saddam Hussein, and, riding the wave of international solidarity with the USA after the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, the time now seemed favorable to finally start bringing about the new world order that had been promulgated in the Gulf War. That the UN Security Council rejected this strategy did not prevent the war. But even though the United Nations and international law received a severe setback with the war commenced against Iraq, continuing massive protests against the war policy (as well in England and in the USA) have shown that not only the political leadership of 'Old Europe', but also the international community are more willing to assign far greater weight to the principle of solving disagreements through peaceful means than was the case in Bosnia or in Kosovo.

The Bush administration has responded to this precarious situation with a new propaganda strategy. Compared with the Gulf War, when journalists were escorted to selected showplaces in convoys, the current practice of "embedding" reporters in the combat troops may appear at first glance to represent a gain for freedom of information. Never before have the media had such close access to war, promised US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and Chris Cramer, head of CNN, tried to sell this as an historical step for journalism. Yet, as Alexander Michel rightly commented in the *Südkurier*, (a Konstanz, Germany newspaper ) on 28 March, "in the Tigris-Euphrates region it is not only the retinue, but also the truth that is embedded. Concretely, the lack of information is not due as much to the practice of censorship, which subjects all photos, films and texts to surveillance. It is rather the comradely closeness of reporter and soldier - eating, sleeping and crouching in the trenches together - that detracts from objective reporting from a detached perspective. Distance disappears, a sense of comradeship arises, and propaganda results, for example when a CNN reporter states, 'We are continuing to advance', or 'We have met with strong resistance'."


Unlike the Gulf War, when Peter Arnett of CNN stuck it out alone in Baghdad, however, this time there were also many journalists reporting from the other side of the Front, and the view which has grown since the Gulf War that journalists are not merely neutral reporters, but rather exert an influence on political events, has meant that today the media (at least in Germany) are dealing much more critically with war and their own role in this war. A new situation has arisen for the development of constructive conflict-reporting as an opposite pole to the usual propaganda, whose

strengths must still be studied and whose lessons must still be determined. If permitted by the overall societal frame in which it unfolds, the professional competence and creativity of journalists themselves are doubtlessly one of the most important sources from which something can be learned about the chances and limits of peace journalism.

This issue of conflict & communication online studies the contributions of media to creating the environment in which foreign policy is implemented, using the example of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Dov Shinar argues for understanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as above all a cultural conflict, analyzes the serious consequences which the faulty evaluation of the nature of conflicts has (can have) for conflict reporting and explicates some of the consequences resulting from the model of conflict transformation for constructive reporting on cultural conflicts. Lea Mandelzis analyzes changes in the image of the enemy found in the news discourse of Israeli papers during the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and an article by Anat First & Eli Avraham considers how changes in the political, social and media environment have affected reporting on Arab Israeli citizens in the Israeli media. The topical focus on "conflict, enmification and reconciliation" which was begun here will be continued in the next issue of conflict & communication online, which focuses on theoretical concepts and international experiences going beyond the case of Israel and Palestine. Besides case studies on other conflict areas, Vol. 2, No. 2 includes a study by Susan Dente Ross on the fallout from the terror attack of 11 September 2001 on the framing of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in editorials in the New York Times, and an article by Wilhelm Kempf develops a concept of constructive conflict coverage from a social-psychological perspective. Under the heading " Non-Thematic Contributions," the present issue of conflict & communication online includes an article by Andreas Mattenschlager and Hubert Riedle on the results of two case studies done in a research project launched by Heikki Luostarinen (University of Jyväskylä, Finland) on the media construction of national identities in post-war Europe (1945-1995). While the German case study focuses on the construction of national identity under the conditions of a divided country (FRG/GDR), in the Swiss case study the focus is on the gradual overcoming of isolationism by "neutral" Switzerland and its increasing integration into Europe.

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Wilhelm Kempf



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*Dov Shinar*

## **Friedensprozesse in Kulturkonflikten: Die Rolle der Medien**

Der vorliegende Artikel untersucht (1) den kulturellen Charakter des palästinensisch-israelischen Konflikts; (2) die "Nicht-Handhabbarkeit" von Kulturkonflikten; (3) Modelle des Konfliktmanagements: "Versöhnung"/"Beendigung des Konflikts" versus "Konflikttransformation" und deren Relation zu Kulturkonflikten; (4) die schwerwiegenden Konsequenzen, welche die Fehlzuordnung von Konflikten und Modellen nach sich ziehen kann, z.B. wenn das Versöhnungsmodell auf Kulturkonflikte angewendet wird; (5) die sich verändernde Rolle der Medien für internationale Beziehungen und ihren Beitrag zur "Krise der Erwartungen", die im September 2000 im Ausbruch der Intifada ihre Früchte trug; (6) die Möglichkeiten der Medien, einen Beitrag zu Friedensprozessen zu leisten; und (7) einige der Implikationen, welche sich aus der Übernahme des Konflikttransformationsmodells durch die Medien ergeben.

Aufgezeigt werden der (im Unterschied zu anderen gewaltsamen Konfrontationen) grundlegend kulturelle Charakter des Nahostkonflikts, insbesondere in seiner palästinensisch-israelischen Spielart; die "Nicht-Handhabbarkeit" von Kulturkonflikten insofern, als sie nur schwer und möglicherweise überhaupt nicht gelöst werden können; dass es neben der Versöhnung auch die Konflikttransformation als konstruktive Möglichkeit des Ausgangs von Konflikten gibt; dass die Fehlinterpretation von Konfliktlösungsstrategien sowohl in der Politik als auch in den Medien und in der öffentlichen Meinung eine "Krise der Erwartungen" heraufbeschwören kann, und dass die Medien in all diesen Prozessen eine wichtige Rolle spielen.

**Volltext (in Englisch)**

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### **Peace process in cultural conflict: The role of the media**

This article explores (1) the cultural nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; (2) the "intractability" of cultural conflicts; (3) conflict management models: reconciliation/"end-of-conflict" versus "conflict transformation" and their relation to cultural conflict; (4) the serious consequences of the wrong matching of models and conflicts, such as using the reconciliation model in cultural conflict; (5) the changing role of the media in international relations, and their contribution to the "crisis of expectations" that came to fruition in September 2000, with the eruption of the Intifada; (6) the possibility of the media contributing to peace processes; and (7) implications of the media adoption of the conflict transformation model. The premises are that, unlike other violent confrontations, the Middle Eastern conflict is fundamentally cultural, particularly in its Palestinian-Israeli version; that cultural conflicts are "intractable" (Lederach, 1998; Burgess&Burgess, 1996; Kraybill, 1995), in the sense that they are very difficult, perhaps impossible to resolve; that reconciliation is not the only possible or desirable outcome of conflict: transformation (Vayrynen, 1991) is another viable option; that mistaken interpretations of conflict-resolution strategies can lead to "crises of expectations" in policy-making, in the media, and in public opinion; and that the media can play important roles in these processes.

[full text \(in English\)](#)

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Dov Shinar

## The peace process in cultural conflict: The role of the media<sup>1</sup>

*Kurzfassung:* Der vorliegende Artikel untersucht (1) den kulturellen Charakter des palästinensisch-israelischen Konflikts; (2) die "Nicht-Handhabbarkeit" von Kulturkonflikten; (3) Modelle des Konfliktmanagements: „Versöhnung“ /"Beendigung des Konflikts" versus "Konflikttransformation" und deren Relation zu Kulturkonflikten; (4) die schwerwiegenden Konsequenzen, welche die Fehlzurordnung von Konflikten und Modellen nach sich ziehen kann, z.B. wenn das Versöhnungsmodell auf Kulturkonflikte angewendet wird (5) die sich verändernde Rolle der Medien für internationale Beziehungen und ihren Beitrag zur „Krise der Erwartungen“ die im September 2000 im Ausbruch der Intifada ihre Früchte trug; (6) die Möglichkeiten der Medien, einen Beitrag zu Friedensprozessen zu leisten; und (7) einige der Implikationen, welche sich aus der Übernahme des Konflikttransformationsmodells durch die Medien ergeben.

Aufgezeigt werden der (im Unterschied zu anderen gewaltsamen Konfrontationen) grundlegend kulturelle Charakter des Nahostkonflikts, insbesondere in seiner palästinensisch-israelischen Spielart; die „Nicht-Handhabbarkeit“ von Kulturkonflikten insofern, als sie nur schwer und möglicherweise überhaupt nicht gelöst werden können; dass es neben der Versöhnung auch die Konflikttransformation als konstruktive Möglichkeit des Ausgangs von Konflikten gibt; dass die Fehlinterpretation von Konfliktlösungsstrategien sowohl in der Politik als auch in den Medien und in der öffentlichen Meinung eine „Krise der Erwartungen“ heraufbeschwören kann, und dass die Medien in all diesen Prozessen eine wichtige Rolle spielen.

*Abstract:* This article explores (1) the cultural nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; (2) the "intractability" of cultural conflicts; (3) conflict management models: reconciliation/"end-of-conflict" versus "conflict transformation" and their relation to cultural conflict; (4) the serious consequences of the wrong matching of models and conflicts, such as using the reconciliation model in cultural conflict; (5) the changing role of the media in international relations, and their contribution to the "crisis of expectations" that came to fruition in September 2000, with the eruption of the Intifada; (6) the possibility of the media contributing to peace processes; and (7) implications of the media adoption of the conflict transformation model.

The premises are that, unlike other violent confrontations, the Middle Eastern conflict is fundamentally cultural, particularly in its Palestinian-Israeli version; that cultural conflicts are "intractable", in the sense that they are very difficult, perhaps impossible to resolve; that reconciliation is not the only possible or desirable outcome of conflict: transformation is another viable option; that mistaken interpretations of conflict-resolution strategies can lead to "crises of expectations" in policy-making, in the media, and in public opinion; and that the media can play important roles in these processes.

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1 Updated version of the author's "Cultural Conflict in the Middle East: The Media as Peacemakers," published in E. Gilboa (ed.), *Media and Conflict: Framing Issues, Making Policy, Shaping Opinions*, Ardsley, NY, Transnational, 2002.

## **1. The Middle East: A case of cultural conflict**

One of the puzzling questions posed by the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is how to understand and explain the contradiction between the peace process based on the now defunct Oslo agreement and the violence that has accompanied it. Good illustrations of this are the surprise expressed over the eruption of the current Intifada in response to what had been seen by many Israelis and their supporters around the world as the generous offers made by Prime Minister Ehud Barak at the Camp David talks in 2000; and the criticism made by many Palestinians and their supporters of the lack of trust demonstrated by the Sharon government, and the excessive violence it has employed in response to Palestinian Authority declarations of readiness to renew talks.

In attempting to explain the contradiction, politicians, scholars and journalists have used a variety of terms and concepts. Arab/Islamic and Israeli/Jewish mentality, conflicting ideologies – nationalism, colonialism/anti-colonialism – and struggles over scarce resources such as land, oil, and water have been unconvincingly invoked as single or major factors. Although admittedly present in the conflict, none of them, neither singly nor in combination, has sufficed to fully explain the conflict's nature, contradictions and implications.

A fuller explanation of the contradiction can be achieved by combining the variables found in the positions of leading anthropologists, political psychologists, historians and others into an integrated cultural approach. Departing from the premise that the Middle Eastern conflict is anchored in profound symbols of the pursuit, formation, and preservation of Israeli and Palestinian collective identities, the present analysis is an effort to achieve the still-needed conceptual and operational application of this approach.

Thus, "essentialism" – the integration of primordial sentiments and inherited symbols of collective consciousness and identity, such as blood, race, language, land, or religion, offered by Clifford Geertz (1973) – can be regarded as a crucial cultural composite element in long-term highly-intensive conflicts. The complex cultural character of such conflicts, particularly in the Middle East, is highlighted by Herbert Kelman's argument that they are more than international or intergovernmental, as they affect the societies involved at the deepest levels of identity and existence. Anthony Smith's (2003) approach to culture as an integrative concept – which combines elements of subjective consciousness with ethnicity, "blood and origin," and long-term cultural characteristics with shorter-term civil and national affinities – offers a third important basis for a cultural approach to the understanding of conflicts and their contradictions. And, Michael Ignatieff (1993) highlights the centrality of identity symbols and traditional cultures in the civic and ethnic nationalism he discovered during his visits to the former Yugoslavia, Germany, the Ukraine, Quebec, Kurdistan, and Northern Ireland in the early 1990s.

## **2. Cultural conflict: Exclusive, deep, long-lasting, total, global**

Israeli-Palestinian relations suggest that cultural conflicts can be characterized by their exclusivity, depth, duration, totality and global nature.

The concept of "Jihad" illustrates the exclusivity of cultural conflict. Benjamin Barber (1992, 1995) has used this concept to describe the re-tribalization of human society, expressed in recent years by the dilution of nation-states, the establishment of new boundaries and the strengthening of specific identities. The Jihad's centrifugal movement has revived forgotten divisions, closed communities, and fundamentalist movements. Its essentialist nature rejects the centripetal character of Barber's second major current: "McWorld," the transnational socio-economic and cultural homogenization, inspired by globalizing markets, technology, and communications, and by a rapid diffusion of Western products. Michael Ignatieff (1993) gives indirect support to this view by making a conceptual distinction between a Jihad-inspired ethnic nationalism built around cultural symbols, and a more liberal and cosmopolitan, McWorldist concept of civic nationalism.

The "Jihadist" nature of cultural conflict is expressed in the total refusal to accept "the other." In cases such as the Middle East, this refusal can serve to culturally and symbolically fuel "highly-escalated conflict." Applied to territory, this is particularly interesting. As a resource or commodity, territory has been the subject of conflict, such as in the most recent Peru-Ecuador war of 1995, which was resolved by diplomatic negotiations and agreements, followed by reconciliation and the reestablishment of full relations. In contrast to such cases, territory in the Middle East represents a *raison d'être* and not just a strategic or economic resource, displaying symbols essential to the formation, existence, and preservation of collective identity. Jerusalem, Galilee, Hebron, Bethlehem, Judea and Samaria, collectively and individually, as well as the tracts of land between them, are exclusive symbols of being Jewish, Moslem, Christian, Palestinian or Israeli. The difficulty in making any compromises on such sentiments is central to the Middle Eastern conflict. Unlike conflicts in which violence and war are political, economic or ideological tools, the essentialist exclusiveness of Jihadist thinking and action fuels the view of war as a manifestation of acceptable primordial

sentiments, in which mutual recognition is almost impossible, suspicion and animosity permeate all spheres of life at all times, and violence is generally legitimized.

The strength of such feelings clarifies the depth of cultural conflict. Depth has to do with roots. The view of the Middle Eastern conflict as a mere national confrontation is artificial, irrelevant, and inadequate. Nationalism, a relatively recent European invention,<sup>1</sup> is capable of explaining cases of war and reconciliation in the context of territorial or economic conflict, but fails to explain the persistence of cultural conflict. Thus, the failure of all ideologies developed in the 19th century, including nationalism, to deal with cultural conflict, triggered a search for alternative, "tighter" frames of collective identity.

The continuity of cultural conflicts differs from the dynamics of conventional belligerence, in which war is an eruption of violence between more or less well-organized armies that interrupts periods of relative or absolute peace. Thus, unlike the Peru-Ecuador and similar conflicts, in cases of cultural conflict violence does not necessarily stop when peace agreements are signed. Israelis and Arabs have fought five conventional wars: in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982. In contrast, however, with the cyclical alternation of war and peace in conventional conflict, hostility has been uninterrupted in the area since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, conducted by official forces, secret services, armed militias, terrorist/guerrilla organizations, and civilians. The "low intensity" and "irregular" categories of war elsewhere have found intense daily expressions in the Middle East: during the 1950s and 1960s they included the activities of Arab "infiltrators," Israeli retaliatory measures, and Israeli-Syrian or Israeli-Egyptian clashes; in the "war of attrition" that followed the 1967 war; in the rise of the PLO in the area, and the attempts made by Israel, Jordan, and others to destabilize the organization since the 1970s; during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in the 1980s and the withdrawal more than a decade later; in the first and second Intifadas; and in the terrorist/guerrilla activities interspersed over the entire period. The pattern has not really changed during the peace process that resulted from the Oslo agreements. Israel and the PLO officially pledged mutual recognition and peaceful relations, but nevertheless violence has continued. In this sense, the cultural conflict approach strongly correlates with models in warfare research, where cultural elements greatly contribute to escalation.

Totality and globality are defined by span and space. Cultural conflict is not confined to official military battle zones, as in conventional war. In the Middle East, this has been demonstrated by Palestinian violence against airline passengers, Olympic athletes, and civilians inside and outside Israel; by the violence of Israeli occupation forces and settlers against Palestinians; by battles between Mosad and Palestinian organizations in which no difference was made between guilty and innocent. For the Israelis, the totality of war has been expressed in acts of terrorism against military personnel and civilians; in the universal long period of obligatory military service for men and women; in the constant state of alert; and in the number and frequency of deaths and injuries. For the Palestinians, the totality of war has been expressed in the infringement of human rights and humiliating contacts with military occupation; in daily physical danger of bodily harm and death; and in violent interventions by Israeli settlers and others. No Palestinian family has been sheltered from this reality.

These characteristics clarify the extent to which conflicts rooted in culture are difficult, perhaps impossible to resolve.

### **3. "End-of-conflict" and reconciliation versus transformation**

Lessons from the Middle East – the Oslo agreements and the second Intifada, for example – allow at least two perceptions of peace processes: the first maintains that peace agreements mean "end-of-conflict" and reconciliation.

The other maintains that negotiations and treaties represent no more than a transformation of the conflict's nature. "End-of-conflict" and reconciliation are concepts applicable to one or more dimensions of conflict – territorial, political, economic, ideological, ethnic, religious. These concepts seem adequate to study conflicts that do not result from the search for identity symbols, and whose solution does not affect essentialist sentiments.

But they do not seem to function in the contradictory coexistence of peace treaties and eruptions of violence which are typical of cultural conflict. Thus, since the mid-1990s, doubt has accompanied the hopes aroused by the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. In doubt was the now irrelevant question of whether the Oslo peace process was irreversible. Indeed, doubts emerged with the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin; with the political downfall of his partners, his party and his peace camp; with the victory of the Israeli right and its anti-Oslo positions in the elections of 1996 and 2001; with the escalating violence employed by Palestinians and Israelis, not always well-conceived, not always proportional, and always condoned by right-wing, left-wing, and national unity governments. On the other hand,

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1 This argument is based on the "modernist"/instrumental" historical approach offered by Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson, and others to the concept of "nation" as a relatively new development in Europe during the late 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, rather than a pattern of social organization developed in the Middle Ages or earlier, as maintained by historians of the "primordialist" school.

hopes about the success of the process have been nurtured by the unprecedented and paradoxical return of large and important tracts of land to the Palestinians by Benjamin Netanyahu's right wing government in 1996-1999; by public expressions supporting the process, including Ehud Barak's election in 1999; and by a more or less viable Israeli-Palestinian coexistence, at least until September 2000. The contradiction of these tendencies has been expressed, first, in the gulf between declarations made by both sides in favor of peace vis-à-vis their radically opposed essentialist positions on the questions of Jerusalem, the settlements, or the Palestinian right of return.

A second expression of the contradiction, particularly since September 2000, has been the continual breaching of cease-fire agreements, mostly by Arafat, but also by Israel.

In order to understand this contradiction, adequate concepts are necessary.

The exclusivity, depth, continuity, totality, and globality of cultural conflict do not allow for viewing peace processes as full or even partial and gradual reconciliation.

This clarifies why the resolution of conflict is so difficult, why cultural wars do not end when the cannons fall silent, and why peace is not secured by the signing of agreements.

#### **4. Conflict transformation**

Another vision is that peace processes in cultural conflicts do not lead to reconciliation but rather to a transformation of the conflict (Burgess et al., 1997; Lederach, 1995; Vayrinen, 1991). The terms "conflict resolution" and "conflict management" serve to clarify this vision. The former implies the possibility and need to end conflict. This implication assumes that conflict is a short-term phenomenon that can be "resolved" permanently. The assumption behind "conflict management" is that conflicts are long-term processes that often cannot be quickly resolved. But the notion of "management" suggests that people in conflict can be guided or controlled. In addition, "management" suggests that the goal is to reduce or control conflict volatility rather than to deal with the real sources of conflict.

"Conflict transformation" does not suggest simply eliminating or containing conflict, but recognizes the complex nature of some conflicts, in which relationships are changed, communication and patterns of social organization are altered, and images of the self and of the other are transformed. Conflict transformation is also a prescriptive concept.

It suggests that while conflict is destructive, it can be transformed, and that self-images, relationships, and social structures can be improved. This involves transforming perceptions of issues, actions, and people or groups. Since conflict usually transforms perceptions by accentuating the differences between people and positions, effective conflict transformation can improve mutual understanding.

Even when interests, values, and needs appear to be irreconcilable, progress can be made if groups engaged in conflict can achieve a fairly accurate understanding of each other. Thus, the presidents, government ministers, politicians, diplomats, and journalists who took part in the celebrations of the Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements were undoubtedly participating in historic events. Together with millions of TV spectators around the globe, they witnessed the end of one era and the beginning of another. However, the optimism of the agreements, and the less euphoric reality of ongoing violence, did not signify conventional post-war peacemaking. They represent, at best, a changing pattern in the relations of long-standing warring parties. Instead of a direct confrontation, this new structure has featured an interaction of two coalitions, new in their transnational orientation, and rare in their intercultural composition.

On one hand, a hitherto impossible "*peace coalition*," made up of the Israeli and Palestinian official positions, and supported by the governments of Jordan, Egypt, North Africa, the Gulf, the United States, Europe, and others, has been making efforts to provide the peace agreements with acceptable and durable contents. On the other hand, an "*alliance of the extremes*," bringing together an unprecedented mix of radical right-wing Jewish Israelis, Islamic fundamentalists, PLO critics, and others, has been directly and indirectly supporting each other, through the use of verbal, diplomatic, and physical violence, to reject any agreement opposed to their essentialist-Jihadist convictions.

#### **5. Peacemaking models and crises of expectations**

The confrontation of the coalitions explains the violence that accompanies the process, shows the resilience of cultural conflicts, even when political agreement is reached, and demonstrates the stable nature of cultural conflicts, even in the context of political treaties between powerful entities.

Mistaken interpretations of conflict can have serious consequences. Viewing the Oslo process as reconciliation ignores the importance of these factors. This and the belief that the process represents the end of the conflict produced the

confusion, frustration and crisis of expectations that have been affecting all involved: right- and left-wing Israelis; settlers, and peaceniks; and Arafat's supporters and opponents among the Palestinians and in the Arab world.

Those who interpreted the spirit of Oslo according to the transformation model and considered the cultural environment and the realistic chances of reducing tension and violence, have lowered their level of expectations, which enabled them to perceive the crisis less radically, and react to violence more rationally.

Moreover, it can be expected that in addition to providing more realistic interpretations of reality, the transformation approach might contribute to the areas of policy-making, crisis management and education, and explain how to relate to the two coalitions, how to deal with the extremes and how to control polarization within the Israeli and Palestinian societies.

## **6. The media in war and peace**

How are the media involved in these processes? What is their share in creating crises of expectations, and how can they contribute to easing them and to promoting realistic peace processes? We now turn to these questions.

International communications in recent decades can be described along two major axes: the first is a modification of media functions; the second is media preference for war and violence rather than peace coverage.

### **Modification of Functions**

The roles of the media in international relations have changed. The traditional tasks of gathering and selecting facts, and of constructing, encoding, and representing realities (Tuchman, 1978; Hall, 1980) have been expanded. Journalists are no longer expected to simply present the news "fairly and without bias in language ... unambiguous, undistorting ..." (Fowler, 1991, 1).

In recent decades, the media have assumed new roles. The 1970s' Kissinger media diplomacy, elaborated in academic detail two decades later (Kissinger, 1995), confirms Abba Eban's (1983) diagnosis of the impact open media diplomacy has had on the collapse of traditional diplomatic reticence. Media organizations and professionals now participate in international relations, both at-large and as catalysts and 'diplomatic brokers' (Larson, 1986; Gilboa, 1998).

As participants-at-large, the media take part in exchanges between journalists, policy-makers, and field staff (Larson, 1988), as illustrated by the TV sets in decision-makers' offices and 'situation rooms'; by briefings in official airplanes or in sealed compounds, such as in Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf War (Andersen, 1991; Servaes, 1991); and by media-monitored 'secret negotiations' such as in Camp David (1979); Dayton, Ohio (1995); Stormont Castle (1997, 1998); and Wye River (1998).

As catalysts, the media provide arenas and resources for international dialogue. They include shuttle diplomacy (Kissinger, 1995); 'tomahawk diplomacy' used in the 1998 Kosovo and Iraq crises (TIME, October 19, 1998); media exchanges (Clinton-Saddam, Rabin/Netanyahu-Arafat/Assad); and media events, such as summit meetings and the signing of peace agreements (Dayan and Katz, 1992; Gilboa, 1998).

As diplomatic brokers, the media conduct and sometimes initiate international mediation, in ways that often blur the distinctions between the roles of reporters and diplomats. This is illustrated by the participation of the media in diplomatic processes, such as Walter Cronkite's claim to having inspired Anwar Sadat's 1977 visit to Jerusalem (Cronkite, 1996; Gilboa, 1998); or ABC's Ted Koppel's live-on-air Jerusalem 'town meeting', conducted during the Intifada in 1988, and featuring unprecedented face-to-face Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (ABC News, 1988); and, by work behind enemy lines, such as CNN's Peter Arnett's reporting from Baghdad during the Gulf War (Arnett, 1991), Christian Ammanpour's in Iraq, during Operation 'Desert Fox' in 1998, and Al Jazeera's coverage of the war in Afghanistan in 2001.

### **Media preference for war and violence**

Professional and historical reasons explain the preference for war as media subject matter and symbolic inspiration. War is more compatible than peace with media professional standards, conventional discourse and economic structures. War provides visuals and images of action. It is associated with heroism and conflict, focuses on the emotional rather than on the rational, and satisfies news-value demands: the present, the unusual, the dramatic, simplicity, action, personalization, and results (Galtung and Ruge, 1970; Bird and Dardenne, 1988). This preference is magnified by the vivid colors, clear-cut polarities, unexpected features, and primordial sentiments typical of cultural conflict; and its variety of images and voices exceeds that of conventional warfare, conveying Aristotle's "pity and fear" at their "best." The typical peace coverage of press conferences, "talking heads" and airport scenes, has much lower news value.

The history of international journalism adds weight to this preference.

Political constraints – mostly the Cold War's – caused the media to adopt the governmental rhetoric of power and violence in their "official discourse." "Peace talk" was labeled "communist" in the 1950s and 1960s, and "challenger discourse" until the late 1980s, with low popularity and entry into the general-audience media (Gamson, 1988; Meyer, 1995). This is also typical of communications research, where revisionist historians have been documenting the claim that the development of media research coincides with research done for official agencies since World War II. The work of some "founding fathers" was sponsored and funded by the Radio Bureau of the Office of War Information, the Information Division of the War Department, the US Air Force, and the CIA (Robinson, 1988, Bruck, 1989, Simpson, 1994).

Although there is no conclusive evidence of a direct and causal relation between warfare and research approaches, one cannot ignore that most of these researchers founded or joined leading communication departments and institutes (Rowland, 1983); that research on the media coverage of Vietnam and the Middle East deals only briefly with peace talks; and that, compared with the multitude of media studies on Middle Eastern wars, there are only few studies of the media in the peace process.

## **7. A new media environment**

The new powers of the media as actors in international processes have made a significant contribution to the crisis of expectations that has typified the peace process in the Middle East. The clarification of this argument calls for a discussion of the media climate since the end of the Cold War.

The features of this new climate – concerted peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts, together with the revival of radical and sometimes violent separatist movements and demands (Ignatieff, 1993; Barber, 1995) – have posed significant normative and practical challenges to the media.

One question is whether the media should use their new powers to promote peace. Conservative objections to a peace-oriented media on the grounds of loss of objectivity can be countered with the argument that the changing functions of the media in international relations are part of an ongoing erosion of mythical "objectivity" and of the acceptance of subjective reality-construction concepts. The question of "whose version of peace should be promoted?" can be answered by demanding that free expression, professional integrity and ethics should be guaranteed, just as in the coverage of conventional crime.

Even considering the differences in the news value of war and peace, professional integrity and ethics demand that, together with legitimate considerations of sales and ratings, the media orient themselves to values that match their critical stand on crime and drugs; and that in accord with the code-of-conduct which calls for media responsiveness to social changes, they should join current peacemaking efforts. Finally, if this position is accepted in general, it should certainly be adopted with regard to cultural conflict, because of both its frightening dimensions and the media potential to help in its transformation. In this sense, the media should be required to produce persuasive symbols of security, alternatives to those of war; to construct credible realities of change in the roles played by arch-enemies, once they become peacemaking partners; and to act as participants, catalysts, and brokers in the psychological adjustment – including in the reduction of dissonance, paranoid feelings, etc. – to the unknown environment created by peace processes, that dramatically differs from a long-term climate of war.

## **8. The media in the Middle Eastern conflict**

Another question is how can and how should the media be involved in the new international climate. The performance of local and foreign media in the Middle Eastern conflict can provide considerable insight into this topic. Since the Oslo process became public, the media have been dealing with the dilemma of how to function in a peacemaking era, and of choosing a model to guide coverage. Two phases are characteristic of this dilemma. In the first, between the mid-1990s and September 2000, the end-of-conflict and reconciliation model inspired coverage. However, like the leaders and politicians who adopted this model, the media had difficulty in explaining the violence which had been accompanying the process from as early as 1996, after which the peace camp began to lose momentum.

In the second phase, starting in September 2000, the media have been forced, together with Israeli and other leaders and in the face of changing public opinion, to abandon the reconciliation model, at least in order to resolve the contradictions between the peace process and the ongoing violence.

### **Preference of the reconciliation model**



Public opinion on the peace process, led by the Oslo negotiators and by the media – at least until September 2000 – has shown a preference for reconciliation, negotiation and mutual concessions. Also the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin served to fortify the consensus around the Oslo agreements (Wolfsfeld, forthcoming).

On the other hand, there are serious doubts about the belief, cherished by the Israeli right wing, that the open and full media mobilization behind the Oslo agreements resulted in a brainwashing process in which public opinion was captured. Wolfsfeld's contention that many critical positions were expressed by and in the media indeed reduces the validity of this argument. Nevertheless, it is equally acceptable to claim that the professional style and the general direction of the world's media coverage contributed directly and indirectly to the creation of a favorable public climate toward the Oslo process. This has been expressed, for example, in the wide coverage and in the tone of wondering admiration attached by the media to the main actors in the process, to the signing of the agreements, and to events such as the awarding of the Nobel Prize for Peace to Arafat, Peres and Rabin. Some additional findings provide good illustrations of the formation of this sympathetic climate. Wolfsfeld finds that the public and political environments and social consensual expectations have influenced the positions taken by the media, particularly the overall optimistic tone that has obscured imminent dangers. Other studies (Dente Ross, 2002; Mandelzis, 2002) point to the favorable discourse and framing of the Oslo process in the international press and the legitimacy given by the Israeli media to the parties in the process, particularly Yasser Arafat and his PLO movement. This is rather surprising, since it contradicts the traditional preference of the media for the action and drama of war and violence.

Background factors and professional reasons can provide at least some clarification. Background factors include the emotional openness of the public towards peace; the symbiotic relations between the media and governments; and inferences from earlier peace processes.

- Emotional Openness of the Public: When the Oslo negotiations became public, a climate developed characterized by emotional openness and psychological readiness to see the agreements in terms of reconciliation, particularly among the agreements' supporters. In this sense, it is interesting to note that the Israeli extreme right was more realistic than the left and than the media, with its reservations against interpreting Oslo in terms of reconciliation. Right-wing activists and parties have supported and promoted the notion that the conflict has deep cultural roots. Even those who reject their radical conclusions have to respond to the accuracy of this diagnosis.
- Media-Government Symbiotic Relations: The tendency of the media to adopt official views in return for an open flow of information is well known. In the wake of the Cold War, particularly after Oslo, the Israeli and international media could not afford to ignore the manifestations of governmental and public opinion supporting the peace process.
- Inferences from earlier peace processes: The peace processes with Egypt and Jordan gave the media and the public an idea of what peace should be. The inferences from these agreements to the Palestinian case seemed even more plausible with the recognition by the media that even though the former agreements have not developed into full normal relations, they have included gestures of reconciliation on the part of Anwar Sadat, King Hussein, Menahem Begin, and Yitzhak Rabin; and an "acceptable" amount of violence.

Professional reasons derive from the paradox that reconciliation has news value, particularly against a background of violence. A good example is the ample coverage given to King Hussein's visit to the Israeli town of Beth Shemesh in 1994 and the humble and conciliatory stance he took in apologizing to the families of young women killed by a Jordanian soldier in a border incident.

Thus the media could not ignore the developing climate in favor of reconciliation. The professional factors related to this dynamics include some aspects of news value: polarization and contrast; and media events.

- Polarization and contrast increase the news value of an item. In the reconciliation model, these practices seem to convert the coverage of violence into the exception that proves the rule. Examples include the massacre committed by Baruch Goldstein in Hebron's Cave of the Patriarchs in 1994; the violence which accompanied the opening of the Wailing Wall tunnel in 1996, and even the first stages of the Intifada. These were covered by the media in an alternating style, in which stories of violence were contrasted with coverage of the ongoing peace process, a factor that enhanced the news value of both types of stories.
- Media Events: Dayan and Katz's media events theory (1985, 1992) illustrates the emphasis on reconciliation in peace coverage. The perception of newsworthy reconciliation is evident in various types of media events coverage: The signing of peace agreements, in pre-planned highly performative and widely-covered rituals of new or renewed friendship, can be identified as "coronation events": "ceremonial parades ... ritual transformation of the hero from one status to the next ..." (Katz and Dayan, 1985, 306).

Also a tone of reconciliation, accompanied by high news value, is present in "conquest events," where a "hero – facing insuperable odds – enters the enemy camp ..." (Katz and Dayan, 1985, 306), as in Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.

Examples of this type of matching between reconciliation and news value in the Middle East include the official and unofficial visits of Egyptian, Jordanian, Palestinian and Israeli officials to each others' cities and sites during negotiations; the presence of Arab leaders at Yitzhak Rabin's funeral; Arafat's visit of condolence to Lea Rabin; the participation of Israeli leaders in King Hussein's funeral, etc.

The coverage of "contest events," "rule-governed battles of champions in sports and politics, such as the World Cup or presidential debates ..." (Dayan and Katz, 1992, 26), in terms of reconciliation, also enjoys added news-value.

This was demonstrated by Netanyahu's highly-promoted negotiation discourse ("if they give [security] they get [land]; if they don't give, they don't get"); or by the already famous scene in which Ehud Barak and Arafat play the role of gentlemen jostling each other at the entrance of the White House, in the best tradition of slapstick comedy.

### Abandoning the reconciliation model

It is not surprising that the escalation of violence in the fall of 2000 did not support theories of reconciliation. Ehud Barak's spectacular defeat in the Israeli election of 2001 provides irrefutable evidence to that effect. The media, local, regional, and international alike, discontinued the promotion of such perceptions. They did not go all the way, however. Abandoning the reconciliation model did not mean adopting the conflict transformation model, because of the conflict's cultural nature.

Thus, since late 2000 most explanations given by the media about changes in Palestinian-Israeli relations have dealt with the failure to reconcile rather than with the deeper roots of the conflict. Media coverage of Israeli and Palestinian violence has focused on the vanished dream of ending the conflict rather than on its complex cultural nature and context. Here too, studies such as Wolfsfeld's (forthcoming) and Dor's (2003) confirm that the reasons are linked with the contradictory nature of the professional requirements of news value and efficiency, in the adoption and abandonment of the reconciliation model on one hand, and in the conflict transformation model on the other.

- *Results:* The adoption of the reconciliation model by the media created "end-of-conflict expectations." Abandoning the model made the media emphasize the escalation of violence.

These are clear and striking results. In contrast, the open-endedness of the transformation model does not allow for a decisive presentation of results, a fact that imposes additional work on media professionals, reduces interest and produces lower news value.

- *Complexity:* The transformation model demands the media to present, and audiences to understand, complex processes, whereas both the media adoption and abandonment of the reconciliation model focus on simple events which increase production efficiency and have higher news value.
- *Historical Duration:* The transformation model requires the media to describe (and audiences to perceive) the long course of events. Also historical insight must be provided and understood. This requires more work and reduces news value. In contrast, the adoption and abandonment of the reconciliation model emphasizes the present, demands less effort on the part of the media and their audiences and has higher news value.
- *Rationality:* As it emphasizes logic and rationality, the transformation model requires the investment of more effort by the media and by audiences.

The adoption and abandonment of the reconciliation model involves emotional factors which have higher news value and are less labor-consuming in media production and consumption alike.

- *Personalization and Concretization:* The transformation model focuses on collective values and abstract symbols, while the adoption and abandonment of the reconciliation model involves relations between people and concrete entities. The latter is clearly less labor-intensive and has higher news value.

The characteristics of the transformation model with regard to these news value criteria are considered less attractive by media producers and consumers, at least compared with the reconciliation model.

## 9. Discussion

At least until September 2000, the media did not show much interest in the cultural nature of the conflict. Inspired by professional norms of efficiency and news value, the media preferred to emphasize the openness of public opinion to

reconciliation, positive governmental attitudes in this direction, and historical deductions from previous peace processes. Two major professional strategies were used in this context: the first was polarization and contrast, focusing on reconciliation against the background of the violence that has preceded and accompanied the peace process. The second was the coverage of media events related to reconciliation.

By using these practices, the media have contributed to the arousal of hope before and disappointment of expectations after the failure of the process. The Intifada forced the media to abandon the discourse of reconciliation. Frustrated by the collapse of the process, along with the majority of the public, the media returned to focusing on the escalating violence rather than on the deep cultural aspects of the conflict.

The conclusion is that the media must take the crucial and necessary step in full: to internalize the cultural meanings of the conflict; to transmit these meanings to the public, in order to raise the consciousness of their significance and consequences; and to encourage public debate, first on peacemaking under constraining cultural conditions; and secondly, on the choice between an interminable violent feud and a great but acceptable burden imposed by the transformation of conflict.

Adopting this strategy can pose a dilemma, calling upon the media to make a choice between the ideology of contributing to peacemaking and the professional demands of efficiency and news value. Confronting this dilemma might help the media deal with the idiosyncrasies of the transformation model and with the professionally uncomfortable dimensions of cultural conflict coverage. The satisfaction of these demands is difficult, because it means departing from current norms and standards. But this is the real test of an ethics and morality that goes beyond the technical levels of media professionalism.

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*Lea Mandelzis*

## **Veränderungen des Feindbildes im Nachrichtendiskurs israelischer Zeitungen, 1993-1994**

Geht man davon aus, dass Mediendarstellungen eng mit der öffentlichen Meinung und den Grundlinien der Politik zusammenhängen, so sind sie in Übergangsperioden, während derer Menschen am empfänglichsten für Veränderungen sind, von besonderer Bedeutung. Die Oslo-Abkommen von 1993 markierten eine radikale Veränderung in der israelischen Politik. Die gegenseitige Anerkennung Israels und der Palästinensischen Befreiungsfront (PLO) und der Händedruck zwischen Premierminister Rabin und dem Vorsitzenden Arafat auf dem Rasen des Weißen Hauses im September 1993 stellten dramatische und revolutionäre Schritte dar. Sie spiegelten Veränderungen in der Haltung der israelischen Regierung und der israelischen Medien gegenüber der arabischen Welt im Allgemeinen und den Palästinensern im Besonderen wider.

Die vorliegende Studie untersucht Veränderungen, die sich im Nachrichtendiskurs zweier führender Zeitungen abzeichneten, während sich die israelische Gesellschaft von einer Kriegskultur abwandte und stattdessen eine Friedensvision entwickelte. Sie konzentriert sich auf Stereotype und Mythen bezüglich des erklärten Feindes des Staates Israel, nämlich Yasser Arafat und die PLO.

Die Untersuchungsstichprobe wurde nach dem Zufallsprinzip aus zwei aufeinanderfolgenden Zeitspannen ausgewählt, die durch die Unterzeichnung der Oslo-Abkommen - einem Wende- und Höhepunkt im Übergang vom Krieg zum Frieden - voneinander getrennt sind. Insgesamt wurden 1186 Zeitungsartikel, die auf den ersten beiden Seiten von *Ha'aretz*, einer qualitativ hochwertigen Zeitung, und *Yedioth Achronoth*, einer populäreren Publikation, erschienen waren, inhaltsanalytisch ausgewertet. Die ausgewählten Artikel bezogen sich auf Sicherheit, Frieden und Politik.

Die Prä-Oslo-Periode wurde definiert vom 20. Januar 1993 bis zum 26. August 1993; die Post-Oslo-Periode vom 3. September 1993 bis zum 31. Oktober 1994, als der Friedensvertrag zwischen Israel und Jordanien unterzeichnet wurde. Das wichtigste Thema oder der wichtigste Akteur im Zeitungsartikel wurde als "primär" definiert. Das zweitwichtigste Thema oder der zweitwichtigste Akteur im Text selbst wurde als "sekundär" definiert. Quantitative Untersuchungsmethoden wurden durch qualitative Daten ergänzt, d.h. durch ausgewählte Zitate aus den Zeitungsartikeln und Interviews mit Schlüsselfiguren der israelischen Politik.

Die Ergebnisse zeigen, wie Elemente der "Wirklichkeit" in den Nachrichtendiskurs implementiert werden. Während beider Zeitperioden reproduzierten und legitimierten die Zeitungen die je unterschiedlichen politischen Haltungen. Ein Vergleich zwischen der Darstellung von Sicherheit, Frieden und politischen Themen und Akteuren in beiden Perioden zeigt, dass die Routine-Nachrichtenstrategie darin bestand, die offizielle Politik und deren Stellungnahmen zu betonen.

Volltext (in Englisch)

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### **The changing image of the enemy in the news discourse of Israeli newspapers, 1993-1994**

Given that media representations are closely linked to public opinion and political policy, they are especially important during transitional periods, when people are most open to change (Dennis, 1991). The 1993 Oslo accords marked a radical change in Israeli politics. The mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the handshake on the White House lawn between Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat on September 1993 were dramatic and revolutionary steps. They reflected shifts in the attitudes of the Israeli government and media towards the Arab world in general and the Palestinians in particular.

This study examines changes that occurred within the news discourse of two leading newspapers as Israeli society evolved from a war culture towards a vision of peace. It focuses on stereotypes and myths relating to the perceived enemy of the State of Israel, namely Yasser Arafat and the PLO.

A sample was selected on a weekly random basis over two consecutive periods, separated by the signing of the Oslo accords, which marked a "transitory" breakpoint. (Azar and Cohen, 1979:159), i.e., a turning point and apex in a transformation from war to peace. Discourse content analysis was applied to 1186 news articles published on the first two pages of *Ha'aretz*, a quality newspaper, and *Yedioth Ahronoth*, a more popular publication. The chosen news articles related to security, peace and politics.

The pre-Oslo period was defined as lasting from 20 January 1993 to 26 August 1993; the post-Oslo period, from 3 September 1993 to 31 October 1994, when the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan was signed. The most prominent topic or actor in the news article was defined as 'primary'. The second most prominent topic or actor in the text was defined as 'secondary'. Quantitative research methods were complemented by qualitative data, i.e., selected quotations from news articles and interviews with key Israeli policymakers.

The findings show how mass communications introduce 'reality' elements into news discourse. It can be argued that the newspapers faithfully reproduced and legitimated different political attitudes during each period. Comparisons among the representation of security, peace and politics topics and actors in each period show that the routine news strategy was to highlight official policies and their assertions.

[full text \(in English\)](#)

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*Kurzfassung:* Geht man davon aus, dass Mediendarstellungen eng mit der öffentlichen Meinung und den Grundlinien der Politik zusammenhängen, so sind sie in Übergangsperioden, während derer Menschen am empfänglichsten für Veränderungen sind, von besonderer Bedeutung. Die Oslo-Abkommen von 1993 markierten eine radikale Veränderung in der israelischen Politik. Die gegenseitige Anerkennung Israels und der Palästinensischen Befreiungsfront (PLO) und der Händedruck zwischen Premierminister Rabin und dem Vorsitzenden Arafat auf dem Rasen des Weißen Hauses im September 1993 stellten dramatische und revolutionäre Schritte dar. Sie spiegelten Veränderungen in der Haltung der israelischen Regierung und der israelischen Medien gegenüber der arabischen Welt im Allgemeinen und den Palästinensern im Besonderen wider.

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*Abstract:* Given that media representations are closely linked to public opinion and political policy, they are especially important during transitional periods, when people are most open to change (Dennis, 1991). The 1993 Oslo accords marked a radical change in Israeli politics. The mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the handshake on the White House lawn between Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat on September 1993 were dramatic and revolutionary steps. They reflected shifts in the attitudes of the Israeli government and media towards the Arab world in general and the Palestinians in particular.

This study examines changes that occurred within the news discourse of two leading newspapers as Israeli society evolved from a war culture towards a vision of peace. It focuses on stereotypes and myths relating to the perceived enemy of the State of Israel, namely Yasser Arafat and the PLO.

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The findings show how mass communications introduce 'reality' elements into news discourse. It can be argued that the newspapers faithfully reproduced and legitimated different political attitudes during each period. Comparisons among the representation of security, peace and politics topics and actors in each period show that the routine news strategy was to highlight official policies and their assertions.

## 1. Images, myths and media

Theorists writing about images, myths and stereotypes are inclined to focus on pre-existing, value-laden groups of ideas derived from culture and transmitted by communication. Kuhn (1996) discusses how elements of images and representations produce meanings within social and historical contexts which are disseminated by mass communication through narratives and myths (Nossek, 1994). Roach (1993) explains that images and myths sustain beliefs that justify war-making and the need to view the 'other' as an enemy. Geertz (1977) adds that as symbolic systems, myths and news act both as models of culture and as models for culture.

Barthes (1993) holds that meanings are produced through the codes at work in representations, and that while meanings might appear to be natural, they are, in fact, produced: they are constructed through identifiable processes of signification in all representations.

O'Sullivan et al. (1994) define the role of myth as a guide for understanding, expressing and communicating self-identity in a specific culture. They argue that in anthropological ritual, a myth is an "anonymously composed narrative that offers explanations of why the world is as it is." News, like myths, provides a way for people to create order out of disorder and transforms knowledge and familiarity into shared communal experiences (Bird and Dardenne, 1988). Ultimately, the relationship between the information function of the news text and the meanings of context often convey opinions drawn from myths and images in the culture of the political and ideological discourse-makers and the audience (Barthes, 1993).

Furthermore, journalism has a strong bias towards elites, both as sources of information and as subjects to cover (Galtung 1996). News discourse is based not merely on facts, but also on information that is invariably interpreted in a subjective way. Bernstein (2002) explains that the media use stereotypes in order to represent reality. "Stereotyping is an ideological process that works to the advantage of the powerful groups in society" (Bernstein, 2002:266).

Bird and Dardenne (1988) propose that news stories, like myths, do not "tell it like it is," but rather "tell it like it means" (Bird and Dardenne, 1988:71). Jalbert (1983) also argues that ideology is a routine feature of the social production of news articles that are compatible with political and economic interests. Dennis (1991) maintains that since the press is closely connected with the state structure, the media – despite their presumed adversarial role – are largely sympathetic to government policies, especially in foreign policy.

## 2. The significance of myths and stereotypes in Israel

Since the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has served as an enduring source of political and ideological discourses influencing personal identity, collective memory, social beliefs, myths and language (Bar-Tal, 1995). In contemporary Israel, where war and terrorism constitute daily reality, the shared rhetoric is that of a nation under threat (Arian, 1995). Conflicts with Arabs and Palestinians, in particular, are routinely stereotyped by images and myths which are widely supported by the public, media and political leaders. These incorporate concepts inspired by biblical quotations such as 'a nation which shall dwell alone' and 'the whole world is against us'.

The personification of the contemporary enemies of the Jewish people draws on past tradition. Examples include: Titus, the Roman emperor whose army destroyed the second Jewish Temple in AD 70; Haman, the advisor to King Ahasuerus of Persia in the fifth century BC; and Adolf Hitler, who destroyed half of European Jewry in the Second World War. These images are frequently combined to emphasize the links between the Jewish past and present.

Prior to the Oslo peace process, the Israeli media displayed only a crude understanding of Arafat, the PLO and the Palestinians. Indeed, images of Arafat and the PLO in the Israeli media (see below) were typical of the rigid thinking that characterizes conflict situations. Elizur (1993) defines a stereotype as an image whose affective or emotional content does not change even when it can be demonstrated that its cognitive content is inaccurate. She argues that when political leaders use stereotypes, they reinforce concepts and distort reality.

Denial of the opponent's rights, demonization of intentions, condemnation of actions and emphasis on the threat posed all undermine the legitimacy of the opponent. Dehumanization also serves to justify hostile acts, since the enemy is cast "into extremely negative social categories which are excluded from human groups within the limits of acceptable norms and values" (Bar-Tal, 1989:170). This creates a vicious circle where perceptions are so distorted that opportunities for conflict resolution may be missed.

Nossek (1994) argues that the Israeli press used the Holocaust to magnify the significance of the Palestinian threat. This reinforced the psychological need for consensus and the ethos of national security. Representation of this ethos became a dominant cultural process in forging Israeli collective identity. According to Arian (1995), Israeli leaders sought to promote the idea of Israel as a nation-state under threat. The motif of the Holocaust continued to play a central role in

the conceptions and rhetoric of political leaders, especially those of right-wing Likud governments. On the other hand, the existence of the State of Israel enabled its Jewish citizens to feel relatively safe in their own nation-state.

### 3. Perceptions of Arafat and the PLO in Israel

For most of the first twenty-five years of Israeli history, official rhetoric portrayed Palestinians as Arabs lacking any distinct national identity. This attitude was reinforced by a statement attributed to former Israeli prime minister Golda Meir in 1969: "There has never been a Palestinian nation" (Rolef, 1997). For almost three decades following the establishment of the PLO in 1968 (Bechor, 1995), Israeli propaganda depicted it as a terrorist organization whose *raison d'être* was to establish a Palestinian state including the whole area of Palestine (Dennis, 1991), including the territory of the State of Israel.

Generations of conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors, together with Palestinian demands for the destruction of the State of Israel, generated hatred and fear which, in turn, influenced Israeli attitudes towards Arafat and the PLO. Arafat was represented as a bloodthirsty terrorist intent on destroying Israel and the Jewish nation. Rubinstein (1995) relates that outside the Middle East Arafat was called the head of the Palestinian guerrilla organization, while Israelis described him as the head of the PLO terrorist organization.

Jalbert (1983) writes that for years Palestinians were referred to by Israelis as 'terrorists'. A distinction was initially made between the PLO led by Arafat and the Palestinian people. But since the 1982 Lebanon War, when it became clear that the majority of Palestinians regarded the PLO as their sole representative (Hiro, 1996), the category 'terrorist' was routinely applied to all Palestinians by the Israeli media.

The use of stereotypes to promote social solidarity (Abercrombie et al., 1994) through news discourse, according to structural linguists (Levi-Strauss, 1995), creates images intended to appeal to audiences rather than to reproduce reality. To Jews in Israel, Arafat was a demon in their modern mythology and a perpetrator of terror. Successive Israeli governments referred to Arafat and the PLO as terrorists and murderers, while depicting Israeli citizens as victims. Prime Minister Begin (1977-1983) referred to Arafat as "Hitler in his lair" (Corbin, 1994:15). The attitudes of both Labor and Likud governments were illustrated by former prime minister Yitzhak Shamir when he affirmed his refusal to deal with the terrorist PLO, who wanted only to destroy Israel and the Jewish people.

One common denominator which until the signing of the Oslo accords characterized all Israeli prime ministers, from Golda Meir to Yitzhak Rabin, was hatred of Arafat and his policies. It is hard to describe the extent to which even "the hairs on his face," in the words of Prime Minister Menachem Begin, were the subject of worldwide derision (Rubinstein, 1995:29).

Loathing of Arafat was thereby combined with sweeping generalizations, traditional fears and Holocaust-related anxieties. He was referred to as "the Nazi in the Bunker," and "the beast on two legs" (Barnea, 2002). He was generally depicted as wearing a military uniform and carrying a revolver, with a *keffiyah* (headress) arranged in the shape of the map of Palestine.

From the early 1980s on, a few Israeli peace activists, such as members of the Communist Party and a handful of academics, started to meet with PLO members and Arafat clandestinely, in Europe as well as locally. In his own account of clandestine meetings with PLO activists, the editor of the left-wing weekly *Haolam Hazeh*, Uri Avnery MK, attests to the value of these initial encounters:

"Political decisions are made by people. People's actions are shaped by their perceptions. Mere politicians do not understand the underlying psychological realities of the world in which they move. Our job is to change these realities on both sides in order to change the course of events from war to peace" (Avnery, 1986: 334).

Such contacts, however, were extremely rare prior to the period of the Intifada (the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip between 1987-1991). Indeed, it was not until 1986 that the Israeli government regarded it as necessary to explicitly prohibit meetings with the PLO by legislating the Order for the Prevention of Terror (Rolef, 1997).

In his memoirs, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) (1994), the second most important PLO official, provides details of secret contacts between Israeli government officials and the outlawed PLO. During the Likud government, PLO officials and Likud politicians met in Europe in December 1991; and during the Labor government, PLO leaders met with a senior Labor Party activist in late October. Bechor (1995) also documents meetings between Israeli and PLO activists.

The Intifada led to a new era of diplomatic relations between Israel, the Palestinians and some neighboring Arab countries. These developments emerged as a result of the 1991 Madrid conference, at which Israeli and Palestinian delegations met for the first time to discuss peace talks.

The delegation of local Palestinian leaders from the West Bank was defined by the Israeli government and media as the 'alternative leadership'. Israel thereby hoped to establish an alternative Palestinian leadership to replace the exiled Arafat and the PLO as their representative (Bregman and El-Tahri, 1998). These developments also paved the way to the Oslo peace process and the 1994 peace treaty with Jordan (Shamir and Shamir, 1993).

Dehumanization of the enemy on the battlefield always serves an essential psychological function, but in times of peace, this function changes. Before the Oslo peace process, Arafat had personified the enemy and the Palestinian problem. After Oslo, the emphasis changed from the identification of the Palestinian problem to efforts to bring about reconciliation and peace negotiations.

The mutual recognition between PLO and the government of Israel on 13 September 1993 was supported by most of the world and challenged, in a way, the myth of the Jews as a 'nation that shall dwell alone'. Israeli media discourse reflected the public jubilation and a sense of victory. Newspapers, in particular, were subsequently full of peace ideology and portrayed the former enemy as a friend. The image of Arafat presented in the post-Oslo media gave the impression that terror was now a thing of the past. From then on, Arafat was the chairman of the PLO and the leader of the Palestinian people, the partner for peace. An opinion poll conducted by Gallup Israel in December 1996 revealed the transformation of Arafat's image when he was selected as the favorite character on the *Hartuzim* (satirical puppet show) on Israel Channel 2 (Barnea, 2002).

Ezrachi (2002) argues that the representation of Arafat as either a satanic figure or as a partner in peace was a response to strong emotional needs. The changing image of the enemy in the news texts over time corresponded to the political changes that took place post-Oslo. Therefore, it is important to characterize the Israeli government and the press relations prior to the analyzed results.

#### **4. The Israeli government and the press**

The intense political partisanship that characterized the Israeli media, due mostly to security considerations, shaped the relationship between the government and the news media. During the period under review, most legal restrictions on the dissemination of information were neutralized by contentious security concerns which marked the boundaries of the ongoing political process in Israel, a relatively small country in size and population. These factors created symbiotic relationships between media and politics. The effects of political culture on the construction of media frames in a democratic state flowed two ways: politicians needed media channels in order to reach audiences and solicit support. In turn, the media looked to political institutions as key sources of information of public interest.

The day-to-day performance of the press was affected by the legal framework – a combination of laws derived from British mandatory powers, yet influenced by a liberal tradition and aware of the requirements of security – which marked the boundaries of the relationship. The Israeli press was committed to the preservation and defense of the state and subject to the conflicting demands of an intensely politicized situation. This commitment created a special relationship between government and media; although information was frequently 'leaked' to the media, a strict form of self-censorship was practiced.

Wolfsfeld (1997) argues that journalists inevitably interpret the world from a national, or even nationalistic, perspective, especially when they cover conflicts involving their own country. On the other hand, political opponents' information and access to the media depend mostly on their ability to ensure that events provide a good narrative. Consequently, political conflict affects the struggle for access to the media and the control of meaning.

Mobility between media and politics in Israel has implications for journalists and politicians in terms of informal relationships and patterns of information, and many political personalities have worked with the media. The founder of modern Zionism, Theodor Herzl, was a foreign correspondent for the Austrian *Neue Freie Presse* in Paris, Berl Katzenelson, one of the leaders of the Israeli Labor Party, was the editor of a daily newspaper, *Davar*. Many MKs, such as Yossi Beilin, held important positions in the media before entering politics. The existence of such relations apparently supports the conception that perceives the media as an integral part of the socio-political system and the establishment that heads it, a kind of bond between elites.

Furthermore, many political figures have engaged journalists as advisors or spokespersons who effectively served the organization by framing the information disseminated to the public. In addition, the military censor imposed security censorship on the media. These factors together created a degree of control over the media which was contrary to the social responsibility model of communication, freedom of expression and the public right to know. The best example of this was the ability of the Rabin government to keep the secret channels of communication during the Oslo process hidden from the media by maintaining complete control over events and then controlling the flow of information in the first week after the story broke.

It has been argued that a better educated citizenry, new communication technologies and gradual reduction of national security tensions all increased the pressure on the authorities to reduce control and censorship. The media therefore became more open, and greater freedom of expression was evident, particularly among the print media.

Israel is a pluralistic society with a hegemonic culture and many sub-cultures. In the 1990s, it was still devoted to the concept of building the State of Israel on the basis of a pervasive approach that led to Jewish domination of most aspects of Israeli society.

Although Israel is a democratic state which upholds the tradition of freedom of the press in practice, the media has always worked under war conditions which were inductive to self-censorship. According to Geertz (1977:244), despite its Western orientation, Israel exhibited many features typical of developments in the cultural processes of the Third World – collective integration, cultural renaissance, and socio-economic change, “an interplay between institutional change and cultural reconstruction.” He argues that such a process can be characterized as a series of simultaneous, multi-dimensional interactions between internal and external forces, from which various results may emerge with different patterns, rates, and rhythms (Geertz, 1977).

## 6. Research findings on changing images

During the pre-Oslo period, Arafat and the PLO were virtually ignored in news articles (in the course of 255 days, they were mentioned only 5 times in *Yedioth* and 7 times in *Ha'aretz*). The political de-legitimization of the enemy by the 1986 ban on contacts with PLO members was upheld by media discourse. Arafat and the PLO were de-legitimized in news discourse, which treated them as a non-issue. In the nine pre-Oslo months, Arafat and the PLO barely figured in either newspaper. As primary actors, they appeared in 6.8% of news articles in *Yedioth* and 8.1% in *Ha'aretz* (see Table 1). As secondary actors, they appeared in 9.4% of news articles in *Yedioth* and 5.8% in *Ha'aretz* (see Table 2, p. 6).

Categories	<i>Yedioth Ahronoth</i>		<i>Ha'aretz</i>	
	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo
	N = 73	N = 284	N = 148	N = 431
Arafat & the PLO	6.8%	40.1%	8.1%	29.5%
Local Palestinian leadership	15.1%	2.8%	16.2%	4.2%
Others*	78.1%	57.1%	74.7%	66.3%
Total relative change	20%	80%	26%	74%

\* This includes neighboring Arab states, the Gulf states and other Muslim countries, the US, European countries, the United Nations, Hamas and Hizbollah, and the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza.

Table 1: Representation of Primary Foreign Actors in News Articles Relating to Security, Peace and Politics during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

The total frequencies of the perceived enemy (Arafat, the PLO, the local Palestinian leadership) were represented pre-Oslo by 21.9% of foreign actors in news articles in *Yedioth* and 24.3% in *Ha'aretz*. It is also noteworthy that the local Palestinian leadership, which participated in bilateral talks with Israel, was represented twice as often as Arafat and the PLO (defined as enemies) (6.8% in *Ha'aretz* and 8.1% in *Yedioth*) in both newspapers during the pre-Oslo period (see Table 1).

In order to show the dichotomy in the news discourse representation between the legitimate Palestinian local leadership and the de-legitimized PLO leadership headed by Arafat in Tunis, I separated them from Table 1. Tables 3 and 4 show the breakdown within the category of Palestinian actors between the different Palestinian representatives and the changes in the political and ideological news discourses between the pre- and post-Oslo periods. These tables show the different frequencies with which Arafat and the PLO were mentioned in news articles, either as primary or secondary actors. The Palestinian delegation that negotiated with the Israelis in Washington pre-Oslo evidently became irrelevant post-Oslo, and almost disappeared from the news.

Categories	<i>Yedioth Ahronoth</i>		<i>Ha'aretz</i>	
	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo
	N =32	N=142	N=69	N=231
Arafat & PLO	9.4%	28.9%	5.8%	21.6%
Local Palestinian leadership	12.5%	4.2%	17.4%	4.3%
Others*	79.1%	66.9%	76.8%	76.1%
Total relative change	18%	82%	23%	77%

\* This includes neighboring Arab states, the Gulf states and other Muslim countries, the US, European countries, the United Nations, Hamas and Hizbollah, and the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza.

Table 2: Representation of Secondary Foreign Actors in News Articles relating to Security, Peace and Politics during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

Categories	<i>Yedioth Ahronoth</i>				<i>Ha'aretz</i>			
	Pre-Oslo		Post-Oslo		Pre-Oslo		Post-Oslo	
	N=12	100%	N=104	100%	N=23	100%	N=114	100%
Arafat	3	25%	78	75%	7	30.4%	79	69.3%
PLO	2	16.7%	25	24%	5	21.7%	31	27.2%
Local Palestinian leadership	7	58.3%	1	1%	11	47.9%	4	3.5%

Table 3: Representation of the Primary Palestinian Representatives (Foreign Actors) in News Articles relating to Security, Peace and Politics during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

Table 3 shows the significant transformation of actors (the enemy) in the news discourse; from de-legitimization (i.e., perceived as almost a non-issue) to dominant actors. During almost nine months prior to the signing of the Oslo accords, Arafat appeared in only 3 news articles in *Yedioth* (25%) and the PLO (16.7%), with 2 references as primary actors. In *Ha'aretz*, Arafat was covered by (30.4%) in 7 news articles, while the PLO had 21.7% (2 references). During this period, the local Palestinian leadership figured in 58% (7 references) in *Yedioth* and 47.9% (11 news articles) in *Ha'aretz*.

Post-Oslo, Arafat's frequencies immediately rose to the very high level of 75% (78 news articles); the PLO rose to 24% (25 news articles); together they were represented with a total of 99% of news articles in *Yedioth*. In *Ha'aretz*, Arafat was represented with 69.3% (79 news articles) and the PLO with 27.2% (31 news articles). Together they totaled 97.5%. In contrast, the local Palestinian leadership vanished from the news, figuring in just 1% of the news in *Yedioth* and 3.5 % in *Ha'aretz*. This is indicative of the fact that the media legitimized Arafat as the Palestinian representative and recognized him as a partner for peace, while automatically ignoring the local Palestinian leadership.

Clearly, both newspapers displayed the same attitude towards the Palestinian actors: the dramatic increase in representation is demonstrated by the role Arafat played as the PLO leader and representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO, although represented more often post-Oslo, appeared in the news media less often than Arafat, both pre- and post-Oslo.

Arafat was clearly perceived in the news discourse as the leader of the PLO during the two periods. The local Palestinian leadership, which received much coverage pre-Oslo, was represented post-Oslo by an "eloquent absence, their silence; or refracted through the glance or the gaze of others" (Hall, 1986:9).

In sum, analysis of data pertaining to *Ha'aretz* and *Yedioth* demonstrates the same policy towards Arafat as leader of the PLO and the Palestinian nation pre- and post-Oslo. The local Palestinian leadership, represented as partners in 'peace talks' pre-Oslo, became marginal post-Oslo, while Arafat and the PLO became the representatives of the Palestinian nation and legitimized partners for peace.

The news 'reality' that validated the change in Israeli government policy towards Arafat, the PLO and the local Palestinian leadership is illustrated in the tables below.

Categories	<i>Yedioth Ahronoth</i>				<i>Ha'aretz</i>			
	Pre-Oslo		Post-Oslo		Pre-Oslo		Post-Oslo	
	N=5	100%	N=39	100%	N=10	100%	N=48	100%
Arafat	1	20%	16	41%	1	10%	13	34.2%
PLO	2	40%	21	53.8%	3	30%	24	63.2%
Local Palestinian leadership	2	40%	2	5.1%	6	60%	11	2.6%

Table 4: Representation of the Secondary Palestinian Representatives (Foreign Actor) in News Articles relating to Security, Peace and Politics during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

Table 4 shows the representation of secondary references to Palestinians in the news pre- and post-Oslo. The tendency in both newspapers was evidently similar to those illustrated in Table 3. As expected, during the pre-Oslo period *Ha'aretz* granted significant representation to the local Palestinian leadership (60%), Arafat was represented in 10% of news articles, and the PLO in 30%. This conformed to the agenda of the Israeli government, which de-legitimized Arafat and the PLO in the pre-Oslo period. *Yedioth*, a populist newspaper, said less than *Ha'aretz* about the local Palestinian leadership, who were represented by 40% (2 news articles), the PLO (also 40%, 2 news articles) and Arafat (only 20%, 1 news article).

However, both newspapers dramatically increased their representation of the PLO and Arafat in the news discourse post-Oslo, thereby granting Arafat and the PLO a new status as legitimized political partners for peace. Shimon Peres (interviewed on 3 May 2002) pointed out that, "for the first time, Arafat recognized worldwide the right of Israel to exist in peace and security according to UN resolution 242, and Israel recognized Arafat as the Palestinians' leader." Indeed, Arafat and the PLO were seen as representing the Palestinian nation and became active partners in peace negotiations and conflict resolution.

The data below demonstrate the dramatic changes in the news representation of the Palestinian actors.

Categories	<i>Yedioth Ahronoth</i>		<i>Ha'aretz</i>	
	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo
Arafat & PLO	41.7%	99%	52.1%	96.5%
Local Palestinian leadership	58.3%	1%	47.9%	3.5%

Table 5: Changes between Two Palestinian Forces as Primary Actors during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods (Data derived from Table 3)

In the popular newspaper *Yedioth*, the data showed a dramatic change between the two periods. In *Ha'aretz*, the change was less marked but still significant. The frequency of mentioning Arafat in *Yedioth* increased by 230%; in *Ha'aretz* it increased by 190%. However, the total frequency with which Arafat and the PLO are represented in the news indicates a significant correlation in both topics. The primary representation in *Yedioth* was 99% and in *Ha'aretz*, 96.5%.

The differences also apply to the local Palestinian leadership, which was more prominent in pre-Oslo *Ha'aretz* than in *Yedioth*. The differences between the two newspapers can be explained by the fact that *Ha'aretz* is a quality publication with an emphasis on political issues. *Yedioth* became more political post-Oslo in response to the demands of its readers. However, both newspapers reflected government policy and discourse, and responded to the public need for information. The differences between the two newspapers are marginal and point to the same policies pre- and post-Oslo.

The relative change in the new discourse of both newspapers can be seen in Table 6.

Categories	<i>Yedioth Ahronoth</i>		<i>Ha'aretz</i>	
	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo
Arafat & PLO	30%	70%	35%	65%
Local Palestinian leadership	98%	2%	93%	7%

Table 6: Relative Changes between Two Palestinian Forces as Primary Actors during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods (Data derived from Table 5)

Table 6 reveals the dramatic changes in the news discourse relating to Arafat and the PLO, i.e., from 30% pre-Oslo to 70% post-Oslo in *Yedioth*, and from 35% pre-Oslo to 65% post-Oslo in *Ha'aretz*. The local Palestinian leadership evidently became irrelevant, changing from 98% pre-Oslo to 2% post-Oslo in *Yedioth* and from 93% pre-Oslo to 7% post-Oslo in *Ha'aretz*.

It is interesting to analyze the representation of the secondary actor in the Palestinian arena and to examine the interplay in both newspapers between the primary actor and the secondary one. The same tendency regarding the main foreign actor was shown regarding the secondary one. First, the representation of Arafat increased dramatically in the news coverage post-Oslo. Second, the representation of the PLO also increased, more so in *Ha'aretz* than in *Yedioth*. Third, the local Palestinian leadership lost its position in the Israeli news media.

While the changes described above are very clear, the interplay between the primary and the secondary actors is particularly interesting. In both newspapers, Arafat and the PLO, as the primary actor, was more prominent than the PLO, both pre- and post-Oslo, while as the secondary actor the PLO gained more prominence (53.8% in *Yedioth* and 63.2% in *Ha'aretz*) than Arafat (41% in *Yedioth* and 34.2% in *Ha'aretz*) in post-Oslo. As secondary actors, the Palestinians became marginal (5.1% in *Yedioth* and 2.6% in *Ha'aretz*). In general, the tendency of the secondary actor in both newspapers was similar to the primary one in terms of the pre-Oslo enemy, who became a legitimate partner post-Oslo. These results for the secondary Palestinian actors are illustrated in Table 7.

Categories	<i>Yedioth Ahronoth</i>		<i>Ha'aretz</i>	
	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo
Arafat & PLO	60%	94.8%	40%	97.4%
Local Palestinian leadership	40%	5.1%	60%	2.6%

Table 7: Changes between Two Palestinian Forces as Secondary Actors During the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods (Data derived from Table 4)

As in Table 5, which shows data on the primary actors, the data in Table 7 shows changes between the levels of representation of Arafat and the PLO, on the one side, and the local Palestinian leadership, on the other. A perfect correlation in frequencies was revealed in both newspapers: Arafat figured as the primary actor more than twice as often as he was featured as a secondary actor in post-Oslo. In *Yedioth*, he appeared to be more salient than in *Ha'aretz*, although with a very small difference. In short, Table 7 shows that both newspapers exhibited the same policy and the same changes in the representation of Arafat and the PLO image pre- and post-Oslo and are similar to the final results of Tables 3 and 4.

Post-Oslo, the local Palestinian leadership, Arafat and the PLO together were represented as follows:

- Primary actor = 99% in *Yedioth* and 96.5% in *Ha'aretz* (cf. Table 5).
- Secondary actor = 94.8% in *Yedioth* and 97.4% in *Ha'aretz* (cf. Table 7).

The relative change in the new discourse of both newspapers can be seen in Table 8.



Categories	<i>Yedioth Ahronoth</i>		<i>Ha'aretz</i>	
	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo
Arafat & PLO	39%	61%	29%	71%
Local Palestinian leadership	89%	11%	96%	4%

Table 8: Relative Changes Between Two Palestinian Forces as Primary Actors During the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods (Data derived from Table 7)

Table 8 reveals the dramatic change in the news discourse relating to Arafat and the PLO: from 39% pre-Oslo to 61% post-Oslo in *Yedioth*, and from 29% pre-Oslo to 71% post-Oslo in *Ha'aretz*. The local Palestinian leadership became irrelevant and dropped from 89% pre-Oslo to 11% post-Oslo in *Yedioth* and from 96% pre-Oslo to 4% post-Oslo in *Ha'aretz*.

The following quotations illustrate stereotypical perceptions of Arafat in the pre-Oslo period:

"Arafat [in exile in Tunis] congratulated the deported terrorists, praised the sacred dead and called on the Palestinians to remain steadfast to their land" (*Ha'aretz*, 31 March 1993).

Prime Minister Rabin told American Jewish leaders that "there is no change in Israeli relations with PLO, and we will not negotiate with them" (*Ha'aretz*, 2 August 1993, shortly before the signing of the Oslo accords).

Arafat was hardly ever mentioned in the political news discourse in Israel. His image, however, was reinforced by news articles about the Middle East policy of the US, Israel's most important ally (through third and fourth topics in the texts). The following quotations attest to this trend:

"[Warren] Christopher [US Secretary of State] told the Palestinians: 'For you, Arafat is a president, but not as far as we are concerned. We do not recognize him'" (*Ha'aretz*, 12 March 1993).

"American reporters noted that the key to peace talks lies with the Palestinian people" (*Yedioth*, 23 February 1993).

Post-Oslo, Arafat and the PLO became so popular in the Israeli media following the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO that both newspapers declared him a partner and a neighbor. Depicted pre-Oslo as the head of the terrorist PLO, Arafat became the post-Oslo leader of the Palestinians, who signed the "peace of the brave" (*Ha'aretz* and *Yedioth*, 14 September 1993). Arafat himself was cited in both newspapers using the term: "peace between the brave" (*Ha'aretz* and *Yedioth*, 17 January 1994). He was frequently represented in the news in both newspapers. Furthermore, journalists often used the same adjectives and titles to describe both Arafat and Rabin, and these two leaders were represented with similar frequencies in each of the news articles.

A featured news article on the first page of *Ha'aretz* was randomly selected to analyze Arafat's frequencies during the pre-Oslo period (21 March 1993). This showed that the Palestinians were mentioned 19 times, the PLO twice and Arafat once. On the day the Oslo accords were signed (13 September 1993), one news article in *Ha'aretz* mentioned Arafat 21 times, the PLO 16 and the Palestinians just 6 times. Post-Oslo, one randomly selected news article in *Ha'aretz* (6 October 1993) mentioned Arafat 20 times, the PLO 15 and the Palestinians 3 times. Similar figures apply to a selection of articles from *Yedioth*: Pre-Oslo (2 May 1993) the Palestinians were mentioned 11 times in a randomly-selected news article, the PLO once and Arafat once. Post-Oslo (6 October 1993) the main article mentioned Arafat 16 times, the PLO 11 and the Palestinians only 4 times, and on 30 December 1993 the news article mentioned Arafat 18 times, the PLO 7 and the Palestinians, 10 times.

When mentioning 'Prime Minister Rabin', news articles referred to 'Chairman Arafat'. When the prime minister was referred to by his surname, the same convention was applied to 'Arafat'. When articles mentioned 'Yitzhak Rabin', they also mentioned 'Yasser Arafat'. For the first time, Arafat was referred to as 'Mr. Arafat and was portrayed as a normal person.

A quotation illustrates the positive atmosphere relating to Arafat as a partner:

"It was a good meeting between Rabin and Arafat at the Eretz checkpoint ... The two reached an agreement, and the peace process was fuelled again ... It was undoubtedly the most successful meeting between Rabin and Arafat to date. The two personalities who, to put it mildly, do not like each other, renewed the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Arafat, for his part, promised to suppress terrorism. In general, Arafat supplied the goods yesterday" (*Yedioth*, 26 September 1994).

Arafat was also legitimized in the Western world:

"... the American media event where US President Clinton hugged both Arafat and Rabin while shaking hands..." (Yossi Beilin, interviewed on 15 May 2002).

"The peace era has begun and the war era ended" (*Yedioth* and *Ha'aretz*, 13 September 1993).

"The handshake that changed the Middle East"; "A new Middle East" (*Yedioth* and *Ha'aretz*, 14 September 1993).

Both newspapers published opinion polls that strengthened and supported the Oslo peace process and government policy. According to a Dahaf Institute poll which was published on the front pages of both *Ha'aretz* and *Yedioth* on 15 September 1993, 61% of Israelis supported the 'Gaza and Jericho First' plan [granting autonomy to the PA in Gaza and Jericho under Arafat]. "The PLO suggested an integrated economy between Israel, Jordan and the PA" (*Yedioth* and *Ha'aretz*, 29 September 1993). Another poll by the Dahaf Institute, published in both *Yedioth* and *Ha'aretz* (18 February 1994), revealed that 64% of Israelis expected that a Palestinian state would be established.

## 6. Conclusions

It is easy to speak glibly about the image of an enemy and to describe him impressionistically without precision or a systematic assessment. However, the results of quantitative content analysis demonstrate the transition from delegitimization to total legitimization and are supported by quotations from news articles. The news media reflected through its discourse a change of image – from the stereotype of ultimate evil emerged a new stereotype, namely a partner for peace.

Hiro (1996) argues that Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Peres were both sincere in their commitment to achieving peace. They accepted the basic premise that the core intent of Oslo was to create the semblance of a balance of power between Israelis and Palestinians over five years so that the two peoples could start to coexist peacefully. He stresses that the change in the image of the enemy was reflected by mutual trust leading to the establishment of a telephone hotline between Rabin and Arafat, along with the use of hidden channels of communication.

The Israeli media experienced a dramatic and immediate transformation, as reflected by media discourse. The phrase 'the peace of the brave' was used to invoke the idea of a 'Brave New World'. Ari Shavit (1997), a veteran columnist in *Ha'aretz*, uses the expression "messianic times" to describe the intoxicated atmosphere and pervasive sense of triumph. He also illustrates the change in the media discourse:

"We felt the great powers were with us and became ecstatic. We didn't hesitate to mobilize our powers as reporters. We believed that the global changes reflected the 'end of history', the end of conflict and wars, and that Rabin and Peres would create for us a Western Europe in the Middle East." (Shavit, *Ha'aretz*, 26 December 1997).

Kempf (1998) argues that the more a society is involved in conflict, the more escalation-oriented will be its media coverage of the conflict. He explains that even the most powerful political leaders cannot just switch to a cooperative strategy once a cease-fire or peace treaty is achieved. They risk losing power or even their lives. Willingness to compromise may even be regarded as betrayal. (Indeed, such was the case in Israel, where Rabin was murdered by a Jewish religious fanatic.)

Beliefs which help a society to endure ongoing conflict remain dominant. Thus, transformations from the habit of war to the norm of peace require a gradual deconstruction of stereotypes in addition to trust-building; this can be achieved by developing a strong civil society. This process cannot be achieved by simply adopting a new political discourse and ideology that idealize cooperation, as reflected by post-Oslo Israeli news media discourse. "If stereotypes and prejudice are only suppressed, they will prevail and return to the surface of social life as soon as they are given the slightest chance" (Azar and Cohen, 1979:169).

The danger of an ideology is rooted in the performance of image and the promotion of the enemy's political identity (Young, 1992). Rubinstein (1995) argues that due to bitter differences over the Middle East conflict, the personal opinion of each reporter determined whether Arafat was immediately described as 'the PLO leader', or 'the chairman of the PLO executive'.

Hitherto, it was Shavit (1997) and Barnea (2002) who accused the media of promoting a "left-wing religion" in the aftermath of 13 September 1993. Barnea (2002) recalls that after the major wave of terrorism in 1996, Dankner, a well-known journalist, wrote in *Ha'aretz*: "Arafat is not the Evil Empire's terrifying Caesar anymore ... he is the chosen leader of the Palestinian people who made a peace treaty with the Israeli people" (Barnea, 2002:7). However, the dramatic change in the enemy's media representations did not mean any profound change on the level of traditional political

and/or public perceptions. The following "peace process" has been extremely difficult, and a lot of evidence can be found that in fact it was not really a peace process (Said, 2000).

McHoul (1993) raises a question based on Foucault's (1967) theory of change:

"If the historical flow of ideas is radically discontinuous and are also part of the system, then aren't we left in a rather difficult situation: either to accept the system or submit to the chaotic and random changes brought about by discontinuity?" (McHoul, 1993: 42).

Clearly, these images illustrate how the government and the press relate to simplistic personifications of the enemy as threats to Jewish existence and the Jewish state. Obviously, the media should be concerned about the question of Arafat's mythological construction. After representing him for decades as the ultimate enemy and arch-terrorist, how did he become overnight a legitimate representative of the Palestinian nation, a human being, a neighbor and a partner? Moreover, the news discourse did not raise any issues in relation to the Palestinian delegation in peace talks and their continuing role in the process. Furthermore, no news or any background information about Palestinian culture was conveyed to the Israeli public.

Analysis of findings related to Arafat, the PLO and the Palestinians shows how mass communication implements 'reality' elements in news discourse. It could be argued that news discourses in the printed press are part of the ideological and political policy of government, and disseminate messages to the public, identifying the enemy of the nation and conferring legitimacy on potential partners for peace.

The findings show that the newspapers faithfully reproduced and legitimated different political attitudes during each period. Comparisons between the representations of security, peace and political topics and actors in each period show that the routine news strategy was to highlight official policies and policy statements.

Finally, I argue that the media news discourse informs the public about political priorities through mediated political discourse that changes according to government policy, in addition to global processes, regional circumstances and local ideology. Although the Israeli media reclassified the actors, there continued to be traditional perceptions which emphasized an enemy for the sake of maintaining group consensus.

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*Anat First & Eli Avraham*

## **Veränderungen des politischen, sozialen und medienbezogenen Umfelds und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Berichterstattung über Konflikte: das Beispiel der arabischen Bürger Israels**

Die vorliegende Studie untersucht, in welcher Weise die arabischen Bürger Israels in den hebräischen Medien porträtiert werden. Insbesondere geht es dabei um die Berichterstattung der nationalen Presse über zwei gewaltsame Zwischenfälle: über die Ereignisse rund um den ersten "Land Day" (30.03.76) und über die Ereignisse während der ersten beiden Wochen der Al-Aksa Intifada im Oktober 2000. Damit verfolgen wir zwei Ziele. Erstens wollen wir die Art und Weise explorieren, wie die israelischen Araber während gewaltsamer Konflikte dargestellt werden, so dass die jüdische Bevölkerung sie als eine Bedrohung erlebt; und zweitens soll durch die Betrachtung dieser Darstellungsmittel in ihrem zeitlichen Rahmen die Annahme überprüft werden, dass der Darstellungsprozess dynamischer Natur ist und in sozialer wie auch in symbolischer Hinsicht von der sich ändernden "Realität" beeinflusst wird. Als Untersuchungsmethode kamen sowohl quantitative als auch qualitative Verfahren der (Medien-)Inhaltsanalyse zum Einsatz.

Zwei Hauptfragen stehen im Mittelpunkt unserer Arbeit: 1. Wie wird "der andere" während des Ausbruches eines nationalen/ethnischen Konflikts in den nationalen Medien dargestellt? Mit anderen Worten, wie werden arabische Israelis in der israelischen Presse geschildert? 2. Verändert sich diese Darstellung in den verschiedenen Zeitungen im Laufe der Jahre, und wie lässt sich ein solcher Unterschied erklären?

Zwei hebräischsprachige Zeitungen - ein Boulevardblatt und eine Qualitätszeitung - wurden analysiert und hinsichtlich der Art ihrer Berichterstattung über die Ereignisse miteinander verglichen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen Ähnlichkeiten in der Berichterstattung über beide Ereignisse in beiden Zeitungen, darunter die Darstellung der Ereignisse auf der Folie von Aufruhr und Terror, die Identifikation der israelischen Araber als Feind und die Nicht-Thematisierung der Ereignisse als Bürgerprotest. Beide Zeitungen übernahmen die Sichtweise des Establishments und der Sicherheitskräfte und ignorierten die arabische Stimme. Die Berichterstattung bediente sich einer "Wir-gegen-sie"-Terminologie, und die arabischen Führer wie auch die Hintergründe der Ereignisse wurden delegitimiert. Dennoch gab es gewisse Unterschiede in der Berichterstattung der beiden Zeitungen. Diese Unterschiede beruhen auf den im Laufe der Jahre eingetretenen Veränderungen im sozio-politischen Umfeld, im Umfeld der Medien und in der arabisch-israelischen Bevölkerung.

[Volltext \(in Englisch\)](#)

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## **Changes in the political, social, and media environment and their impact on the coverage of conflict: The case of the Arab citizens in Israel**

The present paper examines the ways in which the Arab citizens of Israel are portrayed in the Hebrew media, with particular attention to the coverage of two violent incidents in national newspapers: the events surrounding the first Land Day (3/30/76) and the events of October 2000, which took place during the first two weeks of the Al-Aksa Intifadeh. Our purpose is twofold: 1) to examine the ways in which Israeli Arabs are portrayed in times of violent conflict that lead Jewish citizens to perceive them as threatening, and 2) to examine the means of presentation in terms of a time frame, in accordance with the view that the presentation process is dynamic, affected both socially and symbolically by a changing "reality." The research was conducted using both a quantitative and qualitative analysis of media content.

Two central questions are at the heart of this research: 1. How is the "other" portrayed in the national media during the outbreak of national-ethnic conflict? In other words, how are Arab Israelis depicted in the Israeli press? 2. Has there been a difference in this representation in various newspapers throughout the years, and how can such differences be explained?

We analyzed two Hebrew national newspapers - one a popular daily and the other a quality paper - and compared their coverage of the events. Our findings showed similarities in the coverage of both events in the two papers, including the use of disorder and terror frames, the identification of Israeli Arabs as the enemy and not presenting the events as civilian protest. Both papers used the voice of the establishment and the security forces as the defining voices of the coverage, while ignoring the Arab voice. The coverage was presented with the use of "us vs. them" terminology, and the Arab leaders and the reasons behind the events were de-legitimized. Nevertheless, there were some differences between the coverage of the two newspapers and the two events. These differences stem from changes in the socio-political environment, the media environment and the Arab Israeli population in the course of the years.

[full text \(in English\)](#)

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Anat First & Eli Avraham

## **Changes in the political, social, and media environments and their impact on the coverage of conflict: The case of the Arab citizens of Israel**

*Kurzfassung:* Die vorliegende Studie untersucht, in welcher Weise die arabischen Bürger Israels in den hebräischen Medien porträtiert werden. Insbesondere geht es dabei um die Berichterstattung der nationalen Presse über zwei gewaltsame Zwischenfälle: über die Ereignisse rund um den ersten „Land Day“ (30.03.76) und über die Ereignisse während der ersten beiden Wochen der Al-Aksa Intifada im Oktober 2000. Damit verfolgen wir zwei Ziele. Erstens wollen wir die Art und Weise explorieren, wie die israelischen Araber während gewaltsamer Konflikte dargestellt werden, so dass die jüdische Bevölkerung sie als eine Bedrohung erlebt; und zweitens soll durch die Betrachtung dieser Darstellungsmittel in ihrem zeitlichen Rahmen die Annahme überprüft werden, dass der Darstellungsprozess dynamischer Natur ist und in sozialer wie auch in symbolischer Hinsicht von der sich ändernden „Realität“ beeinflusst wird. Als Untersuchungsmethode kamen sowohl quantitative als auch qualitative Verfahren der (Medien-)Inhaltsanalyse zum Einsatz.

Zwei Hauptfragen stehen im Mittelpunkt unserer Arbeit: 1. Wie wird „der andere“ während des Ausbruches eines nationalen/ethnischen Konflikts in den nationalen Medien dargestellt? Mit anderen Worten, wie werden arabische Israelis in der israelischen Presse geschildert? 2. Verändert sich diese Darstellung in den verschiedenen Zeitungen im Laufe der Jahre, und wie lässt sich ein solcher Unterschied erklären?

Zwei hebräischsprachige Zeitungen – ein Boulevardblatt und eine Qualitätszeitung - wurden analysiert und hinsichtlich der Art ihrer Berichterstattung über die Ereignisse miteinander verglichen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen Ähnlichkeiten in der Berichterstattung über beide Ereignisse in beiden Zeitungen, darunter die Darstellung der Ereignisse auf der Folie von Aufruhr und Terror, die Identifikation der israelischen Araber als Feind und die Nicht-Thematisierung der Ereignisse als Bürgerprotest. Beide Zeitungen übernahmen die Sichtweise des Establishments und der Sicherheitskräfte und ignorierten die arabische Stimme. Die Berichterstattung bediente sich einer „Wir-gegen-sie“-Terminologie, und die arabischen Führer wie auch die Hintergründe der Ereignisse wurden delegitimiert. Dennoch gab es gewisse Unterschiede in der Berichterstattung der beiden Zeitungen. Diese Unterschiede beruhen auf den im Laufe der Jahre eingetretenen Veränderungen im sozio-politischen Umfeld, im Umfeld der Medien und in der arabisch-israelischen Bevölkerung.

*Abstract:* The present paper examines the ways in which the Arab citizens of Israel are portrayed in the Hebrew media, with particular attention to the coverage of two violent incidents in national newspapers: the events surrounding the first Land Day (3/30/76) and the events of October 2000, which took place during the first two weeks of the Al-Aksa Intifadeh. Our purpose is twofold: 1) to examine the ways in which Israeli Arabs are portrayed in times of violent conflict that lead Jewish citizens to perceive them as threatening, and 2) to examine the means of presentation in terms of a time frame, in accordance with the view that the presentation process is dynamic, affected both socially and symbolically by a changing “reality.” The research was conducted using both a quantitative and qualitative analysis of media content.

Two central questions are at the heart of this research: 1. How is the “other” portrayed in the national media during the outbreak of national-ethnic conflict? In other words, how are Arab Israelis depicted in the Israeli press? 2. Has there been a difference in this representation in various newspapers throughout the years, and how can such differences be explained?

We analyzed two Hebrew national newspapers – one a popular daily and the other a quality paper – and compared their coverage of the events. Our findings showed similarities in the coverage of both events in the two papers, including the use of disorder and terror frames, the identification of Israeli Arabs as the enemy and not presenting the events as civilian protest. Both papers used the voice of the establishment and the security forces as the defining voices of the coverage, while ignoring the Arab voice. The coverage was presented with the use of “us vs. them” terminology, and the Arab leaders and the reasons behind the events were de-legitimized. Nevertheless, there were some differences between the coverage of the two newspapers and the two events. These differences stem from changes in the socio-political environment, the media environment and the Arab Israeli population in the course of the years.

## 1. Introduction

In this article we will examine the ways in which the Arab population of Israel<sup>1</sup> is portrayed in the Hebrew media, with particular attention to the coverage of two violent incidents by national newspapers. The events selected are those surrounding the first Land Day, which occurred on March 30, 1976, and those which took place in October 2000 during the first two weeks of the Al Aksa Intifada. In both cases Israeli Arab civilians were killed, and both are considered milestones in Israeli history and in the fractured Arab-Jewish relationship in particular. In our opinion, investigation of the media reporting of these events is of great importance because during times of conflict people rely on media even more heavily than usual, and they shape their views of reality (Cohen et al., 1990). Consequently, the purpose of this research is twofold: 1) to explore how the way in which the Arab citizens of Israel are portrayed in times of violent conflict encourages Jewish citizens to perceive them as a threat, and 2) to examine the means of presentation in terms of a time frame, in accordance with the view that the presentation process is a dynamic one affected both socially and symbolically by a changing "reality." This will be done via a quantitative and qualitative analysis of media content.

### Presentation and stereotypes in the coverage of the "other"

The way minorities are covered in the media has become a major topic in media research. The reason for this interest lies in the fact that presentation is a central component of cultural life in all societies (Hall, 1997). Researchers who have dealt with the coverage of minority groups in the media have found that in most cases there has been a tendency to either ignore them or to portray them negatively. Such coverage implies that the "other" represents a threat to the social order. In addition, implicit in this coverage is the notion that because they are different from "us," minorities are to blame for our economic and social difficulties. The description, coverage, and portrayal of the "other" in the media, whether based upon religious, national, ethnic or other differences, is accompanied in many countries by the widespread use of generalizations, stereotypes, and prejudices, and ignores the background, causes, and political-social context that has given rise to difficulties and crises involving minorities in many areas (Avraham, 2001; First, 2001; Weimann, 2000; Wolfsfeld, 1997).

As we know, the mass media help us consolidate our interpretation of political, social, and economic conflicts. The media play a similar role in describing the "others" of our world. The term "construction" is used with regard to news stories, because news reports are stories created in the framework of a specific narrative which organize and define everyday events in a wider context (Wolfsfeld, 1997). In this process, the news continually presents impressions through pictures and words of different social groups and identities. In this manner, the media constructs for viewers the affiliations of certain groups and defines "us" and "them" and our national awareness, which is itself also an artificial social product, pertaining to an imagined community (Kellner, 1995).

The presentation process is affected by both the "political-social reality" and the "symbolic reality" in which it occurs. The influence of "political-social reality" functions on two levels. First, the effects of processes and events occur in a given time and environment. For example, the outbreak of a conflict increases the distinction and polarization between "us" and "them" (First, 2001). In addition, there is the framework of relations between the political institution and the media institution (Caspi & Limor, 1992). As mentioned above, the symbolic reality in which the presentation process occurs is comprised of various means of expression, including literature, art forms, and the media. The last of these formats includes the news, which is the central source that constructs our political, social, and economic agenda. The influence of this reality itself acts on two levels. First, the proliferation of channels presents an ever-increasing number of images. Second, the process of constructing the media product includes the routines of media organizations, the process of encoding information, for example, who was it who covered the "other," interpreted his actions, etc.

The presentation process includes stereotypes created during the sorting out and cataloging of the various fields, for aspects of society are subject to interpretation based on the physical environment or the symbolic environment in which they appear. This results in a distortion of the "social reality" of social groups, which inevitably become media subjects. The discussion of the means of presentation includes at least three indexes which assist in examining the location of the group within a given society: 1) How does the group appear in the context of the media – is it "extinct," portrayed stereotypically or "normally"? 2) What are the status systems with which group members are affiliated, in other words, the nature of the visibility of the "other," which is generally measured in terms of professional social position and status characteristics? 3) What are the modes of interaction between members of the dominant group and members of the minority group? These relationships indicate the extent of proximity between the groups. The existence of daily social interaction on an equal footing indicates that the hierarchy of power is diminishing (Gross, 1991; Greenberg & Brand, 1994).

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1 Throughout our research we used the terms: "Israeli Arabs," "the Arab citizens of Israel," "the Arab population," etc. These terms are used most often in research on this topic.

## **Media frames**

The discussion of media frames constitutes the connecting link with research on the question of representation, in other words between processes and products, since a dialectical relationship exists between the two. An analysis of the theories dealing with media frames demonstrates that different definitions exist. Here we are discussing the frame from the point of view of the media, regarding which there are a number of competing and complementary definitions (Gamson, 1989; Gitlin, 1980). A summary of the various definitions demonstrates that the framing process includes the placing of "facts" or components perceived as "reality" in frames that provide them with coherency, meaning the presentation of a causal explanation, moral evaluation, and/or recommendations for a solution. A media frame can be identified through a newspaper's use of metaphors, key sentences and symbolic means, including words and pictures. It should be noted that there is a constant competition among the various factions and interest groups which want to employ the media frames most suited to them. Additionally, in periods of conflict, the emphasis is placed primarily on the impact of the conflict, and less on its nature and possible solutions (First, 1998). Framing, according to Liebes (1997), includes the following mechanisms: excising, sanitizing, equalizing, personalizing, demonizing, and contextualizing. The framing mechanisms as such are in accordance with the methods we presented regarding the presentation of the "other." In general, it is widely noted that the viewpoint of news framing includes mechanisms of frame representation – of the exclusion and alienation of the "other" – which occur in a certain symbolic and cultural context.

## **Effects of socio-political environments on media content**

Media serve as ideological instruments by delineating and distributing the parameters of discourse. News writers use framing mechanisms, as well as known socio-cultural codes, to transform the news from unusual and unexpected events into understandable media contents (Gitlin, 1982; Hartely, 1982). The presenter, namely the media organization, has reciprocal relations with the changing social and political environment and is also part of it. Accordingly, the presentation process is a dynamic one. In this environment there are a variety of cultural assumptions regarding a society's central values, which in turn affect the behavior of media personnel and the manner in which the news is presented, as well as the product itself (Avraham, 2002; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980).

The constructivist approach holds that news reporters prefer news stories that are recognized as effective and culturally acceptable, and tend to lend them professional approval. Editors' decisions are influenced by their opinions regarding the target audience and the belief that dominant groups have little interest in the status of minorities, unless such information might upset their day-to-day lives (Jakubowicz et al., 1994; van-Dijk, 1996). There is a greater tendency to place a minority group in more marginal media frames the less the values and goals of that group are consistent with those of the political and media elite. Ottosen (1995) holds that changes in the images of minorities stem from changes in the political elite's minority conceptualization. According to Ottosen, it is important to deal with minority images because stereotypes of and generalizations about marginal groups tend to legitimize the use of violence against them by the establishment/government (Avraham, 2001).

## **From 1976 to 2000: Changes in Israeli society**

As previously mentioned, the media is a product of a particular country and culture, and as a consequence media images are dynamic. This cultural context is affected by two different sources, "socio-political reality" and the "symbolic reality" which is part of it and in which it creates and is created. All realities make their distinctive contribution, but we must not forget that there are permanent relations of reciprocity among them.

## **Changes in the social-political reality of Jewish Israeli society**

Israeli society underwent profound changes in the period covered by the research (1976-2000). We will not delineate these changes here, but will rather briefly summarize a number of processes related to our discussion. The framework of relations between Israel and the Arab countries, as well as with the Palestinians, has undergone significant changes as a result of a number of events, including the peace agreement signed with Egypt in 1979, the Lebanese War in 1982, the first Intifada, which began in December 1987, the Gulf War of 1991, the mutual recognition agreements that were signed in 1993 between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (the Oslo Accords), the peace treaty signed with Jordan in 1994, and the beginning of negotiations with the Palestinians, Syrians, and Lebanese aimed at ending the continuous state of conflict. Primarily as a result of the Oslo Accords, peace was recognized as a political option whose recognition sharpened the political debate, culminating in the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. The peace process ultimately became deadlocked, and the Al Aksa Intifada broke out in October 2000.

The political system has also undergone significant changes. These changes include the end of Labor Movement hegemony in 1977 and the formation of a government by the Right (the Likud Party) for the first time. In addition, the

larger parties became weaker, and the political system went from one with a dominant center to one with a divided center (Arian, 1997). In this period over a million immigrants arrived in Israel, and the process of globalization and the communications revolution brought changes to politics as well as to societal values. Ethnic groups began to fight for their identities, individualism as an ideology grew in strength, universal values became acceptable, and a civil society began to develop (Timm, 2001). Politically and culturally speaking, the hegemony of the pseudo-Western secular "Israeli" was broken, and a number of almost autonomous societies and cultures began to appear separately from one another, even if they were dependent upon one another, one of them being the Arab-Israeli society.

### **Changes in Arab Israeli society**

Most researchers who have dealt with the question of the identity of the Arab population in Israel agree that it is comprised of two central components. There is a civil element, resulting from the very status of Arabs as citizens of the State, and a national component, resulting from the national affinity of Arabs in Israel for the Arab world and the Palestinian people in the territories (Al-Haj, 2000). The formation of the identities of Arabs and their relationship with the State of Israel have been affected since the establishment of the State by four central focuses. These include: the local focus, namely, the internal structure of the Arab population; the national focus, pertaining to formal and informal status within the State of Israel; the regional focus, relating to the cultural and national affiliation with the Arab world, and in particular with the Palestinians in the territories; and the religious focus, involving the ethnic identities of the Moslems, Christians, and Druze. Ghanem and Osatski-Lazar (2001) maintain that an analysis of the events of October 2000 within the framework of the Al Aksa Intifada must include an additional focus, the global focus. They claim that the end of the Cold War was accompanied by an emphasis upon local and regional politics. It should be noted that there is a constant interaction among all of the above factors, though we shall primarily emphasize the first two. In the period covered by our research, from the 1970s to 2000, changes occurred in all four focuses. In the local realm, Israeli Arabs have undergone a process of modernization in economy and education (Al-Haj, 2000; Kimmerling & Migdal, 2001). Arab society has experienced a widespread politicization reflected in changes in voting habits, nationwide organizational developments and the development of political parties. Indeed, during the elections for Prime Minister in 1999, MK Beshara, an Israeli Arab, declared his intention to run as a candidate (Ghanem & Ositski-Lazar, 2001).

In the regional realm the "Israeliness" of the Arab citizens of Israel has been discussed again and again. Their "Israeliness" is expressed first and foremost in terms of their formal status, as they are citizens of the State of Israel, constituting 18% of the population. Nevertheless, the "Israeliness" of Arabs is incomplete, and they are marginalized in Israeli society. In other words, they have little influence on any level of daily life. Additionally, their interpretation of their citizenship is inconsistent with the acceptable Jewish interpretation of "loyalty to the State," empathy with its nature, and identifying with Jewish symbols. Although it seems that Israeli society is undergoing processes of democratization and is more amenable to the entry of marginal groups into the center, this process does not include Arabs (Ghanem & Ositski-Lazar, 2001). The Yom Kippur War (1973), the Lebanese War (1982), the first Intifada (1987), and increasing ties with the populations living in the territories have led to a growing "process of Palestinianization," a growing sense of Palestinian national identity amongst Israeli Arabs (Al-Haj, 2000).

The two major events chosen for this research and the period it covers emphasize the consolidation of national identity as opposed to civil identity. Both involve incidents of protest by Arab Israelis against actions of the Israeli government that culminated in the deaths of demonstrators – six in the first and 13 in the second. In the first, a series of violent confrontations took place on March 29-30, 1976 over the expropriation of lands owned by Arab Israelis by the State and was later dubbed *the First Land Day*. The second, the *events of October 2000*, which began with demonstrations on Thursday, September 28, 2000 against Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, was an important stage of the Al Aksa Intifada in the occupied territories. On October 1, the Arab citizens of Israel began to stage protests which developed into violent clashes with security forces throughout the country and continued for ten days.

The Arabs are the "other" in Israeli society because they are situated outside of the Israeli-Jewish collective and are portrayed as such in the media. However, their presentation is neither homogeneous nor static and is influenced by the framework of political relations that the different Arab groups apply to the State of Israel in a given period (First, 1998). Previous studies dealing with this subject concluded that the Hebrew media generally ignore the Arab population, and the little coverage there is deals primarily with disorder and perennial subjects such as crime, involvement in terrorism, violence and civil disorder (Asia, 2000; Avraham, et al., 2000; First, 1998).

### **Changes in the symbolic reality**

There are conflicting views regarding the role of the press in Israeli society. This debate is particularly acute when examined in the context of liberal democracy. Usually, the Israeli press tends to behave no differently from state presses in un-democratic countries, e.g., with various self-imposed prohibitions (Pappe, 1997). The central explanation for such behavior was the Arab-Israeli conflict that has beset the State of Israel since it came into being. In times of war the

press has supported national aims and portrayed the conflict from the national perspective (Liebes, 1997). As such, the Israeli media (both print and broadcast) adopted the task of promoting the national cause in a variety of ways (see for example: Dor, 2001; First, 2001; Niger et al., 2001). There is no doubt that during the years covered by our research (1976-2000) a revolution took place in the national press (Caspi & Limor, 1992). Ideological party-oriented newspapers died out (aside from the ultra-Orthodox press), their place being taken by privately-owned newspapers. The battle for the hearts of readers altered the format of major newspapers such as *Ma'ariv* and *Yedioth Aharonoth*, popular newspapers which together account for approximately 90% of the market. Newspapers began to devote greater space to personal stories and focused upon "difficult news" in the humane format of the "soft" story (Roeh, 1994). Likewise, dramatic changes took place from the 1970s to the year 2000 in television stations. In this period the monopoly of public television came to an end, and commercial stations as well as cable television started up. Such developments increased the competition in all Israeli media forms.

## 2. Research methods

### Research questions

Two central questions are at the heart of this research:

1. How is the "other" portrayed in the national media during the outbreak of national-ethnic conflict? In other words, how are Arab Israelis depicted in the Israeli press?
2. Has there been a change in this representation in various newspapers over the course of the years, and how can such changes be explained?

In this study we have used two research methods to examine the questions posed: an analysis of quantitative content and an analysis of the qualitative content of 388 articles and media texts.

### Quantitative content analysis

In order to answer the questions posed by the research, a coding system was constructed to assist in the measurement of the dependent variables. The validity and reliability of this coding system was arrived at by means of three judges, who agreed amongst themselves an average of 93% of the time regarding the different variables on the coding page. In order to reach this percentage, the judges went through a training course, and a number of "pre-research" tests were made (pre-test). The coding page for newspaper analysis included the following variables: type of newspaper, date, location, length of news piece, type of event, writer's name and ethnic background, subjects reported on, existence of quoted sources, references to injured Arabs and their description, the Arab participant and his description, connection between the article and civil protest, terrorism, the Arab world and the Palestinians, the use of historical arguments, or group demands and issues mentioned in the article.

### The sample population

*Media:* The two newspapers studied were *Yedioth Aharonoth* and *Ha'aretz*. These two papers were chosen for the following reasons: *Yedioth Aharonoth* is an independent commercial newspaper that is popular with the mainstream. It targets the public at large, its news items have emotional appeal and concentrate on personal stories, and it is the most widely-read newspaper in the country. *Ha'aretz* is an independent newspaper that is considered both high quality and elitist. It speaks primarily to the well-educated public and the elites, emphasizes institutional critique and adopts a liberal perspective.

*Sample Period:* We analyzed all the articles appearing in the two weeks following the events detailed in all the sections of the newspaper (aside from the sports section). Our analysis focused on two periods of time: the first two weeks following the events of Land Day in March 1976 (in our qualitative analysis we studied the two weeks preceding these events as well) and the first two weeks of the Al Aksa Intifada of October 2000.

### Qualitative content analysis

In the current research, after viewing and reading all the articles pertaining to the events of our investigation, we extrapolated key components that in our opinion characterized the coverage of Israeli Arabs and were consistent with the characteristics described in the theoretical portion of this paper. These include types of framing, generalizations, limitations, objectivity and subjectivity, context, group voice or voice hegemony, sources of information and the writer's ethnic background.

### 3. Findings and interpretation

The data is presented through comparisons of the newspapers and the periods. The analysis of the press includes the analysis of 388 items (articles, opinion editorials, caricatures, photographs) from two newspapers. A total of 147 items were analyzed in 1976 and 241 items in 2000.

#### Coverage salience

*1976:* In the printed press there were 147 articles dealing with events surrounding Land Day; 80 articles appeared in *Yedioth Aharonoth* and 67 appeared in *Ha'aretz*. An analysis of these articles demonstrates that the event was prominently portrayed in the national newspapers. Information regarding the event appeared 14 times in the headlines on the first page of *Yedioth Aharonoth*, amounting to about 18% of the covered material. However, in *Ha'aretz* 10 references appeared in the front page headlines, amounting to approximately 15% of the covered material in the group. The events were accompanied by a large number of editorials. Comparison with studies on the coverage of Arab citizens during non-crisis periods (Aburaiya, et al., 1998; Avraham, 2001) demonstrates that this event received very extensive coverage. The average size of each article was 226 square centimeters.

*2000:* Regarding the events of October, there were 241 articles dealing with the topic, and they can be divided almost equally between *Yedioth Aharonoth* (113 articles) and *Ha'aretz* (128 articles). The matter was deemed of high importance, for most of the reports appeared on the front pages or the news pages. It should be noted that the subject appeared in 18% of the cases in the headlines or on the front page of *Yedioth Aharonoth*, as compared to 6% on the front page of *Ha'aretz*. The importance of the events studied is apparent from the number of editorials devoted to them in the newspapers (14% in *Yedioth Aharonoth* as compared to 18% in *Ha'aretz*). The average size of each article was 433 square centimeters.

#### Clashes accompanying the event – Disorder

*1976:* The event was typically categorized as a civil disorder. The total coverage of Land Day in *Yedioth Aharonoth* dealt with 30 events in terms of demonstrations, marches, property damage and loss of life. This represents about 38% of the total events. The report in *Ha'aretz* was quite similar. Twenty-six articles, amounting to about 39% of the articles printed, dealt with events in which there were civil disturbances such as demonstrations involving property damage and loss of life. In other words, the newspaper preference was more for events involving damage and personal injury, as opposed to discussions of the issues, their implications, alternative solutions, etc. As a result, the Arab Israeli community was identified more than anything else with violence and civil disorder, as well as with the protest it expressed.

*2000:* The event was classified in less than half of the articles as a civil disorder, in 41% of the examples in *Yedioth Aharonoth*, as opposed to 52% in *Ha'aretz*. The events were portrayed in various manifestations, including demonstrations, marches, property damage and loss of life.

#### Who is the spokesman – Is this the hegemonic voice?

*1976:* An analysis of the sources of quoted information reveals that in about 60% of the articles there was use of an information source in both newspapers. Security sources were provided with an opportunity to respond or reply in about 25% of all articles. In 40% of the articles there were responses from Jewish leaders to the events, whereas the responses of Arab leaders appeared in only 19% of the articles. At first glance, one might assume that Arab politicians were given sufficient representation, although an analysis of those quoted reveals that they were primarily Arab politicians who opposed the strike (Koren, 1994).

*2000:* Generally speaking, it can be said that the Jewish political institutional voice was far less apparent in both newspapers as compared to 1976, primarily in *Ha'aretz*. In this newspaper, the responses of Jewish leaders dropped to 26% in 2000. Concurrently, the defense establishment gained in strength as a news source. The most quoted source in both newspapers continued to be that of the security forces. In *Yedioth Aharonoth*, the security forces were cited in 32% of all articles, as compared to about 38% of all articles in *Ha'aretz*. A survey of the subject matter list shows that in *Yedioth Aharonoth* there was a similar level of presentation over time for Jewish leaders, which ranged between 29% and 31%. In comparison, while in *Ha'aretz* there was an increase in the level of presentation for Arab leaders (from 12% in 1976 to 22% in 2000), *Yedioth Aharonoth* showed a decrease from 21% to 12%. Additionally, the Arab participants mentioned in articles were still politicians (21% in *Yedioth Aharonoth* and 28% in *Ha'aretz*), though the demonstrators' voices can also be heard (5% in *Yedioth Aharonoth* and 16% in *Ha'aretz*), along with those of the people in the street (5% in *Yedioth Aharonoth* and 9% in *Ha'aretz*). It seems that *Ha'aretz* tends to portray a greater variety of opinions than *Yedioth Aharonoth*.

### Similarity in subject matter in the two newspapers

*1976:* An analysis of the subjects most often covered demonstrates a small difference between the newspapers. In *Yedioth Aharonoth* the seven most covered subjects were, in descending order: the connection of the events with coexistence and the status of Arab Israelis in the State, activities of the security forces, the protests themselves, the response of Jewish leaders, attempts at further incitement, internal struggles between group leaders and the responses of Arab leaders.

*2000:* An analysis of the most frequently covered subjects reveals that in *Yedioth Aharonoth* the seven most often covered subjects, in descending order, were as follows: connection with coexistence and the status of Israeli Arabs in the State (49%), the protests themselves (47%), actions of the security forces (45%), the responses of Jewish leaders (29%), reports of Arab casualties (25%), attempts at further incitement (18%) and reports of Jewish casualties (18%). In *Ha'aretz* the seven most often covered subjects, in descending order, were as follows: the protests themselves (73%), actions of the security forces (45%), links to coexistence and the status of Israeli Arabs in the State (48%), reports of Arab casualties (22%), complaints of discrimination (26%), responses of Jewish leaders (26%) and the responses of Arab leaders (22%).

Despite the similarity in the subject priority and the amount of coverage between the two newspapers in 1976, the differences between them were more pronounced in 2000 in two areas: group discrimination and the responses of Arab leaders. In *Ha'aretz* there was a preference for covering complaints of discrimination (26% of all articles in *Ha'aretz* as opposed to 15% in *Yedioth Aharonoth*). A similar level of coverage was maintained regarding the responses of Arab leaders (22% in *Ha'aretz* versus 12% in *Yedioth Aharonoth*). It seems that the focus of reporting in *Yedioth Aharonoth* was the Jewish collective. It appears over time that *Yedioth Aharonoth* still preferred to cover matters relating to coexistence and the status of Israeli Arabs in the State. In these articles the events were examined in the light of the group's status in the State and in connection with its activities regarding coexistence. The subject of Arab leaders' responses received less coverage in 2000. It should be noted that in *Ha'aretz* there was a sharp increase in the coverage of complaints of discrimination, yet a decline in reporting on attempted incitement and Jewish casualties. This contrasts with the increase in reporting of Arab casualties (from 18% in 1976 to 37% in 2000).

### The reporter and the Jewish perspective

*1976:* In *Yedioth Aharonoth* no articles were found regarding the "other," the Arab. Likewise, the newspaper did not contain any reports or editorials written by Arab citizens. In *Ha'aretz* only 6% of the relevant articles were written by Arab reporters or analysts. Coverage of the events presented the Jewish perspective, in terms that implicitly or explicitly invoked notions of "us" versus "them." This type of presentation is important for two reasons. First, the group is separated from "us," the Jewish citizens, and secondly, by their very classification as "others" Arabs are perceived as different from the majority group, and therefore their legitimacy is questioned:

"... *We dismantled 'El Arad' (an Arab Party) ... and we exiled from the country some of the inciters ... we closed Arab newspapers, we dispersed demonstrations, we closed Arab stores and schools ...*" (*Yedioth Aharonoth* 23.3.76).

*2000:* In this period, the first glimmerings of the voices of Arab Israelis appeared. There were 16 articles written by Arab writers in *Yedioth Aharonoth*, and these articles accounted for 14% of all articles dealing with the subject. In *Ha'aretz* there were only five articles by Arab writers, making up only 4% of the total coverage of the subject. It appears that the number of Arab writers had increased, with the most dramatic increase appearing in *Yedioth Aharonoth*. This increase was due to the hiring of an Arab writer, as well as a new willingness to permit Arab Knesset members and Arab newspaper editors to respond to events. The percentage of articles mentioning the number of Arabs who had been shot doubled in relation to Land Day (11% in *Yedioth Aharonoth*, 16% in *Ha'aretz*).

### Group leadership: Hostile and non-representative

*1976:* In addition to the alienation of the Arab population of Israel, in two major areas a similar process of delegitimization occurred in the media regarding the group's leaders. First, for a variety of political reasons, news organizations declared the group leaders to be 'off limits', thereby implying that they had joined Israel's enemies by trying to prevent the land expropriation and by speaking out against discrimination. Secondly, the leadership was portrayed as non-representative of the group. Characterizing the leaders as "nationalistic extremist forces" (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, 30.3.76), "Rakah (the Arab Communist Party) propagandists" (*Ha'aretz*, 29.3.76), "subversive elements" (*Yedioth Aharonoth*) belittles their public activities. Moreover, it was claimed that supporters of the strike were not representative of the population, and the disparagement of the legality of the strike created a platform for those opposed to the strike. The strikers were disparaged in two ways. First, their ability to think autonomously was belittled through caricatures and portrayals of Israeli Arabs standing in front of a *Rakah* pharmacy in which a nefarious pharmacist was urging them to purchase a magic potion (*Ha'aretz*, 31.3.76). Second, the leaders were characterized as

PLO members, and in another caricature stones thrown by demonstrators form the letters "PLO" (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, 2.4.76). Along with providing a stage for those opposing the strike, the leaders of the strike were distanced from the discourse, while their statements and claims were disparaged.

2000: Both newspapers found that the ultimate reason for the actions of Israeli Arabs stemmed from incitement by Arab MKs. This is how events were described in *Ha'aretz*: "The Arab MKs are partners in the bitter consequences ..." (page A1, A3, 2.10.00). In other words, these MKs were initiating some of the events. According to an article in *Yedioth Aharonoth*, "Incitement by MKs craving ratings" (page 1, 18, 2.10.00) was behind many of the events. It was in fact implied that these leaders had incited the incidents in order to increase their popularity. Despite the article's warning, one can also find in it the understanding that "the Arab MKs are the principal representatives for the organization of dialogue between the majority and minority. We can ask them not to be swept along by the fickle masses, but rather to steer its behavior." An interesting explanation was provided (*Ha'aretz*, 6.10.00) for the behavior of the Arab Israeli leadership: "Minority leaders are either weak or agitators."

### **Interpretation of events: Discriminated against or in league with the enemy?**

1976: An analysis of the reasons for the strike will help us understand how the media construction of events controls the depiction of reality. In other words, were these demonstrations against discrimination, deprivation, and land expropriation – as the demonstration organizers claimed – or provocation by a marginal, unrepresentative group with ties to the enemy? It seems that most of the news commentators chose the second media frame, portraying the developments with an emphasis upon the ties between the organizers of the demonstrations and the Arab world or the Palestinians, as part of the unceasing struggle to destroy Israel. " 'The Arabs are stabbing us in the back', said a Jewish businessman '... the Arabs are raising their heads. *It is undoubtedly another link in the demonstrations in Judea and Samaria designed to make the State smell bad ...*' (*Ha'aretz*, 23.3.76). The manner in which events were reported dismisses the demonstrators' stated reasons for the demonstrations. Instead, "correct" reasons were given for the demonstrations: "... at first glance the Land Day demonstrations were 'against discrimination, against land expropriation'; although the truth is well known to us. Well-known sources demonstrate that there is no discrimination involved in the matter" (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, 1.4.76). An additional connotation of "us" and "them" relates to the relations with the superpowers at the time – "we," the West, versus "them," the East bloc. Along with the adoption of a media frame and the interpretation provided by the establishment, we discerned an attempt to view the land expropriations as not only harmless to the residents, but as actually improving their situation.

Two competing explanations were given for the strike, which are reciprocally related. First, the Arab population of Israel is an enemy and allied with the Arab world and the Palestinians. Second, this was an attempt by *Rakah* to dominate the Israeli Arabs and incite them against the State. *Rakah*, according to the descriptions of the news reporters, is a political enemy whose legitimate existence must be terminated. At the same time, spokespersons of the establishment (for example, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Shmuel Toledano, the Prime Minister's Advisor on Arab Affairs) were given the stage, which they utilized to sharply criticize the activities of *Rakah*:

"... the Prime Minister – Yitzhak Rabin, who sat in the Knesset during a no-confidence vote advocated by the *Rakah* faction, will speak wonders of the self-restraint of the security forces, faced with *the violent and provocative deeds inspired by subversive elements ...*" (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, 31.3.76).

2000: "The Fire has Spread to Israeli Arabs" was the headline that dominated the front page of *Yedioth Aharonoth* (2.10.00), and in such a manner that the conflict in the territories was linked to the clashes with the Arab citizens of Israel. A supplementary headline on the same day reported about the significance of the events: "Rioting in Arab villages in Galilee and the 'Triangle' severed the connection with the North of the country." The notion that a real threat was growing was underscored by a picture printed on the same page. The caption accompanying this picture informs readers that, "Arabs threw stones and border policemen *were forced* to fire rubber bullets." The association between the general Arab-Israeli conflict and the Al Aksa Intifada was made through the use of various media techniques. These include: *language* – "Intifada in Galilee and Jaffa" (page 4, 23); *visual documentation* – the pictures; via *newspaper graphic design* – in proximity to a picture of the clashes in Galilee was another picture of identical size of a boy, Mohammed A-Dura, who had been shot in clashes in the Gaza Strip; *use of symbols* – the use of the same logo during the coverage of the events in the territories and in Arab villages in Israel.

This association blurred the lines between the two conflicts in such a way that it implied the unity of the Palestinian forces going to war in Israel. From the events reported that day in *Yedioth Aharonoth*, one could reach the conclusion that it was an all-out war, one vast battlefield, with "three days of battles in the territories and in Israel, accompanied by live fire" ("War of Independence?" page 2). To enhance the portrayal of the country as under siege from "all the centers of opposition," one could still see the green line (the 1967 border) on the map, but it was quite blurry and vague. This associative process in *Yedioth Aharonoth* continued. On October 3, 2000 the paper printed two pictures of



equal size. One was taken in Israel and showed young Israeli Arabs burning tires, and alongside it was a picture of incidents in the territories in which a young Palestinian can be seen desecrating an Israeli flag. In contrast to the reports in *Yedioth Aharonoth*, *Ha'aretz* (2.10.00) reported about the rioting in the territories in its front page headline. The newspaper's reports did not include the same implied rhetorical threats, although they could be inferred from the reporting of the overall situation, which was restrained as a result of editing by security sources:

"Security sources expressed deep concern regarding the dimensions of the protests amongst the Israeli Arab public. In their opinion, the obstruction of roads for long periods of time is a very disturbing sign of what may come next. They expressed concern that the strikes and protests had been coordinated from the start with the Palestinian Authority."

The tendency of *Ha'aretz* not to link events in the territories with those occurring inside Israel was evident in the supplementary headline on the front page (3.10.00):

"Rioting increasing: five Israeli Arabs were killed yesterday, two more succumbed to their wounds. In the territories: two Israelis and about 15 Palestinians were killed in shooting incidents."

The major headline of the newspaper focused upon the events in Israel and delved into the significance of the events for the government with statements such as "Barak and Arab Israeli leaders will meet in an attempt to bring calm."

### **Historical contexts of events and patterns of identity**

*1976:* We sought to determine whether the articles provided historical explanations of the events, and whether the reader could ascertain the demands of the group involved in the incident. In the above case, there is a long history of the nationalization of land, and the strike had a defined purpose – to bring an end to the confiscation of Arab land. In both newspapers, the historical reasons for the events were delineated in just 13% of the articles. The group's demands ranged in both newspapers from 11% to 16%; and both claims together amounted to about 10%. Additionally, we sought to determine if the articles made any reference to civilian protest, specifically, to its civilian context in the State of Israel or primarily to the Palestinians in the territories and the Arab world. Although the strike is the ultimate civilian protest activity, the connection to civilian protest appeared in fewer than 50% of the articles (43% in *Yedioth Aharonoth* and 51% in *Ha'aretz*). The relevance of the context of Arab identity was made via references to both the Palestinians and the Arab world. The first reference to the Palestinians was made in *Yedioth Aharonoth* in 64% of the articles, and in *Ha'aretz* in 49% of the articles. Reference to the Arab world was made in *Yedioth Aharonoth* in 44% of the articles and in 37% of those in *Ha'aretz*. Furthermore, an interesting finding is the high percentage of links found between the strike and terrorism, despite the inherently civilian nature of the strike (19% of the articles in *Yedioth Aharonoth*).

*2000:* At the onset of the disturbances, the group was presented as having just one goal – identification with the Palestinians in the territories. Only after Arab civilians were shot were references made to the discrimination suffered by the group, with primary emphasis on the civilian status of the Arab residents. It is interesting that there was a decline in the percentage of these two components in comparison to 1976. Reference to the historical reasons for the events was made in about 20% of the articles. Group demands are more prominent in *Ha'aretz* than in *Yedioth Aharonoth* (22% as compared to 12%). In both newspapers, the two claims made together in the same article appear in no more than 11% of the items.

As mentioned above, an additional aspect of context entails the contours of the surveyed group's identity. The group's connection with the Palestinian people was initially portrayed in articles in both newspapers – 71% in *Yedioth Aharonoth* and 63% in *Ha'aretz*, thereby emphasizing the element of Palestinian identity. After three days had passed, however, the public discussion shifted to the group's civilian identity, a topic discussed in about 48% of the articles in *Yedioth Aharonoth* and 43% of those in *Ha'aretz*. Reference to the Arab world occurred in between 15% (*Yedioth Aharonoth*) and 9% (*Ha'aretz*) of the articles. In light of the fact that at first group coverage was more limited regarding Palestinian activities, the reference to terrorism was limited in both newspapers (8% in *Yedioth Aharonoth* and 6% in *Ha'aretz*).

### **Blaming the group for members' deaths and supporting security forces**

*1976:* News reporters had a tendency not to accept the group's claims regarding the question of who was to blame for the violence that broke out, resulting in many dead and injured amongst the Israeli Arabs. In most of the articles it was claimed that the group's policies were responsible for the response of the security forces, who had had no choice but to use live ammunition in self-defense. In other words, group violence was the catalyst for the violence of the security forces. Likewise, the security forces were lavished with praise for their actions:

"The violent breach of the curfew necessitated the use of weapons" (*Ha'aretz*, 31.3.76).

"... in no other country could a situation arise in which a group, for all intents and purposes a fifth column, would dare to attend Parliament the day after orchestrating and implementing violent confrontations, and *accuse the State of committing crimes*" (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, 1.4.76).

News reporter 'enlistment' in the State's defense was so widespread that in some cases identification with the security forces went beyond support for their claims (in other words, the security forces were compelled to use live fire):

"... *Congratulations ... it is our duty to send commendation to our police, who so faithfully carried out their duties in these difficult times ...* (an editorial extolling the security forces) (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, 4.4.76).

The law-and-order syndrome became clear in discussions of the security forces. The legitimacy of maintaining public order, first and foremost, stemmed from the view of the news reporters that the law was not the appropriate response for dealing with a violent strike:

"This decision can be appealed in accordance with law – *and anyone who attempts to use the means of incitement and violence will be met with the appropriate response*" (editorial article in *Ha'aretz*, 28.3.76).

2000. In most articles the security forces were given starring roles, primarily the police and senior officers. Discourses on "law and order" predominated. Police actions and the deaths of Israeli civilians did not merit any serious criticism and were portrayed as regrettable but unavoidable. News commentators did not challenge the principle of "law and order." For example, when an automobile driven by an Arab pediatrician was fired upon on October 3, *Yedioth Aharonoth* described the incident (4.10.00) as follows: "Nazareth Police involved in another serious incident." The newspaper concluded the article with the response of one of the police chiefs, who placed the blame on the doctor: "Just as the doctor drove down the road, a Molotov cocktail was thrown at the police. The startled doctor drove towards the police. The police suspected that he had thrown the Molotov cocktail – and opened fire in response. The incident is being investigated." Despite the problematic answer, the news personnel did not ask additional probing questions. It seems, once again, that the group was held responsible for a member's death. It was not until October 4 that for the first time an editorial criticized police behavior. In a piece on page 2 of *Yedioth Aharonoth* the editor criticized the actions of the security forces, declaring that "a black flag of illegality hovered over the command to use live ammunition against the demonstrators."

We have thus seen the similarities in the manner in which events have been presented over the years. Nevertheless, the question remains: in what way was the coverage of the events of October 2000 different from that of the events of 1976?

Despite the similarity, one could find in the pages of the newspapers in 2000 a call for coexistence and an understanding of the pain that burst forth from the "other." That is, in addition to the criticism of Arab Knesset members, criticism could also be found of the Israeli Right, along with sympathy for the anger of Arab citizens of Israel. Criticism was leveled primarily in editorial articles in which one could find empathy for the pain of the "other," a desire to continue living together, and criticism of "us" as well. In *Ha'aretz* there were editorial articles and criticisms by a growing number of journalists. In an article entitled "On the Temple Mount and Speaking Out Against Discrimination" a journalist described "emotional youths speaking with a sense of distress about 'Jewish occupation', discrimination, humiliation, unemployment and despair" (3.10.00). Despite the problematic framing of the events in *Yedioth Aharonoth* (as described above), by the second day of the news reporting (the third day of the incidents) other voices could also be heard. One writer, in an article entitled "Save My City" (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, 3.10.00, page 4), blamed both the Jews and the Arabs, saying, "It's a great day for Jewish and Moslem fanatics, who see peace as anathema. It's a devastating failure for the advocates of peace, who did not understand how to translate their dream into an understandable language." The writer also expressed understanding of and empathy for the others' situation: "The Islamic and Jewish nationalist racists leave no alternative for this population, having been caught for decades between the Israeli hammer and the anvil of nationalist fundamentalism."

Another senior reporter, in an article entitled "The Pain Bursts Out" (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, 3.10.00, page 13), described the battlefield (his section was called "In the Line of Fire") in an Arab village, Um El Fahm. Although he felt himself to be in danger during his stay in Nazareth, he quotes the words of Arab leaders and their claims against the government, the police, the media, and the attitudes of these groups towards the Arab population. In addition to criticism, the writer attempts to understand the sources of the uprising and to delineate them with the assistance of his doctor friend, who felt he had been turned into a second-class citizen. "These things are well known, but it hurts so much when said by your good friend, among the best students in the class, a person who did everything, everything to be an Israeli." He also reaches the conclusion that Arab-Jewish relations have not been completely shattered by these events. "Regarding my compatriots, the crisis is an outburst of accumulated pain."

Another difference can be found in the cessation of the process of objectification of Israeli-Arab citizens. On the fourth day of clashes the news pages (page 2) of *Yedioth Aharonoth* already featured photos of six Arabs killed. In addition,

pictures of two Nazareth residents who had been killed appeared on October 10. The caption under the main picture in the article, which was taken from television, was "Bidding the Children Farewell."

The victims from Nazareth were personalized in both *Yedioth Aharonoth* and *Ha'aretz*. However, in *Yedioth Aharonoth* more emphasis was placed upon the feelings of the victims' families, whereas *Ha'aretz* presented the opinions of the family members about the behavior of the security forces.

As we have stated, the media ecology underwent a change, and the press could not ignore the images on the small screen. In fact, in *Yedioth Aharonoth* we found the story of an Arab woman doctor and her sister from Nazareth who were beaten by police forces. They were assaulted while on their way home as they stopped with a small group of people on Fountain Square in Nazareth. The article covered the story of the woman doctor, and alongside it was a picture of the policeman who had struck the woman – a picture taken from television. Additionally, voices of the "other" could be heard as well. In *Yedioth Aharonoth*, next to the opinions of a Jewish leader were those of an Arab reporter ("Dangerous Turning-Point," page 1, 21), both of which appeared under similar frames on the front page of the newspaper. One could read the positions of these adjacent articles in two contrasting ways. There are those who would claim that the article by the Arab writer pales in light of the newspaper's general tone, according to which Arab Israelis were part of a general threat, the aim being to enhance the feeling of conflict. Conversely, others might claim that despite the troubled atmosphere, the newspaper chose to give the "other" an opportunity to express his position.

#### 4. Discussion and conclusion

A comparison of the types of media coverage of the events surrounding Land Day and the early events of the Al Aksa Intifada of 2000 amongst the Arab population in Israel reveals that there were both similarities and differences between the newspapers, as well as across the years. The similarities and differences both revolve around the central means of presentation in minority group presentation, and the myriad ways of portraying political-social conflicts in the framework of symbolic reality. Coverage of the events surrounding Land Day in the press during 1976 provides a classic example of symbolic extinction, objectification, and stereotyping, and the unequal balance of power in the reciprocal relations between majority and minority groups. Newspaper framing included different means of presentation that helped to belittle the existence of the group, its demands, its explanations for the demonstrations and its proposals for resolving the conflict. Quantitative symbolic extinction could be found in the number of articles, small in both number and size, devoted to the topic. Qualitative extinction of the Israeli-Arab citizens was expressed by means of descriptors applied to the strikers, such as: "traitors," "rabble," "agitators," and "fifth column." Such an approach provided legitimacy for blaming the group for its death. The Israeli-Arab citizens suffered from objectification – transparency both as strikers and as victims. The number of spokesmen who organized or participated in the strike and appeared in the media were few indeed. The victims remained anonymous – without homes, ages, professions or life stories.

The balance of power between the groups was clear. Reciprocal relations arising from the coverage reveals a paternalistic relationship in which the larger group – the Jews – did not assume responsibility for the deaths of members of the other group, the Israeli-Arab citizens. The press provided a platform for the Jewish politicians and security forces, and in order to completely de-legitimize the events surrounding the strike, it provided a platform for those amongst the Arab citizens of the State who opposed the strike. Reciprocal relations were expressed primarily on an institutional level concerning both the political institution and the media institution. In terms of the political institution, we found that the views expressed were primarily those of the Jewish establishment, emphasis being given to those who organized the strike, *Rakah*. In terms of the media institution, the voice of the "other" was not heard. In other words, no Israeli-Arab news reporters were quoted at all, a fact that additionally contributed to the alienation of the Arabs from their citizenship as Israelis. The news stories' declared support for the security forces and the labeling of the leadership of the strike as enemies of all citizens of the State contributed further to this alienation. The focus upon official sources and the adoption of their language and the terminology they employed to interpret the events created closed perspectives that left no place for alternative viewpoints. The reporting in both newspapers portrayed the strike as involving the disruption of public order, and the frame of coverage was accompanied by the de-legitimization of the group's activities, its leaders and its demands, while all Arab citizens were generalized to belong to the enemy. There was agreement amongst writers that *Rakah* was to blame. Although it was possible to interpret the events in different ways, the writers chose to interpret them in the context of an attempt to harm Israel, instead of depicting a group that had been treated unjustly and therefore demanded change and justice.

All of the points mentioned above regarding the coverage in 1976 can be made regarding the coverage of the events of October 2000 as well. The most prominent characteristic of the news reporting was the portrayal of the actions of the Arab citizens primarily as disrupting civil order. However, this time the framing of the stories was more threatening. The events were portrayed as a war against the very existence of Jewish citizens in their homeland, the initial central comparison being made to a "war for independence." The alienation and disenfranchisement of Arab citizens were also

increased by these incidents. A connection was found between the protests and events in the territories and other incidents such as rioting and violent demonstrations perceived as posing an existential threat to the Jewish population (as appears in other research, such as Niger and others, 2001). The process included the use of language, visual documentation, graphic editing, and the use of various symbols. A villain was found once again, just as in the previous conflict. This time it was Israeli-Arab Knesset members, primarily members of the Arab Parties. Reporters themselves supported the actions of the security forces, criticism of the security forces was extremely limited, and the security discourse was once again predominant. Arab citizens were once again blamed for their own suffering, and the coverage and the interpretation of the events through graphic editing, pictures, and maps made their activities synonymous with the larger Arab-Israeli conflict.

Comparison between the two newspapers showed that in 1976 there was a difference in the coverage of events, but the difference was rather slight. The topics covered were similar, and the frequency of their appearance was similar as well. The reason for this can be summed up with the phrase "crisis drives Jewish writers back home," that is, there is a tendency amongst journalists to rally around the official version of incidents. Likewise, in October 2000 the phenomenon of "coming back home" occurred amongst news-people who once again rallied around the official stance, although this time there was increased latitude that permitted the voicing of other opinions. Despite the similarity between the two periods, there were some significant differences as well. The first prominent difference between the two periods was the volume of reporting. The number of articles in both newspapers together almost doubled from 147 articles in both newspapers about events surrounding Land Day in 1976 to 241 articles during the outbreak of the Al Aksa Intifada. Additionally, the size of the articles themselves almost doubled between the two periods. This finding demonstrates the increased importance of the topic in the national, political, and social day-to-day events of the State of Israel, which, in turn, permitted a greater variety of voices to be heard.

Another change could be found in the voices that occupied the journalists' stage. First of all, the voice of the Jewish political establishment was muted, while the voice of the defense establishment grew in strength. The Arab citizens' voice also underwent a change. There was a difference in the number of Arabs who appeared as writers of articles and editorials, as well as of those interviewed in the newspapers, and the content of their messages changed as well. Whereas in 1976 the Arab-speakers played second fiddle to Jewish opinions, and those quoted largely opposed the strike, by 2000 the opinions of Arab citizens were presented as a contrast to those of the Jews in an attempt to portray events from the Arab perspective. Change also occurred in the framework of the reporting itself. The most significant turning-point took place in *Yedioth Aharonoth*, where for the first time there were Arab journalists, and leaders and representatives of the group were allowed to offer alternative points of view about the incidents. Whereas the voice of Jewish reporters and Jews interviewed in 1976 was unified, by 2000 a variety of voices could be heard, both on the Jewish side and on the Israeli-Arab side, thereby to some extent fragmenting the unity. In both newspapers one could find articles and editorials about Jews who expressed sorrow, empathy, and a desire to mend the tapestry of relations between Jewish and Israeli-Arab citizens. Such articles appeared by the second day of the incidents. Likewise, Arab writers and intellectuals were allowed to express their opinions, and their articles and editorials could be found, for example, on the first page of *Yedioth Aharonoth*.

In 2000 the differences between the newspapers had increased. *Ha'aretz* and *Yedioth Aharonoth* each focus upon different target audiences, and the editorial decision-makers of the newspapers believe that their audience differs in its points of view and outlook regarding the Arab population in Israel (Avraham, 2001). As a matter of fact, interviews with journalists demonstrate different outlooks regarding the target audience. The *Yedioth Aharonoth* writers who were interviewed claimed that there is a connection between the editors' behavior and the views of the target audience. In their opinion, editors prefer not to publish positive articles about Arabs because such articles would not interest their audience. In contrast, for *Ha'aretz*, the outlook of the target audience, its preferences and what it needs to know are totally different from those of *Yedioth Aharonoth*. A reporter covering the group alleged that the newspaper staff expects him to air the problems of Arabs in the newspaper, since it is deemed important that the target audience know about them. On one hand there is the viewpoint of *Yedioth Aharonoth*, which believes that the reader is not interested in objective coverage of matters affecting the Arab population of Israel. This contrasts with *Ha'aretz*, which seeks to advance the group and its affairs by means of fair and comprehensive coverage. The differences in outlook inevitably express themselves in different coverage and attitudes between the newspapers and the group. This extinction was evident primarily in the difference between them in topics covered. For example, *Ha'aretz*, far more than *Yedioth Aharonoth*, preferred topics such as charges of discrimination by the group, reports of Arab casualties, and the opinions of Arab leaders. The latter preferred items such as attempts by Arab leaders to incite unrest, reports of Jewish casualties, and the opinions of Jewish leaders about the incidents.

During the coverage of both events, the press exhibited a tendency to adopt the interpretations and definitions provided by the security forces in order to explain, and to a certain extent to justify, the response of the security forces. When these definitions become the dominant tools of the media, the media itself becomes part of the security process. Through the newspapers' coverage, the use of "security definitions" and the linkage of the protests to other events and

events in the occupied territories, readers were in effect "prepared" to think of the events in the context of an immediate and existential threat to their lives, which in turn provided legitimacy and justification for the use of all the means at the disposal of the security forces (Koren, 1994).

Although both newspapers framed the "other" in a similar fashion, the reporting of the two newspapers definitely changed over time. In *Ha'aretz* the difference was paramount between 1976 and 2000. *Yedioth Aharonoth* portrayed a greater feeling of threat than that described in *Ha'aretz*, and the latter presented a more balanced and consistent picture. Both newspapers utilized permanent logos accompanying the coverage of the events in the initial days following the outbreak of the events – a permanent headline that went with the pages dealing with the different aspects of the events and a secondary headline that varied depending upon the subject covered on that page. A feeling of moderation was created by the relationship between the text and the pictures, between the different texts, excessive and contrasting expressions, and the graphic editing of the newspaper. The impression of moderation in *Ha'aretz* stemmed largely from the style, the lack of both pictures and emotional terms. Nevertheless, it is our opinion that the style of the articles, which focused more upon reports and was more security-establishment oriented, created the sense that an appeal to the collective seemed more rational. It should be noted that both newspapers made scant criticism of the defense establishment. *Yedioth Aharonoth* tried to portray events in the Jewish collective life of Israeli society. Moreover, the reporting in *Yedioth Aharonoth* underwent a change during the period surveyed, and the initially enflamed tone was moderated over time, reaching its peak in a lengthy research article in the weekend edition on the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Arabs.

The events of 2000 transpired in a socio-political reality marked by reciprocal relations that signified a different symbolic reality. Jewish citizens and Arab citizens alike had undergone significant changes since 1976. The Zionist armor now had cracks, ideological differences between different Jewish groups had grown, and the old rule of the elite (Kimerling & Migdal, 2001) was no longer secure. In addition, substantial changes had occurred amongst the Arab population in Israel, primarily during the last decade. A new, stable generation had arisen with a firm national identity, as well as consolidated political views. The grandchildren of the generation of 1948 and the children of those who had led the Day events in 1976 stood at the center of the political arena during the events of 2000 (Rabinowitz & Abu Bakar, 2002). Likewise, there was radical change in the media ecology accounting for the basis of the symbolic reality in which the process of representation and framing transpires. Despite the differences both between the two newspapers and the periods of the events, the distinction in press coverage between "us" and "them" still exists and is the result of a vicious cycle that has yet to be resolved. The problem is that the Jewish writer reports and broadcasts to the Jewish audience from the Jewish viewpoint. However, it is apparent that this distinction is less clear-cut than previously. Changes can be found in the prominence of Arab opinions aired, the names applied to the group, the nationality of the writers reporting and analyzing the events, the references to the names of victims, an increase in the diversity of Arab voices reflected in the articles, and so forth.

In conclusion, both similarities and differences stem from the fact that both the socio-political reality and the symbolic reality have undergone vast changes. At the same time, reciprocal relations between them have changed the process of representation and framing. A comparison between the media's behavior in the two periods provides a better understanding of the coverage of the events of 2000 than if the events were analyzed in isolation. This comparison provides us with a better perspective regarding the path taken by the media in Israel since the 1970s. Accordingly, despite the criticism we have made of the manner in which the media covered the "other," there has been a change for the better.

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*Andreas Mattenschlager & Hubert Riedle*

## **Medienkonstruktion nationaler Identitäten in Deutschland und der Schweiz, 1946-1995**

In einem gemeinsamen Forschungsprojekt untersuchten drei Universitäten die Konstruktion nationaler Identitäten durch Mainstream-Printmedien in historischer Perspektive. Die inhaltsanalytische Arbeit verfolgte das Ziel, herauszufinden, auf welche Weise die Medien das Konzept der Nationalität aufbauten, und die geschichtlichen Veränderungen aufzufindig zu machen, denen dieses Konzept zwischen 1945 und 1995 unterworfen war. Der Aufsatz stellt die Resultate der deutschen und der Schweizer Länderstudie vor.

In der deutschen Studie lag der Betrachtungsschwerpunkt auf den Veränderungsprozessen in der Konstruktion nationaler Identitäten, im Wechselspiel mit den massiven politischen und gesellschaftlichen Veränderungen in Deutschland nach dem 2. Weltkrieg. Mit den Jahren nach der Kapitulation des nationalsozialistischen Deutschlands (1945), der Teilung Deutschlands in BRD und DDR (1949) bis hin zur Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands (1990) liegen im Untersuchungszeitraum mehrere politische und gesellschaftliche Ereignisse, die massive Auswirkungen auf die nationale(n) Identität(en) vermuten lassen. Anhand der Berichterstattung über historische Aspekte sowie über die deutsch-deutschen Beziehungen werden speziell die Unterschiede zwischen der Berichterstattung in Ost- (DDR und Neue Bundesländer, NBL) und Westdeutschland (BRD und Alte Bundesländer, ABL) beleuchtet. Es zeigt sich dabei, dass die DDR-Presse deutlicher versuchte, eine neue nationale (DDR-) Identität zu etablieren. In massiverer Form wurden identitätsbildende Themen dargestellt und verwendet. Die westdeutsche Presse griff dagegen eher auf subtilere Mechanismen zurück und stellte (bei Abgrenzung von der NS-Zeit - wie die ostdeutsche Berichterstattung auch) deutlich mehr Bezüge zur gemeinsamen deutschen Vergangenheit her. Die Schweizer Studie unternahm eine quantitative Inhaltsanalyse der Identitätserzeugung durch vier Zeitungen der deutschsprachigen Schweiz vor dem Hintergrund relevanter Identitätsdimensionen und einer qualitativen Untersuchung der historischen und sozialen Veränderungen während des Untersuchungszeitraums. Einige der Ergebnisse bestätigten die vorausgehenden Erwartungen, beispielsweise in Bezug auf die durchgängige Westintegration der "neutralen" Schweiz. Im folgenden Beitrag werden jedoch die weniger offensichtlichen Aspekte der Modernisierung nationaler Identität und der zunehmenden Europaintegration besonders betont. Während sich die vier Zeitungen in ihren Berichterstattungsstilen nur vergleichsweise wenig unterschieden, konnten kontinuierliche zeitabhängige Veränderungen aufgezeigt werden, die die Modernisierung nationaler Identitäten insbesondere seit den 1970er Jahren widerspiegeln: Der unkritische Ausdruck von Nationalstolz nahm ab, traditionale Institutionen wie die Armee verloren teilweise ihren früheren Einfluss,

und die Selbstdarstellung als "einzigartige" Nation wurde weniger gängig. Diese Entwicklung geht klar mit dem Prozess der zunehmenden Europaintegration der Schweiz einher.

[Volltext \(in Englisch\)](#)

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*Andreas Mattenschlager & Hubert Riedle*

## **Media construction of national identities in Germany and Switzerland, 1946-1995**

In a joint research project of three universities the construction of national identities by mainstream print media was analyzed in historical perspective. The goal of the content-analytical approach was to find out how the media constructed a concept of nationality and to detect the historical changes which took place between 1945 and 1995. The article presents the results of the German and Swiss country studies. In the German study the focus was on processes of change in the construction of national identities in interaction with the enormous political and societal changes that have taken place in Germany since the Second World War. In the years since the capitulation of National Socialist Germany (1945), during which Germany was divided into the FRG and the GDR (1949) until reunification (1990), several political and societal events occurred which allow us to infer great effects on national identities. On the basis of the reporting of historical aspects and of German-German relationships, in particular differences between reporting in the East (GDR and new German states, [neue Bundesländer], NBL) and West Germany (FRG and old states [Alte Bundesländer], ABL) are illuminated. It was found that the GDR press clearly tried to establish a new national (GDR) identity. Identity-forming themes were presented and used in a distorted form. The West German press, to the contrary, employed more subtle mechanisms and made (in contrast to the NS period - as did East German reporting as well) more references to a common German past. The Swiss study made a quantitative content analysis of identity production by four newspapers in German-speaking Switzerland against the background of the relevant identity dimensions and a qualitative investigation of historical and social transformations throughout the study period. Some of the results confirmed previous expectations, for example, the continuing Western integration of "neutral" Switzerland. However, in the following contribution the less obvious aspects of identity modernization and growing European integration will be particularly emphasized. Whereas differences in coverage among the four papers studied were of comparatively minor importance, a continuous time-dependent change could be demonstrated, reflecting the modernization of national identities, particularly since the 1970s: Uncritical expressions of national pride declined, traditional institutions like the army lost some of their previous influence, and self-presentation as a "unique" nation became less common. This coincides clearly with the country's growing European integration.

[full text \(in English\)](#)

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Andreas Mattenschlager & Hubert Riedle

## Media construction of national identities in Germany and Switzerland, 1946-1995

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*Abstract:* In a joint research project of three universities the construction of national identities by mainstream print media was analyzed in historical perspective. The goal of the content-analytical approach was to find out how the media constructed a concept of nationality and to detect the historical changes which took place between 1945 and 1995. The article presents the results of the German and Swiss country studies.

In the German study the focus was on processes of change in the construction of national identities in interaction with the enormous political and societal changes that have taken place in Germany since the Second World War. In the years since the capitulation of National Socialist Germany (1945), during which Germany was divided into the FRG and the GDR (1949) until reunification (1990), several political and societal events occurred which allow us to infer great effects on national identities. On the basis of the reporting of historical aspects and of German-German relationships, in particular differences between reporting in the East (GDR and new German states, [neue Bundesländer], NBL) and West Germany (FRG and old states [Alte Bundesländer], ABL) are illuminated. It was found that the GDR press clearly tried to establish a new national (GDR) identity. Identity-forming themes were presented and used in a distorted form. The West German press, to the contrary, employed more subtle mechanisms and made (in contrast to the NS period – as did East German reporting as well) more references to a common German past.

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## 1. The national identities project

### 1.1 A European research project at the end of the 20th century

How do the mass media construct and reflect ideas of "nationality"? In what way has "nationalist" coverage undergone historical change, and what differences can be discerned within and between different types of newspaper? Questions like these were at the focus of a multidisciplinary research project on national identities begun as a joint undertaking by the Universities of Tampere (Finland), Konstanz (Germany) and Tartu (Estonia). With the title "Media construction of national identities in the changing state structures of post-war Europe – Nationalism and the press in Austria, Finland, Estonia, Germany and Switzerland, 1945 – 1995," this project examines the concepts and ideas of the own nation as developed by the press of the respective countries in a historical and constructivist perspective (cf. Luostarinen, 1998): A "nation" is understood as a type of community based on a variety of shared ideas and values which are built up by direct (social interaction) and indirect (mass media influence) discourse. At the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the project was motivated by momentous recent events, making it even more important to understand the underlying mechanisms of this discourse:

- Integration process in the European Union, its consequences and counter-reactions.
- Demands for regional autonomy and independence.
- Reconstruction of national identities and formation of new nation states in former socialist Europe.
- Growth of ethnic and religious minorities in Europe.
- Growth of xenophobic and racist parties and movements in many European countries.

Among the various and sometimes vague connotations of "nationalism," the project analyzes the aspect of national identity construction, more specifically the print media's contribution to it throughout the post-war period in Europe. For this purpose, a content analytical framework has been developed and applied in the various countries. The present article deals with the context and the results of the German (Mattenschlager, 1997, 1998) and Swiss (Riedle, 1997, 1998) case studies.

### 1.2 The methodological approach

The project analyzed the construction of national identities by the mainstream press of several countries, among them Germany and Switzerland. In each country the selection of newspapers to be analyzed covered the complete political spectrum from left to right. At least one national, one regional and (if available) one tabloid paper were studied. In the German and Swiss case study, these were the papers listed in Table 1.

	national	regional	tabloid <sup>1</sup>
Germany	<i>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</i> (FRG) <i>Neues Deutschland</i> (GDR/New Länder)	<i>Südkurier</i> (FRG) <i>Berliner Zeitung</i> (GDR/New Länder)	<i>Bild</i> (FRG)
Switzerland	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i> <i>Tagesanzeiger</i> <sup>2</sup>	<i>Thurgauer Zeitung</i> ( <i>Tagesanzeiger</i> )	<i>Blick</i>

Table 1: Sample of newspapers in the German and Swiss case study

The study period covered the fifty years from 1945 to 1995, and in each year at least one day of national importance (e.g. the national holiday) was selected for the sample of articles to be analyzed. For these days national identity, perspective, history, etc. can be expected to play a major role in press coverage. The complete sample included all articles, editorials and political news referring to (in a broad sense) "national identities" which were published on these days. The articles were analyzed using content-analytical coding schemes which were standardized as far as possible for

1 The tabloid papers do not cover the entire 1945 – 1995 study period. They were only published from 1953 (*Bild*) respectively 1959 (*Blick*) on.

2 The *Tagesanzeiger* was primarily considered to be a national paper. However, due to its focus on the Zurich region, it also has features of a regional paper.

the various case studies. From the resulting raw data, latent styles of identity construction were derived by means of Latent Class Analysis (LCA), a statistical method developed by Lazarsfeld (1950).

Using LCA, latent (hidden, not directly apparent from frequency tables) styles and argumentation structures can be identified. These styles are thereby described through the respective probabilities of appearance of the content-analytical variables. The occurrence of these styles can then be regarded in a second step in the context of defined criteria (e.g., passage of time, comparison of newspapers, East-West comparison) (cf. Kempf, 2002).

### 1.3 Variables and samples of the case studies

In the construction of the variables to be studied, an attempt was made to collect the greatest amount of comparable information in the individual sub-studies. Against the background of national peculiarities and approaches, there were also a range of specific groups of variables in the individual studies. The results presented in this article refer only to selected groups of variables from the original studies, however(cf. Table 2).<sup>3</sup> By year and newspaper, the reporting was analyzed on at least one day. This was respectively a day with particular national significance. While in the Swiss sub-study this was the same day over the entire research period, in the German sub-study – due to political changes – the day studied varied over the course of time (cf. Table 3).

Germany	German-German Relations Historical Aspects
Switzerland	"Patriotism" Militarism European Relations Neutrality

Table 2: Selected variable groups from the German and Swiss case studies.

<b>Germany</b>			
FRG	1946-1953	8 May	Anniversary of the end of the Second World War
	1949	23 May	Proclamation of the Basic law of the FRG (Grundgesetz)
		7 October	Founding of the GDR
	1954-1990	17 June	Anniversary of the workers' revolt in the GDR (national holiday)
	1990	3 October	German reunification
	1991-1995	3 October	Anniversary of German reunification (national holiday)
GDR & new states	1946-1949	8 May	Anniversary of the end of the Second World War
	1949	23 May	Proclamation of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the FRG
		7 October	Founding of the GDR
	1950-1989	7 October	Anniversary of the founding of the GDR (national holiday)
	1990	3 October	German reunification
	1991-1995	3 October	Anniversary of German reunification (national holiday)
<b>Switzerland</b>			
	1946-1995	1 August	National holiday

Table 3: Selected study days

3 Beyond this, relevant stylistic devices were collected in the articles studied: the use of illustrations, reference to national symbols, historical reference time points and national points of reference.

In all, the following sample sizes shown in Table 4 resulted for the two country studies:

		Number of articles
<b>Germany<sup>4</sup></b>		
	<i>Neues Deutschland</i> (GDR / New Länder)	103
	<i>Berliner Zeitung</i> (GDR / New Länder)	108
	<i>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</i> (FRG)	103
	<i>Südkurier</i> (FRG)	118
	<i>Bild</i> (tabloid, FRG)	142
	<b>Total</b>	<b>574</b>
<b>Switzerland</b>		
	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	139
	<i>Thurgauer Zeitung</i>	102
	<i>Tagesanzeiger</i>	114
	<i>Blick</i> (tabloid)	46
	<b>Total</b>	<b>401</b>

Table 4: The sample of analyzed articles

## 2. Germany: The division of a nation

### 2.1 The historical situation in Germany after World War II

From the perspective of nationalism, the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany on 8 May 1945 marked the end of a very eventful and dramatic period in recent history. Starting with World War I (1914-18), nationalistic ideologies and sentiments had been manifest in all European countries and the first democratic state in Germany, the "Weimar Republic," lasting from 1919 to 1933, had failed to come to terms with economic challenges and the national humiliation of a lost war. All this had prepared the ground for the rise of National Socialism and ushered in the most ominous era in German history, characterized by genocide and the commencement of World War II.

A new era in German history then began with the end of the war and the division of German territory into four occupation zones by the victorious Allies. By introducing a currency reform in June 1948 within the boundaries of the three western occupation zones, the economic union (agreed upon at Potsdam) was abandoned, and the division of Germany into East and West took its course. With the passage of the "Basic Law" (serving as a constitution) in West Germany (23 May 1949) and the founding of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) on 7 October 1949, Germany was divided into two separate states. Although the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was intended by its founders to be only temporary, tendencies to create a separate state can be observed during this period.

The working class revolt in East German cities on 17 June 1953 was regarded in the Federal Republic as a manifestation of the people's protest against a repressive regime in the GDR, and was, in consequence, declared a national public holiday for the purpose of keeping alive the ultimate goal of the re-unification of the two German states.

In the following years the polarization was exacerbated by both the FRG and the GDR, each integrated into the two opposing military alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact respectively, and by the erection of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961.

On 6 April 1968 the GDR introduced a "Socialist State of the German Nation," followed by enforced passport and visa requirements at its borders (also for citizens from the FRG traveling to Berlin, or crossing GDR territory). However, as early as the mid-1960s channels of communication began to be opened between the political leadership in both German states. One of the chief results of this was the "Treaty on the Foundations of Mutual Relations" (Grundlagenvertrag),

4 In the below-discussed East-West comparisons the articles in the *Bild-Zeitung* are not considered, since no equivalent existed on the East German side.

signed by both partners on 21 December 1972. In consequence of this political agreement between two separate co-existing German states, both were admitted to membership in the United Nations (18 September 1973).

In the early 80's the rivalry, and with it the polarization, between East and West reached a peak, which also left a distinctive mark on the relations between the two German states, still separated by one of the most heavily fortified lines of demarcation between the world's big-power blocs.

Not until the mid-1980s did a policy of rapprochement between the political leaders of East and West Germany begin to take shape, encouraged by the Soviet Union's "Perestroika" policy. May 1989 marked the onset of a wave of GDR citizens crossing over to the West via Hungary. The activities of certain groups within the GDR opposed to the regime gained momentum and culminated in – and, in fact, brought about political changes there (September, 1989). November 9th of that year was the day the Berlin Wall fell, which – after almost 40 years – was seen as symbolizing the reunification of Germany. It was officially celebrated the following year on 3 October 1990.

## 2.2 The national situation after World War II

Focusing on the developments and changes in national identity(-ies) in Germany after World War II certainly implies taking note of some important aspects of the German situation.

First of all, after 1949 people belonging to a single nation now lived in two distinct political systems within the framework of two opposing super-power military alliances. In consequence, post-war national identity(-ies) necessarily evolved along two diverging, and indeed contrary, lines over a longer period of time. A very interesting question is how, and to what extent, the media actually contributed to creating two new, distinctly different collective identities at the expense of the old, common national identity in post-war Germany.

The coverage given by the press to *the relationship between the now "two German states"* is, therefore, among others, an extremely relevant aspect.

One has to keep in mind, though, that the concept of "nationality" had been, in the more recent past, grossly abused by Hitler to legitimize his policy of brute force, violence and oppression. As a result, the attitudes of post-war generations in Germany towards the "national heritage" were clearly negative. An important factor contributing to the formation of a nation's collective identity is its national history. Yet, with respect to the two new German states, the most recent period in Germany's history did not lend itself to serving as a suitable basis to rebuild the former seriously-damaged national identity. Another interesting point in the study of post-war Germany is the way in which the media, under these auspices, handled these "*historical aspects*."

## 2.3 The forbidden past

Which facets contribute to a definition of the concept of "nationalism"? Although the answer to this question is still disputed, there appears to be a kind of consensus with regard to the relationship between national identity and commonly-shared, unifying memories – in other words: national history – as an important community-building factor among the members of a nation (Deutsch 1966, Koenen 1975, Alter 1985, Uffelmann 1994, Dann 1996).

In contrast to other criteria commonly used to characterize "national identity," e.g., territory, language, religion, etc., history is one such criterion defining "nationalism" which – because the writing of history cannot be totally objective – is subject to selective perception, interpretation, and perhaps even manipulation. The presentation of history in a national context, and particularly its evaluation, can be used to influence the evolution of "national identity" in a very direct manner, because it is presented to the public in an already "processed" version; e.g., some aspects of history are presented as "good," while others may be labeled "bad," i.e., as running counter to "national identity."

In the German context, therefore, the way one handles data on "national identity" is interesting to observe from two different viewpoints.

First, the coverage of the latest historical events that were commonly shared by all Germans, in particular the crimes against humanity of the Nazi-era and World War II.

Second, the process of coming to terms with an ambivalent situation: two evolving political entities, competing with each other, yet sharing the same historical background as a common basis of their new collective identities. How do the printed media, when referring to historical aspects, impress upon the public the polarization or solidarity between the now two German nations?

The answer to the first question is not really surprising: both German states certainly handled the hard facts of their most recent common history (i.e., the Nazi-past) in terms of a radical break with the past and a counter-identity. The

new German states were aware of the brutality and the resulting crimes of their recent past. The newly-evolving Germany(-ies), with their young generation(s), both in the present as well as in the future, were definite about what they were not going to be: fascist, brutal, intolerant. This logic was used to create an important common basis for the identity of the new states and their citizens. Certainly, this aspect of national identity did not evolve solely from within these new nations, it was in the first place strongly suggested and emphasized by the Allies.

In the press-coverage of both German political systems, this logic can be found in terms of negative historical points of reference, and as logical arguments within the LCA. Also, it is not surprising that the same observation could be made in the later socialist GDR, even more so than in the FRG.

A second question is how the printed media handled the problem that after 1949 people with the same historical background lived in two different state systems which, at least in a rudimentary way, tried to create two new, distinctive and separate national identities. Can one observe movements toward isolation or rapprochement in the media coverage of national celebrations and public holidays? One first indication could be seen in the use of historical points of reference in relevant articles. While reading the articles, I took brief notes on these references, and I came to some interesting conclusions: The papers in East Germany were more likely to cite the end of World War II (cf. above) and aspects of the passage of time of the already-divided Germany as positive historical points of reference (five times as often as in West German papers!). Historical aspects of a single German state as positive points of reference, as had been the case before 1933, and as occasionally referred to in the West German press, were practically ignored in the GDR-papers. These, probably, can be seen as indications that in East German papers there were stronger tendencies to emphasize a new, distinctly different and separate national identity. Connections and links to a common German history were not mentioned. The historiography of the GDR within the context of the construction of a collective identity beginning with National Socialism, as a negative reference, leads to the foundation of the German Democratic Republic and the development of socialism, which were viewed as positive achievements. The East German media seemed to emphasize a socialist identity as something new – beyond the then current German identity – but with a duty to debate the latest phase of German history; to make sure that recent history would not be repeated. This tendency can be also be observed in the LCA results below (style 3).

The West German media, on the other hand, attempt to build bridges and links to almost every era in German history, trying to put to use the historical experiences gained before the Nazi-era as the common backdrop for an all-German historical identity, therefore considering itself to be the legitimate successor to this German history (e.g., the "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation" or the "Weimar Republic").

Including the LCA results makes the analysis more differentiated (cf. Figures 1-2).

What is shown here are four distinct types (styles) of press coverage with regard to historical argumentation in relevant articles. First, style 1 can be found more frequently than average when employed by national papers like the FAZ for the FRG, and *Neues Deutschland* for the GDR. Here, the theory of "two German states" is discussed as controversial, and at the same time, the international context is described in terms of complementation (it is the only style using this aspect!). This is the style that tries to come to terms with the National Socialist past in discussing the situation of a divided Germany. Interestingly – and here it is comparable to style 2 –, their usage does not show much difference between East and West German papers. Variations in the use of this style reflect different political situations. So, this style is very prevalent after the end of World War II, and also at the time of, and after, re-unification.

Style 2, as already mentioned, which is only slightly more frequent in East German media, is characterized by a negative assessment of the division of Germany and by a critical discussion of the eras of unified Germany. It must be stressed that this style becomes most prominent after re-unification.


So far, and surprisingly enough, the differences in the media-coverage of historical material between the FRG and GDR are very small.

The most frequent style – which is common to all of the analyzed papers – is style 4. This style does not in any way make use of historical arguments. Yet, this non-usage of historical arguments is clearly more frequent in West German papers.

By comparison, in the East German press another style is very typical. Style 3 (already mentioned above) only appears in *Neues Deutschland* and the *Berliner Zeitung* and can therefore be termed a typically East German way of handling the issue. In this style, historical aspects of divided Germany are assessed positively, a clean break with Nazi-Germany is demonstrated, and the international context is portrayed in terms of conflict. This type of argumentation, a specialty of the GDR press, becomes extremely prominent in the periods following the political agreements during the period of co-existence of the two separate state entities; for example 1969-1974: with the signing of the "Treaty on the Foundations of Mutual Relations" on Dec. 21, 1972, and subsequently, the admission of the two Germanys as equal member states to the United Nations on Sept. 18, 1973. As far as the GDR was concerned, this turn of events was seen and can be



interpreted as a forceful attempt to establish its own history, independent of and distinct from the FRG and the former common history. In other words, the LCA here plausibly illustrates the effort to create a new GDR identity, or at least a new common history for East German citizens. Its main significance is that it starts with the end of World War II (and fascism as a counter-identity) and emphasizes the development and the advantages of Socialism achieved in the years following the foundation of the Republic.




**1+** Positive evaluation of aspects of shared German history (before 1933 or after 1990). **1-** Negative evaluation of these aspects. **2-** Negative evaluation of aspects of German history during the Third Reich (1933-1945). **3+** Positive evaluation of aspects of divergent German history (1945-1990). **3-** Negative evaluation of these aspects. **4+** Emphasis on the cultural unity of East and West Germany / reference to the shared cultural past. **5+** International history: mention of periods of fruitful cooperation with other states and/or representation of unnecessary wars and conflicts with other states. **5-** International history: emphasis on conflicts and wars (as means to enforce rights) and/or definition and presentation of national enemies and/or demands for retribution and revenge.

Figure 1: Construction of historical aspects in the German Press

The main results with regard to the coverage of historical aspects can thus be summarized as follows:

1. Both German states demonstrate a clear and uncompromising break with National Socialism as a common basis for a new historical identity. This effort is more apparent in the publications of the East German press.
2. The attempts to build a new history found in the examined material appear to be more intensive in the East German sub-sample than in that of the FRG.
3. The West German print media try to create links and points of reference to nearly all eras of German history, while, in contrast, argumentation in the East starts in most cases as late as the end of World War II. The period before that is practically ignored by East German media when reflecting on GDR-history, thus creating a particular GDR-image. In other words, it can be observed that the GDR media try to break with the past common German history and build something new and different: a socialist identity. The style typical for this argumentation is most prominent during the period of the political co-existence of two German entities.



**Style 1** (15,0%) is characterised by an argumentation in which the era of „two German states“ is discussed in a controversial manner. **Style 2** (7,8%) is characterised by a negative assessment of the division of Germany. **Style 3** (6,5%) is characterised by a positive assessment of the division of Germany. In **Style 4** (70,6%) historical aspects are rarely mentioned.

Figure 2: Construction of historical aspects over the course of time

## 2.4 The image of the other German state

A rough chronology of the time-span in which Germany was divided into two parts was presented earlier in this chapter. Because of the peculiarity of this situation, it seems necessary to include some further results concerning the relationship between the two German states in this chapter.

After the division of Germany by the Allies at the end of the war there were mainly three aspects defining the relationship between the two German states within the context of national identities:

- the question of the re-unification of the state-systems, either 'yes' or 'no', as a political goal,
- the question of the legitimacy of either state-system, and
- the obvious and threatening rivalry and antagonism between East and West Germany.

*Re-unification of the two German state-systems as a political goal?* Hardly any other topic was as heatedly and provocatively discussed in the FRG between 1945 and 1989. The arguments and political statements on the matter differed greatly depending on diverging basic political views, often heated up by a very fluid national and international situation. For example: "German Unification through West-integration" could – with the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 – no longer serve as a model, for which it was neither useful nor even credible. It was then replaced by the idea that (instead of a unification of two separate state-systems), the goal of national unity should be given a chance. One result was that by politically acknowledging each other as separate states – (a beginning was made in 1963 with the first signed agreement on passports for West-Berliners, enabling them to visit their relatives in East Berlin, and the "Eastern Treaties") – improvements on a humanitarian level between the two German states could be achieved.

Younger Germans, born after the division of Germany, perceived the "reality of two German states" as a rather normal situation. As a result, the sentiment of a commonly shared identity between the two groups of citizens grew weaker among younger Germans. However, the political discussion of re-unification, with its arguments for and against, was – on the intellectual, cognitive level – a significant point of reference, and it remains an important factor which has to be kept in mind when studying the evolution of national identity(-ies) in Germany.

*Legitimacy of either state-system.* Linked very closely with the discussion of re-unification is the question of the legitimacy of each respective German state. Concerns like international recognition and the opening of diplomatic relations, in line with international standards between two sovereign states, demarcate this problem.

It seems obvious that accepting the other state as sovereign certainly had repercussions for the core of one's own self-image (for example: was the FRG only a temporary institution for as long as re-unification had not, as yet, been achieved, or was it a sovereign state with its own vision of the future, i.e., independently of the GDR?).

*Rivalry, antagonism between West- and East Germany.* Studying the articles in the print media from 1949 to 1995 which are relevant to the empirical analysis gave an impression of the day-to-day usage of the mass-media: the other German state (i.e., from my view-point the GDR) is presented as a kind of gauge enabling me to calibrate and assess the FRG's potentials and achievements. A direct comparison with the "other" Germany is a frequently used argumentative figure in all examined papers, both East and West German. The economic and social situation, (as well as soccer and other sports, which unfortunately were not included in this analysis) in the "other Germany" is, according to this kind of logic, often used as a first point of reference for analysis and reports on one's own "superior" performance. This manner of drawing a comparison with, and at the same time dissociating oneself from, the "other" (in the sense of: "That is how they do things, but we are much better") is certainly a mechanism fostering the process of division, and diminishing sentiments like "we belong together."

Finally, it seems to be very important in all this not to lose sight of the overall international political context within which these German-German observations took place: after 1955, when the FRG became a member of NATO, and the GDR joined the Warsaw Pact, the dividing line between the two German states automatically became the frontier between the two formidable military alliances facing each other across the Iron Curtain. Along the inner-German border, this frontier was very real, something to be taken seriously, and therefore more threatening than other lines of demarcation around the world. During the years of the Cold War, international disagreements and mutual distrust left their marks on the respective image of the other German state, in this way deepening the dissolution of a formerly shared national identity.

It is interesting to observe these aspects in the context of the LCA-results (cf. Figure 3-4):

*Re-unification of the two German state-systems as a political goal?* The relevant items can be found most frequently in Style 3. This style appears in East and West German papers, but the focus of attention shifts somewhat over time. It is prominent at one very definite point in time (i.e., immediately after World War II), but it is most frequent after re-unification. However, it shifts to a critical discussion of the situation in the period after re-unification, replacing the earlier for or against argumentation.

Another style employs this aspect very often: style 6, a typically West German style, appears throughout the post-war period. A few critical statements on the topic are clearly out-weighted by twice as many positive arguments. This argument in favor of re-unification as a political goal is enforced by the favorable documentation of the Western political system and goes hand-in-hand with a denigration of the GDR. The justification for this claim lies, therefore, in the socio-political context. All other styles use arguments slightly in favor of re-unification, but not to a great extent. As long as Germany was divided, this topic appeared (to a noticeable degree) only in West German papers.

*Legitimacy of a state system.* As for the question of re-unification, this is also an aspect seriously discussed in only West German papers. There is only one style dealing with argumentation on this: style 7. This style treats the question as controversial. And here again, the argumentation is based on the assumed superiority of the West German socio-political system. It appears mainly in the FAZ and was very prominent from 1969 to 1976. This was the era when the Social Democrats entered into a coalition with the liberal Free Democrats to form a national government which openly favored – and, in fact, created avenues towards – peaceful co-existence with the GDR. However, compared with style 6, style 7 is less common. Style 6 appears to be a relatively predominant and enduring feature of the West German press. Style 7, on the other hand, seems to be used – mainly by the conservative FAZ – in the context of current political events, perhaps reflecting the critical voices and reactions of opposition parties.

Moreover, it may be worth mentioning that on the level of the spoken word the topic is at first glance discussed in balanced terms, however controversially. Yet, a clear answer to the question of "legitimacy" is given rather indirectly by implication: by implying that the GDR's political system is inferior to that of the FRG.

*The rivalry and antagonism between West and East Germany.* This aspect of the relationship between the two Germanys can be found in all papers.

The LCA-results regarding this topic indicate that different styles are, more or less exclusively, used by the East and West German print media. For either Germany one can identify a style focusing more on the economic system: style 2 for the West German press, and style 4 for the East German papers. In figure 3 it can be seen that East German style 4 is quite obviously more assertive, even bombastic, in its argumentation than style 2. In every article of style 4 the GDR economic and political system is assessed in a positive manner. Both aspects are slightly devaluated for the FRG. In contrast, West German style 2 focuses on economic aspects only. The positive evaluation of the Western system is complemented here by the devaluation of the GDR economic system. The argumentation in style 2 is not as suggestive as in style 4, and it does not appear to be as frequent.




Figure 3: Construction of German-German relations in the German press


Two other styles concentrate more on socio-political aspects. For the West German press, style 7, mentioned above (as found mainly in the FAZ), argues in this context chiefly against the socio-political system of the GDR, sometimes mentioning positive aspects of the West German system. Both argumentations are somewhat complemented by their opposites, which creates the impression of a more differentiated argumentation. Style 5, taking up this topic in the East German papers, appears to be more direct in its approach: characteristically this style discredits the FRG system (the most prominent aspect of this particular style) and comments favorably on the East German system. Again, it is more frequent than its West German equivalent.

Rivalry – in terms of comparison – appears to be very important in all papers. But the examined sample of the GDR-press seems to emphasize this aspect more heavily and in a more direct manner, as well as more frequently, than the comparable West German samples.

Other results on the relationship between the two German states:

The coverage in East and West German papers, once again, shows significant differences. Only style 3 (most prominent after re-unification) is used in both sub-sub-samples in a comparable way. The presses in the FRG and the GDR handle this topic in clearly different ways. The styles typical of the East German press disappear almost completely after 1990. They are replaced by the argumentation typical of the pre-unification FRG.

Another interesting aspect focuses on the comparison of the inter-personal relations of citizens in East and West Germany. The West German papers more often emphasize differences between people on the personal level in East and West Germany. Moreover, the discussion of differences between the people of either former state is very prominent after re-unification (style 3); this is a phenomenon which certainly contributes little, if anything at all, to the process of integration. It can probably be interpreted as a "documentation of stunned bewilderment" at the rifts that had developed over nearly 50 years between the two separate German entities.



**Style 1** (41,8%): little mentioning of the theme. **Style 2** (4,3%): comparison of the economic systems I (mainly east-german papers). **Style 3** (8,3%): clear agreement with (or demand for) reunification I (east- and west-german papers). **Style 4** (7,7%): comparison of the economic systems II (mainly west-german papers). **Style 5** (13,45 %): comparison of the political systems I (mainly east-german papers). **Style 6** (17,8%) clear agreement with (or demand for) reunification II (mainly west-german papers). **Style 7** (6,6 %): comparison of the political systems II (mainly west-german papers)

Figure 4: Construction of German-German relations over the course of time

The main results of this part, therefore, may briefly be summarized as follows:

1. The Coverage in the GDR press clearly shows the attempt to establish a new national identity. The legitimacy of the other state system and the goal of re-unification are ignored.
2. Rivalry (i.e., antagonism), which is a preoccupation in East and West German papers, appears to be more pronounced and suggestive in the GDR-media. This, in my view, can be interpreted as an attempt to allege and/or propagate one's own superiority and independence within the context of socio-economics as a basis for a new collective national identity.

3. Coverage in West German papers appears to be more subtle, yet at the same time it also displays a high degree of conflict, sending a somewhat different signal – the main message here would seem to be not: “Our new German state can exist as an independent and sovereign entity,” but rather: “The GDR is on the wrong track.”

Following this line of argument, the claim to re-unification and the discussion of the legitimacy of the other state system (as proposed in the more conservative FAZ) can then be viewed as simply logical.

### **3. Switzerland: From institutional isolation to growing European integration**

#### **3.1 The “multicultural” background of Swiss national identity**

Remembering the goal of analyzing the media production of changing national identities in post-war Europe, one could ask whether the Swiss media are of any interest: Switzerland was not actively involved as a combatant in the two World Wars (so the notion of a post-war period could be doubted), has a long-established and consistently pursued policy of political and military neutrality and is a small non-EU country for which worldwide relations with trading and financial market partners outside Europe were a reality even at a time when hardly anybody used the term “globalization.” Throughout the whole post-war period Switzerland enjoyed internal stability, and its relations with other countries were also very stable. However, a second glance at these characteristics indicates the usefulness of more profound analyses, for example, in order to find out whether the media have also produced stable national identities and what the consequences of internal social transformations and European integration are for the expression of journalists’ viewpoints on the nation. These analyses were carried out in a historical perspective focusing on the daily newspapers of the country’s German-speaking areas, where in fact the most influential media are located.

One of the most striking features of Swiss society is the great variety of life styles, cultural situations, socio-economic backgrounds, values and political attitudes to be found among its 7 million inhabitants. Unlike stereotypical images of Switzerland as typically a rural and mountainous country, the vast majority of the population lives in the Swiss midlands, which could be considered a single conurbation spread over the rather flat areas between the Alps and the Jura mountains, from the Northeast (Lake Constance) to the Southwest (Lake Geneva). In spite (or because?) of its small size, Switzerland is one of the most international and multicultural countries in Europe, not only due to its four official languages, but also to its long tradition of immigration, encouraged, on the one hand, by economic prosperity, social opportunities, and, on the other hand, by political and economic crises in immigrants’ home countries. The percentage of foreigners is particularly high in centers of industry, trade and diplomacy like Geneva and Basel, where in some urban districts it exceeds 50%. At Zurich Technical University (ETH), more than 40% of the scientific staff come from abroad, contributing to an international atmosphere which is still unusual in other parts of Europe: In the words of its president (of German origin), the ETH is “a window on the world which has no equivalent in Germany.” Similarly, some French-speaking regions of the *Romandie* (like Geneva, the second largest city) are “windows on the world,” partly culturally oriented towards Paris and sometimes severely critical of the conservative mentalities and remaining cultural borders in the central and eastern parts of Switzerland.

If one looks at external relations, the traditional “global” orientation of Swiss foreign policy and economic policy was not limited to Western Europe, the focal point of most current efforts for political and economic integration. Some Swiss citizens regret that this orientation has given way to a more “European” or “internal” perspective: As former ambassador August R. Lindt, then 95 years old, once pointed out in an interview: “In my opinion the EU is simply too small. For me, internationally Switzerland is of global importance and not limited to the EU. Switzerland ought to play a global role again, mediating for example between the rich countries and the Third World. ... Switzerland should join the world instead of the EU.” Should this position be considered simply an old man’s exaggerated national self-esteem, or rather the basis of a kind of globalization which includes humanitarian responsibility and cultural openness going beyond economic “shareholder value”? (cf. *Tagesanzeiger* 1999).

The multiple overlap of linguistic, political, regional and religious loyalties has been considered one of the most important factors for the maintenance of stability (cf. Schwander 1977, Steiner & Obler 1977). The linguistic regions do not defend their interests as homogenous blocks, but have their internal micro-structures and act according to these various loyalties and the long federal tradition. The fact that there have been no attempts to abolish cultural differences by state pressure, but, on the contrary, there is official encouragement of diversity (provided it remains within the boundaries of the “consensual” framework) could explain the absence of violent ethnic conflicts since the 1848 Federal State’s foundation. Whereas in most other “multicultural” states ethnic conflicts have expressed themselves in open violence, in Switzerland they could be dealt with by the well-established procedures of consensus-oriented bargaining and decision-making, leaving the Jura conflict the only example of a more complicated political situation. The well-known instruments of direct democracy, referendum and initiative have further contributed to the development of “consociational democracy” (a concept developed by political scientists, esp. in the Netherlands: cf. Daalder 1971, Steiner & Obler 1977): This term means the ongoing effort to find a political compromise before a decision is taken, in order to maintain

the consensus principle as society's essential basis. In their analysis, however, Steiner & Obler conclude that Swiss history and the present situation could only to some extent be described by the original concept of "consociationalism." They explained the rare expression of open ethnic hostilities with other factors, including the high general level of prosperity, leaving no group with a feeling of "relative deprivation," and the similar international status of the two major languages, German and French. In addition, they referred (as early as 1977) to the slow pace of innovation as a by-product of consensus-oriented systems. Indeed, disappointment with the political system has grown in recent years, especially since the official 700th anniversary celebrations held by Switzerland in 1991. Major events which contributed to this frustration were the rejection of the treaty on the European Economic Area (EEA) in the December 1992 referendum, the economic recession of the 1990s, the recent crises or even bankruptcy of businesses which were once sources of national pride (ABB, Credit Suisse, Swissair) and the discussion of Switzerland's role in the Second World War, highlighting its economic relations with Nazi Germany and restrictive refugee policy.

This short introduction to the "multicultural" background of Swiss national identity was included because the study which produced the following results is in fact limited to the content analysis of 400 news articles and editorials in the *German-speaking Swiss press* (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, *Tagesanzeiger*, the tabloid *Blick* and a regional paper, *Thurgauer Zeitung*), which appeared on national holidays (August 1) between 1946 and 1995. Voting results of federal referenda and initiatives indicate that the *Romandie* differs in the judgment of "delicate" political issues – like European integration, immigration policy, ecological and transport policy and military issues. Even though a difference among linguistic regions may also be discerned in media coverage, it is by no means the only one of relevance. For example, voting behavior also differs between the urban conurbations of German-speaking Switzerland (Zurich, Basel, Berne) and more rural/mountainous areas.

### 3.2 The institutional process of European integration

After a very slim majority of only 50.3% of voters had rejected Switzerland's Federal decision on joining the EEA on 6 December 1992, it took more than six years to find an alternative solution for Swiss participation in the process of European integration. The voters' "no" shocked large segments of the political élites which had prepared the treaty, but was in accordance with other votes against increased institutional integration, like the rejection of UN membership in 1986 (in another vote in 2002 Switzerland finally joined the UN), which have sometimes been explained by the fact that anonymous "big" bureaucracies are distrusted by people accustomed to basic democratic decision-making procedures. For the government (Federal Council), which had already applied for full EU membership before, the "EEA no" meant that bilateral negotiations with the EU were the only possible way to end institutional isolation, even if not in complete accordance with official EU philosophy, which only foresees "common policy" and an automatic transposition of internal market rules by *acquis communautaire*, but no individual paths for individual countries. The results of bilateral negotiations are a series of interrelated documents or *dossiers* on the most important political and economic issues of institutional integration, like free trade, technical harmonization, freedom of movement, land and air transport, agriculture, public procurement, research, internal security and participation in EU programs (e.g., media, statistics, environment). The first series of bilateral treaties came into force in summer 2002, almost ten years after the 1992 vote.

The slow process of political or institutional integration contrasts with Switzerland's traditionally intense process of economic and cultural integration. Due to its geographical position at the very center of Western Europe, cultural exchanges with all European (and also non-European) countries have always been important, as the high percentage of foreigners (nearly a fifth of the resident population) and the opportunities for multilingualism clearly demonstrate. In economic terms, Switzerland belongs to the group of "small open economies" which have high levels of export-oriented external trade, high status as financial and service centers and good preconditions for international economic activities, including political stability, liberalized financial markets, a central geographical position and an excellent transport and communication infrastructure (Kriesi 1998). However, since the end of the Cold War political neutrality is assessed differently in the international context and is no longer accepted as a sound principle of foreign policy. Kriesi (1998) postulates that new international challenges have split the Swiss population into two ideologically clearly different groups which can less and less be reconciled by the traditional procedures of consensus and compromise: "One group demands an even stronger retreat and conjures up the old myths, whereas the other favors self-criticism and an opening towards the international sphere. ... The split is particularly evident in referenda on issues which are central to the "myth of Switzerland": military, employment, immigrants and foreign policy. A cleft has opened between a rural Switzerland highly attached to traditions and a modern, urban Switzerland. Both groups are not primarily divided along the well-known political borders, but represent a conflict between two life styles: The one dominated by the traditional values of family, church, work and home region, the other by anti-authoritarian values and a striving for individual emancipation. The issue separates younger and older generations, geographically more and less flexible persons as well as men and women with higher educational levels and the rest of the population." Supporting this hypothesis are some recent results of parliamentary elections where ideological differences between the parties have sharpened and industrialist Christoph

Blocher's right-wing SVP party gained strength. Blocher is a clear adversary of institutional integration and claims that Swiss EU membership would mean higher taxes, more unemployment and more bureaucracy.

From the perspective of political science, one main question is whether the most efficient way of influencing decision-making on the European level is a high degree of formal/institutional integration, or rather "standing apart" and using informal instruments to exert influence. In one recent working paper, Kux (1998) analyzes this question for transport policy, an issue where the "communitarization" of decisions (the transfer of competences from member states to the European Commission) has made much progress in recent years. His results and conclusions may in part be transferred to other policy areas. According to Kux, the relative openness of EU institutions and procedures offers non-member states numerous options for participation. In the specific case of Switzerland's opportunities to influence EU transport policy, there are a range of other favorable conditions, like the transit function of Switzerland, the interdependence of different policy aspects and the innovative role of Swiss policy, providing a "first mover advantage" in the European context. Another opportunity is the growing influence of sub-state and non-governmental levels (intermediary organizations), which ease the articulation of interests, widen the basis of EU policy and partly compensate for the "democratic deficiencies" of the formal Community institutions. Intermediary organizations have the potential for influencing decision-making in changing "advocacy coalitions" beyond the traditional institutional focus of political procedures. On the other hand, there are clear-cut limits to non-membership, especially in areas going beyond the "conceptual phase": For decisions on "hard policy," like taxes or financing, European procedures are relatively closed to non-member states. Among "third states" the recent focus of the European Commission has increasingly been on the relation to Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). The accession of ten new members to the EU, most of them from the CEEC, plus Romania and Bulgaria later on, will probably further reduce Swiss influence.

To sum up, the question of institutional integration, being the central issue of foreign policy, ought to be considered a central theme in the analysis of the media production of national identities. How are the varying levels of integration assessed in the press? Do coverage styles differ from "public opinion," as expressed in referenda and initiatives? How do the described transformations of social structures and ideological loyalties, as discernible in media coverage, interact with the judgment of integration policy? Are there differences between a short-term and a long-term perspective? In the following section I will try to approach these questions using the content analysis results for four papers: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, *Tagesanzeiger*, *Blick* and *Thurgauer Zeitung* between 1946 and 1995 (Riedle 1997).

### 3.3 Major results on modernizing national identity and European integration

The two issues of modernizing national identity and European integration are interrelated in media coverage, but the results of our content analysis do not allow us to test in detail the hypothesis of Hanspeter Kriesi (1998) that Swiss society is gradually shifting away from a nation-wide consensus towards more polarized ideological positions. However, it is possible to verify some long-term tendencies in the evolution of both aspects. By "national identity modernization" I understand an increase in individualism, pluralism and self-critical judgment of one's national history. The analysis of French-speaking papers and possibly also an extension of the analysis to the period after 1995 would probably make it possible to check some hypotheses about a "more polarized present phase." One example is the coverage of a meeting in summer 1999 of Second World War veterans, who were celebrating the 60th anniversary of national defense by the Swiss army, and General Guisan. Whereas the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* responded to the event with a very favorable comment, mentioning that it was more important than the political demonstrations of "certain minorities," some French-speaking papers referred to the veterans as a "mob" still committed to militarism and xenophobic nationalism.


Among the variable groups analyzed, the following are selected to give an impression of national identity modernization and European integration: "*patriotism*" and the assessment of one's own state (cf. Figure 5), the *role of the army* (cf. Figure 6-7), *neutrality* (cf. Figure 8) and *European relations* (cf. Figure 9-10).

The "*patriotism*" variable group is a conglomerate of variables related to national pride, the achievements of the Swiss political system, statements on citizens' national identification, and also national self-criticism, crises of the political system and the opposites of these variables. The fact that a six-style solution has been selected as best suited for the data structure indicates that the issue might be more complicated than others (like the multiculturalism group). In the most common style, found in almost exactly half of all articles, neither of the variables is frequently referred to. Sometimes (in 23% of all articles with this style) national achievements are mentioned. However, they are not used to justify or favor national pride. Considering the fact that all the texts were published on the national holiday (or the preceding or following days), it is interesting to find that half of them are not related to patriotism, national ideologies or – on the other hand – national self-criticism. The second largest class, representing 26.7% of the texts, might be described as an openly nationalistic coverage style. In nearly all cases (90%) it is characterized by expressions of national pride and references to the achievements of one's own political system. Doubts about these statements occur only very rarely. In some cases (13%) the authors mentioned national crises, but most frequently only to describe them



as manageable or to say that in the past similar problems had been resolved by the nation. Another style, representing about 11% of all texts, is characterized by national self-criticism. National pride is considerably more often questioned (46%) than affirmed (22%), and in many cases (34%) even the importance of national achievements is doubted. All the articles of this group express national self-criticism, and frequently (35%) there are references to crises. In contrast to the second style, there are no references to the potentials of crisis management or problem-solving.


The remaining three styles represent only small percentages (between 3% and 6%) of the material. The differences in style usage between the four papers analyzed were not statistically significant. However, it is interesting to analyze the statistically-significant differences in coverage styles between the post-war periods: The "patriotic" style decreases continuously between the late 1940s (80% – but keep in mind that the articles appeared on the national holiday) and the 1970s and later stabilizes at a low level. The neutral or self-critical styles, on the other hand, display an opposite tendency: Whereas in the 1940s and 1950s they were rather marginal, they represent more than three-quarters of national holiday coverage in the 1980s. The direct expression of national self-criticism peaked in the 1970s, identifying this as a period of national modernization and critical debates where positions characteristic of earlier periods were reversed. In the 1980s and 1990s the consequences of this turning point persisted (as shown by the relatively small changes occurring then), but, on the other hand, there was again a modest movement toward the opposite, "patriotic" direction.



**Style 1** (4,3%) often refers to pride and national achievements, but discusses controversially the question of national identification in Switzerland. **Style 2** (3,3%) is a more emphasized version of a "patriotic style", characterized by references to pride and national achievements. National self-criticism is always rejected. **Style 3** (5,8%) can be described as a more subtle version of a "self-critical" coverage. **Style 4** (49%) comprises none or few of the analysed variables and refers sometimes to national achievements. "Patriotic" issues do not play an important role here, and the own state is dealt with in a relativ unideological way. **Style 5** (10,9%) is an openly self-critical style which questions national pride and achievements. National crises are frequently mentioned, and there are many self-critical statements. **Style 6** (26,7%) can be described as an openly patriotic style, emphasizing national pride and achievements in nearly all cases. Self-critical expressions occur rarely, but sometimes crises are mentioned and described as manageable.

Figure 5: Construction of patriotism over the course of time

In the "militarism" variable group, it is possible to find another argument for Switzerland's strong Western political integration, which has already been confirmed by the descriptive variable "national reference points": the Cold War was also featured in the Swiss media. Among the four coverage styles identified by the quantitative content analysis, the second one describes a radicalized pro-military position, unanimously emphasizing military competence and the strength of the national army, legitimizing the army (defense of one's country, suspicion of criticism) and representing external dangers to national security while at the same time omitting criticism of a military-oriented security policy. This style could be found in 6.6% of the analyzed articles, whereby its frequency never exceeded 7% – with the exception of the 1950 – 1959 period, when the Cold War was at its peak, while style 2 was used in 22.5% of the articles. Style 1 is a rather moderate pro-military position which reached a frequency of almost 30% in the fifties and sixties, but decreased rapidly later on (only 6.5% of press articles in the 1990s were written in that style).




**1+** Military competence and power of one's own army is emphasized and/or demands for disarmament are rejected. **1-** Doubt / denial / questioning. **2+** Internationalization of national security, emphasis on alliances (including those Switzerland does not belong to) and/or presentation of an external danger. **2-** Doubt / denial / questioning of external dangers. **5+** Legitimation of the military: It is said that the only task of the military is the defense of one's own country and/or doubt / denial / questioning of criticism of the army's role. **5-** Criticism of the army's role, its excessive importance in society or excessive military expenditures.

Figure 6: Construction of militarism in the Swiss press

The discussion of Swiss "neutrality" also reached its peak in the 1950s. Throughout the whole postwar period, about 10% of the articles treated neutrality themes, while in the 1950s 24% did this. When the press deals with neutrality, it usually (about two-thirds of all articles) supports it, but there are also controversial positions in about one-third of the relevant articles. So we can say that political and journalistic propaganda for the Cold War also existed in Switzerland, and Switzerland was a resolute supporter of the Western side. In the 1980s, which were marked by a second peak of the Cold War (e.g., the SDI program) and finally the breakdown of the East bloc system, neutrality was also discussed slightly more often than in the decades before. Whilst in the 1950s stronger Western integration could protect Switzerland against potential (East bloc) aggression, the disappearance of the East-West dualism gives Swiss foreign policy somewhat more flexibility, because the country is no longer at the center of international political tensions.


The "militarism" variable group gives – apart from the Cold War discussion – some impression of the role the army plays for Swiss national identity. Most of the texts (style 3, 71%) do not deal with themes relevant to the militarism variables. But already the second most frequent style (style 1, 18%) is characterized by a mostly positive view of the military. Military competence and power are often emphasized (48%), and demands for disarmament are rejected; the style also emphasizes the importance of international alliances and the danger of external enemies (internationalization of national security, 55%). Doubts about the importance of the military or general criticism are very rare or are not expressed at all. Style 2, which has already been presented, can be seen as a radicalized version of style 1. It has an overall frequency of 6.6%. The least frequent style (style 4, 3.7%) presents pro- as well as anti-military positions, with a specific emphasis on criticism of the army and military conflict management. The legitimation of military institutions is questioned in all the articles of this group. Nevertheless, this critical style is the rarest one in our sample. When Swiss media refer (on the national holiday) to the army, they do this in a largely supportive and legitimizing way. The Swiss press reflects the high social status of the militia army, seen in the regular military exercises participated in by almost all Swiss men, the omnipresence of military institutions (like barracks and military training areas) and a long tradition of discrimination

against conscientious objectors. Style differences between the four analyzed papers are not statistically significant; accordingly the rather positive view of armed defense seems to have a majority and rather consensual status.



**Style 1** (18,3%) is characterized by a mostly positive view of the military. Power and importance of the Swiss army are often emphasized and / or demands of disarmament are rejected. The style tends also to refer to external enemies and alliances. Doubts or general criticism of the military do not occur. **Style 2** (6,6%) is a more radical version of style 1. The army's power, a rejection of disarmament and legitimations of the military are mentioned in all articles of this group; often we also find references to external enemies. General criticism of the military is rather rare. **Style 3** (71,4%) doesn't mention arguments relevant for this variable group. **Style 4** (3,7%) presents balanced arguments for and against military defence with a stronger emphasis on anti-militaristic criticism. The army's legitimation is denied in all articles of this group.

Figure 7: Construction of militarism over the course of time




**Style 1** (10,2%) discusses neutrality and mostly consents to it. However, at the same time neutrality is sometimes questioned, and there are many references to Switzerland's actual engagement in foreign policy or diplomacy. In **style 2** (89,8%) all neutrality related variables are rare, and only in few cases Switzerland's active foreign policy is mentioned.

Figure 8: Construction of neutrality over the course of time

The high social status of armed defense may not continue to be maintained in the future, however. As developments throughout the fifty postwar years show, pro-military styles are on the decline in favor of anti-military and neutral ones. The powerful time-dependent transformations are similar to those found in other variable groups – it is suggested that we describe these striking changes as the consequence of the modernization of national identity stimulated by different

life styles (e.g., urbanization), new social movements and a progressive tendency including "national self-criticism." The less radical pro-military style 1 was detected in about one-third of the articles between 1946 and 1969, but later it declined steadily. The more radical pro-military style 2 shows much more stability since the 1960s (always between 2 and 6%), but reached its above-mentioned peak in the Cold War fifties. Articles on non-military topics (neutral, style 3) became increasingly frequent. Today they dominate press coverage, with 83% of the material. Whilst among the rest pro-military positions are still stronger than their opposite, critical articles (style 4) are on the increase. Today, in the 1990s, they have a frequency of 6.7%, whereas they were almost non-existent in the years immediately after World War II.

The generally positive attitude towards the military could be partly explained by history or rather the social construction of history. Recent Swiss history includes almost no armed violence, no cruel dictatorships and no wars with neighboring states; so the army could maintain its reputation as a peaceful, purely defensive institution which is still strengthened by its social integration. In other states the army has been discredited more often by ongoing wars and war crimes, and it is not so closely linked to society. But nevertheless it cannot be concluded that Switzerland is or has been a predominantly militaristic state. There is a strong pacifist movement for a "Switzerland without an army" (Gruppe für eine Schweiz ohne Armee) which has found much support in several elections. In the press, anti-militaristic positions are on the increase, perhaps because some constructions of history have been altered. Should it be shown that the country was spared German invasion in World War Two for economic collaboration rather than for "defensive" reasons, if the negative social consequences of militarism is increasingly acknowledged and the Eastern "enemy image" disappears, then a more critical attitude may be stimulated.




**3+** Positive evaluation of certain aspects / the idea of Swiss integration into European structures. **3-** Negative evaluation of certain aspects / the idea of Swiss integration into European structures. **4+** Abandonment of certain aspects of national sovereignty (for instance border controls, legislation) is described as reasonable / desirable in the European context. **4-** Doubt / denial / questioning of the abandonment of certain aspects of national sovereignty. **7+** Notion that the European states should get to know each other better. **8+** Emphasis on own dependence on international (political, economic...) development. **9+** Critical evaluation of Switzerland's role: Isolationism, no responsibility taken.

Figure 9: Construction of European integration in the Swiss press

As the study period begins well before the European Union was founded, the general topic of interest is not primarily the question of Swiss-EU relations, but rather the Swiss *relationship to European integration* in general. In the most frequent class of the selected four-class solution, European integration is not discussed (style 3, 83.6%). Among the remaining

styles, quantitative content analysis distinguishes a pro-integration, a counter-integration and a comprehensive style presenting arguments for both positions. A total of 8.3% of the articles contain the pro-European style 1. This means that the majority of articles relevant to the European variables favors a strengthening of economic and political internationalism – a tendency which could also be discerned in the “national reference points,” where coverage was rather favorable to European institutions. Style 1 always (in 100% of the texts) evaluates European integration in a positive way and never evaluates it in a negative way. Frequently (39% of style 1) the abandonment of certain aspects of national sovereignty is described as reasonable or desirable in the European context. Again, there are no statements opposing the abandonment of certain sovereignty aspects. Quite often we also find the notion that European nations should get to know each other better (29.5%), an emphasis on national dependence on international development (47%) and a critical evaluation of the present Swiss role (44%) as characterized by institutional isolation.

On the other hand, in style 2, which occurs in 5.4% of the sampled articles, negative evaluations (91%) of Swiss European integration are more important than positive ones (72%). Consequently, the authors are rather skeptical regarding an abandonment of sovereignty aspects in favor of European institutions (66% rejected). Variables reflecting a general internationalist attitude do not occur here. Finally, the rarest style of the sample (style 4; 2.7%) is a comprehensive one presenting balanced arguments for both positions. A potential abandonment of sovereignty aspects is at the same time both appreciated and criticized. Again we find variables reflecting a general internationalist attitude that European states should become better acquainted (56%) and a critical evaluation of the present, rather isolated Swiss role (46.5%). In spite of the balanced view, voices favoring European integration (91%) are more frequent than opposing ones (65%).



**Style 1** (8,3%) describes a pro-European position. European integration of Switzerland is always evaluated in a positive way and never evaluated in a negative way. Often, the abandonment of certain sovereignty aspects is described as reasonable or desirable in the European context. There are also often general internationalist arguments like the emphasis of one's own dependence on international development. **Style 2** (5,4%) on the contrary presents a rather sceptical position towards European integration. Negative evaluations of the integration process are more frequent than positive ones, and most of these texts reject an abandonment of certain sovereignty aspects. General internationalist variables do not occur. **Style 3** (83,6%) doesn't mention arguments relevant for this variable group. **Style 4** (2,7%) presents at the same time arguments for and against further Swiss integration into European institutions. All variables of this variable group occur frequently, including general internationalist positions. In spite of the two-sided argumentation, pro-European positions predominate over their opposite.

Figure 10: Construction of European integration over the course of time

So Swiss European integration is mostly appreciated in the press, while at the same time the population was rather skeptical, for instance in their rejection of the EEA treaty with the EU in 1992 – it is possible to observe a discrepancy between media and public opinion similar to that found for the militarism themes. A more detailed description of press coverage is provided by the time-dependent development which has been analyzed throughout the postwar decades. The development differs remarkably from the rather steady, gradual changes observed in other variable groups, such as, e.g., militarism or the production of national identities. After long years of not mentioning European integration (the irrelevant style 3 always reached 90% or more), the topic suddenly receives more journalistic attention in the 1990s, when about 29% pro-European (style 1) and 10% Europe-skeptical (style 2) articles could be distinguished. The nineties were and are the decade of Europe-relevant referenda, of the 700th Swiss anniversary celebrations, of bilateral

negotiations between Switzerland and the EU, etc. ... The press prepares and reflects public discussions, but produces a general attitude different from public opinion. In the decades before 1990, there is only one other period with European coverage worth mentioning: the period between 1950 and 1969, including, for instance, the foundation of the EFTA and early European discussions in other states. In this period, Swiss print media were mainly skeptical of Europe; thirty years later the former majority media position has been reversed.

### 3.4 Some conclusions and hypotheses on the modernization of identity

It is possible to summarize many of the above findings and especially the time-dependent transformations of major coverage styles under the idea of social modernization, which has been developed by sociology and can also be applied to national identity. Writers like Deutsch (1966), Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983) and Alter (1985) have discussed the role that modernization – the fundamental social transformations and changed values brought about by industrial societies – played for the perception of nations as new “imagined communities” and for the founding of nationalistic ideologies. It is only recently (i.e., in the post-war decades) that other social transformations took place whose impacts were compared to those of industrialization. Social scientists’ ideas of relatively static and well-defined group memberships had to give way to new approaches in contemporary “post-industrial,” “communication,” “postmodern” or “information” societies. As Luostarinen (1999) points out: “In contemporary social science the concept of collective (or social or cultural) identity has received a prominent role. In part, it has replaced concepts like class, strata, status, power position or interest group membership which are linked to the analysis of the political and economic structure of a given society. In mass media research this change reflects the shift towards approaches borrowed from cultural studies in which the active subject and his/her freedom to use mass communication for individual and often unforeseeable purposes have received more visibility. Identification refers more to active and subjective ‘identity work’ in which the individual has the opportunity to ‘pick and choose’ between various collective identities and to construct a combination and hierarchy of ‘we-ness’ which is changeable, flexible, concentric, situational, diversified and individual.”

From this point of view, it is possible to discuss the hypothesis that national identity is not just a product of some “first wave” of modernization in the 19th century, but *in itself* subject to continuous modernization parallel to additional steps and waves of social transformation. The Swiss case seems to be an ideal one to confirm this hypothesis, because “identification” is more important here for citizenship than it is in “nations” which are defined by linguistic or cultural uniformity. Even if it has always been rather difficult to obtain citizenship, there are now a number of Swiss of Italian, Portuguese, other European or even African or Asian origin, who have decided in favor of the option to integrate. “Objective” post-war history in Switzerland seems to be characterized by economic and political continuity rather than by transformation. However, in the same period there were considerable social transformations, last but not least as consequences of the relatively late industrialization process. Most important are the processes of urbanization and suburbanization which have profoundly changed the country’s originally rural structures. The forms of urban settlement in nearly all regions not situated in the mountains are just one aspect of this. Still more important is the second aspect of urbanization, concerning the transformation of life styles and economic activities, which are now similar in both conurbations and in the remaining rural areas (e.g., female employment, growth of the service sector, availability of infrastructure for transport and communication, increase in leisure time). Contrasting these partly accelerated developments, some other steps of social modernization (e.g., female suffrage) and “milestone” social events (1960s youth riots) happened later than in other countries.

The media construction of national identities during the post-war decades to a certain degree changed parallel to these gradual modifications of “objective” social realities. In most variable groups there were coverage styles which were “increasing” or “decreasing” in importance. The 1970s, and partly already the 1960s, often mark a turning point, as periods of modernization and of polarization between older generations (who did military service during the Second World War and who spent their youth in “a different” Switzerland) and younger ones. As mentioned, it was not politically incorrect, but rather self-evident in the post-war period to present oneself as “nationally conscious.” Issues like the “military” or “national community” retained their moral integrity – in this Switzerland clearly differed from the nations actively involved in wartime military operations. The stable period of economic prosperity in the 1950s even permitted extending the feeling of national pride into the future. However, the following periods of urbanization, immigration, demystification of national history and the growth of intellectual opposition considerably transformed the country and consequently the relation between citizens and their state. “National self-criticism” became a common pattern of political and journalistic argumentation, but also the favorite “enemy image” of conservatives, who never lost their former influence completely. The tendencies observed in the media coverage of the 1980s and 1990s demonstrate that “progressive” and “constructive” concepts of national identity continued to be on the increase.

However, the long-term analysis interacts with everyday political events, and besides newspaper coverage there are various other forms of social communication which could influence citizens’ attitudes and behavior. Some of the short-term tendencies in the political climate seem to contradict the notions of “an increase in progressive and more

constructive concepts of national identity" and of people's willingness to integrate beyond national borders. In 1999 foreign observers were shocked at right-wing parties winning national parliamentary elections in Austria and Switzerland, two relatively prosperous countries (which, by the way, shows that right-wing voting behavior need not be linked with serious economic problems). Even if Blocher's success was not a sign of the complete change of the political climate, some tended to claim (the SVP simply replaced some smaller right-wing parties, and the Swiss political system prevents them from gaining too much influence on government decisions), it might be one of several indications of the present ambivalence of the trends in social attitudes (in Europe, not only in Switzerland). Because the younger generation voted over-proportionally for Blocher (and, in Austria, for Haider), the weekly paper *Die Weltwoche* commissioned a market research firm to make a representative opinion survey of young Swiss (18 to 40 years), asking about their views on immigration policy, Switzerland's integration, their own values and their political self-perception (*Die Weltwoche*, 1999). In this survey, 56% of the sample responded positively to the question, "Does Switzerland have a problem with too many foreigners in the country," and a conservative value, "family," was by far the value that most of the persons surveyed (45%) judged to be "the most important" in their lives. Another remarkable result is that political self-perceptions and attitudes towards "key" policy issues no longer harmonize: Whereas most (40%) of the young Swiss perceived their political standpoint as "in the middle" (neither right-, nor left-wing), 64% of the "moderates" (and even 29% of those who rated themselves as left-wing) were convinced that Switzerland has "a problem with too many foreigners."

In an increasingly complex social world, the content analysis of newspapers (which are not likely to be the most influential type of media for the young people mentioned) provides various insights into reality, but does not allow us to reliably assess the developments of recent years, or even to provide a forecast: The consequences of profoundly changed international circumstances ("new world order" or "globalization") still remain to be studied in the future. In this, Switzerland does not differ much from other industrialized (or, rather, information society?) countries.

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